Values in Political Science: The Concept of Allocation

Author(s): J. S. Sorzano
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Feb., 1977), pp. 24-40
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
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 Values
in
Political Science:
The Concept
of
Allocation

J. S. SORZANO

DESPITE THE GROWING ACCEPTANCE of the thesis that political sci-

ence is necesarily a value-laden discipline' two of its central aspects
have received surprisingly little detailed analysis. There is, first, a
need to determine the precise manner in which values are unavoid-
ably introduced into political science.2 And, secondly, there is the
further task of explicitly identifying which values are built into the
study of politics.3

' The literature on the topic of a value-free science of politics is voluminous,

but Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (University of Chicago Press, 1953),
and Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (University of Chicago Press,
1952) are two well-known and vocal critics of a value-neutral political science.
More recently, the value-ladeness of political science has also been discussed by,
among others, Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science" in Laslett and
Runciman, eds., Politics, Philosophy and Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1967) and W. Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness," Polity, (Fall, 1973).
For a statement of the opposite view see F. Oppenheim, "'Facts' and 'Values'
in Politics: Are They Separable?" Political Theory, 1 (February 1973).
2 Oppenheim has, for instance, complained about the vagueness of Taylor's
claim that normative principles are "secreted" by explanatory theories of poli-
tics. "'Facts' and 'Values' in Politics," 65.
3 Bruce E. Wright has recently stated that "if, indeed, political scientists are
coming to recognize that the study of politics is necessarily value-laden, we

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THE ALLOCATION OF VALUES 25

This paper explores these interrelated questions through a de-

tailed examination of David Easton's conception of politics as "the
authoritative allocation of values for a society."' This procedure
may be justified both on methodological and on substantive grounds.
Methodologically it seems more profitable to avoid a general dis-
cussion of these issues at an abstract level and to concentrate in-
stead on an in-depth analysis of the latent evaluations present in
the empirical work of a particular political scientist In this light
the selection of Easton's definition of politics for purposes of illustra-
tion presents several substantive advantages. Since, for instance,
it is advanced as a descriptive or non-evaluative definition, it pre-
sents a suitable test case for the proposition concerning the value-
ladeness of empirical political science.5 Moreover, partly as a re-
sult of political scientists having freely borrowed his definitions and

must come to examine explicitly the normative principles that are assumed in
the very concept of politics itself." "A Cognitivist Program for Normative
Political Theory," The Journal of Politics, 36, (August 1974), 682.
4David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political
Science (New York: Knopf, 1953), 129. (Hereinafter referred to as Political
System). There is a growing number of commentaries evaluating different
aspects of Easton's theoretical work. For a useful bibliography see his "Systems
Analysis and its Classical Critics," The Political Science Reviewer, 3, (Fall
1973), 300-301. Among these, however, only a few have been primarily devoted
to a discussion of Easton's definition of the political. Criticisms of the definition
have commonly centered around the ambiguities involved in the notions of
"authoritative" and of "society." On the former see F. M. Frohock, "Notes
on the Concept of Politics: Weber, Easton, Strauss," Journal of Politics, 36,
(May 1974), 379-408; and M. Evans, "Notes on David Easton's Model of the
Political System," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 8, (July 1970),
and on the latter see E. Miller, "David Easton's Political Theory," The Political
Science Reviewer, 1, (Fall 1971), 184-235. I wish, therefore, to set these two
concepts aside and to focus instead on the various ramifications of the relatively
less discussed notion of "allocation." (W. C. Mitchell's "Politics as the Alloca-
tion of Values: A Critique," Ethics, 71 (Jan. 1974), 79-89, is to my knowledge,
the only extended discussion of the term although Frohock's previously cited
essay also discusses some of its aspects.)
5 This should not be taken to imply that Easton necessarily upholds the
broader view of political science as a value-free enterprise. The point is that
his definition is intended to be descriptive and that in terms of evaluative
content it is quite different from, say, Bernard Crick's conception of politics.
In Defense of Politics (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964).
6 As Michael Evans notes: "Easton's definition of the political appears to
have become common coinage among political scientists and even social an-
thropologists. Only rarely has doubt been expressed. We are much more likely

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 26 nMT JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 39, 1977

partly because Easton's view of politics forms part of the

allocationist tradition in political science,7 the conclusions
here, while obviously not capable of being extended to th
of political science will, nevertheless, have applicability we
Easton's work.

THE AUTHORITATIVE ALLOCATION OF VALUES

Over twenty years ago in his influential The Political System,

Easton assessed-and found wanting-several alternative ap-
proaches which sought to identify the most general and character-
istic properties of political life. The details of the specific reserva-
tions and criticisms leveled by Easton against these various orienting
principles do not concern us here. Suffice it to say that he found
the existing conceptions either too restrictive (the concept of the
state), too narrow (the concept of power), or too broad (Harold
D. Lasswell's allocationist outlook).8 Evaluation of these ap-
proaches suggested to Easton the most promising manner of de-
veloping an alternative notion of the political capable both of trans-
cending the limitations of the existing approaches and of serving as
the keystone for a general theory of politics. His efforts in that
direction bring us to Easton's identification of the distinctive prop-
erty of the political.
The scarcity of valued things provides Easton with his initial
premise in the effort to develop a generic conception of politics with
universal applicability. According to him, "The fundamental fact
confronting all societies is that scarcity of some valued things pre-
vail. It leads inevitably to disputes over their allocation."9 The po-
tential for conflict created by scarcity is such that "without the provi-
sion for some means of deciding among competing claims to limited
values the society would be rent by constant strife." Consequently,
every society provides some mechanism, however rudimentary, for

to find the definition recommended to us." "Notes on David Easton's Model,"

118.
7 See W. C. Mitchell's "Politics as the Allocation of Values" for a discussion
of the "major postulates" of the allocative approach to politics predominant
in American political science.
8 Political System, 106-124.
9 David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1965), 53. (Hereinafter referred to as Framework).

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THE ALLOCATION OF VALUES 27

"deciding who is to get what there is of the desirable things."

Given this inevitability of disputes over allocations, politics becomes
a universal characteristic of communal living transcending cultural
as well as historical parameters. Indeed, Easton claims that some
form of allocative process is not only "unavoidable" but is a "mini-
mum prerequisite" of any society as well.10
Having identified the presumably universal need for allocations,
Easton proceeded to narrow it down to manageable proportions by
linking it to the authoritative factor. The authoritative element in
some allocations is required because not all disputes over alloca-
tions can be solved through some customary process of private
negotiations. When such disputes are not or cannot be solved
privately to the satisfaction of the parties involved, then an authori-
tative allocation having the backing and sanction of society is
sought. It is precisely this authoritative or binding character of
some allocations which distinguishes the political from other areas
of social interaction and which enables Easton to circumscribe the
scope of the political world. In this manner he concluded that
"the property of a social act that informs it with a political aspect
is the act's relation to the authoritative allocation of values for a
society."""

MARKET-PLACE POLITICS

Does this conception provide a generic conception of the political

having universal applicability? Clearly Easton thinks so. He, for
instance, states that the authoritative allocation of values is a task
which "must be faced by all political systems regardless of time or
place, from the most democratic to the most dictatorial, from the
most primitive to the most industrialized, from the most traditional
to the most modern."12 The evidence, however, seems to indicate
that rather than delineating the contours of the political in its
broadest sense, his definition depicts a specific and by no means
universal form of political activity best identified as "market-place
politics." This characterization seems quite appropriate because
it both accurately describes the form of politics involved, and points

10 Political System, 136-137.

"Political System, 134.
12 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1965), 14. (Hereinafter referred to as Systems Analysis).

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 28 nTH JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 39, 1977

to the intellectual ancestry of the allocative conception of t

cal process. The conception of the political process as the
tative allocation of values makes use of several concepts w
central to traditional economic analysis.'3 Useful as they m
these concepts possess an inherent logic and entail assump
corollaries which reduce their utility as the foundation for
description of the political.
The economic notion of allocation is part and parcel of a
interdependent propositions concerning human behavior a
nature of economic goods. First, there is an underlying ass
about human nature. Every individual is regarded as a homo
oeconomicus motivated by an almost insatiable desire to maximize
his wealth. Following Harold D. Lasswell's usage I shall refer to
this assumption as the maximization postulate.14 The second and
implicit proposition can be inferred from the maximization postu-
late. It assumes the existence of a value consensus among the eco-
nomic actors given their unanimous agreement concerning the de-
sirability of wealth. Thirdly, it also assumes that wealth is a scarce
resource. In other words, at any given time the amount of wealth
available for distribution is fixed in the sense of being a "limited pie"
and consequently it is not abundant enough to distribute to every-
one's entire satisfaction. Finally, the combination of the maximiza-
tion postulate with the assumption of scarcity necessarily leads to
conflict (or competition) among economic actors.
The nature of this conflict is important. It is a dispute not about
what is valuable but about how to distribute something which all
value but which is not sufficiently abundant to satisfy individual de-
sires. Economic conflict comes about precisely because the actors

13 Mitchell, "Politics as the Allocation of Values," and P. Leslie, "General

Theory in Political Science: A Critique of Easton's Systems Analysis," British
Journal of Political Science, 2 (April 1972) 155-171. It should be noted, how-
ever, that Easton has more than once emphatically denied (e.g., Framework, xi-
xii and Systems Analysis, 477) any connection between his conception of politics
and traditional economic analysis and has suggested that any similarities be-
tween the two are largely coincidental. I have elsewhere argued that comparing
Easton's model with that of Adam Smith reveals that the similarities between
the two are too extensive and important to be the result of mere coincidence.
"David Easton and the Invisible Hand" American Political Science Review,
69 (March, 1975), 91-106.
14 Harold Lasswell & Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites
(Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), 7.

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THE ALLOCATION OF VALUES 29

unanimously desire the same scarce value. Consensus on the de-

sirability of a particular value is a precondition for conflict over its
allocation. If actors were not similarly motivated to maximize the
same value neither conflict, nor scarcity, nor allocation would occur.
Easton's understanding of political conflict as a dispute over the
allocation of scarce values also includes an unstated assumption re-
garding the actors' agreement on what is to be deemed valuable.
The conception of political conflict which emerges out of the au-
thoritative allocation of values is essentially a dispute over who is
to get what in any on-going or proposed division of the commonly
desired goods. It is, as Easton states, a dispute to decide "who is
to get what there is of the desirable things."'5 As such it seems to
be an unduly restrictive conception of the scope of political con-
flict. It does not suggest that such political disputes do not exist
or are not frequently encountered. The problem is that such a
restrictive conception of political conflict undermines Easton's claim
to have identified the political in its most inclusive sense because it
excludes another important type of political dispute.
Frequently political conflict focuses on which value (s) ought to be
preferred rather than how to allocate a commonly desired value.
This points to the existence of a not entirely uncommon form of
political dispute which is essentially different from, and not included
within, the Eastonian type of allocationist conflict. Conflicting
actors do not always or necessarily ask, "How large is my share?"
They also may and do ask, "What shall we in this society regard as
valuable?" Parties to this latter type of conflict disagree not about
how to increase or protect their holdings of a given good, but as
Easton has more recently phrased it, over "alternative conceptions
of the good political life."16
Underneath the failure to include disputes over differing norma-
tive views of the desirable lies the particular definition of value em-
ployed by Easton which deserves closer scrutiny. Values may be
identified with "norms" (the standards or principles for determining
"the desirable.") In this sense they are the "criteria which men
apply in deciding which things shall be preferred above others or
which courses of conduct may be excluded entirely from the range

15 Political System, 137.

16 David Easton, "Continuities in Political Analysis: Behavioralism and Post-
Behavioralism," in Epilogue to the Second Edition of the Political System
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 363.

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30 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 39, 1977

of the 'permissible' choice as they consider how they shall act. ""7
On the other hand, values are often identified with an individuals
"goals." The essential feature of this approach is that it defines
values operationally as 'the desired." In this sense "value is a syno-
nym for the desired."'8 The distinction is often conceived as the
difference between what an actor actually desires, and the standards
for determining the worth of these desires. Although not necessarily
mutually exclusive these definitions are not coextensive or inter-
changeable.
Commentators'9 have previously noted that Easton is not entirely
consistent in his use of the term "value," and that he equates it with
several different and even contradictory meanings. Yet, the evi-
dence suggests that he leans in the direction of the "values-as-the-
desired" definition. Thus, for example, in The Political System he
broadly identifies values with the desired.20 The decisive considera-
tion which allows us to select among his several usages is that the
definition of value as "the desired" is congruent with Easton's con-
ception of the allocative function of the political process. It is,
however, precisely this preference for the definition of values as
"the desired" which limits his capacity to regard disputes over
normative principles as a source of political conflicts. By sub-
stituting the relevant terms, the criterion of the political becomes
"the authoritative allocation of the desired." Once phrased in this
manner, it reveals the implicit assumption of the existence of a con-
sensus on what is desired.21

17 Philip JacobW and James Flink, "Values and their Function in Decision
Making," The American Behavioral Scientist, 5, (May 1962) (Supplement), 20.
18 Vernon Van Dyke International Politics (2nd. Edition, New York: Ap-
pleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), 4.
19 Eugene Miller has noted that "Easton uses the term 'value' to apply, vari-
ously, to a person's desires, his sentiments of approval or disapproval, his
principles or ideals and his statements. . . . As we have seen, Easton defines
political science as the study of the authoritative allocation of values for a
society. Values in this sense are goods that serve as the objects of human de-
sires, i.e., 'valued things.'" "David Easton's Political Theory," 212.
20 Political System, 221-222.
21 It should be noted that my point is not that Easton himself believes that
political systems are characterized by the existence of consensus on the desired.
In fact, he explicitly denies it. (Systems Analysis, 196ff). Rather, I am sug-
gesting that the logic inherent in the concept of allocation implicitly leads
Easton to hold positions which he explicitly denies elsewhere.

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THE ALLOCATION OF VALUES 31

I do not mean to suggest that Easton's works include no discus-

sion of conflict over what is desirable. His discussion of the "Re-
gime" as an object of support is but one instance in which he pro-
vides a detailed description of various kinds of conflict over norma-
tive principles.22 But these are an entirely different kind of political
conflict which cannot be readily reduced to, subsumed under or
equated with Easton's allocationist sort of conflict, and thus are not
included within his definition. Take, for instance, the often en-
countered conflict over what he calls "Regime Norms." These norms
are "the general conceptions about right and wrong ways of behav-
ing in political life."23 While it is undeniable that the resolution
one way or another of a conflict over the rightful way to behave
politically may decisively affect the outcome of the allocative proc-
ess, it is a gross over-simplification as well as a glossing over of
significant distinctions to claim that a conflict over the right or
wrong way to behave politically is really a conflict over who gets
what.24
To summarize, partly due to its reliance on the concepts of
scarcity and allocation, and partly as a result of a particular defini-
tion of value it employs, Easton's view of the political is unable to
incorporate political disputes over normative principles. The "au-
thoritative allocation of values" turns out not to be as inclusive a
notion of the political as is sometmes believed. There is, however,
still another difficulty associated with Easton's view of the political.

THE SCARCITY OF VALUES

The proposition that values are scarce is an essential ingredient

of Easton's views on conflict, allocation, and, as a matter of fact, of
his conception of the political process as a whole. Yet, although
William C. Mitchell asked over a decade ago whether it makes sense
to think of values in terms of scarcity,25 this assumption has re-
mained largely unexamined.

22 Systems Analysis, 190-211.

23 Ibid., 201.
24 This is, of course, not to deny that notions of the desirable when translated
into social arrangements have allocationist consequences. The two cannot be
separated but neither should they be confused. Indeed, only by maintaining
the distinction can we take seriously the normative factor in politics.
25 "Politics as the Allocation of Values," 83.

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 32 TEI JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 39, 1977

First it is necessary to determine what is meant

fortunately, Easton uses the concept without spec
meaning. Easton's silence, however, need not be a decisive ob-
stacle in establishing the meaning of scarcity within his framework.
We can proceed indirectly by asking, "What qualities must a value
have to create the conditions for disputes over its allocations?" In
this manner, by analyzing its interdependence with the notions of
conflict and allocations we can obtain a reasonably accurate estimate
of its meaning. A convenient manner of achieving this is to examine
the relatively better-known aspects of the concept of scarcity within
its economic context.
In economic analysis wealth is a scarce value. This means that
at any given time the supply of wealth is limited. In the short run
wealth is a fixed resource. The concept of scarcity, therefore, initi-
ally connotes the fact that the amount of a particular value, good, or
commodity is limited, at least temporarily. Note that in this sense,
other desired things such as knowledge26 can be regarded as scarce
since it may be assumed that at any given time the amount of knowl-
edge in the world is also limited. Yet, in and of itself, this first
characteristic implied by the concept of scarcity is insufficient to
account both for economic conflict and for the need to allocate
wealth. These are occasioned by a second element included within
the notion of scarcity. In other words, besides connoting limited
quantity, scarcity also implies that the value in question has what
we may call a "competitive" characteristic.27 The meaning of this
second element is graphically illustrated by the conventional meta-
phor of the economic pie. According to this familiar metaphor,
whichever slice of economic resources is allocated to one actor can-
not be allocated to another, and in addition, an increase in the por-

26 I am using "knowledge" in the illustration because it must be considered

a value under the definition of values as "the desired." Furthermore, Harold
D. Lasswell, whose allocationist notion of politics deeply influenced Easton,
includes "Enlightenment" (i.e., the giving and receiving of information) in his
list of ends pursued by political actors (World Revolutionary Elites, 8). Las-
swell, however, recognizes that some values may not be scarce (he calls them
"pluralistic" and/or "stratified"), thus suggesting that not all values need to
be allocated. Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society:
A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950),
58.
27 I am following Lasswell's depiction of "wealth" as a "competitive" value.
Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society, 58.

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 THE ALLOCATION OF VALUES 33

tion allocated to any one actor must correspondingly decrease the

amount available for distribution among the rest of the group.28
Note that in this second sense our previous characterization of
knowledge as a scarce value must be abandoned since two or more
individuals not only can simultaneously increase their knowledge
but they can do so without decreasing the amount of knowledge
available to other actors. It is clear that knowledge is not a value
which needs to be allocated since increasing a person's share does
not decrease the amount available to others. For the same reason
it also is evident that it cannot lead to conflicts over its distribution.
This suggests that only if two actors cannot simultaneously possess
and/or maximize the same value does a situation of conflict over its
allocation arise. To be conceived as a scarce value leading to allo-
cative conflict a value must not only be in limited supply, but must
display the required competitive characteristic as well. It is the
combination of these two traits in a value which leads individuals
to dispute its allocation.
The fact that "knowledge" does not meet the required conditions
of scarcity alerts us to the possibility that not all values need
be scarce and prompts the following question, "Which values does
Easton conceive as being scarce and thus in need of allocation
through the political process?" Easton's answer is, at best, rather
sketchy. It certainly is less fully developed than one would wish.
Although often broadly referring to "competing claims to limited
values"; "scarce social and economic values"; and scarce "goods both

28 It is sometimes objected that scarcity is intrinsically dependent upon

limited supply and "that this conceptualization does not provide for the possi-
bility that production gains may rule out losses or denials. The total pie may
be enlarged, thus making possible the assignment of goods and services without
anyone being denied anything." (Frohock, "Notes on the Concept of Politics,"
387). Professor Frohock is right in claiming that whether there are losses or
denials depends on the reference point used. In the allocation of a newly
enlarged pie an actor may have lost in terms of his relative share of the pie,
but he may well have increased his holdings in absolute terms. On the other
hand, even if we assume an enlarged pie, when distribution comes about, the
larger an individual's share the smaller the amount available for distribution
among the rest of the group. It is in this sense that "losses or denials" are
present regardless of the size of the pie. See Simon Kuznets' "Parts and Wholes
in Economics" in Parts and Wholes, ed., Daniel Lerner (New York: Free Press,
1963), 49, and J. S. Chipman, "The Nature and Meaning of Equilibrium in
Economic Theory," in Functionalism in the Social Sciences edited by Don
Martindale, 1965, 43.

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 34 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 39, 1977

spiritual and material";29 seldom does he narrow his focus

tify precisely which values are scarce. It appears that
deliberate move on Easton's part for he expresses doub
whether any universal list of substantive ends could ever
strued."30 Granted that an exhaustive list of scarce values
necessary and perhaps even impossible to compile, the issu
central to Easton's entire approach that we would expect hi
it more than passing attention. In the few instances in
Easton does enumerate values he mentions "prestige,"
"power," "status," and "recognition," among others.3' Quit
from any doubts concerning the representativeness of th
values as a sample of things allocated by the political proc
the issue of their presumed scarcity. Besides "wealth" and
power" it is at least questionable whether the other val
the conditions of scarcity. Whether or not they do largely
how these values are conceptualized. At the very least,
we can say that it is not entirely self-evident how such in
values as "status," "recognition" and "prestige" meet the com
requirement inherent in the concept of scarcity.32 This is
suggest that these values cannot be made scarce by operat
them in specific ways. But Easton seems to have taken for
the scarcity of values and has neglected to clarify this mos
mental assumption of his proposed definition of politics.
One possible way of conferring scarcity on intangible va
to operationalize them in terms of the material means or r
which must be employed in their pursuit.33 Thus, for
while "knowledge" does not manifest the required scarcity
by concentrating on the means of resources most conduci
attainment (say, institutions of higher learning), we may
of it as providing the grounds for conflicts over its alloca
other words, given the limited number of slots in any insti
learning, demands for admission lead to conflict over the a

29 Political System, 137, 135; Systems Analysis, 247.

30 Systems Analysis, 356.
31 Ibid., 356 and "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems
Politics, 9, (April 1957) 387.
32 Mitchell, "Politics as the Allocation of Values," 83.
33 This is, for instance, the approach used by Talcott Parsons. Talcott Par-
sons and E. Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper,
1962), 197-201.

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THE ALLOCATION OF VALUES 35

of the available positions. There is evidence to suggest that Easton

is not entirely unaware of this procedure for he sometimes refers
to scarce "resources" as the sort of things allocated by authoritative
outputs.34 If, however, Easton is assuming that non-scarce values
may be regarded as scarce by taking into consideration the material
resources necessary to attain them, then he has not made this point
sufficiently clear.
The procedure of converting non-scarce values into scarce ones
by taking into consideration the material resources necessary to at-
tain them reinforces the conclusion suggested by our previous dis-
cussion regarding the scope and nature of political conflict yielded
by Easton's definition. That is, one result of operationalizing the
scarcity of values in this fashion is that it leads to a conception of
the political process which is remarkably similar to the traditional
vision of the economic process. Both allocate scarce resources, only
the respective institutional means are different. While it is unde-
niable that much distribution of scarce resources is accomplished
through the political process, it is less certain whether the view of
the function of politics as essentially a process for the allocation of
scarce material resources is an exhaustive one. As previously sug-
gested, politics is often concerned with ideals and with questions of
a normative order which seem incapable of being reduced to the
allocation of scarce material resources.
The concept of Allocation, then, plays a double role within Eas-
ton's definition. It plays the vital role of accounting for both the
existence of the allocative type of political conflict and the alleg-
edly universal need for authoritative decisions. In this capacity it
is clearly the keystone of Easton's broader theoretical framework
and it is difficult to conceive how it could be removed without
drastically altering the whole structure. On the other hand, the
concept of allocation cannot be adequately understood in isolation
given its entanglement in a web of other concepts, assumptions and
propositions. Its intimate interdependence with the notion of scar-
city and, especially, with the assumption of consensus about what
is desired diminishes the utility of the concept of allocation as a
foundation for a generic description of the political. By requiring
a consensus on the desired as a necessary pre-condition for political
conflict Easton's view of politics systematically excludes another

34 Systems Analysis, 269, 355, 448, 449.

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36 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 39, 1977

type of conflict-a dispute over alternative normati

of the desirable-traditionally regarded as political. In this sense
Easton's claim to have isolated the political at its most comprehen-
sive level can only be maintained by equating conflict over what
essentially are "bread-and-butter" issues with all kinds of political
conflicts.85

SOME IMPLICATIONS

Given the many ramifications of the concept of allocation it is not

surprising that it also has important normative implications. These
do not result in direct recommendations of particular political sys-
tems, institutions, or practices. Instead, they are produced by arti-
ficially narrowing the range of possible political alternatives.
Take, for instance, the implication which flows from the be-
havioral pattern assumed by the definition. Easton claims that
maximizing individuals will inevitably quarrel over the allocation of
scarce values.36 Granted that this maximizing, quarreling form of
behavior is a common phenomenon in politics, yet, it is by no means
the only kind of behavior encountered in the political arena. Peace-
ful cooperation, for example, readily comes to mind as another sort
of activity also observed in political life. This exclusive preference
for one type of behavior becomes a source of normative implications
because it involves Easton in implicitly favoring some institutional
arrangements over alternative ones. Classical thinkers as well as
contemporary political scientists have persuasively argued that dif-
ferent behavioral patterns provide the basis of different political
systems and that, consequently, a specific behavioral pattern is not
equally compatible with all sorts of political institutions.37 By as-

35 It might be worth noting that Easton's view of politics bears a strong

resemblance to, and may have been derived from, the type of politics which
traditionally has predominated in the United States. Thus, Paul Roazen has
noted that in American politics, "The controversies tend to be less about rival
ideas of how one ought to live and more about questions of loaves and fishes,"
which is not too different, if it differs at all, from the Eastonian conception of
politics. Freud: Political and Social Thought (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1968), 31.
36 See above, footnote 9, and Framework, 53.
37 Machiavelli, for instance, argued that different types of behavior were to
be found at the respective foundations of principalities and republics and main-
tained that the latter form of government was only possible when the citizens

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THE ALLOCATION OF VALUES 37

suming a particular form of political behavior, the definition indi-

rectly favors those political systems which are compatible with such
behavior, and implicitly rules out from the range of viable political
systems those based on divergent behavioral foundations. Given
this dependence of political structures on specific patterns of be-
havior it is doubtful whether, say, an institutional complex requiring
peaceful collaboration among individuals could successfully func-
tion on the "Hobbesian" behavioral foundations presupposed by the
Eastonian definition.38 On this point, therefore, the definition's
normative impact comes not so much through specific directives as
through the exclusion of possible institutional alternatives.
The definition's assumption concerning the ends or goals of in-
dividual political activities is another source of normative implica-
tions. Easton suggests that individual actors engage in political ac-
tion aiming to increase their share of a given value.89 In a well-
known essay, Christian Bay40 referred to this sort of political be-
havior as "pseudo-politics" and sought to delineate its hidden norma-
tive premises by contrasting it with a type of political activity which
is oriented towards the public welfare. Bay's distinction concerning
the different aims of individual political behavior was familiar to the
Greek political philosophers who, while acknowledging the existence
of the politics of "private interests," insisted on the possibility and
desirability of engaging in political action to promote the common
good. This early vision of a political process aimed at the common

had virtue . Likewise, Almond and Verba have identified three different kinds
of behavior, the parochial, subject and participant and have suggested that each
of these would be most congruent with, respectively, a traditional political
structure, a centralized authoritarian structure, and a democratic political
structure. The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965), 20.
38 The pattern of behavior implied by Easton's definition brings to mind
Hobbes' homo politicos constantly in conflict with his fellow men since "if any
two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they
become enemies; and in their way to their End ... they endeavour to destroy,
or subdue one another." Leviathan (New York: E. P. Dutton Co.), 102. This
similarity between the patterns of behavior assumed by Easton and those pre-
supposed by Hobbes' theory has been noticed by M. Weinstein in his Syste-
matic Political Theory (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.,
1971), 7-11.
- 39 Systems Analysis, 363-364.
40 Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some
Behavioral Literature," American Political Science Review, 59 (March 1965).

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38 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 39, 1977

good has retained its strong appeal until the present day, yet, its very
possibility is thrown into question by Easton's assumption that actors
engage in political activities to secure or enlarge their private shares
of given values. Presented as a plausible empirical proposition, the
assumption has, nevertheless, a normative effect by disregarding, if
not wholly ignoring, a possible type of political action ranked by
many as the most desirable of all.
The Eastonian definition also yields a restrictive conception of the
function of politics. That allocation or distribution is an important
function of politics cannot, of course, be denied, but it is not the only
possible one, and perhaps not even the most important one. The
history of political thought is, in fact, full of instances in which other
significant functions have been identified or advocated. These in-
clude the attainment of justice, the setting of societal goals, the
enhancement of the moral character of the citizens, the promotion of
their happiness, the development of the individual personality, the
attainment of national power and many others too numerous and
well-known to mention. While the allocative function characteristic
of Eastonian politics may be conducive to the performance of some
of these other functions, it becomes a likely source of normative im-
plications once we regard it either as the sole or pre-eminent func-
tion of politics. This may be illustrated by contrasting the institu-
tional means required for the performance of the allocative function
with, say, those whose primary aim is the inculcation of moral virtue
in the citizens.41 By preferring allocation over moral education we
are led to prefer institutions such as those of liberal democracy over
those, for instance, of Plato's Republic. That is a legitimate choice
and one which many of us will want to make, but the point remains
that the Eastonian definition leads us to prefer some political ar-
rangements over others.
This brings us to a final implication of Easton's definition. His
claim that the authoritative allocation of values is a minimal pre-

41 Henry B. Veatch has remarked that "most of us nowadays are inclined

to assume that the purpose and function of the state is to make available to us
various so-called external goods, hopefully in ever increasing amounts, and so to
provide us with an ever higher and higher standard of living. But not so
Aristotle, for his constant message is that the aim of the state is not so much
to provide men with goods as to make them good men. And by 'good' Aristotle
means 'morally good'...." Arotle (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1974), 120.

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 THE ALLOCATION OF VALUES 39

requisite of any society questions at least the effectiveness if not the

possibility of the political arrangements preferred by the Anarchistic
tradition and those advocated by classical laissez-faire liberals.42 The
former wish to have a free association among autonomous individ-
uals without the need of hierarchical binding decisions while the
latter prefer that the function of allocation be performed not by the
political system but by the market mechanism. Moreover, although
much depends on how we interpret Engel's famous theory of the
"withering away of the state," if we accept the conventional inter-
pretation, it seems that Easton's insistence on the need for binding
political decisions is also at odds with the Marxist prediction of a
future society in which the "government of persons" would be re-
placed by the "administration of things."43 In this fashion, by ex-
clusion rather than by specific directives, Easton's definition once
again favors some political structures in comparison to others.
Interestingly, these consequences which seem to flow from the
definition when it is considered in isolation are minimized or even
neutralized by some of the other theoretical components of Easton's
broader framework. The implications of either an individual con-
stantly quarreling with his fellow men, or the egoistic political actor
selfishly pursuing his own private interests regardless of the public
welfare are offset by Easton's insistence on the restraining function
of cultural norms and the importance of political socialization in de-
termining the ends and means likely to be adopted by an individual.
It is possible that a given mode of political socialization and cultural
context could produce altruistic individuals strongly motivated to
cooperate with their fellow men in the pursuit of common aims. It
is clear, however, that under such conditions much of the descriptive
power of the definition as it now stands would be lost.

CONCLUSION

From its inception systematic thought about politics has had an

architectonic thrust. It has been concerned with determining dif-
fering ways in which social relationshps can be arranged and has
passed judgments on the desirability of these alternatives. This

42 Political System, 136.

43 The Marxist conception of the good society can be interpreted as lacking
"politics," and Easton's view of the inevitability of allocative conflict would
preclude such a possibility.

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40 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 39, 1977

architectonic function, however, is eroded when the choice of basic

ingredients-the building blocs-out of which the alternative so-
cietal arrangements can be constructed is artificially reduced. It
is mostly in this manner that Easton's definition loses its neutrality.
The seemingly straightforward conception of politics as the au-
thoritative allocation of values conceals a welter of assumptions con-
cerning the nature of political patterns of behavior, the scope of
political conflict, the ends of political action, the function of politics
and the ineradicable need for binding political decisions. On each
of these issues the definition directs us to take a given stance when,
in fact, more than a single alternative is open to us. The number
and kinds of possible political worlds are thus unrealistically and un-
necessarily reduced.
I have also suggested that despite the fact that the concept of
allocation is to be found at the root of these normative implications,
they are offset by some of the other elements within Easton's broader
explanatory framework. A complex explanatory framework, in
other words, need not yield a set of mutually consistent values. It
may, instead, yield several and perhaps even contradictory norma-
tive positions. Consequently it is not only misleading to speak of
the normative implication of a given theory, but it is also extremely
difficult to stipulate precisely what these may be.
Finally, I have shown that Easton's definition of the political is less
comprehensive than he would have us believe. Indeed, not only
does it lack comprehensiveness, but the elements excluded from the
definition are not negligible. That is to say, Easton's idea of the
political is flawed to the extent that due to its own internal logic,
it is compelled to assume the existence of a consensus on the desired;
to stress the allocation of material resources; and to down-play dis-
putes over alternative normative conceptions of the way political
actors ought to act. This last characteristic seems an especially
critical shortcoming in light of Easton's recent declaration that in
the age of the "post-behavioral revolution" special attention should
be paid to the normative dimension of political life.44

44Easton "Continuities in Political Analysis," 357-364.

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