1

Introduction: The International

Political Economy of Transformation

,,

B_;'o'rnHettne

'[his book is not so much a general introduction to International

Political Economy as a contribution to the study of change and
transformation within this relatively new, exciting and growing
academic field. This study becomes' the more urgent as change, as
we now conceive it, implies 'disorder', 'turbulence' or 'Chaos', to
quote some expressions from the authors of this book. It may be
true that 'change' in and of itself is of limited interest (Sorensen,
1994; Vincent, 1983), but what is not to be doubted is that a
capacity to handle change and transformation intellectually marks
tile maturity of a social-science discipline. In the case of Inter-
national Political Economy this challenge is nothing less than the
comprehension of 'global transformation' (Sakamoto, 1994)' All
the contributions to this book therefore address the problem of
IlOW to understand the current era of global uncertainties. But first
some general remarks about the specific academic field of Inter-
national Political Economy are called for.

The Meanings of Political Economy

Political economy is one of the more complex and contested con-
cepts in social science (Staniland, 1985; Caporaso and Levine, 1992).
This is consequently also true for the more recent concept of
International Political Economy (IPE). According to most intro-
ductory textbooks, IPE deals with the way the world economy is
organized politically, or how political anarchy can be compatible
2 International Political Economy B;'o'rnHettne - 3
,

with international economic cooperation - the non-coincidence of world of the economist. In the absence of the market, the state or its
political organization and economic function. More concisely, IPE equivalent would allocate economic resources; this would be the pure
world of the political scientist. (Gilpin, 1987: 8)
is the connection between politics and economics in international
relations.' The crucial issue is how we define this connection. I'll .re are, however, many approaches to choose from:

One important underlying assumption of IPE, which makes it
distinct from mainstream international economics, is that no eco- I\~lchapproach may define what constitutes the 'political' and the 'eco-
nomic system can exist for long witho;ut a stabilizin olitical frame- nomic', and their integration into a particular 'political economy', in
work of some sort. Thus the world economy and the international different ways. (Gill and Law, 1988: I j)
political system cannot be usefully analysed in separation from each
Essentially, the two logics - of the state and of the market - are
other, but must be dealt with within one single theoretical frame- ,,(' '11 as incompatible:
work, although necessarily informed by several disciplines. Since
these disciplines can in themselves be understood as the result of '[he logic of the market is to locate economic activities where they are

a fragmentation of classical political economy, the study of IPE most productive and profitable; the logic of the state is to capture and
-- - - ..

control the process of economic growth and capital accumulation.

can also be seen as a contribution to a reconstituted social science,
(Gilpin, 1987: I I, quoting Heilbroner, 1985: 94-j)
primarily aimed at overcoming the artificial distinctions between
economic-political, on the one hand, and domestic-international, '1'11C easy way is to build a discipline upon each of these logics.
on the other. l lcnce we have political science and economics. The hard part is
Political economy is a long-established but at the same time I.) combine them. However, transcending or synthesizing attempts
rather elusive concept. While some would say that it represents the .rr also being made: ,
very core of social science, others may fear that the holism it
implies spells the end of what we mean by the modern social Many examples of modern Political Economy transcend the arbitrary
sciences. This is because it seems to contradict scientific achieve- distinction between the political and the economic. (jones, 1988: I)
ments presumed to have been gained through academic specializa- What I am suggesting here is a way to synthesize politics and economics
tion; for instance, the study of what is understood as 'economic by means of ~I:!uctu~alanalysisof the effects of states - or more properly
man', not to speak of an equally strange creature called 'political of any kind of political authority - on markets and, conversely,of market
man'. forces on states. (Strange, 1988: 13-14)
Political economy is compatible with widely differing ideological
There are also different views on the relative importance of the
and theoretical perspectives or paradigms, which further adds to its
state vis-a-vis the market. Neither should be seen as primary; their
elusiveness. Although political economy was always an ideological
relationship is interactive and dialectical, as shown in Karl Polanyi's
battlefield, there is a consensus about what conventionally consti-
pioneering contribution to this field (polanyi, 1957). For instance,
tutes, or at least has in the past constituted, the fundamental
Robert Cox mentions Karl Polanyi together with Antonio Gramsci
concern of political economy, namely the interaction of state and
and Fernand Braudel as sources of inspiration so far as the under-
market, or, in different terms, politics and economics:
-tanding of structural change is concerned. Polanyi has, further-
more, been viewed as the 'most influential forerunner of world-
Without both state and market there would be no political economy. In
the absence of the state, the price mechanism and market forces would system analysis' (Agh, 1990), and many of the current research
determine the outcome of economic activities; this would be the pure questions in IPE formed part of his conceptual and thcorct 11:11

,
 4 International Political Economy Bjorn Hettne 5

framework. The era to which he gave the name the 'Great Trans- I xchange in small-scale symmetrical communities, the latter to
,

formation' thus largely coincided with the rise and decline of British politically determined distribution in stratified societies marked by
hegemony. The current debate is, rather, about the implications of .1 centre-periphery structure. Both modes of distribution were
the decline of US hegemony. ' . undermined by the growth of market exchange.

In this introduction I will relate the contemporary discussion on IIowever, as the market principle penetrated all spheres of human

change in the international system to Polanyi's now fifty-year-old .ll'l ivity, thereby eroding social structures, redistribution had to be

magnum opus The Great Traniformatioti,,(originally published in 1944), reinvented in order to provide people with the necessary social

for the reason that the contributors to this volume favour an protection, Polanyi called this type of reaction on the part of society
approach to the study of change in the global political economy III' second part of a 'double movement', the first part being the

that is exemplified by, if not identified with, Polanyi's work. expansion and deepening of market exchange. This was the origin
Outside IPE, Polanyi is better-known for a number of other ,If the modern welfare state, as well as of other types of interven-

important conceptual innovations to further what he called a 'sub- _ uonist economy. Thus, modern industrial societies were typically
,

stantive', in contradistinction to 'formal', understanding of economic .Irstinguished by a market-redistribution mix. Depending on the
reality. It should be emphasized, however, that his concepts form nature of this mix we called some 'capitalist' and others 'socialist',
a framework within which societal transformation can be fruitfully III neither system does reciprocity playa role in economic trans- .
analysed. A comparison can be made with Gramsci, who also ,II I ions outside the family and kinship groups. After the present
provided us with a set of useful concepts (hegemony, civil society, 111,:lseof neo-liberal hegemony and social marginalization, reci-
historic bloc) which were used contextually rather than in a trans- I'I ocity - or what in other theoretical frameworks is called
historical manner. " ommunity' or 'civil society' - ,is bound to become more impor-
The concept of market, for instance, has according to Polanyi r.uu again, simply as a mode of survival when the protective
two meanings: one concrete, namely the marketplace, another udistributive political structures break up (Hettne, 1990).

abstract, referring to the market system. Marketplaces are a more C ntemporary scholars in the field of IPE rarely refer to Polanyi
or less universal phenomenon, as we can learn from history and I~ a pioneer. The contributors to this book are exceptions in this

anthropology. They all operate in accordance with the same basic I. ~\:lrd. The methodology of Polanyi, and above all the historical
logic, regardless of how the society at large has chosen to institu- (III contrast to the historicist) approach, should inspire future work
III 111efield of IPE. The idea of the double movement involves
tionalize economic life. The prices of those goods that are ex-
changed on the market fluctuate according to supply and demand 111.lrethan redistributive responses. As some contributors to this
conditions, and determine the 'profits' of different commodities in I,. iok emphasize, social movements can also be seen as protective
the short run and resource allocation between the production of uu-nsures in an era of extreme market dominance.
different commodities ('investnlent') in the long run. Thus, the inclusion of civil society together with a strong
Historically, marketplaces were atypical forms of economic 1,lst rical dimension constitute important contributions by Polanyi
exchange, accountable to and restricted by political and social III IPE. In spite of its ambition to integrate the 'political' and the

controls. The c?mplete domination of societies by the market 'rrunomic', current IPE gives only a partial view of society, par-
principle, implying that land, capital and labour have also been II! ularly of societal change, \'l/e can perhaps define a New Inter-

commodified, is a recent phenomenon. Two other mechanisms of 11.1 t ional Political Economy as attempts to go beyond the state-
economic integration have existed historically: reciprocity and redistri- ru.rrker contradiction, without necessarily implying that such an
,I( .ulcrnic innovation yet exists in a distinct and homogeneous form
bution. The former refers to the socially embedded forms of
6 International Political Economy Bjo'rn Hettne 7

(Murphy and Tooze, 1991). It should be stressed that these are still vhich it gave birth was the early process of state formation. Mer-
no more than attempts, probably because to achieve the break- ( .uuilisrn can thus best be understood as the political economy of
through would necessitate the construction of a broader theoretical ,.ue-building,
foundation, a historical social science. By 'this', I mean an integrated 'file essence of ',!iberalisT' (albeit that the label was applied only
study of society as sequential historical structures, each essentially III retrospect) is a critique not only of autocratic government but

different from what went before. . (" ibe state as such. Market solutions to the problem of resource
This emerging body of thought o'Ughtto be informed by classical .rllocation are, according to the liberal view, seen as inherently

political economy, which in some respects was more complex and 'natural'; and the evolution, as well as the emerging hegemony, of
richer in content than modern political economy, not to speak of 111(' market stands out as the essence of development. However,

what is known as 'the new political economy'. The reason for this the liberal tradition, particularly in the case of major figures like
is that modern political economy is usually seen as a marriage - Allam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, contains
between political science and economics, which of course did not principally important scientific enquiries going beyond the im-

exist as specialized disciplines when classical political economy was mediate political issues of the day. I am referring to problems such
founded. IPE, for its part, is definitely something more than a ,IS tile sources of economic value and the dynamics of. economic

marriage between international economics and world politics. As .lcvelopment.

Robert Cox emphasizes in his contribution to this volume, political I~ach tradition of political economy in fact contains elements
economy is concerned with structures within which political and which transcend the particular contexts in which they took shape,
III reby assuming a more general significance. The second tradition
economic activities take place. To distinguish the political from the
I elates to the mercantilist practice, but in a new and qualitatively
economic is usually a very artificial exercise. This is also the case
with efforts to create a pure political economy. More recently, IIill crent historical context: '..h~modernization imperative, that is, the
efforts have instead been made to conceptualize a 'global political need for modern states to catch up with more advanced industrial
i ountries in order t~ avoid being eaten by them, This particular
economy' (Gill and Law, 1988; Peterson and Runyan, 1993). Since
we are dealing with a new and only partially known structure, this II)!~icforms part of the European state system. The classic conflict
conceptualization is necessarily tentative. We can assume, however, W;IS the one between Great Britain and Germany: 'cosmopolitical

that there will be a very different role for the state in this post- political economy' versus 'national political economy'. These labels
Westphalian complex, multi-level world (Cox, 1993). were used by F. List, the founder of national political economy,
which has also been labelled mercantilist or realist political economy.
'Mercantilism' is here used in a different and broader sense from
IPE in the Past when the concept first appeared. I have suggested that it can be
defined as 'the pursuit of statene_ss' (Hettne, 1993a and 1993b),
Political economy is hard to distinguish from underlying competing This implies interstate conflicts, particularly between countries with
ideologies about the organization of economic life. When it first :1 strong position in the world economy and those who try to catch

appeared as a comprehensive doctrine, political economy argued in lip. In his contribution to this book (Chapter 5), Kees van der Pijl
favour of a market-oriented economy, liberated from the statist speaks of a Hobbesian Counterpoint of contender states to the
practice which marked the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries dominant Lockeian heartland.
and which was later given the label 'mercantilism'. The historical The third tradition, Marxism, took shape as a 'Critique of Political
context of this fundamental political conflict and the doctrine to Economy', that is, as a reaction against the liberal tradition, and can
 -
8 International Political Economy Bjo'rn Hettne 9

only be understood in that context. This is because Marx did his .1 fully integrated and self-regulating world economy. ~ccording to
economic analysis largely within a Ricardian framework (which he ,I more pragmatic view, a functioning world economy would require

also tried to transcend). Its persistence can to some extent be IInnsnational 'regimes' as stabilizers in various sectors (Krasner,

explained by the ultimate demise of classical political economy, 11)82).

symbolized in the change of label from political economy to eco- Marxist International Political Economy does not really start with

nomics. The 'economic' was unlinked from the 'political' and ana- Marx, who essentially analysed capitalism as a closed system which,
lysed as a self-regulating system with a logic of its own. 'Man' 11~'lltlyor wrongly, came to be taken by many of his followers to
o

became 'economic man'. i oincide with the national economy (Brown, 1988). Its concern
All theory ultimately has to adapt to changes in the real world. with the dynamics of global capitalism came later, more precisely in
The transnationalization of economic life is one such change. This Illl' era of 'imperialism', which in this ideological perspective meant

change, underlying the whole process of globalization, has made - .ibove all inter-capitalist rivalry paving the way for the First World
many assumptions of political economy irrelevant. Political economy
\V/. r. After the Russian Revolution and the rise of a state-sane-
was consequently reborn as IPE. In the IPE context, the perspec- til mcd Marxist orthodoxy, less of theoretical interest happened as

tives associated with the three historical traditions outlined above 1.1I' :IS IPE is concerned, until the rise of structuralist, dependency
are instead related to the dynamics of a trans nationalized world Illtl world-system theories in the 1960s and the 1970s. This 'neo-

economy and its possible political frameworks. A brief description r-..1;lrxist'tradition contradicted the classic Marxist view in crucial
with a special focus on change and transformation will be given II spccts (Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984). Particularly in the form of

here. '.irld-systern theory, this approach must be said to lack the ower
Liberal International Political Economy is still the mainstream, but II' explain how the world system with its centre-periphery structure
compared to the others it has a less distinct identity, since a liberal III.IY as such be transformed. This has been pointed out by more
international economy is in principle no different from a liberal , l.issical Marxism, which for its part has been criticized for being
national economy. The liberal vision is that of ~ borderless world, t, II' deterministic, Another unorthodox tradition, with perhaps
at least as far as economic activities are concerned. The difference 11111'x11ected relevance for International Relations and IPE theory,
is quantitative, a matter of the size of the market. Most liberals I 111~'rgcd with the rediscovery of Gramsci and the so-called 'critical
were free traders, and the term 'liberalism' was in fact used by I hool' (Gill, 1993). Its closeness to the historical reality it is trying

their opponents as a rather pejorative term, suggesting lack of I', .xplain makes it more relevant also when it comes to under-
(state) control and (therefore) irresponsibility (Tooze, 1988: 12). 1.IIIIling change.

The recent breakdown of the socialist subsystem seemed to con- I?/'tllist International Political Eeono,,'.} focuses in particular on the
firm the liberal principle: the 'unnatural' sooner or later gives in to II It II In-state system and the role of international political relations
the 'natural'. Any attempt to isolate oneself from market forces is III III' organization of the world economy. In the modern context,

thus a sentence to stagnation. The optimum size of an economy 'II ,lllst' usually refers to the 'neo-realist' tradition, which acknowl-
(and therefore the ultimate form) is the world market. All other Ili\('~other actors apart from states, and other sources of power
arrangements, for instance regional trade arrangements, are only 11'.11 t from military strength. The eclectic and pragmatic approach

second best, but acceptable to the extent that they are stepping "I Ill' Realist School makes it the dynamic core in the current
stones rather than stumbling blocks to the world market. In a II. \ clopmcnt of IPE, but also the vaguest of the three traditions
fundamentalist liberal perspective, change is the transformation of (I.,IIIS, 1988: 163). It is also ambiguous in the way it deals with
an incomplete world economy still regulated by political actors into ,1,.lllgC. Changes in the state system are related to the 11owc'r
 .

10 International Political Economy Bjo'rn Hettne - II

capabilities of states, but there is no notion of transition 11"111 I" I II Iplaced with a different one), or the general inten-
Westphalian to post-Westphalian, The stress is more UPOI) (' 'II 1,1",11111' I)f cess (the striving for socialism or market
tinuity than on transformation. However, as Cox has pointed IIIII I 11,111 uistcad use the concept of transformation; more
classical realism (in contrast to nco-realism) can, due to its, II' I "II I VIII<1<)this in the Polanyi tradition, in which modern
regard for public ritual, serve the purpose of critical theory ,IS '''I II I III'111'1 ~Iood both as a result of market expansion ('the
,
In his words, 'Machiavelli's Prince appears to be addressed t () IIII 111I "'" 'II') and as the self-protection of society against th-e
powerful, to the palazzo, In effect, his work instructs the outsich I I II ,,1,1 destabilizing effects of the market ('the second

in the mechanisms of power, it enlightens the piazza' (Cox, I,)') I Iii III')

18). 1111,111
IIIV(' change in the economic and social structure of
Before we enter the current debate, it should be noted that IIII I" "I II IY t hat Polanyi called the Great Transformation was
three intellectual traditions interact, which is the reason why tll('\ JI' I '111',1'11I)y the market system and the movement - under
, , ,
can be said to form part of a single held. The liberal insisten (' ,'I I
I III I 1111111y. tile Gold Standard, and the Balance of Power
the need to maintain a reasonable efficiency through exposllr' tIl ,
I '" 'f', 1'1';1c) - towards complete dominance of this system
competition is today universally acknowledged. But this will 11,,1 IIIIIIVI principles of economic organization, that is, reci-

for long imply a complete neglect of the 'national interest'. AI IIII III' I II',IISIriliution as discussed earlier. The redistributive
same time, the main body of IPE shows an increasing openncss II) II' "11:11turbulence, suchas the welfare state, the fascist
Marxist and other heterodox ideas, as can be seen in the crnct I 1",1 II, I nmmunist state, were not compatible and therefore
gence and wide acceptance of the 'critical school' (Ashley, 19K." I II I ""I 111111(' a viable world order, nor a security order com-
Cox, for instance in this volume). It seems as if turbulence III a
II I, I" II1I 1.()llg Peace. The result was second world war; and
world politics and disorder in international relations - to a larg'l III 1",1"I I1()I:lnyi's analysis ends with a big question mark
degree than stability - calls for eclecticism and methodologic-al III' II" l'l)stwar social order. Rather than a new hegemonic
rethinking. Neither of the classical traditions really explains wily I, I111 1,11)sl likely candidate as hegemon being the USA),
changes occur (Staniland, 1985), vacillating as they do between I' I 'II' I I (1111 inued growth of market forces, he preferred a
economism and politicism. Furthermore, they largely neglect t11(' ,I, "I VIII'I(I rder, the 'order' being based on the principle
problem of development in the South, which further underlines I III ""1' 111,111ning (polanyi, 1945).
their partial and static orientation (Hettne, 1995). ,'1 III, I t xchange can only be amoral, or morally neutral, it
1'1' III' I" tilt ical regime to deal with the unintended and/or
"'I' ,I , ',IISt'llll .nces of the way in which an unregulated market
IPE and Transformation 11111'"~I) i ty also changes in accordance with the double
I" III, vlut 11means that the economy tends to be re-embedded
Judging from the current debate in IPE and International Rcl: 1',11.uloxically, even the process of becoming dis embedded
tions theory, we live in a period of 'transformation' or 'transition'. IIII" I ,I ,,~t rOllg and consciously active state. The market
In historical studies of transition from one system to another, we ,"1,'1 1111, I,ll" itself; neither can it organize society! It reflects,
have the record - that is, both the starting points and the end , II ":11I .r of the society and its particular social order,
points are known to us. In studies of contemporary 'transitions' or I I, I ,,1 1,1I,ll order,
processes of transformation, we don't know the end points. Since I J 11" I, ,11""'IS of the Polanyi tradition, among which I and
'transition' can only refer to a completed process (when one social III , "",llli'IIIIII"S to this volume count ourselves, the political,
,
12 International Political Economy Bjo'rn Hettne

redistributive logic (or the logic of the state) stands out as less 111.1welfare must, therefore, be found in transnational structures,
destructive than the anarchistic logic of the market itself (polanyi- 11I,ll r regional.
Levitt, 1990; Mendell and Salee, 1991). Apart
, . from the redistributive \X/ll:ltimages of the current transformation and implications for
response, which Polanyi perhaps overemphasized, the potential of 11.1 l uture are conveyed by post-Westphalian and other 'post-'
civil society (or, in more Polanyian terms, the principle of reci- "'11' ('I)lS? We are saying farewell to a world made up of sovereign
procity) is now increasingly discussed as a means for the powerless I III~ divided into two hostile but stable blocs which shared com-

and the poor. The fundamental p~oblem in a process of trans- I" 1111V('ly in a process of modernization, structured by a hegemonic
formation is to understand the substantive character of market '1,1"1.tile content of which was marked by American civilization.
exchange, and what possible substitutes there are in the insti- IIII what methodological conclusions can we draw? In order to
tutionalization of economic life, in the future as well as in the past Illl.I"lsland the emerging world, we must be less state-centric; we
(polanyi, 1957). . 1111'('10 understand global dynamics in the context of pluralism;
~

The supporting evidence for an ongoing transformation is the I,. V I) litics' will become 'high politics', Western civilization will
frequency with which the prefixes 'post-' and 'neo-' are added to I" III teasingly challenged, and risks as well as possibilities will
concepts which describe a particular social order. We are now 'post-' Illll(';lse.
something, whether post-Keynesian, post-Fordist, 'post-modern', A~ a holistic and interdisciplina:ry social-science aEr9achJ IPE
_ ',a .

'post-hegemonic', 'post-Westphalian', 'post-international', or 'post- I I",,'S specific problems. The combination of a large number of
Columbian'; and we need a 'neo-' something, whether 'nee-realism', 11111(" -nr types of variable, the complex interrelationship between
'neo-liberal institutionalism', 'neo-Marxism', 'neo-mercantilism', I, "I Is' of society, the emphasis on qualitative factors, and an interest
'neo-structuralism', or 'nee-idealism', in order to understand what III tructural change, all make the verification or falsification of
is going on and where we are heading' III' "I tical propositions particularly difficult. The situation is made
Let me consider one of these conceptualizations that seems , 'II more complex by the fact that we only have one international
quite useful, namely 'post-Westphalian'. First, what do we mean I" ,1111('aleconomy at a time.
by 'Westphalian'? By use of this term, Cox (personal communi- ( )11' would assume that the contending theories in IPE provide
cation) refers to the concept of an interstate system derived from I' 1111;11 insights into the basic research problem: structural changes
the principles that scholars have attributed to the peace of III 1111'international political economy. In this problem orientation,
Westphalia that concluded the Thirty Years' War in 1648: the 11'1', rornes close to what Skocpol (1984) discusses as 'historical
sovereign independence of states; each state being motivated in its "I I(Ilogy'; and at least two of her examples of leaders in this field,

international behaviour by a consistent national interest; the inter- 1'.,I,lllyi and Wallerstein, are also central to the IPE field. This
state system regulated by a balance of power among the principal 1111,1 .rlines the difficulties involved in setting scientific boundaries.
powers. There is necessarily a particular political rationality under- 'l listorical sociology' is not an adequate term. It should be noted
lying this behaviour. The West _halian rationality takes a particular ,I,.11Skocpol (1984: 4) also seems to have something more general

state as the given guarantee for security as well as welfare. What 111,111 sociology in mind:
is outside the state borders is chaos and anarchy. The disorder
and turbulence people experience today comes with the realiza- 111my view historical sociology is better understood as a continuing
ever-renewed tradition of research devoted to understanding the nature
tion that this guarantee can no longer be taken for granted. The
und effects of large-scale structures and fundamental processes of
post-Westphalian logic implies that the nation-state has lost much change.
of its usefulness and that solutions to the problems of security
 -
[4 International Political Economy Bjo'rn Hettne 1 5

Sociology adds important dimensions to the understanding of world 1IIIII implies that the very fact that US hegemony is called into
society (Robertson, 1992.; Scholte, 1993; Shaw, 1994), but like con- III'~11()nalready means a loss in hegemonic power. A hegemony is
ventional IPE it is nevertheless insufficiently

holistic. Historical social I , unsensual order which can decline as a consequence of a legiti-
science would, as suggested above, come closer to an appropriate I'll' y deficit, even if the coercive power resources as such should
designation. This is also the term chosen' by Wallerstein for the " m.iin intact. Reduction in military capability is compatible with
project of renewing social science 0X'allerstein, 1991); but of course 111.11111 .nance of a hegemonic position: to the extent that the leader-
the mere invention of a term doesnot solve our problem. Rather, 1111'role of the hegemon continues to be accepted, hegemony on
the various disciplines must simultaneously work towards the goal I1II I vel of the world order can thus be described as a form of
of a holistic understanding of global change. I have elsewhere ., '11(1governance, that is, a set of rules backed by the authority
suggested that development theory has in its own way served the (1,1,1 redibility) of the hegemon. Hegemony can be seen as a special
purpose of preparing for such a project (Hettne, 1995) - I 111< I of power, based on different but mutually supportive dimen-
The emphasis on history is essential, however. IPE deals also I,III~, fulfilling certain functions (the providing of international

with concrete historical structures: for instance, the two hegemonic "IIII(tive goods) in a larger system which lacks formal authority
global structures in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I earlier IIIIIiure, and consequently is more or less voluntarily accepted by
referred to the role of British hegemony in the Polanyian interpre- "III, I actors ..

tation of the first Great Transformation. The idea of hegemony in I'll' analysis of hegemonic structures should, however, be seen
fact appears in several traditions, but with different meanings. A I Ifirming part of a larger issue: what constitutes a world order.
brief overview, indicating the differences in approach, will have to II I :1 basic premiss for all political economists that a market, in
suffice here. 1'1111'1 to function, presupposes some kind of order, a concept which
The Theory of Hegemonic Stabili!J, pioneered by Kindleberger (1973), I '1111:tillS both coercive and consensual dimensions. Recent debate
elaborated by Gilpin (1981), and succinctly formulated by Keohane III locused on the role of hegemonic stability and, to the extent
(1980), asserts that an open world economy requires a dominant I1III this role is considered essential for the functioning of the
global power for its smooth functioning. Since the issue concerns iun-rnational economy, the implications of hegemonic decline.'
the essential nature of the postwar order, it would be unrealistic to III reased .rivalry ~nd conflic~ among capitalist countries also has
expect a consensus on how to interpret it. The interpretations vary I I,( uring on the problem of succession, that is, the question of the

from nco-realist to neo-Marxist and Gramscian. These schools I" 'II'IItial new hegemon. In a historical (and realist) perspective this
accept the importance of hegemony for the maintenance of a liberal I'I' ihlcrn has been resolved through wars (Modelski, 1978; Gilpin,
world economy, while the liberal (or 'nco-liberal institutionalist') "IK I; Kennedy, 1987), Limited wars may still serve the purpose of
position (Keohane, 1984, 1989), as well as that of most international , -,,'rting or denying hegemonic claims, particularly in the case of
economists, is that interdependence would be possible in a post- II 1',I(lnalgreat powers. However, the emerging battleground is eco-
hegemonic world through the self-interest of the trading states (the IIIIIllic competition, possibly between emerging trade blocs. Based
invisible hand applied to international economics). "II its multidimensional hegemonic power, the USA has so far
For Robert Cox (1983, 1991, and Chapter 2. of this volume), l'I"vided the rules, summed up in the Bretton Woods system, which
using hegemony in the Gramscian sense of a structure of values II,I~ onstituted the framework for economic interdependence over
and understandings, the ideological dimension of hegemonic power IIII last couple of decades. Consequently, a decline in US hegemonic
stands out as more important than the military and economic I,,)\vcr seems to imply a world governance crisis: for instance, it)
dimensions. The significance of hegemony is that it is unquestioned, ,11('form of nationalist and protectionist policies, challenging rhc

I
 International Political Economy Bjo'rn Hettne 17

existing rules of the game and making the world economy more I\, t Iward is increasing due to the regionalist trend in the world
fragmented and less stable. There is one debate on the theory of 'IIIlilly.
hegemonic stability as such, and another that deals with the issue
as to whether a case for US decline' really can be made. Both
11'1', ind the Future
propositions have been challenge~, and sometimes the two debates
are mixed up in a confusing way." Perhaps the issue has now been like social science as a whole, must also be able to tell us
overtaken by real events. It is true that
,
in absolute and even relative IIII1Illing useful about the future. As suggested by Rosenau in
terms the USA is by far the most powerful state; but, as discussed 1'1 i outribution to this volume (Chapter 3): 'A more theoretically-
above, hegemonic power is a very special kind of power. To the ",l I 1()lISpolicy-making community might have more thoroughly
extent that the USA takes upon itself the role of hegemon, it will f 11"1(I the policies needed to foster a new world order and cope
differ from the Cold War period when hegemony was exercised in II1III" new challenges it poses.' In future-oriented,IPE the crucial
a tense bipolar context and containment of communism was a : 'III' III)(1 is the following: what will a post-Westphalian and post-
major goal. What seems clear is that the will to exercise hegemonic . I,. 'I monic world order look like? Of course there is no consen-
power is markedly reduced even if the capacity has remained intact, I IIII this issue since the very notion of hegemonic stability is
which is under dispute." "1111Sled. Is it based on material power and dominance, insti-
This raises a number of important research questions, which a 1IIIf"IIS,or an intersubjective moral order? One way of classifying
future-oriented IPE has to address. Can we expect a new hegemonic I I,ll P ssible post-hegemonic scenarios currently being discussed
power to emerge? The two main candidates are Japan and the New II I1II IrE literature is to identify them on a continuum between
Europe. Neither is very self-assertive at the moment, troubled as I ., I onrrasting models of world order: global interdependence
they are by difficult adaptations and internal divisions. III1 ,I fragmented world.
The '1992 project' in Europe was a social myth, skilfully created (),tl' scenario, which may be called interdependence based on
by Jacques Delors, in order to facilitate the development of Euro- ,/II/.,II'It1iism,has a number of variants, but in all of them global-
pean competitiveness and leverage on world affairs. It was based I 1III1IIwill continue to run its course. It could, for instance, be a

on the market utopia, and neglected other relevant issues - for '" " 1I11.ral world of trading and mutually dependent nations that
instance, 'domestic' legitimacy and a capacity to solve regional crises. 1'1'1 ,III successfully found a niche in the structure of world com-
The Maastricht Treaty was meant to provide the means to handle "1,111' (Rosecrance, 1986).
these issues. The continuous democratic deficit, the very high level \ Ielated scenario is the formation of international regimes (systems
of unemployment, the failure to find a common solution to mon- II iu.magement) in specific realms (trade, oceans, finance, energy)
etary turbulence, and the unsuccessful attempts to solve the Balkan IIIII nations comply with established norms without hegemonic
crisis show how far Europe still has to go and even raise doubts 1'" xur '. Multilateral institutions would here furnish the confidence
about its capacity to ever get there. l'!' \ rously provided by the hegemon (Keohane 1984, 1989)' Such
And what about Japan: will it remain number two in a Pax """1' selective 'post-hegemonic' cooperation also relies on the self-
Americana or take a more independent global role? The latter IIII1II'~(of nation-states forming part of an open world economy on
option, more likely in a longer perspective, would mean the 1IIIII they also depend for their security and welfare. For any
accumulation of military strength and a break with the introverted I' ,'111ipant the costs of breaking the rules of a specific regime is
Japanese world-view. Alternatively, Japan will again become a 11111', Iligher than complying with them. Keohane, the best-known
regional hegemon. The pressure on Japan to decide which is the 1,1111'111,'otof this view, calls it 'neoliberal institutionalism',

I
18 International Political Economy Bjorn Hellne

International regimes do not cover all forms of international behav- I '. insofidate the structure of interdependence, however, a certain
iour and therefore imply more fragmentation than the pure multi- ,""'III( of interventionism would be needed: for instance, in the
lateral model. I IIII (I f an organized transfer of resources from rich to poor
A third scenario, more to the centre. of the continuum but , ,1111Ilies. Compared to such 'neo-Keynesianism', arguing for an
nevertheless assuming an open world economy, is some kind of 1','llsionary economic policy within the framework of a larger

tripartite division of the world into so-called 'megamarkets': North I III IIIC)reextroverted region, 'nco-mercantilism' is a more intro-
America (now organized in NAFrA), Europe (partly organized in , IIII1 f rm of the 'new regionalism', aiming at a 'region-state' and

the EU), and Pacific Asia (albeit still lacking a formal organization). v~ II nded nationalism'.
The trilateralist scenario, in which the three capitalist centres, the \ ~~reatdeal of empirical research is needed to be able to assess
USA, Western Europe and Japan, take a shared hegemonic res- I11I realism of the various scenarios, which furthermore can be
ponsibility, also assumes a more or less open world economy (Gill, "lllllillCd in different ways. The crucial issue seems to be the
1990). Here international economic institutions and multinational -

1,11,111('(' between functional and territorial principles: the universal
corporations, rather than nation-state actors, take predominance.
, "111imic interdependence between increasingly non-territorial
A more conflictual and consequently more deeply fragmented ""I'llnic actors in a completely globalized world versus neo-
variant is that of a world economy consisting of competing trading ,,1' II .intilist politicization and regionalization of the world economy
blocs, sometimes called the Triad. Depending on the gravity of (1II IIIIC, 1993a and 1993b; Hettne ' and Inotai, 1994). The future
conflict, this polarization may even indicate a transition to a more ',1111order will be shaped by the way the contradiction between
closed, regionalized world economy. III.',(' Iwo principles is resolved.
A fifth scenario is thus a more territorial type of fragmentation: 1,('1us now return to Polanyi to see whether his analysis of the
a form of regionalization of the world into more or less self-contained I ,II .11Transformation has something to tell us about the situation
blocs with stable internal structures and interregional relations. The "I Illtl~ly.Basic insights and ideas in social science remain relevant,
region as such here emerges as an actor, and one may therefore , I II if they have to be adapted to new situations. To my mind the
speak of 'extended nationalism'. " 'III('I)t of a 'regionalized world order' is just such an idea, origi-
The fragmentation may - although this is not very likely in the IIIII developed by Polanyi in an article in 1945 but rarely referred
present era of globalization - go even further towards economic I,. III the political economy literature. This was just after the
nationalism and protectionism: a regression to more classical 'mer- 1"IIIILlsion of a great war, when the eventual shape of the new
cantilism'. This would imply a breakdown of the system of inter- , ,'1111order was an open question, a situation structurally similar to
dependence, and a dramatic increase in the level of disorder and ,III one we are currently living through after the Cold War. The
decrease in the level of welfare in most regions. II A was then preparing itself for its role as the guardian of the
One emerging form of regionalization is the 'new regionalism', II11to-be-born Bretton Woods system. Polanyi warned against the
defined as a multidimensional process of regional integration which '1IIII'rentinstability of a liberal world order based on the market and
includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects (Hettne and III}',t'monic powers, and argued in favour of a regional world order
Inotai, 1994). Tile concept clearly goes far beyond the 'common '\ I111some element of planning which he considered to be a more
market' idea, that is, the interlinking of several previously more or I 1111<.: system than the various universalisms criticized in the article.
less secluded national markets into one functional economic unit. I Illl' of them, the universalized market utopia, can be compared to
Rather, the political ambition of creating territorial identity and \ 11;11today is discussed as 'globalization', particularly economic
regional coherence is the primary nee-regionalist motive. In order 1.11):tlization.
 -
20 International Political Economy Bjorn Hettne 21

If globalization is interpreted primarily as 'economic', and 111"11 -rnre level (post-Westphalianism). This may, again following
regionalization primarily as 'political', then their relationship is of I 1111\1,prevent fascism (linked to a Westphalian mentality) and
course a core issue in IPE. Polanyi's crucial question of how to I II, .freedom in a complex society' as the positive alternative to
build 'freedom in a complex society" is-more urgent and more II 'IIII'11g civilizations or urban jungles of criminal mafias, so
difficult than ever. Contrary to whit Polanyi expected (or at least I I, II), .ind usually correctly described in neo-conservative writings,

hoped for), another hegemonic order was established after the war. " wuhout a hint of what should be done.
Pax Americana was, like Pax Britannica that went before it, based

on a security order, namely the Cold War system, and an economic
order, namely the Bretton Woods system. The economic order I I,. Contributions to this Volume
permitted a long 'golden age' period of stable growth in the world
economy. The system was based upon a compromise between inter- '111"'11wanting to force the authors of this book into a particular
national free trade and domestic regulation based on Keynesianism - , "" Ilral school, it can be said that they share a normative and
- what Ruggie has termed the compromise of 'embedded liberalism' f, 'I'l', oriented approach, that they agree on the need for ontologi-
(Ruggie, 1983). Those pillars are now gone. US hegemony is de- II I II consciousness, and that all hold the view that the key to
clining, the Bretton Woods system has collapsed, and the Cold War 1",1,I I;lllding the future lies in history rather than in ahistorical
system has yet to be replaced by a viable security order. We are in II II II 1 ions. In this respect they are all sympathetic to a Polanyian
a new turbulent period of disorder, waiting for the second 'double 11'1'1.ll'I,. TI,e authors have all been associated with a research
movement' of regulation and social protection, further complicated II ',I.lllllne committed to understanding and reinterpreting the
by the issue of ecological protection. The challenges are enormous. ,,, ur.uional political economy, namely the MUNS programme
Regional cooperation as such is not a new idea, but it is now lulul.ucralism and the United Nations System) sponsored by the
possible to see the early signs of the 'new regionalism' throughout I "II, ,I Nations University. Most of the contributors participated in

the world. What, then, is the connection between the two ideas; 1,11111'day in the summer of 1993 at the University of Oslo
the 'new regionalism' and the double movement? Previously, the I "II II to new trends in International Political Economy.
self-protection of society was carried out mainly by the state, on I I,l' basic concern of the MUNS programme is to analyse the

the level of the nation-state. This is no longer possible (for small 1IIIII11SIlipbetween the changing structure of the world order
and weak states it never was); and it is my contention that the 'new ,,1,1 II'l' process of international organization, Furthermore, the
regionalism' sho~ld be seen as a manifestation of the second " 'II I I entertains the idea of a New Multilateralism, wider in scope
movement, the self-protection of society, on the level of the region, I, 'II IIICconventional concept that implies little more than politics
as a social reaction against the global market expansion which took I 111('UN General Assembly and/or equal access to the global

place in the 1980s and still is the predominant trend today, albeit 'I,ll r 'gime, The broader concept, in contrast, includes relations
increasingly questioned. I" I v . .n actors in civil society; the implications of the biosphere
In terms of Polanyi's framework, there could also be a new rise "~"~Irived as an active societal force for the human condition and
of reciprocal structures in the form of localism - local structures I, 'I political behaviour; and, above all, the possibility for global

of self-help and solidarity - as supplements to redistributive struc- '111111':11 pluralism, or what the research programme refers to as
tures in the form of regionalism. This would certainly involve a III' I II .xistence of different value systems, a 'supra-intersubjectiviry'
complex system of interacting levels, with a stronger role for IIIII would reconcile culturally distinct intersubjectivities (Cox, I993:
supranational and subnationallevels, and a diminished role for the I,) )

22 International Political Economy Bjo'rn Hettne

Robert Cox, tile intellectual father of the MUNS programme as I. I,I,! II Gill, here as in earlier works (1990, 1993), seeks ins pi-
well as of the Gramscian school in IPE, opens this volume with the I 'II III Antonio Gramsci's writings in analysing contradictions

assertion that the principal task for ~PE. today is to construct a ,. II ,~I()balizing and territorially based social forces. The quo-
fll II 11')11)Gramsci with which Gill opens the chapter might have
mental framework adequate to comprehend the profound and inter
acting structural changes that are going on, rendering the 'West- 1.1,,I :1 motto for this book: 'The old is dying, the new is being
phalian system' increasingly obsolete. The system is being replaced III II11Iill the interregnum there are many morbid symptoms.'
by a multilevel order, and structures of political authority are form- II II" vrvcr, sees the present chaos as 'organized chaos', since it
ing above and below the level of states: macro- and micro-regions, I" I" )lllls to the interest of class forces pressing for a deregulated
as well as social movements at the base of society. In order to grasp I 11,IIII,ltyorder, as expressed in neo-liberal orthodoxy. Therefore
these complex changes theory is essential, and theory can be of two I ',11,I order itself is by definition a turbulent order, and change
kinds: either its aim is to maintain the existing social order (problem III 111)1the search for order but the replacement of one order
solving theory) or to change it (critical theory). Cox, in common 111',1111'1'. J ill here uses the metaphor of the 'double movement'
with the other authors in this volume, belongs to the second cat-
III, I. II I('IICCto sociopolitical forces asserting democratic control
egory. In fact political economy, in contrast to political science and I t 11"11.11. ,ollnterhegemonic politics must, however, be redefined
economics, which deal with actors rather than structures, is critical I 11.1111 totalizing visions, whether fundamentalist or economistic.
theory. Structures, however, must be dealt with diachronically. 1 I I V,III der Pijl defines the new world order as the global-
Historical structures contain both coherence and elements of contra- II.,II "I I 11e Lockeian state/society configuration, characterized
diction, and transformation should be studied as it derives from III' I,uninance of market forces, historically challenged by a
I 1 'Hobbesian' contender ,states trying to catch up with the
these points of conflict. And in this Polanyi showed the way.
James Rosenau, in a similar vein, stresses the need for theory, a I I I III II .artland, first on the European continent, then in the
theoretical imperative even, in order to grasp what in a major work , "I 111('world. Supported by transnational elite networks, the
(Rosenau, 1990) he has called 'Turbulence in World Politics'. To I I. III) ~yslem of 'economic freedom' has triumphed; and the
I I III 1,1,tile 'second glorious revolution', or 'second great trans-
quote a passage from this book:
1111. "'1' ill Polanyi's terms, seems to be a terminal crisis of the
Of course it is conceivable that all the chaos does reflect randomness. 1IIIII.I.IIIS(ate.
Such a conclusion, however, should be based on more than impres- I' 1I11 .11.11akamoto explores the potential of global democra-
sions. At the very least, it is a conclusion that ought not to be reached
II.')1 .1",lillSt the background of the internationalization and
without first exploring the possibility that appearances are deceiving,
that all the disorder we observe is, in fact ordered, if not orderly. I 1111')II,lliz;ltionof the state. The first of these processes implies
I" I.III 11( tate power, as the forces of production are increas-
In his chapter, Rosenau further explores the tension between the I I.III.III:lC(I,whereas the latter implies a fragmentation of the
dynamics of globalization and those pressing in the opposite direc ,I II III 111(;: rise of ethnonationalism. There is a gap, he says,
tion toward fragmentation, localization and individualization. These I ., II IIII' global problematic and national democracy. These
processes are causally linked; that is, we are dealing with a specific 1.1 II1,111('people's power diffuse, unless coupled with the
phenomenon, that of 'fragmegration' (a concept combining frag- I)I til' ,t It) I a trong civil society; but, if based on critical social
mentation and integration). This idea is quite compatible with III. Ills, :1 new perspective on a democratic world order may
Polanyi's 'double movement' in its dialectical combination of II 1,1(('(1.110r this to be possible, cultural as well as civilizational
disintegrative and integrative forces. I I IIIIIIII III 11)l1Stbe rejected, and a new multilateralism based on
 International Political Economy Bjo'rn Hettne

cultural pluralism created. Thus, Sakamoto puts his faith in the I 'I'he literature on hegemonic decline and its consequences contains
'reciprocity' type of response. Ilrl, " III theoretical perspectives and, consequently, different scenarios as
I I I II,e post-hegemonic world is concerned. Normally the transition
To conclude on an optimistic note, it should be noted that,
I I.', I between two hegemonic systems is, as Modelski (1973) and Gilpin
although all the authors in this volume conceive current trends - I I I) 1,:1ve emphasized, marked by warfare. Authors on the left tend to

globalization - in the international political economy as rather "I" 11,1.: more apocalyptic forecasts: if war can be avoided, hegemonic
distressing, their contributions are not at all gloomy. Cox, in em- I ,I"", nt least signals a collapse of capitalism (Block, 1977; Mandel, 1974;
phasizing also the importance o~, cultural dimensions of a post- ,II, I srein, 1979)' Liberal authors, on the other hand (Rosecrance, 1986),
, r vubstitute in an international trading system consisting of a number
hegemonic world order, speaks of' a global 'supra-intersubjectivity'
I n.ruons realizing that they can better advance their position through
providing a bridge across the subjectivities of different coexisting
"""'Ilic development and trade than through recourse to war. Con-
(and internally transforming) civilizations. This is the vision of post- , IIIV. authors feel uncomfortable with the concept and its implications
hegemonic global pluralism. Rosenau says that to allow for the " I IS power (Huntington, 1988). Joseph Nye argues that the USA is
possibility that we may presently be at a turning point in history _ I "",,1 10 lead, but due to what he calls 'complex interdependence' a very

is to give ourselves licence to exercise control over our future. Gill
I'" 1.,1 type of leadership is needed (Nye, 1990). The more multidimen-
"'" ,I II,e way hegemonic power is defined, the more difficult it is to
cites Gramsci's political maxim 'pessimism of the intelligence,

'I v, I tile question about rise or decline in precise quantitative terms.

optimism of the will' and concludes by observing that not all the II ,1111\' may characterize one dimension and not another. It is, therefore,
symptoms that arise during the interregnum are morbid ones. Van "" I, .11' at what point it is appropriate to 'talk of 'after hegemony' (Gill and
der Pijl points to the 'non-elites', and Sakamoto to popular forces I ", ,,)88: 336).
of global democratization, the 'power of the powerless', while my I A forum for the more mainstream debate is the journal International
own analysis in this Introduction has pointed to new forms of I', (10). See, for instance, the following articles: J.G. Ruggie, 'Inter-
Illi'\.(/liol'
"III"lill Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the
transnational redistributive polities as well as protective local reci- I , I v.ir Economic Order', 10, 36, 1982: 379-41); A.A. Stein, 'The
procity networks, for correcting the dislocations of market II. ,'I III n's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International
utopianism. The international political economy of disorder is also I '1lllllllic Order', 10, 38, 1984: 3) )-86; B. Russett, 'The Mysterious Case
the international political economy of the future. I Vunishing Hegemony, or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?', 10, 39 (2), 198):
, \I; S. Strange, 'Protectionism and World Politics', 10, 39, 198): 233-
I j I), nidal, 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory', 10, 39, 198):
'J (, '4; S, Strange, 'The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony', 10, 41 (4):
Notes II' ',I, 1987. On the whole, International Organization is essential reading if
"" wishes to understand the intellectual origins of mainstream IPE
1. Some widely used textbooks are Gilpin, 1987; Strange, 1988; Gill and 111'1,11y and Tooze, 1991: 4), For the current debate, the UK-based Review
Law, 1988; Spero, 1990; Murphy and Tooze, 1991; Frieden and Lake, 1991; tntrrnational Political EconoH!), should be consulted.
Stubbs and Underhill, 1994. The list of references appended to this intro- I, Paul Kennedy (1987) explicitly avoids theorizing and provides a
duction also contains a general bibliography with a more comprehensive 1,1 "lllcal account of the rise and fall of great powers. He studies the relation-
list of relevant IPE literature. 1II1Ibetween economic depression and military strength and finds that
2. To a large extent the ideas of 'post-conditions' overlap. The 'modern I" f',I'lllonicdecline is related to what he calls 'imperial overstretch', Follow-
condition' in terms of International Relations theory is the system of ter- "'I' ,I ritical review of 'declinist literature', the conservative theorist Samuel
ritorial states; 'modern territoriality' (Ruggie, 1993) is the Westphalian system l lunrington (1988: 77) concludes: 'The image of renewal is far closer to the
and the expansion of Europe - the Columbian age. On the other hand, the uu-rican truth then the image of decadence purveyed by the declinists.'
'neo-equipment', with the help of which we are supposed to understand I" (Ilh Nye (1990) argues that the United States remains the dominant
the new condition, reflect the same old ideological battlefield. After the I" ,\1,1('1' with no challenger to its position in sight. However, the nature of
hegemony of neo-realism it is time for a neo-idealist revival (Kegley, 1993) I" '\1,1('1' itself has changed as the world has become more interdependent.
 ,
International Political Economy Bjorn Hettne 27
Susan Strange (1988) emphasizes structural power, defined through four (II and D.P. Levine (1992) Theories of Poliitical Economy, Cam-
I ", ) 1\.,
mensions: security, production, finance and knowledge; and concludes thut I I " l lnivcrsity Press, New York.
the USA retains its position as the leading power in all four dimensions. III I \ (I <;83) 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations. An
particular she criticizes the idea that 'Ma~e in, USA' should be t~ken as an I II"1'1Method', MillenniufJl, vol. 12, no. 2 (Summer), pp. 162-75.
indicator of power. 'What matters is the relation between the United States (1,)H7) Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making
as a state with political authority and 'the corporations operating in and 11,1(,,/ Y. Columbia University Press, New York.
outside the United States' (1988: 237). Bruce Russett (1985) similarly makes ( 11)1)I) Perspectiveson Multilateralism, United Nations University, Tokyo.
a distinction between power base and ,control over outcomes, and concedes US (I ')1)3)'Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for
decline only in the former. Using the Gramscian concept of hegemony, I III''III', in S. Gill, ed., Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International
Robert Cox from the 'critical school' of IPE asserts (1987) that the USA /"""'/1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
may well remain dominant, but still lose hegemonic power. TIle very fact (11)<)4)'The Crisis in World Order and the Challenge to Inter-
that US hegemony is called in question indicates a weakening of the ideo 11111"1.11 Organization', Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 99-113.
logical dimensions of hegemony. Stephen Gill (1990) finds the debate too I"l, ) 1\., and D.A. Lake (1991) International Political Economy. Perspectives
nation-centred and emphasizes the internationalization of the USA, and II 1,1"I",II)ollJer and Wealth, Unwin Hyman, London.
the Americanization of the World: the emergence of a transnational II , (11)90)American Hegemorry and the Trilateral Commission, Cambridge
economy, which in later works he calls the global politial economy. I 1ll\,ll~ily Press, Cambridge.
III ,1,1. (1993) Gramsci, Historical MaterialisfJl and International Relations,
I 11111'li(lge University Press, Cambridge.
II '"llltl D. Law (1988) The Global Political Economy. Perspectives, Problems
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