1946 Laurel - v. - Misa20161027 672 Yx9k5d PDF

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-200. March 28, 1946.]
ANASTACIO LAUREL , petitioner, vs . ERIBERTO MISA, as Director of

Prisons , respondent.
Sulpicio V. Cea for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr. for
respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz as amicus curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF SECTION 19 OF COMMONWEALTH

ACT NO. 682; CLASS LEGISLATION; UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWERS; RETROACTIVE EFFECT. Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682,
suspending the provision so of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code in so far as
political detainees were concerned, for six months from their formal delivery by the
Commander in Chief of United States Army in the Philippines to the Commonwealth
Government, is not discriminatory in nature, unlawful delegation of legislative powers,
retroactive in operation.
Per PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
2. WARRANT OF ARREST. One of the essential requisites of depriving a
person of his liberty, when he is accused of an offense, is the existence of a warrant of
arrest issued in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, if the due process
clause of the same must be complied with.
3. SPECIFIC OFFENSE. One of the fundamental rights of an accused is to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. That right is
violated when accused is detained for "active collaboration with the Japanese during
the Japanese regime," there being no such offense described in any law applicable to
petitioner.
4. SEVERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VIOLATED. Upon the facts of the
case, several constitutional rights of petitioner appeared to have been violated, such as
the right to meet the witnesses face to face, to have witnesses in his behalf compelled
to appear, to have speedy and public trial, to have equal protection of the laws, to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment.
5. SECTION 19 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 682. Section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682, providing for the suspension of article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, and as said suspension is interpreted and applied in actual practice, is
violative of the due process of law constitutional guaranty.
6. AUTHORIZES TRAMPLING PERSONAL FAVOR. Section 19 of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
Commonwealth Act No. 682, as interpreted, in fact, authorizes public officers and
employees to deprive and continue depriving the political prisoners concerned of their
personal liberty, without due or any legal process of law.
7. DISCRIMINATION. No one can, with candor and fairness, deny the
discriminatory character of the provision. If all discriminations are abhorrent under any
regime of law and justice, it is imperatively more so in a democracy.
8. DICTATORSHIP. Granting the Special Prosecutors' Office full discretion
as to how long within the six-month maximum article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
must continue suspended, turns said office into a dictatorship which may dispense its
favors and disfavors to individual prisoners under no other test than its convenience
and whims.
9. THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL COURT FOR SPECIAL PURPOSES. The
creation of a special court to try cases arising years before its creation is a blunder
identical in nature and viciousness to the former practice of shuffling judges of first
instance, the judicial rigodon resorted to before to suit certain purposes of the
government and which was stopped by Judge Borromeo's courageous defense of the
independence of the judiciary, in a leading case before the Supreme Court which made
history.
10. SEGREGATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. We are not
ready to support petitioner's contention that the whole Commonwealth Act No. 682
should be declared null and void because of unconstitutional provisions contained
therein, considering that said provisions may be segregated and the remaining portions
of the text may stand on their own feet.
11. A WRONG PRINCIPLE. The creation of the People's Court should not
per set a precedent that will sanction a wrong principle. Generally speaking, the
creation of temporary tribunals to administer justice in specifically pre-determined
existing cases is contrary to the nature and character of judicial functions.
12. WHAT JUDGES ARE SUPPOSED TO DECIDE. Judges are not supposed
to decide on what may appear right or wrong in the evanescent moment when the voice
of passion grows louder in the market of human activities. They must not make
decisions in the spur of news that wake screaming headlines and arouse the
uncontrollable emotions of political leaders or of the populace. They must decide
between right and wrong by the criterion of universal conscience, by the judgment, not
only of the fleeting instance of evolving history, but the unending caravans of
generations to come.
13. PERMANENT INSTITUTIONS. In order that judges could render
judgments of lasting value which would embody the wisdom of the ages and the moral
sense of all time, it is necessary that they should preside over tribunals which must be
looked upon as permanent institutions of justice, not temporary makeshifts, more
appropriate to serve ephemeral purposes than to be the inviolable temples of an
eternal goddess.
14. INTELLECTUAL OVERHAULING. The facts of current experience,
showed the imperative need of a wholesale intellectual overhauling as part of the work
of post-war rehabilitation in all orders of our national life.
15. MANY ELEMENTAL TENETS AND IDEALS NEED BE RESTATED. The
worries and psychological shocks caused by the Japanese initial victories and brutal
oppressions concomitant with their occupation of our country, had the effect of
warping the mentality and the sense of moral values of not a negligible number of
persons, and many elemental ideas and tenets must be restated, if not rediscovered.
Among them is our concept on human freedom.
DECISION
BENGZON , J : p
Anastacio Laurel demands his release from Bilibid Prison, mainly asserting that
Commonwealth Act No. 682, creating People's Court, specially section 19, under which
he is detained as a political prisoner, is unconstitutional and void. The Solicitor General,
meeting the issue, sustains the validity of the whole law.
According to the pleadings, petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was arrested in
Camarines Sur in May, 1945, by the United States Army, and was interned, under a
commitment order "for his active collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese
occupation," but in September, 1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth
Government, and since then has been under the custody of the respondent Director of
Prisons.
The legality of the petitioner's arrest and detention by the military authorities of
the United States is now beyond question. 1 His present incarceration, which is merely a
continuation of his previous apprehension, has lasted "more than six hours" counted
from his delivery to the respondent; but section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682
provides in part as follows:
"Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
United States in the Philippines of the persons detained by him as political
prisoners, to the Commonwealth Government, the Office of the Special
Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, exhibits and such other things
as the Government of the United States may have turned over in connection with
and/or affecting said political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records,
documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as speedily as possible, such action as may
be proper: Provided, however, . . . And, provided, further, That, in the interest of
public security, the provisions of article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar
as the aforesaid political prisoners are concerned, until the filing of the
corresponding information with the People's Court, but the period of suspension
shall not be more than six (6) months from the formal delivery of said political
prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in
the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government." In view of this provision, and
the statement of the Solicitor General that even on the date the petition was
presented his office had, ready for filing, an information charging herein petitioner
with treason, we fail to see how petitioner's release may now be decreed.
However, he contends that the aforesaid section violates our Constitution,
because it is (a)discriminatory in nature; (b ) unlawful delegation of legislative powers;
and (c) retroactive in operation.
(a) It is rst argued that the suspension is not general in application, it being
made operative only to "the political prisoners concerned," that other citizens are not
denied the six-hour limitation in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, that such
discrimination is unexcusable and amounts to denial of the equal protection of the
laws.
It is accepted doctrine in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause
does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects
upon which different rules shall operateso long as the classi cation is not
unreasonable. 2 Instances of valid classi cation are numerous. The point to be
determined then is whether the differentiation in the case of the political prisoner is
unreasonable or arbitrary.
One of the proclamations issued by General MacArthur upon his arrival in Leyte
(December 29, 1944) referred to those Filipino citizens who voluntarily given aid,
comfort and sustenance to the Japanese. It announced his purpose to hold them in
restraint for the duration of the war, "whereafter they shall be turned over to the
Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases." When active
hostilities with Japan terminated, General MacArthur ordered the delivery to the
Commonwealth of all the prisoners in theretofore taken under his said proclamation.
There were 6,000 in round numbers. The problem was momentous and urgent. Criminal
informantions against all were , or a majority, or even a substantial number of them
could not be properly led in the six-hour period. They could not obviously be turned
loose, considering the conditions of peace and order, and the safety of the prisoners
themselves. So the President, by virtue of his emergency powers, promulgated
Executive Order No. 65 suspending article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, for not more
than thirty days, with regard to said detainees or internees, having found such
suspension necessary "to enable the Government to ful ll its responsibilities and to
adopt temporary measures in relation with their custody and the investigation,
prosecution and disposal of their respective cases." The Order added that it shall be in
force and effect until the Congress shall provide otherwise. Congress later approved
Commonwealth Act No. 682, establishing the People's Court and the Of ce of Special
Prosecutors for the prosecution and trial of crimes against national security committed
during the second World War. It found the thirty-day period too short compared with
the facilities available to the prosecution, and set the limit at six months.
Considering the circumstances, we are not prepared to hold the extension of the
period for the political detainees was unreasonable. The Legislature chose to give the
prosecutor's of ce suf cient time to investigate and to le the proper chargeor
discharge those who m it may nd innocent. If time had not been granted, the
prosecutor would perhaps have been forced to indict all the detainees indiscriminately:
reserving, of course, its right subsequently to request the liberation of those it may
think not guilty. But such wholesale indictment was obviously neither practical nor
desirable. We will allow that there be some dispute as to the wisdom or adequacy of
the extension. Yet the point is primarily for the Legislature to decide. The only issue is
the power to promulgate special rules for the custody and investigation of active
collaborationists, and so long as reasons exist in support of the legislative action
courts should be careful not to deny it.
In this connection, it must be stated there can be no really be no substantial
ground to assail the six-month extension, in view of the provisions authorizing the
release under bail. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was intended to prevent any
abuse of resulting from con ning a person without informing him of his offense and
without permitting him to go on bail. Commonwealth Act. No. 682 gives no occasion to
such abuse. The political prisoners know, or ought to know, they are being kept for
crimes against national security. And they are generally permitted to furnish bail bonds.
(b ) There is hardly any merit to the argument that as "the duration of the
suspension of article 125 is placed in the hands of the Special Prosecutor's Of ce," the
section constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative powers; for as explained by the
Solicitor-General, the resultsome informations led before, afterwardsis merely the
consequence of the fact that six thousand informations could not be led
simultaneously, and that some one had to be rst or some one else, necessarily the
last." The law, in, effect, permitted the Solicitor General to file the informations within six
months. And statutes permitting of cers to perform their duties within certain periods
of time may not surely be declared invalid delegations of legislative power.
( c) Nor is the position correct that section 19 is retroactive in its operation. It
refers to detention after its passage-not before. Incidentally, there is no constitutional
objection to retroactive statutes where they relate, to remedies or procedure. 3
The argument is advanced that when he was arrested, (May, 1945), article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code was in force, and petitioner could have asked for release after
six hours and, therefore, Commonwealth Act No. 682 that takes away that right is ex
post facto, retroactive and fundamentally objectionable. The premises are incorrect. In
May, 1945, he could not have asked for release after six hours. In other words, he would
not have been discharged from custody.(Raquiza vs. Bradford, supra.) Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code was in force, it is true; but not as to him. The laws of the
Commonwealth were revived in Camarines Sur by operation of General MacArthur's
proclamation of October 23, 1944, upon its liberation from enemy control; but subject
to his reservation to hold active collaborationists in restraint "for duration of the war."
So, persons apprehended under that directive, for treasonable collaboration, could not
necessarily invoke the benefits of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Undoubtedly the Legislature could validly repeal section 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Had it done so, herein petitioner would have no ground to protest on
constitutional principles, as he could claim no vested right to the continued
enforcement of said section. 4 Therefore, a fortiori he may not complain, if, instead of
repealing section, our lawmaking body merely suspended its operation for a de nite
period of time. Should he counter that such repeal or suspension must be general to be
valid, he will be referred to the preceding considerations regarding classi cation and
the equal protection of the laws.
Wherefore, we perceive no irreconcilable con ict between the Constitution and
the challenged portions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act. No. 682.
The other features of the People's Court Act which are the subject of
denunciation by petitioner do not , in our opinion, require speci c elucidation at this
time, because he has not as yet been held into that court, and the issues appear to have
important or necessary connection with his current deprivation of liberty. 5
The petition for the writ of habeas corpus will be denied. With costs.
Moran, C.J., Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
OZAETA , J., with whom concurs PARAS , J., concurring in the result:
I concur with the majority in upholding the constitutionality of section 19 of the

People's Court Act. In the view I held in the Raquiza case the detention of the petitioner
by the military authorities was illegal for lack of due process. But the same thing cannot
be said as to his present detention by the respondent Director of Prisons, especially
now that an information for treason has been filed against him.
PERFECTO , J., dissenting :
On or about May 6, 1945, petitioner was arrested by the C.I.C., United States
Army, Camarines Sur. On September 6, 1945 he was turned over to the Commonwealth
Government by the United States Army and since that date he remained in prison under
the personal custody of the respondent Director of Prisons, and now he comes before
us complaining that his arrest and detention are illegal and in violation of many of his
constitutional rights, in that: "(a) He was arrested and detained without a warrant of
arrest. (See Constitution , Article III, section 3) (b ) No information or charge has been
lodged against him, informing him of the nature and cause of his arrest. (See
Constitution, Article III, section 17.) (c) He was not given an opportunity to confront the
witnesses who caused his arrest and detention. (See Constitution, Article III, section
17.) (d) He was not accorded the bene t of compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses in behalf. (See Constitution, Article III, section 17.) (e) He was
and is being denied the right to a prompt, speedy and public trial. (See Constitution,
Article III, section 17.) (f) His arrest and detention was and is without due process of
law. ( See Constitution, Article III, section 15.) (g ) He was not accorded the equal
protection of the laws. (See Constitution, Article III, section 1.) (h) He was subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment. (See Constitution, Article III, section 19.) (i) He was
committed to prison and detained by the respondent under a bill of attainder.( See
Constitution, Article III, section 11.)".
Petitioner also maintains that the People's Court Act No. 682, under which the
respondent herein purports to act, violates not only the spirit but also the letter of the
fundamental law in many ways, in that: "(a) It constitutes an assault upon the
independence of the judiciary. (See Tydings-McDuf e Law, section 2, par.[ a]) (b ) It
deprives the accused of certain rights already acquired at the time of its passage, and
therefore is ex-post facto in nature. (See Constitution, Article III, section 11.) (c) It
partakes of the nature of a bill of attainder. ( See Constitution, Article III, section 11.) (d)
It denies the equal protection of the laws. (See Constitution, Article III, section 1.) (e) It
provides for cruel and unusual punishment. (See Constitution, Article III, section 19.)(f)
It deprives the citizen of his day in court.(See Constitution, Article III, section 21.) (g ) It
constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative and executive functions. (See Tydings-
McDuf e Law, section 2, par[a].)( h) It covers more than one subject matter. ( See
Constitution, Article VI, section 12, par. 1.) ( i) It authorizes the charging of multifarious
crimes in one complaint or information thereby making it impossible to be informed of
the real nature of and cause of the accusation against the accused. (See Constitution,
Article III, section 17.) (j) It denies the constitutional right of a person to bail before
conviction. (See Constitution, Article III, section 16.)"
Consequently, petitioner prays that Commonwealth Act No. 682 be declared
unconstitutional and null and void, that his detention, irrespective of the validity of the
said act, be declared illegal and in violation of many of his constitutional rights, and that
an order be issued for his complete and absolute release.
Respondent answered that, pursuant to the authority of the proclamation issued
by the Commander in Chief of the American Armed Forces, Southwest Paci c Area,
General Douglas MacArthur, Dated December 29, 1944, petitioner was arrested and
thereafter detained on May 10, 1945, under security commitment order, issued by the
commanding of cer of the 904th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, United
States Army, upon the charge of "active collaboration with the Japanese during the
Japanese occupation"; that his subsequent detention as a political prisoner, upon the
transfer of his person to the Commonwealth Government by the United States Army,
pursuant to the terms of the proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on
December 29, 1944, Executive Order No. 65, issued by President of the Philippines on
September 3, 1945, and pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 682,
approved on September 25, 1945, was a mere logical sequence of his previous
commitment and hence equally valid and legal.
Respondent alleges also that petitioner has not as yet availed of the bene ts of
section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which confers upon political prisoners the
privilege of securing their release on bail upon proper application therefor with the
People's Court; that Commonwealth Act No. 682 does not trench upon, nor contravene
any of the provisions of the Constitution; that it is not ex post facto in nature in that it
suspends, in the interest of national security, the provision of article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code for a period of not more than six months, which is fully justi ed by the
practical necessities of the situation, considering the circumstance that there are more
than 6,000 political prisoners charged with the grave crime of treason and other
offenses against national security; that said law does not materially impair the
substantial rights of the accused to have the question of his guilt determined according
to the substantive law existing at the time of the commission of the offense, that it is
not a bill of attainder, since it does not in ict punishment without a judicial trial; that it
neither deprives the citizen of his day in court, nor it provides for cruel and unusual
punishment; that it applies equally and uniformly to all persons similarly situated; that it
complies with the constitutional requirement that the accused must be informed of the
nature of the accusation against him ; that instead of suppressing or denying the
constitutional right of an accused to bail before conviction, said act recognizes and
concedes to all accused in section 19 the right to bail, except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong; that the information against the
petitioner, charging him with treason upon ten counts was ready for ling in People's
Court even on the date the petition in this proceeding was presented; and that in due
deference to this Supreme Court, the ling of said information has been held in
abeyance pending the final disposition of this habeas corpus proceeding.
For purposes of this discussion, the discrepancy between petitioner and

respondent as to the correct date when petitioner was arrested, May 6 or May 10,
cannot affect the merits of the case.
Without a lawful warrant of arrest. Whether the arrest took place on May 6,
1945, as alleged by petitioner or on May 10, as alleged by respondent, there is
absolutely no question that petitioner was arrested without any lawful warrant of arrest.
Section 1:3 of Article III of the Constitution provides that "no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath
or af rmation of the complainant and his witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." This
provision considered in connection with the provision of section 1:1 of Article III of the
Constitution and section 1:15 of the same article that no person shall be deprived of
liberty or be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, implies
necessarily that one of the essential requisites for depriving a person of his liberty,
when he is accused of an offense, is the existence of a warrant of arrest issued in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
We are of opinion that the arrest of petitioner was executed in agrant violation
of the above-mentioned constitutional provisions.
No information as to any charge. The Constitution provides that one of the
fundamental rights of an accused is "to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him." (Section 1:17, Article III of the Constitution.)
This constitutional guarantee appears equally to have been violated in
petitioner's case.
Respondent's allegation that petitioner is detained because of his active
collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese Occupation does not inform
petitioner of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, it appearing that there
is no such offense described in any law applicable to petitioner as "active collaboration
with the Japanese during the Japanese regime."
Meeting witnesses face to face. Petitioner complains that he was not given an
opportunity to confront his witnesses who caused his arrest and detention.
The complainant is equally well-taken. There is nothing in the record to show that
before, during , or at any time after his arrest, petitioner has ever been accorded the
opportunity of meeting the witnesses "face to face" as provided in section 1:17 of
Article III of the Constitution.
Attendance of witnesses in his behalf. Petitioner complains he was not
accorded of the bene t of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
in his behalf as provided in section 1:17 of Article III of the Constitution. This allegation
has not been disputed.
We have, therefore, here another agrant violation of a constitutional right of
petitioner.
Speedy and public trial. Petitioner invokes also his constitutional right to "have
a speedy and public trial" as provided in section 1:17 of Article III of the Constitution.
There is absolutely no question that this constitutional right of petitioner has
been equally violated.
Equal protection of the laws. Petitioner complains that he was not accorded
equal protection of the laws as provided in section 1:1 of Article III of the Constitution.
Petitioner's allegation is equally well-founded, there being no question as to the
fact that he was and he is being deprived of several of his fundamental rights under the
Constitution without any legal process.
Cruel and unusual punishment. Petitioner complains that he was subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of section 1:19 of Article III of the
Constitution.
There is no question that petitioner is being deprived of his liberty without any
information or complaint charging him of any speci ed offense under the laws of the
land.
So it appears that he is being, in effect, subjected to the punishment of
deprivation of liberty for almost one year, without any de nite information as to when it
will end. This means that he is being subjected to punishment, not only because he is
not authorized by any law of the land, but because it is meted out to petitioner for no
speci c offense at all. The violation of section 1: 19 of Article III of the Constitution is
indispensable.
Petitioner complains that those responsible for his detention appear to have
never heard of such tri es as those contained in the Bill of Rights and even if they did,
they contend that the Constitution was never meant for the "untouchables" known in the
contemporary Philippine history as "collaborators," and that no one can imagine a more
glaring case for the granting of a writ of habeas corpus than that of the petitioner, it
appearing that the circumstances of his arrest are self-demonstrative of the most
scandalous violation of the Bill of Rights ever perpetrated under the American flag.
Petitioner, as has been shown, appears well supported in his complaint.
Now, as one of the questions raised in this case, let us determine the validity of
that portion of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, an act creating the People's
Court, which provides as follows:
". . . And, provided, further, That , in the interest of public security, the
provisions of article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the
aforesaid political prisoners are concerned, until the filing of the corresponding
information with the People's Court, but the period of suspension shall not be
more than six (6) months from the formal delivery of said political prisoners by
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the
Philippines to the Commonwealth Government."
The provision of the Revised Penal Code which has been virtually suspended by
this law is:
"Art. 125. Delay in the Delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of six hours." (As amended by Act No. 3940.)
The pertinent provisions of our fundamental law which limit the powers of the
legislative branch of our government in the enactment of our laws are as follows:
"ART. III.-BILL OF RIGHTS.
"SECTION 1. (1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
"(15) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
"(17) In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf."
"Development of the Doctrine of Due Process of Law.
"Though the words 'due process of law' have not a long history, the
doctrine implied by them has history in Anglo-American law which extends for
more than seven hundred yearsback, indeed, to the signing of the Magna
Charta. And yet, notwithstanding this long period during which countless
opportunities have presented themselves for its application and judicial definition,
the doctrine has not yet received a statement in such a form that its specific
applications can, in all cases, be determined. This failure has been due, not to any
lack of judicial effort or acumen, but to the very nature of the doctrine which,
asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is
not susceptible of more than general statement. The result is, that the meaning of
the phrase has to be sought in the history of its specific applications, and, as the
variety of these possible applications is infinite, it will probably never be possible
to say that the full content of that meaning has been determined. In Twining vs.
New Jersey (211 U.S., 78), we find the court saying: 'Few phrases in the law are so
elusive of exact apprehension as this. This court has always declined to give a
comprehensive definition of it, and has preferred that its full meaning should be
gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of
the decisions of cases as they arise.' So also in Davidson vs. New Orleans (96
U.S., 97), the court said: 'to define what it is for a state to deprive a person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, in terms which would cover every
exercise of power thus forbidden to the state, and exclude those which are not, no
more useful construction could be furnished by this or any other court to any part
of the fundamental law.' And, later in the same opinion: 'There is wisdom in the
ascertaining of the intent and application of such an important phrase in the
Federal Constitution by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion as
the cases presented for decision shall require, with the reasoning on which such
discussions may be founded.'
"In Holden vs. Hardy (169 U.S., 366) the court said: 'This court has never
attempted to define with precision the words "due process of law," It is sufficient
to say that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the
very idea of free government no member of the Union may disregard.'
"It would appear, then, that a complete knowledge of the meaning of the
doctrine of due process of law in American constitutional jurisprudence can be
obtained only by a study of every case in which its application has been sought. .
. ."
"Per legem Terrae.
"The historical antecedents of the phrase 'due process of law' may be
clearly traced back to the expression per legem terrae as it occurs in the Charter
wrung by the Barrons from King John. The 39th chapter of that document
provides that 'no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed,
or exiled, or in any way destroyed; nor shall we go upon him or send upon him, but
by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land' (per legem terrae). In the
later re-issues and reaffirmations of this charter by Henry III, in 1216, 1217 and
1225, this provision was repeated, with however, in the issues of 1217 and 1255,
the addition of the words after disseized, 'of his freehold, or liberties, or free
customs,' (de libero tenemento suo vel libertatibus, vel liberis consuetudinibus
suis).
"The words of Magna Charta, per legem terrae, probably had at this time
the technical meaning that no civil or criminal plea should be decided against a
freeman until he had been given the opportunity to furnish the customary 'proof'
which the law, as it then stood, recognized and permitted him to offer. This proof
might be by battle, or ordeal, or by compurgation. Whatever form it might assume
it was technically known as the law (lex), that is, as a test according to which the
defendant's claim was to be upheld or denied. (McKechnie, Magna Charta, 102,
441, 442: Thayer, Evidence, 200; Bigelow, History of Procedure, 155. Thayer and
Bigelow are cited by McKechnie.)
"In the various petitions of the Parliament in the Fourteenth Century
against the arbitrary acts of the King's Council, the guaranty of the law of the land
was appealed to, and these petitions, when assented to by the King, became, of
course, statutes of the realm. Thus, in 1331, in Stat. 5 Edw. III, C. 9, it was declared
that 'no man from henceforth shall be attacked by any accusation, nor forejudged
of life or limb, nor his lands, tenements, goods nor chattels seized into the King's
hands against the form of the Great Charter and the law of the land.' So again, in
1351, in Stat. 25, Edw. III, C. 4, it was declared that 'from henceforth none shall be
taken by petition or by suggestion made to our lord the King or his Council, unless
it be by presentment or indictment of his good and lawful people of the same
neighborhood, where such deeds be done, in due manner or by process made by
writ original at the common law, nor that none be ousted of his franchises, nor of
his household, unless he be fully brought in to answer and forejudged of the
same by the courts of the law,' Still again, in 1355, in Stat. 28, Edw. III, C. 3, there
was substantially similar provision, and there, for what would appear to be the
first time, we have the modern phrase employed. 'No man,' it was declared, 'of
what state or condition soever he be , shall be put out of his lands, or tenements,
nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor indicted, nor put to death, without he be brought in
to answer by due process of law.' (Par due proces de lei.) (Cf. McGehee, Due
Process of Law, Chap. I.)
"It is thus apparent that in these petitions and statutes of Edward III, the
phrases 'due process of law' and 'the law of the land' had come to be
synonymous, both indicating, as the substance of the petitions shows, that the
guaranty insisted upon was that persons should not be imprisoned except upon
due indictment, or without an opportunity on their parts to testify the legality of
their arrest and detention, and that their property should not be taken except in
proceedings conducted in due form in which fair opportunity was offered to the
one claiming ownership or right to possession to appear and show cause, if any,
why the seizure should not be made.
"The Petition of Right of 1628, approved by Charles I, recited various
arbitrary acts complained of, and appealed to 'the laws and franchises of the
realm.' Coke, in the his Second Institute, defined the phrase per legem terrae as
meaning 'the common law, statute law or custom of England,' and then declared:
'For the true sense and exposition of these words , see the Statute 37, Edw. III, C. 8,
where the words' by the law of the land' are rendered 'without due process of law',
for there it is said, though it be contained in the Great Charter, that no man be
taken, imprisoned or put out of his freehold without due process of law; that is by
indictment or presentment of good and lawful men where such deeds be done or
by writ original of the common law.
"It was in this sense as employed in the statutes of Edward III and by Coke,
and as relating solely to matters of procedure, that the phrase due process of law
was introduced into American law." (3 Willoughby on the Constitution of the
United States, 2d ed., sections 1113,1114, pp. 1685, 1688,)
"English and American Use of the Phrase 'Due Process of Law' Contrasted.
"Coming now to American practice we find that the exact phrase 'due
process of law' was not employed in any of the eleven State constitutions
adopted prior to the Federal Constitution, but that it early found expression in
substance, if not in very words, in those instruments. The very words do, however,
appear in the Declaration of Rights of the State of New York, adopted in 1777,
and in one of the amendments proposed by that State to the Federal Constitution
as drafted by the Constitution of the United States in, adopted in 1791. That
amendment provides, inter alia, that 'nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.' The Federal imposition of the
requirement upon the States did not come until 1868 when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.
"It is a very remarkable fact that not until our written Constitution was more
than half a century old did the phrase receive an interpretation and application
which approximates that which it has today, and not, indeed, until a hundred
years had passed away was resort had to it as the usual device of those
disapproving of the acts of their legislatures. This, however, is no doubt in a
measure explainable by the fact that not until the increased complexity of social
and industrial life had led, upon the one hand, to the use by the State and Federal
Governments of administrative process more or less summary in character and,
upon the other hand, to marked increase in the regulative control of law over
private acts and use of public property, did there appear the necessity for the
appeal to this limitation by those who conceived themselves injured by the
exercise of such administrative powers or by the enforcement of these legislative
regulations.
"In two most important respects the application in America of the
requirement of due process of law has differed from that which it had received in
England prior to 1776, and which indeed, it still receives in that country. These are:
(1) that, in the United States, it operates as a limitation upon the legislative as well
as upon the executive branch of the government, and (2) that it relates to
substantive as well as procedural rights. This second application is, however, one
which, as we shall see, was not at first developed.
"Before the requirement could be recognized as one imposed upon the
legislature there had to be first established the doctrine that the courts, when
called upon to apply the enactments of the lawmaking branch of the government
of which they themselves constitute the judiciary, may declare the invalidity of the
enactments, which, in their judgment, conflict with the provision of the written
Constitution. This doctrine, as is well known, was not accepted without protest,
but may be said to have received final and decisive sanction as the fundamental
principle of American constitutional jurisprudence in the great opinion of
Marshall, rendered in 1803, in the case of Marbury vs. Madison (1 Cr., 137).
"That, as contrasted with English practice, the requirement of due process
of law was a limitation upon the legislative power, so far, at least, as to render
void an enactment authorizing a taking of life, liberty or property by an arbitrary or
otherwise defective procedure, seems early to have been held, the argument being
founded upon the obvious fact that, as contrasted with English constitutional
documents, American written instruments of government and their accompanying
Bills of Rights have for their primary aim the delimitation of the powers of all
departments of government,of the legislative as well as the executive or
judicial." (3 Willoughby, 2d ed., section 1115, pp. 1689, 1690.)
"The possibility, under a popular form of government, of oppression in the
form of laws enacted by their own representatives, does not appear to have been
keenly felt by the people. So far, however, as it was apprehended , the early view
seems to have been that the restraints of natural law would be operative,
according to the doctrine that the law-making branch of every government is
inherently without the power arbitrarily and oppressively to invade the sphere of
private rights of a persons and property. This natural law doctrine, though it can
never be said to have a gained a definite establishment, even for a time,
nevertheless received frequent obiter assertion, and its influence was for a long
time seen in discussions of our higher courts. Thus, for example, in 1875, in Loan
Association vs. Topeka the court said: 'It must be conceded that there are such
rights in every free government beyond the control of the state,a government
which recognized no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty and the property
of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control
of even the most democratic depository of power is, after all, but a despotism . . .
The theory of our governments, state and municipal, is opposed to the deposit of
unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative and the judicial branches
of these governments are all of limited and defined powers. There are limitations
on such power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments
implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could
not exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name. No
court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that A
and B who were husband and wife to each other should be so no longer, but that
A should thereafter be the husband of C, and B the wife of D, or should enact that
the homestead now owned by A should henceforth be the property of B.'" 3
Willoughby, United States Constitutional Law, section 1116, pp. 1692, 1693.)
"There are certain general principles, well settled, however, which narrow
the field of discussion, and may serve as helps to correct conclusions. These
principles grow out of the proposition universally accepted by American Courts on
the authority of Coke, that the words 'due process of law' are equivalent in
meaning to the words 'law of the land,' contained in the chapter of Magna Charta
which provides that 'no freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or
outlawed, or exiled, or any wise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor send
upon him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.'"
"In Hagar vs. Reclamation Dist. it was said: 'It is sufficient to say that by
due process of law is meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate
to the case and just as to the parties to be affected. It must be pursued in the
ordinary mode of prescribed by law, it must be adapted to the end to be attained,
and whenever it is necessary for the protection of the parties, it must give them
the opportunity to be heard respecting the justness of the judgment sought. The
clause, therefore, means that there can be no proceeding against life, liberty or
property which may result in deprivation of either, without the observance of
those general rules established in our system of jurisprudence for the security of
private rights.'
"'By the law of the land,' said Webster in a much quoted paragraph, 'is most
clearly intended the general law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty and property and immunities under the protection
of general rules which govern society. Everything which may pass under the form
of an enactment is not law of the land.'" (3 Willoughby, 2d ed., pp. 1708, 1709.).
"The fact that the requirement as to due process includes, to a very
considerable extent at least, the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, is
especially shown in the opinion if the court in Smyth vs. Ames where it is said:
'The equal protection of the laws, which by the Fourteenth Amendment no state
can deny to the individual, forbids legislation, in whatever form it may be enacted,
by which the property of an individual is, without compensation, wrested from
him for the benefit of another, or of the public.'
"The possible distinction between the two prohibitions we find touched
upon by Chief Justice Taft in his opinion in Truax vs. Corrigan. He there said: 'It
may be that they (the two prohibitions) overlap, that a violation of one may
involve at times the violation of the other, but the spheres of the protection they
offer are not coterminous. . . . The due process clause . . . of course tends to
secure equality of law in the sense that it makes a required minimum of
protection of everyone's right of life, liberty and property, which the Congress or
the legislature may not withhold. Our whole system of law is predicated on the
general fundamental principle of equality of application of the law. . . . But the
framers and adopters of this (Fourteenth) Amendment were not content to
depend on a mere minimum secured by the due process clause, or upon the spirit
of equality which might not be insisted on by local public opinion. They therefore
embodied that spirit in a specific guaranty. The guaranty was aimed at undue
favor and individual or class privilege, on the one hand, and at hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality, on the other. It sought an equality
of treatment of all persons, even though all enjoyed the protection of due
process.' Thus, in the instant case, the Chief Justice pointed out that the State
statute under examination which prohibited interference by injunctions in
disputes between employers and employees concerning terms and conditions of
employment resulted in the recognition of our set of actions against ordinary tort
feasors and another set against tort feasors in labor disputes. The contention that
no one has a vested right to injunctive relief, he said, did not meet the objection
that the granting of equitable relief to one man or set of men, and denying it to
others under like circumstances and in the same jurisdiction was a denial of the
equal protection of the laws.
"In Hayes vs. Missouri the court said of the Fourteenth Amendment that it
'does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the objects to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. It merely requires that all
persons subject to such legislation shall be treated alike , under like
circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed.' Having quoted this statement, Chief Justice Taft in Truax vs. Corrigan
added: 'Indeed, protection is not protection unless it does so. Immunity granted to
a class, however limited, having the effect to deprive another class, however
limited, of a personal or property right, is just as clearly a denial of equal
protection of laws to the latter class as if the immunity were in favor of, or the
deprivation of right permitted worked against, a larger class.'
"From what has been said it is clear that, in many cases, laws which have
been held invalid as denying due process of law might also have been so held
denying equal protection of the laws, or vice versa, and that, in fact, in not a few
cases, the courts have referred to both prohibitions leaving it uncertain which
prohibition was deemed the most pertinent and potent in the premises.
"One of the best general statements of the scope and intent of the
provision for the equal protection of the laws is that given by Justice Field in his
opinion in Barbier vs. Connolly, in which, speaking for the court, he said:
The Fourteenth Amendment in declaring that no State "shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor to deny any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," undoubtedly
intended, not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or
arbitrary spoliation of property but the equal protection and security should be
given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil
rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and
acquire and enjoy property; that they should have like access to the courts of the
country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and
redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should
be interposed to the pursuits by anyone except as applied to the same pursuits by
others under like circumstances ; that no greater burdens calling and condition,
and that in the administration of criminal justice no different or higher
punishment should be imposed upon one that such as is prescribed to all for like
offenses.'" (3 Willoughby 2d ed., pp. 1928, 1930.)
"The legislature may suspend the operation of the general laws of the
State, but when it does so the suspension must be general, and cannot be made
for individual cases or for particular localities. Privileges may be granted to
particular individuals when by so doing the rights of others are not interfered with;
disabilities may be removed; the legislature as parens patriae, when not forbidden,
may grant authority to the guardians or trustees of incompetent persons to
exercise a statutory control over their estates for assistance, comfort or support,
or for the discharge of legal or equitable liens upon their property; but everyone
has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute
which, without his consent, singles his case out as one to be regulated by a
different law from that which is applied in all similar cases, would not be
legitimate legislation, but would be an arbitrary mandate as is not within the
province of free governments. Those make the laws 'are to govern by
promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have
one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough.'
This is a maxim in constitutional law, and by it we may test the authority and
binding force of legislative enactments." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th
ed., pp. 558, 559.)
"Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the
aim of the law; and if special privileges are granted, or special burdens or
restrictions imposed in any case, it must be presumed that the legislature
designed to depart as little as possible from this fundamental maxim of
government.
"The State, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and designs to
inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are always obnoxious
and discriminations against persons or classes are still more so; and, as a rule of
construction, it is to be presumed they were probably not contemplated or
designed. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 562, 563.)
"It is usual for state constitutions and statutes to provide for the accused a
speedy and public trial. By speedy trial is meant one that can be had as soon after
indictment as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence prepare for, regard
being had to the terms of court; a trial conducted according to fixed rules,
regulations, and proceedings of law, free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. The term 'speedy' as thus used, being a word of indeterminate
meaning, permits legislative definition to some extent; and authorities uniformly
hold that such statutes are enacted for the purpose of enforcing the constitutional
right, and that they constitute a legislative construction or definition of the
constitutional provision, and must be construed fairly to the accomplishment of
that end. Any act of the legislature which infringes the constitutional provision is
necessarily nugatory." (16 C.J., pp. 439, 440.)
"'The purpose of the statute (1) is to prevent continued incarceration
without opportunity to the accused, within reasonable time, to meet the proofs
upon which the charge is based.' (State vs. Miller, 72 Wash., 154, 159, 163; 129 P.,
1140.) (2) 'The constitutional privilege of a speedy trial was intended to prevent
an arbitrary, indefinite imprisonment, without any opportunity to the accused to
face his accusers in a public trial. It was never intended as furnishing a technical
means for escaping trial.' (State vs. Miller, supra.) (3) 'The sole object of all laws
from first to last, was to ensure a speedy trial to the accused, and to guard
against a protracted imprisonment or harrassment by a criminal prosecution, an
object but little if any less interesting to the public than to him." (Com. vs. Adcock,
8 Grat. [49 Va.], 661, 680.) (Quote Denham vs. Robinson, 72 W. Va., 243, 255; 77
S.E., 970; 45 L.R.A., N. S., 1123; Ann. Cas. 1915D,997.) (See also Ex parte Santee(2
Va. Cas. [4 Va.], 363, 365) (where the court said: That whilst it has an eye to the
solemn duty of protecting the public against the wrongs of those who are
regardless of their obligations to society, and to the delays which the
Commonwealth may unavoidably encounter in prosecuting breaches of these
obligations, it is studious to shield the accused from the consequences of the
laches of those to whom the duty of conducting the prosecution may have been
assigned. The public has rights as well as the accused, and one of the first of
these is, that of redressing, or punishing their wrongs. It would not seem
reasonable that this right, so necessary for the preservation of society, should be
forfeited without its default).
"This provision of our constitutions must receive a reasonable

interpretation. It cannot be held to mean that in all the possible vicissitudes of
human affairs, a person who is accused of a crime shall have a speedy and
public trial in due form of law, because there may be times when the civil
administration will be suspended by the force of uncontrollable circumstances.
This constitutional provision was adopted upon general considerations growing
out of the experience of past times, and was intended to prevent the government
from oppressing the citizen by holding criminal prosecutions suspended over him
for an indefinite time; and it was also intended to prevent delays in the customary
administration of justice, by imposing upon the judicial tribunals an obligation to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal accusations.' (Ex parte
Turman, 26 Tex., 708, 710; 84 Am. D., 598.)." (16 C.J., 440, footnote.)
"In any criminal case, the person accused may not be deprived of life,
liberty, property except by due process of law, even though he is guilty. The law by
which the question of due process is determined is the law of the jurisdiction
where the offense was committed and the trial is had.
"Due process of law in a criminal case requires a law creating or defining
the offense, a court of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and
opportunity to defend, trial before an impartial judge or judge and jury according
to established criminal procedure, and a right to be discharged unless found
guilty. . . .
"While the freedom of the state and federal governments to control and
regulate the procedure of their courts for the prosecution of criminal offenses is
limited by the requirement of the process of the law, and the procedure must not
work a denial of fundamental rights of accused included within the conception of
due process, no particular form or method of procedure in criminal cases is
required by the guaranty of due process so long as accused has due and
sufficient notice of the charge or accusation and an adequate opportunity to be
heard in defense." (16 C. J. S., pp. 1171-1173.).
"An emergency existing does not increase constitutional power or diminish,
constitutional restrictions; hence while emergency legislation may temporarily
limit available remedies, it does not contemplate the permanent denial of due
process." (16 C. J. S. P. 1157.).
"Although a law is fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as to make
unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the prohibition of the Federal
Constitution." (Chy Lung vs. Freeman, 92 U.S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550.)
"The action of a state through its officers charged with the administration
of the law fair in appearance may be of such character as to constitute a denial
of the equal protection of the laws." (Bailey vs. Alabama, 219 U.S., 219; 31 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 145; 55 Law. ed., 191.)
"The clause 'due process of law' means that there can be no proceeding
against life, liberty or property which may result in the deprivation of either,
without the observance of those general rules established in our system of
jurisprudence for the security of private rights." (Turpin vs. Lemon, 187 U.S., 51; 23
Sup. Ct. Rep., 20; 47 Law. ed., 70.)
"CRIMINAL ACCUSATIONS.
"Perhaps the most important of the protections to personal liberty consist
in the mode of trial which is secured to every person accused of crime. At
common law, accusations of felony were made in the form of an indictment by a
grand jury; and this process is still retained in many States, while others have
substituted in its stead an information filed by the prosecuting officer of the State
or country. The mode of investigating the facts, however, is the same in all; and
this is through a trial by jury, surrounded by certain safeguards which are well
understood part of the system, and which the government cannot dispense with.
"First, we may mention that the humanity of our law always presumes an
accused party innocent until he is proved guilty. This is a presumption which
attends all the proceedings against him, from their initiation until they result in a
verdict, which either finds the party guilty or converts the presumption of
innocence into an adjudged fact.
"If there were any mode short of confinement which would, with
reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused to answer the
accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when the
effect is to subject him, in a greater or less degree, to the punishment of a guilty
person, while as yet it is not determined that he has committed any crime. If the
punishment on conviction cannot exceed in severity the forfeiture of a large sum
of money, then it is reasonable to suppose that such a sum of money, or an
agreement by responsible parties to pay it to the government in case the accused
should fail to appear, would be sufficient security for his attendance; and
therefore, at the common law, it was customary to take security of this character
in all cases of misdemeanor; one or more friends of the accused undertaking for
his appearance for trial, aggreeing that a certain sum of money should be levied
of their goods and chattels, lands and tenements, if he made default. . . . The
presumption of innocence is an absolute protection against conviction and
punishment, except either, first on confession in an open court; or, second, on
proof which places the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Formerly, if a prisoner
arraigned for felony stood mute wilfully, and refused to plead, a terrible mode was
resorted to for the purpose of compelling him to do so, and this might even end in
his death; but a more merciful proceeding is now substituted; the court entering
the plea of not guilty for a party who, for any reason, fails to plead for himself.
"Again, it is required that the trial be speedy: and here also the injunction is
addressed to the sense of justice and sound judgment of the court. In this
country, where officers are specially appointed or elected to represent the people
in these prosecutions, their position gives them an immense power for
oppression: and it is so feared they do not always sufficiently appreciate the
responsibility, and wield the power with due regard to the legal rights and
privileges of the accused. When a person charged with crime is willing to proceed
at once to trial, no delay on the part of the prosecution is reasonable, except only
that which is necessary for proper preparation and to secure the attendance of
witnesses. Very much, however, must be left to the judgment of the prosecuting
officer in these cases; and the court would not compel the government to proceed
to trial at the first term after indictment found or information filed, if the officer
who represents it should state, under the responsibility of his official oath, that he
was not and could not be ready at that time. But further delay would not generally
be allowed without a more specific showing of the causes which prevent the
State proceeding to trial, including the names of the witnesses, the steps taken to
procure them, and the facts expected to be proved by them, in order that the court
might judge of the reasonableness of the application, and that the prisoner, might,
if he saw fit to take the course, secure an immediate trial by admitting that the
witnesses, if present, would testify to the facts which the prosecution have
claimed could be proven by them." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed.,
pp. 436-441.)
"Section 19 of our Bill of Rights provides that 'no citizen of this state shall
be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities , or in any manner
disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.'
"'Law of the land' is interpreted to mean general public law, operating
equally upon every member of the community." (Re Jilz, 3 Mo. App., 246.).
"No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws;" "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
property without due process of law." . . . U.S. Constitution, section 1, article 14.
"Due process of law under the 14th amendment and the equal protection
of the law are secured if the law operates on all alike and does not subject the
individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. (Duncan vs.
Missouri, 152 U.S., 382; 38 Law. ed., 487; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 570; Hurtado vs.
California, 110 U.S., 535; 28 Law. ed., 232; 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 111, 292.).
"Do laws operate equally upon the citizens of the Commonwealth of Texas
which will imprison under like verdicts one man for a month and another for six
months? Manifestly not.
"Section 3 of the Bill of Rights to the State Constitution provides: 'All
freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights.'
"A law which makes different punishments follow the same identical
criminal acts in the different political subdivisions of Texas violates both our
state and Federal Constitutions. It fails to accord equal rights and equal
protection of the law, and a conviction under it is not in due course of the 'law of
the land.' Re Jilz (3 Mo. App., 246); Re H. F. Millon (16 Idaho, 737; 22 L. R. A. [N.
S.], 1123;102 Pac., 374), and Jackson vs. State (55 Tex. Crim. Rep., 557; 117 S.
W., 818), are cited in support of our view in their reasoning.
"We think the principles announced in the case of Ex parte Jones (106 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 185; 290 S. W., 177), apply in some degree to the instant case. It was
there held that article 793, Code Crim. Proc., superseded and controlled an
ordinance of the city of Dallas which allowed only 50 cents per day to be credited
upon the fine of a convict for labor performed. Provisions similar to those quoted
in our state constitution have been a part of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence since
there was a wrung from the unwilling hands of King John at Runnymede in 1215
the Magna Charta, which itself provides that a freeman shall not be passed upon
or condemned but 'by the lawful judgment of his peers and the law of the land.'
'Law of the land' has the same legal meaning as 'due process of law,' and one of
its accepted meanings is that quoted above. Re Jilz, 3 Mo. App., 243; 3 Words &
Phrases, pp. 2227-2232." (Ex Parte Sizemore, 59 A.L.R., Annotated, pp. 430, 432.)
"And in Re Jilz ([1877], 3 Mo. App., 2430),an act of the legislature of

Missouri, which, by limiting the power of a court established in a certain country
to assess punishments, varied the penalties for crimes committed therein from
those fixed by the general law for the whole state, was held to be unconstitutional
in so far as it had that effect, the court saying: 'A law which should prescribe
death as the punishment of murder in one country, and imprisonment as the
penalty for the same crime in other parts of the state, would be void, because not
operating equally upon all inhabitants of the state. The general law applicable to
the state prescribes, as the punishment for the offense for which the petitioner
was convicted, imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or fine not
exceeding $500, or both such fine and imprisonment. . . . A law prescribing a
different punishment from this in St. Louis county is clearly unconstitutional. It
follows that so much of the act referred to, establishing the court of criminal
correction, as limits the punishment for the misdemeanor in St. Louis county to
imprisonment for six month's is void.'
"So, in State vs. Buchardt (Mo.) supra, where the same legislative act was
in question, the court says: 'Under our Constitution, it is not permissible to punish
the same offense or violation of some public or general law by one species of
punishment in one locality, and by a different or more heavy punishment in other
localities in the state. A law inflicting such different penalties for the perpetration
of any given crime cannot bear the test of judicial examination.'
"And in State vs. Gregori ([1928],Mo, 2 S. W. [2d], 747), an act of the
legislature which made children seventeen years of age in counties of 50,000
population or more subject to the juvenile court act, while in counties of less than
50,000 population children seventeen years of age were not subject to the juvenile
court act, but were subject to full criminal responsibility, was held
unconstitutional as denying equal protection of the laws; the court stating that it
was the general doctrine that the law relative to those who might be charged with
and convicted of crime, as well as to the punishment to be inflicted therefor,
should operate equally upon every citizen or inhabitant of the state.
"And, in State vs. Fowler ([1927], 193 N. C., 290; 136 S.E., 709), an act of the
North Carolina legislature, applicable to five counties of the state only, which
imposed as punishment for a specified offense a fine only, while a statute
applicable to the whole state imposed a fine or imprisonment, was held to be
unconstitutional under both the Federal and State Constitutions as a denial of the
equal protection of the laws. The court says: 'But the statute under consideration
cannot be sustained on the ground that it was enacted in the exercise of the
police power. The question is whether it shall supersede "the law of the land"
the general public law which was designed to operate without exception or
partiality throughout the state. It is needful to remember that indictment was
drafted under the general law, and that the decisive question is whether offenders
in the five counties referred to may lawfully be exempted from the punishment
prescribed by the general law; whether they shall be subject only to a fine when
the offenders in ninety-five other counties may be punished by imprisonment. In
our judgment this part of section 2 is neither equal protection of the laws nor the
protection of equal laws. . . . It is the grant of a special exemption from
punishment or an exclusive or separate privilege which is forbidden by the cited
provision. . . . The principle of uniformity in the operation of a general law extends
to the punishment, and denounces as arbitrary and unreasonable the imposition
in one county of any kind of punishment which is different from that which is
prescribed under the general law to all who may be guilty of the same offense. It
follows that the provision limiting the punishment for the first offense to a fine
must be regarded as an arbitrary class distinction which cannot be sustained
because forbidden by the fundamental law, and the judgment which was
pronounced by authority of the general law must be upheld." (Annotation, 59 A. L.
R., Annotated, p. 434.)
"Bills of attainder were prohibited to be passed, either by the Congress or
by the legislatures of the several States. Attainder, in a strict sense, means an
extinction of civil and political rights and capacities; and at the common law it
followed, as of course, on conviction and sentence for the different classes of
felony.
"A bill of attainder was legislative conviction for alleged crime, with
judgment of death. Such convictions have not been uncommon under other
governments, and then power to pass these bills has been exercised by the
Parliament of England at some periods in its history, under the most oppressive
and unjustifiable circumstances, greatly aggravated by an arbitrary course of
procedure, which had few of the incidents of a judicial investigation into alleged
crime. For some time before the American Revolution, however, no one had
attempted to defend it as a legitimate exercise of power; and if it would be
unjustifiable anywhere, there were many reasons why it would be specially
obnoxious under a free government, and why consequently its provision, under
the existing circumstances of our country, would be a matter of more than
ordinary importance. Every one must concede that a legislative body, from its
numbers and organization, and from the very intimate dependence of its
members upon the people, which renders them liable to be peculiarly susceptible
to popular clamor, it not properly constituted to try with coolness, caution, and
impartiality a criminal charge, especially in those cases in which the popular
feeling is strongly excitedthe very class of cases most likely to be prosecuted by
this mode. And although it would be conceded that, if such bills were allowable,
they should be properly be presented only for offenses against the general laws
of the land, and be proceeded with on the same full opportunity for investigation
and defense which is afforded in the courts of the common law, yet it was
remembered that in practice they were often resorted to because an obnoxious
person was not subject to punishment under the general law, or because, in
proceeding against him by this mode, some rule of the common law requiring a
particular species of degree of evidence might be evaded, and a conviction
secured on proofs that a jury would not be suffered to accept as overcoming the
presumption of innocence. Whether the accused should necessarily be served
with process; what degree or species of evidence should be required; whether the
rules of law should be followed, either in determining what constituted the crime,
or in dealing with the accused after convictionwere all questions which would
necessarily address themselves to the legislative discretion and sense of justice;
and the very qualities which are essential in a court to protect individuals on trial
before them against popular clamor, or the hate of those in powers, were precisely
those which were likely to prove weak or wanting in legislative body at such a
time. And what could be more obnoxious in a free government than the exercise
of such a power by a popular body, controlled by a mere majority, fresh from the
contests of exciting elections, and quite too apt, under the most favorable
circumstances, to suspect the motives of the adversaries, and to resort to
measures of doubtful propriety to secure party ends?
"Nor were legislative punishments of this severe character the only ones
known to parliamentary history; there were others of a milder form, which were
only less obnoxious in that the consequences were less terrible. These legislative
convictions were imposed punishments less than that of death were called bills
of pains and penalties, as distinguished from bills of attainder; but the
constitutional provisions we have referred to were undoubtedly aimed at any and
every species of legislative punishment for criminal or supposed criminal
offenses; and the term 'bill of attainder' is used in a generic sense, which would
include bills of pains and penalties also.
"The thoughtful reader will not fail to discover, in the acts of the American
States during the Revolutionary period, sufficient reason for this constitutional
provision, even if the still more monitory history of English attainders had not
been so freshly remembered. Some of these acts provided for the forfeiture of the
estates, within the Commonwealth, of those British subjects who had withdrawn
from the jurisdiction because not satisfied that grievances existed sufficiently
serious to justify the last resort of an oppressed people, or because of other
reasons not satisfactory to the existing authorities; and the only investigation
provided for was an inquiry into the desertion. Others mentioned particular
persons by name, adjudged them guilty of adhering to the enemies of the State,
and proceeded to inflict punishment upon them so far as the presence of property
within the Commonwealth would enable the government to do so. These were the
resorts of a time of extreme peril, and if possible to justify them in a period of
revolution, when everything was staked on success, and when the public safety
would not permit too much weight to scruples concerning the private rights of
those who were not aiding a popular cause, the power to repeat such acts under
any conceivable circumstances in which the country could be placed again was
felt to be too dangerous to be left in the legislative hands. So far as proceedings
had been completed under those acts before the treaty of 1783, by the actual
transfer of property, they remained valid and effectual afterwards; but so far as
they were then incomplete, they were put an end to by that treaty.
"The conviction of the propriety of this constitutional provision has been so

universal, that it has never been questioned, either in legislative bodies or
elsewhere. Nevertheless, cases have recently arisen, growing out of the attempt to
break up and destroy the government of the United States has adjudged certain
action of Congress to be in violation of this provision and consequently void. The
action referred to was designed to exclude from practice in the United States
courts all persons who had taken up arms against the government during the
recent rebellion, or who had voluntarily given aid and encouragement to its
enemies; and the mode adopted to effect the exclusion was to require of all
persons, before they should be admitted to the bar or allowed to practice, an oath
negating any such disloyal action. This decision was not at first universally
accepted as sound; and the Supreme Courts of West Virginia and of the District of
Columbia declined to follow it, insisting that permission to practise in the courts is
not a right but a privilege, and that the withholding it for any reason of State
policy or personal unfitness could not be regarded as the infliction of criminal
punishment.
"The Supreme Court of the United States has also, upon the same
reasoning, held a clause in the Constitution of Missouri, which among other
things, excluded all priests and clergymen from practising or teaching unless they
should first take a similar oath of loyalty, to be void, overruling in so doing a
decision of the Supreme Court of that State." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
7th ed., pp. 368-372.)
The legal problem confronting us is characterized by the fact that we have to
avoid the misleading effect resulting from the difference between the text and the letter
of the law and their grammatical sense and effect on one side, and as it is interpreted
and applied in actual practice.
Apparently, there is nothing so harmless as the provision of section 19 of Act No.
682, suspending for a period of not more than six months the provision of article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code punishes the public of cer or employee
who "shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person
to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."
Said article has nothing to show that it bears constitutional sanction. It is only a
part of the penal laws which are within the full jurisdiction of the legislative power to
enact or not to enact. The Philippine Legislature which enacted the Revised Penal Code
could have failed to do so without, by that very fact, violating any provision of the
Constitution. The succeeding legislative bodiesthe unicameral National Assembly and
the Congressmay, without question, repeal or suspend article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as any other article of the same, or even the whole code.
Therefore, as an abstract proposition, as a matter of legal technicality, we believe
that there is absolutely no ground for disputing the power of the legislative body to
suspend or even repeal article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. But the provision is
vitiated:
(1) By the fact that it is class legislation, excluding the political prisoners
concerned from the same bene ts and protection afforded all other persons by article
125.
(2) By the fact that it is interpreted and applied, not only in the negative sense
as a deterrent against public of cials or employees bent on encroaching and trampling
upon the personal freedom of any person, but as a positive authority to said of cers
and employees to deprive and continue depriving the political prisoners concerned of
their personal liberty, without due or any legal process of law provided the deprivation
of liberty did not exceed six months, but without reckoning the previous many months
of illegal detention they had already suffered before their formal transfer to
Commonwealth Government.
For these two radical and incurable defects, section 19 of Act No. 682 runs
counter to the Constitution when it prohibits that no person shall be deprived of liberty
without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws. (Article III, section 1 [1], Constitution of the Philippines.)
No one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the
provision. If all discriminations are abhorrent under any regime of law and justice,
imperatively more in a democracy such as ours , tribunals must be recreant to their
duties if they fail to deny validity to such odious legal measure, conceived, adopted, and
unhappily enacted by the legislative power in one of its blundering moods in utter
defiance of the fundamental law of the land.
Petitioner points out that in the provision there is an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative powers, because the power to suspend the provision of article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code within the maximum period of six months, in fact, is transferred to
the Special Prosecutors' Of ce, which may shorten or lengthen said suspension by
filing the corresponding criminal information at any time it may deem convenient.
The Special Prosecutor's Of ce may not suspend altogether article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code by filing immediately the information. It may suspend it for 10 days,
by ling the information within that time. It may suspend it for one month, two months,
or three months, by filing the information within the desired time. It may suspend it for a
maximum period of six months just by mere inaction, by not ling any information at all.
The result is, in fact, to place in the hands of the Special Prosecutors' Of ce the power
to suspend article 125 for any length of time within the maximum period of six months.
And what is worst is that the suspension that the Special Prosecutor's Of ce may
decree is individualized, and not of general effect to all the political prisoners
concerned, thus making the Special Prosecutors' Of ce a kind of dictatorship which
may dispense its favors and disfavors to individual prisoners under no other test than
its convenience and whims.
Evidently, petitioner's complaint is well-taken, giving additional ground for the
nullity of the provision in question, the legislative power having been reserved by the
Constitution exclusively to Congress.
Lastly, the provision in question appears to legalize the many months of illegal
detention already endured by the political prisoners concerned. The legislative power
can not legalize illegal detention, much more if that illegal detention has been
perpetrated in utter violation of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.
Petitioner assails the Validity of the whole Act. No. 682, aside from what has
been already said about section 19 thereof, upon the following grounds:
(1) Because it is an ex post facto law, violating section 1(11), Article III, of the
Constitution, petitioner having been deprived of his acquired right to be freed, under
penalty of his detainers, within six hours after his detention under article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
(2) Because section 2 set up a legal trap by which a person, accused in the
information of an offense, may be convicted and sentenced for a different one, thus
violating his constitutional right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him." (Section 1 [17], Article III, Constitution of the Philippines.)
(3) Because it creates a special court to try cases arising years before its
creation, transferring a jurisdictional belonging to courts of rst instance to the
People's Court, a blunder identical in nature and viciousness to the former practice of
shuf ing judges of rst instance, the judicial rigodon resorted to before to suit certain
purposes of the government and which was stopped by Judge Borromeo's courageous
defense of the independence of the judiciary, in a leading case before the Supreme
Court which made history.
(4) Because the creation of the People's Court is a judicial gerrymandering.
(5) Because the name "People's Court" suggests a political entity, a popular
dispenser of political justice, in contrast with the stable, impartial, cultured nature of a
judiciary, detached from momentary interests and influences.
(6) Because the self-extinguishing character of the People's Court makes it
an agency for special mission, more an agency of the legislature than that of the
administration of justice.
(7) Because it disquali es members of the judiciary who served under the
Japanese regime.
We cannot but recognize that strength of the objections, specially objections of
(1), (2) and (7).But we are not ready to support petitioner's contention that the whole
act should be declared null and void, considering that the unconstitutional provisions
thereof may be segregated and the remaining portions of the text may stand on their
own feet.
Objection (1) adds only one another ground to show the unconstitutionality of
the provision of section 19, suspending article 125 of the Revised Penal Code; and
objection (2) only affects the corresponding provision of section 2 of the act. Objection
(7), upon which we already expressed our opinion in the case of De la Rama vs. Misa
(42 Off. Gaz., 1544), only affects the provision concerning the disquali cation of certain
justices of the Supreme Court.
Regarding objections (3), (4), (5), and (6), although they are meritorious, we
believe that they are offset by the collegiate character of the newly created court. We
are inclined to believe that the main purpose in creating the People's Court was
precisely to afford those who will be charged and tried before it a special safeguard, in
the fact that more than one judge will have to hear and try a case, to counterbalance the
prevailing prejudice in the community against the persons who are accused for having
collaborated with the enemy. For this reason, we are of opinion that the act of creating
the People's Court must not be invalidated.
But it is our hope that its creation will not set a precedent that will sanction a
wrong principle. Generally speaking, the creation of temporary tribunals to administer
justice in specially pre-determined existing cases is contrary to the nature and
character of judicial functions and the purposes of the administration of justice, which
must be characterized by the independence of judicial of cers, independence that
cannot be secured without guaranteeing the stability of tenure of office.
Judges are not supposed to decide on what may appear right or wrong in the
evanescent moment when the voice of passion grows louder in the market of human
activities. They must not make decisions in the spur of the news that make screaming
headlines and arouse the uncontrollable emotions of political leaders or of the
populace. They must decide between right and wrong by the criterion of universal
conscience, by judgment, not only of the eeting instance of evolving history, but the
unending caravans of generations to come.
The inherent justice of their decisions must continue being sensed as the
treasured human heritage long long after they had rendered their inescapable tribute to
death, like aroma which continues enriching and sweetening the air long after the
owers have been crushed in the chemist's retorts to give way to their perfumed
essence, like the beauty of the temples and palaces of Palmyra which continues
charming our memory millenniums after they have become just dusty ruins, like the
heavenly melodies which continue lingering in our ears long after we have heard those
musical gems, such as the masterpieces of Bach and the symphonies of Beethoven,
like light emitted by stars which ceased to exist centuries ago still traveling in the
immensity of space to attract our admiration and arouse dreams of immortality.
In order that judges could render judgments of lasting value which would
embody the wisdom of the ages and the moral sense of all time, it is necessary that
they should preside over tribunals which must be looked upon as permanent
institutions of justice, not temporary makeshifts, more appropriate to serve ephemeral
purposes than to be the inviolable temples of an eternal goddess. And the judge
themselves, to acquire the olympic serenity, the awesome and noble austerity, the
heretic aloofness, the majestic equanimity proper of their great mission, there being
none greater that can be entrusted to a person as the image of God, must feel, by the
permanency, stability, and security of their tenure of of ce, that they owe an undivided
loyalty, not to any transient idols or to any momentary masters, no matter how powerful
they are, but to the inseparable twin divinities of truth and justice.
Judge Robert N. Wilkin said that the special function of a judicial of cer is to
determine what is right and what is wrong, not only for the clamorous present, but for
silent generations to come. From him we quote these illuminating paragraphs:
"The guiding force in social evolution is not to be found in the arbitrary will
of groups , nor in a common purpose. It is to be found in the law of our nature,
that imminent or inherent law founded on the characteristics of human kind. 'A
law instilled and not imposed,' as Cicero said, 'a law in which we are fashioned,
not instructed.' It is not created by proclamation or legislative fiat. It is discovered
by patient research and spiritual insight.
"The true judge must have something of the vision of prophet. He must be
able to see the trends of his time extended, so that principles which he announces
may be adjusted to conditions yet to come. The observation of Graham Wallas
that a great judge needs a touch of the qualities that make a poet has been
quoted with approval by Professor Chafee, Justice Cardozo, and others. Poets, as
has been stated, bear the same relation to society as the antennae of an insect to
its body; they are 'feelers' of the body politic. Their sensibilities are more acute,
more advanced than those of their contemporaries, and what they feel and
express today their fellows will feel and understand tomorrow. Poets, prophets,
judgesthey are God's elect; we cannot elect them.
"The great judge cannot be a child of his age. If his judgments are to be
great they must be timeless, or at least timed to the future. The spirit of the law
should enable him to transcend the spirit of his times and he should be able to
speak sub specie aeternitatis. What a desecration of the office to choose its
incumbent by any system which forces him to temporize!.
"Judges in early times were priests, or more accurately stated, the priests
performed the functions of judges. There is still much about the judicial office
that is priestly. This has ever seemed quite natural to those who took seriously
their first legal learning from Blackstone, who stated at the outset that all human
laws depend upon the divine law. While for a time that teaching seemed out of
fashion, the more recent trend is to acknowledge again our subjection to a law of
nature, a law divine. Be that as it may, it will not be disputed that a proper
performance of judicial duties requires a devotion to quite similar to the
consecration of priest. Judges, like the clergy, should be kept unspotted from the
world. Any personal interest, selfish concern, or party consciousness, corrupts not
only the judge but the judicial function. Any want of honest detachment in the
judge undermines public faith in judicial administration. As has frequently been
stated, it is quite as important to the public that judges should be free from the
appearance of evil as that they should be free from actual evil. The prevalent
disrespect for law is prompted not so much by corruption in the courts, as by that
system of choosing judges which makes every judge suspect.
"The taking of judicial office should be much like the taking of holy orders
one should not do so who is unwilling to suffer a kind of civil death. The only
way in which one can be worthy of the office is by submerging self in the
performance of the duties of the office. A judge should be only the voice of the
law. As Cicero said, 'While the law is a voiceless magistrate, the magistrate is law
made vocal.' It is arrogant presumption for a judge to pose as anything more, and
gross indiscretion for him to assert his own voice. The only way in which he can
avoid violation of the injunction, 'Judge not, that they be not judged,' is by
pronouncing , not his personal will, but the judgment of the law. How otherwise
could a judge impose a death sentence and live in peace? If the judgment is his
own, the blood of the condemned is upon him. If the judgment is at the behest of
popular clamor he has given sanction to lynching. But if his judgment is the
pronouncement of the law, the judicial function is fulfilled and his conscience
clear. The judicial robe should be submerge personality and make its bearer, like a
priest in vestment, an impersonal part of divine function." (The Judicial Function
and the Need of Professional Section of Judgesby Robert N. Wilkin, Journal of the
American Judicature Society, Vol. 29, No. 4, Dec., 1945.)
The facts of current experience showed the imperative need of intellectual
overhauling as part of the work of post-war rehabilitation of in all orders of our national
life. Many elemental tenets and ideals need be restated, if not rediscovered. The
worries and psychological shocks caused by the Japanese initial victories and brutal
oppressions concomitant with their occupation of our country, had the effect of
warping the mentality and sense of moral values of not a negligible number of persons.
There are men whose intellectual outlook and views of freedom and fundamental
human rights, tethered by defective development of ideology, are not only outmoded,
but absolutely incompatible with the trends of progress, whose brains appear not to be
completely freed from the embryonic amnion and are in need of allantoic nutrition, who
would rather wield the bludgeon of jungle arbitrariness and make a cof e of serfs of
free people, than abide by the constitutional precepts and the noble doctrines of the
UNO Charter, whose juridical ideas, rather than in forum of modern democracy, have
their proper place among the fossils of apteryx, megatheria and dinosaurs' museum
and, notwithstanding, are being haled in apparently responsible sectors of the press as
heroes of progressiveness. Such nonsense and intellectual travesty are inconceivable
except in a topsyturvy world which has adopted the thyrsus as the choicest emblem of
human happiness, where the frenzied mental processes have been inverted as if in the
Corinthian order, the frieze, cornice, and architrave are placed at the foot of the column
and above it the stylobate.
Among the basic concepts that must be included in the wholesale intellectual
overhauling which we need to undergo, if we have to follow the mental, social, legal, and
moral thread which was cut at the impact of the disastrous invasion of our soil, is the
one we have on personal liberty, upon which traditional democratic principles we had
been accepting and following before the enemy occupation, as part of the nature of our
social and political institutions, appear to have been forgotten, the present case being
one of a series of instances evidencing it, as can be seen in our opinions in Raquiza vs.
Bradford (75 Phil., 50);Reyes vs. Crisologo (75 Phil., 225); Duran vs. Abad Santos (75
Phil., 410); Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira (75 Phil., 634); Herras Teehankee vs. Director of
Prisons p. 756, post; Taada vs. Quirino (42 Off. Gaz., 394), the pronouncements in
which we are reiterating here.
The moral hiatus in our national life is over, and in this hour of resumption of
democratic processes, there is an imperative need, as one of the cornerstones of our
national structure, to redefine and reaffirmed our pre-war concept of human freedom.
The petitioner is entitled to be immediately set free, and we vote for restoring
him to his personal freedom of which he was deprived without any legal process.
Footnotes
1. See Raquiza vs. Bradford (75 Phil., 50).

2. See 6 R.C.L., section 369; Taada, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 74; 16 C.J.S., p.
954 et seq.

3. See 16 C.J.S., p. 865 et seq.
4. See 16 C.J.S., section 228.
5. Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners (36 Phil., 120).

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-200. March 28, 1946.]

ANASTACIO LAUREL , petitioner, vs . ERIBERTO MISA, as Director of

Sulpicio V. Cea for petitioner.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; VALIDITY OF SECTION 19 OF COMMONWEALTH

I concur with the majority in upholding the constitutionality of section 19 of the

PERFECTO , J., dissenting :

For purposes of this discussion, the discrepancy between petitioner and

"This provision of our constitutions must receive a reasonable

"And in Re Jilz ([1877], 3 Mo. App., 2430),an act of the legislature of

"The conviction of the propriety of this constitutional provision has been so

1. See Raquiza vs. Bradford (75 Phil., 50).

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