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    Vda de Macabenta vs. Davao Terminal Company (Case)

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    This document is a Supreme Court decision regarding a claim for workmen's compensation benefits by the widow and posthumous child of a deceased employee of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. The Court affirms the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission awarding benefits, finding that: 1) Under the clear language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the widow and child are considered dependents even though the widow's marriage occurred after the employee's death; and 2) The Commission's factual findings are entitled to deference and its decision did not involve any abuse of discretion.

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    Vda de Macabenta vs. Davao Terminal Company (Case)

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    This document is a Supreme Court decision regarding a claim for workmen's compensation benefits by the widow and posthumous child of a deceased employee of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. The Court affirms the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission awarding benefits, finding that: 1) Under the clear language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the widow and child are considered dependents even though the widow's marriage occurred after the employee's death; and 2) The Commission's factual findings are entitled to deference and its decision did not involve any abuse of discretion.

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    5. Vda de Macabenta vs. Davao Terminal Company (Case)

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    This document is a Supreme Court decision regarding a claim for workmen's compensation benefits by the widow and posthumous child of a deceased employee of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. The Court affirms the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission awarding benefits, finding that: 1) Under the clear language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the widow and child are considered dependents even though the widow's marriage occurred after the employee's death; and 2) The Commission's factual findings are entitled to deference and its decision did not involve any abuse of discretion.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    93 views7 pages

    Vda de Macabenta vs. Davao Terminal Company (Case)

    Uploaded by

    jomar ico
    This document is a Supreme Court decision regarding a claim for workmen's compensation benefits by the widow and posthumous child of a deceased employee of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. The Court affirms the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission awarding benefits, finding that: 1) Under the clear language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the widow and child are considered dependents even though the widow's marriage occurred after the employee's death; and 2) The Commission's factual findings are entitled to deference and its decision did not involve any abuse of discretion.

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    of 7

    EN BANC

    [G.R. No. L-27489. April 30, 1970.]

    LEONORA TANTOY VDA. DE MACABENTA, for herself and in behalf of


    her minor child, RAQUEL MACABENTA, claimants-appellees, v.
    DAVAO STEVEDORE TERMINAL COMPANY, Respondent-Appellant.

    Peregrino M. Andres for Claimants-Appellees.

    H. A. Cabarroguis & Associates for Respondent-Appellant.

    SYLLABUS

    1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT;


    DEPENDENTS OF INJURED EMPLOYER. From the express language of the
    Workmens Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually
    dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18
    years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried,
    whether or not actually dependent upon the deceased, are considered
    dependents.

    2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. Claimant here is clearly the widow of the
    deceased Conrado Macabenta. It is true that the marriage took place after
    the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of his death she
    was marked to him.

    3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY OF COURT


    TO APPLY THE LAW TO FACTS AS FOUND. Where the law is clear, our
    duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. What is more,
    we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting
    an interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach
    to it a significance different from that intended by the lawmakers. A
    paraphrases of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. there can
    always occur to intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a
    misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too
    far-fetched.
    4. ID.; ID.; SETTLED RULE. The Court has constantly held from the early
    cases of Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485, a 1909 decision, in United States v.
    Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 and again in Riera v. Palmori, 40 Phil. 105 (1919) that ,
    assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best
    conforms to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail and
    that no construction is to be adopted that would "tend to defeat the purpose
    and object of the legislator."cralaw virtua1aw library

    5. ID.; ID.; WHERE POLICY OF LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY COURT TO GIVE


    EFFECT. Once the policy of purpose of the law has been ascertained,
    effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Even if honest doubts could be
    entertained, therefor, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still
    respect for such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao
    Stevedore Terminal Company.

    6. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT;


    INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION, TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
    CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE. "To state the constructions sought to be
    fastened on the clear and explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It
    comes into collision with the constitutional command pursuant to the social
    justice principle that the government extend protection to labor." How could
    such an intent then be imputed to the legislative body. No such suspicious
    ought to be entertained that it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any
    provision of the Workmens Compensation Act could be so worded as to deny
    protection to the laboring elements and their dependents and thus frustrate
    the constitutional objective of social justice.

    7. ID.; ID.; WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION; FINDINGS OF FACT


    IT BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL;
    INSTANT CASE. The alleged error that the accident resulting in the death
    of Condrado Macabenta could not be considered as having arisen out of and
    in the course of employment is not to be taken too seriously. The facts as
    set forth in the decision, which must be accepted by us in view of their being
    based on substantial evidence argue against the condensation of the Davao
    Stevedore Terminal Company.

    8. ID.; ID.; APPEAL FROM DECISION OF THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION


    COMMISSION TO SUPREME COURT ASCERTAINTMENT OF CREDIBILITY AND
    WEIGHT OF CONFLICTING EVIDENCE, BEYOND AUTHORITY IN APPEALS BY
    CERTIORARI. The task of ascertaining the credibility and weight of
    conflicting evidence is, however, beyond the province of our authority in
    appeals by certiorari. Even if the possibility that the Commissions
    conclusions were erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow the
    language of justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmens
    Compensation Commission, such errors would constitute mere errors of
    judgment but do not involve any grave abuse of discretion on its part.

    DECISION

    FERNANDO, J.:

    The success of the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company in


    imparting plausibility to the novel question raised as to whether or not the
    widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after the accident
    as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the
    meaning of the Workmens Compensation Act may be gauged by the fact
    that we gave due course to the petition for the review of a decision of the
    Workmens Compensation Commission answering the question in the
    affirmative and sustaining the right to compensation of the claimant Leonora
    Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta for herself and in behalf of her minor child,
    Raquel Macabenta. After hearing the parties and in the right of the language
    of the law, its manifest purpose, and the constitutional provisions on social
    justice and protection to labor, we answer the question similarly. We affirm
    the appealed decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission.

    In the decision rendered by the then Chairman of the Commission, Nieves


    Baens del Rosario, dated September 27, 1966, it is stated that there is no
    dispute "that at the time that the decedent met the vehicular accident on
    September 13, 1961 which led to his death on September 29, 1961, the
    claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had
    already been living together as husband and wife for the past three months.
    However. on the day following the accident, they were lawfully wedded in a
    marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital in Davao City where
    the deceased was hospitalized up to his death. It is noteworthy that the
    marriage was facilitated through the intercession of the general manager of
    the respondent company." 1 The decision likewise noted that the claimant
    widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous daughter of the
    deceased who was given the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta.

    As to how the deceased Conrado Macabenta met his accident, the decision,
    after stating that the deceased was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao
    Stevedore Terminal Company at Manay, Panabo, Davao, about 48 kilometers
    from his residence in Davao City, went on as follows: "Although some sort of
    quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill,
    many of them apparently preferred to commute, and the deceased in
    particular went home about three times a week. While the respondent,
    through its lone witness and at the same time production manager, Sergio
    Dalisay, disclaimed the claimants declarations that the company provided a
    service pickup to transport its employees to and from work, the synthesis of
    the very same testimonial evidence does not support this denial, but on the
    contrary tends to bring out the fact that the respondent did furnish
    transportation." 2 As a result, it reversed the finding of the then acting
    referee of its regional office in Davao City and awarded to the claimant
    widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount of P2,708.00
    as compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorneys fees.

    Hence, this petition for review, which, as noted, was given due course
    primarily due to the question raised being one of first impression. As
    announced at the opening of this opinion, we uphold the Workmens
    Compensation Commission.

    1. From the express language of the Workmens Compensation Act, a widow


    living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as
    well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him
    or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon the
    deceased are considered dependents. 3 Claimant here is clearly the widow of
    the deceased Conrado Macabenta. It is true that the marriage took place
    after the fatal accident but there was no question that at the time of his
    death she was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the
    letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel
    Macabenta, also falls within the words the Act employs. As set forth in the
    decision, while the marriage took place on Sept. 14, 1961, the widow and
    the deceased had already been living together as husband and wife the
    preceding three months. The child born of such relationship, later legalized,
    is, as made clear in the decision, the posthumous daughter of the deceased.
    What the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company seems bent in
    ignoring is that our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a conceived
    child born for all purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is
    attended with the conditions specified, namely, that she is alive at the time
    she is completely delivered from the mothers womb. 4 Here, fortunately,
    the child has survived the ordeal of the loss of the one called upon to
    support her, her father, who, unfortunately however, met his death before
    her birth.

    Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is clear, our duty
    is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. 5 What is more, we
    have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an
    interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to
    it a significance different from that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrase
    of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate. There can always occur to
    an intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may,
    without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched. The employer in
    this case, without impugning its motives, must have succumbed to such a
    temptation, quite understandable but certainly far from justifiable. It is quite
    obvious then why we find its stand devoid of merit.

    2. Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental principle that


    once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be
    given to it by the judiciary. 6 Even if honest doubts could be entertained,
    therefore, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for such
    a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao Stevedore
    Terminal Company. We have never deviated from our constant holding from
    Ty Sue v. Hord, 7 a 1909 decision, that, assuming a choice is necessary
    between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of
    the statute and its purpose should prevail. Again, as far back as United
    States v. Toribio, 8 decided the next year, we made unmistakable our view
    that no construction is to be adopted that would bend "to defeat the purpose
    and object of the legislator." We made use of an expression almost identical
    in Riera v. Palmaroli 9 with our warning against so narrowly interpreting a
    statute "as to defeat the manifest purpose of the legislator." The employer in
    this case should have been well advised to take into consideration the
    teachings of the above cases before it sought to press upon us the
    desirability of imparting to the applicable statutory language a meaning that
    would render fruitless the purpose so clearly evident on the face of the
    Workmens Compensation Act.

    3. There is still another avenue of approach that similarly calls for the
    affirmance of the decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission now
    on appeal. This is apparent from an excerpt from a recent case of
    Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated v. Lingad: 10 "To
    state the construction sought to be fastened on the clear and explicit
    language of the statute is to reject it. It comes into collision with the
    constitutional command pursuant to the social justice principle that the
    government extend protection to labor." How could such an intent then be
    imputed to the legislative body. No such suspicion ought to be entertained
    that it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any provision of the
    Workmens Compensation Act could be so worded as to deny protection to
    the laboring elements and their dependents and thus frustrate the
    constitutional objective of social justice. To quote from the Lingad case
    anew: "For it is undeniable that every statute, much more so one arising
    from a legislative implementation of a constitutional mandate, must be so
    construed that no question as to its conformity with what the fundamental
    law requires need arise.

    4. The basic question in this petition for review thus disposed of, there is
    nothing to stand in the way of the affirmance of the decision now on appeal.
    The alleged error that the accident resulting in the death of Conrado
    Macabenta could not be considered as having arisen out of and in the course
    of employment is not to be taken too seriously. The facts as set forth in the
    decision, which must be accepted by us in view of their being based on
    substantial evidence argue against the contention of the Davao Stevedore
    Terminal Company. As we had occasion to state only last month in B. F.
    Goodrich Philippines, Inc. v. Acebedo: 11 "Nor can the conclusion reached by
    respondent Commission be repudiated unless on a clear showing of failure
    to consider the evidence on record or failure to consider fundamental and
    patent logical relationships in the evidence, amounting to a clear travesty of
    justice or grave abuse of discretion. What was said by us in Basaysay v.
    Workmens Compensation Commission, through the present Chief Justice,
    bears repeating: The task of ascertaining the credibility and weight of
    conflicting evidence, is, however, beyond the province of our authority in
    appeals by certiorari. Even if the possibility that the Commissions
    conclusions were erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow the
    language of Justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmens
    Compensation Commission.such errors would constitute mere errors of
    judgment but do not involve any grave abuse of discretion on its part."

    WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmens Compensation Commission of


    September 27, 1966 is affirmed. With costs against respondent Davao
    Stevedore Terminal Company.

    Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Castro, Zaldivar, Teehankee and


    Villamor, JJ., concur.

    Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

    Endnotes:

    1. Petition, Decision, Annex A, p. 1.

    2. Ibid, p. 3.

    3. Section 9 of the Workmens Compensation Act, Republic Act No. 3428


    (1927) as amended, reads as follows: "Dependents of the injured person.
    The following persons, and no others shall be considered as dependents and
    entitled to compensation under the provisions of this Act; A son or daughter,
    if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and
    unmarried, whether actually dependent upon the deceased or not; The
    widow, only if she was living with the deceased or was actually dependent
    upon him, totally or partly."cralaw virtua1aw library

    4. According to the Civil Code:" [Art.] 40. Birth determines personality; but
    the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
    favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
    following article. [Art.] 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if
    it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mothers womb.
    However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it
    is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete
    delivery from the maternal womb."cralaw virtua1aw library

    5. Cf. People v. Mapa, L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific
    Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA
    917; Dequito v. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1352; Padilla v.
    City of Pasay, L-24039, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1349; Garcia v. Vasquez, L-
    26808, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 505; La Perla Cigar & Cigarette Factory v.
    Capapas. L-27948 & 28001-11, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1085; Mobil Oil
    Philippines v. Diocares, L-26371, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 656; Luzon
    Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, L-25659, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111.

    6. Cf. Sarcos v. Castillo, L-29755, Jan. 31, 1959, 26 SCRA 853.

    7. 12 Phil. 485.

    8. 15 Phil. 85.

    9. 40 Phil. 105 (1919).

    10. L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248.

    11. L-29551, March 25, 1970, citing Batangas Transportation Co. v. Rivera,
    L-14427, Aug. 29, 1960; Basaysay v. Workmens Compensation
    Commission, L-16438, Nov. 29, 1961, 3 SCRA 530 and Philippine Rabbit Bus
    Lines, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation Commission, L-20614 and L-21517,
    May 25, 1964, 11 SCRA 60. Cf. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmens
    Compensation Commission, L-25640, March 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 1215 and
    Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmens Compensation Commission, L-
    25665, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285.

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