People Vs Amaca (Dying Declaration)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EDELCIANO AMACA @ EDDIE and

JOHN DOE @ OGANG, accused, EDELCIANO AMACA @ EDDIE, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 110129. August 12, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Topic: Rule: 130 Sec. 36 - Dying Declaration
The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to identify the
assailant in the case at hand. However, the accused cannot be convicted of
murder attended by treachery, because the Information charged him with
murder qualified only by evident premeditation. Statement of the Case
Procedural History:
These postulates are explained in the Courts adjudication of this appeal from the
Decision dated November 19, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City convicting
Accused Edelciano Amaca of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Facts:
On December 17, 1990, an Information was filed by Bais City Prosecutor Epifanio E.
Liberal, Jr. against Appellant Amaca and one known only by his alias Ogang,
charging them with murder.
A warrant for the arrest of accused-appellant was issued on January 16, 1991.
However, this was returned unserved on two different occasions for the reason that
the subject had already changed address and his whereabouts [were] unknown.
Jurisdiction over the person of appellant was acquired by the said court only on July
1, 1991 when he was arrested by police authorities.
Thereafter, reinvestigation was conducted but the prosecutor, reiterating his prima
facie findings, resolved to continue the prosecution of the accused.
Arraigned on September 25, 1991, the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Ondoy,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued in due course.
Upon trial the court discovered the following:
To prove the injuries sustained by the victim, Wilson Vergara, and his cause of
death, the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar P. Pialago, a resident physician of the
Guihulngan District Hospital, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental.
Upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Cardenas, he saw the victim already on board a Ford
Fiera pick up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from the victim about
the incident, and the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon
query why he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he was
shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim said that he was about to die.
(TSN, p. 22, March 4, 1992) Upon being asked, the victim identified himself as
Nelson (sic) Vergara. He was able to reduce into writing the declaration of victim
Vergara, and have the latter affixed (sic) his thumbmark with the use of his own
blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty of murder.
Issue:
Whether the dying declaration was sufficient to identify and convict the accused.
Held:
Yes. The appeal is partially granted. The appellant is guilty only of homicide,
not murder, and civil indemnity shall not be awarded to the heirs of the deceased.
Dying Declaration Sufficient to Identify Assailant
A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who
is aware of his impending death to accuse falsely or even carelessly anyone of
being responsible for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, when a person is at the point
of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the
most powerful consideration to speak the truth. This is the rationale for this
exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased made the declaration
conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have been a competent
witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal
case where the declarants death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declaration is
complete in itself. All these concur in the present case.
The appellant contends that had he survived, the declarant would not have been a
competent witness to identify his assailant. He emphasizes that the victim was shot
twice at the back at nighttime and that x x x the witness/victim based on the
foregoing circumstance was not able to see the alleged assailants x x x.
We are not persuaded. True, the victim, Wilson Vergara, was hit at the back by two
bullets. But as the prosecution clearly showed by other evidence, Wilson did not
lose consciousness upon being shot. In fact, his ante mortem statement
clearly indicates that he was able to see and recognize who shot him. In
this light, appellant is assailing the credibility, not the competency, of the victim.
Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum ability to observe,
record, recollect and recount as well as an understanding of the duty to
tell the truth. Appellant does not dispute that the victim was capable of observing
and recounting the occurrences around him; appellant merely questions whether
the victim, under the circumstances of this case, could have seen his assailant. In
effect, appellant challenges merely the credibility of the victims ante mortem
statement.
We hold that the serious nature of the victims injuries did not affect his credibility
as a witness since said injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause the
immediate loss of his ability to perceive and to identify his shooter.
The defense attempts to cast doubt on the genuineness of the dying declaration by
suggesting that since the relationship between CAFGU and the PNP is marred by
jealousy, suspicion and general dislike for one another, Police Officer Mangubat
had enough motive to falsely implicate appellant who was a CAFGU
member. The defense also asks: Why was the alleged dying declaration of the
victim merely thumbmark (sic) when in fact he was still coherent, conscious and
very capable of writing his name at that time? Additionally, the defense questions
why Wagner Cardenas who signed the ante mortem statement as witness was not
presented as such by the prosecution.
The foregoing ulterior-motive theory is thoroughly unconvincing. Clearly, it does
not destroy the genuineness of the ante mortem statement. Police Officer
Mangubat is presumed under the law to have regularly performed his duty. There is
nothing in the circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows
any semblance of irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to frame Appellant
Amaca. As aptly noted by the trial court, even appellant testified that he
had no previous misunderstanding with Police Officer Mangubat and knew
no reason why the latter would falsely testify against him. This dismal
failure of the defense to show any ill motive on the part of said police officer adds
credence to Mangubats testimony.
Moreover, that the declarant attested to his ante mortem statement through his
thumbmark in his own blood is sufficient to sustain the genuineness and veracity
thereof. This manner of authentication is understandable in view of the necessity
and urgency required by the attendant extreme circumstances. It cannot be
indicative of any ulterior motive on the part of Police Officer Mangubat. We have
clearly ruled that an ante mortem statement may be authenticated through the
declarants thumbmark imprinted with his own blood, and serve as evidence in the
form of a dying declaration in a criminal case involving his death. Verily, such
declaration need not even be in writing and may be proven by testimony of
witnesses who heard it.
Finally, the non-presentation of Wagner Cardenas as witness during the trial is not
fatal, as his testimony would have been merely corroborative of Mangubats. In
addition, the presumption that evidence omitted by a party would be adverse if
presented does not obtain in this case, since Wagner Cardenas is also available and
could have been called to the witness stand by accused-appellant. Besides, it is the
prosecutors prerogative to choose his own witnesses to prove the Peoples cause.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Courts conscience rests easy with the moral
certainty that indeed accused-appellant committed the crime charged. His pretense
at innocence is futile in view of the overwhelming evidence presented against him.
Even his flight -- eluding the police for almost six months after the issue of the
warrant for his arrest -- clearly bespeaks his guilt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned Decision is hereby MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Edelciano Amaca is found GUILTY of homicide and SENTENCED to
an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. No civil
indemnity is awarded. No costs.
SO ORDERED

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

EDELCIANO AMACA @ EDDIE and

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