Judith and Sidney Swartz Director

and Professor of Politics

Shai Feldman
Sisis Egypt: Building Political Legitimacy
Associate Director
amidst Economic Crises
Kristina Cherniahivsky

Charles (Corky) Goodman Professor Ahmad Shokr

of Middle East History and
Associate Director for Research
Naghmeh Sohrabi

Myra and Robert Kraft Professor

of Arab Politics
Eva Bellin
O n November 3, 2016, the government of Egyptian
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi accelerated the
implementation of a set of economic decisions that previous
Henry J. Leir Professor of the
Economics of the Middle East
governments had feared to undertake. The reformsan
Nader Habibi austerity program including subsidy cuts; currency reform;
Rene and Lester Crown Professor and increased indirect taxeshave been gradually adopted
of Modern Middle East Studies
Pascal Menoret in the lead-up to an agreement for a major loan from the
Senior Fellows
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Abdel Monem Said Aly, PhD
Kanan Makiya Egypts decision to float its currency immediately caused the value of the
Goldman Senior Fellow
Egyptian pound to crash almost 50 percent against the U.S. dollar. Along
Khalil Shikaki, PhD with earlier subsidy cuts, these reforms have created a set of inflationary
pressures with which Egyptians of varying incomes and social backgrounds
Research Fellow
David Siddhartha Patel, PhD have struggled to deal. While lower-middle-class and poor Egyptians, who
spend a greater percentage of their income on food and utility bills, have
Marilyn and Terry Diamond predictably struggled to pay for daily necessities, more affluent Egyptians
Junior Research Fellow
Mohammed Masbah, PhD have also faced growing economic difficulties, as the costs of private school
tuition and imported goods are rising considerably.1 These painful measures
Neubauer Junior Research Fellow
Serra Hakyamez, PhD
have accordingly frustrated many Egyptians, even as many observers see them
as necessary to restore economic stability. And the reform program raises
Junior Research Fellows questions, not only about who might benefit (or not) from these reforms, but
Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, PhD
Ahmad Shokr, PhD regarding how Sisis chosen economic course might affect the governments
political legitimacy in the coming years.

This Brief argues that under current economic conditions, the Sisi government
February 2017 will find it difficult to use economic policy as a means of building a durable
No. 106 social coalition that can strengthen its political authority.
 To remain in power, the government will likely rely more heavily on other
means, like continuing to convince Egyptians of the necessity of a strong ruler to
maintain order and security through the heavy-handed use of force.

With the IMF having approved a $12 billion loan to Egypt in November, a fair
amount of media attention has been devoted to Egypts growing economic
crisis.2 Much of the coverage, focusing on the countrys macroeconomic
performance, has blamed the Sisi government for economic mismanagement and
questioned whether the governments austerity policies will indeed help cut its
budget deficit, correct its balance of payments difficulties, and restore economic
growth. This Brief takes a different approach, considering the challenges facing
the Egyptian government in trying to forge a new social bargain in which it
can anchor its claims to political legitimacy. It will argue that unlike previous
governments in Egypts postcolonial history, the Sisi government has limited
options in trying to build a broad and durable social coalition, for several
reasons:

1. It has limited fiscal resources at its disposal, especially with Egypts

debt service obligations due to rise in the near future;
2. Large sections of Egypts variegated middle class will be adversely
affected, rather than co-opted, under the current policies;
3. The main beneficiaries of the Sisi governments economic program
are those segments of the middle and upper classes connected to the
Egyptian military and its economic activities, and these will likely prove
insufficient to build a sustainable social base for years to come.

The current economic program, supported by the IMF, is being implemented in

the context of decades of free-market policies that have slowly caused Egypts
Nasser-era social coalition to unravel since the 1970s. In the absence of a new
social contract that can serve as the basis of its rule, the Sisi government is left
with limited options in attempting to sustain its political legitimacy: It can
continue to buttress an alliance it has been creating between the military and
its web of economic enterprises, foreign capital (especially from the Arab Gulf
states), and select local oligarchs; or it can open its political system to allow
for other actors to participate in the political and economic decision-making
process as a way to strengthen its legitimacy in the long term.

Ahmad Shokr is a Junior

Research Fellow at the
The Fiscal Straitjacket
Crown Center and an Since the 2011 uprising against former president Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian
Assistant Professor of government has faced growing deficits both in its budget and in its balance of
History at Swarthmore payments. The budget deficit, which reached over 11 percent of GDP in the 2015
College. 16 fiscal year, is due largely to the states overspending on three major items:
an unwieldy subsidies program, salaries for a mammoth bureaucracy, and debt
servicing.3 The balance of payments crisis is in large part the consequence of a
drop in tourism and foreign investment that followed the events of 2011. The
The opinions and findings expressed result has been a shortage of foreign currency, with the country steadily losing
in this Brief belong to the author its ability to pay for basic imports.
exclusively and do not reflect those of the
Crown Center or Brandeis University. After 2013, the Egyptian government attempted to address these problems
through a series of measures. It tried to create more income through large
infrastructure projects, like the expansion of the Suez Canal. Though this

2
is part of a long-term strategy to more than double While Egypt is expected to unlock up to $9 billion in
Egypts annual revenue, it has so far failed to generate additional funding from sources like the World Bank and
more income and has created more pressure on the state the African Development Bank, these loans risk raising
budget.4 It then made concerted efforts to attract foreign Egypts external debts to levels unseen since the countrys
investment, especially through a much-publicized 2015 external debt crisis in the late 1980s.8
conference on economic development in Sharm El-Sheikh,
but a substantial increase in foreign investment has failed Reversing a Mubarak-era trend of borrowing mostly from
to materialize. By the fall of 2016, the government had domestic sources, the Egyptian government has relied more
turned to the IMF for a $12 billion loan over three years heavily on external funding in the last few years. Today,
to help plug its budget deficit and correct its foreign Egypts external debt is over $55 billion; as a percentage
exchange difficulties. But the loan is conditional upon the of GDP, external debt currently stands at an estimated 14
implementation of an austerity program, including cuts percent, and that is expected to double by 2019.9 While
to fuel subsidies, currency devaluation, and more indirect this is still less severe than Egypts debt crisis in the 1980s,
taxes on consumer goods. These policies raise important raising its external debt servicing obligations in the coming
questions about how the cost of fiscal restructuring will be years will likely mean that the government will have fewer
distributed across different segments of Egyptian society. funds available for social expenditures through which it
could try to strengthen its popular support base.10
In an effort to demonstrate its commitment to market
reforms in order to secure the IMF loan, the government
floated the Egyptian pound on November 3 and has A Disaffected Middle Class
continued to liberalize fuel prices that had been heavily
subsidized for decades. In August 2016, the government To find examples of relatively successful social coalition
approved a new 13 percent value-added tax, with building in Egypt, we need look no further than the
exemptions for some basic goods and services.5 These countrys recent past. After 1952, when Egypt attained
policies are undoubtedly intended to address Egypts twin full independence, state elites cemented their authority
deficits, but they also shift a major share of the burden for by creating a strong link between economic policy and
fiscal restructuring onto the middle class and the poorer political legitimacy. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and his
segments of Egyptian society, who will suffer most from cohorts built an authoritarian government founded on an
inflation and higher taxes. alliance between the military and state bureaucrats, with
support from wide segments of the agrarian middle class
While the government has considered the implementation and organized labor. Two pillars were key to sustaining
of some alternative policies alongside or in place of this this coalition. First, the government provided guarantees
kind of austerityspecifically, taxing the assets and/ of public employment, so much so that by the 1960s a vast
or business activities of the richer segments of Egypts segment of urban middle class state employees had become
populationit has temporarily shied away from these the economic backbone of the government. Second, it
alternatives out of fear of provoking anger from economic relied on a system of price controls in the form of subsidies,
elites. As a result, policies like higher taxes on income rent ceilings, and the like that provided for a relatively high
(particularly on those who earn over 1 million LE per degree of social mobility.
year), on capital gains, and on property have not been
adopted as central components of the reform agenda. For over two decades, these policies helped to underpin
Thus, in 2014 the government delayed for three more years a durable political and social order that enlisted consent
a much-anticipated capital gains tax that it had agreed to from sizeable segments of Egyptian society. But this order
implement as part of its deal with the IMF.6 has been slowly unraveling since the 1970s, with successive
waves of free-market reforms creating what one might
As a result of these policies and the loans to which these call dominance without hegemony, a situation in which
policies are tied, Egypt risks remaining chronically coercion has generally outweighed consent/co-optation
indebted for years to come. According to the IMF, Egypts in the functioning of state power.11 Egypts model of free-
total public debt has increased from 70 percent of GDP in market growth, especially after the 1990s, failed to generate
2009/10 to 94.6 percent in 2015/16.7 The IMF loan will be sufficient trickle-down effects that could expand its
the largest in the history of the Middle East and North benefits as widely as possible. By 2011, large numbers of
Africa. Egyptians had turned against this particular brand of free-
market capitalism.

3
The popular revolt that brought down Mubaraks force and the development of new kinds of monitoring and
government was fueled, at least in part, by social and surveillance in different areas of the informal economy.15
economic grievances growing out of the unfair distribution
of the wealth that had existed in the preceding period. As it phases out its existing subsidies for fuel, the
Egyptian government over the past few years has also been
Despite some popular representations after 2013 of Sisi experimenting with new mechanisms, like direct cash
as Nasser redux, the two governments in fact had little in transfers to vulnerable groups, to help mitigate the effects
common. And indeed, the re-creation of any form of neo- of urban poverty. Governments in other countries with
Nasserism in Egypt is highly unlikely, for a number of large urban populations that live and work outside of the
reasons. formal economy have tried similar experiments, oftentimes
as a strategy to reverse the effects of rural displacement
For one thing, the Egyptian state today has a different that has created large urban populations who have lost
fiscal structure than it did sixty years ago. It has less access to their land without gaining access to formal wage
access to windfalls (such as from nationalization and land employment.16 Such programs might benefit segments of
expropriation) with which to undertake the kinds of social the informal economy in Egypt, but they remain in their
spending that Nasser instituted. Although Egypt became infancy.
a net exporter of petroleum (and later natural gas) in the
1970s, those sources of rent have diminished in recent More conventional mechanisms for building a social
years, as the countrys domestic energy consumption has contract, such as taxation, public employment, and social
outpaced its exports.12 services, are usually employed in the formal economy and
target a variety of social groups that constitute what is
Since taking power in 2013, Sisi has overseen a cash- often called the middle class. And the absence of a new
strapped state that has survived in large measure owing to social contract in Egypt has recently prompted anxieties
infusions of tens of billions of dollars from the Arab Gulf in the press about the condition of Egypts middle class: its
states. Moreover, the global economic context is different shrinking size over the past decades, and its place in Sisis
than it was in the 1950s and 60s. The world economy future economic order. According to one recent estimate,
is more financialized and integrated, and international the middle class in Egypt constituted roughly 44 percent
financial institutions no longer encourage experiments of the population in 2011 when the uprising against Hosni
in state-led development of the sort that prevailed in the Mubaraks government began, the majority concentrated
three decades after World War II. in urban areas.17 If the middle class was expanded to
include those whose income hovers just above the poverty
Assessing the Sisi governments ability to forge a social line of $2 a day, then the same estimate would assess the
alliance in this context requires looking at how it deals size of the middle class as anywhere between 60 and 80
with both the formal and informal sectors of Egypts percent of the population. This vast segment of Egyptian
economy. The informal economy includes a vast range of society is composed of at least four major subgroups that
activities that the World Bank estimates to account for belong to different circuits of capital accumulation: a
40 percent of employment in the country.13 This includes private sector middle class, a public sector middle class,
millions of people who earn a living by making use of a remittance middle class, and a military middle class.
resources they do not legally possessfor example, by Each of these subgroups is internally variegated, and they
squatting on state land or using public space to engage are not mutually exclusive. In general, however, each of
in street vendingand who are not fully monitored by these groups has its own set of interests and stands to fare
the government. The mechanisms for bringing about differently in the present context.
consent to political rule within this segment of society
often look different than those that operate in the formal The current economic crisis has taken a harsher toll on
economy. Anthropologist Partha Chatterjee uses the the private sector middle class than at any time since the
term political society to describe those segments of 2011 uprising. This group includes people ranging from
the population whose habitation or livelihood verges businessmen and small and medium entrepreneurs to
on the margins of legality.14 Governments tend to deal employees in multinational corporations, all of whom will
with such populations not by applying general rules and be affected to some extent by the current policies. The
principles (such as property rights), but rather by means wealthier segments of this group were among the main
of exceptional practices that take place in the context of beneficiaries of economic liberalization in the 1990s, but by
a whole set of everyday negotiations with state officials. the mid-2000s they had begun to feel squeezed by the rise
Imposing control over the informal sector, which has of a new economic oligarchy that was closely connected
grown with the rolling back of the Egyptian welfare state to the government.18 Over the last ten years, many became
since the 1970s, has required the expansion of the police
4
increasingly frustrated that a small group of politically North Africa, with several million people living abroad.
connected capitalists was reaping most of the benefits of Remittances have dropped recently owing to the global
private sector growth without creating enough jobs to economic downturn, low oil prices, and expectations of
absorb a demographic youth bulge.19 further currency devaluation in Egypt.24 Today, most of the
$20 billion (roughly 5-6 percent of GDP) that Egyptians
Today, many in this group are being hurt by Egypts remit annually finds its way to Egypt through unofficial
currency crisis. Their savings in EGP have lost value as the channels.25 The government has shown an interest in
Egyptian pound has plummeted, so some have scrambled redirecting some of these funds through the formal banking
to move their savings into more stable assets, like real system to help ease its dollar shortage; in February, it
estate and gold. The cost of education at elite private launched a scheme to encourage expats to invest their
universities is expected to rise steeply and has already dollar savings in special certificates issued by the countrys
triggered a string of student protests.20 Those who operate largest state-owned banks.26 Tapping into remittance flows
their own businesses have been unable to purchase all can be an important source of foreign exchange amidst the
their supplies because of the dollar shortage.21 And the existing currency crisis; but in the end, remittance earners
consumption patterns of those at the higher end of this cannot make up a central part of any social coalition, as the
group, which depend to a large extent on imported luxury livelihoods of this group depend on earnings from outside
goods, have been interrupted, first by government controls of Egypt. And the government has little fiscal leverage in
that have limited what goods can be imported into Egypt improving remittance earners income and standards of
and then by inflation that has resulted from the Central living.
Bank of Egypts decision to float the Egyptian pound.
The primary beneficiaries of the new government have
Relying on the continued support of public sector been those connected to the political and business
employees and civil servants, as previous Egyptian activities of the Egyptian army and security apparatus,
governments have done, does not appear to be a viable including police and army officers who have received
long-term option, either. There are an estimated six million generous raises in their salaries and benefits since 2013,
public employees in Egypt, and their salaries consume along with thousands of retired senior officers who
about one-quarter of state expenditures. Though the have been placed in charge of government ministries
public sector has traditionally been treated as an important and agencies, local governing bodies, and state-owned
source of political support for every president since Nasser, companies. (Yezid Sayigh has called the latter group the
over the past two decades, strikes in the public sector officers republic.27) Under Sisi, there has been a steady
have proliferated in the face of both privatization and militarization of the civilian bureaucracy that oversees
deteriorating work conditions, and they constituted over key areas of economic policy. For example, in September
half of labor mobilizations in Egypt during this period.22 2016, a new retired army general was appointed to take
As the government continues to implement the IMF- over the Supply Ministry, which controls the distribution
supported economic program, which includes plans to of subsidized food, after corruption allegations against the
optimize the public sector wage bill, this group is likely former minister over wheat procurement.28
to witness a deterioration in its economic conditions.
An attempt last year to introduce a civil service law that Also included in this group of beneficiaries of the Sisi
would reduce the size of the public sector was ultimately government are the many companies tied to the army that
rejected by the Egyptian parliament to avoid a political have secured contracts for a variety of economic projects,
conflict between the state and its support base; but with ranging from housing to infrastructural mega-projects
its budget deficit growing in recent years, the government to real estate management, as well as private education
will likely find it hard to continue sustaining this public and the provision of private security.29 As Shana Marshall
sector wage bill. As political economist Amr Adly has has argued, since 2013 the Egyptian Armed Forces have
recently argued, [Egypts] current economic crisis dramatically expanded their economic role to the point
deprives the regime ofthe financial and economic resources of becoming the primary gatekeeper for the Egyptian
needed to sustain a solid social base among public sector economy.30 With several of these projects financed in
employees, and hence hinders the [Sisi governments] whole or in part by investments from the Arab Gulf states,
consolidation of authoritarian rule.23 there appears to be a growing nexus of Gulf capital and
the Egyptian military that is overseeing many of the major
The remittance middle classthose Egyptians who earn development projects that are either anticipated or now
an income abroad and send money back to Egyptis underway in Egypt.
largely tied to the Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia.
Egypt is the top remittance receiver in the Middle East and

5
 state; large sections of Egypts variegated middle class will
A New Military Society? suffer economically, at least in the short term, under the
current austerity policies; and those policies benefiting
The challenges of building a new social coalition in Egypt people in the middle and upper classes who are connected
did not originate with Sisi, but rather are the result of to the Egyptian military and its economic activities will
structural problems that began with the unraveling of the accelerate tendencies toward the militarization of the
Nasserist coalition four decades ago. Sisis government government and its social base.
is still in formation, and its long-term base of support is
yet to be consolidated. While Sisi has been likened to his Without a new social bargain, the Sisi government
predecessorsnamely, Nasser and Hosni Mubarakhis will likely continue to establish its authority by relying
government is different from theirs in several key respects. increasingly on coercion rather than economic co-optation.
In the absence of a broad social contract that could serve
As has been argued above, Sisis government does not to entrench its political legitimacy, the Sisi government
possess the ability, the resources, or the appropriate global can continue to invest in the military and its connected
context to create a form of neo-Nasserist rule. Nor does business interests as its base of support. Alternatively,
his government represent a straightforward continuation it could choose to open up politically and allow for the
of Mubarak-style rule. Many elements of the Sisi creation of a more pluralistic political space, wherein
governments economic policiesin particular, attempting different actors and factions in Egyptian society could
to boost Egypts economic performance by attracting articulate their grievances and take part in the political
foreign investmentmay resemble Mubarak policies, but and economic decision-making process. Otherwise, the
there is no clear plan for more inclusive growth. And other combination of political repression and economic turmoil
key elements that underpinned Mubaraks rule, including might present serious challenges for Sisis government in
the National Democratic Party (which was dissolved the future.
in April 2011) and the politically connected capitalists
associated with his son, Gamal Mubarak, are no longer
central to the functioning of political power in Egypt. Endnotes
Instead, Sisi is overseeing the creation of a government in
which the military is at the center of the system of power: 1 Making Ends Meet: 6 Stories of Household Budgeting,
Under him, the army is playing a greater role in the state Mada Masr, February 1, 2017.
bureaucracy, in domestic security, and in overseeing major 2 E.g., The Ruining of Egypt, The Economist, August 6, 2016.
economic development projects than it had been prior to 3 Egypts Budget Deficit Rises to 11.2 percent of GDP in First
2011. Growing an alliance of the military middle class and 11 Months of 2015/16, Reuters, September 5, 2016.
select private business interests will continue this trend of 4 Ismael El-Kholy, One Year On, Are New Suez Canal
militarizing both the government and its social base. Revenues Sinking? Al-Monitor, August 10, 2016.
5 Eric Knecht and Ahmed Aboulenein, Egyptian Parliament
Approves Value-Added Tax at 13 Percent, Reuters, August
In the absence of a strong welfare state that could underpin 29, 2016.
a new kind of benevolent authoritarianism, another option 6 Ahmed Feteha and Abdel Latif Wahba, Egypt Extends
would be to open the political system in ways that would Delay on Capital Gains Tax amid Currency Crunch,
allow a wider group of stakeholdersopposition parties, Bloomberg, November 2, 2016.
trade unions, civil societyto have a say in political and 7 International Monetary Fund, Arab Republic of Egypt, IMF
economic decision making, thereby giving more legitimacy Country Report No. 17/17 (Washington D.C.: International
to government policies going forward. But the Sisi Monetary Fund), January 2017, pp. 5, 24.
government so far appears uninterested in exploring this 8 Ahmed Feteha and Abdel Latif Wahba Egypt Seeks
possibility. Regions Biggest IMF Loan to Repair Battered Economy,
Bloomberg, July 26, 2016.
9 International Monetary Fund, Arab Republic of Egypt, p. 47.
10 Bawaith al-Qalaq: Al-Dayn al-Khariji Fi Misr [Reasons for
Conclusion Concern: External Debt in Egypt], The Egyptian Initiative
For Personal Rights, January 2017.
This Brief has argued that under current economic 11 I borrow this term from Ranajit Guha, Dominance without
conditions, the Sisi government faces serious challenges Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge:
in using economic policy as a means of building a durable Harvard University Press, 1997).
social coalition that can strengthen its political authority. 12 Samer Soliman, The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and
Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak (Stanford: Stanford
The government faces fiscal constraints that hamper its
University Press, 2011).
ability to maintain or expand the welfare functions of the
6
13 Heba Saleh, Egypt: World Bank Sees Widening of Shadow 29 Zeinab Abul-Magd, Egypts Military Business: The Need
Economy, Financial Times, July 29, 2014. for Change, Middle East Institute, November 19, 2015; Yezid
14 Partha Chatterjee, Lineages of Political Society: Studies in Sayigh, The Return of Egypts Military Interest Groups,
Postcolonial Democracy (New York: Columbia University Carnegie Middle East Center, December 21, 2015.
Press, 2011), p. 223. 30 Shana Marshall, The Egyptian Armed Forces and the
15 Hazem Kandil, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypts Road to Remaking of an Economic Empire, Carnegie Middle East
Revolt (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2012), and Salwa Ismail, Political Center, April 15, 2015.
Life in Cairos New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). *Weblinks are available in the online version at
16 For an assessment of similar programs in South Africa, see www.brandeis.edu/crown
James Ferguson, Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics
of Distribution (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015). For
an analysis of how governments in the Global South use
such policies to reverse the effects of rural dispossession
without proletarianization, see Kalyan Sanyal, Rethinking
Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, Governmentality,
and Postcolonial Capitalism. (London: Routledge, 2007).
17 Khalid Abu Ismail and Niranjan Sarangi, A New Approach
to Measuring the Middle Class: Egypt, Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia (New York: United Nation, 2013)
18 Ishac Diwan, Understanding Revolution in the Middle
East: The Central Role of the Middle Class, Middle East
Development Journal 5, no. 1, March 2013, p. 10.
19 Hamouda Chekir and Ishac Diwan, Crony Capitalism in
Egypt, Journal of Globalization and Development (2015); Elena
Ianchovichina, Lili Mottaghi, and Shantayanan Devarajan,
Inequality, Uprisings, and Conflict in the Arab World, Middle East
and North Africa Economic Monitor (Washington, D.C:
World Bank, October 2015). Many politically connected
business tycoons from the late Mubarak period faced
corruption charges after the 2011 uprising and were
subsequently imprisoned or left the country. A number
of them have since managed to use their wealth to buy
immunity from prosecution in a series of well-publicized
reconciliation deals. See Bel Trew and Osama Diab, The
Crooks Return to Cairo, Foreign Policy, February 7, 2014.
20 Diaa Hadid and Nour Youssef, Protests at Elite University
Show How Egyptian Cash Crisis Tests All, New York
Times, November 17, 2016.
21 Salma Shukrallah, High Inflation Takes Its Toll on Egypts
Shrinking Middle Class, Ahram Online, October 23, 2016.
22 Joel Beinin, Workers and Thieves: Labor Movements and Popular
Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2015), p. 68.
23 Amr Adly, Egypts Government Faces an Authoritarian
Catch-22 Carnegie Middle East Center, July 21, 2016.
24 Dilip Ratha et al., Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments
and Outlook, April 2016, Migration and Development Brief 26
(Washington, D.C: World Bank, April 2016), p. 26.
25 In 2015, the former governor of the Central Bank of Egypt,
Hisham Ramez, estimated that 90 percent of remittances
return to Egypt through the black market. See To boost
foreign reserves, campaign tells expats to transfer money
into Egyptian banks, Mada Masr, November 9, 2015.
26 Egypt Launches Investment Scheme to Lure Expat Dollars,
Reuters, February 29, 2016.
27 Yezid Sayigh, Above the State: The Officers Republic in
Egypt, Carnegie Middle East Center, August 1, 2012.
28 Hamza Hendawi, Retired Army General Takes Over Key
Cabinet Post in Egypt, Associated Press, September 6, 2016.
7
Sisis Egypt: Building Political Legitimacy
amidst Economic Crises
Ahmad Shokr

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