Oblicon - Prescription

TITLE V.
PRESCRIPTION HELD: The attempts of humble people to have

disposable lands they have been tilling for
Chapter 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS generations titled in their names should not only
be viewed with an understanding attitude but
should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged.
Article 1106. By prescription, one acquires
ownership and other real rights through
the lapse of time in the manner and under (b) Freedom from judicial harassment
the conditions laid down by law. (occasioned by claims without basis).
In the same way, rights and actions are lost (c) Convenience in procedural matters (in certain
by prescription. instances, juridical proof is dispensed with).
COMMENT:(1) Definition of Prescription (d) Presumed abandonment or waiver (in view of

the owners indifference or inaction).
Prescription is a mode of acquiring (or losing)
ownership and other real rights thru the lapse of (4) Classification of Prescription
time in the manner and under the conditions laid
down by law, namely, that the possession (a) as to whether rights are acquired or lost:
should be:
1) acquisitive prescription (prescription of
. (a) in the concept of an owner ownership and other real rights).
. (b) public a) ordinaryprescriptionb)

extraordinaryprescription
. (c) peaceful
2
. (d) uninterrupted. (Arts. 1106, 1118, Civil
Code). CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1106
. (e) adverse. In order that a possession may 2) extinctive prescription (liberatory

really be adverse, the claimant must clearly, prescription; prescription of actions); (Statute
definitely, and unequivocally notify the owner of of Limitations).
his (the claimants) intention to avert an
exclusive ownership in himself. (Clendenin v. (b) as to the object or subject matter:
Clendenin, 181 N.C. 465 and Director of Lands v.
Abiertas, CA-GR 91-R, Mar. 13, 1947, 44 O.G.
1) prescription of property a)
923).
prescriptionofrealproperty b)
prescriptionofpersonalrights
1
2) prescription of rights
Art. 1106 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(5) Laches
(2) Proof Needed
Laches (or estoppel by laches) is unreasonable
Because prescription is an extraordinary mode of delay in the bringing of a cause of action before
acquiring ownership, all the essential the courts of justice. Thus, if an action prescribes
ingredients, particularly the period of time, must say in ten (10) years, it should be brought to
be shown clearly. (Boyo v. Makabenta, CA-GR court as soon as possible, without waiting for 8
7941-R, Nov. 24, 1952). or 9 years, unless the delay can be justifiably
explained (as when there is a search for
(3) Reasons or Bases for Prescription evidence). Note therefore, that while an action
has not yet prescribed, it may no longer be
(a) Economic necessity (otherwise, property brought to court because of laches.
rights would remain unstable).
Director of Lands, et al. v. Funtillar, et al.

GR 68533, May 23, 1986
FACTS: Where the land sought to be registered

was declared alienable and disposable 33 years
ago, and is no longer a forest land, and the same
has been possessed and cultivated by the
applicants and their predecessors for at least
three generations.
As defined by the Supreme Court, laches is years, the rule does not apply where a fiduciary
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and relation exists and the trustee recognizes the
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by trust.
exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to Gallardo v. Intermediate Appellate Court
assert a right within a reasonable time, GR 67742, Oct. 29, 1987
warranting a presumption that the party entitled
thereto either has abandoned it or declined to
In determining whether a delay in seeking to
assert it. However, courts will not be bound by
enforce a right constitutes laches, the existence
strictures of the statute of limitations or laches
of a confidential relationship between the parties
when manifest wrong or injuries would result
is an important circumstance for consideration.
thereby. (Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175).
A delay under such circumstance is not as
strictly regarded as where the parties are
Arradaza, et al. v. CA & Larrazabal GR strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is
50422, Feb. 8, 1989 not strictly applied between near relatives, and
the fact that parties are connected by ties of
The principle of laches is a creation of equity. It blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise
is applied, not really to penalize neglect or unreasonable delay.
sleeping upon ones right, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in 4
a clearly inequitable situation.
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1106
(6) Rationale for Laches
Narciso Buenaventura & Maria
If a person fails to act as soon as possible in Buenaventura v. CA & Manotok Realty, Inc.
vindication of an alleged right, it is possible that GR 50837, Dec. 28, 1992
the right does not really exist.
The defense of laches applies independently of
3 prescription. Laches is different from the statute
of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the
Art. 1106 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES fact of delay, whereas laches is concerned with
the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of
(7) Prescription Distinguished from time; laches is principally a question of inequity
Laches of permitting a claim to be enforced, this
inequity being founded on the same change in
the condition of the property or the relation of
Mapa III v. Guanzon 77 SCRA 387
the parties. Prescrip- tion is statutory; laches is
not. Laches applies in equity, whereas
While prescription is concerned with the FACT of prescription applies at law. Prescription is based
delay, laches deals with the EFFECT of on fixed time; laches is not.
unreasonable delay.
(8) Constitutional Provision
David v. Bandin GR 48322, Apr. 8, 1987
The right of the State to recover properties
FACTS: A and B, husband and wife, died unlawfully acquired by public officials or
intestate, leaving two children, X and Y. X had employees, from them or from their nominees or
been administering the property until her death transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
in Feb. 15, 1955. Plaintiffs, the children of Y, laches, or estoppel. (Sec. 15, Art. XI, The 1987
were given their shares of the fruits of the Philippine Constitution).
property, though irregular and at times little,
depending on the amount of the harvest. On (9) Cases
April 23, 1963, plaintiffs, the children of Y, sent a
letter of demand to the heirs of X for partition,
and on June 14, 1963, or within a period of Republic v. Animas 56 SCRA 871
approximately 8 years from Xs death, filed their
complaint against Xs heirs. Prescription does not run against the State,
especially because the recovery of unlawfully
HELD: Plaintiffs cannot be held guilty of laches, acquired properties has become a State policy.
nor is their claim barred by prescription.
Plaintiffs were not guilty of negligence nor did Aldovino v. Alunan III 49 SCAD 340 (1994)
they sleep on their rights.
Prescription must yield to the higher interest of
Prescription generally does not run in favor of a justice.
co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co- ownership. While Francisco v. CA 122 SCRA 538
implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10
Philippine jurisprudence shows that the filing of registered land in derogation to that of a
the complaint, even if merely for purposes of registered owner shall be acquired by
preliminary examination prescription or adverse possession. (J.M. Tuason
& Co. v. Aquirre, 7 SCRA 109 [1963]).
5
In fact, there is a host of jurisprudence that hold
Art. 1106 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES that prescription and laches could not apply to
registered land covered by the Torrens system.
(Bishop v. CA, 208 SCRA 636 [1992] and St.
or investigation, suspends and interrupts the
Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cleofas, supra). With
running of the prescriptive period. more reason are these principles applicable to
laches, which is an equitable principle. Laches
(10) Prescriptive Period on Registered may not prevail against a specific provision of
Land covered by Tor- rens System law, since equity, which has been defined as
justice outside le- gality is applied in the
Quirino Mateo & Matias v. Dorotea Diaz, et obscene of and not against statutory law or rules
al. GR 137305, Jan. 17, 2002 of procedure. (Causapin v. CA, 233 SCRA 615
[1994]).
FACTS: The land involved is registered under the
Tor- rens system in the name of petitioners Upon the other hand, the heirs of the registered
father Claro Mateo. There is no question raised owner are not estopped from claiming their
with respect to the validity of the title. fathers property, since they merely stepped into
Immediately after petitioners discovered the the shoes of the previous owners. Prescrip- tion
existence of OCT 206 in 1977 or 1978, they took is unavailing not only against the registered
steps to assert their rights thereto. They divided owner, but also against his hereditary successors
the land between the two of them in an because the latter merely step into the shoes of
extrajudicial partition. Then petitioners filed the the decedent by operation of law and are merely
case below to recover ownership and possession the continuation of the personality of their
as the only surviving children of original owners, predecessor- in-interest. (Teofila de Guinoo v. CA
the late Claro Mateo. [97 Phil. 235] and Gil Atun v. Eusebio Nuez [97
Phil. 762]).
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bulacan, at
Malolos, ruled that prescription and laches are The CA erred in ordering the Register of Deeds
applicable against petitioners, that real actions to cancel OCT 206 of Claro Mateo and issue new
over an immovable prescribe after 30 years, that titles to those who are occupying the subject
ownership can be acquired thru possession in land. This violates the indefeasibility of a Torrens
good faith and with just title for a period of 10 title. The title of Claro Mateo could be cancelled
years, and that ownership may be acquired thru only if there is competent proof that he had
uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years transferred his rights over the parcel of land to
without need of just title or of good faith. The another party, otherwise title would pass to his
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed that of the trial heirs only by testate or intestate succession.
court, thus, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fallo: The Supreme Court thereupon
ISSUE: Whether or not the equitable doctrine of reverses the CAs decision. In lieu thereof, the
laches may override a provision of the Land Court remands the case to the trial court for
Registration Act on imprescriptibility of title to determination of the heirs of Claro Mateo in a
registered land. Otherwise put, the issue raised proper proceeding.
is whether prescription and the equitable
principle of laches are applicable in derogation of Far East Bank & Trust Co. v. Estrella O.
the title of the registered owner. Querimit GR 148582, Jan. 16, 2002
HELD: A party who had filed immediately a case FACTS: Respondent deposited her savings with
as soon as he discovered that the land in petitioner- bank. She did not withdraw her
question was covered by a transfer certificate in deposit even after maturity date
the name of another person is not guilty of
laches. (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Cleofas,
7
92 SCRA 389 [1979]). An action to recover
possession of a registered land never prescribe
in view of the provision of Sec. 44 of Act 496 Art. 1106 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
(now
of the certificates of deposit (CDs) precisely
6 because she wanted to set it aside for her
retirement, relying on the banks assur- ance, as
reflected on the face of the instruments
themselves, that interest would accrue or
accumulate annually even after their maturity.
Sec. 47 of PD 1529) to the effect that no title to
Petitioner-bank failed to prove that it had already when it pays deposits evidenced by a CD,
paid respondent, bearer and lawful holder of without its production and surrender after proper
subject CDs, i.e., petitioner failed to prove that indorsement. (Clark v. Young, 21 So. 2d 331
the CDs had been paid out of its funds, since [1994]).
evidence by respondent stands unrebutted that
subject CDs until now remain unindorsed, The equitable principle of laches is not sufficient
undelivered, and unwithdrawn by her. to defeat the rights of respondent over the
subject CDs. Laches is the failure or neglect, for
ISSUE: Would it be unjust to allow the doctrine of an unreasonable length of time, to do that
laches to defeat the right of respondent to which, by exercising due diligence, could or
recover her savings which she deposited with should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
the petitioner? omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party
HELD: Yes, it would be unjust not to allow entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
respondent to recover her savings which she declined to assert it. (Felizardo v. Fernandez, GR
deposited with petitioner-bank. For one, 137509, Aug. 15, 2001).
Petitioner failed to exercise that degree of
diligence required by the nature of its business. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes
(Art. 1173). Because the business of banks is laches or staleness of demand; each case is to
impressed with public interest, the degree of be determined according to its particular
diligence required of banks is more than that of circumstances. The question of laches is
a good father of the family or of an ordinary addressed to the sound discretion of the court
business firm. and, being an equitable doctrine, its application
is controlled by equitable considerations. It
The fiduciary nature of their relationship with cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate
their depositors requires banks to treat fraud and injustice. Courts will not be guided or
accounts of their clients with the highest degree bound strictly by the Statute of Limitations or
of care. (Canlas v. CA, 326 SCRA 415 [2000]). A the doctrine of laches when to do so manifest
bank is under obligation to treat accounts of its wrong or injustice would result. (Rosales v. CA,
depositors with meticulous care whether such GR 137566, Feb. 28, 2001).
accounts consist only of a few hundred pesos or
of millions of pesos. Responsibility arising from Respondent is entitled to moral damages
negligence in the performance of every kind of because of the mental anguish and humiliation
obligation is demandable. (Prudential Bank v. she suffered as a result of the wrongly refusal of
CA, 328 SCRA 264 [2000]). Petitioner failed to petitioner to pay her even after she had de-
prove payment of the subject CDs issued to livered the CDs. (Arts. 2217 and 2219). In
respondent and, therefore, remains liable for the addition, petitioner should pay respondent
value of the dollar deposits indicated thereon exemplary damages which the trial court
with accrued interest. imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good (Art. 2229). Finally, respondent is
A certificate of deposit is defined as a written entitled to attorneys fees since petitioners act
acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the or omission compelled her to incur expenses to
receipt of a sum of money on deposit which the
bank or banker promises to pay to the deposi- 9
tor, to the order of the depositor, or to some
other person or his order, whereby the relation Art. 1106 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
of debtor and creditor between the bank and the protect her interest making such award just and
depositor is created. Principles governing other equitable. (Art.
8 2208).
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1106 Development Bank of the Phils. v. CA &
Carlos Cajes GR 129471, Apr. 28, 2000
types of bank deposits are applicable to CDs (10
AM Juri 2d Sec. 455), as are the rules governing FACTS: Petitioner filed an ejectment suit against
promissory notes when they contain an private respondent, claiming ownership of a
unconditional promise to pay a sum certain of parcel of land covered by a TCT, which included
money absolutely. (Ibid., Sec. 457). the 19.4 hectares being occupied by the latter.
The trial court declared petitioner to be the
The principle that payment, in order to discharge owner of the land, but the Court of Appeals (CA)
a debt, must be made to someone authorized to reversed the trial court. On appeal, petitioner
receive it is applicable to the payment of CDs. claimed that its predecessor-in-interest had
Thus, a bank will be protected in making become the owner of the land by virtue of the
payment to the holder a certificate indorsed by decree of registration in his name. The
the payee, unless it has notice of the invalidity of Supreme Court affirmed the CA.
the indorsement or the holders want of title. (10
Am Jur 2d Sec. 461). A bank acts at its peril
HELD: Taking into consideration the possession (a) those who can make use of the other modes
of his predecessor-in-interest, private respondent of acquiring ownership.
had been in uninterrupted adverse possession
of the land for more than 30 years prior to the (b) even minors and other incapacitated
decree of registration issued in favor of persons (like the insane).
petitioners predecessor-in-interest. Such
possession ripened into ownership of the land
(2) Reason for Par. 1 (Those Capable of
thru acquisitive prescription, a mode of acquiring
Acquiring Property or Rights Thru the
ownership and other real rights over immovable
Other Modes)
property. A decree of registration cut off or
extinguished a right acquired by a person only
when such right refers to a lien or encumbrance Since prescription is also a mode of acquiring
on the land which was not annotated on the ownership, it follows that if a person is capable
certificate of title issued thereon, but not to the of becoming an owner by the other legal modes,
right of ownership thereof. Regis- tration of land he should also be capable of acquiring the same
does not create a title nor vest one. Accordingly, property by prescription. Thus, if a person can
the 19.4 hectares of land being occupied by become an owner by donation, he can also
private respondent must be reconveyed in his become an owner by prescription.
favor.
(3) Query (Re Donation by Paramour)
(11) Presumptive Period re Ill-Gotten
Wealth or Behest Loans A husband cannot validly receive a donation
from a paramour. Now then, can he acquire by
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding prescription the property donated to him by the
Committee on Behest Loans v. Aniano A. paramour?
Desierto (Recovery of Ill-Gotten Wealth)GR
130340, Oct. 25, 1999114 SCAD 707 11
Behest loans, which are part of the ill-gotten Art. 1108 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
wealth which former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and his cronies accumulated and which ANS.: Yes, but only by extraordinary prescription
the Government thru the Presidential (not ordinary prescription) since he would be
lacking the element of just title. There would
10 be no just title because under the law, they
are incapacitated to donate to each other. (See
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1107 Art. 739, Civil Code). Note that even if a
donation is VOID, it may constitute the legal
basis for adverse possession. (See Tagalgal v.
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) seeks
Luega, CA-GR 19651-R, Feb. 19, 1959).
to recover, have a prescriptive period to be
counted from the discovery of the crimes
charged, and not from the date of their (4) Reason Why Minors May Acquire
commission. If the commission of the crime is Personally
known, the prescriptive period shall commence
to run on the day it was committed. This is because only juridical capacity is required
for possession, not capacity to act. Thus, even
The prosecution of offenses arising from, relating discernment of intent to possess is not required
or inci- dent to, or involving ill-gotten wealth for such personal acquisition. This is so because
contemplated in Sec. 15, Art. XI of the Philippine the law makes no distinction.
Constitution of 1987 may be barred by
prescription. Said provision applies only in civil Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive
actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not and extinctive, runs against:
to criminal cases.
(1) Minors and other incapacitated persons
Art. 1107. Persons who are capable of who have parents, guardians or other legal
acquiring property or rights by the other representatives;
legal modes may acquire the same by
means of prescription. (2) Absentees who have administrators,
either appointed by them before their
Minors and other incapacitated persons disappearance, or appointed by the courts;
may acquire property or rights by
prescription, either personally or through (3) Persons living abroad, who have
their parents, guardians or legal managers or administrators;
representatives.
(4) Juridical persons, except the State and
COMMENT:(1) Who May Acquire Property or its subdivisions.
Rights by Prescription
Persons who are disqualified from between husband and wife, even though
administering their property have a right there be a separation of property agreed
to claim damages from their legal rep- upon in the marriage settlements or by
resentatives whose negligence has been judicial decree.
the cause of prescription.
Neither does prescription run between
COMMENT:(1) Persons Against Whom parents and children, during the minority
Prescription May Run or insanity of the latter, and between
guardian and ward during the continuance
. (a) The Article enumerates four such groups. of the guardianship.
. (b) Reason for Pars. 1, 2, and 3: These people 13

are supposed to be protected by those in charge.
If they are not properly protected thru the lat- Art. 1109 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
12 COMMENT:(1) No Prescription Between

Husband and Wife
(a) Reason for the law The close relationship
ters negligence, a claim for damages against between them, engendered by affection or
the latter can prosper. influence, may prevent one from suing the other.
Hence, the general rule is NO PRESCRIPTION.
(NOTE: The Article was applied in Toriba
(2) Query (Re Minors Without Parents, etc.)
Fontanilla Pacio, et al. v. Manuela Pacio Billon, et
al., L-15088, Jan. 31, 1961).
Suppose the minors or the insane persons have
no parents or legal representatives, does
(b) Note that there is no prescription even if
prescription run against them? there has been a separation of property, for
the same reluctance to sue each other may still
ANS.: While the Article seemingly implies that in exist.
such a case, prescription should not run against
them, it is believed that Secs. 42, 45, and 46 of
(c) Query Suppose the separation of
Act No. 190 (the Code of Civil Procedure) can property is the consequence of legal
apply to them, since implied repeals are not
separation, does prescription run? ANS.: It is
looked upon with favor. Thus, prescription can believed that prescription will also not run, for
still run against minors, the insane, and those in
the law does not distinguish. After all, here, the
jail, except that these people may still bring the separation of property would be by judicial
action within a number of years after their
decree.
disability has been removed:
(d) Exceptions when prescription is

. (a) 3 years in case of recovery of land
specifically provided for by law, such as:
. (b) 2 years in other civil actions 1) the prescriptive period for legal separation
suits (Art. 120, Civil Code);
These saving clauses are in line with some
saving clauses provided for minors and the 2) alienations made by the husband, without
incapacitated under the New Civil Code. (See, for
the wifes consent. (Art. 173, Civil Code).
example, Art. 285 with respect to the right of a
natural child to compel recognition after the
parents death, if the parent dies while the child (2) Between Parents and Children
was still a minor).
(a) No prescription shall run between them
If the minor has a guardian, there is NO DOUBT during the MI- NORITY or INSANITY of the latter.
that prescription runs against him even during A sensu contrario prescription runs if the legal
minority. (See Wenzel, et al. v. Surigao disability does not exist anymore.
Consolidated Mining Co., L-10843, May 31,
1960). (b) As a general rule, even if the child is neither
insane nor incapacitated, an adverse possession
(3) State and Its Subdivisions cannot be predicated on the possession of the
parent as against the child, or in the possession
of the child as against its parent. Thus, where a
No prescription can run against them, except father became insane, and one of his sons
with refer- ence to patrimonial property. (See
managed the
Art. 1113, Civil Code).
14
Art. 1109. Prescription does not run
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Arts. 1110-1111 Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly
renounced when the renunciation results
farm during the rest of his fathers lifetime and from acts which imply the abandonment of
remained in possession of it for the statutory the right acquired.
period, it was held that these facts alone did not
warrant the presumption of a conveyance to the COMMENT:
son by the father or of a release to him by the
other heirs subsequent to their fathers death. (1 (1) Requisites for Renunciation of Property
Am. Jur. 807 and Director of Lands v. Abiertas, Acquired by Prescription
44 O.G. 923).
(a) Renouncer must have capacity to alienate
(3) Between Guardian and Ward property (because renunciation is an exercise
to the jus disponendi).
No prescription runs between them during the
continuance of the guardianship. This is so even (b) The property acquired must have already
if the guardian expressly repudiates the been obtained (hence, the right to prescription in
guardianship (without court approval); the future cannot be renounced, since
otherwise, the trust relationship would be manifestly, this would be contrary to public
rendered nugatory. policy).
Art. 1110. Prescription, acquisitive and (c) The renouncing must be made by the owner
extinctive, runs in favor of, or against a of the right (not by a mere administrator or
married woman. guardian, for he does not own the property).
COMMENT:Prescription in the Case of a (d) The renouncing must not prejudice the rights
Married Woman This Article refers to a married of others, such as creditors. (Arts. 6, 1114, Civil
woman and a stranger. Code).
Art. 1111. Prescription obtained by a co- (2) Form

proprietor or a co-owner shall benefit the
others.
(a) may be express or implied (tacit)
COMMENT:(1) Prescription Obtained by Co-

(b) requires no consent on the part of the
Proprietor or Co-Owner
person to be ben- efited
Reason:
(c) requires no solemnities or formalities
In a sense, a co-owner or co-proprietor acts for

(3) Implied or Tacit Renunciation
the interest of the whole co-ownership. Similarly,
an action for ejectment may be brought by just
one of the co-owners. (See Art. 487, Civil Code). There is tacit renunciation when there is an
action which implies the abandonment of the
right acquired.
[NOTE, however, that as between or among co-
owners, there can be prescription when there is
a definite repudiation of the co-ownership, made 16
known to the other co-owners. (Laguna v.
Levantino, 71 Phil. 566).] CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1113
15 Example:
Art. 1112 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Sonia formerly owed Esperanza but the debt has
already prescribed.
(2) Limitation
(a)
The prescription obtained by a co-owner must IfSonia,knowingthatthedebthasprescribed,never
have refer- ence to the property held in theless still acknowledges the existence of the
common, naturally; otherwise the Article does debt and promises to pay for it, there is an
not apply. implied renunciation of the prescription. She
still has a civil obligation.
Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to
alienate property may renounce (b) If Sonia, knowing that the debt has
prescription already obtained, but not the prescribed, nevertheless voluntarily pays the
right to prescribe in the future. debt, she cannot recover what she had paid. This
would be a natural obligation.
. (c) If Sonia, not knowing that the debt has However, the rule just stated cannot be
prescribed pays it, there is no renunciation of the altogether inflex- ible, as witnessed, for
prescription; and she can still recover on the example, by the presence of Rep. Act 1942
basis of solutio indebiti. ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: If a (approved June 22, 1957), amending Sec. 48(b)
taxpayer, complaining re- of the Public Land Act (Com. Act 141). Thus, as
amended by RA 1952, Sec. 48 of CA 141 now
peatedly against a tax assessment, makes reads as follows:
several requests for a reinvestigation thereof, he
may be said to have WAIVED the defense of Section 48. The following described citizens of
prescription. (Yutivo & Sons Hardware Co. v. Ct. the Philip- pines occupying lands of the public
of Tax Appeals & Collector of Int. Rev., L-13203, domain or claiming to own any such land or an
Jan. 28, 1961). interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
Art. 1113. All things which are within the of First In- stance of the province where the land
commerce of men are susceptible of is located for confirmation of their claims and
prescription, unless otherwise provided. the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
Property of the State or any of its under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription. xx x
COMMENT:(1) Things That May Be Acquired b) Those who by themselves or through their
by Prescription predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
Generally all things within the commerce of and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
man. domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
(2) Patrimonial Property
confirmation of the title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be
. (a) By implication under this Article, patrimonial conclusively presumed to have performed all the
property of the State or any of its subdivisions conditions essential to a Government grant, and
may be acquired by prescription. shall be entitled to a certificate of title
. (b) While it may be claimed that a direct and 18

clear provision (Art. 1108, Civil Code which
says that prescription does not run against the
State or any of its subdivisions) prevails
under the provisions of this chapter (the chapter

17
deals with judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles).
Art. 1113
(NOTE: However, under RA 107, the deadline of
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES the application was only up to Dec. 31, 1957.)
over an implication (Art. 1113, Civil Code), still (4) Some Doctrines
when we consider the intent of Congress in
inserting the phrase not patrimonial in (a)
character in the original draft submitted by the
AfishpondconstructedintheBambangRivercanbe
Code Commission, it is clear that patrimonial ordered removed by the government, regardless
property may indeed be the subject of
of the number of years that have elapsed since
prescription. This is so because patrimonial the construction of said fishpond, inasmuch as a
properties are really in the same category as
river, or a portion thereof, is property of public
private properties. dominion, and cannot therefore be acquired by
acquisitive prescription. (Meneses v. Com-
(3) No Prescription With Respect to Public monwealth, 69 Phil. 647).
Property
(b) Similarly, a tract of land, formerly low and
Public property, however, cannot be the subject swampy, but gradually raised by the action of
of prescription. This rule applies even to the sea, is not susceptible of prescription, and
privately owned unregistered lands which, may therefore be recovered by the government
unless the contrary is shown, are presumed to despite the construction thereon of warehouses
be public lands, under the principle that all and a wharf. The land is part of the public
lands belong to the Crown unless they had been domain. (Insular Government v. Aldecoa and Co.,
granted by the King (State) or in his name, or by 19 Phil. 505).
the Kings who preceded him. (Valenton v.
Murciano, 3 Phil. 53).
(c) A plaza intended for public use is likewise
not subject to prescription. (Harty v. Mun. of issue of prescription. Moreover, the Court said
Victoria, 13 Phil. 152). that a prescribed debt may be the subject of
novation. (Estrada v. Villaroel, 40 O.G. Supp. No.
(5) Things or Properties That Cannot Be 5, 9, p. 201).
Acquired by Pre- scription
Art. 1115. The provisions of the present
. (a) those protected by a Torrens Title. (Sec. 46, Title are understood to be without
Act No. 496) (Francisco v. Cruz, 43 O.G. 5103). prejudice to what in this Code or in special
laws is established with respect to specific
cases of prescription.
. (b) movables acquired thru a crime. (Art. 1133,
Civil Code).
COMMENT:(1) Specific Provisions on
Prescription
. (c) those outside the commerce of men. (Art.
1113, Civil Code).
Specific provisions on prescription found
elsewhere in the Code, or in special laws, prevail
. (d) properties of spouses, parents and children, over the provisions of this
wards and guardians, under the restrictions
imposed by law. (Art. 1109, Civil Code).
20
Art. 1114. Creditors and all other persons
interested in making the prescription CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1115
effective may avail themselves thereof
notwithstanding the express or tacit Chapter. This is particularly true in the instances
renunciation by the debtor or proprietor. when specific periods of prescription are
provided for.
19
(2) Examples
(a) A legitimate child may bring an action to
COMMENT:(1) Right of Creditors to Make claim legitimacy as long as he is alive
Use of Prescription (generally). (Art. 173, Family Code).
Reason for the law: (b) An illegitimate child may bring an action to
establish illegitimate filiation during his lifetime
(generally). (Art. 175, Family Code).
While rights may be waived, third persons with a
right recognized by law should not be
prejudiced. (Art. 6, Civil Code). (c) The real right of possession of real property
is lost at the end of 10 years.
(2) Example
(d) The proceeding for the probate of a will
never prescribes. (Guevara v. Guevara, et al., L-
Tom who is indebted to Nicole acquired a parcel
5405, Jan. 31, 1956).
of land by prescription. If Tom renounces the
prescription, may Nicole make use of said land?
(e) The proceeding for the deportation of an
alien must be brought within five years from the
ANS.: Yes, to the extent of her credit, if Tom is date the cause for deportation arose. (Sec. 37,
not able to pay his debt. Tom is not allowed to
Immigration Act). [Thus, where an alien entered
prejudice Nicole. the Philippines illegally in 1998, but he violated
the Immigration Law in 2004 by bringing in his
Sambrano v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al. wife who was not lawfully entitled to enter or
101 Phil. 1 reside in the Philippines, the deportation
proceeding commenced in 2005 had not
FACTS: Although the right of the State to collect prescribed. This is because the cause accrued in
the taxes had already been extinguished by 1999. (See Porta Perez v. Board, L-9236, May 29,
prescription, taxpayer Sam- brano nevertheless 1957).]
executed a chattel mortgage on his properties
to guarantee the payment of the same. As a (f) An action to annul a sale of shares of stock in
matter of fact, he actually paid part of the debt. a corporation is violation of the Securities Act
Issue: Can Sambrano later on raise the issue of because there was no permit for the same, and
prescription? for the recovery of the purchase price must be
instituted within a period of two years from the
HELD: No more, for his actuations amount to a date of the sale. Hence, if the sale is made on
renewal (renovacion) of the obligation or to a Oct. 23, 2003, but the action is brought on Nov.
waiver of the benefit granted by the law to him. 2, 2005, the action is 10 days late, and can no
He is, therefore, now estopped from raising the longer be entertained. (See Benedicto v. Phil.
American Finance and Development Co., L-8695, counted from Aug. 30, 1950.
May 31, 1957). However, if by this method a
longer period would be
. (g) In order to confer jurisdiction on the Court of needed, a
Tax Appeals, the suit for refund of taxes
erroneously or illegally assessed must be 22
brought within the statutory period of two years,
and the requirements provided in the National CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1116
Internal
period that is even longer than that provided
21 under the OLD law, said OLD law applies).
Art. 1116 (2) Example of the First Rule Given
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Paz Ongsiaco and the Heirs of theLate
Augusto Ongsiaco v. Roman D. Dallo, et al.
(h) L-27451, Feb. 28, 1969
Revenue Code must be complied with. (Collector FACTS: A complaint was filed in 1966 against the
of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, et family of Paz Ongsiaco for recovery of the
al., L-11494, Jan. 28, 1961). ownership of a parcel of land in Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija. It was admitted by claimants that since
An action for accounting or reliquidation of 1924 (42 years before the basic complaint was
agricultural crops under par. 3, Sec. 17 of Rep. filed in 1966), said family had been in
Act 1199 should be brought within 3 years from possession of the land and that said possession
the threshing of the crops in question. (Agaton was really adverse or in the concept of owner.
Mateo v. Gregorio Duran, et al., L-14314, Feb. However, it was alleged that the possession was
22, 1961). in BAD FAITH. Issue: May recovery of the
property be allowed?
Art. 1116. Prescription already running
before the effectivity of this Code shall be HELD: Recovery cannot be allowed for the cause
governed by laws previously in force; but if of action has already prescribed. Under Art.
since the time this Code took effect the 1116, in a case like this, the law in force before
entire period herein required for the New Civil Code should apply. It is clear that
prescription should elapse, the present under such old law, the Code of Civil Procedure,
Code shall be applicable, even though by good or bad faith was immaterial for purposes of
the former laws a longer period might be acquisitive prescription. (Sec. 41). Moreover,
required. even the thirty-year period fixed in the New Civil
Code for the acquisition in bad faith by
prescription of real property had already expired
COMMENT:(1) Transitional Rules for when this case was filed in 1966.
Prescription
(3) Example of the Third Rule Given BAR

. (a) If the period for prescription BEGAN and
ENDED under the OLD laws, said OLD laws
govern. A, with knowledge that B is not the owner of a
parcel of land, buys it for a nominal sum from B
in 1944, and since then has been in open,
. (b) If the period for prescription BEGAN under
actual, continuous, and public possession
the NEW Civil Code, the NEW Civil Code governs. thereof, under claim of title exclusive of any
other rights and adverse to all other claimants.
C, the real owner of the land, who has left in
. (c) If the period began under the OLD law, and 1944 by reason of the war, was able to return to
continues under the NEW Civil Code, the OLD the land only in 1958 and learning of As
law applies. Exception: In this third rule, it is the possession, files suit. A claims prescription of ten
NEW Civil Code that will apply, provided two years, because he took possession of the land
conditions are present: before the new Civil Code; but C counters that as
1 1) The NEW Civil Code 23

requires a shorter period;
2 2) This shorter period has
already elapsed since Aug. 30, A entered the land in bad faith, and he had not
1950, the date when the NEW
yet acquired ownership by the time the New Civil
Civil Code became effective. Code took effect, the period is thirty years under
(Thus, the period prescribed
the New Code. Decide with reasons.
under the NEW Code should be
ANS.: Inasmuch as here the prescription was 1960, a promissory note was executed in 1935,
already running before Aug. 30, 1950, it follows payable in 1937. The claim for payment was
that only 10 years would be required because presented in the settlement of the estate of the
under the Code of Civil Procedure, regardless of deceased debtor in Sept. 1955. The Court ruled
good faith or bad faith, the period for acquiring that the ten-year period of prescription under Act
land by prescription was only 10 years. (Sec. 190 had already lapsed.
41, Act 190, Code of Civil Procedure and Osorio
v. Tan Jongko, 51 O.G. 6221). It, therefore, (d) In Nagrampa, et al. v. Nagrampa, L-15434,
follows necessarily that in 1954, A had already Oct. 31, 1960, the Court observed that under the
acquired the property by acquisitive prescription. old law, no special period of prescription was
Hence, C should lose the case, unless of course fixed for the revocation of donations for non-
the land is covered by a Torrens Certificate of compliance with the conditions stipulated.
Title. (Osorio v. Tan Jongko, supra). However, under the New Civil Code (Art. 764),
the period fixed for such a case is 4 years. The
The period of 10 years must necessarily start suit was filed in July, 1958, alleging that the
from 1944, and not from Aug. 30, 1950, since plaintiffs had demanded compliance five years
here, the prescriptive period under the OLD law ago, but the defendant refused. The Court held
was SHORTER. Had the period under the old law that the entire period of four years fixed by the
been LONGER, it is the shorter period under the New Civil Code has elapsed since it took effect in
new Civil Code that should apply, but this time, 1950. Suit was filed only in July, 1958 for a
the period should commence from the date of violation made in 1953.
effectivity of the new Civil Code Aug. 30, 1950
in view of the clause but if since the time this (e) In Amar v. Odianan, L-15179, Sept. 30, 1960,
Code took effect . . . a complaint for the recovery of land was filed in
November, 1948, alleging that in April, 1948,
(4) Example of the Exception the land had been seized by the defendant by
means of fraud, deceit, and strategy. It was held
Under the old law the period was 10 years (as in that the old law, Sec. 40 of Act 190 (which
the case of reduction of a donation of land on provided that an action for the recovery of real
the ground of birth of a child), but under the New property can only be brought within 10 years)
Civil Code, the period is only 4 years, counted was applicable, and that therefore, the action
from the birth of the first child. (Art. 763). It is has already prescribed.
clear here that the New Civil Code (4 years) will
apply, even if the donation and the birth (f) In PNB v. Galicano Ador Dionisio, L-18342,
occurred under the old law, but the period Sept. 19, 1963, it was held that a judgment that
should be counted from Aug. 30, 1950, unless in had become final in 1949 could not be revived
so doing, a period of more than 10 years would anymore in 1960 (lapse of more than 10 years),
result. despite written extrajudicial demand in 1954 for
the satisfaction of the judgment. This is because
(5) Some Doctrines this
(a) InEstayov.DeGuzman,L- 25
10902,Dec.29,1958,the Supreme Court held that
when the action to enforce the mortgage Art. 1116
presented as an appeal bond in a court action
became effective by the entry of the judgment CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
of the Supreme Court on Aug. 6, 1940, the
encumbrance may be cancelled after Aug. 6,
case is governed not by Art. 1155 of the Civil
1950.
Code, but by Sec. 50 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (which section does not state that
24 such written extrajudicial demands interrupt the
prescriptive period). The old law applies because
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1116 Art. 1116 says prescription already running
before the effectivity of this Code shall be
. (b) InOngsiako,etal.v.Ongsiako,etal.,L- governed by laws previously in force . . .
7510,Mar.30,1957, the Supreme Court held that
Art. 1116 (Civil Code) prevails over the general 26
transitory rule in Art. 2258 (Civil Code) which
provides that actions and rights which came into CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
being but which were not exercised before the
effectivity of the Code, shall remain in full force
Chapter 2
in conformity with the old legislation, but the
exercise, duration, and procedure to enforce
them shall be regulated by the Rules of Court. PRESCRIPTION OF OWNERSHIP AND OTHER
REAL RIGHTS
. (c) In Borromeo v. Zaballero, L-14357, Aug. 31,
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of (b) for EXTRAORDINARY prescription (no other
dominion and other real rights may be requisites except those mentioned in Comment
ordinary or extraordinary. No. 1 under this Ar- ticle are required).
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires Art. 1118. Possession has to be in the

possession of things in good faith and with concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
just title for the time fixed by law. uninterrupted.
COMMENT: COMMENT:
(1) Requisites Common to Ordinary and (1) Characteristics of the Possession

Extraordinary Pre- scription Needed for Prescrip- tion
. (a) capacity of acquirer to acquire by See this Article. See also the comments in the
prescription preceding Article.
. (b) capacity of loser to lose by prescription (2) Possessor in the Concept of Holder
. (c) object must be susceptible of prescription A possessor in the concept of holder cannot
acquire property by prescription because his
. (d) lapse of required period of time possession is not adverse. Thus, the possession
of land in the capacity of administrator (mere
holder) cannot ripen into ownership. (Ranjo v.
. (e) the possession must be: Payoma, L-1866, May 30, 1951). Neither is the
possession by a mortgagee adverse. (Garcia v.
1 1) in concepto de dueo Arjona, L-7279, Oct. 29, 1955).
(concept of owner)
(3) Owner-Administrator
2 2) public (not clandestine or
non-apparent) The mere fact that the person who claims
ownership of the property also administers the
3 3) peaceful (not thru force, same does not militate against its acquisition of
violence, or intimidation) the property by prescription. The fact that he
4 4) continuous or uninterrupted 28
[NOTE: Under the old law
the Code of Civil Procedure
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Arts. 1119-1120
whether the possession was in
good faith or in bad faith did
not matter. The period for im- stated that he administered the properties in
movables was always 10 question does not necessarily imply that he is
years. Also, the possession not the owner thereof for certainly an owner of a
need not be peaceful. (See property can be its own administrator. (Guarin,
Arboso v. Andrade, 87 Phil. et al. v. De Vera, L-9577, Feb. 28, 1957).
782). However, the possession,
even under the old law Art. 1119. Acts of possessory character
executed in virtue of license or by mere
27 tolerance of the owner shall not be
available for the purposes of possession.
COMMENT:Possession by License or
Tolerance of Owner
had to be uninterrupted, actual, exclusive, and
not merely tolerated. (See Pascual v. Mina, 20
Phil. 202 and Villanueva v. Protacio, CA-GR In possession by license or tolerance, there is
7591-R, Mar. 22, 1955).] implied recognition of ownership residing in
ANOTHER. (See Macaltao v. Castro, CA-GR
22408-R, Aug. 12, 1963).
(2) Additional Requisites
Art. 1120. Possession is interrupted for the

(a) for ORDINARY prescription 1) goodfaith purposes of prescription, naturally or
civilly.
2) just title (there was a mode of acquiring
ownership but the grantor was not the owner; COMMENT:
hence, the just title here is titulo colorado or
colorable title).
(1) How Possession Is Interrupted for
Purposes of Prescrip- tion The Article explains itself.
(a) naturally. (Arts. 1121, 1122, Civil Code). (b) Art. 1123. Civil interruption is produced by
civilly. (Arts. 1123, 1124, Civil Code). judicial summons to the possessor.
(2) Natural Interruption COMMENT:Civil Interruption Defined
If prescription is interrupted, the old possession The definition is implicit in the Article. 30
will generally not be counted; the period must
begin all over again. CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Arts. 1124-1125
(3) Suspension of Prescription Art. 1124. Judicial summons shall be

deemed not to have been issued and shall
If prescription is merely suspended (as not give rise to interruption:
distinguished from interruption), the old
possession will be ADDED. This may hap- pen (1) If it should be void for lack of legal
when during war, the civil courts are NOT open solemnities;
(Arts. 1136, Civil Code); or when there is a
moratorium on the payment of debts. (Talens, et
(2) If the plaintiff should desist from the
al. v. Chuakay and Co., GR L-10127, Jun. 30,
complaint or
29
should allow the proceedings to lapse;
Arts. 1121-1123 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(3) If the possessor should be absolved
1958 and Rio and Co. v. Datu Jolkipli, GR L-
from the complaint.
12301, Apr. 13,
In all these cases, the period of the

1959).
interruption shall be counted for the
prescription.
Art. 1121. Possession is naturally
interrupted when through any cause it
COMMENT:
should cease for more than one year.
(1) When Judicial Summons Cannot Be

The old possession is not revived if a new
Considered Civil Interruption
possession should be exercised by the
same adverse claimant.
Three instances are given in the Article.
COMMENT:(1) Natural Interruption
Defined NOTE: If the possessors are sued, but emerge
victorious, it is as if there was no interruption
during the period of the suit. (Lacuesta v.
The definition is implied in the first paragraph.
Guerrero, 8 Phil. 719).
Note the phrase any cause.
(2) Apparent Interruption

(2) Reason for the Period Involved
In the three cases given above, it is as if there

Possession de facto is lost if the property be in
was NO interruption. Interruption in the last
the possession of another for more than one
sentence should therefore read as apparent
year. Hence, if the possession of another has
interruption since under the law there was
been for one year or less, it is as if there was no
never an interruption. (See first sentence).
interruption. (Art. 1122, Civil Code).
(3) Applicability to Acquisitive, Not

(3) Reason for the Non-Revival of the
Extinctive Prescrip- tion
Possession
In Amar v. Odianan (L-15179, Sept. 30, 1960),

Possession here must be continuous and not
the Court held that Arts. 1943, 1945, and 1946
interrupted.
of the old Civil Code (and from which Arts. 1120,
1123, and 1124 of the New Civil Code were
Art. 1122. If the natural interruption is for taken), refer to interruption of possession in
only one year or less, the time elapsed relation to acquisitive prescription, and not to
shall be counted in favor of the pre- cases of extinctive prescription.
scription.
Art. 1125. Any express or tacit recognition
COMMENT: which the possessor may make of the
owners right also interrupts possession. 2) Suppose 12 years after Artemio takes
possession, Arcadio sells the land to Benedicto,
31 an innocent purchaser for value (who, in
investigating Arcadios title found that the
property was indeed registered in Arcadios
Art. 1126 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES name), will Benedicto become the owner?
COMMENT:(1) Recognition by Possessor of

ANS.: Yes, for insofar as the innocent world was
Owners Right concerned, Arcadio was still the owner at the
time he sold it to Benedicto. He could therefore
Reason for the Article Here the possession is validly transfer ownership to Benedicto
no longer in concepto de dueo or adverse. Artemios prescriptive right should clearly not
prejudice Benedicto.
(2) Example
(NOTE: If Artemio had caused his title to be
The act of a government official, duly authorized registered, he could have become the owner
to so act, in recognizing ownership of land in a insofar as the entire world was concerned, not
private person, interrupts possession by the from the time he registered the forged deed of
municipality concerned. (Seminary of San Carlos sale in his favor but from the time of the lapse of
v. Mun. of Cebu, 19 Phil. 32). 10 years after such recording. What begins to
run from such recording is not the ownership,
Art. 1126. Against a title recorded in the but the period or time for prescription.)
Registry of Prop- erty, ordinary
prescription of ownership or real rights (2) Lands Registered Under the Land
shall not take place to the prejudice of a Registration Law
third person, except in virtue of another
title also recorded; and the time shall Lands registered under the Torrens system
begin to run from the recording of the cannot be acquired by prescription (Alfonso v.
latter. Jayme, L-12754, Jan. 30, 1960) but this rule can
be invoked only by one under whose name (or
As to lands registered under the Land under whose predecessors name) it was
Registration Act, the provisions of that registered. (Jocson, et al. v. Silos, L-12998, July
special law shall govern. 25, 1960).
COMMENT:(1) Prescription of Titles Alfonso v. Jayme L-12754, Jan. 30, 1960

Recorded in Registry of Property
FACTS: Plaintiffs land, protected by a Torrens
. (a) It is clear that Art. 1126 does NOT refer to Title, was taken by Pasay City for conversion into
land registered under the Land Registration Law a road in 1925, without compensation. In 1954,
(with a Torrens Title). plaintiff sued for recovery of the land or its
value.
. (b) It, however, refers to all other lands.
HELD: Since the land was under his name under
. (c) Example: Arcadio is the owner of land not the Tor- rens system, plaintiff remained owner,
protected by a Tor- rens Title. His right is, and could recover posses-
however, duly registered in the Registry (for the
deed of sale in his favor has been duly 33
registered).
1) If Artemio, a stranger, takes possession of the
land in good faith (from a seller-forger), is there sion at any time. However, because it is now a
a chance for him to become, after 10 years, the ROAD, it is not convenient to restore it to
owner of the land, as against Arcadio? plaintiff. Pasay City was ordered to pay
compensation based on the value of the land in
32 1925, with legal interest as damages.
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1126 Jocson, et al. v. Silos L-12998, Jul. 25, 1960
ANS.: Yes, after all, Arcadio is not protected by a FACTS: A widower sold conjugal property,
Torrens Title. He certainly is not the third person registered under his name under the Torrens
referred to in the Article. (See Sison v. Ramos, system, to an innocent purchaser for value, who
13 Phil. 54). Thus, as between Arcadio and was subsequently given or issued a new transfer
Artemio, Artemio becomes the owner at the end certificate of title, under his (the buyers) name.
of 10 years. Twenty-two years later, the heirs of the
deceased spouse (the wife) sued for annulment
of the sale with respect to one-half of the land. period.
HELD: The suit for annulment and recovery has (TS, Jan. 25, 1945).
already prescribed. The claim of
imprescriptibility would have been correct if the (3) Good Faith Changing to Bad Faith
land had been registered in the name of the
husband and wife, not in the name of the
It is, however, possible that the good faith may
husband alone.
later change to bad faith. In such a case, how
many more years of possession would be
Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor required?
consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing
ANS.:
was the owner thereof, and could transmit
his ownership.
(a) For real property, three years of possession
in bad faith would be equivalent to one year of
COMMENT:Good Faith of Possessor
possession in good faith. (Reason: 30 years
Defined
would be required for extraordinary prescription,
but only 10 years are needed for ordinary
Note that the definition here of good faith prescription).
applies in con- nection with prescription.
(b) For personal property, two years of
Art. 1128. The conditions of good faith possession in bad faith would be equivalent to
required for possession in Articles 526, one year in good faith.
527, 528, and 529 of this Code are likewise
necessary for the determination of good
35
faith in the prescription of ownership and
other real rights.
COMMENT:(1) Other Requisites for Good
Faith (Reason: Extraordinary prescription needs 8
years; ordinary prescription, 4 years).
The requisites in the Articles mentioned must
ALL be present otherwise there is no good Art. 1129. For the purposes of prescription,
faith. there is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes
34
recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1128 grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.
. (a) Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good
faith who is not aware that there exists in his COMMENT:Just Title Defined(a) The
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which definition is implied in the Article. (b) See
invalidates it. He is deemed a possessor in bad Comments under the next Article.
faith who possesses in any case contrary to the
foregoing. Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult
Art. 1130. The title for prescription must
question of law may be the basis of good faith.
be true and valid.
. (b) Art. 527. Good faith is always presumed, and

COMMENT:Nature of the Title Required
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof.
(a) What is really meant by just title is titulo
colorado, that is, there was a mode of
. (c) Art. 528. Possession acquired in good faith
acquisition but the grantor was not the owner.
does not lose this character except in the case
Had he been the owner, there would be no more
and from the moment facts exist which show
necessity for prescription. (See Doliendo v.
that the possessor is not unaware that he
Biarnesa, 7 Phil. 232; see also Genova v.
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
Cariobaldes, CA-GR 15945-R, Mar. 25, 1957, 53
O.G. 4511).
. (d) Art. 529. It is presumed that possession
continues to be enjoyed in the same character in
(b) True and valid as used in Art. 1130 does
which it was acquired, until the contrary is
not mean one without any defect, for in such a
proved.
case, there would be no necessity for
prescription. What it means is that the mode
(2) For How Long the Good Faith Must Last should ordinarily have been valid and true, had
the grantor been the owner. (Doliendo v.
The good faith must last throughout the required Biarnesa, 7 Phil. 232; 2 Castan 240). Thus, if
aside from the defect of the grantor not being Art. 1133 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
the owner, there is another defect that would
render the acquisition void, the title thus (2) Rule with Respect to Lost Movables
acquired would not be sufficient for ordinary and Those of Which the Owner Has Been
prescription. Such for example would be the Illegally Deprived The possession of movable
case if the contract were absolutely simulated; property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a
or when title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any mov-
able or has been unlawfully deprived thereof,
36 may recover it from the person in possession of
the same. If the possessor of a movable lost or
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Arts. 1131-1132 of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
a husband, pretending to be the owner of certain
reim- bursing the price paid therefor. (Art. 559,
property, would donate it to his paramour. Even Civil Code).
if the husband had been the owner, the donation
would have been null and void just the same.
Here, the donee, lacking just title, can acquire (3) Rule with Respect to Public Sales,
ownership by extraordinary, not by ordinary Fairs, Markets, and Merchants Store
prescription. Subject to the provisions of this Title, where
goods are sold by a person who is not the owner
thereof, and who does not sell them under
Art. 1131. For the purposes of prescription, authority or with the consent of the owner, the
just title must be proved; it is never
buyer acquired no better title to the goods than
presumed. the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is
by his conduct precluded from denying the
COMMENT: sellers authority to sell. Nothing in this Title,
however, shall affect:
Necessity of Proving the Just Title
1 (a) The provisions of any
. (a) Proof is needed in view of the aggressive or factors acts, recording laws, or
offensive character of prescription. any other provision of law
enabling the apparent owner
. (b) In prescription, therefore, the presumption of of goods to dispose of them as
just title given under Art. 541 regarding if he were the true owner
DEFENSE of rights does not apply. (See 2 Castan thereof;
241).
2 (b) The validity of any
Art. 1132. The ownership of movables contracts of sale under
prescribes through uninterrupted statutory power of sale or
possession for four years in good faith. under the order of a court of
competent jurisdiction;
The ownership of personal property also
prescribes through uninterrupted 3 (c) Purchases made in a
possession for eight years, without need of merchants store, or in fairs, or
any other condition. markets, in accordance with
the Code of Commerce and
special laws. (Art. 1505, Civil
With regard to the right of the owner to Code).
recover personal property lost or of which
he has been illegally deprived, as well as
with respect to movables acquired in a Art. 1133. Movables possessed through a
public sale, fair, or market, or from a crime can never
merchants store the provisions of Articles
559 and 1505 of this Code shall be be acquired through prescription by the
observed. offender.
COMMENT:(1) Period of Prescription for COMMENT:(1) Movables Possessed Through

Movables a Crime
This Article states the rules for MOVABLES: Note the word offender. By implication,
subsequent acquirers from the offender may
. (a) ordinary prescription 4 years acquire the property by prescription.
. (b) extraordinary prescription 8 years 38
37 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Arts. 1134-1136

(2) Rule for Immovables (Where Crimes Are consequence of chaos and confusion. The
Involved) determination of this matter is a question of fact,
which should be ventilated in the hearing of a
Regarding immovables, possession by force or case on the merits.
violence does not give rise to prescription.
(b) During the Japanese occupation, there were
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights places in the Philippines where no civil courts
over immovable property are acquired by could function.
ordinary prescription through possession
of ten years. (2) Fortuitous Event Effect on
Prescription
COMMENT:Prescriptive Periods for
Acquiring Real Property Note that under Art. 1154 of the Civil Code, the
period during which the obligee was prevented
This Article and the following ones state the rule by a fortuitous event from enforcing his right is
for IM- MOVABLES: not reckoned against him.
. (a) ordinary prescription 10 years Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights
over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
. (b) extraordinary prescription 30 years. (Art.
for thirty years, without need of title or of
1137, Civil Code). good faith.
Art. 1135. In case the adverse claimant

COMMENT:
possesses by mistake an area greater, or
less, than that expressed in his title,
prescription shall be based on the (1) Extraordinary Prescription With
possession. Respect to Immova- bles
COMMENT: This Article refers to extraordinary prescription

regarding:
When Area Possessed Varies from Area in
Title (a) ownership over immovables
. (a) The term possesses here refers to both (b) other real rights over immovables
actual and constructive possession, since
possession in the eyes of the law does not mean (2) Period Required
that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of land. (Ramos v. Dir. of Lands, 39 Phil. Note the period 30 years. 40
175).
. (b) Notice that possession here prevails over
the title. Necessarily, if there is NO title, the
(3) What Are Not Needed
Article cannot apply.
Under this Article, neither good faith nor just title

. (c) The possession here must be by mistake.
is essential; hence, property voidly donated
may be acquired by extraordinary prescription.
Art. 1136. Possession in wartime, when the This may for instance occur when the donation
civil courts are not open, shall not be of real properties had not been validly accepted
counted in favor of the adverse claimant. by the donee. Although here the donation is
void, it may be the basis for the acquisition of
39 the donee of said properties by prescription.
(Guarin, et al. v. De Vera, L-9577, Feb. 28, 1957
Art. 1137 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Pensader v. Pensader, 47 Phil. 959).
COMMENT:(1) Possession in War Time (4) Retroactive Effect of the Prescription
. (a) The Article does not apply when the civil Prescription has a retroactive effect, that is, the
courts are open. In Rio y Compania v. Datu acquirer, as soon as the necessary period has
Jolkipli, L-12301, April 13, 1959, the Supreme lapsed, is considered the owner from the
Court held that the statute of limitations is BEGINNING of the possession. Thus, any encum-
suspended if during wartime, courts are not or brances made by him during said period should
cannot be kept open. However, to invoke this be considered as valid, while those of the
rule, a party must first show that the court was original owner are not binding on the acquirer by
closed or could not be opened for business as a prescription. The acquirer is also entitled to all
the fruits during said period in view of his 42
retroactive ownership. (2 Castan 254-255).
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Art. 1138. In the computation of time
necessary for prescription, the following Chapter 3 PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION
rules shall be observed:
Art. 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere
(1) The present possessor may complete lapse of time fixed by law.
the period necessary for prescription by
tacking his possession to that of his
COMMENT:(1) How Actions Prescribe
grantor or predecessor in interest;
By the mere lapse of the time indicated in the

(2) It is presumed that the present
law. There is no other requirement.
possessor who was also the possessor at a
previous time, has continued to be in
possession during the intervening time, (2) Scope or Nature of the Chapter
unless there is proof to the contrary;
This chapter is our general Statute of
(3) The first day shall be excluded and the Limitations, because particular provisions on
last day included. prescription naturally prevail. (See Art. 1148,
Civil Code).
COMMENT:
(3) Prescription as a Defense
Rules for Computation of Time
In general, we may say that the prescription of
action is available as a DEFENSE. To be asserted
Par. 1 Tacking of Possession
as such, it must be specifically pleaded and
proved. (Hodges v. Salas, 63 Phil. 567). Thus, if
(a) This means ADDING the period of possession not set up or pleaded as a defense, proof cannot
of the predecessor. Reason: The true owner of later on be presented if objection is made to the
the property was introduction of such proof. (National Bank v.
Escudero, 92 Phil. 150). Upon the other hand, as
41 long as the defendant raised the defense of
prescription in his answer to the complaint, but
Art. 1138 the complaint was dismissed on some other
ground, he can still set up in his brief in the ap-
pellate court in an appeal by the plaintiff from
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES the decision of the trial court. (Lapuz v. Sy Uy, L-
10079, May 17, 1957). If the issue of prescription
(b) can be decided from the averments of the
pleadings, more particularly from the plaintiffs
(c) complaint, there is NO necessity of receiving
evidence on the matter, before the
after all NOT in possession, during the
possession of said predecessor. 43
Tacking is allowed only if there be privity of Art. 1139 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Court
relationship between the predecessor and the may dismiss the complaint on the ground of
successor, as in the case of succession, prescription.
donation, sale, barter, etc. Thus, a mere intruder
or usurper cannot tack. (See Razote v. Razote, (Bambao, et al. v. Lednicky, et al., L-15495, Jan.
14 Phil. 182; Lacson v. Govt., 39 Phil. 63). 28, 1961).
Tacking by a subsequent possessor of his (4) Effect of Death on Prescription

predecessors possession can be allowed if the
predecessors possession can satisfy the
If a father has a cause of action against a
requisites for prescription (such as the fact that stranger (the period of prescription of which is,
the possession must be in the concept of owner,
let us say, 4 years) and the father dies before
peaceful, etc.). (See 2 Corpus Juris 92 and the end of such prescriptive period, should
Casilag v. Fajardo, CA-GR 1066-R Jun. 18, 1948,
prescription continue to run, even if say his
46 O.G. 570). children are still MINORS? The Supreme Court in
the case of Martir, et al. v. Trinidad, et al., L-
Par. 2 Presumption of Continuing Possession 12057, May 20, 1959, answered YES, for after all
The presumption is expressly declared to be in this case the cause of action accrued in favor
rebuttable. of the father himself, and not directly in favor of
the children. Except where a statute provides
otherwise, one disability (like the fathers death) Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables
CANNOT be tacked to anothers disability (like shall prescribe eight years from the time
the childrens minority). Nor can a party avail the possession thereof is lost, unless the
himself of several disabilities, unless they all possessor has acquired the ownership by
existed at the time when the right of action prescription for a less period, according of
accrued. This is in obedience to the universal Article 1132, and without prejudice to the
rule that when a Statute begins to run, no provisions of Articles 559, 1505, and 1133.
subsequent disability can stop its operation
unless specially so provided in the statute. COMMENT:Recovery of Movables
(5) Conflict of Laws Variance of Foreign This refers to extraordinary prescription for
and Local Law Re Prescription movables. Art. 1141. Real action over
immovables prescribe after
In the case of DAlmeida v. Hagedorn (L-10804,
May 22, 1957), an action was brought in 1954 in thirty years.
the Philippines on two demand notes executed in
1942 and 1943 in Hong Kong where both debtor
This provision is without prejudice to what
and creditor were residing until liberation. The
is established for the acquisition of
Court, in applying the rule that the moratorium
ownership and other real rights by pre-
law suspended the running of the prescriptive
scription.
period and that therefore the action had not
prescribed, ruled that prescription is governed
by the law of the forum. It would seem from this 45
ruling that even if the cause of action accrued in
Hong Kong and has already prescribed under Art. 1142 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Hong Kong law, it has not yet prescribed under
Philippine law. This seems to lose sight of a COMMENT:
section of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure)
which states that if, by the laws of the State or
country where the cause of action arose, the Recovery of Immovables
action is barred, it is also barred in the
Philippines. In the instant case, however, there (a) This refers to extraordinary prescription for
was no proof that the claim was barred under immovables.
Hong Kong law, and it is well-settled that in the
absence of proof of the foreign law, it is (b) The possession de jure of an immovable is
presumed to be the same as Philippine law. lost, however, at the end of 10 years. (No. 4, Art.
555, Civil Code). De Jesus, et al. v. CA, et al.
44 GR 57092, Jan. 21, 1993 Prescription running
even after the effectivity of the New
Civil Code on August 30, 1950, continued to be
(NOTE: The presumption has been referred to as governed by Sec. 41 of the Old Civil Code.
a proces- sual presumption).
Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive
(6) How Long Is a Month? period required for the acquisition of
immovable property is 10 years if the possession
is in good faith, and 30 years if in bad faith. Such
Quizon v. Baltazar 76 SCRA 560 open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
occupation of the dis- puted property for 30
The term month as used in a law (such as Art. years must be conclusively established.
90 of the Revised Penal Code) is understood to
refer to a 30-day month and not to a calendar Reckoned from the time she executed the
month. affidavit of adjudication in 1961, eleven years
after the New Civil Code had taken effect,
(7) Query private respondents possession of the contested
lot is far too short of the prescriptive period of
Does a property deemed part of the public forest 30 years, considering that her possession is in
prescribe? bad faith. The filing of the petition for recovery
of ownership and possession and quieting of title
by petitioners on Apr. 27, 1973 was well below
ANS.: An action for reversion filed by the State to
the acquisitive prescriptive period for private
recover property registered in favor of any party
respondent, which is 30 years under Art. 1141 of
which is part of the public forest or of a forest
the present Civil Code. In this case, the statutory
reservation never prescribes. (Heirs of the Late
period of prescription is deemed to have
Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soteranea Rafols
commenced when petitioners were made aware
Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, 500 SCRA 209
of a claim adverse to them, i.e., when the
[2006]).
affidavit of adjudication was duly registered with
the Registry of Deeds which, at the earliest may would seem to cover
be considered to be in 1974, when private
respondent was able to secure a tax declaration 47
in her name.
Art. 1143 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES also
Art. 1142. A mortgage action prescribes the right to demand a compulsory or legal
after ten years. easement
COMMENT:(1) Prescription of Mortgage of drainage. (See Art. 676, Civil Code).](b)

Actions Reason for the non-prescriptibility: public policy.
10 years. (2) Some Other Actions That Do Not

Prescribe
46
(a) The action to demand partition of a co-
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1143 ownership (as long as the co-ownership has
been expressly or implicitly recognized). (Art.
. (2) When Period Begins From what moment 494, Civil Code). Budiong v. Pandoc 79 SCRA
must the 10-year period be counted? From the 24 The right to demand partition does not
day on which it could have been brought. (Art. prescribe. (See Art. 494 of the Civil Code).
1150, Civil Code). Thus, if the parents of an
employee should execute a real estate mortgage (b) The action (or the defense) for the
to secure a performance bond given by a surety declaration of contract of marriage as null and
company for their son, the period of prescription void or inexistent. (See Art. 1410; see also
begins from the moment the surety company Banaga v. Soler, L-15717, Jun. 30, 1961).
pays by reason of said bond because from said
date, the mortgagors become liable, and (c) The action to have a will probated
foreclosure can be made. (Nabong v. Luzon (otherwise, the desires of the deceased, who
Surety Co., Inc., L-10034, May 17, 1957). cannot help himself, may be frustrated).
(Guevara v. Guevara, et al., L-05405, Jan. 31,
. (3) Lands With a Torrens Title While lands 1956).
with a Torrens Title cannot be acquired by
prescription (Sec. 39, Act 496 and Rosario v. (d) The action for the quieting of title so long as
Aud. General, L-11817, Apr. 30, 1958), still the the plaintiff is in possession of the property.
right to foreclose a mortgage on such lands does (Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana, L-11285, May 6, 1958).
prescribe for what does not prescribe is the
ownership of said lands.
(e) The right to demand support (present and
future), but installments on support in arrears
. (4) Effect if Mortgage Is Registered Even if may prescribe. (Trinidad Florencio v. Rufino
a mortgage is registered, the action to foreclose Organo, GR L-4037, Nov. 29, 1951).
upon it may still prescribe. (Buhat v. Besana, 50
O.G. 4215, Sept. 1954).
(f) Generally, an action to recover property
expressly placed in trust (express trust) cannot
. (5) Effect on Interest on Debt If a mortgage prescribe in view of the confidence reposed,
debt had already prescribed, so also has the UNLESS such trust has been repudiated
action to recover interest thereon. (Soriano v. unequivocally. However, constructive trusts are
Enriquez, 24 Phil. 584). Art. 1143. The affected by prescription and laches in view of the
following rights among others specified lack of confidence or fiduciary relations. (Diaz, et
al. v. Garricho and Agriado, L-11229, Mar. 20,
elsewhere in this Code, are not 1958; see Bachrach Motor Co. v. Lejano, L-
extinguished by prescription: 10910, Jan. 16, 1959; see also comments under
Art. 1456, this Volume).
. (1) To demand a right of way, regulated in
Article 649; 48
. (2) To bring an action to abate a public or CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1144
private nui-
(g) An action to compel reconveyance of
sance. property with a Tor- rens Title does NOT
prescribe if the registered owner had obtained
COMMENT:(1) Rights Not Extinguished by registration in bad faith, and the property is still
Prescription in the latters name. The reason is that the
registration is in the nature of a continuing and
subsisting trust. (Cala- diao v. Vda. de Blas, L-
(a) Two rights are indicated in the Article. [The 19063, Apr. 29, 1964). However, if the property
first right, the demanding of the right of way,
has already passed to an innocent purchaser for The liability of an employer for compensation
value, the principle of imprescriptibility does not cases under the Workmens Compensation Law
apply. (Ibid.). NOTE: In Gerona, et al. v. Carmen prescribes in ten (10) years.
de Guzman, et al., L-19060, May 29, 1964,
however, the Supreme Court stated that Negre v. Workmens Compensation
although there are some decisions to the con- Commission GR 43795, Apr. 15, 1985
trary, it is already settled that an action for
reconveyance of real property based upon a
A workmens compensation claim filed 8 years
constructive or implied trust, resulting from
after the employees death is well within the
fraud, may be barred by prescription. The period
statutory period to file a compensation claim,
is 4 years from the discovery of the fraud.
which is 10 years.
. (h) An action brought by a buyer of land to

Villamor v. CAGR 97332, Oct. 10, 1991
compel the seller to execute the proper deed of
conveyance does NOT prescribe, provided that
said buyer is still in POSSESSION. (See Castrillo Under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, actions
v. Court of Appeals, L-18046, Mar. 31, 1964). upon a written contract must be brought within
ten (10) years. The deed of option was executed
on Nov. 11, 1971. The acceptance was also
. (i) An action by the registered owner of land
made in the same instrument. The complaint
(protected by a Torrens Title) to recover
was filed by Villamor on Jul. 13, 1987, 17 years
possession of said land. (Act 496).
from the time of the execution of the contract.
Hence, the right of action had prescribed. There
. (j) Case of Rodil Rodil v. Benedicto L-28616, were allegations by Villamor that they
Jan. 22, 1980 The right of the applicant for demanded from Reyes as early as 1984 the
registered land (or the purchaser thereof) to ask enforcement of their rights under the
for the writ of possession does not prescribe.
50
Art. 1144. The following actions must be
brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
contract. Still, it was beyond the ten (10)-year

. (1) Upon a written contract;
period prescribed by the Civil Code.
. (2) Upon an obligation created by law;

It is of judicial notice that the price of real estate
in Metro Manila is continuously on the rise. To
. (3) Upon a judgment. allow Villamor to demand the delivery of the
property subject of this case 13 years or 17
49 years after the execution of the deed at the price
of only P70 per square meter is inequitous. For
Art. 1144 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES reasons of equity and in consideration of the fact
that Reyes has no other decent place to live in,
the Court in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, is
COMMENT:(1) Actions That Prescribe in 10
not inclined to grant Villamors prayer.
Years
(2) Example of a Written Contract

The Article enumerates three kinds.
A passenger of a ship, or his heirs, can bring an

Other actions that prescribe in 10 years include action based on culpa contractual within a
the following:
period of 10 years because the TICKET issued for
the transportation is by itself a COM- PLETE
. (a) action to recover de jure possession of real WRITTEN CONTRACT. (Peralta de Guerrero, et al.
property from a possessor in good faith. (Art. v. Madrigal Shipping Co., L-12951, Nov. 17,
555, Civil Code; also Art. 1141, par. 2, in relation 1959).
to Art. 1134, Civil Code).
[NOTE: An action for the reformation of a written
. (b) a real mortgage action. (Art. 1142, Civil contract prescribes in ten (10) years. (Jayme v.
Code). [NOTE: An action to annul a marriage on Judge Nestor Alampay, L-39592, Jan. 28, 1975).]
the ground of
(NOTE: In this case, the Court held that
impotency prescribes in eight (8) years, counted although the complaint does not state that the
from the cel- ebration of the marriage. (Art. 87, transportation was under- taken by virtue of a
par. 6, Civil Code).] written contract of carriage, nevertheless this
can be implied from the complaint because it is
Veloso v. Workmens Compensation a matter of common knowledge that whenever a
Commission 78 SCRA 503 passenger boards a ship for transportation from
one place to another, he is issued a ticket The judgment referred to here must be a final
wherein the terms of the contract are and executory one (that is, on appeal, the
specified.) judgment was confirmed, or that no appeal was
ever made within the proper period).
(3) Examples of Obligations Created by Law Parenthetically, the validity of a judgment or
order of a court which has become final and
executory, may be attacked generally only by a
. (a) The obligation to pay indemnity for a legal direct action, or proceeding to annul the same.
right of way. (If the right of way of a public road
(See Rosensons, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Jose Jimenez,
was acquired in 1914, the claim for payment of et al., L-41225, Nov. 11, 1975).
the same brought to the Auditor- General only in
1955 has prescribed, especially where, due to
the loss of the papers during the war, the 52
Government cannot be sure that no payment
has been made). (Rosario v. Auditor-General, L- CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1144
11817, Apr. 30, 1958).
Installments for support granted by a final
. (b) An action to recover compensation for the judgment prescribe after 10 years, each
death of a worker or employee, being an action particular installment prescribing after 10 years
based on law, prescribes in from the time it is due. (Trinidad Florendo v.
Rufino Organo, L-4037, Nov. 29, 1951).
51
[NOTE: Under the Rules of Court, a judgment
Art. 1144 becomes DORMANT after 5 years. This means
that the judgment may be enforced only within 5
years by writ of execution. Thereafter, since the
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES judgment has become dormant, it can be
enforced only by another action, within 10 years
10 years, in the absence of any specific provision from the time there was final judgment on the
of law on the matter. (Under the former law, Act first action. (See Sec. 6, Rule 39, Revised Rules
190, said action prescribed after 6 years). (Pan of Court). It necessarily follows that the action to
Phil. Corp. v. Workmens Compensation Com. enforce the judgment must be filed within 10
and Frias, L-9807, Apr. 17, 1957). [NOTE: In the years. The time, however, that a moratorium law
Pan Phil. Corporation case, the death occurred affecting the obligation was in force should be
on Dec. 25, 1945. The claim was filed with the deducted from the 10-year prescriptive period
Workmens Compensation Division of the Bureau for the reason that moratorium laws have the
of Labor on Feb. 11, 1949. The Bureau then effect of tolling (suspending) the prescriptive
ordered the employer to pay compensation on period. (PNB v. Aboitiz and Pascual, L-9500, Apr.
September 9, 1950, but on Jun. 20, 1952, the 11, 1957; Tioseco v. Day, L-9944, Apr. 30, 1957;
Workmens Compensation Commission was Liboro, et al. v. Finance and Mining Investment
created and it took cognizance of the case. On Corp., L-8948, Nov. 29, 1957; Intestate Estate of
Feb. 3, 1955, decision was rendered on the claim Montilla, Jr. v. Pacific Co., L-8223, Dec. 20, 1955;
which was subsequently affirmed by the and Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores, L-9396, Aug.
Commissioner, but the employer raised the 16, 1956).]
defense of prescription, on the ground that when
the Commission assumed jurisdiction over the In Quimabao v. Mora (L-12690, May 25, 1960), a
case on Jun. 20, 1952, the six years prescription
driver was convicted in a criminal case on May
period provided for in Act 190 had already 19, 1950, and was sen- tenced among other
expired. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling
things, to indemnify the offended party in the
of the Commission that the period of prescription amount of P2,000. However, said driver was
had been extended by Art. 1144(2) of the Civil
insolvent. Issue: What is the prescriptive period
Code to 10 years from the accrual of the action for suing the drivers employer for his subsidiary
and that the 10-year period did not expire until
liability? HELD: Ten years, for the suit is based,
Dec. 25, 1965. On the claim that Art. 1144 could not on the drivers negligence, but on the final
not be applied because Art. 2252 of the Code
judgment in the criminal case.
provides that changes made and new provisions
and rules laid down by this Code which may
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in In Heirs of Sindiong v. Committee, L-15975, April
accordance with the old legislation shall have 30, 1964, it was held that an action to enforce a
no retroactive effect and that the application decision (or to revive a court judgment)
of Art. 1144 would impair vested rights of the prescribes upon the expiration of ten years from
employer, the Court held that the employer had the date the decision became final.
no vested right when the period of 6 years
provided in Act 190 did not expire until Dec. 15, Olego v. Rebueno L-39350, Oct. 29, 1975
1951.]
FACTS: More than 10 years after a judicial
(4) Actions Based on a Judgment compromise had been approved, plaintiff sought
to cite defendant in contempt
53 RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Br. 56,
etc., GR 139776, Aug. 1, 2002.
FACTS: On June 20, 1995, private respondents,
of court for having allegedly violated the as legitimate children and forced heirs of their
judgment. Issue: May this be done? late father, Faustino Lumaniug, filed with the RTC
of Libmanan, Camarines Sur docketed as Civil
Case L-787, a complaint for recovery of sum of
HELD: No, this will not be allowed, for in effect money against petitioner alleging that: (1) their
what plaintiff wanted was to enforce a judgment
father was insured by petitioner under Life
that had prescribed (10 years had passed) thru Insurance Policy 1305486 with a face value of
the institution of contempt proceedings.
P50,000; (2) their father died of coronary
throm- bosis on Nov. 25, 1980; (3) on Jun. 22,
(5) Action Not Actually Based on Written 1981, they claimed and continuously claimed all
Contract the proceeds and interests under the life
insurance policy in the amount of P641,000; and
Bucton, et al. v. Gabar, et al. L-36359, Jan. (4) despite repeated demands for payment
31, 1974 and/or settlement of the claim due from
petitioner, the last of which was on Dec. 1, 1994,
FACTS: Villarin sold in 1946 to Gabar a parcel of petitioner finally refused or disallowed said
land on the installment plan. Gabar in turn had claim on Feb. 14, 1995. In view thereof, private
an oral agreement with Bucton that the latter respondents filed their complaint on Jun. 20,
would pay half of the price, and thus own half of 1995.
the land. Bucton paid her share to Gabar, and
was given in 1946 receipts acknowledging the Petitioner filed an Answer with Counterclaim and
payment. Motion to Dismiss, contending that:
In 1947, Villarin executed a formal deed of sale the cause of action of private respondents had
in favor of Gabar, who immediately built a house prescribed and they are guilty of laches;
on half of the lot. Bucton took possession of the
other half, and built improvements thereon. it had denied private respondents claim in a
When Bucton asked for a separate title, she was letter dated Mar. 12, 1982 on the ground of
refused, and so, in 1968, she filed a complaint to concealment on the part of the decreased
compel Gabar to execute a formal deed of sale insured Faustino when he asserted in his
in her favor. The Court of Appeals ruled that the application for insurance coverage that he had
action had already prescribed because this was not been treated for indication of chest pain,
an action to enforce a written contract, and palpitation, high blood pressure, rheumatic
should have been brought within 10 years from fever, heart murmur, heart attack or other
1946, under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code. Issue: disorder of the heart or blood vessel when, in
Has the action really prescribed? fact, he was a known hypertensive since 1974;
HELD: No, the action has not really prescribed. private respondents sent a letter dated May 25,
The error of the Court of Appeals is that it 1983 re- questing for reconsideration of the
considered the execution of the receipt (in 1946) denial; and
as the basis of the action. The real basis of the
action is Buctons ownership (and possession of
the property). No enforcement of the contract of in a letter dated July 11, 1983, it reiterated its
sale is needed, because the property has already decision to deny the claim for payment of the
been delivered to Bucton, and ownership thereof proceeds more than 10 years later, or on Dec. 1,
has already been transferred by operation of law 1994, it received a letter from Jose
under Art. 1434, referring to property sold by a
person (Gabar) who subsequently becomes the 55
owner thereof. The action here therefore is one
to quiet title, and as Bucton is in possession, the
action is imprescriptible.
C. Claro, a provincial board member of

54
Camarines Sur, reiterating the early request for
reconsideration which it denied in a letter dated
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1144 Feb. 14, 1995.
(6) Payment of Life Insurance Private respondents opposed the motion to

dismiss. On Jun. 7, 1996 the RTC issued an Order
Philippine American life & General which reads, in part: After a perusal of the
Insurance Co. v. Judge Lore R. Valencia- motion to dismiss by defendants counsel and
Bagalacsa, the objection submitted by plaintiffs counsel,
the court finds that the matters treated in their
respective pleadings are evidentiary in nature, The Article enumerates two kinds.
hence, the necessity of a trial on the merits.
Petitioners motions for reconsideration was (2) Examples
denied by the RTC in its Order dated Dec. 12,
1997 upholding, however, in the same Order the
(a) In Ilagan v. Adame, L-19619, Mar. 31, 1964,
claim of private respondents counsel that the
it was held that an action to enforce an oral
running of the 10-year period was stopped on
contract of tenancy (action to compel the
May 25, 1983 when private respondents
landlord to reinstate the tenant to the land)
requested for a reconsideration of the denial,
comes under Art. 1145 (six years) and not under
and it was only on Feb. 14, 1995 when petitioner
Art. 1149 (five years) of the Civil Code.
finally decided to deny their claim that the 10-
year period began to run. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (b) In Belman Compania, Inc. v. Central Bank, L-
(CA). On Apr. 30, 1999, the CA rendered its 15044, Jul. 14, 1960, it was held that an action
decision finding no grave abuse of discretion to recover a foreign exchange tax erroneously
committed by the court a quo when it issued the collected by the Central Bank (Bangko Sentral) is
Orders dated Jun. 7, 1996 and dated Dec. 12, one based on the quasi-contract of solutio
1997, respectively. Hence, the present petition indebiti, and it, therefore, prescribes in six years.
for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed by (3) Actions Where Periods Are Not Fixed
private respondents for payment of life
insurance is already barred by prescription of Any other action whose period has not been
action. fixed in the Civil Code or in other laws, to be
counted from the time the right of action
HELD: The RTCs ruling that the cause of action accrues. (Art. 1149, Civil Code).
of private respondents had not prescribed, is
arbitrary and patently erroneous for not being Art. 1146. The following actions must be
founded on evidence on record, and, therefore, instituted within four years:
the same is void. Consequently, while the CA did
not err in upholding the Jun. 7, 1996 Order of the (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the
RTC, it committed a reversible error when it plaintiff;
declared that the RTC did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the Order dated
Dec. 12, 1997. The CA should have granted the (2) Upon a quasi-delict.
petition for certiorari assailing said Order of Dec.
12, 1997. Said Order was issued with grave 57
abuse of discretion for being patently erroneous
and arbitrary, thus, depriving petitioner of due Art. 1146 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
process.
COMMENT:(1) Actions That Prescribe in 4
The petition is partly granted. The assailed CA Years
decision dated Apr. 30, 1999 insofar only as it
upheld the Order dated Dec. 12, 1997 is
The Article enumerates two kinds.
reversed and set aside. A new judgment is en-
tered reversing and setting aside the Order
dated Dec. 12, 1997 Other actions include:
56 (a) Action for the annulment of marriage based

on non-age, fraud, force, or intimidation. (Art.
87, pars. 1, 4, and 5, Civil Code).
(b) Action for the revocation or reduction (this is

of the RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Br. 56,
actually only for reduction) of donations based
and affirming its Order dated Jun. 20, 1995. Said
on birth, appearance, or adoption of a child. (Art.
RTC is directed to proceed with dispatch with
763, Civil Code).
Civil Case L-787.
(c) Action to revoke a donation for non-

Art. 1145. The following actions must be
compliance with conditions imposed by donor
commenced within six years:
upon donee, the period to be counted from the
non-compliance with the said condition. (Art.
. (1) Upon an oral contract; 764, Civil Code).
. (2) Upon a quasi-contract. (d) Action for rescission of contracts. (Art. 1389,
par. 1, Civil Code). [NOTE: In case of persons
COMMENT:(1) Actions That Prescribe in 6 under guardianship and in the case of
Years absentees, the period of prescription shall not
begin until the termination of the formers case was brought against the defendants driver
incapacity, or until the domicile of the latter is in the Justice of the Peace Court (now
known. (Art. 1389, par. 2, Civil Code).] Municipal/Metropoli- tan Trial Court) on Dec. 13,
1949. The case was, however,
. (e) Action for the annulment of a contract. (Art.
1391, par. 1, Civil Code). [NOTE: In cases of 59
intimidation, violence, or undue influence, the
period is counted from the time the vitiation Art. 1146
ceases (Art. 1391, par. 3, Civil Code); in case of
mistake or fraud, from the time of discovery of
the same (Art. 1391, par. 4, Civil Code); and in
cases of contracts entered into by minors or
other incapacitated persons, from the time the eventually dismissed, without prejudice, by the
guardianship ceases. (Art. 1391, par. 5, Civil Court of First Instance, on Feb. 16, 1954. Having
Code).] failed to have the criminal case reinstated thru
the fiscals office, the plaintiff filed a civil action
for damages against the defendants employer.
(2) Example of Injury to the Rights of the
Plaintiff
HELD: The civil action did not prescribe, it
appear- ing that the plaintiff neither expressly
In Valencia v. Cebu Portland Cement Co., et al.,
waived the civil action nor reserved his right to
L-13715, Dec. 23, 1959, a case involving a
file a separate civil action. Because the civil
plaintiff separated from his employment for
aspect remained with the criminal case, the
alleged unjustifiable causes, the Supreme Court
period of prescription was suspended from Dec.
13, 1949 up to Feb. 16, 1954 (the period when
58 the criminal case was pending).
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1146 [NOTE: The ruling stated above is correct if the
civil action is based on the CRIME. If the civil
held that the action is one for injury to the action is based on a QUASI-DELICT (which is
rights of the plaintiff, and must be brought within considered an independent civil action), the
4 years. institution of the criminal action cannot have the
effect of interrupting the civil action based on
(3) Rules for Quasi-Delicts such quasi-delict. (Paulan, et al. v. Sarabia, et
al., L-10542, Jul. 31, 1958).]
. (a) In a quasi-delict, the period begins from the
day the quasi- delict was committed. Paulan, et (4) Rule Under the Code of Civil Procedure
al. v. Sarabia, et al. L-10542, Jul. 31, 1958
FACTS: Basco was riding on a bus owned by Under the Code of Civil Procedure, an action to
defendant Sarabia when it collided with recover personal property, and an action for the
another truck owned by third-party defendant recovery of damages for taking, retaining, or
Lim. Basco died on Jul. 25, 1951. On Apr. 19, injuring personal property, can only be brought
1955, a complaint against Sarabia and his driver within 4 years after the right of action accrues.
was filed by the widow and heirs. On Jul. 11,
1955 (after more than 4 years from the date of Lapuz v. Sy Uy L-10079, May 17, 1957
the collision), Sarabia in turn filed a third-party
complaint against Lim and her driver. Issue:
FACTS: In a civil case between the defendant
From what time must the 4-year period be
and his wife, certain jewelries belonging to the
counted for the filing of the third-party complaint
plaintiff were alleged to have been wrongfully
from the day of the collision or from the filing
attached on Aug. 24, 1943. Unfortunately,
of the principal complaint? HELD: The period
during the liberation, the jewels were looted
begins from the day of the collision, since the
from the safe of the sheriff. On Apr. 27, 1952,
action is based on a quasi-delict. The third-party
the plaintiff filed an action for the recovery of
complaint was therefore dismissed.
the jewelries or of their value. Issue: Has the
action already prescribed?
. (b) An action for damages arising from physical
injuries because of a tort must be filed within 4
HELD: The action has prescribed. Whether the
years. (See Escueta v. Fandialan, L-39675, Nov.
case is considered as one for the recovery of
29, 1974). However, when a criminal action for
personal property or one for damages based on
the same physical injuries is instituted, the civil
a tort, the plaintiff had only four years
action for recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party 60
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately. Degollacion v. Li CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1147
Chui L-11640, May 22, 1956 FACTS: A traffic
accident occurred on Sept. 29, 1949. A criminal from Aug. 24, 1943 or up to Aug. 24, 1947,
within which to file the action against Sy Uy. In forcible entry, the period is counted from date
of unlawful deprivation (Sec. 1, Rule 70, 1997
Art. 1147. The following actions must be Rules of Civil Procedure); in case of fraud or
filed within one year: stealth, counted from discovery of the same. In
unlawful detainer, the period is to be counted
from the date of last demand. (Sarona, et al. v.
. (1) For forcible entry and detainer;
Villegas, L-22984, Mar. 2, 1968; DBP v. Canonoy,
L-29422, Sept. 30, 1970; and Calipayan v.
. (2) For defamation. Pascual, L-22645, Sep. 18, 1967).
COMMENT:(1) Actions That Prescribe in 1 (3) Rule in Case of Libel

Year
In libel, while it is true that the written
The Article enumerates two kinds. Others defamation become actionable upon its
include: publication (i.e., communication to third person),
still the libelous matter must first be exhibited to
. (a) An action for legal separation, to be counted the person libelled before the action can be
from knowledge of the cause (but the action brought. Hence, the one-year period runs from
must be brought within 5 years from the time the offended party knows of the
occurrence). (Art. 102, Civil Code). Note: Under libelous matter. A person defamed can hardly be
Art. 57 of the Family Code, the prescriptive expected to institute proceedings for damages
period for filing an action for legal separation arising from libel when he has no knowledge of
shall be counted from the date of occurrence of the said libel. (Alcantara, et al. v. Amoranto, L-
the cause. 12493, Feb. 29, 1960).
. (b) Action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, (4) Actions That Prescribe in Six (6) Months
the period to be counted from the recording of
the birth in the Local Civil Registry, if the (a) Action for the reduction of the price or for
husband should be in the same place, or in a rescission of a sale of real estate (by the unit
proper case, any of his heirs. (Art. 263, par. 1, area) if the vendor is unable to deliver on
Civil Code). [NOTE: If the husband or his heirs demand all that is stated in the contract. (Art.
are absent, the period shall be 18 months if they 1543, in re Art. 1539, Civil Code).
should reside in the Philippines; 2 years if
abroad; if the birth of the child is concealed, the
(b) Action for reduction of the price or for
period is to be counted from the discovery of the rescission of a sale (a cuerpo cierto) of real
fraud. (Art. 263, par. 2, Civil Code).]
estate (made with mention of boundaries) if the
vendor is unable to deliver all that is included
. (c) Action for the revocation of a donation on within said boundaries. (Art. 1543, in re Art.
the ground of ingratitude, the period to be 1542, Civil Code).
counted from the time the donor had knowledge
of the fact, and it was possible for him to bring
62
the action. (Art. 169, Civil Code).

. (d) Action for rescission or for damages for sale
of immovable encumbered with any non-
apparent burden or servitude, the period to be Art. 1148. The limitations of action
counted from the execution of the deed. (Art. mentioned in Articles 1140 to 1142, and
1560, par. 3, Civil Code). 1144 to 1147 are without prejudice to
those specified in other parts of this Code,
in the Code of Commerce, and in special
61 laws.
Art. 1147 (e)

COMMENT:(1) Periods of Prescription
Specified Elsewhere
Aside from the periods and actions indicated in
Action for damages (no rescission anymore) for the Articles stated, other periods and other
sale of immovable encumbered with any non- actions are found elsewhere.
apparent burden or servitude, the one year after
the execution of the deed having lapsed, said Basa v. Republic GR 45277, Aug. 5, 1985
period to be counted from the date on which the
burden or servitude is discovered. (Art. 1560,
par. 4, Civil Code). The 5-year period after assessment within which
court action for tax collection shall be instituted
is suspended during the period the Bureau of
(2) Rule in Case of Forcible Entry and Internal Revenue is prohibited from instituting
Detainer
court action.
Republic v. Ricarte GR 46893, Nov. 12, Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods
1985 are not fixed in this Code or in other laws
must be brought within five years from the
The prescriptive period provided for in the Tax time the right of action accrues.
Code is counted from the date when the BIR
assessed the income tax return of the taxpayer. COMMENT:(1) General Proviso 5 years
The action has prescribed if it had been filed 6
years and 9 months after the assessment. If the The Article explains itself. 64
Govern- ment presents no evidence that the
taxpayer received a copy of a subsequent or
follow-up assessment notice regarding the
alleged deficiency tax within the 5-year period,
then, the prescriptive period is deemed to have Tolentino v. CA and David L-41427, Jun. 10,
lapsed. 1988
Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. CA GR 57493, Jan. 7, All actions, unless an exception is provided, have
1987 a prescriptive period. Unless the law makes an
action imprescriptible, it is subject to bar by
prescription and the period of prescription is 5
An action upon an obligation created by law,
years from the time the right of action accrues
such as a petition filed by an employee to
when no other period is prescribed by law. The
compel the employer to remit his SSS
Civil Code provides for some rights which are not
contributions to the SSS prescribes after 10
extinguished by prescription, but an action
years from the time the right of action accrues.
against a woman who has been legally divorced
from her husband, brought by the latters
63 present wife, seeking to enjoin the former wife
from using the surname of her former husband,
Art. 1149 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES is not one of them. Neither is there a special law
providing for imprescriptibility.
(2) Rules in Case of Fraud
The mere fact that the supposed violation of the
. (a) The action for relief on the ground of fraud petitioners right may be a continuous one does
may be brought within 4 years from the not change the principle that the moment the
discovery of the fraud. (Art. 1391, Civil Code; breach of right or duty occurs, the right of action
and Sec. 43[3], Act 190). Thus, where the plain- accrues and the action from that moment can be
tiffs filed an action in 1953 to annul a contract of legally instituted. It is the legal possibility of
sale on the ground that they had been bringing the action which determines the
fraudulently induced to sign the same in the starting point for the computation of the period
belief that it was a mortgage, although they of prescription. The petitioner should have
discovered the fraud in 1945, the same is brought legal action immediately against the
barred. (Raymundo v. Afable, L-7651, Feb. 28, private respondent after she gained knowledge
1955). A subsequent action by the same of the use by the private respondent of the
plaintiffs against the same defendants for the surname of her former husband.
recovery of title and possession of the real
property, subject matter of the aforementioned (2) Examples
contract of sale is likewise barred. While it may
be true that the recovery of the title and (a) Action to impugn the recognition of a natural
possession of the lot were ultimate objectives of child. (Art. 296, Civil Code).
the plaintiffs, still to attain that goal, they must
first travel over the road of relief on the ground
(b) Action to impugn the legitimation of a child.
of fraud. (Rone v. Claro and Baquiring, 91 Phil.
(Art. 275, Civil Code).
250). Indeed, the plaintiffs cannot be declared
as still the owners of the property, entitled to its
possession, without annulling the contract of (c) Action to reduce inofficious donations (to be
sale. Said contract cannot be annulled without counted from the death of the donor). (See Art.
declar- ing it fraudulent, and annulment on this 772, Civil Code). [NOTE: Castan believes,
ground cannot be done anymore in view of the however, that the period for this is 4 years, not 5
prescription. (Raymundo v. De Guzman, L- years, applying the rule for rescissi- ble
109020, Dec. 29, 1959). contracts under Art. 1389 of the Civil Code. (4
Castan 194).]
. (b) An action for reconveyance of land, for
which a patent had been issued to the defendant (3) Query (Re Validity of Stipulation
by reason of fraudulent statements, is one based Concerning Period)
on fraud, and must be instituted within 4 years
from the discovery of the fraudulent state- May the parties stipulate when action for court
ments made in the application. (Rosario v. Aud. enforcement may be brought?
Gen., L-11817, April 30, 1958; Jean v. Agregado,
L-7921, Sept. 28, 1955).
65 one thing; right to have is another. It was only
from the time of denial of registration that the
Art. 1150 cause of action accrued. (Lee E. Won v. Wack
Wack Golf and Country Club, L-10122, Aug. 30,
1958).
(e) In an action to recover payment of the

(a) (b)
difference between the wages paid an employee
and that fixed by the Minimun Wage Law, every
ANS.: Yes, unless the stipulation: contravenes a monthly payment of salaries made by defendant
valid statute;or the time fixed is unreasonably employer gives the employee a separate and
short. independent cause of action to recover the
underpayment; hence, the period provided for
[Thus, the Supreme Court, in Pao v. Remorosa by law is to be counted from the date of each
(L-10292, Feb. 28, 1958) held that an agreement and every monthly payment. (Abrasaldo, et al. v.
whereby the claim against the surety must be Compania Maritima, L-11918, Jul. 31, 1958).
filed within thirty days, otherwise, court action is
waived, is unreasonable and is an invalid (4) Some Cases
limitation of action. (See Ongsiako v. World Wide
Insurance Co., L-12077, June 27, 1958).]
Lichauco v. Soriano 35 Phil. 203
Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all FACTS: A promise to pay within one year was
kinds of actions, when there is no special
made. At the option of the creditor, the period
provision which ordains otherwise, shall be could be extended for one year. The debtor
counted from the day they may be brought.
failed to pay, and the creditor failed to demand.
Issue: From what time will the prescriptive period
COMMENT:(1) From What Time Period Is to run?
Be Counted
HELD: Mere delay by the debtors and failure to
Note that the period shall be counted from the demand by the creditor does not mean that the
day the action may be brought, except if there extension of one year had been granted.
is a special provision that ordains otherwise. Therefore, since the debt became due at the end
of the original year, the prescriptive period
(2) Reason for the Law should commence from said end of the first year.
One cannot be said to begin sleeping on his Varela v. Marajas, et al. L-19215, Apr. 30,
rights, if such rights have not yet accrued. Thus, 1958
the starting point is the legal possibility. (TS,
May 8, 1903). FACTS: The heirs of a deceased person settled
the estate in a written agreement dated Feb. 14,
(3) Examples 1941, providing that one of them would pay an
absent heir, upon the reappearance of the latter.
. (a) In an action based on a quasi-delict because Said absent heir returned to the Philippines from
of a traffic collision from the day of the the United States in November, 1945. He
collision. (Paulan, et al. v. Sarabia, et al., L- immediately asked
10542, Jul. 3, 1958).
67
. (b) In a promissory note with a maturity date,
from the date of such maturity. (See Varela v. Art. 1150 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Marajas, et al., L-10215, Apr. 30, 1958).
for his share, but was not paid. He then filed the
. (c) In a collection for the unpaid balance of complaint for payment of his share on Dec. 6,
subscribed corporation shares, from the date of 1954. Issue: From what time should the
demand or call by the Board of Directors. (Garcia prescriptive period be counted?
v. Suarez, 67 Phil. 441).
HELD: The prescriptive period should be counted
66 from November, 1945, when he presented
himself for payment but was not paid. Hence,
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1150 the action has not yet prescribed. It is unfair to
begin computing from 1941 when the agreement
was made. This is so, because the agreement
. (d) In an action to compel the registration of an provided for payment upon his appearance, and
assigned mem- bership certificate in a non-stock no period was fixed for said purposes. The
corporation, the period runs not from the date of situation is similar to that of a debt evidenced by
assignment, but from the date of denial of a written document payable within a stated
registration. Reason: The existence of a right is period, where the cause of action would accrue
only upon the expiration of the stipulated period COMMENT:Obligations to Pay Principal With
in case payment is not made certainly, not Interest or Annuity
from the date of the agreement.
Example: If a matured debt is recognized later
Intestate Estate of Francisco Ubat, et al. v. by the payment of interest, the prescriptive
Atanasia Ubat de Montes, PNB, et al. L- period begins, not from the date of maturity, but
11633, Jan. 31, 1961 from the last payment of said interest. (See
Obras Pias v. Devera Ignacio, 17 Phil. 45).
FACTS: Eduardo Ubat borrowed P460 from the
Philippine National Bank in 1936, payable on or Art. 1152. The period for prescription of
before the 7th day of October, 1946. The actions to demand the fulfillment of
contract further provided that the payment obligations declared by a judgment
shall be made in 10 equal yearly installments. commences from the time the judgment
Suit for the whole amount was brought in 1954 became final.
since not a single installment had been paid.
Issue: Has the debt prescribed? COMMENT:Obligations Declared by a
Judgment
HELD: Under Art. 1150 of the new Civil Code, the
prescriptive period starts from the time creditor The Article explains itself. 69
may file an action, not from the time he wishes
to do so. The payment of yearly installments
was mandatory because of the phrase shall be
made. Therefore, the prescriptive period for
EACH installment should start from the time it Luzon Surety Co. v. IAC GR 72645, Jun. 30,
became due. However, considering the 1987
suspensive effect of the Moratorium Law, only
the first five installments have prescribed. The It is now settled that the ten-year period within
others may still be recovered. which an action for revival of a judgment should
be brought, commences to run from the date of
Castrillo v. Court L-18046, Mar. 31, 1964 finality of the judgment, and not from the
expiration of the five-year period within which
the judgment may be enforced by mere motion.
The prescriptive period within which to ask for a
declaration of co-ownership in a parcel of land
covered by a Torrens Three (3) reasons were advanced, to wit:
68 (1) Sec. 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(which is similar to the last sentence of Sec. 6,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court) should be
construed in relation to Sec. 43, No. 1 of the said
Title begins from the moment a transfer
Code (which is similar to Art. 1144 of the Civil
certificate is issued in
Code); and as thus construed, the conclusion
one arrives at is that after the expiration of the
the name of the new owners.Republic v. Hon. five years within which execution can be issued
Numeriano Estenzo upon a judgment, the winning party can revive it
only in the manner therein provided so long as
L-24656, Sept. 25, 1968 the period of ten years does not expire from the
date of said judgment, according to Sec. 43, No.
ISSUE: To have a judgment on compromise set 1 of the same Code.
aside, from what moment should prescription be
counted? (2) The right of the winning party to enforce the
judgment against the defeated party begins to
HELD: By its very nature, a judgment based on exist the moment the judgment is final; and this
compromise is generally final and immediately right, according to our Code of Civil Procedure,
executory. (Enrique v. Padilla, 77 Phil. 373; consists in having an execution of the judgment
Badiongan v. Ceniza, et al., 102 Phil. 750). For issued during the first five years next following,
this reason, prescription begins (or tolls) not and in com- mencing after that period the
from the date of its entry, but from the date of proceeding provided in Sec. 447 to revive it, and
its rendition. (Dirige v. Biranya, L-22033, Jul. 30, this latter remedy can be pursued only before
1966). the judgment prescribes, that is to say, during
the five years next following. It is so much an
action to ask for an execution as it is to file a
Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of
complaint for reviving it, because, as we know,
actions which have for their object the by action is meant the legal demand of the right
enforcement of obligations to pay principal
or rights one may have.
with interest or annuity runs from the last
payment of the annuity or of the interest.
(3) If it is held that the winning party has still ten
(10) years within which to revive the judgment
after the expiration of five years, then the Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is
judgment would not prescribe until after fifteen interrupted when they are filed before the
(15) years, which is against No. 1 of Sec. 43 of court, when there is a written extrajudicial
the Code of Civil Procedure. It cannot be said demand by the creditors, and when there
that such is the letter, and much less, the is any written acknowledgment of the debt
intention of the law, for there is nothing in Sec. by the debtor.
447 of the said Code, making this new period
different from the one prescribed in said Sec. 43, COMMENT:(1) Old Law Re Interruption of
No. 1, or reconciling these two Prescriptive Periods
70 Under the old law, while it is true that the

prescription of actions is interrupted when they
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Arts. 1153-1154 are filed before the court, still, if the case is
dismissed without any unfavorable judgment
provisions, there being no other way of against the defendants, even if without prejudice
reconciling them than to say that after the to another action, the same does not constitute
expiration of the first five years next following an interruption of the period of prescription for
the judgment, there remains to the victorious the parties are in exactly the same position.
party only another five years to review it. (Ongsiako v. Ongsiako, L-7510, Mar. 30, 1957).
This doctrine was reiterated in Amar v. Odianan,
L-15179, Sept. 30, 1960. Moreo- ver, according
Art. 1153. The period for prescription of to the Court, Act 190 contains NO provisions on
action to demand accounting runs from the
the interruption or suspension of the period of
day the persons who should render the prescription by the mere institution of an action.
same cease in their functions.
(2) When Prescription of Actions Is

The period for the action arising from the Interrupted Under the Civil Code
result of the accounting runs from the
date when said result was recognized by
agreement of the interested parties. (a) filed before the court (judicial demand) (this
is true even if there were no summons issued
and even if there be no judgment). (Manresa).
COMMENT: (NOTE that this Article must not be confused
with Art. 1124). Said latter Article does not apply
(1) Actions to Demand Accounting and here in Art. 1155. [NOTE: If a complaint is
Actions Arising from Result of the amended, with the impleading of an additional
Accounting defendant, prescription is interrupted as to such
additional defendant only from the time of the
The first paragraph deals with the demand for admission of the amended complaint, not from
accounting, the second deals with the result of the filing of the original complaint. (Aetna
the accounting. Insurance v. Barber Steamship Lines, Inc., L-
25266, Jan. 15, 1975).]
(2) Accounting and Reliquidation
(b) written extrajudicial demand.
There is NO difference, however, between an
action for ACCOUNTING and one for (c) written acknowledgment by the debtor of his
RELIQUIDATION, both of which involve the debt.
determination and settlement of what is due the
parties under the provisions of the law. (Mateo (3) Requirement of Written Demand or
v. Duran, L-14314, Feb. 22, 1961 and Yusay v. Acknowledgment
Alejado, L-14881 and L-15001-7, Apr. 30, 1960).
Note the requirement of a WRITTEN extrajudicial
Art. 1154. The period during which the demand or acknowledgment. Thus, a written
obligee was prevented by a fortuitous offer of payment works as a renewal of the
event from enforcing his right is not obligation and prevents prescription from
reckoned against him.
72
COMMENT:Effect of a Fortuitous Event
The Article explains itself. After all, fortuitous
events are generally exempt.
setting in. (Phil. National Bank v. Hipolito, L-
16463, Jan. 30, 1965). Thus also, an oral or
71 verbal acknowledgment has been held
insufficient to interrupt or suspend the running
Art. 1155 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES of the prescriptive period. Like the Statute of
Frauds, the plain purpose of the law is to avoid
uncertainty in the determination of the periods
of limitation, and not leave such determination IfthedebtorwasNOTawardamageclaimant,theperi
on the fallacies of human memory. This was also odof prescription was suspended from Mar. 10,
the rule under the old rule. (Sec. 50 of Act 190). 1945 (Ex. Order 32) to Jul. 26, 1948 [when the
Moratorium Law, Rep. Act 342, became
It would be different, however, if such oral effective]. (Rio & Co. v. Datu Jolkipli, GR L-
acknowledgment assumes a new obligation, and 12301, Apr. 13, 1959; see Hongkong & Shanghai
is not merely a promise to pay an old debt at a Banking Corp. v. Pauli, L-15713, Mar. 31, 1962).
future time. (Borromeo v. Zaballero, L-14357,
Aug. 31, 1960). Written extrajudicial demands (6) Closure of Courts During the Japanese
made AFTER an action has prescribed do NOT of Occupation
course revive the action. (Belman Co., Inc. v.
Central Bank, L-15044, May 30, 1960). Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the
regular courts were closed or ceased to function
(4) Moratorium Law Suspended Right to with the overrunning of Luzon by the Japanese
Sue forces in Dec. 1941. They did not reopen until
Jan. 30, 1942. This interruption in the functions
The Moratorium Law suspended the creditors of the courts naturally suspended also the
right to sue, and for purposes of prescription, the running of the prescriptive period. (Talens, et al.
time it was in force must be excluded from the v. Chuakay and Co., GR L-10127, Jun. 30, 1958).
computation. (Magdelena, et al. v. Benedicto, L-
9105, Feb. 28, 1958; Talens, et al. v. Chuakay & (7) Actions Under the Carriage of Goods by
Co., GR L-10127, Jun. 30, 1958; Rio & Co. v. Datu Sea Act
Jolkipli, GR L-12301, Apr. 13, 1959; Levy
Hermanos v. Perez, GR L-14487, April 29, 1960). The interruption by a written extrajudicial
BUT the Moratorium Law does not apply to pre- demand does not apply to actions under the
war debts. (Nielsen & Co., Inc. v. Lepanto, L- Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, which must be
21661, Dec. 28, 1968). filed within one year from receipt of the cargo.
The reason is that matters affecting
(5) Effect of President Osmeas transportation of goods by sea should be
Moratorium Order (Exec. Order 32), and decided in as short a time as possible. To apply
the Moratorium Law (Rep. Act 342), upon the Civil Code provision would permit delays.
the Statute of Limitations for Debts (Yek Tong Lin Fire Ins. Co. v. American President
Contracted Before Dec. 31, 1941 Lines, Inc., L-11081, Apr. 30, 1958).
(a) If the debtor was a WAR DAMAGE claimant, Dole Phils., Inc. v. Maritime Co. of the
the period of prescription was suspended from Phils. GR 61352, Feb. 27, 1987
Mar. 10, 1945 (Ex. Order No. 32) to May 18,
1953 (when the decision in Rutter v. Esteban, 49 In a case governed by the Carriage of Goods by
O.G. 1807, holding unconstitutional the further Sea Act, the general provisions of the Code of
operation of Rep. Act 342 became operative). Civil Procedure on Prescrip-
[Note that in said Rutter case, the Moratorium
Law was not declared void ab initio; the Court
74
only held that its continued operation and
enforcement had already become unreasonable
and oppressive. Said law therefore suspended CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1155
the Statute of
tion should not be made to apply. Similarly, in
73 such a case, Art. 1155 cannot be made to apply,
as such application would have the effect of
extending the one-year period of prescription
Art. 1155
fixed in the law. It is desirable that matters
affecting transportation of goods by sea be
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES decided in as short a time as possible. Thus, the
application of Art. 1155 would unnecessarily
(b) extend the period and permit delays in the
settlement of question affecting transportation,
Limitations, and no action for collection could be contrary to the clear intent and purpose of the
main- tained during the period when it was still law.
in effect. (Vda. de Quiambao v. Manila Motor Co.,
Inc., L-17384, Jan. 30, 1962).] Whether or not the (8) Rule in Taxation Cases
creditor actually brought his suit before or after
the Rutter decision, the period for the The motion for reconsideration of a decision of
enforcement of the credit was tolled or the Collector of Internal Revenue suspends the
suspended. (Ibid.). The presumption is that the running of the prescriptive period within which
creditor was a war damage claimant. (Rio y the taxpayer may appeal to the Court of Tax
Compania v. Court of Appeals, L-15666, Jun. 30, Appeals; and the period resumes its running the
1962). day following the receipt by the taxpayer of the
Collectors denial of said motion. (Collector of the cause of action for the fixing of the period of
Internal Revenue v. Convention of Philippine lease accrued. This is as it should be because
Baptist Churches, L-11807, Jan. 28, 1961). prior to that, the validity of the second contract
of lease was being challenged. The case for
(9) Effect of a Motion for Reconsideration unlawful detainer filed by the plaintiff-appellee
became in fact a case questioning the validity of
the second contract on the grounds that the said
A motion for reconsideration on the ground that contract was simulated and that there was no
the decision is completely against the evidence
consideration. The plaintiff-appellee could not
and the law, without pointing out the finding and have been expected to file an action for the
pronouncement made in the judgment that were
fixing of the period of the lease before the Court
allegedly contrary to the evidence and the law is of Appeals promulgated its decision because she
pro forma and does not stop the running of the
was not yet aware that the said paragraph of the
period within which to appeal (Valdez v. Jugo, second contract was a provision that called for
74 Phil. 49 and Villalon v. Ysip, 53 O.G. 1094);
an indefinite period. For the reason that the very
and the fact that before entry of the order existence, and subsequently, the interpretation
denying the motion for reconsideration, the
of the second contract of lease, particularly par.
movants filed a pleading where they pointed out 3 thereof, were put in issue in the unlawful
the fraud allegedly committed, does not cure the
detainer case, the court trying the case was
defect of such motion. (Garganta, et al. v. Court required to interpret the provisions of, and
of Appeals, et al., L-12104, Mar. 31, 1959).
consequently, rule on the validity of, the said
contract.
(10) Some Cases
PDCP v. IACGR 73198, Sept. 2, 1992
Buccat v. Dispo L-44338, Apr. 15, 1988
As to petitioners contention that the cause of
In order to resolve whether or not the present action of respondent is barred by prescription
action has prescribed, it is necessary to first and that there is a pending case before the
determine when the right of action for the fixing Davao RTC with the same cause of action, be it
of the period of lease accrued. Should it be noted that litis pendentia cannot apply in an
instance where there is no identity of parties.
75
In the case at bar, records show and as admitted
Art. 1155 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES by petitioner, the action filed in the Manila RTC
was against the respondent while the case filed
reckoned from the time when the parties entered in the Davao RTC was against DATICOR, the
into the second contract of lease which was on president of which is the respondent. The first
Aug. 1959 as the defendants-ap- pellants claim, case is against a natural person, while the
or at the time when the decision of the Court of second, is against a juridical person.
Appeals upholding the validity of the second
contract of lease was promulgated which was on 76
Nov. 1972 as the plaintiff-appellee claims?
The Court held that it was only on Nov. 1972 that

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TITLE V.

PRESCRIPTION HELD: The attempts of humble people to have

COMMENT:(1) Definition of Prescription (d) Presumed abandonment or waiver (in view of

. (b) public a) ordinaryprescriptionb)

. (e) adverse. In order that a possession may 2) extinctive prescription (liberatory

Director of Lands, et al. v. Funtillar, et al.

FACTS: Where the land sought to be registered

. (b) Reason for Pars. 1, 2, and 3: These people 13

12 COMMENT:(1) No Prescription Between

(d) Exceptions when prescription is

Art. 1111. Prescription obtained by a co- (2) Form

COMMENT:(1) Prescription Obtained by Co-

In a sense, a co-owner or co-proprietor acts for

. (b) While it may be claimed that a direct and 18

under the provisions of this chapter (the chapter

Art. 1116 (2) Example of the First Rule Given

(3) Example of the Third Rule Given BAR

1 1) The NEW Civil Code 23

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires Art. 1118. Possession has to be in the

(1) Requisites Common to Ordinary and (1) Characteristics of the Possession

Art. 1120. Possession is interrupted for the

(2) Natural Interruption COMMENT:Civil Interruption Defined

(3) Suspension of Prescription Art. 1124. Judicial summons shall be

Arts. 1121-1123 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

In all these cases, the period of the

(1) When Judicial Summons Cannot Be

(2) Apparent Interruption

In the three cases given above, it is as if there

(3) Applicability to Acquisitive, Not

In Amar v. Odianan (L-15179, Sept. 30, 1960),

COMMENT:(1) Recognition by Possessor of

COMMENT:(1) Prescription of Titles Alfonso v. Jayme L-12754, Jan. 30, 1960

. (b) Art. 527. Good faith is always presumed, and

COMMENT:(1) Period of Prescription for COMMENT:(1) Movables Possessed Through

. (b) extraordinary prescription 8 years 38

37 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Arts. 1134-1136

Art. 1135. In case the adverse claimant

COMMENT: This Article refers to extraordinary prescription

Under this Article, neither good faith nor just title

COMMENT:(1) Possession in War Time (4) Retroactive Effect of the Prescription

By the mere lapse of the time indicated in the

Tacking by a subsequent possessor of his (4) Effect of Death on Prescription

COMMENT:(1) Prescription of Mortgage of drainage. (See Art. 676, Civil Code).](b)

10 years. (2) Some Other Actions That Do Not

. (h) An action brought by a buyer of land to

contract. Still, it was beyond the ten (10)-year

. (2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(2) Example of a Written Contract

A passenger of a ship, or his heirs, can bring an

C. Claro, a provincial board member of

(6) Payment of Life Insurance Private respondents opposed the motion to

56 (a) Action for the annulment of marriage based

(b) Action for the revocation or reduction (this is

(c) Action to revoke a donation for non-

COMMENT:(1) Actions That Prescribe in 1 (3) Rule in Case of Libel

CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art. 1148

Art. 1147 (e)

(e) In an action to recover payment of the