SALLY V. BELLOSILLO v.

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES and

Doctrine:
Generally, a prima facie case consists of that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the general
presumption of innocence and warrant a conviction, if not countered and contradicted by evidence tending to contradict it and
render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with it

In Uy vs. Gonzales, we held that a proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action; it involves no
private interest and affords no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for public
welfare. Nonetheless, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.

Facts:
1. Petitioner filed a disbarment case against respondent for alleged gross professional misconduct and malpractice. Essentially,
petitioner charged respondent of pocketing the settlement money in the Philippine Plaza bombing incident; improper financial
dealings through borrowings of cash and post-dated checks; and unwarranted solicitations in the form of gifts, pianos, lechon,
and wallpapering of respondents house.

2. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the charges because it hinges on a hearsay and false allegations. And if fails to show
a prima facie case against him. Respondent argued that despite the challenge to produce receipts and documents, the petitioner
could not produce any document or evidence that he settled the claims of the Philippine Plaza bombing victims and
misappropriated the proceeds thereof for his benefit; that with respect to the post-dated checks, the petitioner has changed her
theory by alleging that it was she who was lending money to the respondent and the checks issued to her by the respondent
were payments of said borrowings; and assuming arguendo the change in theory to be true, the parties transactions were
ordinary business transactions where conflicts do not provide grounds for disbarment.

3. The IBP denied his motion to dismiss as well as his petition for review.
4. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer of preliminary injunction to the SC challenging the orders
of the IBP. And insisting that the pleadings of the parties on record, affidavits and admissions would clearly show lack
of prima facie case against him, so that the case should be dismissed outright.

5. On October 13, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution dismissing respondents petition, but directing the IBP Board of Governors,

as follows:

The IBP Board is directed to look into whether or not, on the basis of all the records before it, there is a prima
facie case, or, as claimed by the [respondent], circumstances warrant the outright dismissal of the case. If the interests
of justice require it, reception of evidence may then proceed giving due process to both parties involved.

6. The IBP found that complainants actuations were motivated by vengeance, hatred and ill-will acting as she did only
after the aforesaid civil cases were filed against her, for which she blamed the respondent. Which was eventually
adopted and approved by the court.

WHEREFORE, finding no prima facie case to justify a full dress hearing, it is hereby recommended that the
present administrative case be dismissed.

7. The petitioner went to this Court by way of this petition for certiorari challenging the March 30, 1996 Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of IBP Board of Governors for
allegedly not ruling on her several charges against the respondent. Petitioner demands that a full-dress investigation and
hearing be conducted because the challenged Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is biased for the reason alone
that the Investigating Commissioner and the respondent are both members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity.

8. Petition was denied by the court. Following the denial of the actions instituted, Petitioner next imputes grave abuse of
discretion against the IBP Board of Governors for not ruling on her several charges, thereby invoking her theory that
her present petition could be treated both as a petition for review under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.

9. The court ruled that these remedies are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive; when the first is
available, the second cannot be resorted to.
 10. The court then went to resolve the main issue.

Issue: Whether or not the allegations of the petitioner constitutes a prima facie case against the respondent.

Held:

Generally, a prima facie case consists of that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption
of innocence and warrant a conviction, if not countered and contradicted by evidence tending to contradict it and render it improbable,
or to prove other facts inconsistent with it. [17] It is in this context that, in its Resolution of October 13, 1992, the Court directed the IBP
Board of Governors to look into whether or not, on the basis of all the records before it, there is prima facie case to warrant reception
of evidence or if circumstances warrant the outright dismissal of the administrative complaint against the respondent. The challenged
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors shows faithful compliance with this Courts directive.

Contrary to petitioners allegations that the finding of lack of a prima facie case insofar as the charge of massive borrowing of post-
dated checks by the respondent is derived solely from speculations and averments unsubstantiated by documentary proof, and also
contrary to the nature of the checks submitted by the petitioner, there are telling circumstances found by the Investigating
Commissioner which fully and correctly support the contested findings of the IBP Board of Governors.

The transactions involving post-dated checks could not then, as advanced by the petitioner, constitute a prima facie case for
grave professional misconduct by the respondent. Even from the viewpoint of petitioners submission that she was the lender of
post-dated checks and respondent was the borrower, still it is clearly evident that such arose from the parties personal dealings
and relationship, and not from an attorney-client relationship. These alleged transactions involved a purely personal interest, a
civil transaction.

In Uy vs. Gonzales,[20] we held that a proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action; it involves no
private interest and affords no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for public
welfare. Nonetheless, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court. In the present case, the petitioner failed to prove any of the circumstances enumerated above, by the
subject post-dated checks transactions, and by the other charges against the respondent as hereunder noted.
Finally, we agree with the IBP Board of Governors that
the charge relative to the supposed unwarranted solicitations in the form of gift certificates, lechon and expensive attach
cases, is negated by the petitioners own admission that she
gave those gifts in appreciation of respondents concerns for her and her familysinterests. The related charge that
the respondent requested for, and got, two pianos in 1985 is completely belied by the checks dated 1980, 1981 and 1982,
evidencing respondents payment therefor. Besides, these were plainly personal dealings, not professional misconduct.

The Court reiterates that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the Bar. To be the basis of disciplinary
action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act
or as unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the common sense of decency. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Indeed, considering the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, the Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty.

In Estrella Real Estate Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that in the absence of any showing that the findings of the
IBP are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such
findings must stand. Consequently, absent any showing that there is grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint, the Court
must give credence to the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors that the
complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, dated
March 30, 1996, dismissing the complaint against respondent in Adm. Case No. 3297 is AFFIRMED.