Let It Be Resolved That, Force of A Contract Should Prevail Over A New Law
Let It Be Resolved That, Force of A Contract Should Prevail Over A New Law
Let It Be Resolved That, Force of A Contract Should Prevail Over A New Law
POSITION:
1. If the laws themselves provide for their retro-activity (Art. 4 Civil Code).
2. If the laws are remedial in nature.
3. If the statute is penal in nature, provided:
a. It is favorable to the accused or convict.
b. The accused or convict is not a habitual delinquent as defined in Art.
22 of the Revised Penal Code.
4. If the laws are of an emergency nature and are authorized by the police
power of the government. (Santos vs. Alvarez 44 O.G. 4259)
5. If the law is curative (necessarily retroactive for the precise purpose to
cure errors or irregularities). This kind of law to be valid must not impair
vested rights nor affect final judgments. (Frivaldo vs. Comelec and Lee G.R.
120295, June 28, 1996)
In Peoples Industrial vs CA, G.R. No. 112733. October 24, 1997, The
high court refused the malicious use of the Maceda Law whereas:
Consequently, when petitioner failed to abide by its obligation to pay the installments in
accordance with the contracts to sell, provision No. 9 automatically took effect.
***Apparently, when B failed to abide by its obligation to pay the installments in accordance
with the contracts to sell, A cited the contracts provision that upon the third month of
delinquency, A can demand for Bs departure and its automatically took effect.
However, A failed to observe Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6552, the "Realty Installment
Buyer Protection Act, That section provides that "If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at
the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after thirty days from receipt
by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a
notarial act. As cancellation of the agreements without a duly notarized demand for rescission
did not mean that it violated said provision of law. Republic Act No. 6552 was approved on
August 26, 1972, the law was passed years AFTER the contract was already in effect and the
contracts to sell had become automatically operational. Republic Act No. 6552 does not
expressly provide for its retroactive application and, therefore, it could not have any effects in the
cancellation of the contracts to sell in this case.
At this juncture, it is apropos to stress that the 1961 agreements are contracts to sell and not
contracts of sale. The distinction between these contracts is graphically depicted in Adelfa
Properties, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 21 as follows:
. . . . The distinction between the two is important for in a contract of sale, the title passes to
the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; whereas in a contract to sell, by agreement
the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the price.
In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the
contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas, in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor
until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition and
failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to
convey title from becoming effective. Thus, a deed of sale is considered absolute in nature
where there is neither a stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved in the
seller until the full payment of the price, nor one giving the vendor the right to unilaterally
resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period.
That the agreements of 1961 are contracts to sell is clear from the following provisions thereof:
3. Title to said parcel of land shall remain in the name of the OWNER until complete payment
by the PURCHASER of all obligations herein stipulated, at which time the OWNER agrees to
execute a final deed of sale in favor of the PURCHASER and cause the issuance of a
certificate of title in the name of the latter, free from liens and encumbrances except those
provided in the Land Registration Act, those imposed by the authorities, and those contained
in Clauses Nos. Five (5) and Six (6) of this agreement.
4. The PURCHASER shall be deemed for all legal purposes to take possession of the parcel
of land upon payment of the down or first payment; provided, however, that his/her
possession under this section shall be only that of a tenant or lessee and subject to
ejectment proceedings during all the period of this agreement.
5. The parcel of land subject of this agreement shall be used by the PURCHASER
exclusively for legal purposes, and he shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones, or
gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the OWNER.
Hence, being contracts to sell, Article 1592 of the Civil Code which requires rescission either
by judicial action or notarial act is not applicable.
"CONTRACT TO SELL." While the title of a contract is not controlling, its stipulations confirm the
nature of that contract. Thus, it provides:
5. Title to said parcels of land shall remain in the name of the OWNER until complete
payment by the PURCHASER of all obligations herein stipulated, at which time, the OWNER
agrees to execute a final deed of sale in favor of the PURCHASER and cause the issuance
of certificates of title in the name of the latter, free from all liens and encumbrances except
those provided in the Land Registration Act, those imposed by the authorities, and those
contained in the stipulations that follow.