From Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo (1985)

By Emmanuel Levinas
Trans. Richard A. Cohen

Chapter Seven relation to another thing. Here, to the contrary, the

face is meaning all by itself. You are you. In this
The Face sense one can say that the face is not "seen". It is
what cannot become a content, which your thought
Ph.N.: In Totality and Infinity you speak at great would embrace; it is uncontainable, it leads you
length of the face . It is one of your frequent themes. beyond. It is in this that the signification of the face
What does this phenomenology of the face, that is, makes it escape from being, as a correlate of a
this analysis of what happens when I look at the knowing. Vision, to the contrary, is a search for
Other face to face, consist in and what is its purpose? adequation; it is what par excellence absorbs being.
But the relation to the face is straightaway ethical.
E.L.: I do not know if one can speak of a The face is what one cannot kill, or at least it is that
"phenomenology" of the face, since phenomenology whose meaning consists in saying: "thou shalt not
describes what appears. So, too, I wonder if one can kill." Murder, it is true, is a banal fact: one can kill
speak of a look turned toward the face, for the look is the Other; the ethical exigency is not an ontological
knowledge, perception. I think rather that access to necessity. The prohibition against killing does not
the face is straightaway ethical. You turn yourself render murder impossible, even if the authority of
toward the Other as toward an object when you see a the prohibition is maintained in the bad conscience
nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can describe about the accomplished evil - malignancy of evil. It
them. The best way of encountering the Other is not also appears in the Scriptures, to which the
even to notice the color of his eyes! When one humanity of man is exposed inasmuch as it is
observes the color of the eyes one is not in social engaged in the world. But to speak truly, the
relationship with the Other. The relation with the appearance in being of these ''ethical peculiarities''
face can surely be dominated by perception, but what the humanity of man is a rupture of being. It is
is specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to significant, even if being resumes and recovers
that. There is first the very uprightness of the face, itself.
its upright exposure, without defense. The skin of the
face is that which stays most naked, most destitute. It Ph.N.: The Other is face; but the Other, equally,
is the most naked, though with a decent nudity. It is speaks to me and I speak to him. Is not human
the most destitute also: there is an essential poverty discourse another way of breaking what you call
in the face; the proof of this is that one tries to mask "totality" ?
this poverty by putting on poses, by taking on a
countenance. The face is exposed, menaced, as if E.L.: Certainly. Face and discourse are tied.
inviting us to an act of violence At the same time, the The face speaks. It speaks, it is in this that it renders
face is what forbids us to kill. possible and begins all discourse. I have just refused
the notion of vision to describe the authentic
Ph.N.: War stories tell us in fact that it is relationship with the Other; it is discourse and, more
difficult to kill someone who looks straight at you. exactly, response or responsibility which is this
authentic relationship.
E.L.: The face is signification, and signification
without context. I mean that the Other, in the Ph.N.: But since the ethical relationship is beyond
rectitude of his face, is not a character within a knowledge, and, on the other hand, it is
context. Ordinarily one is a "character": a professor authentically assumed through discourse, it is thus
at the Sorbonne, a Supreme Court justice, son of that discourse itself is not something of the order of
so-and-so, everything that is in one's passport, the knowledge?
manner of dressing, of presenting oneself. And all
signification in the usual sense of the term is relative E.L.: In discourse I have always distinguished,
to such a context: the meaning of something is in its in fact, between the saying and the said. That the
saying must bear a said is a necessity of the same necessary to weigh, to think, to judge, in comparing
order as that which imposes a society with laws, the incomparable. The interpersonal relation I
institutions and social relations. But the saying is the establish with the Other, I must also establish with
fact that before the face I do not simply remain there other men; it is thus a necessity to moderate this
contemplating it, I respond to it. The saying is a way privilege of the Other; from whence comes justice.
of greeting the Other, but to greet the Other is Justice, exercised through institutions, which are
already to answer for him. It is difficult to be silent in inevitable, must always be held in check by the
someone's presence: this difficulty has its ultimate initial interpersonal relation.
foundation in this signification proper to the saying,
whatever is the said. It is necessary to speak of Ph.N.: The crucial experience is thus here in
something, of the rain and fine weather, no matter your metaphysics: that which permits escaping
what, but to speak, to respond to him and already to Heidegger's ontology as an ontology of the Neutral,
answer for him. an ontology without morals. Is it starting from this
ethical experience that you construct an "ethics"?
Ph.N.: In the face of the Other you say there is For it follows, ethics is made up of rules; it is
an "elevation," a "height." The Other is higher than necessary to establish these rules?
I am. What do you mean by that?
E.L.: My task does not consist in constructing
E.L. The first word of the face is the "Thou shalt not ethics; I only try to find its meaning. In fact I do not
kill. It is an order. There is a commandment believe that all philosophy should be programmatic.
in the appearance of the face, as if a master It is Husserl above all who brought up the idea of a
spoke to me. However, at the same time, the face of program of philosophy. One can without doubt
the Other is destitute; it is the poor for whom I can do construct an ethics in function of what I have just
all and to whom I owe all And me, whoever I said, but this is not my own theme.
may be, but as a "first person," I am he who finds the
resources to respond to the call. Ph.N.: Can you specify in what this discovery
of ethics in the face breaks with the philosophies of
Ph.N.: One is tempted to say to you: yes, in totality?
certain cases. But in other cases, to the contrary, the
encounter with the Other occurs in the mode of E.L. : Absolute knowledge, such as it has been
violence, hate and disdain. sought, promised or recommended by philosophy, is
a thought of the Equal. Being is embraced in the
E.L.: To be sure. But I think that whatever the truth. Even if the truth is considered as never
motivation which explains this inversion, the analysis definitive, there is a promise of a more complete and
of the face such as I have just made, with the mastery adequate truth. Without doubt, the finite being that
of the Other and his poverty, with my submission we are cannot in the final account complete the task
and my wealth, is primary. It is the presupposed in of knowledge; but in the limit where this task is
all human relationships . If it were not that, we would accomplished, it consists in making the other
not even say, before an open door, "After you, sir!" It become the Same. On the other hand, the idea of the
is an original "After you, sir!" that I have tried to Infinite implies a thought of the Unequal. I start
describe. You have spoken of the passion of hate. I from the Cartesian idea of the Infinite, where the
feared a much graver objection: How is it that one ideatum of this idea, that is, what this idea aims at,
can punish and repress? How is it that there is is infinitely greater than the very act through which
justice? I answer that it is the fact of the multiplicity one thinks it. There is a disproportion between the
of men and the presence of someone else next to the act and that to which the act gives access. for
Other, which condition the laws and establish justice. Descartes, this is one of the proofs of God's
If I am alone with the Other, I owe him everything; existence: thought cannot produce something which
but there is someone else. Do I know what my exceeds thought; this something had to be put into
neighbor is in relation to someone else? Do I know if us. One must thus admit to an infinite God who has
someone else has an understanding with him or his put the idea of the Infinite into us. But it is not the
victim? Who is my neighbor? It is consequently proof Descartes sought that interests me here. I am
thinking here of the astonishment at this dis- E.L.: In describing the face positively, and not
proportion between what he calls the "objective merely negatively. You recall what we said: meeting
reality" and the "formal reality" of the idea of God, of the face is not of the order of pure and simple
the very paradox so anti-Greek of an idea "put" perception, of the intentionality which goes toward
into me, even though Socrates taught us that it is adequation. Positively, we will say that since the
impossible to put an idea into a thought without it Other looks at me, I am responsible for him, without
already having been found there. Now, in the face even haying taken on responsibilities in his regard;
such as I describe its approach, is produced the same his responsibility is incumbent on me. It is
exceeding of the act by that to which it leads. In the responsibility that goes beyond what I do. Usually,
access to the face there is certainly also an access to one is responsible for what one does oneself. I say,
the idea of God. In Descartes, the idea of the Infinite in Otherwise than Being, that responsibility is
remains a theoretical idea, a contemplation, a initially a for the Other. This means that I am
knowledge. For my part, I think that the relation to responsible for his very responsibility.
the Infinite is not a knowledge, but a Desire. I have
tried to describe the difference between Desire and Ph.N.: What in this responsibility for the Other
need by the fact that Desire cannot be satisfied; that defines the structure of subjectivity?
Desire in some way nourishes itself on its own
hungers and is augmented by its satisfaction; that E.L.: Responsibility in fact is not a simple
Desire is like a thought which thinks more than it attribute of subjectivity, as if the latter already
thinks, or more than what it thinks. It is a paradoxical existed in itself, before the ethical relationship.
structure, without doubt, but one which is no more so Subjectivity is not for itself; it is, once again,
than this presence of the Infinite in a finite act. initially for another. In the book, the proximity of
the Other is presented as the fact that the Other is
not simply close to me in space, or close like a
parent, but he approaches me essentially insofar as I
Chapter Eight feel myself insofar as I am responsible for him.
It is a structure that in nowise resembles the
Responsibility for the Other intentional relation which in knowledge attaches us
to the object to no matter what object, be it a
Ph.N.: In your last great book published, Otherwise human object. Proximity does not revert to this
than Being or Beyond Essence, you speak of moral intentionality; in particular it does not revert to the
responsibility. Husserl had already spoken of fact that the Other is known to me.
responsibility, but of a responsibility for the truth;
Heidegger had spoken of authenticity; as for yourself, Ph.N.: I can know someone to perfection, but
what do you understand by responsibility? this knowledge will never by itself be a proximity?

E.L.: In this book I speak of responsibility as E.L.: No. The tie with the Other is knotted
the essential, primary and fundamental structure of only as responsibility, this moreover, whether
subjectivity. For I describe subjectivity in ethical accepted or refused, whether knowing or not
terms. Ethics, here, does not supplement a preceding knowing how to assume it, whether able or unable to
existential base; the very node of the subjective is do something concrete for the Other. To say: here I
knotted in ethics understood as responsibility. am [me voici].1 To do something for the Other. To
I understand responsibility as responsibility for give. To be a human spirit, that's it. The incarnation
the Other, thus as responsibility for what is not my of human subjectivity guarantees its spirituality (I
deed, or for what does not even matter to me; or do not see what angels could give one another or
which precisely does matter to me, is met by me as
face.
1
Ph.N.: How, having discovered the Other in his face, Cf., Genesis 22:1, 7 and 11, and Isaiah 6:8, for
Hineni. Also, cf., Emmanuel Levinas, "God and
does one discover him as he to whom one is re-
Philosophy," in Philosophy Today, Vol. XXII, no. 2,
sponsible? Summer 1978, pp. 127-145. [Tr. note]
how they could help one another). Dia-chrony before E.L.: I have previously said elsewhere I do
all dialogue: I analyze the inter-human relationship as not like mentioning it for it should be completed by
if, in proximity with the Other beyond the image I other considerations that I am responsible for the
myself make of the other man his face, the persecutions that I undergo. But only me! My "close
expressive in the Other (and the whole human body is relations" or "my people" are already the others and,
in this sense more or less face), were what ordains me for them, I demand justice.
to serve him. I employ this extreme formulation. The
face orders and ordains me. Its signification is an Ph.N.: You go that far!
order signified. To be precise, if the face signifies an
order in my regard, this is not in the manner in which E.L.: Since I am responsible even for the Other's
an ordinary sign signifies its signified; this order is responsibility. These are extreme formulas which
the very signifyingness of the face. must not be detached from their context. In the
concrete, many other considerations intervene and
Ph.N.: You say at once "it orders me" and "it require justice even for me. Practically, the laws set
ordains me." Is this not a contradiction? certain consequences out of the way. But justice
only has meaning if it retains the spirit of dis-
E.L.: It orders me as one orders someone one interestedness which animates the idea of
commands, as when one says: "Someone's asking for responsibility for the other man. In principle the I
you." does not pull itself out of its "first person"; it
supports the world. Constituting itself in the very
Ph.N.: But is not the Other also responsible in my movement wherein being responsible for the other
regard? devolves on it, subjectivity goes to the point of
substitution for the Other. It assumes the condition
E.L.: Perhaps, but that is his affair. One of the or the uncondition of hostage. Subjectivity as such
fundamental themes of Totality and Infinity about is initially hostage; it answers to the point of
which we have not yet spoken is that the expiating for others. One can appear scandalized by
intersubjective relation is a non-symmetrical relation. this utopian and, for an I, inhuman conception. But
In this sense, I am responsible for the Other without the humanity of the human the true life is absent.
waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. The humanity in historical and objective being, the
Reciprocity is his affair. It is precisely insofar as the very breakthrough of the subjective, of the human
relationship between the Other and me is not psychism in its original vigilance or sobering up, is
reciprocal that I am subjection to the Other; and I am being which undoes its condition of being:
"subject" essentially in this sense. It is I who support disinterestedness. This is what is meant by the title
all. You know that sentence in Dostoyevsky: "We are of the book: Otherwise than Being. The ontological
all guilty of all and for all men before all, and I more condition undoes itself, or is undone, in the human
than the others." 2 This is not owing to such or such a condition or uncondition. To be human means to
guilt which is really mine, or to offenses that I would live as if one were not a being among beings. As if,
have committed; but because I am responsible for a through human spirituality, the categories of being
total responsibility, which answers for all the others inverted into an "otherwise than being." Not only
and for all in the others, even for their responsibility. into a "being otherwise"; being otherwise is still
The I always has one responsibility more than all the being. The "otherwise than being," in truth, has no
others. verb which would designate the event of its un-rest,
its dis-inter-estedness, its putting-into-question of
Ph.N.: That means that if the others do not do this being or this estedness of the being. It is I
what they ought to do, it is owing to me? who support the Other and am responsible
for him. One thus sees that in the human subject,
at the same time as a total subjection, my
primogeniture manifests itself. My responsibility is
2 untransferable. No one could replace me. In fact, it
Cf., Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers
is a matter of saying the very identity of the human I
Karamazov, trans. by Constance Garnett (New York: New
American Library, 1957), p. 264.
starting from responsibility, that is, starting from
this position or deposition of the sovereign I in self-
consciousness, a deposition which is precisely its
responsibility for the Other. Responsibility is what is
incumbent on me exclusively, and what, humanly, I
cannot refuse. This charge is a supreme dignity of the
unique. I am I in the sole measure that I am
responsible, a non-interchangeable I. I can substitute
myself for everyone, but no one can substitute
himself for me. Such is my inalienable identity of
subject. It is in this precise sense that Dostoyevsky
said: "We are all responsible for all for all men before
all, and I more than all the others.''