30 Magat-vs-CA
30 Magat-vs-CA
30 Magat-vs-CA
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner-accused was charged with robbery for divesting an American businessman who
came to Olongapo as a tourist of his money. Within 24 hours after trial, where rebuttal and
sur-rebuttal were presented by the prosecution and the defense, respectively, the Court of
First Instance rendered its judgment of conviction. Petitioner-accused appealed. The Solicitor
General, instead of filing a Brief, filed a Motion and Manifestation joining the accuseds
cause and recommending the reversal of the trial Courts judgment on the grounds that
complainant was not a transient visitor; that the trial Court acted with unusual haste in the
arraignment, trial and rendition of the judgment of conviction; and that the evidence adduced
failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty.
On petition for review, the Supreme Court held: (1) That petitioner-accused was not denied
procedural due process, because the unusual speed with which the trial Court disposed of the
case was in consonance with General Order No. 39 amending General Order No. 12, dated
September 30, 1972 which mandates that cases involving tourists be disposed of within 24
hours from the filing of the complaint. and the rendition of the judgment not long after the
trial was terminated was not necessarily indicative of inordinate haste especially where
petitioner-accused was duly and amply heard in his defeat; (2) that the guilt of petitioner-
accused had been sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt as complainant was
categorical in his identification of the accused and emphatic in his direct and active
involvement in the robbery; and (3) that the conclusions of the trial Court on the question of
credibility are entitled to the utmost respect and will remain undisturbed on appeal.
SYLLABUS
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLAINANT A TOURIST WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF THE LAW.
The submission of the State that complainant is "not a transient visitor" for his testimony
shows clearly that he has been in Olongapo City a number of times for the past fifteen years
is not well taken, the exact declaration of complainant having been "a number of times" and
not "many times." And even if complainant has been in Olongapo City a number of times,
that does not make him any less a transient, or one whose stay is "of uncertain duration" or
for a "short time," or for a "brief period" only each time. There is no question either that
notwithstanding the number of times that he has been to this country, complainant is a
"tourist" or one who travels from place to place for pleasure or culture. As a "tourist" or a
"transient, complainant falls within the coverage of General Order No. 12, as
amended."cralaw virtua1aw library
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-GR. No. 23228-
CR, affirming with modification the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
Branch I, Olongapo City, in Criminal Case No. 4163 for Robbery, convicting petitioner-
accused, Leonardo Magat, of said crime.
The evidence for the prosecution has been summed up by the Trial Court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Petitioner-accused, on the other hand, denied the commission of robbery and claimed that
complainant lost the money to him in a card game. His version was synthesized by
respondent Court of Appeals thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On the other hand, the defense evidence discloses that in the afternoon of July 19, 1979, a
certain driver named Brosas arrived with an American who turned out to be the herein
complainant, at Magats residence at No. 8 Fontaine Extension, Olongapo City. Brosas told
Magat that the American was looking for a girl whom he will pay. Magat then told Brosas to
look for a girl so that they could earn some money. Brosas left Magats residence to look for
a girl while complainant Lanigan waited for him in Magats residence.
While they were waiting, Magat invited Lanigan to play poker/blackjack. Lanigan agreed.
The two of them sat by the table and they played six games. Magat won in five games but lost
in one. Lanigans total loss amounted to a little over P500.00. Lanigan then told Magat that
he will use his travellers check since he had no more money. Magat did not agree and
refused to play further with Lanigan. Magats refusal irritated Lanigan. Lanigan then tried to
grab the cash money in the possession of Magat at the time and the two of them struggled for
possession of the money. In the meanwhile, Lanigan kept on shouting that he was cheated
and that he wants his money back. Later, Lanigan told Magat that he is going to cash his
travellers check at Pag-asa where he has an American acquaintance. Lanigan, however, did
not come back anymore that day.
The following day he appeared at the residence of Magat with a CIS agent named Rene who
told Magat that a certain Captain Santos, Chief of the CIS, wanted to see him in connection
with Lanigans complaint. In the meantime, Patrolman Marcelino also arrived at the house of
Magat who allegedly told the latter that if he will return the P500.00 of the complaining
American, then the complaint against him will be settled." 3
On July 26, 1979, at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, an Information for Robbery was filed
against Leonardo Magat, Francisco Brosas and four others in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, Branch I, at Olongapo City. The case was immediately raffled and set for
arraignment and trial. Only petitioner-accused was arraigned at 4:35 that same afternoon, as
the others had not been apprehended. Petitioner-accused entered a plea of "Not
Guilty."cralaw virtua1aw library
"COURT
This is for immediate trial because according to the motion of the First Assistant City Fiscal,
the complainant is a tourist.
ATTY. BALINGIT
If your Honor please, I was hired about a few minutes ago and I was indeed surprised to be
contracted.
Although I understand the extent of the law which requires the speedy trial of this case,
however, if I may be given at least one (1) hour to confer with my witness, I will proceed
with the trial.
FISCAL ANONAS
COURT
FISCAL ANONAS
Two (2)
COURT
ATTY. BALINGIT
Two (2)
FISCAL ANONAS
I have no objection to the conference between counsel and his witness but after we have
already submitted our case.
ATTY. BALINGIT
But just only one (1) hour to confer to give me the chance to defend my client.
COURT
ATTY. BALINGIT
Provided . . .
COURT
Before you could cross examine. For cross examination. You can consult your client from
time to time." 4
Trial proceeded and lasted up to 7:30 in the evening. The following day, trial was resumed at
8:30 oclock in the morning when petitioner-accused and his witness, testified on direct,
cross, and re-direct examination. At 11:35 that same morning, a judgment of conviction was
promulgated, sentencing the accused to six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P6,996.00, and to pay the
costs.
Petitioner-accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing a Brief for the People,
the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion and Manifestation joining the accuseds
cause, and recommending the reversal of the Trial Courts judgment on the ground that
complainant is not a transient visitor; that said Court acted with unusual haste in the
arraignment, trial, and rendition of the judgment of conviction; and that the evidence adduced
failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In its Decision promulgated on August 21, 1981, the Court of Appeals refuted the contentions
of the Office of the Solicitor General, affirmed conviction, but modified the penalty.
"Except with the aforesaid modification, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
in all other respects."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner-accused appealed by Certiorari to this Court assigning the following errors to the
Court of Appeals:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The Respondent Honorable Court of Appeals erred in brushing aside the mute but clear
import of lack of adherence to the basic fundamental formulation of due process whereby
counsel and client must be accorded the right to be heard i.e., before proceedings to
commence trial ample opportunity must be given for them to confer and prepare for the
defense.
2. The Respondent Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the submission for
acquittal made by the state counsel, the Honorable Solicitor General in its Motion and
Manifestation in lieu of appellees brief anchored upon grave and conclusive circumstantial
facts negativing petitioners guilt.
3. The respondent Honorable Court of Appeals erred in merely modifying the judgment of
conviction of the petitioner based upon mere assumptions and suspicion of guilt."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Required to comment by this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General adopted its Motion
and Manifestation filed before the Court of Appeals and recommended the grant of the
petition for Certiorariaverring that the findings and conclusions of respondent Court of
Appeals are not supported by substantial evidence.
In his first assigned error, petitioner-accused claims lack of due process because of the
unusual speed with which the Trial Court disposed of his case. The record does show that the
accused was arraigned at 4:35 P.M. on July 26, 1979. The request of defense counsel for one
hour within which to confer with his client was deferred by the Trial Court till after the
prosecution had presented its evidence but the Court clarified that it would allow counsel to
consult his client from time to time during cross-examination. Trial commenced thereafter
and continued until 7:30 in the evening, with the prosecution resting its case. The following
day, trial was resumed, for the presentation of evidence for the defense, at 8:30 A.M., and
judgment was promulgated at 11:35 that same morning.
Applicable to this case is General Order No. 39 amending General Order No. 12, dated
September 30, 1972, which gave Civil Courts concurrent jurisdiction with Military Tribunals
over crimes committed against tourists and transients, and mandates that cases involving
tourists be disposed of within 24 hours from the filing of the complaint.
The civil court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the military tribunals over the said
crimes, provided that civil courts shall dispose of such cases within 24 hours after the filing
thereof by the arresting officer. The court or tribunal that first assumes jurisdiction shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others."cralaw virtua1aw library
Considering that explicit requirement, the Trial Court had no other alternative but to speed up
trial. That defense counsel was aware of the prescribed time element is shown by the fact that
he had asked for only one hour within which to confer with his client although normally he
would have been entitled to at least 2 days to prepare for trial. 5 In point of fact, the Trial
Court did not deny defense counsels request for conference with petitioner-accused. The
Trial Court merely deferred such conference till after the prosecution had presented its
witnesses. It is to be noted further that defense counsel was not totally unprepared for trial for
he was ready with two witnesses when asked by the Court. Moreover, after the prosecution
had rested its case, trial was resumed the next day, thereby giving the defense enough time to
prepare for the presentation of its direct evidence. Besides, notwithstanding the brief span of
trial time, rebuttal and surrebuttal were presented by the prosecution and the defense,
respectively.
The rendition of the judgment not long after the trial was terminated is not necessarily
indicative of inordinate haste. On the contrary, Judge Regino T. Veridiano II, the Trial Fiscal,
and the defense counsel are to be commended for their punctilious compliance with the
explicit mandate of the law. A reading of the transcript and of the judgment rendered will
also reveal that petitioner-accused was duly and amply heard in his defense. He was not
denied procedural due process.
The submission of the State that complainant is "not a transient visitor" for his testimony
shows clearly that he has been in Olongapo City many times for the past fifteen years" 6 is
not well taken, the exact declaration of complainant having been "a number of times" and not
"many times." And even if complainant has been in Olongapo City a number of times, that
does not make him any less a transient, or one whose stay is "of uncertain duration" or for a
"short time", or for a "brief period" only each time. 7 There is no question either that
notwithstanding the number of times that he has been to this country, complainant is a
"tourist" or one who travels from place to place for pleasure or culture. 8 As a "tourist" or a
"transient", complainant falls within the coverage of General Order No. 12, as amended,
supra.
We likewise find it difficult to agree with the Solicitor Generals position that the guilt of
petitioner-accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Complainant was
categorical in his identification of petitioner-accused and emphatic as to the latters direct and
active involvement in the robbery. Petitioner-accuseds version of the occurrence does not
ring with truth. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Appellant advances the argument that if robbery was his intention, then he would not have
done it in the very premises of his home. This explanation appeared lame and weak. He did
so, because he never expected that their victim being a tourist will have the insistence and
temerity of lodging and pushing through a complaint against him and his cohorts for forcibly
divesting him of his money. No doubt, appellant and his confederates must have been
emboldened by the fact that even if their victim complained but considering his unfamiliarity
with the place, it will be almost next to impossible for him (the American victim) to trace his
way back to appellants place and pinpoint their identities. In fact, the American MPs were
able to tract down his (Magats) place only because of its notoriety for assaults and acts as
that perpetrated against the complainant. Then too appellant and Brosas were identified only
by their photos in the files of the police. Both happened to be notorious police characters
having been previously involved in a series of robbery and theft cases. They were readily
pointed to and identified by complainant upon seeing their photos as among the persons who
divested him of his money on the day of the incident in question." 9
Again, complainant had been to Olongapo City a number of times in the past, and, therefore
was not a complete stranger to the place. He would have had more or less, an idea where to
go for entertainment, so that petitioner-accuseds allegation that complainant was looking for
a girl when brought to his place hardly deserves credence.
In the last analysis, the issue simmers down to one of credibility. The well established rule is
that the conclusions of a Trial Court on the question of credibility are entitled to utmost
respect and will remain undisturbed on appeal unless substantial facts, which might affect the
result of the case, have been overlooked, which is not the case herein. Suffice it to quote
some notable observations of the Court of Appeals on the matter of credibility even as it
refuted some of the contentions advanced by the Office of the Solicitor General in support of
the latters bid for acquittal of the accused.
"The second point raised by the state counsel is that allegedly complainant admitted having
been strangled by his neck and yet he did not sustain any physical injury or bodily harm as
could be gleaned from his testimony of July 26, 1979 (p. 12 of the motion and manifestation.
That complainant did not suffer any injury whatsoever did not make his version of the
incident incredible because as the accused together with his confederates tried to divest the
complainant of his money, the latter struggled and it was at that juncture when complainant
was choked. What possible injury must he necessarily sustain in a situation of that sort?
Maybe only the reddening of the portion choked which however, was no longer visible to the
naked eye after a couple of hours or so.
"The third circumstance advanced by the Honorable State Counsel is that it was rather
incredible and absurd for one who had robbed another to still endeavor to teach his victim
how to play a game of cards. The argument appears plausible but not conclusive.
Complainant was brought to another room and taught the rudiments of poker blackjack
preparatory to the theory to be set up by the defense that if the American victim has lost his
money . . . it was in gambling where cards were utilized during the game. And secondly, to
properly appease the victim and condition his mind making him cool in the process so that
whatever he may have in mind by way of retaliation may no longer be pursued by him. But
the victim-complainant happened to be a person not of the type the accused thought of him to
be. In short, he was underestimated by the culprits.
"Lastly, it is likewise claimed that when the complainant first appeared before the police
officer on July 19, 1979, the day when the robbery was committed, he allegedly told the
police that a jeepney driver picked him up and with the use of flowery words was able to
take his money. On the fourth day, however, following the incident or on July 23,
complainant in his sworn statement stated that he was choked and strangled by two or three
persons and the accused took his money from his pocket while they were in a house at No. 8
Fontaine Extension, Olongapo City.
"The statement referred to appeared embodied in Exhibit A which was allegedly prepared
by a certain Pfc. Alberto dela Isla, the contents of which reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
This is in connection with Police Blotter Entry No. 2387, (p. 453 dated 15 July, 1979.)
Complainant alleged that on or about 2:00 P.M. to 3:00 P.M. July 1975, at the above
mentioned located, suspect with intent to gain and with intimidation took and carted away his
cash money amounting to $940.00 more or less. Complainant further alleged that while he
was walking along Magsaysay Drive, Q.C., when a jeepney driver picked him up and with
the use of flowery words was able to take his money. Furthermore, suspect/s choked him
while others were holding his hand and at the same time threatened him that if he did not stop
strangling he will be killed. Complainant pointed the person of LEONARDO MAGAT as one
of the suspects when a picture of the said suspect was showed to him. (Italics
supplied)."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Pfc. Isla was never placed on the witness stand to testify on the alleged report. The contents
therein appearing therefore is decidedly hearsay . . . the prosecution being denied of the right
to cross-examine him on the truth thereof. But what appears confusing is the fact that when
complainant-victim made a follow-up of his complaint with the police, since nothing
appeared to have been done in connection therewith, no records whatsoever pertaining to his
complaint could be found. And yet here comes this alleged police report.
"But let it be assumed that complainant when interviewed made the statement that now
appears in this Exhibit A. Analyzing the said statement in its entirety, the conclusion arrived
at appeared not warranted for if complainant was divested of his money merely through the
use of flowery words then why was there a necessity for choking him and holding his hands
and threatening him and, further, that if he did not stop then he will be killed. Interpreted in
the light of the testimony of the complainant, it would appear that the first step that led into
complainants being divested of his money were the flowery words made by Brosas to him
that ultimately brought him to Magats place whereby, through force and intimidation the
offenders took his money from his pocket." 12
All told, we find the second and third assigned errors also without merit, and like the Trial
Court and the Appellate Court, we find petitioner-accuseds guilt proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Review is denied and the judgment of the Court of Appeals
hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1. Fourth Division, composed of Justices Crisolito Pascual, Serafin R. Cuevas (ponente) and
Carolina Grio-Aquino.
3. p. 41, ibid.
8. ibid.