Estrada v. City 1531-CC00465 Post Judgment Order
Estrada v. City 1531-CC00465 Post Judgment Order
Estrada v. City 1531-CC00465 Post Judgment Order
Attorneys Fees, Litigation Costs and Promotion or Other Equitable Relief. Plaintiff has
filed suggestions in support of his motions, and Defendant has filed suggestions in
opposition to Plaintiffs motions. In addition the Court has heard the capable argument
The Court now grants Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Judgment to Include
Attorneys Fees and Litigation Costs, and denies Plaintiffs Motion for Promotion or
Plaintiffs application for attorneys fees and costs was presented to the Court and
consideration of the evidence presented, and the law applicable to the issues, the Court
award of $120,554.34. The Court will issue an Amended Judgment to reflect this
The parties have each capably briefed the law pertaining to the award of post-
judgment attorneys fees, and it would serve no ultimate purpose for the Court to repeat
that in this context. In short, Missouri law provides that a court may award court costs
and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. Section 213.111.2 RSMo.
Plaintiff claims that he is the prevailing party and that he is entitled to a post-
judgment award of attorney fees. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff is the prevailing
Resources, 300 S.W.3d 518 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2009) A prevailing party is one that
succeeds on any significant issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefit the
In consideration of a just fee that should be awarded, the Court must use its own
addition the Court considers a number of factors in the analysis of a reasonable attorney
fee, including: 1) the rates customarily charged by the attorneys involved in the case and
by other attorneys in the community for similar services; 2) the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation; 3) the nature and character of the services
rendered; 4) the degree of professional ability required; 5) the nature and importance of
the subject matter; 6) the amount involved or the result obtained; and 7) the vigor of
the opposition. See Gilliland v. Mo. Athletic Club, 273 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. banc
2009).
The Court, having considered the detailed time records of Plaintiffs attorneys,
the affidavits of Plaintiffs attorneys, the affidavit of [another] local attorney with
expertise in employment litigation and the Courts own observation of the pre-trial and
trial work of Plaintiffs counsel finds as follows: 1) The rate charged by Plaintiffs
counsel, while perhaps higher than that charged by counsel for Defendant, was in fact
contingent on an uncertain outcome. The rate is similarly slightly higher than what may
be charged by experienced attorneys in the immediate venue of the case. However, the
Court finds it not unreasonable that Plaintiff would seek counsel out of the immediate
locale in effort to pursue this litigation against this particular employer. Therefore, the
Court finds the rate charged by Plaintiffs counsel is reasonable in all respects; 2) The
number of hours charged by Plaintiffs counsel is reasonable in all respects, with the
exception of travel time discussed below; 3) The nature and character of the service
provided Plaintiff by his counsel was superior in all respects and evidenced by an
not previously known to the Court, are nonetheless experienced and capable in the
handling and trial of employment cases; 5) The Court is satisfied the nature of Plaintiffs
claims are important, and the jurys verdict in his favor merely confirms that conclusion;
6) The result obtained on behalf of Plaintiff was based on the jurys evaluation of
Plaintiffs special and general damages and presumably was awarded in an amount so as
to fully compensate Plaintiff for his damages; and 7) The attorneys for the Defendant are
experienced, skilled, capable, and did vigorously represent and defend Defendant in
response to all aspects of Plaintiffs claims. Based on this analysis, the Court does not
$2,321.34. Defendant has suggested that the fee award sought is excessive based on,
inter alia, excessive number of hours expended, excessive hourly rate, limited skill level
required, limited damage award and excessive billing. The Court has carefully reviewed
the billing records of Plaintiffs counsel in light of the analysis of Defendant. While the
Court is generally satisfied as analyzed above, the Court does remove travel time from
the hours billed at the full rate as that activity does not merit the skilled billing
component. In addition, the Court is mindful that a substantial portion of the Plaintiffs
effort was in pursuit of persuading the jury that the Defendant should be responsible for
punitive or exemplary damages. Plaintiff did not prevail on that claim. Therefore some
After removing the travel time (admittedly somewhat difficult as the time records
were not kept for this purpose, 36 hours at $400; and 12 hours at $375) and reducing
the remaining statement by 10% based on the punitive damage issue, the Court will
$2,321.34.00.
In addition to the compensatory damages awarded by the jury, and the post-
judgment award of attorneys fees and expenses to be awarded by the Court, Plaintiff
suggests to the Court that it [has] [should exercise] equitable power to order Defendant
to promote Plaintiff in rank [from current rank of corporal to the higher rank of
sergeant.] In addition, or in alternative to, the request for promotion, Plaintiff suggests
the Court exercise its equitable power to order Defendant to award Plaintiff front pay
(calculated as the difference between sergeant pay and corporal pay for the applicable
period) and additional pension benefits that would have accrued had Plaintiff been
Each of these equitable requests are based upon Plaintiffs conclusion stated in
It is clear from the jurys verdict that plaintiff was denied a promotion
This Court can draw no such clarity or conclusion from the jurys verdict. Simply
put, given the state of the law in Missouri, the jury was not asked whether or not
Plaintiff should have been promoted. Nor was the jury asked whether or not, absent his
race, Plaintiff would have been promoted. Nor was the jury asked whether or not
The only query made of the jury was to determine whether or not Plaintiffs race
was a contributing factor in such failure to promote. See: Instruction No. 6. Plaintiff
was free to, and did argue to the jury, and properly so, that his race need only have
contributed in the smallest amount in the decision not to promote in order for him to
obtain a verdict. Plaintiff was never required to persuade the jury that had it not been
for his race he would have been promoted, nor was the jury required to make such a
finding.
Given the law as submitted to the jury [the Court does not suggest the jury was
not properly instructed in compliance with MAI] it is perhaps equally likely that the jury
concluded that the Defendants decision not to promote Plaintiff was entirely proper
based on all the circumstances then under consideration, but that indeed his race
contributed in some [small] manner. Without doubt the Court cannot know what was in
the mind of the jury when they considered the evidence, applied the law, and rendered
the verdict. Neither can the Court purport to grant equitable relief based on a
This Court must conclude, and be guided by the proposition that the jury applied
the law they were given and did in fact award Plaintiff such sum as they believed would
fairly and justly compensate him for any damages they believe Plaintiff sustained and is
reasonably certain to sustain in the future as a direct result of the occurrence mentioned
6/12/2017
Dated: _________ _______________________
Michael J. Cordonnier, Circuit Judge
Greene County Circuit Court, Div. 1