ST Vid10609 Agd
ST Vid10609 Agd
ST Vid10609 Agd
Version 0.4
May 5, 2015
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 7
1.1 Audience ......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 Purpose............................................................................................................................ 7
1.3 Document References ..................................................................................................... 7
1.4 Supported Hardware and Software ................................................................................. 9
1.5 Operational Environment .............................................................................................. 10
1.5.1 Supported non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware ................................................. 10
1.6 Excluded Functionality ................................................................................................. 11
2 Secure Acceptance of the TOE ............................................................................................. 12
3 Secure Installation and Configuration .................................................................................. 14
3.1 Physical Installation ...................................................................................................... 14
3.2 Initial Setup via Direct Console Connection ................................................................ 14
3.2.1 Options to be chosen during the initial setup of the ASR ......................................... 14
3.2.2 Saving Configuration ................................................................................................ 14
3.2.3 Enabling FIPS Mode ................................................................................................. 15
3.2.4 Administrator Configuration and Credentials ........................................................... 15
3.2.5 Session Termination.................................................................................................. 16
3.2.6 User Lockout ............................................................................................................. 16
3.3 Network Protocols and Cryptographic Settings ............................................................ 17
3.3.1 Remote Administration Protocols ............................................................................. 17
3.3.2 Authentication Server Protocols ............................................................................... 21
3.3.3 Logging Configuration.............................................................................................. 21
3.3.4 Logging Protection.................................................................................................... 22
3.3.5 Base Firewall Rule set Configuration ....................................................................... 24
3.3.6 Routing Protocols...................................................................................................... 27
4 Secure Management .............................................................................................................. 28
4.1 User Roles ..................................................................................................................... 28
4.2 Passwords ...................................................................................................................... 28
4.3 Clock Management ....................................................................................................... 31
4.4 Identification and Authentication ................................................................................. 31
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4.5 Login Banners ............................................................................................................... 31
4.6 Virtual Private Networks (VPN) ................................................................................... 32
4.6.1 IPsec Overview ......................................................................................................... 32
4.6.2 IPsec Transforms and Lifetimes ............................................................................... 36
4.6.3 NAT Traversal .......................................................................................................... 37
4.6.4 X.509 Certificates ..................................................................................................... 37
4.6.5 Information Flow Policies......................................................................................... 42
4.6.6 IPsec Session Interuption/Recovery ......................................................................... 43
4.7 Product Updates ............................................................................................................ 44
5 Security Relevant Events ...................................................................................................... 45
5.1 Deleting Audit Records................................................................................................. 58
6 Network Services and Protocols ........................................................................................... 59
7 Modes of Operation .............................................................................................................. 63
8 Security Measures for the Operational Environment............................................................ 66
9 Related Documentation ......................................................................................................... 67
9.1 World Wide Web .......................................................................................................... 67
9.2 Ordering Documentation .............................................................................................. 67
9.3 Documentation Feedback.............................................................................................. 67
10 Obtaining Technical Assistance ............................................................................................ 68
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List of Tables
Table 1: Acronyms .......................................................................................................................... 5
Table 2: Cisco Documentation....................................................................................................... 7
Table 3: Operational Environment Components .......................................................................... 10
Table 4: Excluded Functionality .................................................................................................. 11
Table 5: TOE External Identification .......................................................................................... 12
Table 6: Evaluated Software Images ........................................................................................... 13
Table 7: Auditable Events ............................................................................................................. 46
Table 8 Auditable Administrative Events .................................................................................... 51
Table 8: Protocols and Services .................................................................................................... 59
Table 9: Operational Environment Security Measures ................................................................ 66
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List of Acronyms
Page 5 of 68
DOCUMENT INTRODUCTION
Prepared By:
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
DOCUMENT INTRODUCTION
This document provides supporting evidence for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation
(TOE), the Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series (ASR). This Operational User
Guidance with Preparative Procedures addresses the administration of the TOE software and
hardware and describes how to install, configure, and maintain the TOE in the Common Criteria
evaluated configuration. Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as administrators,
authorized administrators, TOE administrators, semi-privileged administrators, and privileged
administrators in this document.
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1 Introduction
This Operational User Guidance with Preparative Procedures documents the administration of
the Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series (ASR), the TOE, as it was certified under
Common Criteria. The Aggregation Services Router (ASR) 1000 Series (ASR ) may be
referenced below as the model number series ex. ASR 1000, TOE, or simply router.
1.1 Audience
This document is written for administrators configuring the TOE. This document assumes that
you are familiar with the basic concepts and terminologies used in internetworking, and
understand your network topology and the protocols that the devices in your network can use,
that you are a trusted individual, and that you are trained to use the operating systems on which
you are running your network.
1.2 Purpose
This document is the Operational User Guidance with Preparative Procedures for the Common
Criteria evaluation. It was written to highlight the specific TOE configuration and administrator
functions and interfaces that are necessary to configure and maintain the TOE in the evaluated
configuration. This document is not meant to detail specific actions performed by the
administrator but rather is a road map for identifying the appropriate locations within Cisco
documentation to get the specific details for configuring and maintaining ASR operations. All
security relevant commands to manage the TSF data are provided within this documentation
within each functional section.
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# Title Link
[4] Using Setup Mode to Configure a http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/fundamentals/configuration/guid
Cisco Networking Device, December e/cf_setup.html
3, 2010
Page 8 of 68
# Title Link
[14] Cisco IOS IP Routing: RIP Command http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios-
Reference xml/ios/iproute_rip/command/irr-cr-book.html
Page 9 of 68
secure configuration. Likewise, using any software version other than the evaluated software
listed in the ST will invalidate the secure configuration. The TOE is a hardware and software
solution that makes up the router models as follows: Chassis: ASR 1001, ASR 1001X, ASR
1002, ASR 1002X, ASR 1004, ASR 1006, ASR 1013; Embedded Services Processors (ESPr):
ESPr5, ESPr10, ESPr20, ESPr40, ESPr100, ESPr200; Route Processor (RP): RP1, RP2. The
network, on which they reside, is considered part of the environment. The software comes pre-
installed and is comprised of the Cisco IOS-XE software image Release 3.13.
Management Yes This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a SSH client
Workstation installed that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration
with SSH client through SSH protected channels. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used.
Local Console Yes This includes any IT Environment Console that is directly connected to the TOE via
the Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE
administration.
Certification Yes This includes any IT Environment Certification Authority on the TOE network.
Authority (CA) This can be used to provide the TOE with a valid certificate during certificate
enrollment.
Remote VPN Yes This includes any VPN peer with which the TOE participates in VPN
Gateway/Peer communications. Remote VPN Endpoints may be any device that supports IPsec
VPN communications.
NTP Server No The TOE supports communications with an NTP server in order to synchronize the
date and time on the TOE with the NTP servers date and time. A solution must be
used that supports secure communications with up to a 32 character key.
Audit (syslog) Yes This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would transmit syslog messages.
Server
Another No Includes another instance of the TOE that would be installed in the evaluated
instance of the configuration, and likely administered by the same personnel. Used as a VPN peer.
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Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
TOE
These services will be disabled by configuration. The exclusion of this functionality does not
affect compliance to the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for
Network Devices.
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2 Secure Acceptance of the TOE
In order to ensure the correct TOE is received, the TOE should be examined to ensure that that is
has not been tampered with during delivery.
Verify that the TOE software and hardware were not tampered with during delivery by
performing the following actions:
Step 1 Before unpacking the TOE, inspect the physical packaging the equipment was delivered
in. Verify that the external cardboard packing is printed with the Cisco Systems logo and motifs.
If it is not, contact the supplier of the equipment (Cisco Systems or an authorized Cisco
distributor/partner).
Step 2 Verify that the packaging has not obviously been opened and resealed by examining the
tape that seals the package. If the package appears to have been resealed, contact the supplier of
the equipment (Cisco Systems or an authorized Cisco distributor/partner).
Step 3 Verify that the box has a white tamper-resistant, tamper-evident Cisco Systems bar coded
label applied to the external cardboard box. If it does not, contact the supplier of the equipment
(Cisco Systems or an authorized Cisco distributor/partner). This label will include the Cisco
product number, serial number, and other information regarding the contents of the box.
Step 4 Note the serial number of the TOE on the shipping documentation. The serial number
displayed on the white label affixed to the outer box will be that of the device. Verify the serial
number on the shipping documentation matches the serial number on the separately mailed
invoice for the equipment. If it does not, contact the supplier of the equipment (Cisco Systems or
an authorized Cisco distributor/partner).
Step 5 Verify that the box was indeed shipped from the expected supplier of the equipment
(Cisco Systems or an authorized Cisco distributor/partner). This can be done by verifying with
the supplier that they shipped the box with the courier company that delivered the box and that
the consignment note number for the shipment matches that used on the delivery. Also verify
that the serial numbers of the items shipped match the serial numbers of the items delivered. This
verification should be performed by some mechanism that was not involved in the actual
equipment delivery, for example, phone/FAX or other online tracking service.
Step 6 Once the TOE is unpacked, inspect the unit. Verify that the serial number displayed on
the unit itself matches the serial number on the shipping documentation and the invoice. If it
does not, contact the supplier of the equipment (Cisco Systems or an authorized Cisco
distributor/partner). Also verify that the unit has the following external identification as
described in Table 5 below.
Table 5: TOE External Identification
Product Name Model Number External Identification
ASR Series 1001X CISCO 1001X
1002X CISCO 1002X
1006 CISCO 1006
1013 CISCO 1013
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Step 7 Approved methods for obtaining a Common Criteria evaluated software images:
Download the Common Criteria evaluated software image file from Cisco.com onto a
trusted computer system. Software images are available from Cisco.com at the
following: http://www.cisco.com/cisco/software/navigator.html.
The TOE ships with the correct software images installed.
Step 8 Once the file is downloaded, verify that it was not tampered with by using an SHA-1
utility to compute a SHA-1 hash for the downloaded file and comparing this with the SHA-1
hash for the image listed in Table 6 below. If the SHA-1 hashes do not match, contact Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC)
https://tools.cisco.com/ServiceRequestTool/create/launch.do.
Step 9 Install the downloaded and verified software image onto your ASR as described in [1]
Under Configure Click on Configuration Guides System Management Click on
Loading and Managing System Images Configuration Guide.
Start your ASR as described in [2] and [20] Cisco ASR 1000 Series Routers Power Up and
Initial Configuration Powering Up the Cisco ASR 1000 Series Routers. Confirm that your
ASR loads the image correctly, completes internal self-checks and displays the cryptographic
export warning on the console.
Step 10 The end-user must confirm once the TOE has booted that they are indeed running the
evaluated version. Use the show version command [3] to display the currently running system
image filename and the system software release version. See Table 6 below for the detailed hash
value that must be checked to ensure the software has not been modified in any way.
Table 6: Evaluated Software Images
Platform Image Name Hash
ASR 1001X asr1001x-universalk9.03.13.01.S.154-3.S1- MD5: e131ca3e1a5501aada9a2eb0467f926c
ext.SPA.bin
SHA-1: 34c1ecff18ac15af3b55a11ba1e98f902d983146
ASR 1002X asr1002x-universalk9.03.13.01.S.154-3.S1- MD5: 8872c66aa57eb3229e63cc5410519b87
ext.SPA.bin
SHA-1: 74adf9e94ff1e23ee9d85870017f226abb55d877
ASR 1006 asr1000rp2-adventerprisek9.03.13.01.S.154- MD5: d56adaea67c87d5c54497fd4ca588f3f
3.S1-ext.bin
SHA-1: 9228a7e105e0c71ae6c3eb8bff67738e8db12a02
ASR 1013 asr1000rp2-adventerprisek9.03.13.01.S.154- MD5: d56adaea67c87d5c54497fd4ca588f3f
3.S1-ext.bin
SHA-1: 9228a7e105e0c71ae6c3eb8bff67738e8db12a02
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3 Secure Installation and Configuration
3.1 Physical Installation
Follow the Cisco ASR 1000 Series Router Hardware Installation Guide, [2] and [20] for
hardware installation instructions.
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run start). These commands should be used frequently when making changes to the
configuration of the Router. If the Router reboots and resumes operation when uncommitted
changes have been made, these changes will be lost and the Router will revert to the last
configuration saved.
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3.2.5 Session Termination
Inactivity settings must trigger termination of the administrator session. These settings are
configurable by setting
line vty <first> <last> [2] and [20] under section Configuring Virtual Terminal Lines
for Remote Console Access
exec-timeout <time> [10] >System Management > Cisco IOS Configuration
Fundamentals Command Reference, section D through E
line console [19] under section Configuring Line Password Protection
exec-timeout <time>
To save these configuration settings to the startup configuration:
copy run start [3] under section C commands
where first and last are the range of vty lines on the box (i.e. 0 4), and time is the period of
inactivity after which the session should be terminated. Configuration of these settings is limited
to the privileged administrator (see Section 4.1). These settings are not immediately activated
for the current session. The current line console session must be exited. When the user logs
back in, the inactivity timer will be activated for the new session.
3.3.1.1 Steps to configure SSH on router: [10] Cisco IOS Security Command Reference
Guides
1. Generate RSA or ECDSA key material choose a longer modulus length for the
evaluated configuration (i.e., 2048 for RSA and 256 or 384 for ECDSA):
TOE-common-criteria(config)# crypto key generate rsa
How many bits in the modulus [512]: 2048
or
TOE-common-criteria(config)# crypto key generate ec keysize [256 or 384]
RSA and ECDSA keys are generated in pairsone public key and one private key. This
command is not saved in the router configuration; however, the keys generated by this
command are saved in the private configuration in NVRAM (which is never displayed to
the user or backed up to another device) the next time the configuration is written to
NVRAM.
Note: Only one set of keys can be configured using the crypto key generate command at
a time. Repeating the command overwrites the old keys.
Note: If the configuration is not saved to NVRAM with a copy run start, the generated
keys are lost on the next reload of the router.
Note: If the error % Please define a domain-name first is received, enter the command
ip domain-name [domain name].
2. Enable ssh
TOE-common-criteria# ip ssh authentication-retries 2
7. Configure a SSH client to support only the following specific encryption algorithms:
o AES-CBC-128
o AES-CBC-256
peer#ssh -l cisco -c aes128-cbc 1.1.1.1
peer#ssh -l cisco -c aes256-cbc 1.1.1.1
8. Configure a SSH client to support message authentication. Only the following MACs are
allowed and None for MAC is not allowed:
a. hmac-sha1-96
b. hmac-sha1
peer#ssh -l cisco -m hmac-sha1-96 1.1.1.1
HTTP and HTTPS servers were not evaluated and must be disabled: no ip http server
no ip http secure-server
SNMP server was not evaluated and must be disabled: no snmp-server
The configurations below enable the remote VPN peer to connect to the TOE. The steps do the
following:
Create a loopback interface on both devices with an IP on a distinct subnet.
Create crypto acls to send all traffic between the two loopbacks through the ipsec tunnel.
Create settings for the tunnel.
Create the route between the two loopback IPs.
Set the source address for SSH sessions from the peer to be the loopback.
Create and apply an access class acl on the vty to only permit ssh from the peer source ip
Create and apply an acls on all external interfaces to deny ssh traffic
The following configuration is an example TOE configured to only allow SSH through a VPN.
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ip ssh dh min size 2048
!
!
!
crypto isakmp policy 77
encr aes
authentication pre-share
group 14
crypto isakmp key cisco123 address 192.168.2.37
!
!
crypto ipsec transform-set cc-tset esp-aes esp-sha-hmac
mode tunnel
!
!
!
!
!
crypto map cc-asr 77 ipsec-isakmp
set peer 192.168.2.37
set transform-set cc-tset
match address 178
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
interface Loopback0
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ip address 192.168.5.33 255.255.255.0
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0/0
ip address 192.168.2.33 255.255.255.0
ip access-group 111 in
media-type rj45
negotiation auto
cdp enable
crypto map cc-asr
!
no ip http server
no ip http secure-server
ip route profile
ip route 192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.2.37
!
access-list 11 permit 192.168.4.37
access-list 111 deny tcp any any eq 22
access-list 111 permit ip any any
access-list 178 permit ip 192.168.5.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.4.0 0.0.0.255
cdp run
!
!
!
!
control-plane
!
!
!
!
line vty 0 4
access-class 11 in
!
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!
end
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For the following commands see the [10] Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command
References, and Cisco IOS Security Command References:
TOE-common-criteria#configure terminal
TOE-common-criteria(config)#crypto isakmp policy 1
TOE-common-criteria(config-isakmp)#encryption aes
TOE-common-criteria(config-isakmp)#authentication pre-share
TOE-common-criteria(config-isakmp)#group 14
TOE-common-criteria(config-isakmp)#lifetime 28800
TOE-common-criteria(config)#crypto isakmp key [insert 22 character preshared key]
address 10.10.10.101
TOE-common-criteria(config)#crypto isakmp key [insert 22 character preshared key]
address 40.0.0.1
TOE-common-criteria(config)#crypto ipsec transform-set sampleset esp-aes esp-sha-
hmac
TOE-common-criteria(cfg-crypto-trans)#mode tunnel
TOE-common-criteria(config)#crypto map sample 1 ipsec-isakmp
TOE-common-criteria(config-crypto-map)#set peer 11.1.1.4
TOE-common-criteria(config-crypto-map)#set transform-set sampleset
TOE-common-criteria(config-crypto-map)#match address 115
TOE-common-criteria(config-crypto-map)#exit
TOE-common-criteria(config)#interface g0/1
TOE-common-criteria(config-if)#ip address 10.1.1.7 255.255.255.0
TOE-common-criteria(config-if)#no ip route-cache
TOE-common-criteria(config-if)#crypto map sample
TOE-common-criteria(config-if)#interface g0/0
TOE-common-criteria(config-if)#ip address 11.1.1.6 255.255.255.0
TOE-common-criteria(config-if)#crypto map sample
TOE-common-criteria(config-if)#exit
TOE-common-criteria(config)#ip route 12.1.1.0 255.255.255.0 11.1.1.4
TOE-common-criteria(config)#access-list 115 permit ip 10.1.1.0 0.0.0.255 12.1.1.0
0.0.0.255 log
TOE-common-criteria(config)#logging host 12.1.1.1
Traffic matching is done based on a top-down approach in the access list. The first entry that a
packet matches will be the one applied to it. The VPNGW EP requires that the TOE Access
control lists (ACLs) are to be configured to drop all packet flows as the default rule and that
traffic matching the acl be able to be logged. The drop all default rule can be achieved by
including an ACL rule to drop all packets as the last rule in the ACL configuration. The logging
of matching traffic is done by appending the key word log-input per the command reference at
the end of the acl statements, as done below.
A privileged authorized administrator may manipulate the ACLs using the commands ip inspect,
access-list, crypto map, and access-group as described in Chapter 2 and 7 of [10a] and Chapter 6
of [10b] .
Access lists must be configured on the TOE to meet the requirements of the VPN Gateway
Extended Package.
Note: These access lists must be integrated with the defined security policy for your TOE
router. Enabling just these access lists with no permits will result in traffic being dropped.
Ensure that your access list entries are inserted above the default deny acl.
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In this example, we are assuming that interface GigabitEthernet0/0 is the external interface, and
is assigned an IP address of 10.200.1.1. Interface GigabitEthernet0/1 is the internal interface and
is assigned an IP address of 10.100.1.1.
If remote administration is required, ssh has to be explicitly allowed through either the internal or
external interfaces.
TOE-common-criteria# configure terminal
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
TOE-common-criteria(config)# access-list 199 permit tcp host 10.200.0.1 host
10.200.0.1 eq 22 log-input
To log connections to the Certificate Authority, implement the following acl:.
TOE-common-criteria(config)# access-list 100 permit ip any host [IP of CA] log-
input
TOE-common-criteria(config)# access-list 199 permit ip any host [IP of CA] log-
input
To close ports that dont need to be open and may introduce additional vulnerabilities,
implement the following acl:.
TOE-common-criteria(config)# access-list 100 deny 132 any any log-input
TOE-common-criteria(config)# access-list 199 deny 132 any any log-input
To explicitly create the default deny acl for traffic with no other match, implement the following
acl:.
TOE-common-criteria(config)# access-list 100 deny any any log-input
TOE-common-criteria(config)# access-list 199 deny any any log-input
Note: Logging of all traffic hitting the default deny acl can generate a large number of logs, and
a determination should be made whether it is necessary prior to entering this at the end of all
access lists.
To apply the acls to the interfaces:
TOE-common-criteria(config)# interface GigabitEthernet0/0
TOE-common-criteria(config-if)# ip access-group 199 in
TOE-common-criteria(config)# interface GigabitEthernet0/1
TOE-common-criteria(config-if)# ip access-group 100 in
Additional information on creation of packet filtering and VPN information flow policies is
given in Section 4.6.4 below.
The following ACL in the running-configuration can be used to block unknown protocols
(Explicitly permitting and logging specific IPv6 protocols then explicitly denying any other IPv6
packet) -
permit 1 <source> <destination> log
permit 2 <source> <destination> log
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permit 3 <source> <destination> log
permit 4 <source> <destination> log
permit 5 <source> <destination> log
permit tcp <source> <destination> log
permit 7 <source> <destination> log
permit 8 <source> <destination> log
!. continue the ACL entries to include all IPv6 protocol numbers listed in the PP.
deny ipv6 <source> <destination> log
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4 Secure Management
4.1 User Roles
The ASR has both privileged and semi-privileged administrator roles as well as non-
administrative access. Non-administrative access is granted to authenticated neighbor routers for
the ability to receive updated routing tables per the information flow rules. There is no other
access or functions associated with non-administrative access. These privileged and semi-
privileged roles are configured in the Access Control and Session Termination section above.
The TOE also allows for customization of other levels. Privileged access is defined by any
privilege level entering an enable password after their individual login. Privilege levels are
number 0-15 that specifies the various levels for the user. The privilege levels are not
necessarily hierarchical. Privilege level 15 has access to all commands on the TOE. Privilege
levels 0 and 1 are defined by default, while levels 2-14 are undefined by default. Levels 0-14 can
be set to include any of the commands available to the level 15 administrator, and are considered
the semi-privileged administrator for purposes of this evaluation. The privilege level determines
the functions the user can perform; hence the authorized administrator with the appropriate
privileges.
To establish a username-based authentication system, use the username command in global
configuration mode.
When a user no longer requires access to the ASR, the user account can be removed. To remove
an established username-based authentication account, use the no form of the command.
router(config)# no username name
Refer to the IOS Command Reference Guide for available commands and associated roles and
privilege levels.
4.2 Passwords
The password complexity is not enforced by the router by default, and must be administratively
set in the configuration. To prevent administrators from choosing insecure passwords, each
password must be as follows: See [10] Under Reference Guides Command References
Security and VPN See manual Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands A to Z
for this section.
1. At least 15 characters long. Use the following command to set the minimum length to 15
or greater.
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Note: Details for the security passwords min-length command can be found in the: [10]
Under Reference Guides Command References Security and VPN See manual
Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z.
2. Composed of any combination of characters that includes characters for at least 3 of these
four character sets: upper case letters, lower case letters, numerals, and the following
special characters: !, @, #, $, %, ^, &, *, (, ). Configure the router
to enforce that complexity requirement by using enabling aaa password restriction.
Enabling aaa password restriction will also enforce the following restrictions:
1. The new password cannot have any character repeated more than three times
consecutively.
2. The new password cannot be the same as the associated username.
3. The password obtained by capitalization of the username or username reversed is not
accepted.
4. The new password cannot be cisco, ocsic, or any variant obtained by changing the
capitalization of letters therein, or by substituting 1, |, or ! for i, or by substituting
0 for o, or substituting $ for s.
Note: The aaa password restriction command can only be used after the aaa new-model
command is configured. [10] Under Reference Guides Command References Security and
VPN See manual Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands A to C.
The following configuration steps are optional, but recommended for good password complexity.
The below items are recommended but are not enforced by the TOE:
1. Does not contain more than three sequential characters, such as abcd
2. Does not contain dictionary words
3. Does not contain common proper names
Administrative passwords, including any enable password that may be set for any privilege
level, must be stored in non-plaintext form. To have passwords stored as a SHA-256 hash, use
the service password-encryption command in config mode.
router(config)#service password-encryption
Once that service has been enabled, passwords can be entered in plaintext, or has SHA-256 hash
values, and will be stored as SHA-256 hash values in the configuration file when using the
username command.
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Whether or not service password-encryption has been enabled, a password for an individual
username can be entered in either plaintext or as a SHA-256 hash value, and be stored as a
SHA-256 hash value by using the following command:
To store the enable password in non-plaintext form, use the enable secret command when
setting the enable password. The enable password can be entered as plaintext, or as an MD5
hash value. Example:
router(config)#enable secret [level level] {password | 0 | 4 | 5 [encryption-type] encrypted-
password }
level - (Optional) Specifies the level for which the password applies. You can specify up to
sixteen privilege levels, using the numerals 0 through 15.
password password that will be entered
0 - Specifies an unencrypted clear-text password. The password is converted to a SHA256 secret
and gets stored in the router.
4 - Specifies an SHA256 encrypted secret string. The SHA256 secret string is copied from the
router configuration.
5 - Specifies a message digest alogrithm5 (MD5) encrypted secret.
encryption-type - (Optional) Cisco-proprietary algorithm used to encrypt the password. The
encryption types available for this command are 4 and 5. If you specify a value for encryption-
type argument, the next argument you supply must be an encrypted password (a password
encrypted by a Cisco router).
encrypted-password - Encrypted password that is copied from another router configuration.
Use of enable passwords are not necessary, so all administrative passwords can be stored as
SHA-256 if enable passwords are not used.
Note: Cisco requires that the enable password command be used to configure a password for
privileged EXEC mode. The password that is entered with the enable password command is
stored as plain text in the configuration file of the networking device. If passwords were created
with the enable password command, it can be hashed by using the service password-
encryption command. Instead of using the enable password command, Cisco recommends
using the enable secret command because it stores a SHA-256 hash value of the password.
To have IKE preshared keys stored in encrypted form, use the password encryption aes
command to enable the functionality and the key config-key password-encrypt command to set
the master password to be used to encrypt the preshared keys. The preshared keys will be stored
encrypted with symmetric cipher Advanced Encryption Standard [AES].
router(config)# password encryption aes
router(config)# key config-key password-encryption [text]
Page 30 of 68
Note: Details for the password encryption aes command can be found in the: [10] Under
Reference Guides Command References Security and VPN See manual Cisco IOS
Security Command Reference: Commands M to R.
Page 31 of 68
4.6 Virtual Private Networks (VPN)
Page 33 of 68
Note: Both confidentiality and integrity are configured with the hash sha and
encryption aes commands respectively. As a result, confidentiality-only mode is
disabled.
TOE-common-criteria (config-isakmp)# authentication pre-share
This configures IPsec to use pre-shared keys. X.509 v3 certificates are also
supported for authentication of IPsec peers. See Section 4.6.3 below for additional
information.
TOE-common-criteria(config-isakmp)# exit
TOE-common-criteria(config)# Crypto isakmp key cisco123!cisco123!CISC address
11.1.1.4
Note: Pre-shared keys on the TOE must be at least 22 characters in length and
can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers,
and special characters (that include: !, @, #, $, %, ^, &, *,
(, and )).
The TOE supports pre-shared keys up to 128 bytes in length. While longer keys
increase the difficulty of brute-force attacks, longer keys increase processing
time.
TOE-common-criteria (config-isakmp)# group 14
This selects DH Group 14 (2048-bit MODP) for IKE, but 19 (256-bit Random
ECP), 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 20 (384-bit Random ECP), 15
(3072 bit MODP), and 16 (4096-bit MODP) are also allowed and supported.
TOE-common-criteria (config-isakmp)# lifetime 86400
The default time value for Phase 1 SAs is 24 hours (86400 seconds), but this
setting can be changed using the command above with different values.
TOE-common-criteria (config-isakmp)# crypto isakmp aggressive-mode disable
Main mode is the default mode and the crypto isakmp aggressive-mode disable
ensures all IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges will be handled in the default main mode.
TOE-common-criteria(config-isakmp)#exit
Page 34 of 68
TOE-common-criteria (config-ikev2-proposal)# integrity sha1
TOE-common-criteria (config-ikev2-proposal)# encryption aes-cbc-128
This configures IPsec IKEv2 to use AES-CBC-128 for payload encryption. AES-
CBC-256 can be selected with encryption aes-cbc-256. AES-GCM-128 and
AES-GCM-256 can also be selected similarly.
Note: the authorized administrator must ensure that the keysize for this setting is
greater than or equal to the keysize selected for ESP in Section 4.6.2 below. If
AES 128 is selected here, then the highest keysize that can be selected on the TOE
for ESP is AES 128 (either CBC or GCM).
Note: Both confidentiality and integrity are configured with the hash sha and
encryption aes commands respectively. As a result, confidentiality-only mode is
disabled.
TOE-common-criteria (config-ikev2-proposal)# group 14
This selects DH Group 14 (2048-bit MODP) for IKE, but 19 (256-bit Random
ECP), 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 20 (384-bit Random ECP), 15
(3072 bit MODP), and 16 (4096-bit MODP) are also allowed and supported.
TOE-common-criteria (config)#crypto ikev2 keyring keyring-1
TOE-common-criteria (config-ikev2-keyring)# peer peer1
TOE-common-criteria (config-ikev2-keyring-peer)# address 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0
TOE-common-criteria (config-ikev2-keyring-peer)# pre-shared-key
cisco123!cisco123!CISC
This section creates a keyring to hold the pre-shared keys referenced in the steps
above. In IKEv2 these pre-shared keys are specific to the peer.
Note: Pre-shared keys on the TOE must be at least 22 characters in length and
can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers,
and special characters (that include: !, @, #, $, %, ^, &, *,
(, and )).
The TOE supports pre-shared keys up to 128 bytes in length. While longer keys
increase the difficulty of brute-force attacks, longer keys increase processing
time.
HEX keys generated off system can also be input for IKEv2 using the following
instead of the pre-shared-key command above: pre-shared-key hex [hex key].
For example: pre-shared-key hex 0x6A6B6C.
This configures IPsec to use pre-shared keys. X.509 v3 certificates are also
supported for authentication of IPsec peers. See Section 4.6.3 below for
additional information.
TOE-common-criteria (config)#crypto logging ikev2
Page 35 of 68
This setting enables IKEv2 syslog messages.
Note: The configuration above is not a complete IKE v2 configuration, and that additional
settings will be needed. See [18] Configuring Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) for
additional information on IKE v2 configuration.
Page 36 of 68
This configures a lifetime of 100 MB of traffic for Phase 2 SAs. The default
amount for this setting is 2560KB, which is the minimum configurable value for
this command. The maximum configurable value for this command is 4GB.
Additional information regarding configuration of IPsec can be found in [10]. The IPSEC
commands are dispersed within the Security Command References.
This functionality is available to the Privileged Administrator. Configuration of VPN
settings is restricted to the privileged administrator.
Page 37 of 68
1. Enter configure terminal mode:
Device # configure terminal
2. Specify the hostname: hostname name
Device(config)# hostname asrTOE
3. Configure the trustpoint: crypto pki trustpoint trustpoint-name
Device (config)#crypto pki trustpoint ciscotest
4. Configure an enrollment method: enrollment [terminal, url url]
Device (ca-trustpoint)#enrollment url http://192.168.2.137:80
5. Configure subject-name settings for the certificate: subject-name
CN=hostname.domain.com,OU=OU-name
Device (ca-trustpoint)#subject-name CN=asrTOE.cisco.com,OU=TAC
6. Set revocation check method: revocation-check crl
Device (ca-trustpoint)#revocation-check crl
Device (ca-trustpoint)#exit
7. Create the certificate signing request: crypto pki enroll trustpoint-name
Device (config)#crypto pki enroll ciscotest
The administrator should find an error message stating that certificate chain validation has failed
because a certificate in the chain was not a valid CA certificate.
Page 41 of 68
4.6.4.9 Setting X.509 for use with IKE
Once X.509v3 keys are installed on the TOE, they can be set for use with IKEv1 with the
commands:
TOE-common-criteria (config)#crypto isakmp policy 1
TOE-common-criteria (config-isakmp)# authentication rsa-sig
Or
TOE-common-criteria (config-isakmp)# authentication ecdsa-sig
The criteria used in matching traffic in all of these access lists includes the source and destination
address, and optionally the Layer 4 protocol and port.
The TOE enforces information flow policies on network packets that are receive by TOE
interfaces and leave the TOE through other TOE interfaces. When network packets are received
on a TOE interface, the TOE verifies whether the network traffic is allowed or not and performs
one of the following actions, pass/not pass information, as well as optional logging.
Page 42 of 68
4.6.6 IPsec Session Interuption/Recovery
If an IPsec session with a peer is unexpectedly interrupted, the connection will be broken. In
these cases, no administrative interaction is required. The IPsec session will be reestablished (a
new SA set up) once the peer is back online.
Page 43 of 68
4.7 Product Updates
Verification of authenticity of updated software is done in the same manner as ensuring that the
TOE is running a valid image. See Section 2, steps 7 and 9 above for the method to download
and verify an image prior to running it on the TOE.
Page 44 of 68
5 Security Relevant Events
ASR can maintain logs in multiple locations: local storage of the generated audit records, and
when configured for a syslog backup will simultaneously offload those events to the external
syslog server. ASR administrators should review logs at both locations.
The TOE generates an audit record whenever an audited event occurs. The types of events that
cause audit records to be generated include, cryptography related events, identification and
authentication related events, and administrative events (the specific events and the contents of
each audit record are listed in Table 7 below). Each of the events is specified in syslog records
in enough detail to identify the user for which the event is associated, when the event occurred,
where the event occurred, the outcome of the event, and the type of event that occurred.
Additionally, the startup and shutdown of the audit functionality is audited.
The audit trail consists of the individual audit records; one audit record for each event that
occurred. The audit record can contain up to 80 characters and a percent sign (%), which follows
the time-stamp information. The audit fields in each audit event will contain at a minimum the
following:
Example Audit Event: Nov 19 13:55:59: %CRYPTO-6-SELF_TEST_RESULT: Self test info:
(DES encryption/decryption ... passed)
Date: Nov 19
Time: 13:55:59
Subject identity: Available when the command is run by an authorized TOE administrator user
such as user: lab. In cases where the audit event is not associated with an authorized user, an
IP address may be provided for the Non-TOE endpoint and/ or TOE.
IP address: (Optional) May be provided along with the subject identity of a specific authorized
TOE administrator.
Port number: (Optional) May be provided along with the IP address for throughput traffic
Page 46 of 68
Requirement Auditable Additio Sample Record
Events nal
Audit
Record
Content
s
IKE_MESG_FROM_PEER, IKE_MM_EXCH
Jun 20 07:42:26.843: ISAKMP:(0):Old State = IKE_R_MM2 New
State = IKE_R_MM3
Jun 20 07:42:26.843: ISAKMP:(0): processing KE payload.
message ID = 0
Jun 20 07:42:27.055: ISAKMP:(0): processing NONCE payload.
message ID = 0
Jun 20 07:42:27.059: ISAKMP:(0):found peer pre-shared key
matching 100.1.1.5
.Jun 19 21:10:39.615:
ISAKMP:(2034):purging node -22679511
.Jun 20 04:46:14.789:
IPSEC(lifetime_expiry): SA lifetime threshold reached, expiring in
1412 seconds
Configuration of IPsec:
1/3 8:2
1/1 6:3 Inf Jan 30 18:56:50 10.104.49.55 Time set to Jan 30
3 2 o 18:56:50, from server 10.104.49.22.
1/3 11: No 131: *Jan 30 2013 05:20:15: %PARSER-5-
0/1 04: tic CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:console logged
3 42 e command:logging trap 7
1/3 11: No 132: *Jan 30 2013 05:20:16: %SYS-5-CONFIG_I:
Page 47 of 68
Requirement Auditable Additio Sample Record
Events nal
Audit
Record
Content
s
0/1 04: tic Configured from console by console
3 43 e
1/3 11: De
0/1 09: bu 136: *Jan 30 10:54:46.421 IST: crypto_engine: Delete
3 13 g IPsec SA
1/3 11: De
0/1 09: bu 135: *Jan 30 10:54:46.421 IST: crypto engine: deleting
3 13 g IPsec SA :12
1/3 11: No 171: *Jan 30 2013 05:27:31: %PARSER-5-
0/1 11: tic CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:console logged
3 58 e command:no crypto map
1/3 11: No 172: *Jan 30 2013 05:27:42: %PARSER-5-
0/1 12: tic CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:console logged
3 08 e command:crypto map cc
1/3 11: No 171: *Jan 30 2013 05:27:31: %PARSER-5-
0/1 11: tic CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:console logged
3 58 e command:no crypto map
1/3 11: No 172: *Jan 30 2013 05:27:42: %PARSER-5-
0/1 12: tic CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:console logged
3 08 e command:crypto map cc
1/3 11: No 171: *Jan 30 2013 05:27:31: %PARSER-5-
0/1 11: tic CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:console logged
3 58 e command:no crypto map
1/3 11: No 172: *Jan 30 2013 05:27:42: %PARSER-5-
0/1 12: tic CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:console logged
3 08 e command:crypto map cc
1/3 11: No 171: *Jan 30 2013 05:27:31: %PARSER-5-
0/1 11: tic CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:console logged
3 58 e command:no crypto map
FIA_UIA_EX All use of the Provide See Audit events in FIA_UAU_EXT.2
T.1 identification d user
and identity,
authentication origin of
mechanism. the
attempt
(e.g., IP
address).
FIA_UAU_E All use of the Origin Login as an administrative user at the console
XT.2 authentication of the Username: auditperson
mechanism. attempt
(e.g., IP Password:
address). ASR-SL-491>?
Page 48 of 68
Requirement Auditable Additio Sample Record
Events nal
Audit
Record
Content
s
000278: *Apr 23 07:11:56: %SEC_LOGIN-5-LOGIN_SUCCESS:
Login Success [user: auditperson] [Source: 0.0.0.0] [localport: 0] at
07:11:56 UTC Thu Apr 23 2009?
Failed login via the console does not allow any actions
Username: auditperson
Password:
% Authentication failed
Username:
000254: *Apr 26 00:45:43.340: %SEC_LOGIN-4-
LOGIN_FAILED: Login failed [user: auditperson] [Source: 0.0.0.0]
[localport: 0] [Reason: Login Authentication Failed] at 23:45:43 a
Sat Apr 25 2009
FPT_STM.1 Changes to the The old ++++ 14:18:21 ASR1001X Control::transmit +++
time. and new Transmit: show logging | include CLOCKUPDATE
values +--- 14:18:21 ---
for the ++++ 14:18:21 ASR1001X Control::receive +++
time. show logging | include CLOCKUPDATE
Mar 18 13:18:19.639: \%SYS-6-CLOCKUPDATE: System clock
Origin
has been updated from 14:18:19 EDT Wed Mar 18 2015 to
of the
13:18:19 EDT Wed Mar 18 2015, configured from console by script
attempt
on console.
(e.g., IP
ASR1001X#
address).
--- 14:18:36 ---
.Dec 22 22:22:35.812: NTP message sent to 10.24.0.1, from
interface 'GigabitEthernet0/0/0' (10.21.0.110).
.Dec 22 22:22:35.812: NTP message received from 10.24.0.1 on
interface 'GigabitEthernet0/0/0' (10.21.0.110).
.Dec 22 22:22:35.812: NTP Core(DEBUG): ntp_receive: message
Page 49 of 68
Requirement Auditable Additio Sample Record
Events nal
Audit
Record
Content
s
received
.Dec 22 22:22:35.812: NTP Core(DEBUG): ntp_receive: peer is
0x7FD044C809B0, next action is 1.
.Dec 22 22:22:35.812: NTP Core(DEBUG): Peer becomes
reachable, poll set to 6.
.Dec 22 22:22:35.812: NTP Core(INFO): 10.24.0.1 8014 84
reachable
.Dec 22 22:22:35.812: NTP Core(INFO): 10.24.0.1 902D 8D
popcorn popcorn
.Dec 22 22:22:37.112: \%HA_EM-6-LOG: cli_log:
host[ASR1001X] user[script] port[0] exec_lvl[15] command[show
ntp status ] Executed
.Dec 22 22:22:37.811: NTP message sent to 10.24.0.1, from
interface 'GigabitEthernet0/0/0' (10.21.0.110).
.Dec 22 22:22:37.812: NTP message received from 10.24.0.1 on
interface 'GigabitEthernet0/0/0' (10.21.0.110).
.Dec 22 22:22:37.812: NTP Core(DEBUG): ntp_receive: message
received
.Dec 22 22:22:37.812: NTP Core(DEBUG): ntp_receive: peer is
0x7FD044C809B0, next action is 1.
.Dec 22 22:22:37.812: NTP Core(INFO): 10.24.0.1 963A 8A
sys_peer
.Dec 22 22:22:37.812: NTP: step(0xF164A290.06E65E00):
local_offset = 0x00000000.00000000, curtime =
0xE74F9D7D.CFDF3DA0
.Mar 18 14:18:53.838: NTP Core(NOTICE): trans state : 5
FTA_SSL.3 The termination No Audit record generated when SSH session is terminated because of
of a remote addition idle timeout:
session by the al May 29 2012 15:18:00 UTC: %SYS-6-TTY_EXPIRE_TIMER:
Page 50 of 68
Requirement Auditable Additio Sample Record
Events nal
Audit
Record
Content
s
session locking informat (exec timer expired, tty 0 (0.0.0.0)), user admin
mechanism. ion.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination No Audit record generate when admin logs out of CONSOLE.
of an interactive addition
session. al May 17 2011 16:29:09: %PARSER-5-CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD:
informat User:test_admin logged command:exit
ion. Audit record generated when the admin logs out of SSH:
Jun 18 11:17:36.653: SSH0: Session terminated normally
FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the Identific AUDIT: See logs provided by FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.
trusted channel. ation of
Termination of the
the trusted initiator
channel. and
target of
Failure of the
failed
trusted channel
trusted
functions.
channels
establish
ment
attempt.
FTP_TRP.1 Initiation of the Identific AUDIT: See logs provided by FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.
trusted channel. ation of
Termination of the
the trusted claimed
channel. user
identity.
Failures of the
trusted path
functions.
Clearing logs.
Feb 17 2013 16:34:02: %PARSER-5-
CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:test_admin
logged command:logging informational
FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic key Manual key generation Feb 17 2013 16:14:47: %PARSER-5-
generation (for asymmetric keys) CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:test_admin
logged command:crypto key *****
Page 52 of 68
Requirement Management Action to Sample Log
Log
IKEv2-SA-Lifetime:
Mar 14 23:16:24.170: \%PARSER-5-
CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:script logged
command:crypto ipsec security-association
lifetime kilobytes 10240
IKEv2-DH:
Jan 16 00:36:43 cc_toe 279: *Jan 16
00:36:43.032: \%PARSER-5-
CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:script logged
command:crypto ikev2 proposal ike2aes2sha2
Page 54 of 68
Requirement Management Action to Sample Log
Log
command:integrity sha256
Page 55 of 68
Requirement Management Action to Sample Log
Log
Feb 7 2013 02:05:41.953: %AAA-5-
USER_UNLOCKED: User user unlocked by
admin on vty0 (21.0.0.1)
Page 56 of 68
Requirement Management Action to Sample Log
Log
FPT_STM.1: Reliable time stamps Changes to NTP settings. Changes to NTP settings:
Page 57 of 68
Requirement Management Action to Sample Log
Log
FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted update Software updates Jul 10 2013 11:04:09.179: %PARSER-5-
CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:cisco logged
command:upgrade
FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE access Configuring the banner Feb 15 2013 13:12:25.055: %PARSER-5-
banners displayed prior to CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD: User:cisco logged
authentication. command: banner login d This is a banner d
Page 58 of 68
6 Network Services and Protocols
The table below lists the network services/protocols available on the ASR as a client (initiated outbound) and/or server (listening for
inbound connections), all of which run as system-level processes. The table indicates whether each service or protocol is allowed to
be used in the certified configuration.
For more detail about each service, including whether the service is limited by firewall mode (routed or transparent), or by context
(single, multiple, system), refer to Command Reference guides listed in Table 2.
Table 9: Protocols and Services
Service or Description Client Allowed Server Allowed Allowed use in the certified configuration
Protocol (initiating) (terminating)
DHCP Dynamic Host Yes Yes Yes Yes No restrictions.
Configuration
Protocol
DNS Domain Name Yes Yes No n/a No restrictions.
Service
ESP Encapsulating Yes Yes Yes Yes Configure ESP as described in the section
Security Payload (part Error! Reference source not found.of this
of IPsec) document.
FTP File Transfer Protocol Yes No No n/a Use SCP or HTTPS instead.
ICMP Internet Control Yes Yes Yes Yes No restrictions.
Message Protocol
IKE Internet Key Yes Yes Yes Yes As described in section Error! Reference
Exchange source not found. of this document.
IPsec Internet Protocol Yes Yes Yes Yes Only to be used for securing traffic that
Security (suite of originates from or terminates at the ASA, not
protocols including for VPN Gateway functionality to secure
IKE, ESP and AH) traffic through the ASA. See IKE and ESP
for other usage restrictions.
Kerberos A ticket-based Yes Over IPsec No n/a If used for authentication of ASA
authentication administrators, tunnel this authentication
protocol protocol secure with IPsec.
Page 59 of 68
Service or Description Client Allowed Server Allowed Allowed use in the certified configuration
Protocol (initiating) (terminating)
NTP Network Time Yes Yes No n/a Any configuration. Use of key-based
Protocol authentication is recommended.
RADIUS Remote Yes Yes No n/a If used for authentication of ASA
Authentication Dial In administrators, secure through IPsec.
User Service
SDI (RSA RSA SecurID Yes Over IPsec No n/a If used for authentication of ASA
SecureID) authentication administrators, secure through IPsec.
SNMP Simple Network Yes (snmp-trap) Yes Yes No Outbound (traps) only. Recommended to
Management Protocol tunnel through IPsec.
SSH Secure Shell Yes Yes Yes Yes As described in the section 3.3.1 of this
document.
Telnet A protocol used for Yes Yes Yes Yes Use of SSH is recommended.
terminal emulation
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Yes Yes No n/a Recommend using SCP instead, or tunneling
Protocol through IPsec.
CDP Cisco Discovery n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
Protocol there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
DTP Dynamic Trunking n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
Protocol there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
Frame Relay Standardized wide n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
area network there are no restrictions on use of these
technology that protocols
specifies the physical
and logical link layers
of digital
telecommunications
channels using a
packet switching
methodology
Page 60 of 68
Service or Description Client Allowed Server Allowed Allowed use in the certified configuration
Protocol (initiating) (terminating)
HDLC High-Level Data Link n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
Control there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
L2F Layer 2 Forwarding n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
L2TP Layer 2 Tunneling n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
Protocol there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
STP Spanning Tree n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
Protocol there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
VTP VLAN Trunking n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
Protocol there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
PPPoE Point-to-point n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
protocol over Ethernet there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
Token Ring Data Link layer n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
Protocol there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
BGP Border Gateway n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
Protocol there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
MP-BGP Multiprotocol BGP n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
OSP Open Shortest Path n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
First there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
Page 61 of 68
Service or Description Client Allowed Server Allowed Allowed use in the certified configuration
Protocol (initiating) (terminating)
EIGRP Enhanced Interior n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
Gateway Routing there are no restrictions on use of these
Protocol protocols
RIP Routing Information n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
Protocol there are no restrictions on use of these
protocols
IS-IS Intermediate system n/a n/a n/a n/a Follow best practices for the secure usage as
to intermediate there are no restrictions on use of these
system protocols
Page 62 of 68
7 Modes of Operation
An IOS router has several modes of operation, these modes are as follows:
Booting while booting, the routers drop all network traffic until the router image and
configuration has loaded. This mode of operation automatically progresses to the Normal
mode of operation. During booting, an administrator may press the break key on a
console connection within the first 60 seconds of startup to enter the ROM Monitor mode
of operation. This Booting mode is referred to in the IOS guidance documentation as
ROM Monitor Initialization. Additionally if the Router does not find a valid operating
system image it will enter ROM Monitor mode and not normal mode therefore protecting
the router from booting into an insecure state.
Normal - The IOS router image and configuration is loaded and the router is operating as
configured. It should be noted that all levels of administrative access occur in this mode
and that all router based security functions are operating. While operating the router have
little interaction with the administrator. However, the configuration of the router can have
a detrimental effect on security. Misconfiguration of the router could result in the
unprotected network having access to the internal/protected network
Page 63 of 68
All ports are blocked from moving to forwarding state during the POST. Only when all
components of all modules pass the POST is the system placed in FIPS PASS state and
ports are allowed to forward data traffic.
If any of the POST fail, the following actions should be taken:
If possible, review the crashinfo file. This will provide additional information on the
cause of the crash
Restart the TOE to perform POST and determine if normal operation can be resumed
If the problem persists, contact Cisco Technical Assistance via
http://www.cisco.com/techsupport or 1 800 553-2447
If necessary, return the TOE to Cisco under guidance of Cisco Technical Assistance.
If a software upgrade fails, the ASR will display an error when an authorized
administrator tries to boot the system. The ASR will then boot into the rommon prompt.
Directory an_image.bin not found
Unable to locate an_image.bin directory
Unable to load an_image.bin
boot: error executing "boot harddisk:an_image.bin"
autoboot: boot failed, restarting
Autoboot has been enabled by using the config-register 0x2102 command. The
following error message is displayed when the router restarts automatically:
Pressing the Break key or running the break command will cause the ASR to enter
rommon mode.
Please see the list of the TOEs POST error codes below
Software self-integrity test
DES encryption/decryption
3DES encryption/decryption
SHA hashing
SHA256 hashing
SHA384 hashing
SHA512 hashing
AES encryption/decryption
AES CFB encryption/description
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AES ECB encryption/decryption
AES CMAC encryption/decryption
AES GCM encryption/decryption/GMAC
HMAC-SHA
HMAC-SHA256
HMAC-SHA384
HMAC-SHA512
3DES Crypto-C encryption/decryption
SHA Crypto-C hashing
SHA256 Crypto-C hashing
SHA384 Crypto-C hashing
SHA512 Crypto-C hashing
AES Crypto-C encryption/decryption
3DES SSH2 encryption/decryption
DH self test
ECDH P256 self test
EC primitive z self test
SP 800-90 DRBG
RSA Signature test
ECDSA Signature test
KAS FCC Primitive Z computation
See the Hardware Installation Guide [2] Appendix C section Troubleshooting the
Upgrade for more information.
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8 Security Measures for the Operational Environment
Proper operation of the TOE requires functionality from the environment. It is the
responsibility of the authorized administrator of the TOE to ensure that the Operational
Environment provides the necessary functions, and adheres to the environment security
objectives listed below. The environment security objective identifiers map to the
environment security objectives as defined in the Security Target.
Table 10: Operational Environment Security Measures
Environment Operational Environment Privileged and Semi-
Security Objective Security Objective privileged
Definition administrator
responsibility
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPO There are no general-purpose Administrators will make sure
SE computing capabilities (e.g., there are no general-purpose
compilers or user applications) computing capabilities (e.g.,
available on the TOE, other than compilers or user applications)
those services necessary for the available on the TOE.
operation, administration and support
of the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate Administrators must ensure the
with the value of the TOE and the TOE is installed and maintained
data it contains, is provided by the within a secure physical location.
environment. This can include a secured
building with key card access or
within the physical control of an
authorized administrator in a
mobile environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to Administrators must be properly
follow and apply all administrator trained in the usage and proper
guidance in a trusted manner. operation of the TOE and all the
provided functionality per the
implementing organizations
operational security policies.
These administrators must follow
the provided guidance.
OE.CONNECTIONS TOE administrators will ensure that Administrators must ensure that
the TOE is installed in a manner that the TOE can enforce its security
will allow the TOE to effectively policies on the network traffic
enforce its policies on network traffic and not allowed to be ineffective
flowing among attached networks. due to faulty installation.
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9 Related Documentation
Use this document in conjunction with documentation at the following location:
http://www.cisco.com/
Obtaining Documentation
The following sections provide sources for obtaining documentation from Cisco Systems.
http://www.cisco.com
http://www-china.cisco.com
http://www-europe.cisco.com
Registered Cisco.com users can order the Documentation CD-ROM through the online
Subscription Store:
http://www.cisco.com/go/subscription
http://www.cisco.com
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