Lozano V Yorac

6/1/2017 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME203
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lozano vs. Yorac
G.R. No. 94521. October 28,* 1991.<a

href="#p203scra8960256001"> a
>
OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. HON.

COMMISSIONER HAYDEE B. YORAC OF THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 94626. October 28,* 1991.<a

href="#p203scra8960256001"> a
>
OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER ON

ELECTIONS and JEJOMAR C. BINAY, respondents.
Election Law The issue on the inhibition and disqualification

of Commissioner Yorac has been rendered moot and academic.In
G.R. No. 94521, this Court issued on August 16, 1990 a temporary
restraining order ordering respondent Commissioner Yorac to
cease and desist from participating in the deliberation and
resolution of the motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1990
filed in SPC No. 88040, entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. vs.
Jejomar C. Binay. The order was served in the office of
Commissioner Yorac on August 17, 1990 at 11:25 A.M. It appears,
however, that the motion for reconsideration was denied
_______________
* EN BANC.
257
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 257
Lozano vs. Yorac
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015c632ebe8d18163f2b003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/19
by respondent commission en banc in a resolution dated August

15, 1990, copy of which was served on petitioner on August 17,
1990 at 12:35 P.M. Consequently, the issue on the inhibition and
disqualification of Commissioner Yorac has been rendered moot
and academic.
Same Same Petitioners postulation that she should have
inhibited herself from hearing the main case for allegedly having
prejudged the case when she advanced the opinion that respondent
Binay could only be disqualified after conviction by the Regional
Trial Court is of exiguous validity.Granting arguendo that the
petition for inhibition of Commissioner Yorac has not been mooted
by the resolution en banc dismissing the main case for
disqualification, petitioners postulation that she should have
inhibited herself from hearing the main case, for allegedly having
prejudged the case when she advanced the opinion that
respondent Binay could only be disqualified after conviction by
the regional trial court, is of exiguous validity. In the first place,
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 1, Rule 4
thereof, prohibits a member from, among others, sitting in a case
in which he has publicly expressed prejudgment as may be shown
by convincing proof. There is no showing that the memorandum
wherein Commissioner Yorac rendered her opinion was ever made
public either by publication or dissemination of the same to the
public. Furthermore, the opinion of Commissioner Yorac was
based on prior cases for disqualification filed with the COMELEC
wherein prior conviction of the respondent was considered a
condition sine qua non for the filing of the disqualification case.
We accordingly find no compelling reason to inhibit Commissioner
Yorac from participating in the hearing and decision of the case.
Same Commission on Election A motion for reconsideration
of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision not allowed.
Anent the propriety of the issuance of the resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration, suffice it to say that the
requirement of notice in the promulgation of resolutions and
decisions of the COMELEC embodied in Section 5 of Rule 18 of
the Rules does not apply in the case at bar for the simple reason
that a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution,
order or decision is not allowed under Section 1, Rule 13 thereof.
Same Same Court cannot review the factual findings of the
Commission on Elections absent a grave abuse of discretion and a
showing of arbitrariness in its decision, order or resolution.
Finally, we have consistently held that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, and the same is true under the present one, this
Court cannot review the
258
Lozano vs. Yorac
factual findings of the Commission on Elections absent a grave

abuse of discretion and a showing of arbitrariness in its decision,
order or resolution.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS for certiorari to review the

order of the Commission on Elections.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Pedro Q. Quadra for petitioner.
Romulo B. Macalintal for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner Oliver L. Lozano filed these two special civil

actions for certiorari, namely: G.R. No. 94521 which seeks 1
the review of the undated order<a href="#p203scra8960258001"> a>
of respondent Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac denying the
motion for her voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification
in SPC No. 88040, entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. vs.
Mayor Jejomar C. Binay and G.R. No. 94626 which prays
for a reversal 2 of the en banc resolution<a
href="#p203scra8960258002"> a
> promulgated by respondent
Commission on Elections 3
(COMELEC) on August 7, 1990<a
href="#p203scra8960258003"> a
> dismissing the disqualification
petition and criminal complaint for vote buying against
respondent Mayor Jejomar C. Binay in connection with the
January 18, 1988 local elections, and its minute 4
resolution
<a href="#p203scra8960258004"> a
of August 15, 1990 > denying due
course to petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The backdrop of this case on record reveals the following
antecedent facts:
1. On January 11, 1988, prior to the January 18, 1988

local elections, petitioner and Bernadette Agcorpa,
a registered voter of Makati, filed with the
COMELEC a petition for disqualification against
then candidate for mayor Jejomar C. Binay on the
ground that respondent Binay used P9.9 million of
municipal
______________
1 Annex O, Petition, G.R. No. 94521 Rollo, 93.
2 Penned by Commissioner Dario C. Rama, with Commissioners

Haydee B. Yorac, Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. and Leopoldo L. Africa concurring,
and Commissioners Andres R. Flores and Magdara B. Dimaampao
dissenting on the same ground hereinafter clarified.
3 Annex S, Petition, G.R. No. 94626 Rollo, 119.
4 Annex U, id. ibid., 160.
259
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 259

Lozano vs. Yorac
funds to enhance his candidacy and his entire ticket

under the Lakas ng Bansa.
2. The disqualification case was assigned to the
Second Division of the COMELEC composed of
Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac, as presiding
officer, and Commissioners Andres R. Flores and
Magdara B. Dimaampao, as members.
3. The Second Division, through its Presiding
Commissioner, referred the case to the Law
Department of respondent commission for
preliminary investigation of the criminal aspect. On
February 4, 1988, Binay filed his counteraffidavit
with said department.
4. On June 21, 1988, petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion praying for the inhibition and/or
disqualification of Commissioners Yorac and Africa.
This was the first of several motions for inhibition
filed by petitioner before respondent commission.
Petitioner also prayed that the disqualification
petition be referred for consideration en banc.
Commissioner Yorac denied the motion for
inhibition. On August 10, 1988, the COMELEC en
banc denied the prayer that the case be heard en
banc, ruling that no substantial reason exists why
this case should be taken en banc and considering
finally that the case is set for hearing by the Second
Division.
5. On October 26, 1988, petitioner Lozano himself
filed a motion to disqualify Commissioner Yorac
because she postponed motu proprio a hearing set
on the ground that she will study the issue of
jurisdiction. Said motion was denied.
6. On November 3, 1988, the COMELEC en banc
promulgated Resolution No. 2050 which provides
that petitions for disqualification filed prior to the
January 18, 1988 local elections based on Section

68 of the Omnibus Election Code but not
resolved before the elections shall be referred for
preliminary investigation to the Law Department
which shall submit its report to the Commission en
banc. Pursuant to said resolution, the Second
Division on even date referred back the
disqualification case against respondent Binay to
the Law Department before taking any action
thereon.
7. On November 8, 1988, petitioner filed another
motion praying that the disqualification case be
heard and decided en banc invoking therein
COMELEC Resolution No. 2050. Instead of issuing
a formal resolution, respondent COMELEC author
260

Lozano vs. Yorac
ized then Chairman Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a

member of this Court) to reply to petitioners
counsel.
8. On May 23, 1990, the Law Department submitted 5
its investigation report<a href="#p203scra8960260001"> a>
recommending that criminal charges be filed
against respondent Binay for violation of Section
261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation

and Prosecution Division) RECOMMENDS as follows:
1. To file the necessary information against Mayor Jejomar

Binay before the proper Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region for violation of Section 261(a) of
the Omnibus Election Code, the prosecution thereof to
be handled by the Special Prosecution Committee
2. To dismiss the charge against Mayor Jejomar Binay for
threats and intimidation under Section 261(e) of the
Omnibus Election Code for lack of evidence and
3. To dismiss the charge against Conchitina Bernardo for
insufficiency of evidence.
9. On July 2, 1990, petitioner filed a motion praying

that the disqualification case be, resolved jointly
with the investigation report of the Law

Department.
10. On July 9, 1990, petitioner filed a third motion for
the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of
Commissioner Yorac for having issued a previous
memorandum addressed to the chairman and
members of respondent commission expressing her
opinion that Binay should first be convicted by the
regular courts of the offense of vote buying before
he could be disqualified. The full 6 text of said
memorandum<a href="#p203scra8960260002"> a> reads:
I submit for the Commissions consideration the matter of the

procedural problems in the above case. The chronology of events,
so far as this case is concerned, is as follows:
1. SPC No. 88040 for the disqualification of Jejomar Binay,

then candidate for Mayor of Makati was filed on January
11, 1988. It was assigned to the second Division.
_______________
5 Annex L, id. ibid., 73.

6 Annex Q, id. ibid., 116.
261
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 261

Lozano vs. Yorac
2. On July 29, 1988, petitioners filed a motion to set the case

for hearing alleging that the Commission on Audit (COA)
had officially confirmed the allegations of the
complainants.
3. Hearings were actually conducted on August 11,
September 12, October 12 and October 19, 1988.
4. On November 3, 1988, the Commission en banc adopted
Resolution No. 882050, which, inter alia provides that:
1. x x x
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the
commission may motu proprio, or on motion of any of the parties, refer
the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as an
instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a
preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the
election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether
the respondent has been elected or has lost in the election
xxx
3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the referral and shall submit its
study, report and recommendation to the Commission en banc within five
(5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If it makes
a prima facie finding of guilt, it shall submit with such study the
information for filing with the appropriate court.
5. On the same date, conformable with Resolution No. 88

2050, the Second Division referred SPC No. 88040 to the
Law Department.
6. In the course of the investigation by the Law Department,
the case became entangled with procedural difficulties the
resolution of which has been sought in the Second
Division.
My own personal thinking on the matter is that since the

preliminary investigation is the determination of criminal
liability, with the administrative consequence of removal
imposable only as long term sanction, i.e., after final criminal
conviction, the matter of procedure in the preliminary
investigation is one that should be addressed to the commission
en banc rather than to either of its divisions.
11. On August 2, 1990, petitioner received a notice

setting the promulgation of judgment en banc for
August 6, 1990. Petitioner on August 3, 1990 filed
an objection to the promulgation of judgment en
banc, allegedly because there was no showing that
the case was referred to the commission en banc
upon unanimous vote of all the members of the
Second Division.
262

Lozano vs. Yorac
12. In its aforestated August 7, 1990 resolution which

is herein assailed, the COMELEC en banc
dismissed the petition for disqualification and the
criminal complaint for vote buying against
respondent Binay. During the promulgation of
judgment, petitioner asked that the same be
suspended until after the resolution of the legal
issues raised involving constitutional and
jurisdictional questions. Commissioner Yorac was
likewise requested by petitioner to decide the
motion for her inhibition. In her undated order

subject of the petition in G.R. No. 94521, as stated
in limine, Commissioner Yorac denied the motion
for her inhibition, stating that:
During the deliberations on this case, I seriously considered

inhibiting myself from participating and voting despite the flimsy
basis which was cited for it. But I became convinced, from the
information that was coming in, that the motion was really part of
a numbers game, being played out on the basis of information
emanating from the Commission itself as to the developments in
the deliberation and the voting. Reliable information also shows
that approaches have been made to influence the voting.
It is for this reason that I do not inhibit myself from the voting
in this case consistent with my reading of the law and the
evidence.
13. The aforesaid resolution of August 7, 1990 dismissed

the petition for disqualification for lack of merit. The
motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was
denied in a resolution dated August 15, 1990, on the
ground that pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of
an en banc ruling of the Commission is one of the
prohibited pleadings, and therefore not allowed under the
Rules.
Succinctly condensed, the petition filed against
respondents COMELEC and Binay raises the following
issues:
1. Contrary to the requirement under Section 2, Rule

3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, SPC No.
88040 was referred to the Commission en banc
without the required unanimous vote of all the
members of the Second Division.
2. The minute resolution of August 15, 1990 is null
and void for having been issued without prior notice
to the parties and without fixing a date for the
promulgation thereof.
263
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 263

Lozano vs. Yorac
3. Respondent commission committed a grave abuse of

discretion amount to lack of jurisdiction in not
finding Binay guilty of votebuying, contrary to the
evidence presented by
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015c632ebe8d18163f2b003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False petitioner.<a 8/19
evidence presented
7
by petitioner.<a
href="#p203scra8960263001"> a
>
In G.R. No. 94521, this Court issued on August 16, 19908 a

temporary restraining order<a href="#p203scra8960263002"> a>
ordering respondent Commissioner Yorac to cease and
desist from participating in the deliberation and resolution
of the motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1990 filed
in SPC No. 88040, entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. vs.
Jejomar C. Binay. The order was served in the office of
Commissioner Yorac 9on August 17, 1990 at 11:25 A.M.<a
href="#p203scra8960263003"> a
> It appears, however, that the
motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent
commission en banc in a resolution dated August 15, 1990,
copy of which was served on petitioner on August 17, 1990
at 12:35 P.M. Consequently, the issue on the inhibition and
disqualification of Commissioner Yorac has been rendered
moot and academic.
Granting arguendo that the petition for inhibition of
Commissioner Yorac has not been mooted by the resolution
en banc dismissing the main case for disqualification,
petitioners postulation that she should have inhibited
herself from hearing the main case, for allegedly having
prejudged the case when she advanced the opinion that
respondent Binay could only be disqualified after
conviction by the regional trial court, is of exiguous
validity. In the first place, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, specifically Section 1, Rule 4 thereof, prohibits
a member from, among others, sitting in a case in which he
has publicly expressed prejudgment as may be shown by
convincing proof. There is no showing that the
memorandum wherein Commissioner Yorac rendered her
opinion was ever made public either by publication or
dissemination of the same to the public. Furthermore, the
opinion of Commissioner Yorac was based on prior cases for
disqualification filed with the COMELEC wherein prior
conviction of the respondent was considered a condition
sine qua non for the filing of the disqualification
_______________
7 Rollo, G.R. No. 94626, 28.

8 Rollo, G.R. No. 94521, 113114.
9 Ibid., id., 119.
264
Lozano vs. Yorac
10
case.<a href="#p203scra8960264001"> a> We accordingly find no
compelling reason to inhibit Commissioner Yorac from
participating in the hearing and decision of the case.
Similarly, we find the petition in G.R. No. 94626 devoid
of merit. Petitioner first avers that under Section 2, Rule 3
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a case pending in a
division may be referred to and decided by the Commission
en banc only on a unanimous vote of all the members of the
division. It is contended that SPC No. 88040 which was
pending before the COMELECs Second Division was
referred to the Commission en banc without the required
unanimous vote of all the division members, petitioner
alleging that Commissioner Andres R. Flores voted for the
referral of the petition for disqualification to the division. It
is, therefore, the submission of petitioner that the
resolution of the Commission en banc dated August 17,
1990 is null and void for lack of jurisdiction and for being
unconstitutional.
The argument of petitioner is not well taken. COMELEC
Resolution No. 1050 issued by the commission en banc on
November 3, 1988 is the applicable law in this
disqualification case. It provides:
xxx
RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following
rules governing the disposition of cases of disqualification filed by
virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation
to Section 6 of R.A. 6646 otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987:
1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered
candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically enumerated
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly
with the Commission before an election in which the respondent
is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the
purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in
fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission
results in a finding before election, that the respondent
candidate did in fact commit the acts complained (of), the
Commission shall order the disqualification of the respondent
candidate from continuing as such candidate.
_______________
10 Annexes 4 and 5, Comment of the Solicitor General, G.R. No. 94521

Rollo, 148 and 161.
265
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 265

Lozano vs. Yorac
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the
Commission may motu proprio, or on motion of any of the parties,
refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as
the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power
to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving
criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be
availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected
or has lost in the election.
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of the Rep.
Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has
already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a
disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for
preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the
Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before
proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint shall,
nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However,
the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to
the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law
Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the
corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate
trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of
the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which
the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the
suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.
3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary
investigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the referral
and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the
Commission en banc within five (5) days from the conclusion of
the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima facie finding of
guilt, it shall submit with such study the information 11
for filing
with the appropriate court. <a href="#p203scra8960265001"> a>
xxx
Contrary to petitioners submission that said resolution has

been repealed by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
took effect on November 15, 1988, there is nothing in the
resolution which appears to be inconsistent with the
procedural rules issued by the COMELEC.
Firstly, Resolution No. 2050 was passed by reason of the
variance in opinions of the members of respondent
commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases
of disqualification
_______________
11 Annex 2, id. ibid., 144.
266

Lozano vs. Yorac
filed pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election

Code in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, or
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, and the manner of
disposing of the same had not been uniform. Hence, the
COMELEC decided to lay down a definite policy in the
disposition of these disqualification cases. With this
purpose in mind, the Commission en banc adopted
Resolution No. 2050. The transitory provision under
Section 2, Rule 44 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides that these rules shall govern all cases pending at
the time of effectivity thereof, except to the extent that in
the opinion of the commission, or the court in appropriate
cases, an application would not be feasible or would work
injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply.
We believe that Resolution No. 2050 qualifies and should
be considered as an exception to the generally retroactive
effect of said rules.
Secondly, prior to the issuance of Resolution No. 2050,
petitioner had filed several motions with the Second
Division asking for the referral of the disqualification case
to the Commission en banc. After the COMELEC en banc
issued Resolution No. 2050, petitioner filed another motion
for the referral of the case to the Commission en banc,
specifically invoking
12
Resolution No. 2050.<a
href="#p203scra8960266001"> a
> In the words of petitioner in his
said motion, under the aforesaid resolution, once the
petition for disqualification is forwarded to the Law
Department, the case is deemed en banc because the report
is submitted En Banc by the Law Department. Petitioner
having invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc
is now estopped from questioning the same after obtaining
an adverse judgment therefrom.
Thirdly, Commissioner Andres R. Flores, who opined
that the disqualification case should first be resolved by the
Second Division, has since then clarified his position after
he was reminded that Resolution No. 2050, which he had
admittedly completely forgotten had laid down a definite
policy on the disposition of disqualification cases
contemplated in Section 68 13of the Omnibus Election

Code.<a href="#p203scra8960266002"> a>
_______________
12 Annex 6, id. ibid., 172.

13 Annex 10, id. ibid., 179. Acting on the letter of Commissioner Flores
on this matter, dated August 17, 1990, respondent commission resolved to
direct that the same be incorporated and form part of the
267
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 267

Lozano vs. Yorac
Lastly, Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a

definite policy and procedure for disqualification cases. The
COMELEC Rules of Procedure speak of special actions,
which include disqualification cases, in general. Hence. as
between a specific and a general rule, the former shall
necessarily prevail.
Anent the propriety of the issuance of the resolution
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, suffice it to
say that the requirement of notice in the promulgation of
resolutions and decisions of the COMELEC embodied in
Section 5 of Rule 18 of the Rules does not apply in the case
at bar for the simple reason that a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or
decision is not allowed under Section 1, Rule 13 thereof.
Respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for
disqualification and in holding that respondent Binay is
not guilty of vote buying, ruled as follows:
xxx
The commission concurs with the findings of the Law
Department on enumeration Nos. 2 and 3 but rejects exception to
the recommendation for prosecution of respondent Binay under
No. 1 therefor, it appearing that there is a clear misappreciation
of the evidence submitted considering the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of material witnesses for the petitioners, as well as
the correct interpretation and application of the law cited as basis
for the prosecution of respondent Binay.
xxx
The seventeen (17) Affidavits submitted by petitioners
attached to their original petition for disqualification dated
January 11, 1988, differ from the twenty (20) affidavits attached
to the memorandum of petitioners filed with the Commission
(Second Division) on August 22, 1988. The records of the case do
not show that these seventeen (17) affidavits attached to the

original petition were affirmed by the affiants during the
investigation conducted by the Law Department of this
Commission. Of the twenty (20) affidavits appended to the
Memorandum of August 22, 1988, only five (5) of the affiants were
able to
_______________
record of the case so that the pertinent portion of his opinion which
voted to return the case to the Second Division is pro tanto modified and
he is just submitting his vote on the merit of this case to the Commission
en banc.
268

Lozano vs. Yorac
affirm their testimonies before hearing officer Alioden Dalaig of

the Law Department of this Commission x x x.
xxx
In his counter affidavit, respondent Jejomar C. Binay denied
the allegations in the petition for disqualification and interposed
the defense that:
The Christmas giftgiving is an annual project of the Municipal

Government of Makati ever since the time of Mayors Estrella and Yabut
in the spirit of yuletide season wherein basic and essential items are
distributed to the less fortunate and indigent residents of Makati out of
funds appropriated for the purpose duly budgeted and subject to audit by
the Commission on Audit and same were prepared sometime on October
1987 long before I filed my certificate of candidacy and ceased to be the
Acting Mayor of Makati, x x x
The alleged ticket bearing my name, assuming its existence, indicates
nothing of significance except that of a Christmas and New Year greeting
and is not suggestive of anything which may be considered or interpreted
to be political in nature such as indorsing my candidacy for that matter. x
x x
xxx
It is undisputed that at the time the supposed giftgiving

transpired between the periods of December 2230, 1987,
respondent Binay was no longer Mayor of the Municipality of
Makati having resigned from the position on December 2, 1987, to
pursue his candidacy for reelection to the same position. The
OIC Mayor of Makati on the dates complained of, December 22
30, 1987, was OIC Mayor Sergio S. Santos who stated in his
affidavit dated February 4, 1988, that he was OfficerinCharge of

Makati, Metro Manila, from December 2, 1987 to February 2,
1988, and that as such he implemented on December 18, 1987 the
municipal governments annual and traditional distribution of
Christmas gifts.
There is ample evidence to show that it was not respondent
Binay who gave the plastic bags containing Christmas gifts to
the witnesses who executed affidavits for the petitioners. The
giver was in fact the Municipality of Makati. And this is
evidenced by the following documents attached to the records of
this case:
1) Certification dated January 11, 1988 issued by OIC

Roberto A. Chang attached as Annex A to respondent
Binays counter affidavit dated February 5, 1988.
2) COA Report dated January 11, 1988 attached as Annex R
to the pleading denominated as Motion to Set Hearing
filed
269
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 269

Lozano vs. Yorac
by complainant Oliver Lozano dated July 26, 1988, filed in connection

with SPC No. 88040 for disqualification against respondent Binay
The findings of the COA Report itself (dated June 21, 1988) upon
which petitioners rely heavily in their disqualifications case
against respondent Binay, identify the giver of the Christmas
gifts as the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Binay. x x
x
xxx
Respondent Binays allegation that the giftgiving was an
annual project of the Municipal Government of Makati was not
denied nor disputed by the petitioners who in fact made capital of
the aforequoted findings of the Commission on Audit in their
charge against respondent Binay for alleged misuse of public
funds. Also, petitioners in their latest pleading filed with the
Commission on July 2, 1990, entitled Motion To Resolve The
Disqualification Case Jointly With The Investigation Report of
the Law Department instead of rebutting respondent Binays
allegation that the Christmas gift giving is an annual project of
the Municipal Government of Makati ever since the time of
Mayors Estrella and Yabut, merely stated that:
x x x Assuming arguendo that Mayor Estrella had practiced this gift

giving every Christmas, the fact is, that there had been no electoral
campaign ongoing during such distribution and/or no election was

scheduled during Mayor Estrellas tenure.
This is also true in the case of Mayor Yabut.
More. Petitioners documentary evidence, among which are

Exhibits A A1 A2 A20 B B1 B2 B25 C1 C2 C
27 D E and F, all show indubitably that the Christmas
packages which were distributed between the periods of
December 2230, 1987, were ordered, purchased and paid for by
the Municipality of Makati and not by respondent Binay. There is
more than prima facie proofs to show that those gift packages
received by the witnesses for petitioners were intended as
Christmas presents to Makatis indigents in December 1988.
It would therefore appear from the evidence submitted by the
petitioners themselves that the giver, if any, of the Christmas
gifts which were received by the witnesses for the petitioners was
in fact, the Municipality of Makati and not respondent Jejomar C.
Binay. The presence of respondent Binay, if at all true at the time
the gifts were distributed by the Municipality of Makati to the
recipients of the Christmas gifts, was incidental. It did not make
respondent Binay as the giver of those Christmas gifts. Nor did
the giving of such gifts by the Municipal Government of Makati
influence the recipients to vote
270

Lozano vs. Yorac
for respondent Binay considering that the affiants themselves

who testified for the petitioners admitted and were aware that the
gift packages came from the Municipality of Makati and not from
respondent Jejomar C. Binay.
The foregoing conclusion is confirmed by petitioners witnesses
in the persons of Lolita Azcarraga, Johnson Carillo, Rommel
Capalungan, Renato Leonardo, Manuel Allado, Edwin Pascua,
Wilberto Torres, Apolonio De Jesus, Caridad Reposar, Artemus
Runtal and Jose Ermino who, in their sworn statements,
uniformly described the gift package as labelled with the words
Pamaskong Handog ng Makati, a clear indication that the giver
of the Christmas gifts was indeed the Municipality of Makati and
not respondent Binay.
There is one aspect of this case which somehow lends credence
to respondent Binays claim that the instant petition is a political
harassment. It is noted by the commission that while the criminal
indictment against respondent Binay is for alleged violation of
Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioners did
not implead as party respondents the affiants who received the
Christmas packages apparently in exchange for their votes. The

law on vote buying [Section 261(a) supra] also penalizes vote
buying and voteselling, then the present indictment should
have been pursued against both respondent Binay and against
the affiants, against the former for buying votes and 14
against the
latter for selling their votes.<a href="#p203scra8960270001"> a>
xxx
We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the

conclusions reached by respondent COMELEC, in
dismissing the petition for the disqualification of
respondent Binay. No clear and convincing proof exists to
show that respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote
buying. The traditional giftgiving of the Municipality of
Makati during the Christmas season is not refuted. That it
was implemented by respondent Binay as OIC Mayor of
Makati at that time does not sufficiently establish that
respondent was trying to influence and induce his
constituents to vote for him. This would be stretching the
interpretation of the law too far. Petitioner deduces from
this act of giftgiving that respondent was buying the votes
of the Makati residents. It requires more than a mere
tenuous deduction to prove the offense of votebuying.
There has to be concrete and direct
_______________
14 Rollo, G.R. No. 94626, 121134.
271
VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 271

Lozano vs. Yorac
evidence or, at least, strong circumstantial evidence to

support the charge that respondent was indeed engaged in
votebuying. We are convinced that the evidence presented,
as well as the facts obtaining in the case at bar, do not
warrant such finding.
Finally, we have consistently held that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions, and the same is true under the
present one, this Court cannot review the factual findings
of the Commission on Elections absent a grave abuse of
discretion and a showing of arbitrariness in its decision,
order or resolution. Thus:
The principal relief sought by petitioner is predicated on the

certiorari jurisdiction of this court as provided in Section 11,
Article XIIC, 1973 Constitution. It is, as explained in Aratuc vs.

Commission on Elections, not as broad as it used to be under the
old Constitution and it should be confined to instances of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of
due process. Moreover, the legislative construction of the
constitutional provision has narrowed down the scope and extent
of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is
strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review. And
in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, a case decided under the Constitution of
1935, this Court speaking through then Chief Justice Concepcion,
ruled that this Court can not x x x review rulings or findings of
fact of the Commission on Elections, as there is no reason to
believe that the framers of our Constitution intended to place the
[said] Commissioncreated and explicitly made independent by
the Constitution itselfon a lower level than statutory
administrative organs (whose factual findings are not disturbed
by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or
no substantial evidence in support of such findings.) Factual
matters were deemed not proper for consideration in proceedings
brought either as an original action for certiorari or as an appeal
by certiorari . . . [for] the main issue in . . . certiorari is one of
jurisdictionlack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction while petitions for review on
certiorari are limited to the consideration of questions of law.
The aforementioned rule was reiterated in the cases of Ticzon
and Bashier. Indeed, as early as the year 1938, applying Section
4, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, this Court held that the
Electoral Commissions exclusive jurisdiction being clear from
the language of the provision, judgment rendered . . . in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference, except upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvement use of the power as will
272

Lozano vs. Yorac
constitute a denial of due process of law. Originally lodged in the

legislature, that exclusive function of being the sole judge of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the legislature was transferred in its totality to the
Electoral Commission by the 1935 Constitution. That grant of
power, to use the language of the late Justice Jose P. Laurel, was
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature . . . x x x
x x x A review of the respondent Commissions factual
findings/ conclusions made on the basis of the evidence evaluated
is urged by the petitioner, if only to guard against or prevent any

possible misuse or abuse of power. To do so would mean digging
into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment rendered on
matters within the exclusive function of the Commission, which is
proscribed by the Aratuc 15
and other decisions of this Court. x x x<a
href="#p203scra8960272001"> a>
The charge against respondent Binay for alleged

malversation of public funds should be threshed out and
adjudicated in the appropriate proceeding and forum
having jurisdiction over the same. Consequently, it was
properly dismissed by the Commission on Elections.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of respondent
Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac in G.R No. 94521 and the
challenged resolutions of respondent Commission on
Elections subject of the petition in G.R. No. 94626 are
hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order
issued in G.R. No. 94521 is hereby LIFTED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,

Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, GrioAquino and Medialdea JJ.,
concur.
MelencioHerrera, J., On leave.
Davide, Jr., J., No part. As then Chairman of the
COMELEC, I participated in some incidents related to the
issues in this petition.
Order and resolutions affirmed.
o0o
________________
15 Padilla vs. Commission on Elections, et al., 137 SCRA 424 (1985).
273
Copyright2017CentralBookSupply,Inc.Allrightsreserved.

Lozano V Yorac

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lozano V Yorac

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Lozano V Yorac

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

6/1/2017 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME203

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 94521. October 28,* 1991.<a

OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. HON.

G.R. No. 94626. October 28,* 1991.<a

OLIVER O. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER ON

Election Law The issue on the inhibition and disqualification

VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 257

Lozano vs. Yorac

by respondent commission en banc in a resolution dated August

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lozano vs. Yorac

factual findings of the Commission on Elections absent a grave

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS for certiorari to review the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Oliver L. Lozano filed these two special civil

1. On January 11, 1988, prior to the January 18, 1988

1 Annex O, Petition, G.R. No. 94521 Rollo, 93.

2 Penned by Commissioner Dario C. Rama, with Commissioners

VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 259

funds to enhance his candidacy and his entire ticket

January 18, 1988 local elections based on Section

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ized then Chairman Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation

1. To file the necessary information against Mayor Jejomar

9. On July 2, 1990, petitioner filed a motion praying

with the investigation report of the Law

I submit for the Commissions consideration the matter of the

1. SPC No. 88040 for the disqualification of Jejomar Binay,

5 Annex L, id. ibid., 73.

VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 261

2. On July 29, 1988, petitioners filed a motion to set the case

5. On the same date, conformable with Resolution No. 88

My own personal thinking on the matter is that since the

11. On August 2, 1990, petitioner received a notice

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

12. In its aforestated August 7, 1990 resolution which

motion for her inhibition. In her undated order

During the deliberations on this case, I seriously considered

13. The aforesaid resolution of August 7, 1990 dismissed

1. Contrary to the requirement under Section 2, Rule

VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 263

3. Respondent commission committed a grave abuse of

In G.R. No. 94521, this Court issued on August 16, 19908 a

7 Rollo, G.R. No. 94626, 28.

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lozano vs. Yorac

10 Annexes 4 and 5, Comment of the Solicitor General, G.R. No. 94521

VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 265

Contrary to petitioners submission that said resolution has

11 Annex 2, id. ibid., 144.

266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

filed pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election

contemplated in Section 68 13of the Omnibus Election

12 Annex 6, id. ibid., 172.

VOL. 203, OCTOBER 28, 1991 267

Lastly, Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a

not show that these seventeen (17) affidavits attached to the