EDUARDO R. VACA and FERNANDO NIETO, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioners seek a review of the decision, dated October 25, 1996, [1] and the
resolution, dated December 2, 1997,[2] of the Court of Appeals, affirming their conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Eduardo R. Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International, Inc.
(Ervine), which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of refrigeration equipment, while
his son-in-law, petitioner Fernando Nieto, is the firms purchasing manager. On March 10,
1988, petitioners issued a check for P10,000.00 to the General Agency for
Reconnaissance, Detection, and Security, Inc. (GARDS) in partial payment of the security
services rendered by GARDS to Ervine. The check was drawn on the China Banking
Corporation (CBC). When deposited in the Philippine Commercial International Bank
(PCIBank) branch at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, the check was dishonored
for insufficiency of funds.
On March 29, 1988, GARDS wrote Ervine a letter in which it demanded payment in
cash of the amount of the check within seven days from notice. The letter was received
by Ervine on the same day, but petitioners did not pay within the time given.
On April 13, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P19,860.16 to GARDS. The check
was drawn on the Associated Bank. The voucher accompanying it stated that the check
was to replace the dishonored check, the P9,860.16 balance being partial payment for
Ervines outstanding account. The check and the voucher were received by a GARDS
messenger, Nolan C. Pena, on April 15, 1988, but GARDS did not return the dishonored
check.
On April 14, 1988, GARDS Operations Manager Jovito C. Cabusara filed a criminal
complaint against petitioners for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. After preliminary investigation,
an information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 97). However,
the case was dismissed by the court on May 11, 1989, upon motion of the prosecution,
on the ground that Ervine had already paid the amount of the check.
On September 18, 1989, GARDS, through its Acting Operations Manager Eduardo
B. Alindaya, filed another complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against petitioners. This
resulted in the filing of an information against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 100). After trial, petitioners were found guilty of the charge and each
was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and
the costs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It subsequently denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:
 A. Respondent Court gravely erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to
prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
B. Respondent Court gravely erred in basing conviction on the alleged weakness
of the evidence of the defense rather than on the strength of the evidence of
the prosecution.
C. Respondent Court erred in not acquitting petitioners on grounds of mistake of
fact and lack of knowledge.
Petitioners pray that the case against them be dismissed or, in the alternative, that
the decision of the trial court be modified by sentencing each to an increased fine but
without imprisonment.
By supplemental petition, dated January 29, 1998, petitioners submitted an affidavit
of desistance executed by GARDS president Dominador R. Santiago which states that
the case arose from a mere accounting difference between petitioners and GARDS, that
the latter had not really suffered any damage as a result of the issuance of the check in
question and, that GARDS was no longer interested in prosecuting the case.
On May 28, 1998, petitioners filed another supplemental petition, this time invoking
the recent decision in Lao v. Court of Appeals,[3] in which this Court reversed a conviction
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 upon a showing that the accused had no knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds.
The Solicitor General opposes the appeal. He contends that the facts of Lao v. Court
of Appeals are different from those of the case at bar and that the affidavit of desistance
of Dominador Santiago is of no moment, such affidavit having been made only after
petitioners conviction.
After due review of the decision in this case, we find that petitioners conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is well founded.
First. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2) knowledge of the
maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[4] The makers knowledge is presumed from the
dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds.[5] Thus, 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 expressly
provides:

SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and

issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date
of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
 In this case, after being notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their previous
check, petitioners gave GARDS a check for P19,860.16. They claim that this check had
been intended by them to replace the bad check they had previously issued to the
GARDS. Based on the testimony of a GARDS accountant, however, the Court of Appeals
found that the check was actually payment for two bills, one for the period of January 16
to January 31, 1988 in the amount of P9,930.08 and another one for the period of March
16 to March 31, 1988 in the same amount. But even if such check was intended to
replacethe bad one, its issuance on April 13, 1988 15 days after petitioners had been
notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their previous check cannot negate the
presumption that petitioners knew of the insufficiency of funds to cover the amount of their
previous check. Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 requires that such check be given within five (5)
days from the notice of dishonor to them.
Petitioners contend that, in accordance with the ruling in Lao v. Court of
Appeals,[6] they should be acquitted because the preparation of checks is the
responsibility of the company accountant and all they do is sign the checks. They claim
that they rely on the word of the accountant that there are sufficient funds in the bank to
pay for the checks.
In the Lao case, the accused, as the Court found, had merely been made by her
employer, Premiere Investment House, to countersign checks in blank. The accused was
a mere employee who did not have anything to do with the issuance of checks for the
company. She did not know to whom the checks would be paid as the names of payees
were written only later by the head of operations. Moreover, no notice of dishonor was
given to her as required by B.P. Blg. 22, 2. It could thus rightly be concluded that the
accused issued checks to apply to account not knowing that at the time of issuance funds
were insufficient to pay for the checks.
Petitioners in this case cannot pretend ignorance of the insufficiency of funds. While
it may be true that it was the companys accountant who actually prepared the rubber
check, the fact remains that petitioners are the owners and officers of the company. Sec.
1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company, or
entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall
be liable under this Act.
In fact, petitioner Nieto testified that after the check in question was dishonored, he
instructed their company accountant to prepare a replacement check. [7] This belies
petitioners claim that they had no hand in the preparation of checks [8] and shows that
petitioners were in control of the finances of the company.
Second. The affidavit of desistance of the GARDS president deserves no more than
passing mention. The claim that this case was simply the result of a misunderstanding
between GARDS and petitioners and that the former did not really suffer any damage
from the dishonor of the check is flimsy. After prosecuting the case below with tenacity,
complainants going so far as to file another complaint after their first one had been
dismissed, it is trifling with this Court for complainants to now assert that the filing of their
case was simply a mistake. It is for reasons such as this that affidavits of desistance, like
retractions, are generally disfavored.[9] The affidavit in this case, which was made after
petitioners conviction, is nothing but a last-minute attempt to save them from
punishment. Even if the payee suffered no damage as a result of the issuance of the
bouncing check, the damage to the integrity of the banking system cannot be
denied. Damage to the payee is not an element of the crime punished in B.P. Blg. 22.
Third. Petitioners pray that, in the alternative, the penalty be modified by deleting the
sentence of imprisonment and, in lieu thereof, a fine in an increased amount be imposed
on them. In support of their plea, they allege that they do not have any record of prior
conviction; that Eduardo Vaca is of advanced age (late 60s); and, that they come from
good families. Petitioners claim that with their family background and social standing there
is no reason why they will refuse to pay a due and demandable debt of only P10,000.00. It
is precisely because of their founded belief that the subject obligation has been paid that
they refused to be intimidated by a criminal charge.
The Court of Appeals dismissed these allegations as irrelevant to the question of
petitioners guilt. We think so ourselves. However, we believe that they can be considered
in determining the appropriate penalty to impose on petitioners.
B.P. Blg. 22, 1, par. 1 provides a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty days
but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court. Petitioners are first-time
offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national
economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although
mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could
simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a
prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within
the range of discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human
material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.[10] In this case we believe
that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an
appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
modification that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted and petitioners are each
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 equivalent to double the amount of the check.
SO ORDERED.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CORA ABELLA OJEDA, appellant.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

For review is the decision[1] dated June 21, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 38, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Cora Abella Ojeda guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act 4885, in Criminal Case No. 88-
66228 and hereby sentences her to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessories provided by law and with credit for preventive imprisonment undergone, if
any, in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and to pay
complainant Ruby Chua the amount of Two Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand Three
Hundred Six (P228,306.00) Pesos with interests thereon from the time of demand until
fully paid.

Likewise, the Court also finds the said accused guilty for Violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-66230, 88-66232, 88-66235 to 88-66240, 88-66242,
88-66243, 88- 66245 to 88-66248 (14) counts and hereby sentences her to suffer a
penalty of one year of imprisonment for each count. On the other hand, the other charges
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 88- 66229, 88-66231, 88-66233, 88-66234, 88-66241
and 88-66244 are hereby dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Costs against accused in all instances.[2]

Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda was charged in 21 separate Informations for estafa in
Criminal Case No. 88-66228 and for violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22 in Criminal
Case Nos. 88-66229 to 88-66248.
The Information charging Ojeda with estafa read:

That on or about the first week of November, 1983, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud RUBY CHUA
in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, well knowing that she did not have
sufficient funds in the bank and without informing the said Ruby Chua of such fact drew,
made out and issued to the latter the following post-dated Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation checks, to wit:

Check No. Date Amount

1. 033550 Nov. 5, 1983 P17,100.00

2. 041782 Nov. 5, 1983 5,392.34
3. 042935 Nov. 6, 1983 1,840.19
4. 041799 Nov. 9, 1983 11,953.38
 5. 033530 Nov. 10, 1983 19,437.34
6. 041714 Nov. 10, 1983 26, 890.00
7. 042942 Nov. 10, 1983 1,941.59
8. 041783 Nov. 12, 1983 5,392.34
9. 041800 Nov. 14, 1983 11,953.39
10. 041788 Nov. 15, 1983 3,081.90
11. 033529 Nov. 15, 1983 19,437.34
12. 041784 Nov. 18, 1983 5,392.34
13. 042901 Nov. 18, 1983 11,953.38
14. 042902 Nov. 23, 1983 11,953.38
15. 041785 Nov. 25, 1983 5,392.34
16. 042903 Nov. 29, 1983 11,953.38
17. 033532 Nov. 29, 1983 13,603.22
18. 041786 Nov. 30, 1983 5,392.34
19. 042905 Dec. 8, 1983 11,953.39
20. 043004 Dec. 10, 1983 2,386.25
21. 042907 Dec. 15, 1983 11,953.38
22. 042906 Dec. 18, 1983 11,953.39
P228,306.60

in payment of various fabrics and textile materials all in the total amount of P228,306.60
which the said accused ordered or purchased from the said RUBY CHUA on the same
day; that upon presentation of the said checks to the bank for payment, the same were
dishonored and payment thereof refused for the reason Account Closed, and said
accused, notwithstanding due notice to her by the said Ruby Chua of such dishonor of
the said checks, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to deposit the necessary
amount to cover the amount of the checks to the damage and prejudice of the said RUBY
CHUA in the aforesaid amount of P228,306.60, Philippine currency.

Contrary to law.

The Informations charging Ojeda for violation of BP 22 were similarly worded except
for the amounts of the checks, the check numbers and the dates of the checks:

That on or about the first week of November 1983, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to RUBY CHUA to apply on account or for value Rizal Commercial Banking Corp.
Check No. 041784 dated November 18, 1983 payable to Ruby Chua in the amount
of P5,392.34, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he/she/they did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank or payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check, when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the
date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds,
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said complainant
the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five
(5) banking days after receiving said notice.
Contrary to law.

The pertinent facts of the case follow.

Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda used to buy fabrics (telas) from complainant Ruby Chua.
For the three years approximately she transacted business with Chua, appellant used
postdated checks to pay for the fabrics she bought. On November 5, 1983, appellant
purchased from Chua various fabrics and textile materials worth P228,306 for which she
issued 22 postdated checks bearing different dates and amounts.
Chua later presented to the bank for payment check no. 033550 dated November 5,
1983 in the amount of P17,100[3] but it was dishonored due to Account Closed.[4] On April
10, 1984, Chua deposited the rest of the checks but all were dishonored for the same
reason.[5] Demands were allegedly made on the appellant to make good the dishonored
checks, to no avail.
Estafa and BP 22 charges were thereafter filed against appellant. The criminal cases
were consolidated and appellant, on arraignment, pleaded not guilty to each of the
charges.
On the whole, appellants defense was grounded on good faith or absence of deceit,
lack of notice of dishonor and full payment of the total amount of the checks.
With the exception of six checks[6] which did not bear her signature, appellant
admitted that she issued the postdated checks which were the subject of the criminal
cases against her. She, however, alleged that she told Chua not to deposit the postdated
checks on maturity as they were not yet sufficiently funded. Appellant also claimed that
she made partial payments to Chua in the form of finished garments worth P50,000. This
was not rebutted by the prosecution.
The trial court convicted appellant of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized
under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and sentenced
her to reclusion perpetua. The trial court also convicted appellant of violation of BP 22 for
issuing bouncing checks. However, the court a quo held her guilty of only 14 counts out
of the 22 bouncing checks issued. The court reasoned:

xxx This is due to the fact that of the 22 checks, two of them are not covered by the
indictment. This refers to Check No. 042935 dated November 6, 1983 in the amount
of P1,840.19 (Exhibit D) and Check No. 042942 dated November 10, 1983 in the amount
of P1,941.59 (Exhibit F). And of the total number of checks, six of them were not signed
by the accused but by the latters husband (Exhibits C,H,J,M,R and O). The accused
should not be liable for the issuance of the 6 checks in the absence of any showing of
conspiracy.[7]

Appellant appealed to this Court, seeking acquittal. Her counsel, however, failed to
file the appellants brief within the prescribed period. Her appeal was thus dismissed in a
resolution of this Court dated October 14, 1992. [8]
In her motion for reconsideration, appellant asked this Court to reverse its order of
dismissal in the interest of substantial justice and equity.[9] We initially found no compelling
reason to grant her motion and resolved to deny with finality appellants MR in a resolution
dated February 3, 1993.[10] Appellant thereafter filed a Second and Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, attaching thereto an Affidavit of Desistance of complainant Ruby Chua
which stated in part:

xxx xxx xxx.

2. that the defendant Mrs. Cora Ojeda has already fully paid her monetary obligation to
me in the amount of P228,306.00 which is the subject of the aforementioned cases;

xxx xxx xxx.

5. That as the private complainant, I am now appealing to the sense of compassion and
humanity of the good justices of the Supreme Court to reconsider the appeal of Mrs. Cora
Ojeda and I solemnly pray that the criminal liability be extinguished with her civil liability.[11]

In a resolution dated March 17, 1993,[12] this Court denied the second MR for having
been filed without leave of court. In the same resolution, this Court ordered the entry of
judgment in due course.
Appellant thereafter filed another motion dated April 21, 1993, praying that she be
recommended to then President Fidel V. Ramos for executive clemency. In support of
such motion, she once more attached the affidavit of desistance[13] of complainant Ruby
Chua which categorically declared that the defendant, Ms. Cora Ojeda, (had) already fully
paid her monetary obligations to (Chua) in the amount of P228,306 which (was) the
subject of the aforementioned cases.[14]
In view of such special circumstances, this Court issued a resolution dated June 9,
1993[15] recalling its resolutions dated October 14, 1992, February 3, 1993 and March 17,
1993 for humanitarian reasons and in the interest of justice, and in order that this Court
may resolve appellants appeal on the merits.[16]
Hence, the instant appeal with the following assignments of error:
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DECEIT WAS EMPLOYED BY

ACCUSED APPELLANT WHEN SHE ISSUED THE CHECKS TO THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ISSUANCE BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CHECKS TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS
MERELY A MODE OF PAYMENT WHICH ARRANGEMENT HAD BEEN THEIR
PRACTICE FOR THREE (3) YEARS.

III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT GOOD FAITH IS A VALID
DEFENSE AGAINST ESTAFA BY POSTDATING A CHECK

IV.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF FOURTEEN (14)

COUNTS OF B.P. 22 WHEN THERE WAS NO PROOF OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR TO
THE ACCUSED.

V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SINCE 13 OF THE 14 CHECKS
WERE DEPOSITED ONLY AFTER THE LAPSE OF THE 90 DAY PERIOD, HENCE, THE
PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE DOES NOT APPLY.[17]

Appellant firmly denies any criminal liability for estafa. She argues there was no deceit
employed when she issued the checks because she never assured Chua that the checks
were funded. Chua allegedly knew all along that the checks were merely intended to
guarantee future payment by appellant.
Appellant further claims good faith in all her transactions with Chua for three
years. She explained that her failure to fund the checks was brought about by the collapse
of the countrys economy in the wake of the Aquino assassination in 1983. The capital
flight and financial chaos at that time caused her own business to shut down when her
customers also failed to pay her. Despite the closure of her business, appellant maintains
that she did her best to continue paying Chua what she owed and, when she could no
longer pay in cash, she instead paid in kind in the form of finished goods. But these were
not enough to cover her debts. Nevertheless, she spared no effort in complying with her
financial obligations to Chua until she was gradually able to pay all her debts, a fact fully
admitted as true by complainant in her affidavit.
From the foregoing, appellant contends that the element of deceit thru abuse of
confidence or false pretenses was not present. Thus, her guilt was not established with
satisfactory proof. Appellant asserts that good faith on her part was a valid defense to
rebut the prima facie presumption of deceit when she issued the checks that subsequently
bounced.
Furthermore, out of the 14 checks cited in the decision of the trial court, only one
check was deposited within 90 days from due date. This was check no. 033550 dated
November 5, 1983. The rest of the checks were deposited only on April 10, 1984 or more
than 90 days from the date of the last check. [18]
Appellant also denies she received any notice of dishonor of the checks, contrary to
the findings of the trial court. She was not even aware that cases had already been filed
against her for violation of BP 22. Since there was allegedly no proof of notice[19] of the
dishonor of the checks, appellant claims that she cannot be convicted of violation of BP
22.
 On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that appellant was criminally liable
for issuing worthless checks. Complainant Chua accepted the postdated checks as
payment because of appellants good credit standing. She was confident that appellants
checks were good checks. Thus, no assurances from appellant that the checks were
sufficiently funded were needed for Chua to part with her goods. And when the checks
later bounced, appellant betrayed the confidence reposed in her by Chua.
The Solicitor General also argues that there was a simultaneous exchange of textile
materials and checks between complainant and appellant. Complainant Chua would not
have parted with her telas had she known that appellants checks would not
clear. Appellant obtained something in exchange for her worthless checks. When she
issued them, she knew she had no funds to back up those checks because her account
had already been closed. Yet, she did not inform Chua that the checks could not be
cashed upon maturity. She thus deceived Chua into parting with her goods and the deceit
employed constituted estafa.
We grant the appeal.

DECEIT AND DAMAGE AS

ELEMENTS OF ESTAFA

Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by RA 4885, [20] the
elements of estafa are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3)
damage to the payee thereof. Deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense
and must be established by satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. [21] Thus, the drawer
of the dishonored check is given three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover
the amount of the check. Otherwise a prima facie presumption of deceit arises.
The prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima facie presumption of
deceit was successfully rebutted by appellants evidence of good faith, a defense
in estafa by postdating a check.[22] Good faith may be demonstrated, for instance, by a
debtors offer to arrange a payment scheme with his creditor. In this case, the debtor not
only made arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated, the
debtor-appellant fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.
It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful acts
accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in se. The principal consideration
is the existence of malicious intent. There is a concurrence of freedom, intelligence and
intent which together make up the criminal mind behind the criminal act. Thus, to
constitute a crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a
criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind
of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As we held in Tabuena
vs. Sandiganbayan:[23]

The rule was reiterated in People v. Pacana, although this case involved falsification of
public documents and estafa:
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.

American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that criminal
intent in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a
transaction honestly entered into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the
person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose.

The accused may thus prove that he acted in good faith and that he had no intention
to convert the money or goods for his personal benefit.[24] We are convinced that appellant
was able to prove the absence of criminal intent in her transactions with Chua. Had her
intention been tainted with malice and deceit, appellant would not have exerted
extraordinary effort to pay the complainant, given her own business and financial
reverses.

LACK OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR

We also note that the prosecution presented virtually no evidence to show that the
indispensable notice of dishonor was sent to and received by appellant. Excerpts from
the following testimony of complainant are significant:
ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, Mrs. Witness, when these checks from Exhibits A to V have bounced,
what steps, did you do?
A I consulted my lawyer and she wrote a Demand Letter.
COURT:
Q What is the name of that lawyer?
A Atty. Virginia Nabora.
ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, you mentioned a Demand Letter sent by Atty. Virginia Nabor, I am
showing to you this Demand Letter dated March 16, 1988, will you kindly
examine the same if this is the same Demand Letter you mentioned a while
ago?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, on this second page of this Demand Letter there is a signature above the
printed name Virginia Guevarra Nabor, do you know the signature, Mrs.
Witness?
A Yes, that is the signature of my lawyer.
ATTY. ANGELES:
 May we request that this Demand Letter dated March 16, 1988 consisting of
two (2) pages, Your Honor, be marked as Exhibit W and that the signature
on the second page of this letter of Virginia Guevarra Nabor be encircled and
be marked as Exhibit W-1 and that the attached Registry Receipt, Your
Honor, be marked as Exhibit W-2.
COURT:
Mark them.
ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, Mrs. Witness, why do you know that this is the signature of Virginia
Guevarra Nabor?
A After preparing that I saw her sign the letter.
Q Now, after sending this Demand Letter, do you know If the accused herein
made payments or replaced the checks that were issued to you?
COURT:
Q Of course, you assumed that the accused received that letter, that is his basis
on the premise that the accused received that letter?
ATTY. ANGELES:
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q What proof is there to show that accused received the letter because your
question is premises (sic) on the assumption that the accused received the
letter?
ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, do you know Mrs. Witness if the accused received the letter?
A There is a registry receipt.
COURT:
Q Now, later on after sending that letter, did you have communication with the
accused?
A I kept on calling her but I was not able to get in touch with her.
Q But do you know if that letter of your lawyer was received by the accused?
A I was not informed by my lawyer but I presumed that the same was already
received by the accused.
ATTY. ANGELES:
Q Now, aside from sending this Demand Letter, do you know what your lawyer
did?
 A We filed a case with the Fiscals.[25]
Aside from the above testimony, no other reference to the demand letter was made
by the prosecution. The prosecution claimed that the demand letter was sent by
registered mail. To prove this, it presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the
registry return receipt bearing a signature which was, however, not even authenticated or
identified. A registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. [26] Receipts for
registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly
authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. [27]
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that appellant
received the demand letter prepared and sent by her lawyer. She was not certain if
appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor of the checks. All she knew was that a
demand letter was sent by her lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after complainant
made that presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at the Fiscals
office[28] without any confirmation that the demand letter supposedly sent through
registered mail was actually received by appellant.
With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be held
guilty of violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice violated appellants right to procedural
due process. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging
that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. [29] The burden of proving receipt
of notice rests upon the party asserting it and the quantum of proof required for conviction
in this criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
When, during the trial, appellant denied having received the demand letter, it became
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the demand letter was indeed sent through
registered mail and that the same was received by appellant. But it did not. Obviously, it
relied merely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.
This Court therefore cannot, with moral certainty, convict appellant of violation of BP
22. The evident failure of the prosecution to establish that she was given the requisite
notice of dishonor justifies her acquittal.[30]
As held in Lao vs. Court of Appeals:[31]

It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator a
compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal
action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated. This was also compared to certain
laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the
illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability. In
this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days
from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The absence of a notice of dishonor
necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness
require -- that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her
the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22.
 Stated otherwise, responsibility under BP 22 was personal to appellant; hence,
personal knowledge of the notice of dishonor was necessary. Consequently, while there
may have been constructive notice to appellant regarding the insufficiency of her funds in
the bank, it was not enough to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that notice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d)
Art. 315 of the RPC and Sec. 2 of BP 22. While the RPC prescribes that the drawer of the
check must deposit the amount needed to cover his check within three days from receipt
of notice of dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand, requires the maker or drawer to pay the
amount of the check within five days from receipt of notice of dishonor. Under both laws,
notice of dishonor is necessary for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP 22). Without
proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and
no crime (whether estafa or violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Cora Abella Ojeda is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 88-66228 for estafa
and in Criminal Case Nos. 88-66230, 88-66232, 88-66235 to 88-66240, 88-66242, 88-
66243, 88-66245 to 88-66248 for violation of BP 22.
SO ORDERED.