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The Confusion Provoked by Instantaneous
Discussion
The New International Communications Network and
the Chilean Crisis of 18911892 in the United States
JOHN A. BRITTON
On 2 October 1882, the presidents of Chile and the United States celebrated
the opening of the new component of the international telegraph network
that tied their two countries together. President Chester Arthur in Washing-
ton sent a congratulatory message to President Domingo Santa Mara in
Santiago. James Scrymser, head of the Central and South America Tele-
graph Company and its affiliate, the Mexican Telegraph Company, was also
in a celebratory mood. He controlled the 5,610 miles of submarine cable
and 567 miles of land lines that carried President Arthurs words. Com-
munications that had taken weeks by boat and rail now traversed this dis-
tance in a day or two, and soon required only a few hours. Despite this ami-
cable beginning, in less than a decade this electrical network would
transmit messages of hostility and threats of war between the two coun-
tries. The emotional dimensions of jingoism and war-mongering would re-
place the excitement accompanying the arrival of new technology.1
John A. Britton is Gasque Professor of History and a Francis Marion University Board of
Trustees Research Scholar. His current research involves the history of the international
communications network in the Western Hemisphere and its impact on politics, diplo-
macy, business, and culture. He expresses his gratitude to the three anonymous referees
whose comments greatly improved this article.
2007 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved.
0040-165X/07/4804-0002/$8.00
1. New York Times, 10 October 1882; see also New York Times, 21 December 1881. On
U.S.Chilean relations during this period, see William F. Sater, Chile: Clash of Global
Visions II, in United StatesLatin American Relations, 18501903, ed. Thomas Leonard
(Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1999), 17796; William F. Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in
Conflict (Athens, Ga., 1990), 3860; David Healy, James G. Blaine and Latin America
(Columbia, Mo., 2001), 20534; Joyce Goldberg, The Baltimore Affair (Lincoln, Nebr.,
1986); Mario Barros, Historia diplomtica de Chile (Barcelona, 1970), 389515; Joseph
Smith, Illusions of Conflict: Anglo-American Diplomacy toward Latin America, 18651896
(Pittsburgh, 1979), 11754, 192201; Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of
729
T E C H N O L O G Y A N D C U LT U R E
Historians have often categorized the arrival of telegraphic communica-

tions as an example of late-nineteenth-century material progress, stressing
the increased corporate efficiency that came with rapid communications.2
Some studies, however, have emphasized the role of the telegraph in height-
ened tensions and policy complications, especially for government officials
and journalists embroiled in international controversies. The cable made
OCTOBER
speed and instantaneous discussion important factors in politics, diplo-
2007 macy, and journalism. Politicians and diplomats began to expect quick
VOL. 48 responses to their telegrams, while editors and competing journalists ap-
plied pressure for the ever faster accumulation of information. According to
historian David Paull Nickles: By its impact on both the role of public opin-
ion and the quality of decision-making, telegraphy tended to make the man-
agement of diplomatic crises more difficult and arguably increase the likeli-
hood of war. 3 While much of the contemporary response to the telegraph
was favorable, even celebratory, the Chilean crisis produced cautionary
commentary about the political, diplomatic, and journalistic repercussions
of the new technology.4
Chile, 18081994 (Cambridge, 1996), 17880; and Julio Heise Gonzlez, Historia de
Chile: El perodo parlamentario, 18611925 (Santiago, 1974), 1:37782. For an insightful
analysis of the general impact of telegraphy on the diplomacy of this period, mainly in
Europe and the United States, see David Paull Nickles, Under the Wire: How the Telegraph
Changed Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), esp. 79134, and the same authors Tele-
graph Diplomats: The United States Relations with France in 1848 and 1870, Technol-
ogy and Culture 40 (1999): 125. Walter LaFeber places telegraphy within the larger con-
text of the interaction of technology and diplomacy in his seminal Technology and U.S.
Foreign Relations, Diplomatic History 24 (2000): 119.
2. Studies of the business use of the telegraph during this period generally stress the
corporate efficiencies derived from more rapid communications, particularly in terms of
management, the coordinated movement of material goods, and marketing. Alfred
Chandlers classic study, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American
Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), discussed the larger context for these changes. In
Merchants and Manufacturers: Studies in the Changing Structure of Nineteenth-Century
Marketing (Chicago, 1989), Glenn Porter and Harold C. Livesay provide insights on the
use of communications in distributing perishable goods in the United States by Swift,
Armour, United Fruit, and similar firms; see especially pages 16679. Alfred Eichners
The Emergence of Oligopoly: Sugar Refining as a Case Study (Baltimore, 1969) and Susan
Fernndezs Encumbered Cuba: Capital Markets and Revolt (Gainesville, Fla., 2002) iden-
tify advantages that accrued to centralized management. Problems emerged for business
in the hectic and sometimes delayed movement of information about sales and prices on
the New York Stock Exchange; both John Steele Gordon (The Scarlet Woman of Wall
Street [New York, 1988]) and Kenneth Ackerman (The Gold Ring: Jim Fiske, Jay Gould,
and Black Friday, 1869 [New York, 1988]) emphasize the difficulties surrounding the
early use and misuse of the telegraph by the investment community.
3. Nickles, Under the Wire, 79.
4. For contemporary discussions of increased speed in telegraphy, see Electrical
World, 31 January 1885, 46; Telegraphy around the Globe, Scientific American 74
(1896): 347; two articles by Herbert Laws Webb, A Boom in Submarine Cables, Electri-
cal World, 29 June 1889, 374, and Pucks Girdle Round the Earth, Electrical World, 1
730
BRITTONK|KInternational Communications and the Chilean Crisis of 18911892
Recent literature has engaged the more disruptive and controversial im-
pacts of telegraphy on politics, diplomacy, and journalism. In addition to
Nickless analysis in Under the Wire, Menahem Blondheim concludes in his
book, News over the Wires, that the new communications system con-
tributed to discord and division in the United States as well as a tendency
toward national integration. Accelerated tempos of business and politics
characterized the period and contributed to the sense of disruption and
occasional confusion.5 The work of journalists changed substantially be-
cause the telegraph made speed in the coverage of events a crucial, some-
times decisive factor. The first newspaper to print an account of a breaking
story gained a victory of sorts over its rivals in this competitive arena. While
many students of journalism history have stressed the introduction of
more rapid communication through telegraphy during the last half of the
nineteenth century as a critical factor in the increasing influence of news
dissemination in the United States, recent studies by Paul Starr, Asa Briggs
and Peter Burke, and Daniel Czitrom also emphasize the importance of the
centralization (and monopolization) of the system by the Associated Press.6
March 1890, 16668; Lazare Weiller, The Annihilation of Distance, Living Age, 15 Octo-
ber 1898, 16378; and Charles Bright, The Extension of Submarine Telegraphy in a
Quarter Century, Engineering Magazine 16 (1899): 41728. Most of this commentary
praised the application of the new technology; however, one of the central themes in this
study concerns the contemporary expressions of frustration and the development of
critical commentary about the more rapid flow of information via telegraphy during the
Chilean crisis in the United States.
5. Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 18801918 (Cambridge, Mass.,
2005); Michael OMalley, Keeping Watch: A History of American Time (Washington, D.C.,
1990); and Menahem Blondheim, News over the Wires: The Telegraph and the Flow of
Public Information in America, 18441897 (Cambridge, Mass., 1994). For an examination
of the creation of international time zones in a worldwide context, see Clark Blaise, Time
Lord: Sir Sanford Fleming and the Creation of Standard Time (New York, 2000). James
Carey is the author of two standard studies in communications history: Communications
and Culture (Winchester, Mass., 1988), and The Roots of Modern Media Analysis: Lewis
Mumford and Marshall McLuhan, in James Carey: A Critical Reader, ed. Eve Stryker
Munson and Catherine A. Warren (Minneapolis, 1997), 3459. Lewis Mumfords in-
sights on the interactions of technology and humans remain valuable; see, for example,
his Technics and Civilization (New York, 1934).
6. Several authors have stressed the positive aspects of the introduction of more
rapid communication through telegraphy during the last half of the nineteenth century,
especially those dealing with the history of journalism. John Hohenberg, The World
News Revolution, in Foreign Correspondence: The Great Reporters and Their Times, ed.
John Hohenberg (New York, 1964), 74112, is of special relevance for this study. Other
accounts that emphasize the telegraph as the crucial component in the communications
revolution of the nineteenth century include George N. Gordon, The Communications
Revolution: A History of the Mass Media in the United States (New York, 1977), 4047, and
Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution (New York, 1965). For more on centralization,
see Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications
(New York, 2004), 153230; Asa Briggs and Peter Burke, A Social History of the Media
from Gutenberg to the Internet (Cambridge, 2002), 13343; and Daniel Czitrom, Media
731
This larger system, with its capacity for rapid nationwide (and interna-
tional) transmission of messages, helped to create a preference for speed
over accuracy and then magnified the impact of erroneous coverage
through the new network of telegraph lines. As we will see in the Chilean
crisis, the impetus to place the story in print quickly often reduced the reli-
ability of the information.
OCTOBER
In the Chilean crisis of 189192, U.S. president Benjamin Harrison saw
2007 an opportunity amid the confusion generated by this newly rapid move-
VOL. 48
ment of information. He used the cable to apply pressure on the Chilean
government, thereby pushing the two nations close to war amid the excited
coverage of the crisis in the U.S. press. The main thesis of this essay con-
cerns the combination of confusion and aggression that dominated the
human dimension of the interaction of the submarine cable and the mass
press: Harrisons use of the international cable coincided with the jingois-
tic newspaper coverage in the United States to drive these two nations to
the brink of war. Using corporate archival records and contemporary busi-
ness and technical journals to trace the deployment of cables to Chile, and
newspapers and other published documents to analyze press coverage and
political debate, this article explores how the Chilean crisis engendered
public discussion of the impact of the telegraph on government policy
making and on decision making by newspaper editors.
The Drive for Instantaneous Communications
A gathering of dignitaries in the Grand Central Palace in New York City

on 16 May 1896 witnessed what for the time was an impressive display of
long-distance communication via submarine cable. Participants in this
well-publicized experiment included the famous inventor and former tele-
grapher Thomas Edison and the president of the New York Central Rail-
road, Chauncey Depew. An operator in one part of the large hall sent a
message that completed a circuit from New York via Galveston, Santiago,
Buenos Aires, Lisbon, London, and back to the Grand Central Palace in
only twenty-one minutes. Depew, a popular orator, asserted great confi-
dence in the new communications system and foresaw important conse-
quences for instantaneous communication on the conduct of govern-
ment affairs.7
Most of the cables that carried this message were owned and operated by
three major companies in 189192. British cable entrepreneur John Pender
and the American Mind: From Morse to McLuhan (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982), 2129, 91
121. See also Richard Schwarzlose, The Nations News Brokers, vol. 2: The Rush to Insti-
tution, from 1865 to 1920 (Evanston, Ill., 1989), and Annteresa Lubrano, The Telegraph:
How Technology Innovation Caused Social Change (New York, 1997).
7. Telegraphy around the Globe, 347.
732
controlled two of them: the Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Company that

operated the transoceanic cable between Europe and northeastern Brazil,
and the Western and Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Company (W&B),
which carried messages between Pernambuco and southern Brazil, with
connections to Buenos Aires and to Chile. The third cable enterprise, James
Scrymsers Central and South America Telegraph Company (CSA), con-
trolled the lines along the Pacific coast of South and Central America and
connected with Galveston by its affiliated company, Mexican Telegraph.8
As rivals for the cable business between South America and Europe as
well as between South America and the United States, Pender and Scrymser
understood and to some extent shared the adventure and uncertainty of
placing submarine cables in deep ocean waters and along rugged coastlines.
Both men faced the challenges of establishing reliable electric signals over
long distances. Brazilian Submarine had few serious problems in laying its
transoceanic cable during 187374, but the engineers and technicians
working for W&B encountered great difficulties along the Brazilian coast-
line. After five years of frequently broken cables, resulting in interrupted
service, delayed messages, and disgruntled customers, W&B decided to
undertake the expensive task of replacing approximately 400 miles of the
original line with new cables strengthened by reinforced metal sheathing to
offer greater protection from coral reefs, drifting sandbanks, wayward
anchors, and the hooks of fishermen. By the 1880s, W&B established more
consistent and efficient service.9
Scrymsers CSA had less arduous experiences in placing its cables along
the west coast of South America. The cable ship Silvertown was a model of
efficiency in unwinding cable as it slid into the depths of the Pacific.
8. For the history of the cable system in Latin America, two books by Jorma Ahve-
nainen are essential: The History of the Caribbean Telegraphs before the First World War
(Helsinki, 1996), and The European Cable Companies in South America before the First
World War (Helsinki, 2004). Other useful studies include Cynthia Baur, The Founda-
tions of Telegraphy and Telephony in Latin America, Journal of Communications 44
(1994): 925, and John A. Britton and Jorma Ahvenainen, Showdown in South America:
James Scrymser, John Pender, and United StatesBritish Cable Competition, Business
History Review 78 (2004): 127. On the development of the global cable system, see Vary
Coates and Bernard Finn, A Retrospective Technology Assessment: Submarine Teleg-
raphythe Transatlantic Cable of 1866 (San Francisco, 1979); Daniel Headrick, The
Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 18511945 (New York,
1991); Peter Hugill, Global Communications since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology (Balti-
more, 1999); and Jill Hills, The Struggle for Control of Global Communications (Urbana,
Ill., 2002).
9. Western and Brazilian Telegraph Company (hereafter W&B), Minutes of the
Board, 5 May and 26 May 1875, 18 March and 22 April 1880; and Report of the
Directors, 5 December 1877 and 24 January 1879 (all in the Cable and Wireless Archive,
Porthcurno, Cornwall, UK, hereafter CWA). W&B, Report of the Directors, 11 March
and 30 December 1881. Dwayne Winseck and Robert Pike, Communications and Empire:
Media, Markets, and Globalization, 18691930 (Durham, N.C, 2007).
733
Journalist Herbert Laws Webb reported that once in deep water, every-
thing runs as smooth as clockwork. The cable-laying contractor had made
soundings along the route of the line and had identified one major trouble
spot off Cape Blanco on Perus northern coast. When the cable broke in that
area, a repair ship quickly replaced it. Scrymser proudly reported to his
stockholders and the U.S. public that this cable connection with South
OCTOBER
America was open for business in October 1882.10
2007 Just as Pender and Scrymser had surmounted the problems of reliabil-
VOL. 48
ity over great distances, they also took on the challenge of speed. Their cus-
tomers, mostly governments and large businesses, valued the rapid as well
as reliable transmission of messages. Innovations in the technology of
telegraphy made for improvements in this area during the 1870s and 1880s.
The time required for telegraphic communications between Chile and the
United States (and Chile and Europe also) declined appreciably from sev-
eral days to only a few hours. In 1885, CSA boasted a sixty-five minute
transmission from Valparaso, Chile, to Galveston.11 Although the compa-
nies generally relied on the older and somewhat cumbersome mirror gal-
vanometer system for receiving messages, they made innovations else-
where. For example, W&B placed loop cables along the Brazilian coast in
order to bypass some less efficient stations and to place new cables in posi-
tions that avoided zones notorious for environmental hazards.12
One of the most important innovations of the era was the duplex sys-
tem. Based on adjustments in sending and receiving equipment, the duplex
made it possible to send one message and to receive a second one at the
same time on the same cable. The duplex had the potential, in theory, to
reduce the time of transmission by half. Brazilian Submarine introduced
10. Webb, Pucks Girdle Round the Earth (n. 4 above), 16668. New York Times, 11
May and 21 December 1881, and 14 June and 10 October 1882. For more information
on Scrymser and his competition with Pender, see Britton and Ahvenainen, 127. The
author has been unable to locate the corporate archives of either CSA or Mexican Tele-
graph. Some of the best accounts of Scrymser and his business practices are located in
the records of the West Coast of America Telegraph Company (CSAs partner and later
its main competitor in South America) in CWA.
11. Electrical World, 31 January 1885.
12. Webb, Pucks Girdle Round the Earth, 168; and Charles Bright, Submarine Tele-
graphs: Their History, Construction and Working (reprint, New York, 1974 [1898]),
592603. There is some evidence that the more efficient siphon recorder replaced the
mirror galvanometer for the reception of messages in CSA offices by the early 1890s. See
Charles R. Flint to William E. Curtis, 20 April 1892, in box 17, James G. Blaine Papers,
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; W&B, Minutes of the
Board, 9 February and 5 March 1888, and 11 December 1891, and Report of the Direc-
tors, 30 June 1891 (CWA). The British companies experienced considerable difficulty
with Brazilian officials in the laying of the loop cables in 1888 and 1889, but the over-
throw of the monarchy of Emperor Pedro II brought to power a new government that
approved this plan; see also Case of Western and Brazilian Telegraph Company,
Limited, 28 November 1889 (CWA).
734
the duplex on its lines in 1890 and reported a near doubling of capacity
and, by implication, speed. In addition, it initiated a twenty-four-hour
schedule that also added to the pace of message movement along its lines.13
CSA also upgraded technical facilities to increase speed of transmis-
sion. In 1890, Scrymser completed the placement of a new cable from Lima
to Valparaso that looped the existing lines along the Chilean coast. This
loop not only added to the speed of messages, it also outflanked and
severely weakened the small, British-owned West Coast of America Tele-
graph Company, the only rival of CSA on the Pacific coast of South Amer-
ica. Scrymser claimed an advantage over Penders two Atlantic coast com-
panies in transmissions between Chile and the United States. CSA delivered
its messages in two to three hours, while messages to New York via the
longer British lines in the Atlantic Ocean (W&B and Brazilian Submarine)
by way of London and the North Atlantic cables required six to fifteen
hours. The Pender companies did not sit idly by, however. Brazilian Sub-
marine duplicated its transoceanic cable between 1882 and 1884. After a
series of legal and administrative disputes during the 1880s, W&B and Bra-
zilian Submarine ended their differences and formed a Joint Purse agree-
ment in 1889 by which they coordinated financial operations for greater
efficiency.14
By 1891, the international cable system (fig. 1) that connected Chile
with the United States and Europe moved messages at speeds unheard of
during previous years. Both Scrymser and Pender continued to emphasize
the duplication of cables and other technical improvements to achieve
greater speed and volume. In addition, the SantiagoNew York and Santi-
agoLondon cable rates declined considerably. Hailed as evidence of prog-
ress by business and political leaders like Depew, Chester Arthur, and
Domingo Santa Mara, this extension and acceleration of communications
also created unprecedented pressures for politicians, diplomats, and jour-
13. Coates and Finn, 8790, and Hugill, 3235; F. H. C. Tarver, The Associated
Companies in South America, 20 April 1934 (unpublished manuscript, CWA).
14. For the tenuous working relationship between CSA and West Coast of America
Telegraph Company, see Britton and Ahvenainen (n. 8 above), 1422, and Ahvenainen,
The European Cable Companies (n. 8 above), 96114, 21518, 407. For the impact of the
new CSA cable in 1890, see Robert Broughtons reports from Chile in West Coast of
America Telegraph Company, Minutes of the Board, 8 March and 18 June 1890, Re-
port of the Proceedings of the Ordinary General Meeting, 14 May 1890, and Report of
the Proceedings of the Extraordinary General Meeting, 1 September 1890 (CWA); and
All-America Cables, A Half Century of Cable Service to the Three Americas (New York,
1928), 2122. The 1896 demonstration praised by Chauncey Depew was done by special
arrangements with the companies involved and therefore the speed of transmission was
faster than usual; see Nickles, Under the Wire (n. 1 above). Brazilian Submarine, Report
of the Directors, 25 April 1883, 31 October 1884, 7 May and 29 October 1885, and 12
May 1886; W&B, Minutes of the Board, 23 April, 7 May, 25 October, and 6 December
1888, 4 and 21 February and 8 March 1889, and 18 July 1892 (CWA); and Ahvenainen,
The European Cable Companies, 16569, 2023.
735
OCTOBER
2007
VOL. 48
FIG. 1 Map of the cable network that connected Chile and the United States.
(Source: Tariff Book: Central and South American Telegraph Company, August
1882, Western Union Telegraph Records, Archives Center, National Museum
of American History, Smithsonian Institution.)
736
nalists who used the system in times of crises. Under these circumstances,
the United States and Chile became embroiled in a controversy that moved
with unexpected rapidity toward war.15
Civil War and International Tensions
At the same time that Scrymser and Pender were competing in the inter-
national cable business, Chile endured a painful civil war. President Jos
Manuel Balmaceda (188691) was a headstrong advocate of social reform
and economic nationalism whose assertive tactics offended his political
opponents in the Chilean Congress and alarmed British entrepreneurs,
from merchants in Valparaso and Santiago to nitrate miners in the Ata-
cama. Balmacedas apparent threat to British interests coincided with the
arrival of Scrymsers submarine cable from the north and diplomatic over-
tures from Washington, both of which were evidence of U.S. efforts to chal-
lenge the extensive presence of the British in southern South America.
Given the tensions and turmoil associated with the civil war fought between
the Balmaceda administration on one side and his congressional opponents
on the other, and the growing rivalry between the British, who deeply dis-
trusted the Chilean chief executive, and the United States, which tended to
support him, the role of long-distance communication with Europe and the
United States became a vital factor for the nations concerned.16
CSA employed the new Valparaso to Iquique to Lima line for only
about four months before unrest in Chile intervened. The civil war pitted
the Congress, with the backing of the navy, against the president, who had
the support of the army. The congressionalist rebels and the navy in Janu-
ary 1891 took possession of Iquique, the chief port of the nitrate-rich Tara-
pac province and the main link between Santiago and Lima for Scrymsers
CSA. The congressionalists blocked the use of the submarine cable, thereby
15. For continuations of technical improvements, see Commercial and Financial

Chronicle, 1 April 1893, 538, and W&B, Report of the Proceedings of the Ordinary Gen-
eral Meeting, 12 May 1892 (CWA). On reductions in cable rates, see Times (London), 9
May 1885 and 7 November 1891, and Ahvenainen, The European Cable Companies, 235
44. In June 1890, the Pender companies announced a 50 percent reduction in cable rates
for journalists sending messages between South America and Europe. Scrymsers CSA
had previously reduced its charges for traffic between the United States and South Amer-
ica; see Times (London), 12 June 1890, and Britton and Ahvenainen, 1422. These reduc-
tions in cable rates made telegraphic communications easier and probably more
frequent for both government and corporate officials as well as for journalists. Less ex-
pensive cables may have been a factor in the increased flow of telegraphic messages con-
cerning the U.S.Chile crisis in 189192. Nickles, Under the Wire, 7, 9134, 19195.
16. Fernando Pinto Lagarrigue, Balmaceda y los gobiernos seudo-parlamentarios
(Santiago, 1991), 1358; Hernn Ramrez Necochea, Balmaceda y la contrarevolucin de
1891 (Santiago, 1972), 66175; and Harold Blakemore, British Nitrates and Chilean Pol-
itics, 18861896: Balmaceda and North (London, 1974), 65106.
737
eliminating CSA connections to the south. Balmaceda, under naval and

military pressure, pushed CSA to reopen its LimaSantiago line. (Scrymser
later said that Balmacedas demands were actually a threat.) Scrymser re-
sponded by having the cable outside of Iquique cut and then joined to a
new submarine line that went directly to Santiago. The cable steamer Relay
accomplished this technical feat while under the protection of the U.S.
OCTOBER
Navys cruiser Baltimore, an arrangement that disturbed the congressional-
2007 ist leaders. In their view, Scrymser and the U.S. Navy supported their ene-
VOL. 48 my, Balmaceda.17
The congressionalists found additional justifications for their anti-U.S.
feelings in the actions of Admiral George Brown during the fighting of
August 1891. Congressionalist forces invaded Quinteros Bay just to the
north of Valparaso and soon dealt a decisive defeat to Balmacedas military
units. Admiral Brown heard rumors of a congressionalist landing at Quin-
teros Bay and sent Lt. George Dyer onshore to telegraph this information
to Washington.18 Brown then proceeded to Quinteros Bay where he wit-
nessed the landing and, again, used CSA facilities to cable the Navy Depart-
ment in Washington. Unfortunately for Brown, Balmaceda made a public
statement regarding Browns report, creating the impression that the admi-
ral and his lieutenant supplied information to help the Chilean president
and his forces. The congressionalists alleged that Lt. Dyer telegraphed re-
ports of the landing to a newspaper in the United States and that these mes-
sages enabled Balmacedas forces to prolong the fighting, thus adding more
casualties to the bloody struggle. Brown denied that he and Dyer had
favored one side over the other, but these denials did not placate the con-
gressionalists, who added this episode to their list of grievances against the
United States. Although the accusations and Browns defense are difficult to
evaluate now, there is little doubt that he and the U.S. Navy made ill-timed
use of the telegraph at a moment of great tension between Washington and
Chile. By the end of August 1891, the Balmaceda government collapsed as
congressionalist forces took control of Santiago.19
17. Goldberg (n. 1 above), 4749. For Scrymsers defense of CSA actions, see New
York Times, 3 November 1891, and Scrymsers Personal Reminiscences (n.p., 1916), 84.
For the perspective of Western and Brazilian and more detail on Scrymsers competitive
methods, see Western and Brazilian, Board of Directors, Minute Books, 18 July 1891
(CWA).
18. New York Times, 20 November 1891.
19. Goldberg, 4751; and Fernando Bravo Valdivieso, Francisco Bulnes Serrano, and
Gonzalo Vial Correa, Balmaceda y la guerra civil (Santiago, 1991), 35354. The Nation
was especially critical of Brown and Dyer in their handling of communications; see The
Nation, 18 May 1892, 372.
738
The Baltimore Affair: A Heated Exchange
Manuel Antonio Matta and Benjamin Harrison never met, but the two
men engaged in a heated exchange of accusation and recrimination over a
period of four days (811 December 1891) that contributed to increased
tensions between their respective governments. During the next few weeks,
Chile and the United States moved toward the brink of war. The capacity of
long-distance telegraphy to exacerbate hostility between two countries be-
came obviousespecially when the leaders of both nations were prone to
intemperate outbursts.
Although separated by 4,000 miles of geographical distance and the
large cultural differences between the Hispanic-American traditions of
Chile and the Anglo-American culture of the United States, these two men
had in common a tendency toward aggressive behavior when under pres-
sure and an unflinching confidence in the rectitude of their respective
causes. Matta, at the age of 63, was the recently appointed Chilean minister
of foreign affairs. A long-time political activist, he led the controversial
reform movement that restricted the influence of the Catholic Church in
Chile during the middle years of the nineteenth century. Matta cultivated
an interest in politics and philosophy, including especially German culture
and literature. He harbored a deep distrust of the United States, a perspec-
tive reinforced by the U.S. tilt toward Peru in the War of the Pacific and U.S.
ambassador to Chile Patrick Egans support of the ill-fated Balmaceda
administration during the recent civil war. In 189091, Matta was a promi-
nent figure in the congressionalist campaign against Balmaceda and held
his new post as head of the foreign ministry with a fierce determination to
defend the new government.20
As president of the United States from 1889 to 1893, Harrison bore his
share of burdens. Narrowly elected over incumbent Democrat Grover
Cleveland in 1888, Harrison and other Republicans were stunned by the
Democratic Partys comeback in the congressional elections in November
1890. As head of the government and the Republican Party, Harrison car-
ried much of the onus for this embarrassing defeat and, at the same time,
had to deal with plots to remove him from the Republican ticket in 1892.
Throughout 1891 he gave numerous speeches and used his powers as pres-
ident to strike back against the Democrats and disloyal Republicans. By late
20. On Matta, see Jos Miguel Barros Franco, El caso del Baltimore: Apuntes para la
historia diplomtica de Chile (Santiago, 1950); Frederick Pike, Chile and the United States,
18801962 (South Bend, Ind., 1963), 7177; Ricardo Donoso, Las ideas politicas en Chile
(Mexico City, 1946), 20213, 44171; Luis Galdames, A History of Chile (Chapel Hill,
N.C., 1941), 49394; and Valdivieso, Serrano, and Correa, 35657. Also of much value is
Mattas Cuestiones recientes con la legacin y el gobierno de los Estados Unidos de Norte
America (Santiago, 1892).
739
1891, both Harrison and Matta were under pressure to take forceful action
in order to defend themselves and their administrations.21
The victory of the congressionalists in Chiles civil war was decisive
though costly, leaving the government in debt and with both the navy and
army suffering from the loss of life as well as the destruction of equipment.
Chile was not prepared for a confrontation with a foreign power, but that
OCTOBER
is precisely what happened in late 1891 and early 1892 as the new govern-
2007 ment in Santiago lurched toward war with the United States. The specific
VOL. 48
incident that led to this war-scare was the deaths of two sailors from the
Baltimore on 16 October 1891 while on shore leave in Valparaso. In spite
of widespread hostility toward the United States because of its apparent
favoritism toward the Balmaceda administration in the recent civil war,
sailors from the cruiser ventured into a bar known as the True Blue Saloon
in a working-class neighborhood where they encountered a spontaneous
and fatal eruption of hostility. The new Chilean government moved at a
seemingly slow pace in its investigation of the incident. President Harrison
demanded prompt justice that was to include an apology and financial
compensation for the families of the deceased sailors. As tensions mounted,
both governments relied on long-distance telegraphy to state their respec-
tive cases; in the process, they often trespassed the boundary between dip-
lomatic discourse and jingoistic bellicosity.
The first few weeks after the deaths of the two U.S. sailors, Charles Rig-
gin and William Turnbull, were deceptively quiet. Santiagos minister to
Washington was Pedro Montt, who was a capable diplomat and an experi-
enced politician. Montt was careful to keep Secretary of State James Blaine
apprised of the progress of the investigation by Chilean officials, and Blaine
seemed satisfied. Even the excitable U.S. press lowered the intensity of its
coverage and commentary.22 Beneath this calm surface, however, a sense of
outrage spread within the U.S. government and especially in the navy. The
commander of the Baltimore, Captain Winfield Scott Schley, conducted a
quick investigation among members of his crew and surmised that Riggin,
Turnbull, and their shipmates gave no provocation for the fatal attacks, that
the attacks were premeditated, and that the local police participated in the
violence against the sailors. Schley cabled this report to Washington where
Acting Secretary of State William Wharton accepted it as conclusive and
circulated the findings to State Department personnel and officials in other
21. On Harrison, see Charles W. Calhoun, Benjamin Harrison (New York, 2005);
Homer Socolofsky and Allan B. Spetter, The Presidency of Benjamin Harrison (Lawrence,
Kans., 1987); H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics, 1877
1896 (Syracuse, N.Y., 1969), 32064; and Hal Williams, Years of Decision: American Poli-
tics in the 1890s (Prospect Heights, Ill., 1993), 4370.
22. E. A. Fuenzalida, Don Pedro Montt, Galera contempornea de hombres notables
de Chile (Valparaso, 1901), 13337; Healy (n. 1 above), 21520; and Goldberg, 61 65.
740
branches of government.23 The frustration level in Washington emerged

full-blown in the presidents State of the Union message in early December
1891. Harrison emphasized the pending outcome of the investigation by
Chilean officials of the deaths of the sailors and reviewed U.S. policy toward
Chile during the recent civil war. He defended the actions of U.S. minister
Egan, who had enraged the congressionalists by providing diplomatic asy-
lum for defeated Balmaceda supporters. However, Harrisons main targets
were the Chilean judicial system and foreign-relations ministry. In his judg-
ment, the Chileans responsible for the deaths of the U.S. sailors were guilty
of a violent and gross insult to the United States and should be appropri-
ately punished; if they were not, Harrison intended to take serious meas-
ures: I will, by a special message, bring this matter to the attention of con-
gress for such action as may be necessary. 24
The provocative nature of Harrisons address, the reinforcement of his
diatribe by Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracys Annual Report to
Congress, and some stirrings of excitement in major New York newspapers
produced a forceful response from Santiago. Foreign Minister Matta antic-
ipated the general thrust if not the specifics of Harrisons message. As early
as September (several weeks before the Baltimore incident), Matta and Egan
exchanged intemperate notes regarding the aftermath of Chiles civil war.
On 8 December 1891, the day of Harrisons message, Matta telegraphed the
Chilean minister in Washington, Pedro Montt: Egan badly informed, badly
informs his government. 25 Perhaps as early as 9 December and certainly by
10 December, Matta received a telegraphed account of Harrisons speech
and other manifestations of anti-Chilean feelings in the United States and
proceeded to respond in provocative language of his own. On 11 December
Matta argued that the conclusions of Harrison and Tracy were based on
information that was erroneous or deliberately incorrect. He insisted that
Egan had used antagonistic words and, consequently, was unfit to represent
the United States in Chile. In brief, he blamed the U.S. government from
Egan to Tracy to Harrison for undue impatience and unjustified belliger-
ence. Embedding this condemnation in a lengthy telegram to Montt, Matta
did not send it directly to Egan or to the U.S. State Department. Chiles
Diario Oficial and many Chilean newspapers published the inflammatory
statement, however, and it also circulated among Chiles legations in
Europe. Most importantly, Egan sent a copy as it appeared in the Diario
Oficial by telegraph to Blaine along with the customary translation. Har-
risons angry comments inspired an equally angry and, thanks to long-dis-
23. Healy, 22125; Pike, 74; and Goldberg (n. 1 above), 5863.
24. Goldberg, 7682 (quote on 82); see also Valdivieso, Serrano, and Correa, 35357.
25. Matta to Montt, 8 December 1891, quoted from vol. 485 of the Archivos Nacion-
ales, Santiago, in Goldberg, 171. For a Chilean historians account of these events, see
Barros (n. 1 above), 48493.
741
tance telegraphy, remarkably rapid rebuttal. According to historian Joyce

Goldberg, Matta had succumbed to a fit of miscalculation. 26
On 26 December Pedro Montt hosted a dinner party in Washington to
celebrate President Jorge Montts inauguration (Jorge and Pedro Montt
were distant relatives). Present on this occasion were Secretary of State
Blaine and John Trumbull, a native of Chile with family ties in the United
OCTOBER
States. Blaine and Trumbull discussed the current crisis and both seemed
2007 eager to find a peaceful solution. Blaine, however, criticized the Matta tele-
VOL. 48
gram; Trumbull replied that U.S. officials misunderstood the content of the
message. According to Trumbull, the phraseology of the telegram suggested
that Matta did not accuse President Harrison of deliberately lying; rather,
Matta assumed that Harrisons aides had misinformed the president. Trum-
bull concluded, therefore, that Mattas telegram should not have caused
such a hostile response in the United States. Although much of the Blaine
Trumbull conversation indicated that both men wanted an amicable settle-
ment, the latter was uneasy about the mood in the U.S. press and, as he had
revealed in an earlier conversation with Blaine, he also worried about the
propensity of U.S. politicians and newspapers to criticize Chile and thereby
heighten tensions between the two countries.27
Washington Whirlwind
The tense diplomatic relations between Chile and the United States
throughout December 1891 reached crisis proportions early in the next
year. Diplomats and politicians in both countries expressed impatience
with their counterpartsan impatience sharpened by the use of the tele-
graph, particularly Egans telegraphed comment on Chiles handling of the
Baltimore case, Harrisons belligerent statement of 8 December, and Mattas
angry retort of 11 December. By January 1892, the connections of long-dis-
tance telegraphy with the press and politicians had contributed to the ap-
pearance of a new set of problems. The new technology of long-distance
cable communications opened the way for government officials to speed up
26. Goldberg, 8385; Pike (n. 20 above), 7273; Valdivieso, Serrano, and Correa (n.
19 above), 35659; and Galdames (n. 20 above), 49394. Telegraphy played another role
in ChileU.S. relations. Ambassador Egan asked the State Department if he should at-
tend the 26 December inauguration of President Montt, but his telegraphed instructions
from Washington reached him on the day of the inauguration, too late for him to repre-
sent the United States at the ceremony. The effective utilization of the telegraph required
some reasonable forethought, which the department did not employ. At this critical
juncture, many Chileans viewed Egans absence as yet another insult from the United
States; see Goldberg, 8687. For a critical account of the Montt presidency, see Pinto La-
garrigue (n. 16 above), 7595.
27. Goldberg, 9399. Trumbull sent an account of his 26 December 1891 conversa-
tion with Blaine to Foreign Minister Matta; see Trumbull to Matta, 26 December 1891,
vol. 482 of the Archivos Nacionales, as cited in Goldberg, 17273.
742
FIG. 2 Instantaneous discussion of the Chilean issue often produced argu-

ments at the dinner table, as indicated in this illustration from Harpers Weekly
(February 1892, 12).
their formal interactions at the same time that it made possible heightened
press coverage of these events in the jingoistic newspapers of the United
States. The interaction of long-distance telegraphic communication with
this volatile mix of politics and press brought the intrusion of the raucous
and irresponsible into the delicate domain of diplomacy. Jingoism and de-
mands for war reached a fever pitch and, therefore, the flow of information
into the United States and its subsequent presentation in the U.S. print
media became a driving force in this episode (fig. 2). However, both Chile,
as the potential belligerent, and Great Britain, with its diplomatic and eco-
nomic ties to both countries, were also deeply concerned about this explo-
sion of patriotism.
British and Chilean diplomats watched with a mixture of surprise and
alarm as President Harrison, Secretary of State Blaine, their Republican col-
leagues, and their opponents in the Democratic Party attempted to position
themselves for political advantage on the Chilean issue. The U.S. political
arena had become a form of mass entertainment. Newspaper coverage fed
upon the willingness of elected officials to capture the attention of poten-
tial voters by hyperboleif not outright prevarication. When politicians
did not provide the expected action, newspaper editors found their own
material;28 for example, President Cleveland found himself in a difficult re-
28. W. A. Swanberg, Pulitzer (New York, 1967); Morgan (n. 21 above), 6571, 186
743
election campaign against Republican challenger Benjamin Harrison in

1888. The British ambassador to the United States, Lionel Sackville-West,
naively endorsed Clevelands candidacy in a letter responding to questions
raised by a Republican loyalist posing as a British subject. The ambassadors
endorsement appeared in the pages of the Los Angeles Times and quickly
found its way into newspapers across the country. The Republicans re-
OCTOBER
gained the White House and Sackville-West returned to England minus his
2007 diplomatic appointment. This event emphasized the importance of nation-
VOL. 48
al press coverage via the wire services.29
Harrisons defeat of Cleveland underscored the intimacy between press
and politics in the United States. Harrison was sensitive to this connection
and, furthermore, was shaken by the Republican defeats in the 1890 elec-
tions. The incumbent president faced a struggle in 1891 to strengthen his
party and also to secure support for his own renomination for the presi-
dency in 1892. Harrison was an effective public speaker who understood
the national press corps. He attempted a humorous if unflattering remark
in an address to reporters and editors at Washingtons Gridiron Club soon
after attending a meeting to promote technical and scientific innovation,
stating that the meeting was the second time this week that I have been
called upon to open a congress of inventors. 30
Presidential humor and, indeed, levity from any source were in short
supply as the crisis with Chile entered the realm of public discussion. Ob-
servers in Britain noted that exaggeration had become common in the U.S.
press. The 30 October issue of the London Times carried the following tele-
graphed report: The greatest excitement prevails here (Washington) over
a report that the (Harrison) cabinet has decided to declare war against
Chile. I cannot confirm the truth of this report, but fears are expressed that
the decision of the Government is of an extremely grave character. 31 The
presentation of unconfirmed reports seemed to be an acceptable practice
for U.S. reporters supplying Britain and continental Europe with news
from Washington, and also for information moving in the other direc-
tionthat is, from London and the European capitals to the United States.
The London-based correspondent of the New York Times summarized these
distortions in a forceful passage that merits an extended quotation:
During the past week Englishmen have been afforded rather a mor-
tifying example of the worst that the Atlantic Cable can do in propa-
235; John D. Stevens, Sensationalism in the New York Press (New York, 1991), 57100; and
H. Hiley Ward, Mainstreams of American Media History (Boston, 1997), 24363.
29. Morgan, 31316, 585; and Charles S. Campbell, The Dismissal of Lord Sack-
ville, Mississippi Valley Historical Review 46 (1958): 63548.
30. Quoted in Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Gilded Age, or the Hazards of New
Functions (Upper Saddle River, N.J., 1978), 213.
31. Times (London), 30 October 1891; see also Times (London), 31 October 1891.
744
gating and disseminating lies. I say mortifying because, unhappily,

American agencies seem to have a practical monopoly at both ends
of the wire. No important event now occurs on either side of the
water the news of which does not cross the oceans bed wrapped in
thick falsehood. We, over here read with dumbfounded amazement
in the American papers telegrams sent from London purporting to
give European information. As a rule these are much worse than
stuff cabled from America eastward, but the Chilean imbroglio
seems to have inspired the liars on that side to a bold effort to raise
their average. For four days now we have been treated to detailed
accounts of Cabinet meetings [in] which war was treated as a matter
of course, and most desperate resolves were formed by Ministers,
who then came out to unbusom [sic] themselves to reporters. So
pitiful order of intelligence is needed for this sort of work that until
today these sensation-mongers had not even discovered that the
President and Cabinet could not declare war off-hand without
reference to Congress.
These alleged interviews with Harrison, Blaine, Tracy, and others,
which are reported in the same way, show these gentlemen discussing
the gravest affairs of diplomacy and national honor with the reserve
of a fishwife and the acumen of a village idiot. It is all too bad. . . .
[T]hese liars, who now infest cable communication between the two
hemispheres, misrepresent the whole American people, their govern-
ment, their politics, their journalism, their manners, morals and in-
telligence. They flood the English mind with stupid misconceptions
of everything about our people. An exposure to their falsehoods,
since it brings no amendment, only suggests to the Englishman that
we are a nation of liars into the bargain.32
The presidential candidates and the press employed belligerent hyper-
bole. Harrison, for political gain in the approaching elections, and editors,
for gains in newspaper circulation, used jingoism to capture public atten-
tion (fig. 3). Partisanship and patriotism seemed to merge, as noted in a
musical metaphor put forth by a domestic reporter on the pages of the New
York Times: the noise of the brass band that is playing a campaign tune
cannot be distinguished from that which is tooting a martial air to rally our
forces for an onset with Chile. 33
This sensationalism reached a new level of irresponsibility during early
November with the publication of rumors that the United States man-of-
war Baltimore had been sunk off the coast of Chile. The source of the rumor
was apparently an unnamed newspaper reporter who, in conversation with
workers in the Brooklyn Navy Yard on the afternoon of 7 November 1891,
32. New York Times, 1 November 1891.

33. Ibid., 27 October 1891; see also ibid., 26 October and 2831 October 1891.
745
OCTOBER
2007
VOL. 48
FIG. 3 The whip-wielding Uncle Sam assumed an aggressive stance in this edi-
torial cartoon from the Washington Post (19 January 1892, 1).
provided the laborers with the concocted story rather than culling informa-
tion from them. By implication, the reporter found his story in a tele-
graphed report from Chile.34 As this inaccuracy circulated through the wires
to Europe, the London Times lambasted the propensity of the U.S. press to
use the long-distance communications system to spread false information:
It is almost humiliating to a serious correspondent to have to contra-
dict such an absurdity; but as, for want of better sources of informa-
tion, the European press was obliged to accept better stories invented
by Americans which were a disgrace to journalism during the Civil
War with Chile, it is advisable to state that the report of a torpedo
explosion (sinking the Baltimore) is absolutely false. This malevolent
invention, which probably originated in the necessity of trying to jus-
tify the action of the Baltimore in secretly preparing for action, is only
equaled by the accounts of battles which had never been fought . . .
34. Ibid., 8 November 1891.
746
and interviews and events which had never occurred. All these frauds
upon the public must not be overlooked, and attention should be
drawn to them to prevent further mischief.35
The Chilean press and public also experienced a wave of jingoism paral-
lel to the outburst in the United States though not as prone to falsification
or as far-reaching on an international scale. Chilean press criticism of U.S.
actions appeared as early as September 1891 when, for example, El Heraldo
of Valparaso criticized Admiral Brown for his alleged support of Balma-
ceda. False reports emanating from the United States alleged that a mob
attacked Chiles diplomatic legation in Washington. This report elicited ex-
pressions of anger against the United States in the Chilean press and from
Chilean political leaders before the rumors were shown to be false. As ten-
sions mounted in early November, El Combate, a Santiago newspaper, en-
gaged in a mocking attack on what it termed the noble birdthe symbolic
bald eagle.36 The December exchange between Matta and Harrison was big
news in the Chilean press, with the respected newspaper El Ferrocarril print-
ing the full text of the foreign ministers combative remarks. A critic of Egan
and the Harrison administration in general, El Ferrocarril expressed the con-
cern that the United States was engaged in preparations for war.37
Exaggerations in the U.S. press penetrated into the information flow
and incited a surge of patriotism in Chile and the assertive policies of its
government. For example, the falsified story of the sinking of the Baltimore
by a Chilean torpedo caused much vexation among Chiles political lead-
ers.38 In an effort to set the record straight in Europe, an anonymous Chil-
ean wrote a lengthy letter to the London Times that featured a list of abuses
and irresponsible actions perpetrated by the United States, including the
willingness of the U.S. press to publish false stories about Chile, beginning
with the Balmacedacongressionalist struggle and continuing into the Bal-
timore affair.39
35. Times (London), 11 November 1891; see also New York Times, 11 November 1891.
36. New York Times, 29 October and 31 October 1891; and Times (London), 5 No-
vember 1891.
37. Pike (n. 20 above), 76, 33033. On the role of El Ferrocarril and on the Chilean
press and political history in general, see Ral Silva Castro, Prensa y periodismo en Chile
(Santiago, 1958), 21125, 32139, and Alfonso Valdebenito, Periodismo chileno, 1812
1955 (Santiago, 1956), 6470. On Chilean preparations for war, see Emilio Menesses
Ciuffardi, El factor naval en las relaciones entre Chile y los Estados Unidos (18811951)
(Santiago, 1989), 5594.
38. Times (London), 12 November 1891. Other, more reliable sources created anxi-
ety in the Chilean government. W. R. Grace, a well-known businessman with operations
in South America and strong political connections in New York and Washington, tele-
graphed officials in Santiago in late December 1891 that President Harrison favored war
over diplomacy; see Healy (n. 1 above), 22425.
39. Times (London), 12 November 1891.
747
Harrisons Ultimatum via Telegraph
President Harrison exploited the rising tension by adroitly using the

telegraph to outmaneuver the Chileans and impose his solution to the cri-
sis. Harrison and other critics of Santiagos handling of the Baltimore affair
frequently complained of the slowness of the investigation in Chile. Draw-
OCTOBER
ing upon these criticisms, Harrison established a time limit for Chiles
2007 response to his new message that required rapid communication by cable.
VOL. 48
This arrangement came at a propitious time for Harrison. His use of the
telegraph to entrap the Chilean government was a prime example of the
interaction of the cable with the mass press of the United States. Even be-
fore his sharply worded message of 21 January 1892, the political arena in
the United States was awash in jingoism.40 Congressmen and senators from
both political parties and a wide range of newspapers began to speak out
on the Chilean issue. While there was no unanimity in a demand for war,
many newspapers featured detailed stories on war preparations around the
country. Politicians and the press made relations with Chile a national
issue; jingoism resounded loudly in calls for patriotic support of Harrison.
Representative James McCreery of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
issued an unambiguous, We could land a hundred thousand troops, and
such a step being once taken, there would be no halt until our forces had
marched through the whole country (fig. 4).41
The Chilean minister to Great Britain, Augustn Ross, was aware of this
expansive outburst of belligerence. After ruminating on the threats of Mc-
Creery and others, Ross sent an urgent telegram to President Montt on 18
January 1892 that included a mixture of Spanish and English, perhaps in-
dicative of his agitation, coupled with a reference to his sources in the Brit-
ish Foreign Office: British Ministry believes today American question
todava [nevertheless] it is very serious on account of American general
opinion is in great excitement. 42
Into the already heated atmosphere Harrison launched his aggressive
message that made the telegraph an essential part of his diplomacy. Secre-
tary Blaine urged conciliation, but the president rejected this approach,
opting instead for confrontation. He revised Blaines moderate message
into an ultimatum and sent it by cable to the U.S. legation in Santiago on
40. Healy, 22534.

41. McCreery, quoted in New York Times, 4 January 1892; see also Goldberg (n. 1
above), 10811. For examples of enthusiastic support for Harrison, see New York Daily
Tribune, 25 and 26 January 1891; New York Times, 25 January 1892; Washington Post, 25
and 26 January 1892; and Chicago Tribune, 25 and 26 January 1892. For critical coverage
of Harrisons responses to the crisis, see San Francisco Examiner, 25 and 26 January 1892.
42. Quoted in letter from Ross to the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Relations, 22 Jan-
uary 1892, Legacin de Chile en Gran Britania, 18911892, II, Archivos, Ministro de
Relaciones Exteriores, as cited in Pike, 78.
748
FIG. 4 The Chicago Tribune portrayed a determined, warlike Uncle Sam facing
an apparently gracious Chilean soldier (17 January 1892, 1).
21 January. Either Chile agreed to U.S. demands and apologized for its of-
fensive [statements] with the same publicity given to the offensive expres-
sion, or the United States would break relations, apparently in preparation
for a declaration of war. The deciphering and translation of this message by
Egans staff in Santiago was completed on Saturday morning, 23 January.
The Chilean foreign ministry received the ultimatum at 10 AM. In most
nations, including the United States and Chile, Sunday was typically a day
of rest. Harrison hammered shut any window for negotiation when, on
Monday morning (25 January), he presented a lengthy statement to the
U.S. Congress in which he indicted Chile for its failure to respond to his
demands as well as its conduct in the Baltimore affair. He then left matters
in the hands of Congress, with the implication that belligerency was the
next step. The Chilean government faced an ultimatum that required an ex-
ceptionally rapid reply and allowed only two responses: national humilia-
tion or war.43
43. Goldberg, 1017; Healy, 22634; Calhoun (n. 21 above), 12729; and Sater, Chile
and the United States (n. 1 above), 6465.
749
Even including Sunday, the Chileans had barely forty-eight hours to

respond. Harrison used the availability of the international telegraph as the
basis for this short schedule and his entrapment of the Montt administra-
tion. Previous diplomatic crises and confrontations involving the U.S. State
Department were conducted in a more deliberate manner. The resolution of
the Virginus dispute with Spain had relied on the telegraph and taken nearly
OCTOBER
two months in late 1873. The three-sided negotiations over the Samoan
2007 Islands involving the United States, Great Britain, and Germany lasted from
VOL. 48
1885 to 1889 (concluding during Harrisons administration). Another issue
in Harrisons presidencythe commercial harvesting of seals in the Bering
Seainvolved the use of cables between London and Washington. In all of
these cases the United States allowed other governments ample time to re-
spond, whether by cable or mail. In contrast, the president used the speed
of telegraphy to force the Chileans into a difficult situation.44
The audience for Harrisons ultimatum included the newspaper-read-
ing public in the United States as well as the Chilean government. By
January 1892, the wire services and newspapers in the United States in ef-
fect broadcast the story from coast to coast. Harrison found much support
in the press. As early as 14 January, the Washington Post reported that the
president was considering an ultimatum and claimed that the country was
approaching political unity on this issue: [I]t is clear that no party lines are
to be drawn, and that the President will have the united support of con-
gress. Other newspapers from New York to San Francisco carried similar
accounts.45
44. Nickles notes that U.S. diplomats were instructed to use the telegraph only in
emergency situations during the 1880s and 1890s; see Nickles, Under the Wire (n. 1
above), 178, and also his Telegraph Diplomats (n. 1 above), 22. Harrison emerged as an
effective practitioner of telegraph diplomacy in comparison to the confusion encoun-
tered by the diplomats and politicians discussed in Nickless works. On the Virginus dis-
pute, see Richard Bradford, The Virginus Affair (Boulder, Colo., 1980), 2585, and Allan
Nevins, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration (New York, 1957),
2:60787. For the Samoan crisis, see Paul Kennedy, The Samoan Tangle: A Study in
AngloGermanAmerican Relations, 18781900 (New York, 1974), 5197. For the Bering
Sea controversy and a helpful summary of Harrisons diplomacy in general, see Calhoun,
11933. Calhoun also summarizes the U.S.Italian dispute regarding the deaths of sev-
eral Italians in a New Orleans riot in 1891. The diplomatic negotiations in this case con-
tinued for a year. Another relevant case involved the communications between Colombia
and the United States regarding the 1885 U.S. intervention in Panama. These exchanges
spread out over the month of April and included the use of telegraphy; see Helen Delpar,
Colombia: Troubled Friendship, in United StatesLatin American Relations, 18501903,
ed. Thomas M. Leonard (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1999), 5880.
Secretary of State Blaine instructed the Chilean minister in Washington that Har-
rison would not accept any further diplomatic delays; see New York Daily Tribune, 24
January 1892, 1. The Chileans apparently responded on 23 January, but the precise time
that Harrison saw this response remains uncertain; see Goldberg, 12829, and Healy (n.
1 above), 22829.
45. Washington Post, 14 January 1892, 1. Similar reports appeared in the New York
750
FIG. 5 This twelve-inch naval gun, said to be the best of its kind in the world,
moved across the country by rail to be installed on the warship Monterey on
the Pacific Coast. (Source: Chicago Tribune, 13 January 1892, 6.)
Although Harrison did not release his ultimatum directly to the U.S.
press or Congress, on 24 January 1892 newspapers from coast to coast
confirmed the arrival of the message in the Chilean capital through tele-
graphed reports from Santiago and Washington. The public was already in
a state of excitement fed by a mixture of rumor and fact. The New York Daily
Tribune carried rumors that Chilean agents had been seen (by unidentified
observers) making maps of harbors on Puget Sound in Washington State
and that Chilean warships were bound for the Straits of Magellan under
sealed orders (that somehow became unsealed in the United States) to pre-
pare for a confrontation with U.S. naval vessels as they emerged from the
rough seas of Cape Horn. Hearsts San Francisco Examiner traced the prog-
ress of Big Betsy, a large naval cannon, as it moved by rail across the Rocky
Mountains for installation aboard the warship Monterey for the defense of
the Pacific Coast (fig. 5). On 25 and 26 January, several newspapers, includ-
ing the New York Daily Tribune, assured their readers that the U.S. Navy was
ready for a fight; the Washington Post listed the navys vessels that it claimed
were prepared for war; and the Chicago Tribune summarized the opinions of
public officials from Maine and Florida to Montana and Colorado to dis-
cover that, in line with its editorial opinion, the war spirit has been fully
aroused throughout the land. 46 Secretary Tracy received telegrams of pub-
Times, New York Daily Tribune, Chicago Tribune, and San Francisco Examiner from 12 to
19 January 1892, usually on page 1.
46. Chicago Tribune, 2 January 1892; New York Daily Tribune, 17, 25, and 26 January
1892; and San Francisco Examiner, 19 and 21 January 1892. See also these newspapers
and New York Times, Washington Post, The State (Columbia, S.C.), and New Orleans Pic-
ayune throughout January 1892. Coverage of the U.S.Chile crisis was generally on the
front pages; Washington Post, 25 and 26 January 1892, Chicago Tribune, 25 and 26 Jan-
uary 1892.
751
lic support for war. A message dated 18 January 1892 celebrated the accord
that lifetime Republican Horace Porter and lifetime Democrat Austin Cor-
bin found in support of war with Chile: You will have a good solid backing
if the government decides to go down there and give these fellows a good
thrashing. Journalist J. Seaver Page claimed he expressed the admiration of
West Coast Americans for the cruiser San Francisco (stationed in San
OCTOBER
Diego), and concluded with a patriotic note: They only await your call. 47
2007 The sense of crisis intensified when, on 25 January, both the New York Daily
VOL. 48
Tribune and Chicago Tribune carried the same telegraphed account, date-
lined from Santiago on 24 January, that described the public mood in Chile
as approaching the level of aggressiveness in the United States:
The excitement over the imbroglio with the United States is growing
rapidly. The Valparaso incident is the all-prevailing topic of conver-
sation and the probable results of war between Chile and the United
States are eagerly discussed. While it cannot be said that the excite-
ment has reached a stage commonly known as war fever, yet the
natural martial instincts of the Chilean people are, without doubt,
greatly aroused.48
The House of Representatives discussed the crisis on the following day,
26 January. Complicating the debate were reports in several newspapers
that Chile had agreed to meet most of Harrisons demands. The discussion
in the House concentrated on the rapidity of the movement of messages
between the two governments, and from reporters in Chile to newspapers
in the United States. The primary discussants were Democrats William
Breckinridge of Kentucky, Hilary Herbert of Alabama, and the chair of the
House Foreign Relations Committee, James Blount of Georgia. Breckin-
ridge called on Harrison to deliver all of the messages in the White House
concerning Chile, especially those that might verify cable stories on the
front pages of many newspapers.49 Herbert tempered this demand by citing
the large degree of uncertainty surrounding communications from Chile:
47. Corbin to Tracy, 18 January 1892, and Page to Tracy, 25 January 1892, both in Ben-
jamin F. Tracy Letterbooks, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
48. New York Daily Tribune, 25 January 1892, and Chicago Tribune, 25 January 1892.
The New York Evening Post was one of the most outspoken opponents of war among
newspapers in larger metropolitan areas. It pointed out the problems in blockading
Chiles numerous ports, its long coastline, the potential of its navy, and the problems in
occupying such a long, narrow country; see New York Evening Post, 14 January 1892, as
quoted in Literary Digest, 23 January 1892. The Baltimore Sun, New York World, New York
Times, Richmond Times, and Salt Lake Tribune also warned of the consequences of war
with Chile, but the New York Daily Tribune, New York Sun, New York Press, Boston Globe,
Philadelphia Leader, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Detroit Tribune, Chicago Inter-Ocean, and
San Francisco Chronicle supported the aggressive assertion of U.S. power against Chile to
the point of hostilities; see the quoted editorials in Literary Digest, 23 and 30 January and
6 February 1892.
49. Congressional Record, 52nd Cong., 1st sess., 1892, 23:549. For examples of the
752
No one can say with absolute certainty that the news which appears
this morning as an Associated Press dispatch from Santiago is true.
There are features on the face of the telegram which, in my opinion,
render it very doubtful whether the dispatch states the truth. Suppose
the good news that an amicable settlement is at hand be untrue.50
Herbert took a less demanding position than Breckinridge had and con-
cluded that a call for all the presidents messages on the crisis would indicate
a lack of national unity and weaken the position of the administration.51
Like his colleagues, Blount was confused by the torrent of information
produced by the cable and the jingoistic press. He feared that the nation
was being propelled toward war on the basis of muddled thinking spawned
by contradictory information:
So far as any information is concerned in relation to dispatches
received today or yesterday or tomorrow, for one, and speaking for
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, I assure the gentleman from
Kentucky and this House that the committee will not be willing
to make my report to this body without exhausting all the informa-
tion to be had from the correspondence. . . . You can trust yourselves
to-morrow or next week, after deliberation, as you can in the confu-
sion provoked by instantaneous discussion.52
Conclusions
The flood of telegraphic letters and reports in the press following Pres-
ident Benjamin Harrisons ultimatum contained a mixture of reactions to
the possibility of war. Most major metropolitan publications were propo-
nents of a military solution and displayed their enthusiasm for naval and
military preparations. Perhaps the most significant piece of journalism in
this stage of the episode came from the Associated Press reporter (unnamed
in the dispatch) who sent by telegraph an accurate version of the news from
Santiago that President Jorge Montt had accepted the demands made by
Washington. Congressman Herbert questioned the validity of this report as
part of the torrent of telegraph messages concerning the Chilean situation.
Viewed in the context of the inaccuracies contained in previous messages
and plastered across the front pages of major newspapers, Herberts skepti-
coverage in newspapers, see New York Times, 2630 January 1892, and the following on
the same dates: New York Daily Tribune, Chicago Tribune, Atlanta Constitution, The State,
San Francisco Examiner, and Washington Post, all on page 1; see also Goldberg (n. 1
above), 10812, 17476.
50. Congressional Record, 23:551.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid. On Blounts role in the 189394 Hawaii crisis, see Tennent McWilliams, The
New South Faces the World (Baton Rouge, La., 1988), 1646.
753
cism was understandable. Yet this anonymous reporter had described the
actual facts and, in so doing, contributed to ending the crisis.53
The nationwide print-broadcast network placed essentially the same
story on the front pages of city newspapers. Although several newspapers
especially those supporting the Democratic Partyopposed or were reluc-
tant to accept war, a large number of them presented coverage of the grow-
OCTOBER
ing naval power of the United States in jingoistic language. Many of them,
2007 especially those of a Republican bent, advocated war as an acceptable op-
VOL. 48
tion in dealing with Chile. These papers did not bring about the crisis, but
they did play a large part in establishing the boundaries of the national dis-
cussion: their news coverage and editorials placed war within these bound-
aries. In its appeal to national pride, the press made war seem a preferable,
even necessary option in the rise of the United States as an assertive power
in the world arena that was dominated by Britain, France, and Germany.
Harrison and Tracy found a policy that resonated well with most of the
press and public.
Fortunately for advocates of moderation and peace, the report of con-
cessions from Santiago was soon verified by diplomatic sources. The Chil-
ean government acceded to U.S. demands and the controversy ended.54
Taking the Baltimore episode as a whole, however, the records of those who
used long-distance telegraphy were mixed. Several misuses of this new tool
indicated that politicians, diplomats, and naval officers faced an environ-
ment in which the confusion provoked by instantaneous discussion
played a potentially dangerous role. One example was the speed with which
two short-tempered, high-ranking government officials communicated
through telegraphy: Harrisons anger hit Foreign Minister Matta only a day
or two after the presidential message appeared in print in the United States;
Mattas equally angry retort, ostensibly meant for the eyes of Chileans,
quickly reached Washington, again by telegraph.
Harrison, however, soon mastered the use of the telegraph in this inter-
53. San Francisco Examiner, 26 January 1892. See front pages of New York Daily Trib-
une, Washington Post, and the Chicago Tribune for 26 January 1892. Goldberg discusses
the possibility that Harrison saw Chiles response before he sent his remarks to Congress
on 25 January; see Goldberg, 12829.
54. Barros (n. 1 above); Pinto Lagarrigue (n. 16 above), 8384; Pike (n. 20 above),
6685; Goldberg, chap. 7; and Sater, Chile and the United States (n. 1 above), 6668. The
imposition of Harrisons demands created a strong reaction against the United States in
Chile. Leading Chilean politicians and intellectuals were increasingly critical of the
United States and its expanding economic and military power. The Baltimore incident
was part of a series of events arising from ChileU.S. differences during the War of the
Pacific (187983) and extending into the late twentieth century. For discussions of this
topic, see Pike, and Jeffrey F. Taffet, The Making of an Economic Anti-American: Eduar-
do Frei and Chile during the 1960s, in Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the
Caribbean, ed. Alan McPherson (New York, 2006), 11339. An outstanding Chilean critic
of the United States was Marcial Martnez, whose views are expressed in his memoirs,
Obras completas, vol. 3: Opusculos sobre asuntos internacionales (Santiago, 1919).
754
national crisis. His ultimatum of 21 January 1892 was an effective device

that exploited rapid telegraphic communication to push the Chilean gov-
ernment to quickly capitulate. In his deployment of this technique, Harri-
son discarded the traditionally slow pace of diplomacy to give the Chileans
only two days at most to respond to his ultimatum. The reaction of the U.S.
press to Harrisons dramatic, telegraphed ultimatum was laudatory. This
cable-imposed diplomatic victory for the United States found reinforce-
ment in the patriotic mood of the country as newspapers from coast to
coast celebrated the outcome.
The injection of rumor-prone, jingoistic reporting by the U.S. press
into the international communications system faced criticism from E. L.
Godkin, editor of the well-known journal The Nation. Godkin criticized
what he saw as a disgraceful chapter in history in which a brawl in a seaport
saloon led two nations to the brink of war. For Godkin, the pressespe-
cially in a representative democracy such as the United Statesplayed a
large role when international issues assumed such prominence. He blamed
the editors who, in his view, should have been more careful in their selec-
tion of reporters to cover this controversy: There is no doubt that the
newspapers are to blame for a great deal of this. . . . [W]e have all along
maintained that a large part of the wild talk on these matters in which the
newspapers indulge must be due to the extreme youth of the writers to
whom foreign topics are assigned in some offices. Such enthusiasm is typ-
ical of youth in most countries, but in no country but our own are these
youths allowed to stir up bellicose passions in the public press, and propose
to fight first and negotiate afterwards. 55 This irresponsible reporting often
became part of the front-page news in papers across the country thanks to
the centralized wire services and the international telegraph network. God-
kins analysis helps to explain the jingoism in much of the U.S. newspaper
reportage, although he may have underestimated the extent to which ag-
gressiveness may have also affected older reporters and editors.56
The international telegraphic system built and operated by the Pender
55. The Nation, 18 May 1893, 36061. For more on Godkin, see two books by Willi-
am M. Armstrong, E. L. Godkin and American Foreign Policy, 18651900 (New York,
1957) and E. L. Godkin: A Biography (Albany, N.Y., 1978). For a useful interpretive arti-
cle, see Edward Caudill, E. L. Godkin and His (Special and Influential) View of 19th-
Century Journalism, Journalism Quarterly 69 (1992): 103949.
56. Kristin L. Hoganson, in Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics
Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, Conn.,
1998), shows how male concerns about defending the honor of manhood in the United
States contributed to the nations entry into the Spanish-American War and the exten-
sive fighting in its aftermath in the Philippines. Evidence cited in this study of the U.S.
Chile crisis of 189192 indicates that such concerns were prominent early in the decade
of the 1890s. Public events offer some indication of the general mood regarding the Chil-
ean crisis. Goldberg (n. 1 above), 135139, describes the funeral of sailor Charles Riggin
in Philadelphia, where over 28,000 mourners attended the ceremony and about 300,000
lined the streets to bear silent witness to the passing of the funeral cortege.
755
and Scrymser companies allowed the flow of skewed and often erroneous
information to extend outward from the United States to Chile and Britain
and elsewhere in Latin America and Europe.57 The New York Times corre-
spondent in London captured the dismay of fellow journalists who viewed
these jingoistic stories from the distant perspective of Europe. The London
Times editorialized that this type of inventive reporting was a fraud upon
OCTOBER
the public and a threat to international peace. The centralization of news
2007 coverage made it possible for distorted reporting to mix with responsible
VOL. 48
journalism as well as government statements to create the confusion la-
mented by Congressman Blount. Yet this confusion probably contributed
to the success of Harrisons ultimatum. Neither Blount nor his congres-
sional colleagues nor the Chilean government could separate facts from
falsehoods to determine just what the Harrison administration intended to
do. This precarious intersection of diplomacy, electric communications,
and the mass press continued into later crises. Wire services, political lead-
57. The British Foreign Office, like the London Times, closely followed the U.S.Chile
crisis. British minister to Chile Kennedy regarded the Baltimore affair as a minor incident
aggravated by the emotions of intemperate officials until the HarrisonMatta exchange of
early December 1891. By mid-January, the Foreign Office regarded war as a real threat and
advised the Chileans to compromise. To the British, Harrisons bellicosity had brought
political gains for him at home, but Blaines plans for increased U.S. trade with Chile had
suffered a setback, to the benefit of British commerce; see Smith (n. 1 above), 197200,
and Goldberg, 12628. For later diplomatic and political crises and their connections with
international cable communications, see Nickles, Under the Wire (n. 1 above), esp. 79
195; Walter LaFeber, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 2: The
American Search for Opportunity, 18651913 (Cambridge, 1993); Marshall Bertram, The
Birth of AngloAmerican Friendship: The Prime Facet of the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute
(Lanham, Md., 1992); W. Joseph Campbell, Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths,
Defining the Legacies (Westport, Conn., 2001); Piero Gleijeses, 1898: The Opposition to
the Spanish-American War, Journal of Latin American Studies 35 (2003): 681719; and
Oron J. Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy with Special Reference to England and Germany,
18901914 (reprint, Gloucester, Mass., 1964 [1940]). In addition, four groundbreaking
essays offer much insight on this point: Jrgen Wilke, The Telegraph and Transatlantic
Communication Relations; David Paull Nickles, Diplomatic Telegraphy in American
and German History; Menahem Blondheim, Slender Bridges of Misunderstanding:
The Social Legacy of Transatlantic Cable Communications; and Ursula Lehmkuhl,
Producing and Consuming Knowledge: Comparative Perspectives on the Development
and Usage of the Telegraph in Nineteenth-Century Germany and the United States (all
in Atlantic Communications: The Media in American and German History from the Seven-
teenth to the Twentieth Centuries, ed. Norbert Finzsch and Ursula Lehmkuhl [Oxford,
2004], 10779). Submarine cable companies continued to acquire and apply innovations
in cable technology; for example, CSA, W&B, and Brazilian Submarine upgraded their
equipment by duplicating cables and by the adoption of the duplex system throughout
the 1890s to offer faster, more reliable service for their customersin other words, the
pace of communications continued to increase. See Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
1 April 1893, 538 and 11 April 1895, 682; and Western and Brazilian Submarine Telegraph
Company, Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-sixth General Meeting, 11 November
1898 (CWA).
756
ers, diplomats, editors, and reporters continued to use and, sometimes, to

abuse this network. The controversies surrounding the Venezuelan bound-
ary dispute of 189596, the South Africa crisis of 189596, the Spanish-
American War, the Moroccan crises of 19056 and 1911, and the outbreak
of World War I also involved diplomatic and journalistic messages con-
veyed by cable. In many ways, the Chilean crisis was a harbinger of how
these events were handled.
757

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7KH&RQIXVLRQ3URYRNHGE\,QVWDQWDQHRXV'LVFXVVLRQ7KH1HZ,QWHUQDWLRQDO

Historians have often categorized the arrival of telegraphic communica-

The Drive for Instantaneous Communications

A gathering of dignitaries in the Grand Central Palace in New York City

controlled two of them: the Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Company that

Civil War and International Tensions

15. For continuations of technical improvements, see Commercial and Financial

eliminating CSA connections to the south. Balmaceda, under naval and

The Baltimore Affair: A Heated Exchange

branches of government.23 The frustration level in Washington emerged

tance telegraphy, remarkably rapid rebuttal. According to historian Joyce

FIG. 2 Instantaneous discussion of the Chilean issue often produced argu-

election campaign against Republican challenger Benjamin Harrison in

gating and disseminating lies. I say mortifying because, unhappily,

32. New York Times, 1 November 1891.

34. Ibid., 8 November 1891.

Harrisons Ultimatum via Telegraph

President Harrison exploited the rising tension by adroitly using the

40. Healy, 22534.

Even including Sunday, the Chileans had barely forty-eight hours to

national crisis. His ultimatum of 21 January 1892 was an effective device

ers, diplomats, editors, and reporters continued to use and, sometimes, to

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