LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC ; G.R. No.

221697

FACTS:

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found

abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by
a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental
care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his
relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6
September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a
foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-
Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the
petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar." 1

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe
(a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the
trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be
changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were
made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the
court decreed adoption, the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered
only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who
handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a
new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the
name of her adoptive parents. Without delay, petitioner's mother
executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she
submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new
Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe.

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner

registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan
City. She received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for
Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Petitioner
applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993
and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport.

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development

Studies at the University of the Philippines but she opted to continue
her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in
1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts
Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in
Political Studies.

Petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares

(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being
with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew
back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July
1991. While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child
Brian Daniel (Brian). Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna)
and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines.

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American

citizen. She obtained U.S. Passport on 19 December 2001. On 8
April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with
Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May
2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her
youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two
daughters on 8 July 2004.

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner

rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's
deteriorating medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and
eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3
February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as
well as to assist in the settlement of his estate. According to the
petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her
entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the
petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently
in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005. The couple
began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools
for the next semester; coordination with property movers for the
relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S.
to the Philippines; and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the
proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the
country. As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the
U.S.

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and

without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed while
her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place
until she and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a
parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in
the second half of 2005. Meanwhile, her children of school age
began attending Philippine private schools.

In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S.

Postal Service of the family's change and abandonment of their
address in the U.S. The family home was eventually sold on 27 April
2006. Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April
2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a
major Philippine company in July 2006.

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square

meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family
home and to this day, is where the couple and their children have
been residing.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Under
the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July
2006. As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted
favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to
have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are
considered as citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, the BI issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names
of her three (3) children.

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San

Juan City on 31 August 2006. She also secured from the DFA a new
Philippine Passport. This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014
and she was issued Philippine Passport.

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed

petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance
to the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9225. The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted
the said affidavit to the BI and took her oath of office as
Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, petitioner stopped
using her American passport.

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul

of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." On that day, she
accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul
wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of
relinquishing her American citizenship. In the same questionnaire,
the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S.,
specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991
and from May 2005 to present. The U.S. Vice Consul issued to
petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States" effective 21 October 2010.

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her

Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections
wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question
"Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."

Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed

Senator on 16 May 2013. On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained
Philippine Diplomatic Passport.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for
the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that
she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The
petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of
U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in
Quezon City on 14 October 2015.

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo
(Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC.
She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her
petition. Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner
committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her
COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot

be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact
that she was a foundling. Elamparo claimed that international law
does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings. Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified
to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225
for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with. Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino,
she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a
naturalized American citizen. According to Elamparo, natural-born
citizenship must be continuous from birth.

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that

petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012
COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the
country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013
Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that
petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No.
9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of
the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the
earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship
under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified
to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that
she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.

Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered

that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition
as it was actually a petition for quo warranto which could only be filed
if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the
BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not
contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make
false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or
deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC
regarding her citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that
foundlings were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born
of citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship
prior to the filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016
Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not
been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess
natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired
natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for
Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to
evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right
of the Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is,
should she serve as the country's next leader.

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by
Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and
Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC
which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad
alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to
qualify her for the Presidency.

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the

principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage,
particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born
Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of
natural-born status. Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction
that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in
the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude
them. Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a
natural-born citizen.

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or

treaties to support her claim that foundlings have a nationality.76
According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not
self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to
give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.77 He also
stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically
confers natural-born status to foundlings.

Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot

avail of the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and
petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she
did not comply with the ten (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad
opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from
the time she renounced her American citizenship which was
sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned
petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced
by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to
the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of
petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that
her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the
status of a natural-born citizen. He advanced the view that former
natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act
reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their
original status as natural-born citizens.

He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for

Senator that she had only been a resident of the Philippines for at
least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013
Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that
she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines
prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his
position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency
requirement for President.

Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner,

Contreras' petition, docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the
attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015
COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that she
did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for
said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when
she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016. Contreras contended
that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in
the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the
BI. He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country
before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of
her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American
citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration
laws.
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to

state a cause of action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper
for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68
of the Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on
the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner
which are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification
of a candidate to an elective office.90

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo
warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the
Presidency.A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not
the COMELEC.

Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino

citizen is on the respondents. Otherwise stated, she has a
presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this
country.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are

entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country
where they are found. Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to
be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her
natural-born status. Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine
Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance
of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born
citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the
decree of adoption of San Juan RTC. She believed that all these acts
reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she
started reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as
demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the
country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills.99

Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile
of choice in the Philippines even before she renounced her American
citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile
are complied with. She reasoned out that there was no
requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a
prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.

Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency

portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith.1

ISSUE:
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of
petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the
exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false
material representation.

QUESTION: Can the COMELEC be such judge?

ANSWER: The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-

Marcos v. Commission on Elections, which was affirmatively cited in
the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC is our guide.

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for

declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its
rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 1, the
following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess
all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution
or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be
grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is
equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive
matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power
under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy
that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to
decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an
inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of
voters. [Art. IX, C, 2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their
consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from
those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings,
as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local Government
Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming
a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a
word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either
from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand,
refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or
the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent
from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a
public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming
a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice
versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A.
No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in 2 of the
Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the]
disqualifications provided in 4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the
consequences of the respective proceedings, the importance of the
opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere
rule".

Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed
elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the
office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a
candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying,
over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial
question which should be determined lest he wins because of the
very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it
is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a
candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in
his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been
voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his
proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility,
e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long
time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of
Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the
elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character
proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in
their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position
which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications
to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected.
Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation
cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and
members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The
purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements
as reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the
15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all
the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be
grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a
party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or
found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to
Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a
Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall
be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality
of absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before
election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently
required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a
final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be
disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering
from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and
Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not
authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification
must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an
authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment
of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or
she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the
Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or
denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his
or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she
is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by
which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only
exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of
unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions.
Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which
the falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a
proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged
false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and
residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since
foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under
the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the
COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that
she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an
effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that
herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen
when "it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable,"
proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence
to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."