Oxfam Briefing Paper

23

Crisis in
Southern Africa
Nearly 13 million people in Southern Africa face extreme food
shortages between now and April 2003. Zimbabwe, Malawi and
Zambia are particularly affected. Donor countries need to fund a
major emergency food aid operation immediately. But in the
long-term the food crisis will recur unless the right to food for all
is put top of the agenda of international financial institutions and
governments both inside and outside the region, and policies
changed. The magnitude and centrality of the food crisis in
Zimbabwe poses a special challenge.

1
Summary
Nearly 13 million people in Southern Africa face extreme food shortages
between now and April 2003. Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia are particularly
affected. Donor countries need to fund a major emergency food aid
operation immediately. But in the long-term the food crisis will recur unless
the right to food for all is put top of the agenda of international financial
institutions (IFIs) and governments both inside and outside the region, and
policies changed. The magnitude and centrality of the food crisis in
Zimbabwe poses a special challenge.
In many places, this is the second or third consecutive year of food
shortages and many peoples ability to cope has been almost exhausted. At
the same time peace in Angola has revealed a hitherto largely invisible
humanitarian crisis in the zones previously controlled by UNITA and this also
requires a massive international response.
The causes of the food crisis are complex and vary from country to country.
But in different proportions they reflect a mixture of poverty and vulnerability,
bad weather, poor governance, bad advice from donors and economic
collapse. High rates of HIV/AIDS and other diseases have further sapped
peoples ability to cope.
Donor-driven policies of liberalising African food production have been
especially controversial, with evidence that they have made it more difficult
for people to grow food or to afford to buy it, while in Zimbabwe drought and
land-reform policies have contributed to a collapse in food production.
Oxfam believes that food security is a human right and should be top priority
for all governments and the IFIs (World Bank and International Monetary
Fund). Food production in Southern Africa is fragile and needs carefully
thought-out and carefully implemented policies, not policies driven by
dogma, political opportunism or hypocrisy. At the same time as African
farmers are told they can no longer have free seeds or fertilisers, US
farmers are receiving an average $20,000 a year in subsidies which is
soon to increase by 70% - and EU farmers $16,000.
Oxfam calls for action, both immediate and long-term, to get food aid there
and distribute it fairly and effectively, and to rebuild peoples lives.

2 Crisis in Southern Africa

The regional situtation need, impact,
and scale
Nearly 13 million people in the Southern Africa region face extreme
food shortages and the risk of starvation between now and the next
main harvest in April/May 2003. There are serious food needs
already in some places, which will increase and become more
widespread from July onwards, building up to the next pre-harvest
hungry period from September.
The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that
the regional total shortfall is 4m tonnes of food over the next year. Of
that, at least 1.2m tonnes will need to be emergency food aid. They
assume that the difference will be met by commercial sources. A
massive relief operation therefore needs to be mounted now to
ensure that immediate relief needs are met, and that adequate food
reaches the region in time for distribution as the crisis gathers
momentum later in the year.
The food shortages have particularly struck Zimbabwe, Malawi,
Zambia, Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland. Furthermore, this is
happening at the same time as the depth of the humanitarian crisis is
becoming apparent in neighbouring Angola. There the civil war has
ended and large areas of the country have become newly accessible to
the UN and aid agencies, exposing famine conditions. Some one
million more people than usual in Angola will need food and
humanitarian assistance in the coming months and long-term
recovery assistance must also be provided.
In many places, this is the second or third consecutive year of food
shortages and many people's ability to cope has been exhausted.
There are acute signs of stress in parts of Zambia, Malawi and
Zimbabwe with people employing high-risk strategies to survive,
such as eating potentially poisonous wild foods, stealing crops and
prostitution. Other coping mechanisms include reducing the number
of meals consumed per day to two or, often, one; bartering; taking
children out of school and travelling huge distances and queuing for
days to purchase limited supplies.
An Oxfam assessment in two districts in Zimbabwe in May reported
that: In essence, the districts experienced crop failure with more than
95% of the households reporting no harvest ... people are taking the
minimal for survival, a liquid in the morning and a solid meal in the
evening when available.

3
In Malawi there were hundreds of famine-related deaths from the
beginning of this year onwards. People were reduced to eating their
much-reduced maize harvest prematurely, before it had ripened.
They often also ate their seed stocks so lack seeds to plant when the
next agricultural season begins in October/November. Most people
now have some food to get by for a few months, but there will be
pockets of severe need developing from July and WFP estimates that
3 million people in Malawi will need emergency food aid before the
end of the year.
In Zambia there has been a near-complete crop failure in the south of
the country and some 2.3 million people are likely to need emergency
food aid this year. In Mozambique, over half a million people in the
centre and south will need food aid by September.
Currently the harvest across Southern Africa means that there is
some food in most markets. However, prices are considerably higher
than usual for this time of year in all countries, and extremely high in
some pockets. A recent Oxfam assessment in Shangombo district in
Zambias southern province reported maize prices as 400% higher
than the same time last year. A similar Oxfam assessment in
Zimbabwe reported a 300% increase in the maize price. Likewise in
Malawi, prices are up to 350% higher and this rise has been
maintained despite the harvest.
WFP figures show clearly the deterioration that is expected over the
next nine months; 7.59 million people will need emergency food aid
between now and August; 9.11 million between September and
November; and 12.76 million between December and March.
In Zimbabwe, however, there is a simple lack of maize in the country.
Latest estimates are that no less than 5.6 million people are
immediately in need of emergency food aid, to arrive before
September, and that that number will rise to over 6 million from then
on over half the total population. According to USAIDs Famine
Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS) on 19 June, the maize
availability is expected to start deteriorating soon, unless huge
quantities of imports are moved into the country before August 2002.
The magnitude and centrality of the crisis in Zimbabwe is therefore
particularly worrying. According to the UNs Food and Agriculture
Organisation, cereal production has collapsed. Zimbabwe has
produced only a quarter of its maize needs in the past growing
season and needs to import 1.71.8m tonnes of cereals in total. The
FAO blames the countrys prolonged drought the worst for 20 years
but adds that: disruptive land reform activities have also
contributed significantly to the production shortfall.

4 Crisis in Southern Africa

Emergency food aid requirements are estimated to be nearly 850,000
tonnes, more than what is required for the rest of the region put
together. This figure is based on the assumption that commercial
imports will make up the rest of the deficit. This assumption may be
severely tested.

Triggers and underlying causes of the

crisis
The triggers and underlying factors behind the current food crisis are
complex and interrelated. There are region-wide factors and also
country-specific ones.

1. Weather
The whole region has suffered from adverse weather conditions with
irregular rainfall, floods and dry spells at critical times in the growth
period. Zimbabwe has experienced the longest dry spell in 20 years
across almost the entire country, although paradoxically reservoirs
are well stocked. During the drought there was rain but it was erratic
and irregular and came at the wrong times for cropping. Because last
years harvest across the region was poor, regional food stocks were
used up and food prices shot up, particularly for maize, the staple
food. This priced the poor out of the market.
Meteorologists warn that the El Nino phenomenon is likely to hit
southern Africa next year, which may endanger next years harvest
and impede a swift recovery.

2. HIV/AIDS
An exacerbating factor is the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. In 1992
Southern Africa faced a harsh drought that affected some 18 million
people. However, HIV had not then taken hold as it has now. The
most recent antenatal clinic data reveal that in several areas, there are
levels of more than 30% in the most productive age group (15-49
years old). People suffering from HIV-related illnesses need more
nutritious food and food shortages will accelerate illness.
This long-term scourge is also creating an enormous strain on
communities, which are increasingly dependent on smaller numbers
of able-bodied and healthy workers. It places a particular burden on
women, as care-taking falls most often to them, losing opportunities
to maintain productive activities and earn income outside the home.

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In Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, it is common for grandparents to
be caring for ten or more children, due to AIDS-related deaths. There
is also an increase in child-headed households, as there are three
million AIDS orphans in these countries. As well as a significant loss
of labour power, the loss of parents means that agricultural skills are
often not passed down from one generation to the next; orphan-
headed households try to farm with less than adequate knowledge of
agriculture.
High levels of HIV/AIDS infection mean that the coping strategies of
communities, already under major stress, are at breaking point.

3. The dilemmas of liberalisation

Much has been written about the government of Malawis decision to
sell off its entire grain reserve, so that there is no longer a food safety-
net. Where all the money went has still to be explained. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) vehemently denies that it
instructed the government to sell the entire reserve. However, it says
that it did advise it to reduce it by nearly two-thirds, backed by
donors who felt that keeping so much food in-storage was costing the
government far too much.
Across the region the IMF and donor countries have pushed
economic liberalisation practices which have often been
inappropriate. Under the Structural Adjustment Programmes of the
last 15 years subsidised state marketing boards, which guaranteed
countrywide and cross-seasonal prices for food crops, have been
dismantled and privatised. All subsidies for fertiliser and other
agricultural inputs have been removed, and this together with
exchange rate liberalisation has led to massive increases in the costs
of these inputs. In Malawi a highly successful distribution of 20m
worth of free seeds and fertilisers to 2.8 million farmers was scaled
back over several years on the advice of the donors. This scale-back
contributed to a slump in food production.
Numerous studies have shown that these policies have overall had a
negative effect on poverty and food security. Market liberalisation in
Malawi has led to a widening gap between rich and poor and
liberalisation has contributed to a massive increase in food insecurity
across the region, as yields have fallen, soil fertility has decreased,
and prices have become increasingly volatile. An evaluation
commissioned by the IMF itself found that in Zambia, between 1991
and 1994, the liberalisation of state marketing had contributed to a
30% increase in rural poverty.

6 Crisis in Southern Africa

It is clear that without some form of state intervention as a safety net,
poor people have become much more vulnerable to shocks such as
erratic weather. Unfortunately, the IMF and other donors are not
learning this lesson. In a press release in May, the IMF warned that
the government was over-spending on the activities of the food
reserve agency which were aimed to minimise famine mortality.
The IMF press release failed to mention the hundreds of deaths from
starvation that had occurred in the 2-3 months previously.
The position of the IFIs and donors is hypocritical in the extreme as
the US currently subsidises each of its farmers on average $20,000 a
year and in the EU this figure is approximately $16,000. Not only
this, but following the recent farm bill passed in the US subsidies
there are set to increase by a massive 70%.
Oxfam would not advocate a wholesale return to state intervention
and marketing. The current situation in Zimbabwe indicates the
problems which can arise when a parastatal organisation like the
Grain Marketing Board has near-monopoly powers. It markets maize
at low prices which benefit poor consumers, but it does not have the
money to purchase grain on the market in anything like sufficient
quantities. At the same time its attempts to enforce a monopoly on
trading in maize and wheat and a nationally low price means that
private sector traders have difficulties importing food and few
incentives to do so, if they cannot then sell it at a price which will
cover their costs. In practice a parallel market exists and people who
can afford to pay cash can obtain it at four times the Government-
controlled price. But the current situation contributes to a general
unavailability of maize in the market.
Nevertheless, this famine demonstrates clearly that the market alone
cannot ensure food security. Poor people are finding it increasingly
difficult to afford the current free market price of maize, which has
spiralled out of control. There is an urgent need for donors and
governments to discuss solutions to this supply/demand Catch-22,
such as consumer subsidies. There is also a clear need for state
support to be allowed to the agriculture sector, particularly to
maintain national emergency food reserves and to provide subsidised
inputs and extension services to rural populations.
Finally, it is also indisputable that corruption and, in places, political
violence are likely to delay and complicate both national and
international responses to the crisis. The sale of the national grain
reserve in Malawi has already been mentioned, but Malawian civil
society groups have raised questions less about the wisdom of the
sale than about what happened to the money raised, who benefited,
and whether the proceeds could have been reinvested in buying new

7
supplies on the commercial market. In Zimbabwe commercial farm
operations have been severely disrupted by the land reform activities
and widespread farm invasions.
In relief programmes it is crucial that civil society is involved and
strengthened so that people have greater opportunity and power to
hold authorities to account for delivery.

4. Poverty
A major underlying cause of the crisis is simply poverty. Poverty
takes away peoples safety net, without which they are very
vulnerable to shocks, and it does not take much to push them over
the edge. In a normal year in many parts of the region, 40-50% of
households have run out of their own home-produced food by
December, four or five months before the next harvest. In Malawi
70% of farms have run out of home-produced stocks by October. But
increasingly, people have few other ways to earn enough money to
buy food to see them through the hunger gap.
A spiral of economic decline is affecting the whole region,
exacerbated in some countries by conflict and political unrest. This
reduces the possibility for people to migrate from one country to
another to find work and send remittances home. There is a long-
term collapse in peoples ability to earn a living. This livelihoods
crisis is made worse by declining prices for Africas commodities and
the hypocrisy of rich countries in refusing to fully open their markets
to Africas exports.

5. Conflict
Angola is a special case in the Southern Africa crisis. There is a mood
of optimism as the decades-long civil war draws to a close. However,
the huge humanitarian need in the country is only just becoming
visible as the humanitarian community gains access to parts that
have been isolated for years.
Many people have been living under near-siege conditions with no
outside help. There are health problems caused by extremely
unhygienic conditions and clear signs of both acute malnutrition and
chronic food deprivation. Agriculture has been almost impossible, as
people have been frequently displaced, and fear attacks or banditry.
Minefields impede commerce and transportation.
Three million people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance,
including food, medical assistance, clean water and sanitation. It is
imperative that donors do not overlook this need, either by allowing

8 Crisis in Southern Africa

it to be overshadowed by food needs in other countries of the region,
or by emphasising the need for reconstruction at the expense of the
critical humanitarian needs.

Can the current crisis be solved?

Is food available?
At a minimum, 1.2m tonnes of emergency food aid and an extra 2.8m
tonnes of commercial supplies are needed over the next year
according to WFP. This excludes what will be needed for Angola.
WFP and FAO have called on donor governments worldwide to
respond quickly and generously with food aid donations to avoid
widespread hunger from developing into a humanitarian disaster.
Although regional stocks are low, there is food for export within
Southern Africa. South Africa has about 855,000 tonnes of maize
tonnes for export, according to the South Africa Grain Producers
Association. Other countries, such as Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya
and Uganda have exportable surpluses, perhaps as much as 220,000
tonnes in total. Mozambiques surplus - probably 100,000 tonnes is
likely to mostly go to Malawi. Donors should be encouraged to buy
food for emergency aid locally as much as possible. There is also food
on the world market from heavily subsidised farmers in the USA and
from other big grain producing countries, such as Argentina and
Brazil. As well as grain there is also a need for large imports of beans,
oil and other foods so that diets can be properly balanced.
In theory much of the deficit could be met by commercial imports, if
governments and private traders have money to import food. The
gap between what can be bought commercially and what is needed
will have to be met by food aid. Emergency food aid imports are
expected to be up to 208,000 tonnes for Malawi, 174,383 tonnes for
Zambia, and 70,000 tonnes for Mozambique. Zimbabwe will need at
least 849,000 tonnes, however.
The logistics of moving food across the region will be difficult and
will need donor support. WFP is setting up a large-scale operational
centre in Johannesburg, which will co-ordinate the transport and
logistics of the food distributions to the six key drought-affected
countries.
While huge amounts of free food aid are clearly needed, particularly
because many people may not have enough money to buy grain on
the market, Oxfam experience points to the need to plan carefully and
consider alternatives to food aid in certain situations. Large amounts

9
of food aid at the wrong time could depress prices so that poor
farmers get little income at the next harvest. Alternatives include cash
for work, cash grants, food for work, food vouchers and micro-
finance. These are best achieved in connection with ongoing
development programmes. Careful monitoring is needed to know
when different interventions are most appropriate.
In some parts there is potential for a secondary, winter harvest in
November December. Oxfam has therefore focused immediate
work in Malawi and Zambia on ensuring that farmers got seeds and
tools to enable them to plant in June, as many farmers had eaten their
seed-stocks out of hunger. The seeds have been planted in semi-
wetlands, known as dambo, where people have access to a limited
supply of water. Watering cans and pumps were also being
distributed with the seeds.
In Zimbabwe, Oxfam is supporting a range of activities. These
include a feeding programme for primary school children, seed and
tool distribution for the next summer planting season in
September/October, construction of small dams and targeted food
distribution. Such responses by NGOs at a micro-level will help
people survive at a local level and will complement the international
response.

Donor response
WFP is already providing food for 2.6 million people across the
region and plans to launch a major regional appeal in early July.
According to WFP/FAO , the numbers of people needing food
between now and August is around 7.5 million a huge increase.
Many of the donors have already committed funds and food:
DFID has just announced a further 45m package for six countries
Canadian CIDA has just committed 15m for Angola and drought
affected countries
the EU has committed some food for Malawi (with more to arrive
September onwards), 80m for Angola and 4m more for
Zimbabwe on top of c.4.5m committed in May
the US government has recently announced that it will provide
400,000 of food one-third of the total amount required. Some of
this has already been pledged and is en route; the new pledge
amounts to around 275,000 tonnes
Others are waiting for the appeal in July before committing further
funds.

10 Crisis in Southern Africa

It is currently not possible to get a country-by-country analysis of the
quantity of food needed and the current deficit; this will be available
from WFPs appeal document in July. However, our analysis of
currently available information indicates that there appears to be a
lack of donor enthusiasm to fund in Zimbabwe.
Following last years poor harvest the UN launched a humanitarian
appeal for Zimbabwe in September 2001, to run until January 2003.
The appeal was for $86.3m. By the end of April it had raised just
$20.7m, 25% of the required amount. A UN Famine Early Warning
Systems Network report noted that greater humanitarian effort is
required by both the Government and donors to avert a humanitarian
crisis in Zimbabwe. Despite the poor response WFP started food
distributions in February and these are ongoing to over half a million
people and progressing reasonably well.
To meet the new crisis however these will have to be scaled up
enormously, and the indications so far this year are that most
bilateral donors have not prioritised Zimbabwe, despite the far
greater numbers of people needing, or likely to need, food aid there.
This may change after the regional appeal is launched in July. Donor
reactions to the food crisis are inevitably complicated by the political
situation and the practicalities of distribution and by a lack of trust
and dialogue. On 19 June USAIDs Famine Early Warning Systems
Network warned that: The response to the current 2002/03 food
crisis has not yet started. If like last year, then the response by the
donor community could come too late for the severely affected
population. In the longer term Zimbabwes change from exporter to
importer of maize has serious consequences for the whole region if it
becomes a regular phenomenon.

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Recommendations
1. Donors must act NOW and mobilize resources to solve
immediate food shortages, to avert a major famine from September
onwards, and to reverse destruction of livelihoods. Donors should
buy food locally within the region as far as possible.
2. This aid must be carefully targeted:
Food relief is not appropriate all the time or in all circumstances
and may damage food markets - other options such as cash and
cash for work etc should be carefully considered. This will need
consistent grass-roots household and community monitoring and
good communications.
This is not just a food deficit - this is a wider public health
emergency with key problems relating to HIV/AIDS, sanitation
and quality and quantity of water. Programmes should reflect
this holistic approach.
There is a need to rebuild depleted assets and strengthen
livelihoods and local agricultural production now and for the
future. Agricultural extension services are key. The Starter Pack
programme in Malawi, where seeds and tools were distributed
free to vulnerable farmers, should be scaled back up again and
piloted elsewhere in the region.
3. In view of the length of time taken to recover from serious
food shortages and drought, donors must take a long-term view:
Resources need to be committed for several years within the
framework of long-term food security needs.
Agricultural diversification should be investigated perhaps
starting a shift away from maize production, as has been already
achieved in some countries and support given to livestock
programmes.
The involvement and strengthening of regional mechanisms
within SADC should be considered.
4. UN agencies and NGOs must coordinate closely to achieve
quality programming and maximum impact with the resources
available
WFP, FAO and other agencies as appropriate must carefully
monitor commercial imports of food and key indicators such as
terms of trade to ensure that donors and agencies have an
accurate understanding of the situation at all levels.

12 Crisis in Southern Africa

 WFP and agencies must work closely together to standardize
targeting and distribution and work to ensure that aid is
distributed according to need alone.
Food distribution should work with communities and their
organizations. Strong civil society involvement is crucial for
proper targeting and accountability.
NGOs and UN agencies should advocate for and undertake a
holistic and tailored programmatic approach, to take into account
factors such as long-term livelihoods, HIV/AIDS and public
health.
5. The liberalisation of agriculture under structural adjustment
has greatly increased chronic food insecurity. Donors should admit
previous mistakes in giving poor policy guidance and work with all
stakeholders to create an agricultural policy for countries in the
region that really works in the interest of the poorest populations and
supports the human right to food. This should include support for
National Food Reserves, to be run accountably and not forced to
recover costs.
6. Donors, the Government of Zimbabwe and neighbouring
African countries should urgently address the centrality and
magnitude of the current food crisis in Zimbabwe, and the long-term
implications.
It is not acceptable for people to starve due to political differences.
a) The Government of Zimbabwe has the primary responsibility
to ensure adequate food for its population; it must also facilitate the
work of humanitarian agencies, including protection of relief
supplies.
b) Donors and the Zimbabwean Government must find creative
solutions to get food into Zimbabwe now:
Aid if differences with the Zimbabwean Government cannot be
resolved, donors must provide resources through WFP and
NGOs, and provide extra support for the rapid scaling up of these
organizations required to meet the need
Commercial imports must be vigorously encouraged by
Government policies and donors must look for alternative
strategies, such as the provision of incentives
c) Donors, WFP and NGOs must work to ensure
that food aid will be distributed on the basis of need alone
capacity for effective monitoring

13
 strong civil society involvement.
In the longer term, African governments and donors need to deepen
their engagement to try to find solutions in the interests of the peace,
security and prosperity of all people in Zimbabwe. This should
include an in-depth review of cereal production strategy to ensure
long-term food security in the region.
7. Concerning Angola, more humanitarian assistance must start
arriving now. This assistance must be allocated and distributed
according to identified critical needs, and should be done in
consultation with the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs strategy and Consolidated Appeal.
The UN Security Council should increase the numbers of military
observers in Angola, mandated to observe and verify the
demobilisation process.
Urgent protection needs must be addressed, ensuring that
humanitarian relief and demobilisation move forward in a way
that increases the security of civilians, particularly women,
children, the elderly and other vulnerable groups.
De-mining in the quartering areas, in settlements and in
resettlement areas is a high priority.
Civil society must be involved in the peace and reconstruction
process, to avoid previous failures of the collapsed 1994 Lusaka
peace accords.
Now that peace has arrived, transparency in the oil industry must
improve, and also transparency about government revenues.
Publishing details of the governments oil income would act as a
confidence building measure and encourage civil society and
donor response.

14 Crisis in Southern Africa

Country by country analysis

Zimbabwe
This year Zimbabwe has experienced the worst drought in 20 years.
Political upheaval and the land crisis have contributed to a sharp fall
of maize production by commercial farmers, who usually produce
one-third of the total cereals for the country. Although the total area
planted to cereals actually increased last year, with smallholders
planting more, maize production is down by 67% in a country that
used to be one of Africas main exporters for neighbouring countries.
Production of cash crops for export, such as cotton, soyabeans and
groundnuts, which is done largely by commercial farmers, is also
considerably reduced, and the government has little foreign exchange
to buy food from abroad. Finance Minister Simba Makoni says
Zimbabwes economy has lost a third of its jobs since 2000.
Zimbabweans increasingly have no alternative sources of work and
income. In addition, the country has the highest rate of HIV/AIDS of
all the drought-affected countries.
An Oxfam assessment in May stated: Firstly, the 2000/2001 season
was a difficult one with uneven and later excessive rainSecondly,
the 2001/2002 season has been declared by the state authorities as a
disaster.The inadequate supply of food is further exacerbated by
the empty on-farm stocks and unavailability of maize on the
market.Thirdly, the health services in the districts have
deteriorated and are almost collapsing.
On June 19 USAIDs Famine Early Warning Systems Network
(FEWS) released its Zimbabwe Food Security Assessment. This states
that about 849,000 MT of food aid are required immediately for 6.5
million food insecure people before the critical period in September.
By December over six million people, half the population, will need
food aid to survive, according to the FAO. Every district is affected
across the country.
Certain groups are particularly vulnerable, including approaching
people who were formerly workers or the dependants of workers on
commercial farms. An assessment of the impact of the land reform
programme on commercial farm workers done in May by the Farm
Community Trust of Zimbabwe concluded that: The affected farm
workers need assistance urgently. The main priority at the moment is
food. It is important that interested stakeholders move in swiftly to
these areas to avert massive starvation. The FCTZ estimates numbers

15
of commercial farm workers and their families at risk to be near one
million, with the FEWS report estimating about half that figure.
Zimbabwe is expected to need a minimum of 849,000 tonnes in food
aid over the year, according to FEWS, with around 815,000 tonnes to
be imported commercially. However, the Government has very little
foreign exchange and little prospect of obtaining it, and there is
concern that private traders will not come forward to fill the gap
because of government restrictions. Local NGOs increasingly
concerned about the sheer lack of food are urgently petitioning the
Zimbabwean Government for more private commercial imports to be
allowed into the country. They say that heavy bureaucracy,
government Grain Marketing Board (GMB) monopoly on grain
imports, price controls and restrictions on the movement of grain
inside the country need to be eased. Even if the food is imported
commercially, most people have extremely low purchasing power,
due to the lack of employment opportunities.
FEWS notes that: If maize process increase from Z$17.50 per kg (the
current GMB retail price) to Z$75 per kg, then the income sources
would be further stretched, forcing the poorest consumers out of the
market and increasing food aid requirements from 849,000 MT to
910,000 MT and the number of people requiring food aid increases to
5.8 million people.
Donor governments are unwilling to provide emergency food aid to
the Government of Zimbabwe for distribution. Instead they are
providing it through WFP and NGOs, both local and international.
Local groups are also importing food and seeds and distributing
them. Food distributions are ongoing although occasionally
interrupted in some places by political violence. But the reach and
capacity of NGOs are badly stretched already, at a time when they
need to gear up. The resilience of civil society is limited and being
severely tested. By late 2001, over half of Zimbabwes 1500 NGOs
were no longer operating due to funding problems, exacerbated by
political factors. In addition, there are concerns about the
politicisation of food aid. Donors and NGOs are looking for
guarantees that food can be distributed impartially.
Oxfam has been in Zimbabwe, working both directly and through
partners, for 22 years. We are currently planning an expansion of our
humanitarian programme, including work with winter cropping
methods, water and sanitation, food and nutrition, AIDS awareness,
and gender programmes. We will start a food distribution
programme at the end of June in one district in Midlands province
and aim to expand this to two districts not currently covered by WFP.

16 Crisis in Southern Africa

Malawi
Two million people will require food aid by September, rising to over
three million before the end of 2002. While the current food shortages
were triggered by bad weather, long-term poverty and poor
governance also had roles to play.
In 1991/92 there was a severe food shortage in Malawi, with yields
much lower than those preceding the current famine. However, the
state marketing board, ADMARC, had depots in the most
inaccessible rural communities and made food available at subsidised
prices. Ten years later no such safety net exists.
Malawi has removed all subsidies to agriculture and has committed
to privatising ADMARC by the end of 2002 under its last agreement
with the World Bank. In addition the National Food Reserve Agency
(NFRA) has been set up as a separate agency to ADMARC and is
meant to operate on a full cost-recovery basis without relying on any
state subsidy.
Donors have called for a full audit of the sale of the Strategic Grain
Reserve in the early part of 2001, which has yet to be forthcoming.
Although corruption was strongly suspected, confusion was
compounded by the NFRA having no clear mandate, with
uncertainty on whether it was working on food security or cost
recovery. The Agency had to take a loan even to pay its salaries and
start up costs, and had minimal management support or technical
expertise. The confusion surrounding the sale of the reserve
contributed to hesitation by donors and delays in responding to signs
of increasing distress with food assistance.
This situation must change. There should be a reserve which
operates transparently, with a clear mandate and which exists both as
an emergency stock and to play some role in price stabilisation.
The Starter Pack programme introduced four years ago in Malawi
distributed a small packet of free fertiliser and seed to all smallholder
farmers. This, among other factors, led to a bumper crop over the
next two years. The original intention was to continue the Starter
Pack for a number of years until a certain level of food security was
reached. However, following disagreements amongst donors it was
radically cut back, first to half of all farmers, and then to only a third.
This undoubtedly contributed to the shortfall in maize produced last
year. On a positive note though, this year the programme is being
increased once again and is distributing to nearly all smallholders
(c.2.5 million).

17
Zambia
Zambia has a population of 10 million, three-quarters of which live
below the World Bank poverty threshold of one US dollar a day.
Some 2.3 million people will need food assistance up to the next main
harvest in March 2003. Zambia has experienced a second year of
drought, especially in the south. Currently WFP is feeding some 1.3
million people hit by drought and floods last year but warned that, as
of late March, it had received only 40% of the funds it had appealed
for.
A recent Oxfam assessment in selected districts in the Southern
province found the food security situation close to crisis with some
communities expected to run out of maize as early as June, and
others expecting to run out in August. This area has experienced
particularly low rainfall that has resulted in up to 90% crop failure
and led to up to a 400% rise in price of maize. People are eating only
one meal a day instead of three. WFP is expanding its areas of food
distribution in response.
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan just endorsed by the boards of
the World Bank and the IMF, states very clearly that there is little
disagreement within Zambia presently that the policy of
liberalisation is correct for revitalising agriculture.
Zambia liberalised its National Agricultural Marketing Board and
elaborate system of subsidies and marketing in the late eighties and
early nineties, and by 1995 had completely eliminated all consumer
subsidies on maize and maize products. This led to a massive
increase in the cost of agricultural inputs, and a collapse in market
access for rural areas. This has undermined food security in large
sections of the country leading to increased poverty, as the IMF
admitted in an external evaluation of its Zambian programme.
Following the recent food crisis, the new Zambian Government has
decided to reintroduce some state involvement in agriculture and
agricultural marketing in Zambia, a policy strongly criticised by the
World Bank and IMF. Civil society in fact was very clear in its
submission to the Zambian PRSP that there must be a role for the
state in agriculture, and particularly the maintenance of a national
food reserve of maize and other cereals.

Angola
Angolas decades-long civil war appears to have drawn to a close.
However, the scale of humanitarian need is only just becoming

18 Crisis in Southern Africa

apparent as the humanitarian community gains access to parts of the
country that have been isolated from many years.
An estimated one million people are said to be suddenly within reach
of humanitarian assistance, and the needs are dire. This brings the
total number of Angolans in need of immediate humanitarian
assistance to some three million people.
Assessment missions have revealed widespread suffering with
shocking levels of malnutrition. Rapid nutritional screening found
rates of severe malnutrition as high as 10, 17 and even 24% in certain
areas. Generalisations for the country as a whole are not possible,
because of the variations between accessible areas and non-accessible
areas. However, new arrivals from UNITA areas display global
malnutrition rates as high as 42%, with many cases of oedema, which
is an indication of extreme nutritional stress. These malnutrition rates
are nearly four times what normally serves as an alarm for the
international community.
In addition, every location visited contained people in urgent need of
basic health care, sanitation, potable water, food and essential non-
food items. Most of the people in these areas have been living in
extremely unhygienic conditions. For example, in Candumbo, in
Huambo province, every single child seen by the assessment mission
was infected with scabies, due to a lack of soap and water. Many of
the children had suffered multiple untreated fractures, vitamin A and
B deficiencies leading to blindness, and growth retardation. Stunting
was apparent in some of the older children, ages 7-10, which is an
indication of chronic food shortages.
Most areas have few if any schools and health centres. Even those
health centres that exist have few supplies and no food to feed the
patients. In addition, agriculture has been next to impossible, as
people have been frequently displaced, and still fear attacks or
banditry. Major shipping routes have been closed or mined for years.
With an estimated eight million mines scattered across Angola,
nearly all agriculture and commerce has been affected.
Demobilisation is proceeding relatively smoothly, with some 79,000
soldiers demobilised, and some 230,000 family members now living
in the quartering areas.

Other countries
Mozambique
Mozambique presents a mixed picture, both geographically and in
terms of agricultural liberalisation policies. Overall grain production

19
in Mozambique is 8% up on last year. With reasonable rains farmers
produced a good crop in the north of the country, and there is a
surplus of c.100, 000 tonnes for export. In the south and central
regions, however, drought has led to real shortages. The surplus
being produced in the north may be exported to Malawi rather than
being shipped to the south of the country, because of transport costs.
The state marketing structure, AGRICOM, and the Public Grain
Reserve were dismantled by the Mozambique Government in the late
eighties and early nineties under a series of structural adjustment
reforms . AGRICOM had been performing badly and had been of
little use to small farmers. It has been replaced by the Instituto
Nacional de Ceriais, which is trying to build up strategic grain
reserves.
In the centre and north of the country farmers have had increased
access to competing commercial marketing channels and production
has increased. Smallholders do however need much better access to
credit and savings facilities and there is still a shortage of private
sector buyers. The dismantling of the state marketing system has
reduced the ability to market the surplus produced in many rural
areas.
To enhance food security helpful policy changes could include
greater provision for transporting surpluses to deficit areas, the
maintenance of a grain reserve, and provision of credit and savings
facilities in rural areas.

Lesotho
Heavy rain during the ploughing and planting season in October and
November was followed by severe frost, hailstorms and tornadoes.
This led to a harvest 60% below normal. The government declared a
state of famine in April. The plight of poor people is very similar to
that in Malawi, with low purchasing power and high prices of food
more of a problem than a lack of food per se. The situation is made
worse by a downturn in Lesotho's economy. The downsizing of
mines in neighbouring South Africa also hit people hard, as many
rely on remittances from workers abroad.

Swaziland
According to the government, the dry spell between December 2001
and January 2002 caused crop failures in much of the country. The
expected maize deficit for the coming year is 134,000 MT; 40,000 MT
of this deficit will need to be met by emergency food assistance.

20 Crisis in Southern Africa

Namibia
Namibia has also had lower crop yields this year and the
Government has said that, as a minimum, 70,000 people living in the
Caprivi Strip will need food aid.

Notes and References

Key Documents
FEWS Southern Africa Food Security Update 17 May 2002 Is a
Regional Food Security Crisis Looming? and previous reports, and
FEWS Zimbabwe Food security Assessment Report for 2002/03
Consumption Year, 19 June 2002.
FAO/WFP Crop/Food Supply Mission reports, April-May 2002
IRIN reports
Key Oxfam Assessment reports
Humanitarian Needs Assessment in 4 districts of the Southern
Province of Zamiba, May 2002, Oxfam GB
Humanitarian Needs Assessment in 4 districts of Masvingo and
Midlands Province of Zimbabwe, May 2002, Oxfam GB
Humanitarian Needs Assessment in Thyolo and Mulanje districts
of southern Malawi, March 2002

Other sources quoted include:

HIV/AIDS: Aids Epidemic Update Dec 2001, UNAIDS/WHO.
The dilemmas of liberalisation: For Mozambique, see e.g.
Rehabilitation Credit Project 1989 and 1992, Second Economic
Recovery project 1997 (all World Bank). Zambia Economic and
Social Adjustment Credit 1995 or IMF Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility for Zambia, 1991 and 1995. Malawi Third Fiscal
Restructuring and Deregulation Project 1999 and the IMF PRGF
arrangement with Malawi, Staff Report 2000. See Peters P Failed
magic or social context? Market Liberalisation and the Poor in
Malawi Development Discussion Paper No 562 Harvard Institute for
International Development 1996, Kydd, J and A Doward
(forthcoming). The New Washington Consensus on Poor Country
Agriculture: Analysis, Prescription and Gaps: with particular
attention to globalisation and finance for seasonal inputs,
Development Policy Review Abstract.
Malawi: See Malawi: Third Fiscal Restructuring and Deregulation
Project, 1999.

21
Zambia: See Botchwey, K (et al) Report of a Group of Independent
Persons Appointed to Conduct and Evaluation of Certain Aspects of
the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, IMF 1999, and Civil
Society for Poverty Reduction, Zambia PRSP: A Civil Society
Perspective, 2001.
Angola: Nutritional screening was done using the Mid-Upper Arm
Circumference test, known as MUAC. Rates from Chilembo in
Huambo, Chipindo, Huila province, and Sanzo Pombo in Uige,
respectively. The results of the rapid assessments are reported in full
in MSFs report Emergency in Angola an Operational Update, 28
May 2002.
Mozambique: Rehabilitation Credit project 1989, Economic Recovery
Credit Project 1992, Second Economic Recovery Project 1997 (all
World Bank).

Oxfam International 2002 June 2002

This paper was written by John Magrath, Debbie Hillier and Amelia
Bookstein of Oxfam GB. It is part of a series of papers written to inform
public debate on development and humanitarian policy issues. The text
may be freely used for the purposes of campaigning, education, and
research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full.
For further information please email advocacy@oxfaminternational.org

22 Crisis in Southern Africa

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Published by Oxfam International June 2002

Published by Oxfam GB for Oxfam International under ISBN 978-1-84814-298-5

23