CHAPTER 8

PLANT SAFETY AND LAYOUT

8.1 Introduction

Process safety study is an important factor in designing the industrial plant to avoid
major accidents. By ensuring the risk and hazards of chemical processes, accidents
can be reduced to acceptable level. It has to be done to ensure process and operation
in safe condition throughout the life of a plant. Furthermore, it ensures the safety of
the work powers, public and environment.

Industrial safety deals with the area of safety engineering and public health that are
concerned with protecting the workers health, through control of the work
environment to reduce hazards. In Malaysia, The Occupational Safety and Health
Act, (OSHA) 1994 is a tool which provided a new legal and administrative as a driving
force to promote, encourage and stimulate the high quality standards of health and
safety at work place. Both parties such as employers and employees must give their
support and co-operate to obey the law and does not misuse safety in order to
increasing the promotion of safety awareness and effective safety organization and
performance in companies.

There are a few objectives that must be achieved in designing a safe plant and layout
of the industry. The objectives that need to be achieved are listed below:

1) To bring along the human, political and financial costs of having accidents in
the plant to the minimum level. The proper start-up and shut down procedures
of the plant must be prepared.
2) To educate people and employees in the plant on how to work safely
according to Hazard and Operating (HAZOP) studies.
3) To expose the plant layout and the emergency response plan (ERP).

8.2 Plant Start-up & Shut-down Procedure and Standard Operating

Procedure (SOP)

Basically, the plant has a procedure in doing a start-up the plant and shutting it down.
But, there also need a heavy concern about the safety when doing that. During start-

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up and normal operating phase of the new facility, procedures should be in placed to
maintain the integrity of process equipment, where hazardous materials are involved.

The probability for a successful start-up is greatly enhances through operator training
and process design that anticipates start-up problems before they actually occurred.

In contrast, shut-down procedure is important on occasion for the maintenance,

emergency situations and to do an adjustment in product inventories. During the
shut-down phase, deviations outside of any normal operating range can also be
expected. The operating personnel and plant designer have to make sure that the
operating problem is not occurred during plant shut-down. A successful shut-down
of operating facility may results a smooth shut-down procedure in the plant. If a shut-
down procedure is not well implemented, then it will give drawbacks to the plant.

The objectives in prepared the start-up and shut-down procedures for this production
plant which are listed below:

1) To make sure that there is a good practice during start-up of the plant.
2) To ensure a good practice provided while shutting down the plant.
3) To synthesize the knowledge about the standard operating procedures (SOP)
of all equipment that used in the production plant.
4) To provide the proper checklist of each of the SOP of the equipment and
checklists for start-up and shut down procedures for the production plant.

8.3 Plant Start-Up and Shut-Down Procedure

Plant start-up and shut-down is two important elements in operating a plant. This is
due to the present of risk and hazards during these two stages. The procedure of the
plant start-up must be safe, easily and flexible enough to be carried out in several
ways.

8.3.1 Plant Start-Up

In commissioning a new chemical plant, there are huge effort in research, evaluations
and finally the construction. The good start-up of the plant will lead towards a smooth
plant operation throughout it plants life.

The following start-up procedure that should be followed are:

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 1) Final inspection of the unit operations should be made for conformance to the
requirement.
2) Turnaround work list is checked again, whether everything has been
completed and the associated lines have been correctly resembled.
3) All the heat exchangers that were open up to maintenance, must have
undergone the hydrostatically test after it has been assembled.
4) The instrument control loops are checked from the transmission from the plant
signal to control system and also the alarm system circuits to make sure that
it has been correctly located.
5) All the level gauges glasses are confirmed clear and operator can easily
record its reading.
6) All the flanges are made sure to have good joints, with good gasket, in order
to prevent leakage.
7) All the control valves are checked to determine its operability.
8) The operability of pumps is checked.
9) The operating manual and P&ID are updated with the latest condition of the
plant.
10) All the utilities, power supply, steam supply and cooling water supply checked.
11) The onsite fire protection equipment such as extinguishers, water hoses,
nozzles and steam hoses are in place and ready for immediate use.
12) The condition of drains is check to make sure that it is unplugged and water
is drained out from the equipment.
13) The supply of reactants, catalysts and chemicals are adequate.
14) Air freeing and tightness testing are carried out.
15) Gas blanketing for certain equipment.

8.3.2 Plant Shut-Down

Plant shutdown is the process of stopping the production no matter the duration, it
will resulting decreased in revenue. Shut down can be defined as scheduled down
period for a plant for schedule maintenance for an extended period of time. Shutdown
provide unique opportunities to a maintenance department not normally available
during standard operation or even during short shutdown periods. There are three
type of shut down which are:

1) Normal Shut-down

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 This is temporary shutdown for a short duration of time usually for repair
and maintenance. After the maintenance, the plant must be started as
soon as possible to reduce loss in production. A plant shutdown always
has a negative financial impact. This negative impact is due to both loss
of production revenue and major cash outlay for the plant turnaround and
shutdown expenses. The positive impact from turnaround are increase in
equipment and reliability and reduction in the risk of unscheduled outages
or catastrophic failure.

2) Annual Shut-down
During the plant annual shutdown, all the main equipment and instruments
are to be prepared and serviced. The modification is also to be done in
order to improve the performance of the plant. All manholes are opened
for vessels and tank. All bearing must be changed and instruments are
calibrated to maintain the accuracy.

3) Emergency Shut-down
Emergency shutdown usually happen when there is accident happen in
the plant operation or tripped by interlock system due to danger resulting
automatic shutdown. General emergency shutdown process as below:

i) Inform and confirm with the authorized person, manager or

supervisor and also all person at site for shutdown preparation.
ii) The rate of production will slowly down to minimum capacity
iii) Digital cellular screen shows the shutdown target on its screen and
the system will automatically shut down the plant by sequence.
iv) Make sure there is no flow of any material in the system.
v) After all the equipment stopped, the area that having problem will
be inspected.

The following shut-down procedure that should be followed are:

1) The turnaround work list is prepared includes repairing, cleaning, inspection

and modification of all items.
2) The detailed plan of the shutdown and turnaround schedule should be
prepared, probably by-hour schedule.
3) Control system of equipment must be checked, before shutting down the
plant.

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 4) The fire-fighting equipment is located correctly.
5) The personal protective equipment is available for immediate use.
6) All special precaution that is specified for the shutdown is taken care.
7) All items that are needed during shutdown are prepared includes blinds,
hoses, etc.
8) Advanced preparation work prior to the shutdown of the equipment are to be
carried out, to avoid any delay in mechanical work during the actual shutdown,
for example the erection of scaffolding.

8.4 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Main Equipment

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) providing the step by step instruction and
enable the operation to be performed in consistent manner. The documents involved
in SOP serves as the source of instruction which allows employees to act precisely
based on the certain conditions. SOP enables the instructions provided can be
understand easily based on its step by step instructions which describe both technical
and fundamental programmatic operational elements.

8.4.1 Plug Flow Reactor, R-101

The standard operating procedures (SOP) for performing start-up and shut-down of
reactor unit are as follows:

Start-up procedure:

1) Ensuring the correct catalyst type, catalyst levels and support beds are in
place.
2) Starting the heating or cooling jacket system: Since the reactions are
exothermic, the heat of reaction must be removed from the reactor.
3) Adding the correct quantities of reactants, or starting the feed flows to the
reactor.
4) Setting pressure controller to the specified reactor pressure.
5) Controlling flows, pressure and temperature during the reaction cycle.

Shut-down procedure:

1) Shutting off of the reactant feeds to stop reactions and heat generation by
closing the inlet valve.

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 2) Shutting off heating or cooling to the reactor.
3) Cooling and flushing products from the reactor by re-circulating one of the
feeds.
4) When the reactor has been flushed and cooled, all feed and product flows are
stopped and the maintenance can come in action.

8.4.2 Heat Exchanger, E-102

The standard operating procedures (SOP) for performing start-up and shut-down of
heat exchanger unit are as follows:

Start-up procedure:

1) Open the vent connections.

2) Slowly start circulates the cold medium side.
3) Make sure that the entire cold side of the exchanger is completely flooded
before closing its vents.
4) The hot medium gradually introduced, until all passages are filled with fluid.
5) Close the hot side vents and slowly bring the equipment up to its operating
temperature.

Shut-down procedure:

1) Stop supply of hot fluid into the heat exchanger by close the valve. Allow air
to enter and drain the process fluid.
2) The valve of cold medium is also close. Open the cold side vent and drain the
valves to remove the cooling fluid.

8.4.3 Absorption Column, T-102

The standard operating procedures (SOP) for performing start-up and shut-down of
absorption column unit are as follows:

Start-up procedure:

1) Ensure the inlet is closed to prevent the feed flow into the column.
2) Make sure the outlet and inlet connections including pressure gauge
connection are properly installed in order to prevent the leakage of feed or
product desires.

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 3) Ensure the relief valve connection can work properly before the column is
switched on for emergency backup.
4) Turn on the feed pumps if necessary and the pump settings need to be
adjusted on the computer.
5) Wait the pressure and the temperature of the column become stabilized
before running the separation process.

Shut-down procedure:

1) Set the collection tank for the discharged valve to closed and set the feed of
the pump output to zero.
2) Turn off the pressure gauge and remove the connection from the flash vessel
3) Remove the unwanted liquid or gas into the waste container to ensure
properly disposed the potentially hazardous liquid or gas.

8.4.4 Distillation Column, T-103

The standard operating procedures (SOP) for performing start-up and shut-down of
distillation column unit are as follows:

Start-up procedure:

1) Turn the switch box indicator to Distillation Control setting.

2) Switch the column power source lever to the on position. Turn the Reboiler
Heater Control knob clockwise. This prevents over heating of the reboiler.
3) Turn on the cold water supply (CWS) valve until the computer stops telling the
user to increase the volume of the CWS valve.
4) Adjust the Reflux Control to the desired setting.
5) Assure all computer settings are as desired.
6) Allow the tray temperatures to reach a steady-state value.
7) Turn on the feed and reboiler pumps as applicable. The pump settings can be
adjusted on the computer.

Shut-down procedure:

1) Turn the Reboiler Heater Control knob to zero.

2) Turn off the pumps (feed and reboiler).
3) Turn off the CWS valve when the temperature of the distillate is below the
boiling point of the light component of the mixture.
4) Press the stop button.

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 5) Shut off the computer, by selecting the Shut-down option from the special
menu.

8.5 Hazard and operability (HAZOP) study for equipment

Hazard and operability (HAZOP) study is one of the most tedious, forms of hazard
analysis. It identifies potentially complex hazards in a system. HAZOP examines a
combination of every part of the system and analyse the collected data to located
potentially hazardous areas.

HAZOP study is a procedural tools designed to identify the safety and operability
deficiencies in the design of a treatment facility. Basically, HAZOP concentrate on
identifying both hazards as well as operability problems. Although hazard
identification is the main focus, operability problems should be identified to the extent
that they have the potential to lead to process hazards, result in an environmental
violation or have a negative impact on profitability.

Once a potential cause has been identified in the HAZOP study, the HAZOP study
team will identify the potential consequences. If the cause is feasible, and the
consequences severe enough, a member of the study team may have to investigate
the potential means of eliminating or reducing the problem.

The objectives of HAZOP study are:

1) To identify design information not currently available to the team.

2) To familiarize the study team with the design information available.
3) To identify areas of the design that may possess a significant hazard potential.
4) To provide a mechanism for feedback to the client of the study teams detailed
comments.
5) To identify and study features of the design that influences the probability of
a hazardous incident occurring.
6) To ensure that a systematic study is made of the areas of significant hazard
potential.

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8.5.1 HAZOP Procedure

A HAZOP study takes a description of plant and subjects the description to a critical
examination. The structure of the search is provided by the use of simple word models
to create potential deviations at each point in the plant. Then, it will be decided
whether the search deviation can be applicable or not. Actions for prevention and
mitigation of the consequences will be provided.

The HAZOP team focuses on specific portions of the process called nodes.
Generally these are identified from the P&ID of the process before the study begins.
A process parameter is identified, say flow, and an intention is created for the node
under consideration. Then a series of guidewords is combined with the parameter
flow to create deviations.

The team then focuses on listing all the credible causes of deviation beginning with
the cause that can result in the worst possible consequence the team can think of at
the time. Once the causes are recorded the team lists the consequences, safeguards
and any recommendations deemed appropriate. The process is repeated for the next
deviation and so on until completion of the node. The team moves on to the next node
and repeats the process.

HAZOP procedure use the following steps to complete an analysis

(HAZOP Guidelines, 2011):

1) Begin with detailed flow sheet. Break the flow sheet into a number of process
units. Thus, the reactor area might be one unit, and the distillation column is
another unit. Therefore, select each unit for study.
2) Choose a study node such as reactor, column and operating instruction.
3) Describe the design intent of the study node.
4) Pick process parameter such as flow, level, temperature, pressure and
concentration.
5) Use the guide words as tabulated in Table below.
6) If the deviation is applicable, determine possible causes and note any
protective systems.
7) Evaluate the consequences of the deviation if applicable.
8) Recommend action by stating what, whom when involve in the action.
9) Record all information.
10) Repeat steps 5 through 9 until all applicable guide words have been applied
to the chosen parameter.

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 11) Repeat steps 4 through 10 until all applicable process parameters have been
considered for the given study node.
12) Repeat steps 2 through 11 until all study nodes have been considered for the
given section and proceed to the next section on the flow sheet.

The normal guide words that have been used in HAZOP analysis are explain in Table
below.

Table 8.1: HAZOP guide words for analysis (HAZOP Guidelines, 2011)

Guide Meaning Explanation Example of

Words Deviation

NO or NOT The complete No part of the No flow in pipe

or NONE negation intensions is achieved
of these but nothing else
intension happens
MORE/HIGH Quantitative These refer to More flow, more
or increases quantities and temperature, high
LESS/LOW and decreases properties such as flow pressure or less
rates and temperatures, flow, less
as well as activities like temperature, less
HEAT and REACT pressure
AS WELL AS A quantitative All the design and Extra unplanned
increase operating intentions are process operation
achieved together with
some additional activity
PART OF A quantitative Only some of the Reduced strength,
decrease intentions are achieved, missing
some are not component
REVERSE The logical This is mostly Back flow or back
opposite of applicable to activities, pressure heat
the intention for example reverse
flow or chemical
reaction

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 OTHER Complete No part of the original Wrong material
THAN substitution intention is achieved. charging, start-up,
Something quite shutdown
different happens.

As shown in the Figure below, HAZOP analysis have been developed for each main
equipment in this plant which involve plug flow reactor (R-101), heat exchanger (E-
102), distillation column (T-103) and absorption column (T-102). All analysis
information are tabulated as below. In addition, the P&ID after HAZOP also have been
developed and shown after the tabulated analysis.

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 Study node 4

Study node 3

Study node 1

Study node 2

Figure 8.1: Study node before HAZOP based on overall plant

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Study Node 1: Plug flow reactor, R-101

Table 8.2: HAZOP analysis on plug flow reactor, R-101

Process Guide Word Possible Causes Possible Consequences Actions Required

Parameter

Flow No Control valve fails to No reaction occur Install air-to-open valve

operate / fails to for inlet stream
supply at set point Install flow controller to
Blockage in pumps control the set point
and piping system

High Flow controller fails to Rupture pipes inside the Regular maintenance
operate reactor Install flow alarm high
Uncontrolled output (FAH)
Install relief valve

Low Flow controller fails to Not achieved desired Regular maintenance

operate output Install flow alarm low
Fracture pipelines (FAL)

Temperature Low Jacket failure Reaction rate drop Regular maintenance on

Low flow rate of hot oil Not achieve desired the jacket
feed output

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 Install temperature alarm
low (TAL)
High Jacket failure Runaway reaction Regular maintenance on
Uncontrolled hot oil Damage the catalyst the jacket
feed flow Not achieved desired Install flow controller on
output the hot oil feed
Install temperature alarm
high (TAH)
Pressure Low Leakage of pipeline Temperature drop Shut-down process
Failure of compressor Reversible flow occur Install pressure alarm low
Not achieve desired (PAL)
reaction Regular maintenance on
the pipeline
High Blockage of pipeline Rupture the vessel Shut-down process
Failure of pressure Temperature increase Install pressure alarm high
indicator (PAH)
Regular maintenance on
the pipeline
Install relief valve

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Figure 8.2: P&ID after HAZOP for reactor, R-101

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Study Node 2: Heat Exchanger, E-102

Table 8.3: HAZOP analysis on heat exchanger, E-101

Process Guide Word Possible Causes Possible Consequences Actions Required

Parameter

Flow No Control valve fails to Increase in temperature Install flow controller to

operate and pressure control the set point
Rupture pipeline A desired temperature Regular maintenance on
cannot be achieved the pipeline
Affect further process

High Flow controller fails to Increase in temperature Regular maintenance on

operate and pressure the pipeline
Amount of coolant A desired temperature Install flow alarm high
increase cannot be achieved (FAH)
Affect further process

Low Flow controller fails to Increase in temperature Regular maintenance on

operate and pressure the pipeline
Fracture pipelines A desired temperature Install flow alarm low
cannot be achieved (FAL)
Affect further process

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 Reverse Cooling stream pump Unable to control the Inspection done regularly
temperature of outlet
High pressure in flow Install one way flow valve
out Cooling process is not at the cooling stream pipe
effective

Temperature Low Temperature Temperature increases Shut down the process

controller not Affect another process Install temperature alarm
low (TAL)
No change in
temperature at the

Blockage of pipeline

High Pressure increase Shut down the process

Failure to other Install temperature alarm
The temperature of high (TAH)
hot fluid is extremely Explosion could occur
high Increase in temperature
of process fluid

Pressure Low Leakage of tube Temperature drop Install pressure alarm low
Reversible flow occur (PAL)

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 High Fouling on tube Reduce heat transfer Install pressure alarm high
coefficient and efficiency (PAH)
of heat exchanger

Hot Flow Out

Process Liquid In
Process Liquid Out

Sensor

Heat Exchanger
Temperature
Final Control Element TT Transmitter
Hot Flow In

Pressure S-6

Transmitter S-1

PT FT FC
Flow Transmitter Temperature
Controller
Pressure
Indicator PI PAL Flow Controller TC

Pressure
Alarm Low

Figure 8.3: P&ID after HAZOP for heat exchanger, E-102

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Study Node 3: Distillation Column, T-103

Table 8.4: HAZOP analysis on distillation column, T-103

Process Guide Word Possible Causes Possible Consequences Actions Required

Parameter

Flow No Control valve (V-17) Decrease of level inside Install flow controller to
fails to operate the column control the set point
Rupture inlet pipeline Column overheat Regular maintenance on
Desired separation is not the pipeline
achieved Install level indicator
High Flow controller fails to Flooding can occur Regular maintenance on
operate inside the column the pipeline
Blockage at outlet Pressure inside the Install flow and level
pipeline column increase and indicator
might ruptured Install relief valve
Low Pump fails to operate Reflux drum increase Inspection done regularly
Blockage at inlet The desired separation
pipeline cannot be achieved Install flow and level
Outflow is greater indicator
than inflow

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 Reverse Pump at reboiler fails Flooding can occur Inspection done regularly
to operate inside the column
High pressure at Increase pressure inside Shut down process
bottom flow the column
Temperature Low Temperature Ineffective separation Install temperature
controller is not process indicator
functioning The desired separation
cannot be achieved
High Inlet flow extremely Pressure inside the Shut down the process
increase column increase Install temperature
Flow controller is not Ineffective separation indicator
functioning process
The desired separation
cannot be achieved
Pressure Low Leakage of pipeline Temperature inside the Install pressure alarm low
Compressor / Pump column drop (PAL)
fails to operate Reversible flow inside Regular maintenance on
the column can occur the pipeline
when outlet pressure is
low
High Inlet flow extremely Flooding can occur Install pressure alarm high
increase inside the column if liquid (PAH)
Install flow controller

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 Blockage of outlet pressure is high than Shut down process
stream vapour pressure Install relief valve
Over compressed Mechanical damage
vapour inlet Column may rupture
Level Low Outflow greater than Pump failure Install flow controller
Pressure inside the Install level alarm low
Blockage of inlet column may increase (LAL)
stream and affect the separation
process
High Inflow greater than Flooding inside the Install flow controller
outflow column may occur Install level alarm high
Blockage of outlet (LAH)
stream

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Figure 8.4: P&ID after HAZOP for distillation column, T-103

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Study Node 4: Absorption Column (T-102)

Table 8.5: HAZOP analysis on absorption column, T-102

Process Guide Word Possible Causes Possible Consequences Actions Required

Parameter

Flow No Control valve fails to Decrease of level inside Install flow controller to
operate the column control the set point
Rupture pipeline Column overheat Regular maintenance on
Desired separation is not the pipeline
achieved Install level indicator
High Flow controller fails to Flooding can occur Regular maintenance on
operate inside the column the pipeline
Blockage at outlet Pressure inside the Install flow and level
pipeline column increase and indicator
might ruptured Install relief valve
Low Pump fails to operate The desired separation Inspection done regularly
Blockage at inlet cannot be achieved
pipeline Install flow and level
Outflow is greater indicator
than inflow

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 Reverse High pressure at Flooding can occur Inspection done regularly
bottom flow inside the column
Blockage at bottom Increase pressure inside Shut down process
stream the column
Temperature Low Temperature Ineffective separation Install temperature
controller is not process indicator
functioning The desired separation
cannot be achieved
High Inlet flow extremely Pressure inside the Shut down the process
increase column increase Install temperature
Flow controller is not Ineffective separation indicator
functioning process
The desired separation
cannot be achieved
Pressure Low Leakage of pipeline Temperature inside the Install pressure alarm low
Compressor / Pump column drop (PAL)
fails to operate Reversible flow inside Regular maintenance on
the column can occur the pipeline
when outlet pressure is
low
High Inlet flow extremely Flooding can occur Install pressure alarm high
increase inside the column if liquid (PAH)
Install flow controller

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 Blockage of outlet pressure is high than Shut down process
stream vapour pressure Install relief valve
Over compressed Mechanical damage
vapour inlet Column may rupture
Level Low Outflow greater than Pump failure Install flow controller
Pressure inside the Install level alarm low
Blockage of inlet column may increase (LAL)
stream and affect the separation
process
High Inflow greater than Flooding inside the Install flow controller
outflow column may occur Install level alarm high
Blockage of outlet (LAH)
stream

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Figure 8.5: P&ID after HAZOP for absorption column, T-102

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Study Node 5: Sequencing Batch Reactor (SBR) Tank

Table 8.6: HAZOP analysis on SBR tank

Process Guide Word Possible Causes Possible Consequences Actions Required

Parameter

Flow No Control valve fails to Decrease of level inside Install flow controller to
operate the tank control the set point
Rupture pipeline No reaction occur Regular maintenance on
Pump fails to operate the pipeline
High High flow from the Flooding can occur Install flow and level
inlet stream inside the tank indicator
Pressure inside the tank Install relief valve
increase
Low Pump fails to operate Tank takes longer time Inspection done regularly
Blockage at inlet to fill than normal
stream Affect retention time of Install flow and level
Outflow is greater the process indicator
than inflow
Other Than Mixer fails to operate Desired reaction may not Regular maintenance
Air diffuser fails to occur
operate

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Temperature High High temperature Rapid evaporation of Shut down the process
from upstream unit contents during the Install temperature
process indicator
Increased vapour
concentration around
the tank possibly to
hazard level
Affect the lifetime of the
biological agent
Pressure High High pressure of Mechanical damage Install pressure indicator
upstream unit Tank may rupture Shut down process
Affect the lifetime of the
biological agent
Level Low Blockage of inlet Pump failure Install level controller
stream Pressure inside the tank
may increase and affect
the process
High Decant phase not Flooding inside the tank Install level controller
efficient may occur
Blockage of
sedimentation at
outlet stream

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Figure 8.6: P&ID after HAZOP for SBR Tank

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On a long-term basis, operational feedback should confirm that the assessment and
control steps are adequately addressing the risk question. If this is not the case, it
may be necessary to review all assumptions. Feedback should correspond to
ensuring that assumptions made about the level of residual risks are still valid.
Residual risks are risks that are expected to remain after risk control strategies have
been exercised. It is also important to note that new risks may arise from risk control
practices. Sometimes risks that were not originally identified or may have been filtered
out during the initial risk assessment can become aggravating factors due to the
implementation of risk control measures (Risk Management Training Guides,
HAZOP). In order to make sure HAZOP is more efficient, the HAZOP team must be
assembled by equipment. The advantages of HAZOP team are more problems can
be identified and solved productively. Normally, HAZOP team is come from
individuals with their own expertise in equipment processes.

8.6 Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Risk Control (HIRARC)

HIRARC is a compound word which is made up of three consecutive activities

running one after the other. The activities consist of hazard identification, risk
assessment and risk control. Hazard identification is the recognising of things which
may cause injury or harm to a person. Risk assessment is the looking at the possibility
of injury or harm occurring to a person if exposed to a hazard. The introduction of
measures which will eliminate or reduce the risk of a person being exposed to a
hazard is known as risk control.

8.6.1 Hazard Identification

Hazard identification is the identification of undesired events that lead to the

materialisation of the hazard and the mechanism by which those undesired events
could occur [2]. In the simplest way, it is to make sure whether the exposure from
certain incident give bad effect to human health. In petrochemical plant, it is focus on
the analysing the scientific data of the chemical used or chemical produce and the
related it to the effect. The people who have potential to get adverse effect from the
over expose to the chemical can be shown in form of birth defect, death, cancer and
others.

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 HIRARC is the basic practice in management and operation in petrochemical
plant. HIRARC are important to determine because the main purpose of HIRARC are
[2];

i) To identify all the factors that may cause harm to employees and others (the
hazards).
ii) To consider what the chances are of that harm actually be falling anyone in
the circumstances of a particular case and the possible severity that could
come from it (the risks).
iii) To enable employers to plan, introduce and monitor preventive measures to
ensure that the risks are adequately controlled at all times.

The HIRARC process involving both the employer and employees

representative. Both representative must have excellent communication in order
to get the workplace free from hazard. The employer must monitor the employee
to follow up them and keep recording the action.

Classify work activities in accordance with their similarity, such as:

i. Geographical or physical areas within/outside premises

ii. Stages in production/service process
iii. Not too big e.g. building a car
iv. Not too small e.g. fixing a nut
v. Defined task e.g. loading, packing, mixing, fixing the door.

8.6.2 Risk Assessment

Risk is something that people as individuals live with on a day-to-day basis.

People are constantly making decisions based on risk. Risk assessment means the
process of evaluating the risks to safety and health arising from hazards at work. Two
component of risk assessment are risk determination and risk evaluation. Risk is the
combination of the likelihood and severity of a specified hazardous event occurring.

Likelihood is an event likely to occur within the specific period or in specified

circumstances. Assessing likelihood is based worker experience, analysis or
measurement. Likelihood levels range from most likely to inconceivable. Table 4.1
below indicates likelihood using the following values.

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 Table 4.1 Likelihood of an event [2]

LIKELIHOOD EXAMPLE RATING

(L)
Most likely The most likely result of the hazard / event being 5
realized
Possible Has a good chance of occurring and is not 4
unusual
Conceivable Might be occur at some time in future 3
Remote Has not been known to occur after many years 2
Inconceivable Is practically impossible and has never occurred 1

Severity is outcome from an event such as severity of injury or health of people,

or damage to property, or insult to environment, or any combination of those caused
by the event. Severity can be divided into five categories. Severity are based upon an
increasing level of severity to an individuals health, the environment, or to property.
The level of severity can be evaluate by Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2 Severity of an event [2]

SEVERITY (S) EXAMPLE RATING

Catastrophic Numerous fatalities, irrecoverable property damage 5 and 5
productivity
Fatal Approximately one single fatality major property damage 4 if 4
hazard is realized
Serious Non-fatal injury, permanent disability 3
Minor Disabling but not permanent injury 2
Negligible Minor abrasions, bruises, cuts, first aid type injury 1

For risk analysis that uses likelihood and severity in qualitative method, presenting
result in a risk matrix is a very effective way of communicating the distribution of the
risk throughout a plant and area in a workplace. Risk can be calculated using the
following formula:

Lx S = Relative Risk (4.1)

Whereby

32
 L = Likelihood

S = Severity

Table 4.3 Risk analysis matrix

Severity (S)
Likelihood 1 2 3 4 5
(L)
5 5 10 15 20 25
4 4 8 12 16 20
3 3 6 9 12 15
2 2 4 6 8 10
1 1 2 3 4 5

High
Medium
Low

In order to use this matrix, first find the severity column that best describes the
outcome of risk. Then follow the likelihood row to find the description that best suits
the likelihood that the severity will occur. The risk level is given in the box where the
row and column meet. The relative risk value can be used to prioritize necessary
actions to effectively manage work place hazards. Table 4.4 show the level of the risk
and the action required.

Table 4.4 Description of risk [2]

RISK DESCRIPTION ACTION

15 - 25 HIGH A HIGH risk requires immediate action to control the
hazard as detailed in the hierarchy of control.
Actions taken must be documented on the risk
assessment form including date for completion.
5 - 12 MEDIUM A MEDIUM risk requires a planned approach to
controlling the hazard and applies temporary
measure if required. Actions taken must be

33
 documented on the risk assessment form including
date for completion
1-4 LOW A risk identified as LOW may be considered as
acceptable and further reduction may not be
necessary. However, if the risk can be resolved
quickly and efficiently, control measures should be
implemented and recorded.

8.6.3 HIRARC

The HIRARC table, Table 4.5 is the summary of the safety analysis for the
operation plant. It can be divided into three column which are hazard identification,
risk analysis and risk control. The first column is the hazard identification where the
type of the activity may cause the hazard is selected and also the type of hazard will
involve. For an activity, the hazard can be only one and sometime maybe a few. The
hazard need to identify from different view. For the second column, the risk analysis
is placed. The risk analysis is to identify the effect of the hazard either to the building,
human or environment. If the existing risk control already available, it can be place
together in the analysis. The level of severity, likelihood and risk based on the level
from table 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4. For the last column which is risk control, the recommended
control measure are suggested. This recommended control are should able to help in
reduce or prevent the hazard from happen.

34
 Table 8.7: HIRARC summary

1. Hazard Identification 2. Risk Analysis 3. Risk Control

No Work activity Hazard Effect Existing risk control (if Likelihood Severity Risk Recommended Control Measures
any)
1 Handling and Small / large Fire or SMALL FIRE: Use DRY 2 1 2 Keep away from sources of
storage of spillage explosion chemical powder ignition
Isopropyl Keep container in a cool,
Alcohol as raw LARGE FIRE: Use well-ventilated area
material alcohol foam, water Avoid all possible sources
(Source: spray or fog of ignition (spark or flame)
MSDS) Keep container tightly
closed and sealed until
ready for use
Exposure of eyewash 2 1 2 Be sure to use an
chemicals to stations and approved/certified
workers safety showers respirator or equivalent
Splash goggles, Provide exhaust ventilation
lab coat and or other engineering
vapor respirator controls to keep the

35
 airborne concentrations of
vapors below their
respective threshold limit
value.
2 Storage and Small / large Fire or SMALL FIRE: Use DRY 2 1 2 Keep away from heat
handling spillage explosion chemical powder Keep away from sources of
Acetone as ignition
product LARGE FIRE: Use Wear suitable protective
(Source: alcohol foam, water clothing
MSDS) spray or fog Store in a segregated and
approved area (flammables
area)
Keep container in a cool,
well-ventilated area
Skin and Absorbed Splash goggles, 2 1 2 Be sure to use an
eye contact, through skin, full suit, boots approved/certified
ingestion dermal and gloves. respirator or equivalent
and contact, eye Eyewash station A self-contained breathing
inhalation of contact, and safety apparatus should be used
chemical inhalation shower. to avoid inhalation of the
product.

36
3 Storage and Gas leaking Fire or Reduce gas with 2 1 2 Use only non-sparking
handling explosion fog or fine water tools
Hydrogen gas spray Wear leather safety
as product Remove all gloves and safety
(Source: sources of shoes when handling
MSDS) ignition cylinders

4 Handling and Skin and Slightly Move to fresh 2 1 2 Use personal protective
storage of eye contact, hazardous in air equipment
Raney Nickel ingestion case of skin Eyewash station Do not flush into
as catalyst and contact and safety surface water or
(Source: inhalation of (irritant), of shower. sanitary sewer system
MSDS) chemical eye contact Splash goggles, Wear appropriate
(irritant), of full suit, boots protective eyeglasses
ingestion, of and gloves. or chemical safety
inhalation. goggles
Handle in accordance
with good industrial
hygiene and safety
practice.
Small / large Fire Do not breathe 2 1 2 Keep in a dry, cool and
spillage vapors or spray well-ventilated place
mist

37
 Use explosion- Keep away from heat
proof equipment and sources of ignition
Use only non- Keep at temperatures
sparking tools below 40C.
Minimize dust
generation and
accumulation

38
8.7 Plant Layout

The definition of plant layout is the arrangement of physical facilities such as furniture,
equipment, tools and machines in such a manner so as have quickest flow of a
material with the least amount of handling in processing the product from the raw
material to the delivery of final product. The plant layout is the one of main important
criteria in designing the Acetone plant production.

Generally, the process units and ancillary buildings should be laid out to give the most
economical flow of material and personnel around the site. Hazardous process must
be located at a safe distance from other buildings. Consideration must be also being
given to the future expansion of the site. Table below explains the factors that need
to be considered in designing plant layout.

Table 8.8: Consideration in designing plant layout

Consideration Description
Process This is the stage where convenient layout is based on the
order in which items would appear on the process flow sheet
Economics In plant layout, economic is considered mainly with
steelwork, concrete, piping and electric cabling. Structures
and therefore deep foundations can be greatly reduced by
having most equipment on the ground. Where structures
have to be used, more than one item should be supported.
Operational Operational convenience is very important in achieving safe
and reliable operation. It would reduce the chances of
making mistakes and increase the problem ability of
malfunction being detected earlier.
Maintenance The layout designer should look for equipment
arrangements, which assist safe maintenance. Maintenance
that is made safe and easy is more reliable, is often quicker
and saves downtime which in the long run provides plenty
repayment for the thought and care given at the layout stage.
Construction or Construction factor is a must in layout consideration. A
destruction of any building is a necessity for process and operating reasons but
department it will reduce construction access although it will provide
weather protection during construction.

39
 Future expansion of Expansions of structures must be taken into consideration,
the plant such equipment and pipe work so that the additions can be
erected and tested with the minimum interference to plant
operations. One approach to this is to draft the likelihood that
the conditions on a permit to work and then see if the layout
can be altered so that the conditions will be less restrictive
on both operators and the construction teams.
Appearance of the As a rule of thumb, an attractive laid out plot with the
plant equipment in rows is also economically laid out. Buildings,
structures and groups of equipment should form a neat
balanced layout consistent with keeping piper runs to a
minimum and allowing proper access for maintenance.
Maintenance road is provided parallel to the pipe bridge and
process equipment.

8.7.1 Objectives

In plant layout, there are certain objectives that should be achieved in order to get the
beneficial and good plant layout. The objectives are listed below:

1) Ensure the workers safety and health in the best condition

2) Ensure the works, management and other parties are convenient with the
layout
3) Build the best location of each equipment and facilities
4) Utilize labour efficiently
5) Reduce material handling costs
6) Improve productivity
7) Proper utilization of production capacity
8) Transportation of work from one point to another point without any delay
9) Provide for volume and product flexibility
10) Allowance of easy maintenance of machines and plant

8.7.2 Criteria of Plant Layout

The proper layout of industrial facilities is an important factor in the prevention of

catastrophic fires. In spite of ancillary buildings and services required on the site,

40
others additional main processing units also must take consideration, which may
include:

1) Storage for raw materials and products (e.g. tank farms and warehouse)
2) Maintenance workshop
3) Stores for maintenance and operating supplies
4) Laboratories for process control
5) Fire station and other emergency services
6) Utilities; steam boilers, compressed air, power generation, refrigeration and
transformer station
7) Effluent disposal plant
8) Offices for administration
9) Canteen and other amenity buildings, such as medical centre
10) Car parks and bicycle sheds

41
 TANK
1 TANK
2
TANK
3

Nearest evacuate
road
Main gate
Restricted area

Wind direction

Figure 8.7: General Plant Layout of Acetone Plant

42
8.7.3 Plant Layout of Acetone Production Plant

Mo
sq Parking Wastewater Treatment Plant
ue
Acetone Plant Power Area /
Generation Assembly
Ca
nte Area
en Control Waste Storage
Room

Laboratory Workshop Control

Room

3
1 Food Medical
Mosque
Court Centre
Loading Area
Parking
Parking Future Area /
Expansion Fire
Area Area Assembly Dept.
Administrative Building / Area Warehouse
Training Centre

Wind Direction

43
8.7.4 Acceptable Area of Plant Layout

An acceptable of plant layout is concerned with the spatial arrangement of processing

equipment, storage vessels, their interconnecting pipe work, workplace and
warehouse. It is an important aspect in the designing a production plant. A good layout
will ensure that the plant functions properly, safely and efficiently. It considers the
design constraints arising from safety, environment, construction, maintenance, and
operation with an economical balance.

The major consideration is the main production plant is located below the wind
direction. The plant is covered by water treatment area in some distances. In safety
issues, in case fire is happening, the fire supposedly not affect the other building by
following the wind direction. The area is also divided into two area which are restricted
area, which shown by the red zone, and also public area which can be assessed by
public. The restricted area which involved production plant and wastewater treatment
plant is guarded by a security post 2 there. Any visitor must register their self-
information and must have the visitor pass before entering restricted area.

8.7.5 Plant Area Zone

The plant production is separated into divided section. There are processing area,
administrative area and waste management and control area. For administrative
building, canteen, mosque and medical centre are located in distances from
processing area. It is on safety purposed by avoiding people away from potentially
hazard area at the processing section.

For raw materials, there are located in at the storage area. The product from the
production also is located at the storage area as well as warehouse which used as a
storekeeping for any other material, chemical and spare components for the plant.
The storage area is mainly at the second main entrance to make sure an easy
transportation operation and delivering purpose. In addition, the location of loading
area is placed far from attraction area. This can avoid any accident towards human
while handling heavy equipment.

44
8.7.6 Possible Facility

In the plant area, a complete facility is required to enhance employees to work without
any lack of facilities requirement. This is to ensure a maximum productivity of the
workers along with a maximum level of safety.

Food court have been constructed at both public zone and restricted zone so that the
facility are near to processing area which are production plant and administrative
building. Same goes to prayer room or mosque, which are provided at both zone.
There are also three parking areas provided near to attraction location such as near
to administrative building, processing plant and wastewater treatment plant. Medical
centre has been located, in case there are personnel injured or infected by chemicals
or radiation. The medical centre must be located in distances from the hazardous
process to avoid infection to other patients.

8.7.7 Entrance and Exit Points

The entrance and exit point is the main point for production plant. Without the specific
and strategic location of the entrance and exit, it will increase the risk of the danger.
The exit point needs to be more than one point to ensure employees to reach out the
exit safely with shorter time. In plant, a main entrance and exit is built close to the
other facilities than processing plant. This strategic location is to make sure that any
vehicles entering plant will not close to the processing plant to avoid any sparkles that
may cause to fire and explosion.

In this plant, there are two main entrance/exit points which are located for some
purpose. The first point is at the security post 1, which generally accessed for public
vehicles. The second point is located at security post 3, which near to the loading area
and warehouse. This route particularly accessed by heavy transportation such as
trucks to deliver raw material at warehouse or to transfer out product. This discrete
route can avoid any possible incident between vehicles or personnel.

8.7.8 Evacuation and Assembly Point

During an emergency, emergency response team is responsible to help and lead the
workers to the assembly area by following the evacuation route made. It is important
to all workers to know the evacuation route for the different area since different area
will have a different route. An evacuation plan needs to be fully understood by not

45
only to employees of the plant but to all personnel inside the plant such as customers
and suppliers.

In this plant, there are two assembly points provided for both zone. Each assembly
area are located near to main area and accessible for every personnel. In case of
emergency happened, the nearest assembly points are reachable by following the red
arrow routes.

8.8 Emergency Response Plan

The definition of emergency response plan (ERP) is plan of action for the efficient
deployment and coordination of services, agencies and personnel to provide the
earliest possible response to an emergency. The ERP is mainly focus on defensive
health and safety employees and the public as well as assets and the environment.
This ERP is very important in considering about health and safety because with ERP,
the possible accident scenario or possible disaster can be predicted together along
with the ways to overcome or faced the situation. The ERP must take a look in all
aspects whether it is natural disaster or technically from the plant production includes
explosions, floods, fires, leakage, power or utilities features and transportation
accidents

8.8.1 Objective

In order to get the good emergency response plan for the production plant, there are
several objectives that need to be achieved as shown as follows:

1. Reduce human injury and damage to property and environment in an

emergency.

2. Develop hazard identification and risk assessment for plant production

which all people in the plant will ready of all the hazard and risk that they will
faced and the way to reduce the risk into the low level.

3. Significant impact has been identified during the production of acetone.

46
8.8.2 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

Hazard Identification is the process of determining whether exposure to a stressor

can cause an increase in the incidence of specific adverse health effects and whether
the adverse health effect is likely to occur in humans. In the case of chemical
stressors, the process examines the available scientific data for a given chemical (or
group of chemicals) and develops a weight of evidence to characterize the link
between the negative effects and the chemical agent. It is needed to consider the
potential of hazards that might be occurred when production plant is on operation.

To manage risk, hazards must first be identified, and then the risks should be
evaluated and determined to be tolerable or not. The earlier in the life cycle that
effective risk analysis is performed, the more cost effective the future safe operation
of the process or activity is likely to be. The risk understanding developed from these
studies forms the basis for establishing most of the other process safety management
activities undertaken by the facility. An incorrect perception of risk at any point could
lead to either inefficient use of limited resources or unknowing acceptance of risks
exceeding the true tolerance of the company or the community.

In hazard identification and risk assessment, there are procedures that need to be
followed as shown in the Figure 8.8 below.

Classify work activities

Employer Consultation Worker

Representative Representative

Identify Hazard

Risk Assessment
Review

Prepare Risk Control

Action Plan
(If Necessary)

Implement

Figure 8.8: Procedure for hazard identification and risk assessment process
47
8.8.3 Potential Incident Hazard

In any chemical plant, the possibility of accidents to occur is very high. These potential
hazards can be identified based on the equipment and chemical substances involved.
Thus, by identifying potential hazard, preventive measure can be taken. The possible
accidents happen are shown in the table below with its steps taken for those
emergencies.

Table 8.8: Types of Hazards and Action Should Be Taken During Emergencies

Type of hazard Action Should be Taken

Chemical Spills and Leaks Firstly, evacuate the area, close the door and call
the emergencies response number. Dont forget to
activate the alarm to alert all the person in the plant
about the emergencies happens. Then shut down
all the equipment in the plant and restrict the area
where those emergencies happen. Remove the
contaminated clothing as well as rinse the skin,
eyes and all exposed body with water quickly. Do
not enter the restricted area back until the
emergency response team take an action and
confirmed back that the production can be
continued as usual
Explosions First thing first, immediately hide under tables or
other objects that can be our protection against the
breaking glasses or chemical spills from
explosions. Activate the alarm and notify them do
not panic and do not take self-risk actions.
Immediately call the emergencies response
number such as fire fighter or ambulance in cased
there are injuries from the people. After that, exit
towards the emergencies exits and never used the
elevators. After successfully exits, never return to
the emergencies area unless been authorized by
the emergency response team.

48
 Fire Activate the fire alarm. To ensure our safety, make
sure that take a proper way of precautions. As
explosions, do not use the elevators and
immediately exit towards the nearest door that is
free from the fire. When we successfully exit, call
the Fire Department immediately to overcome the
fire happens in the plant industry. If there is only a
small fire happens, used the fire extinguishers to
put down the fires. Lastly, never returns to the
emergencies area unless been authorized by the
emergency response team.

8.8.4 Possible Emergencies Devices

There are certain possible emergencies devices that can be used in order when the
emergencies situation comes to the production.

1) Smoke Detectors
Smoke detectors are installed to detect any undesired smoke occurred
in the plant operation. Basically the smoke alarms include the light
source (incandescent bulb or infrared LED), a lens to collimate the light
into a beam, and a photodiode or other photoelectric sensor at an
angle to the beam as a light detector. If there is smokes detected by
smoke detectors, the LED will keep on beeping then it will immediately
triggered the fire alarm.

2) Fire Alarm
Fire alarm is the most important devices in order to reduce the risk and
in jury levels when emergencies occurred in production plant. Fire
alarm normally is come in two ways of operation which is automatic or
manual. The fire alarm will started automatically when it is triggered by
the smoke detectors. If there is failure from smoke detectors, fire alarm
can be activated manually to alert the people there is emergencies
happened in the plant.

49
 3) Fire Extinguishers
One of the most important devices during the emergencies is fire
extinguishers. It is necessary to put off the small fire occurred when
the running of production. The small fire occurred must be immediately
put off to avoid any explosions or any big fires occurred that will lead
to the serious scenario and injuries happens.

8.9 Conclusion

As the conclusion, the plant safety studies are important in order to create the safe
conditions in the production of acetone. Although the hazard cannot be avoided, it
must be reduced to the lowest level to avoid any serious injuries to the production
team or people around the production plant. HAZOP is created for plant production to
make sure that the plant production running smoothly without a serious problem. The
employee must train to the emergency evacuation plan that has been designed for
this plan. A proper way in handling the possible scenarios happens is important to
make sure there are no serious injuries. A good safety consideration and plant layout
can lead towards the increase of plant productivity and economic costing

50