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FIRST DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No 191726

PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:

SERENO, C.J.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
-versus- BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
REYES,JJ

Promulgated:
NOEL BARTOLOME y BAJO,
Accused-Appellant. FEB 0 6 2013 ,
X-------------------------------------------------------------------------

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A buy-bust operation has been recognized in this jurisdiction as a

legitimate form of entrapment of the culprit. It is distinct from instigation, in
that the accused who is otherwise not predisposed to commit the crime is
enticed or lured or talked into committing the crime. While entrapment is
legal, instigation is not.

This final appeal is taken by the accused from the decision

promulgated on January 29, 20 I 0, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed his conviction for illegal sale of methampethamine hydrochloride
or shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) handed down by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, in Caloocan City (RTC) through its
decision dated July 12, 2006?

Rollo, pp. 2-18; penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor (retired), and concurred in by
Associate Justice Portia Alifio-Hormachuelos (retired) and Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro.
2
CA rolla, pp. 12-22.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 191726

Antecedents

On August 13, 2003, the City Prosecutors Office of Caloocan City

charged the accused with illegally selling methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165
through the information reading thus:

That on or about the 10th day of August 2003 in Caloocan City,

Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO1
Borban Paras, who posed as poseur buyer, one (1) heat sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing 0.06 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu), knowing the same to be dangerous drug.

Contrary to Law.3

After the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued.

The evidence for the State was as follows.

On August 10, 2003, at around 1:00 a.m., an informant went to the

Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Unit (ADSOU) in Caloocan City to
report the illicit drug dealings of the accused on Reparo Street, Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. Acting on the report, Police Inspector Cesar Cruz of
ADSOU immediately instructed some of his men to conduct a buy-bust
operation against the accused. During the pre-operation briefing, the buy-
bust team designated PO1 Borban Paras as the poseur-buyer. Paras was
given a P100.00 bill that he marked with his initials BP. It was agreed that
the informant would drop a cigarette butt in front of the suspect to identify
him to Paras; and that Paras would scratch his head to signal to the buy-bust
team that the transaction with the suspect had been consummated. The
operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

Upon arriving at the target area at around 2:00 a.m. of August 10,
2003, the team members positioned themselves in the vicinity of a store. The
informant then approached a person who was standing in front of the store
and dropped a cigarette butt in front of the person. Paras, then only two
meters away from the informant, saw the dropping of the cigarette butt.
Paras went towards the suspect and said to him: Pre pa-iskor nga. The
suspect responded: Pre, piso na lang tong hawak magkano ba kukunin mo?
Paras replied: Ayos na yan, piso lang naman talaga ang kukunin ko, after
which he handed the marked 100.00 bill to the suspect, who in turn drew
out a plastic sachet containing white substances from his pocket and gave

3
Records, p. 1.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 191726

the sachet to Paras. With that, Paras scratched his head to signal the
consummation of the sale. As the other members of the team were
approaching, Paras grabbed the suspect. PO3 Rodrigo Antonio, another
member of the team, confiscated the marked 100.00 bill from the suspect,
who was identified as Noel Bartolome y Bajo. Paras immediately marked the
sachet at the crime scene with Bartolomes initials NBB.4

Insp. Cruz later requested in writing the PNP Crime Laboratory in

Caloocan City to conduct a laboratory examination of the contents of the
plastic sachet seized from Bartolome.5 PO2 Rolando De Ocampo, another
member of the buy-bust team, brought the request and the sachet and its
contents to the laboratory. In due course, Forensic Chemical Officer Jesse
Abadilla Dela Rosa of the PNP Crime Laboratory confirmed in Physical
Science Report No. D-1038-03 that the plastic sachet contained 0.06 gram of
methamphetamine hydrocholoride or shabu, a dangerous drug.6

On his part, the accused claimed that the arresting officers had framed
him up because they wanted to extort a substantial amount from him in
exchange for his release. The version of the accused tended to show the
following.

On August 9, 2003, at about 12:00 in the afternoon, the accused went

to his brothers house located on Zapote Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City, to take a rest from his work as a construction worker. While he and his
brother were watching the television show Eat Bulaga inside the house, two
policemen suddenly entered the house. One of the policemen, whom the
accused later identified as PO3 Antonio, frisked the accused but spared his
brother because the latter was asthmatic. The policemen then brought the
accused to the police station and detained him. At the police station, PO3
Antonio inquired from the accused if he was selling shabu, but the accused
denied doing so. It was then that PO3 Antonio demanded 20,000.00 from
the accused in exchange for his freedom. The accused refused to pay
because he did not have the money.7

Ruling of the RTC

As stated, the RTC convicted Bartolome of the crime charged,8 to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so holds

that accused NOEL BARTOLOME Y BAJO is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No.
4
Id. at 82.
5
Id. at 83.
6
Id. at 84.
7
TSN, July 20, 2005, pp. 2-12.
8
Supra note 2.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 191726

9165 and imposes upon him the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00).

The one (1) piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet

containing 0.06 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride is hereby
ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be turned over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the accused assailed his conviction, stating:

I
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICIPATED IN
THE SELLING OF ILLEGAL DRUGS, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME
CHARGED SINCE HE WAS MERELY INSTIGATED BY THE
POLICE INTO DOING IT.

II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE POLICES FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURE IN
THE CUSTODY OF SEIZED PROHIBITED AND REGULATED
DRUGS PRESCRIBED UNDER THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 WHICH CASTS
SERIOUS DOUBT ON THE IDENTITY OF THE SEIZED DRUG
CONSTITUTING THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE OFFENSE.

The accused argued that the operation mounted against him was not
an entrapment but an instigation, contending that without the proposal and
instigation made by poseur buyer Paras no transaction would have transpired
between them; that the police team did not show that its members had
conducted any prior surveillance of him; and that the Prosecution should
have presented the informant as a witness against him.

On January 29, 2010, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,9

rejecting the assigned errors of the accused, and affirmed his conviction. It
held that the operation against him was not an instigation but an entrapment,
considering that the criminal intent to sell dangerous drugs had originated
from him, as borne out by the shabu being inside his pocket prior to the
transaction with Paras; that the accused did not show that Paras had any ill
motive to falsely testify against him; that the conduct of a prior surveillance
and the presentation of the informant as a witness were not necessary to
establish the validity of the entrapment; and that the non-compliance by the
buy-bust team with the requirements under Section 21 of the Implementing

9
Supra note 1.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 191726

Rules and Regulations for Republic Act No. 9165 (IRR) was not fatal
because there was a justifiable ground for it, and because the apprehending
team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated drugs.

Hence, the accused is now before the Court in a final bid for acquittal.

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

To establish the crime of illegal sale of shabu, the Prosecution must

prove beyond reasonable doubt (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the identity of the object and the consideration of the sale; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing. The commission
of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, requires simply
the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens at the moment
the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In short, what is material is the
proof showing that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of the thing sold as evidence of the corpus delicti. If
a police officer goes through the operation as a buyer, the crime is
consummated when the police officer makes an offer to buy that is accepted
by the accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them involving
the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the police officer.10

The concurrence of the foregoing elements was conclusively

established herein.

To start with, Paras, as the poseur-buyer, testified that the accused

sold to him shabu during the buy-bust operation, to wit:

Q So when the informant proceeded to the place of Noel

Bartolome, what did the informant do?

A After he threw cigarette in front of Noel Bartolome, I

approached him.
xxxx
Q What happened next?

A When I approached the accused, I told him.

Pre-paiskor nga and he said
Pre, piso na lang tong hawak ko
Magkano ba ang kukunin mo and he said
ayos nay an, piso lang naman talaga ang kukunin ko.

10
People v. Unisa, G.R. No. 185721, September 28, 2011, 658 SCRA 305.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 191726

Q Who handed first you or the accused?

A I was the one who handed the buy bust money.

Q After giving him the P100.00 pesos to Noel Bartolome where

did he place it?

A Then after that he placed it on his front pocket and then after
that he got one (1) plastic sachet from his left front pocket.

Q And then after giving you the plastic sachet containing illegal
drug, what did you do?

A I scratched my head, sir.

Q After scratching your head, what transpired if any?

A When I saw my companions approaching me, I grabbed Noel

Bartolome, sir.11

Secondly, the transmission of the plastic sachet and its contents from
the time of their seizure until they were delivered to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for chemical examination was properly documented, starting
with the marking of the plastic sachet at the crime scene by Paras. This was
followed by the preparation of the written request by Insp. Cruz at the
ADSOU. PO2 De Ocampo then personally brought the plastic sachet and its
contents, together with the written request, to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
where the delivery of the request and of the sachet and its contents was
recorded by SPO1 Bugabuga of that office. In Physical Sciences Report No.
D-1038-03, Chemist Dela Rosa of the PNP Crime Laboratory ultimately
certified that the contents of the plastic sachet were examined and found to
be 0.06 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous
drug.12

And, thirdly, the Prosecution presented the shabu, the marked

P100.00 bill, and Chemist Dela Rosas Physical Sciences Report No. D-
1038-03 at the trial.13

On the other hand, the accuseds claim of being the victim of a vicious
frame-up and extortion is unworthy of serious consideration. The fact that
frame-up and extortion could be easily concocted renders such defenses hard
to believe. Thus, although drug-related violators have commonly tendered
such defenses to fend off or refute valid prosecutions of their drug-related
violations, the Court has required that such defenses, to be credited at all,
must be established with clear and convincing evidence.14 But the accused

11
TSN, March 1, 2004, pp. 13-14.
12
Supra note 6.
13
Records, pp. 84-86.
14
People v. Lazaro, Jr., G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 250, 269.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 191726

did not adduce such evidence here, for all he put up were self-serving
denials. Had the version of the Defense been what really transpired, there
was no reason for the accused and his brother not to have formally charged
the police officers with the severely penalized offense of planting of
evidence under Section 2915 of Republic Act No. 9165 and extortion.
Thereby, the allegations of frame-up and extortion were rendered
implausible.

Yet, the accused discredits the validity of his arrest by contending that
the arrest resulted from an instigation, not from a legitimate entrapment. He
insists that the evidence of the Prosecution did not show him to be then
looking for buyers of shabu when Paras and the informant approached him;
that it was Paras who proposed to buy shabu from him; and that
consequently Paras instigated him to sell shabu. He submits that the
transaction would not have transpired without the proposal and instigation
by Paras; that Paras initiated the commission of the crime by offering to him
P100.00 for the purchase of the shabu; and that he should be acquitted due to
the absolutory cause of instigation.16

The Court is not persuaded to side with the accused.

The trial judge and the CA agreed in their findings on the arrest of the
accused being the result of a legitimate entrapment procedure. Such findings
were based on the credible testimonies of the poseur buyer and other
competent witnesses of the Prosecution. We concur with their findings.
Indeed, the trial judges assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is
entitled to respect. This is because of the trial judges unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before him.17 The
rule applies even more if, like here, the trial judges assessment was
affirmed by the CA upon review.18 This rule should be obeyed here.

Moreover, we find no glaring errors or misapprehension of facts

committed by the RTC in not according credence to the version of the
accused and his brother. In this regard, it is significant that the accused did
not ascribe any ill motive to Paras that could have made the officer testify
falsely against him. Considering that the records were patently bereft of any
indicium of ill motive or of any distorted sense of duty on the part of the
apprehending team, particularly Paras as the poseur buyer, full credence was
properly accorded to the Prosecutions evidence incriminating the accused.
Without the clear and convincing indication of the lawmens ill motive and

15
Section 29. Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence. - Any person who is found guilty of
planting any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, regardless of quantity
and purity, shall suffer the penalty of death.
16
CA rollo, pp. 36-37.
17
People v. Encila, G.R. No. 182419, February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 341, 355; People v. Pringas , G.R.
No. 175928, April 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828, 845.
18
Id.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 191726

irregular performance of duty, it is always good law to presume them to

have performed their official duties in a regular manner.19 That presumption
became conclusive for lack of contravention.

To be clear, then, the insistence by the accused that he was entitled to

the benefit of an absolutory cause as the result of an instigation is
unwarranted.

There is a definite distinction between instigation and entrapment. The

Court highlighted the distinction in People v. Bayani, 20 viz:

Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the

commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other
hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the
purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation,
officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an
accused into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise not
commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the
mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the
apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the
accused cannot justify his or her conduct. In instigation, where law
enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to be acquitted. But
entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said,
instigation is a trap for the unwary innocent, while entrapment is a trap
for the unwary criminal.

As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of

entrapment, is a valid means of arresting violators of Republic Act No.
9165. It is an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of
committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime
originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense.

A police officers act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a

buy-bust operation, or what is known as a decoy solicitation, is not
prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operations.
The sale of contraband is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the
solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the criminals course of conduct.
In People v. Sta. Maria, the Court clarified that a decoy solicitation is
not tantamount to inducement or instigation:

It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that

facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his
way, or that the criminal act was done at the decoy
solicitation of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or
that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present
and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this
true in that class of cases where the office is one habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence
of a course of conduct.
19
People v. Abedin, G.R. No. 179936, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 322, 336.
20
G.R. No. 179150, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 741, 748-751.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 191726

As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by

the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an
intelligence report that appellant has been habitually
dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing
an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant.
There was no showing that the informant induced the
appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.

Conversely, the law deplores instigation or inducement, which

occurs when the police or its agent devises the idea of committing the
crime and lures the accused into executing the offense. Instigation
absolves the accused of any guilt, given the spontaneous moral revulsion
from using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile
persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist.

People v. Doria enumerated the instances when this Court

recognized instigation as a valid defense, and an instance when it was not
applicable:

In United States v. Phelps, we acquitted the accused

from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the
government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced
him to commit the crime in order to persecute him. Smith,
the BIR agent, testified that Phelps apprehension came
after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he like
smoking opium on some occasions. Smiths testimony was
disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it
was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince
him to look for an opium den where both of them could
smoke this drug. The conduct of the BIR agent was
condemned as most reprehensible. In People v. Abella,
we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives
after examining the testimony of the apprehending police
officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer
offered a tempting price, xxx a very high one causing the
accused to sell the explosives. We found there was
inducement, direct, persistent and effective by the police
officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no
evidence sufficient to convict the accused. In People v.
Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, [W]e convicted the accused
after finding that there was no inducement on the part of
the law enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs
secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of
opium from Hong Kong to Cebu after the accused had
already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We
ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the
accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by
pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of
Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the
prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.

In recent years, it has become common practice for law

enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other
entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders, which is made
difficult by the secrecy with which drug-related offenses are conducted
and the many devices and subterfuges employed by offenders to avoid
Decision 10 G.R. No. 191726

detection. On the other hand, the Court has taken judicial notice of the
ugly reality that in cases involving illegal drugs, corrupt law enforcers
have been known to prey upon weak, hapless and innocent persons. The
distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be crucial.
The balance needs to be struck between the individual rights and the
presumption of innocence on one hand, and ensuring the arrest of those
engaged in the illegal traffic of narcotics on the other.

Applying the foregoing, we declare that the accused was not arrested
following an instigation for him to commit the crime. Instead, he was caught
in flagrante delicto during an entrapment through buy-bust. In a buy-bust
operation, the pusher sells the contraband to another posing as a buyer; once
the transaction is consummated, the pusher is validly arrested because he is
committing or has just committed a crime in the presence of the buyer. Here,
Paras asked the accused if he could buy shabu, and the latter, in turn, quickly
transacted with the former, receiving the marked bill from Paras and turning
over the sachet of shabu he took from his pocket. The accused was shown to
have been ready to sell the shabu without much prodding from Paras. There
is no question that the idea to commit the crime originated from the mind of
the accused.

The accused argues that the absence of a prior surveillance cast doubt
on the veracity of the buy-bust operation; and that the failure to present the
informant as a witness against him, as well as the buy-bust teams failure to
comply with the requirements under Section 21, Article II, of Republic Act
No.9165, were fatal to the cause of the Prosecution.21

The argument of the accused lacks merit. We have held that prior
surveillance is not necessary to render a buy-bust operation legitimate,
especially when the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by the
informant.22 That was what precisely happened here.

Similarly, the presentation of an informant as a witness is not regarded

as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused.
As a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in
view of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit
arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informants
identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to law
enforcement.23 Only when the testimony of the informant is considered
absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need
to protect his security be disregarded. Here, however, the informants
testimony as a witness against the accused would only be corroborative of

21
CA Rollo, pp. 38-43.
22
Supra note 19, at 338.
23
People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430, 445-446.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 191726

the sufficient testimony of Paras as the poseur-buyer; hence, such testimony

was unnecessary.24

We consider as unwarranted the contention of the accused about the

non-compliance by the buy-bust team with the requirements of the law for
the proper seizure and custody of dangerous drugs.

The requirements are imposed by Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II

of Republic Act No. 9165, whose pertinent portion reads as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of

the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
xxxx

To implement the requirements of Republic Act No. 9165, Section 21

(a), Article II of the IRR relevantly states:

xxxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items;
xxxx

24
People v. Lazaro, supra note 14, at 272.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 191726

It is notable that pursuant to the IRR, supra, the non-observance of the

requirements may be excused if there is a justification, provided the integrity
of the seized items as evidence is properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team.

Although it appears that the buy-bust team did not literally observe all
the requirements, like photographing the confiscated drugs in the presence of
the accused, of a representative from the media and from the Department of
Justice, and of any elected public official who should be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of it, whatever justification the
members of the buy-bust team had to render in order to explain their non-
observance of all the requirements would remain unrevealed because the
accused did not assail such non-compliance during the trial. He raised the
matter for the first time only in the CA. As such, the Court cannot now dwell
on the matter because to do so would be against the tenets of fair play and
equity. That is what the Court said in People v. Sta. Maria, 25 to wit:

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds.

However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers
involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with
Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question
during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the
police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act
No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for
the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the
trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that
affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to
reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection.
Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal.

We point out that the non-adherence to Section 21, Article II of

Republic Act No. 9165 was not a serious flaw that would make the arrest of
the accused illegal or that would render the shabu subject of the sale by him
inadmissible as evidence against him. What was crucial was the proper
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized shabu,
inasmuch as that would be significant in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.26

The State showed here that the chain of custody of the shabu was firm
and unbroken. The buy-bust team properly preserved the integrity of the
shabu as evidence from the time of its seizure to the time of its presentation
in court. Immediately upon the arrest of the accused, Paras marked the
plastic sachet containing the shabu with the accuseds initials of NBB.
Thereafter, Paras brought the sachet and the contents to the ADSOU,27
25
G.R. No. 171019, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 633-634.
26
Supra note 19, at 337.
27
TSN, March 1, 2004, p. 15.
 Decision 13 G.R. No. 191726

where his superior officer, Insp. Cruz, prepared and signed the request for
the laboratory examination of the contents of the marked sachet. 28 P02 De
Ocampo handcarried the request and the evidence to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. 29 SPO 1 Bugabuga of that office recorded the delivery of the
request and the marked sachet, which were all received by Chemist Dela
Rosa. 30 In turn, Chemist Dela Rosa examined the contents of the marked
sachet, and executed Physical Sciences Report No. D-1 03 8-03 confirming
that the marked sachet contained 0.06 gram of shabu. 31 In this regard, the
accused did not deny that Paras and Chemist Dela Rosa affirmed the
sequence of custody of the shabu during the trial. 32

The CA and the RTC correctly imposed life imprisonment and fine of
P500,000.00. Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 states that the
penalty for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, regardless of the
quantity and purity, shall be life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from 1!500,000.00 toP 10,000,000.00. 33

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated by the Court

of Appeals on January 29, 2010; and ORDER the accused to pay the costs
of suit.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

28
Records, p. 83.
29 Jd.
3o Id.
31
!d. at 84.
32
TSN, March I, 2004, p. 15; records, p. 24.
33
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. -The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(PIO,OOO,OOO.OO) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, ddiver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous
drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 191726

~~o1f-o~Ro Associate Justice

IENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certifY that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice