SALVADOR ATIZADO G.R. No.

173822
and SALVADOR MONREAL,
Petitioners, Present:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

BRION,
-versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF Promulgated:
THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. October 13, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon, convicted the
petitioners of murder.[1] On December 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed their
conviction in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, but modified the awarded damages.[2]

The petitioners contest the CAs affirmance of their conviction in this appeal via petition
for review on certiorari.

We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal
because the RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate his minority at the time of the commission
of the crime. We order his immediate release from prison because he already served his
sentence, as hereby modified. Also, we add to the damages to which the heirs of the victim
were entitled in order to accord with the prevailing law and jurisprudence.

Antecedents

On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally charged
the petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder through the following
information, to wit:

That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Boga, Municipality
of Castilla, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without any justifiable
 cause or motive, with intent to kill, armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot
one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla, Sorsogon,
thereby inflicting upon him mortal and serious wounds which directly caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on November 7,
[4]
1994, the trial ensued.

The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major Saadra Gani
(Major Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Llona (Lawrence), and
Herminia Llona (Herminia).

Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona), her
common-law husband, had attended the fiesta of Barangay Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon; that
at about 8 pm of that date, they had gone to the house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the
same barangay; that as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva), a barangay kagawad of the place, were
seated in the sala of Desders house, she heard thundering steps as if people were running and
then two successive gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body
of Llona; that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, thats enough!;
that while aiding Llona, she heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the direction of
the clicking sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving backwards and
simultaneously adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the
shooting; that she rushed to the house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to
report the shooting; and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona to a hospital where Llona was
pronounced dead.[5]

Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May 18,
1994,[6] based on the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Teodisio R. Dino, Jr. of the Municipal
Trial Court in Castilla, Sorsogon.

Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back that
penetrated his spinal column, liver, and abdomen.[7]

Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent P30,000.00 for the funeral
expenses of Llona.[8]
Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for the Defense
were Monreal, Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph Lorenzana (Lorenzana),
Jesalva, and Lagonsing.

The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, Atizado had
been in his family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,
Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had been in the
house of a certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon drinking gin; that
the petitioners and Danilo had not been recognized to be at the crime scene during the shooting
of Llona; and that the petitioners had been implicated only because of their being employed
by their uncle Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.
As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted Danilo, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador

Atizado and Salvador Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with
the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court hereby sentences each of the
accused to an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Rogelio
Llona the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines currency, in
solidum, as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as
actual expenses and to pay the cost.

Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the

crime charged and he being a detention prisoner, his immediate release from the
provincial jail is hereby ordered, unless he is charged of other lawful cause or
causes.

Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be

credited in full in the service of their sentence.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The Court referred the petitioners direct appeal to the CA pursuant to People v.
Mateo.[10]

On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accused-

appellants Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered to suffer
the imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, they are ordered to pay the
heirs of Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) P30,000.00 as actual damages; and (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[11]

After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration,[12] the petitioners now appeal.

Issue
 The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them guilty of murder
beyond reasonable doubt based on the eyewitness testimony of Mirandilla despite her not
being a credible witness; that some circumstances rendered Mirandillas testimony unreliable,
namely: (a) she had failed to identify them as the assailants of Llona, because she had not
actually witnessed them shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely assumed that they had been the
assailants from the fact that they had worked for Lorenzana, the supposed mastermind; (c) the
autopsy report stated that Llona had been shot from a distance, not at close range, contrary to
Mirandillas claim; (d) Mirandillas testimony was contrary to human experience; and (e)
Mirandillas account was inconsistent with that of Jesalvas.

Ruling

The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the penalty

imposed on Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of damages as civil liability.

I.
Factual findings of the RTC and CA
are accorded respect

The RTC and CAs conclusions were based on Mirandillas positive identification of the
petitioners as the malefactors and on her description of the acts of each of them made during
her court testimony on March 6, 1995,[13] viz:

q Who were you saying we sat together?

a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my 5 years old child to sleep.

q Can you demonstrate or described before this Honorable Court the size of the
sala and the house you wherein (sic)?
a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.

q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the relative position, the sitting
arrangement of yours, Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.
a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on my lap, then Kdg. Llona was
infront of me, I was at the right side of Kdg. Llona

q How about Kdg. Jesalva?

a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Llona was facing the door
in otherwords, the door was at his back.

q Was the door open?

a Yes, sir.
q Was the door immediately found Rather was this the main door of the house?
a That was the main door leading to the porch of the house.
q And from the porch is the main stairs already?
a Yes, sir.

q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you said you have finished
assisting the persons in Bongga about the program, ... after that, what were
you doing then?
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was fanning my child.

q How about Kgd. Jesalva?

a His head was stopping (sic) because of his drunkenness.

q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on that situation, if there
was any incident that happened?
a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they were running and there
were successive shots.

q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive shots can you see the origin
or who was responsible for the shots?
a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and saw Salvador Atizado.

q Who is this Salvador Atizado?

a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona.

q Can you be able to identify him?

a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked of his name
answered Salvador Atizado.)

q So when you heard the shots, who was actually shot?

a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I saw Kgd. Llona sliding
downward.

q Then after that what happened?

a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons responsible stop thats enough,
and I gave assistance to Kgd. Llona.

q Then after that what happened?

a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I heard three (3) clicks of the
trigger of the gun.

q Then what did you do when you heard that?

a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw this Salvador Monreal
but at that time I do not know his name.

q Then what did you see of him?

a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward and he was adjusting the
cylinder of the gun.
 q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3) clicks of the gun, can you see
where the gun was pointed at?
a It was pointed towards me.

q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually fired towards you?
a Yes, sir.

q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal, can you still recognize
this man?
a Yes, sir.

q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in Court?

a Yes, sir.

q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder?

a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench and tap the shoulder of
the person, the person tapped by the witness answered to the name Salvador
Monreal.)

q You said, when you stood up and face with him while he was adjusting his
revolver and he was moving backward, did you see other persons as his
companion, if any?
a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw this Atizado he was already
on the process of leaving the place.

q Who is the first name of this Atizado?

a Danilo Atizado

q And did they actually leave the place at that moment?

a Salvador Monreal was the one left.

Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA. Indeed, Mirandillas
positive identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on what each of the
petitioners did when they mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt
whatsoever that they had conspired to kill and had done so with treachery.

It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial judges
evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of the witness testimony is accorded the highest
respect because the trial judges unique opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the
witness enables him to determine whether the witness is telling the truth or not. [14] Such
evaluation, when affirmed by the CA, is binding on the Court unless facts or circumstances of
weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would
materially affect the disposition of the case.[15] We thus apply the rule, considering that the
petitioners have not called attention to and proved any overlooked, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted circumstance. Fortifying the application of the rule is that Mirandillas positive
declarations on the identities of the assailants prevailed over the petitioners denials
and alibi.[16]

Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[17] Yet, the State did not have
to prove the petitioners previous agreement to commit the murder,[18] because their conspiracy
was deduced from the mode and manner in which they had perpetrated their criminal
act.[19] They had acted in concert in assaulting Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a
community of purpose and design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the conspirators in a
crime are liable as co-principals.[20] Thus, they cannot now successfully assail their conviction
as co-principals in murder.

Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:

Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of

armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons
to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of

a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding

paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of

the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party
might make.[21] For treachery to be attendant, the means, method, or form of execution must
be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offenders. [22] Moreover, treachery must be
present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.[23]
 The CA held that Mirandillas testimonial narrative sufficiently established that
treachery attended the attack o[n] the victim because Atizados shooting the victim at the latters
back had been intended to ensure the execution of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreals
conspiracy to kill the victim was proved by their presence at the scene of the crime each armed
with a handgun that they had fired except that Monreals handgun did not fire.[24]

We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners mounted their
deadly assault with suddenness and without the victim being aware of its imminence. Neither
an altercation between the victim and the assailants had preceded the assault, nor had the
victim provoked the assault in the slightest. The assailants had designed their assault to be
swift and unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of the opportunity to defend
himself.[25] Such manner constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack that ensured
their unhampered execution of the crime.

II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal
and of the Civil Damages

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA
correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable
with Article 63 (2) of the RPC.[26] But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for
Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did
not appreciate Monreals minority at the time of the commission of the murder probably
because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.

Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the
crime was committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed on June 30
1994 stated that he was 17 years of age.[27] Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest
mentioned that he was 17 years old at the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994.[28] Thirdly,
Villafes affidavit dated June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a minor on the date of the
incident.[29] Fourthly, as RTCs minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed,[30] Monreal
was 22 years old when he testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999,[31] which meant
that he was not over 18 years of age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla
described Monreal as a teenager and young looking at the time of the incident.[32]

The foregoing showing of Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed
with the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, also known as
the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,[33] viz:
 Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall
enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child
in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or
older. The age of a child may be determined from the childs birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of
these documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the
child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child,
it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to
the filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary
proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall
decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate
pleadings of all interested parties.

If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is
pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the
age of the child in the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on
the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other

government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of
the child in conflict with the law.

Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,[34] when the offender is over 15 and under 18
years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article
61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to
death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the
range of the penalty of imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its
periods, as the minimum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the maximum
period. Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision
mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal,
as the maximum period.

Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May
18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreals detention should be
credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344,[35] the
revision of the penalty now warrants his immediate release from the penitentiary.

In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted under
Republic Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor offenders through
programs and services, such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation
and re-integration, geared towards their development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as
a convict serving his sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides:
 Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the
time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen
(18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under
this Act or other applicable laws.

Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the surviving heirs
of Llona. Their solidary civil liability arising from the commission of the crime
stands,[36] despite the reduction of Monreals penalty. But we must reform the awards of
damages in order to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The CA granted only P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. We hold
that the amounts for death indemnity and moral damages should each be raised to P75,000.00
to accord with prevailing case law;[37] and that exemplary damages of P30,000.00 due to the
attendance of treachery should be further awarded,[38] to accord with the pronouncement
in People v. Catubig,[39] to wit:

The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as

it breaches the social order and other upon the private victim as it causes personal
sufferings, each of which, is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of
heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores
the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the
criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages,
however is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal,
the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to
the civil liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case,
an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is upheld for being supported by the record.

WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005 promulgated
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the following modifications:
 (a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty from six years
and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day
of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period;

(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to immediately
release Salvador Monreal due to his having fully served the penalty imposed on him, unless
he is being held for other lawful causes; and

(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the heirs of Roger
L. Llona P75,000.00 as death indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P30,000.00 as actual damages.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal service. The Director of Bureau
of Corrections shall report to this Court the action he has taken on this decision within five
days from service.

SO ORDERED.
[1]
Original records, pp. 357-364 (Criminal Case No. 94-3653).
[2]
Rollo, pp. 18-36; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes and Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring.
[3]
Original records, pp. 20-23.
[4]
Id. pp. 55-56.
[5]
TSN, March 6, 1995, pp. 2-14.
[6]
TSN, February 22, 1995, p. 8.
[7]
TSN, February 20, 1995, pp. 2-4.
[8]
TSN, January 9, 1995; February 22, 1995, p. 22.
[9]
Supra, note 1, p. 364.
[10]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[11]
Rollo, p. 36.
[12]
Id., p. 43.
[13]
At pp. 5-10.
[14]
People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 173309, January 23, 2007, 512 SCRA 385, 392.
[15]
People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184958, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 280, 293; People
v. Gerasta, G.R. No. 176981, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 503, 512.
[16]
See People v. Magdaraog, G.R. No. 151251, May 19, 2004, 428 SCRA 529, 531.
[17]
Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
[18]
People v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 105992, February 1, 1955, 241 SCRA 28.
[19]
People v. Factao, G.R. No. 12566, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 38.
[20]
People v. Peralta, No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759, 776-777; People v.
Pablo, G.R. Nos. 120394-97, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA 79.
[21]
Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code.
[22]
People v. Punzalan, No. L-54562, August 6, 1982, 153 SCRA 1, 2.
[23]
People v. Sayaboc, G.R. No. 147201, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 659, 660; People v.
Cajurao, G.R. No. 122767, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 207, 208; People v. Guillermo, G.R.
No. 147786, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 326, 328.
[24]
CA Rollo, pp. 163-165.
[25]
People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 122746, January 29, 1999, 302 SCRA 380, 382.
[26]
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxx
[27]
Original records, pp. 28-29.
[28]
TSN, February 22, 1995, p. 8.
[29]
Original records, p. 30.
[30]
Id., p. 338.
[31]
TSN, March 9, 1999, p. 1.
[32]
TSN, March 28, 1995, pp. 50-51.
[33]
The law was enacted on April 28, 2006 and took effect on May 20, 2006.
[34]
Article 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of
the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from
liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary
penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law
for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
[35]
Section 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. The child in conflict with the law shall be
credited in the services of his of his/her sentence with the full time spent in actual commitment
and detention under this Act.
[36]
Sections 6, 38 and 39 of RA No. 9344.
[37]
People v. Arbalate, G.R. No. 183457, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 239, 255; People v.
Satonero, G.R. No. 186233, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 769.
[38]
Id.
[39]
G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621.