BPI v. de Coster: Petitioners Respondents
BPI v. de Coster: Petitioners Respondents
BPI v. de Coster: Petitioners Respondents
De Coster
G.R. No. L-23181 March 16, 1925 J. Johns
petitioners BPI
respondents Gabriela Andrea de Coster y Roxas and La Orden de Dominicos or PP. Predicadores de la
Provincia del Santisimo Rosario
summary Wife issued power of atty to husband. Husband then signed promissory note w/ bank and
executed chattel and real estate mortgages in banks favor. Note became due and unpaid so
bank filed action. CFI ruled in banks favor. Spouses did not pay judgment so bank went to
court again asking for foreclosure of property mortgaged and auction to settle debt. Wife
assailed that husband had no authority to make her liable as surety on the debt of a third
person and that debt was exclusively made by husband and his firm. SC agreed w/ wife. No
provision in the said doc which authorized or empowered husband to make his wife liable as a
surety for a preexisting debt. Where in an instrument powers and duties are specified and
defined, that all of such powers and duties are limited and confined to those which are
specified and defined, and that all other powers and duties are excluded.
issue
(related to Agency topic) WoN husband Jean, as agent/attorney-in-fact armed with a power of attorney, was authorized to
make wife Gabriela liable as a surety for the preexisting debt of a third person - NO
ratio
Under the power of attorney, Jean had no authority for and on behalf of the wife, Gabriela, to execute a joint and
several note or to make her liable as an accommodation maker. The debt in question was a preexisting debt of her husband
and of the firm of J.M. Poizat and Co., to which she was not a party, and for which she was under no legal obligation to
pay. She never borrowed any money from the bank, and that previous to the signing of the note, she never had any
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dealings with the bank and was not indebted to the bank in any amount. The old, original debts of her husband and J.M.
Poizat and Co. to the bank, to which she was not a party, were all taken up and merged in the new note in question.
The note and mortgage in question show upon their face that at the time they were executed, the husband was
attorney in fact for the defendant wife, and the bank knew or should have known the nature and extent of his authority
and the limitations upon his power.
It is very apparent from the face of the instrument that the whole purpose and intent of the power of attorney was to
empower and authorize the husband to look after and protect the interests of the wife and for her and in her name to
transact any and all of her business. It will be noted that there is no provision in the said document which authorizes or
empowers him to sign anything or to do anything which would make his wife liable as a surety for a preexisting debt.
It is fundamental rule of construction that where in an instrument powers and duties are specified and defined, that all
of such powers and duties are limited and confined to those which are specified and defined, and that all other powers and
duties are excluded.
Hence, it follows that the husband was not authorized or empowered to sign the note in question for and on behalf of
the wife as her act and deed, and that as to her the note is void for want of power of her husband to execute it.
The same thing is true as to the real mortgage to the bank. It was given to secure the note in question and was not
given for any other purpose. The real property described in the mortgage to the bank was and is the property of the wife.
The note being void as to her, it follows that as to her the real mortgage to the bank is also void for want of power to
execute it.