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TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterAt11:38amonJanuary28th1986,the25thSpaceShuttlemission
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Challengerfinalrelease
1.1.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisaster
2.2.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterAt11:38amonJanuary28th1986,the25thSpaceShuttle
missionbeganwithChallengerliftingoffthelaunchpadattheKennedySpaceCenterinFlorida.
Approximately73secondslater,theChallengerwasengulfedinafireball.Sevencrewmemberslosttheir
lives.ThehighprofilenatureoftheTeacherinSpacemissionrequiredanindependentcommissionto
reviewtheaccidentandriskmanagementprocessesthatwereinplaceatNASAandassociatesatthetime.
TheTeacherinSpaceMission
3.3.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterWhentheApolloprogramfinishedinthe1970s,NASAhad
begunplanningforthenextphaseofspaceexploration,aninterplanetaryexpeditiontoMars.This
involvedthreecoreprojectsASpaceShuttleAreusabletransportvehicleASpaceStationThelaunch
beganwithChal...
platformMannedMarsexplorationDuetobudgetaryconstraints,onlyoneoftheseNASAprojectscould
besupported.TheSpaceStationconceptwasfavouredbyPresidentNixon.However,thisrequiredthe
developmentoftheSpaceShuttletosupporttheproject.TheNASASpaceProgramafterApollo
4.4.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterAninitial1972studybytheMathematicaorganisationfound
thatthespaceshuttlecouldorbitpayloadsforaslittleas$100USperpound,onsixtylaunchesperyear
withtheinitialshuttledesignspecifications(69,000poundpayloadcapacity).Thisofferedmilitary,
satellitedeployment,scientificandmedicalresearchapplicationswithaverycosteffectiveoption.
HowevertheMathematicareportwasbasedonunrealisticcostingsprovidedbycontractorstowinNASA
tenders.Additionallyequipmentperformanceshortfallspreventedthe109%ofthrustrequiredbyNASA,
furtherreducingpayloadcapacities.Theactualcostforpayloadsbecame20timestheoriginalestimate.
FeasibilitystudyfortheSpaceShuttleconcept
5.5.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterThepushtomarketthenewtechnology<ul><li>Duringthe
developmentoftheSpaceShuttle,theEuropeanSpaceAgencybegancommercialsatelliteoperations,
increasingthemarketcompetition.</li></ul><ul><li>NASA,inanattempttoremainmarketleader,
partneredwiththeUnitedStatesAirForceforthedevelopmentoftheSpaceShuttleprogram</li></ul>
<ul><li>Withfinancialandpoliticalpressuresinplace,keyengineeringdesigncompromisesweremade
ontheSpaceShuttle.Thesewere</li></ul><ul><ul><li>UseofSolidRocketBoosters(SRB)</li></ul>
</ul><ul><ul><li>PayloadBaysizeandshapeadjustments</li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>RemovalofAir
breathingengines</li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>RemovaloftheEvacuationSystem</li></ul></ul><ul>
<li>Thesechangesaffectedtheweightandcharacteristicsofthevehicle,reducingsafetyfactorsand
versatilityintheSpaceShuttle.</li></ul>
6.6.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterSolidRocketBoostersNASAsinitialspaceshuttledesignwas
withallliquidfuelledrockets,followingonfromApolloandtheSaturnVrocket.Liquidbasedpropulsion
canbeshutdownintheeventofcatastrophe.Howeverthedecisionwasmadetousecheaper,reusable
SolidRocketBoosters(SRB)fortheshuttleprogram.SolidRocketBoostersneedtoexpendallfuel
duringliftofftoseparation.ThepushtomarketthenewtechnologyTheRogersCommissionfoundThe
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SpaceShuttleSystemwasnotdesignedtosurviveafailureoftheSolidRocketBoosters.Thereareno
correctiveactionsthatcanbetakeniftheboostersdonotoperateproperlyafterignition,i.e.,thereisno
abilitytoseparateanOrbitersafelyfromthrustingboostersandnoabilityforthecrewtoescapethe
vehicleduringfirststageascent.
7.7.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterThepushtomarketthenewtechnologyIn1973,afterfinal
designconsiderationsoftheSpaceShuttlehadtakenplace,NASAbeganthetenderingprocess.This
processwasbasedprimarilyoncostconsiderations.RockwellInternationalwonthecontractforthe
constructionoftheSpaceShuttle(alsoknownastheOrbiterSpaceVehicle).Thiswasdespitethesafety
concernsthatRockwellsproposaldidnotincludeanyescapesystem.MortonThiokolIncwonthe
contractfortheSolidRocketBooster(SRB)componentofthedesign.Thiswasawardedduetothecost,
$100millioncheaperthanthenextcompetitor,overthetechnicaldesignandsafetyaspects.QualityCost
TimeNASAconsiderations
8.8.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterSafetytestingTheSRBdidnothaveadequatesafetytestingand
TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterWhentheApolloprogramfinishedinthe1970s,NASAhadbegun
partreplacementprogramsinplace.BeforereuseoftheSRB,engineerswouldtesttheOringsealsfor
deteriorationandfailure.Thisinvolvedblowingairintothesealtocheckintegrity.Thetestwasalso
responsiblefordoingsomedamagetotheseal.Atlowertemperatures,itbecameevidentthatthematerials
usedintheOringdesignwerelesslikelytosealcorrectly.Therecentchangetoanasbestosfreeputty,
usedasabackuptotheseal,alsobecamemorebrittleandlessflexibleduringcolderconditions.Thelack
ofsparepartsduetobudgetconstraintsfurthercompoundedtheSRBsafety.Riskmanagement
9.9.RiskmanagementTheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisaster<ul><li>Theriskmanagementprocessat
NASAandMortonThiokolIncinvolvedthefollowing</li></ul><ul><li>AFlightReadinessReview
(FRR)meetingwhichcoveredthefollowing</li></ul><ul><ul><li>Determinetheoverallmissionstatus
</li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Reviewsignificantproblems</li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Reviewall
constraints</li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Presentallnewwaiversfromthelastflight</li></ul></ul><ul>
<li>PreviousSpaceShuttlemissionshaduncoveredaflawinthesealontheSRB,withdamagetotheO
ringsbecomingmoreevident,especiallyincoolerconditions.Despitethisawaiverwasplaced,allowing
missionstocontinueunabated.</li></ul><ul><li>Theriskmanagementprocessremainedaqualitative
process,wherebyalowaggregateriskremainedacceptable.</li></ul>
10.10.RiskmanagementTheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisaster<ul><li>Currentriskmanagementprocesses
involvethefollowing</li></ul><ul><ul><li>RiskIdentification</li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Risk
Assessment</li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>RiskResponseDevelopment</li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Risk
ResponseControl</li></ul></ul><ul><li>NASAhadawellestablished,albeitsimple,riskclassification
system.</li></ul><ul><li>TheOringcomponentthatfailedinthelaunchofChallengerwasinitially
classedasCriticality1in1982,butlaterreclassifiedtoC1R(redundancyinplace)</li></ul><ul>
<li>MortonThiokolresponsibilitytomitigatethisriskwaspoor,asreportedbyaninternalmemofrom
RichardBoisjoly6monthspreviously.</li></ul>
11.11.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterPolitics,InfightingandChainofCommandNASA,withouta
permanentadministratorfor4monthsbeforetheChallengerincident,wereinmanagementdisarray.
Additionally,theFlightCenterDirectorinMay1985imposedthatNASAscheduleswouldremainon
planningforthenext...
targetthroughoutthe198586fiscalyear.Despitethis,delayswerestilloccurringandmediapressures
wereeverconstant.ThismountedatollonNASAtodeliver.ThelowerlevelemployeesatNASAwere
constrainedthroughthebureaucracytopreventthelaunchofChallenger.
12.12.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisaster16358573MichaelMonteleone,16554131VijayKarigiri,
16569078DavidAlexanderTheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterAtMortonThiokolIncthe
managementwerealsounderconsiderablepressure.Duringapreflightmeeting,NASAsMulloy,already
stressedfrompreviousmissiondelays,demandedMortonThiokolIncreassessthepositiontostopthe
launch.MortonThiokolthenhelda30minuteconferencewithseniorengineers.Astherewasno
sustainableargumentregardingtheOringsealproblemincolderconditions,managementmadethe
decisiontoreverseitsoriginalpositionandgivetheallclear.NASAinterpretedthisasanacceptablerisk
andwenttolaunchthemission.Politics,InfightingandChainofCommand
13.13.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterTheMechanicalCauseoftheAccidentTheconsensusofthe
Commissionwasthemechanicalcauseoftheaccidentwasduetoajointfailureinthelowertwosegments
oftherightSolidRocketMotor(SRM).Thefailurewasduetoafaultydesignunacceptablysensitivetoa
numberoffactors.Thesefactorsweretheeffectsoftemperature,thephysicaldimensions,thecharacterof
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materials,theeffectsofreusability,processingandthereactionofthejointtodynamicloading.These
factorsincombinationwereconsideredtobethemostlikelycausesofmechanicalfailureintheSpace
ShuttleChallengerdestruction.TheRogersCommissionReportFindings
14.14.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterTheinvestigationfocussedonthefollowingEnvironmental
conditionsTheambienttemperaturewas36F,15Fcolderthanthenextcoldestlaunch.Additionally,
waterfrompreviousrainfallsmayhavebeenpresentinthejoints,freezingatthecoolertemperaturesand
preventingpropersealperformanceMechanicalconditionsAcombustiongasleakoccurredintheright
SRMduringtheignitionprocesswhichweakenedthejoint.NootherShuttleelementorthepayload
contributedtothisleak.ProceduralcomplianceNoflighthardwareatthelaunchsitewereoutsideShuttle
designspecifications,launchsiteactivitieswereconductedinaccordwithestablishedprocedures.The
rightSRMwereassembledusingapprovedproceduresandsabotagewasnotafactor.TheRogers
CommissionReportFindings
15.15.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisaster<ul><li>TheUnderlyingCauseoftheAccident</li></ul><ul>
<li>Thecommissionfoundtheunderlyingcauseoftheaccidentwasduetopoordecisionmaking
regardingthemissionlaunch.</li></ul><ul><li>Thisiscomprisedofthefollowingfactors</li></ul>
<ul><ul><li>Thelackofawellstructuredandmanagedsafetysystem</li></ul></ul><ul><ul>
<li>Waivingoflaunchconstraintsattheexpenseofflightsafety</li></ul></ul><ul><ul>
<li>ContainmentofseriousproblemsatMarshallAirBase</li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Thereversalof
theMortonThiokolmanagementdecisionregardingthelaunch.</li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>These
factorscreatedacomplacentflyfirst,safetylaterattitudeatNASA</li></ul></ul>TheRogers
CommissionReportFindings
16.16.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterTheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterTheTeacherinSpace
missionhadthefollowingcrewmembersonboardtheChallengervehicleatthetimeofthedisaster
(picturedfromlefttoright)MissionSpecialistEllisonOnizukaPilotMichaelJohnSmithPayload
TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterAninitial1972studybytheMathematicaorganisationfoundthatthe
SpecialistSharonChristaMcAuliffeCommanderFrancisRichardScobeePayloadSpecialistGregory
BruceJarvisMissionSpecialistRonaldErwinMcNairMissionSpecialistJudithArleneResnikTheir
namesarecommemoratedinaplaqueatArlingtonNationalCemetery.AftertheSpaceShuttle
destruction,NASAconsoleditselfandthenationwiththerealizationthatallfrontiersaredangerousand
toacertainextent,suchadisastershouldbeacceptedasinevitable.However,thisincidentwasavoidable,
andanumberofpoormanagementdecisionsweremadetolaunchinconditionsthatwerehazardousand
unprecedentedatthetime.Thiscostsevenastronautstheirlives.
17.17.TheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterTheSpaceShuttleChallengerDisasterLessonslearntRisk
managementfundamentalsTheChallengerdisasterbecameatextbookcaseofprojectfailureandthelack
ofproperlyadheredtoriskmanagementprocedures.Thetermheterogeneousengineeringbecame
synonymouswiththeSpaceshuttleprogram,asmanagementandengineeringdecisionsweremadeto
meetorganisational,politicalandeconomicneedsratherthanspecificmissionobjectives.Finally,the
SpaceShuttleprogramwasputonholdfor32monthsfortheinvestigationandrepairprocesstobe
effected.MostseniorNASAandMortonThiokolpersonneltookearlyretirementsaftertheincident.

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