People vs.

Genosa

G.R. No 135981

Marivic Genosa and Ben Genosa was married in November 19, 1983 with 3 children. In the first year of
their marriage the couple lived happily. But soon thereafter, the marriage was plagued with quarrels and
their fights became violent.

On November 15, 1995 Ben went home from gambling, with his friend Arturo Basobas, only to find put
that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyete to find him. When she got home with her cousin Ecel Arano,
the appelant found Ben drunk. On that same night Marivic Genosa attacked and wounded his husband
with the pipe that ultimately led to his death. The appellant testified that after the first year of marriage
her husband became a habitual drinker and receive abuse and violence from him. She was convicted of
the crime parricide which is punishable by death penalty.

Appellant subsequently filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for her examination by expert
psychologists and psychiatrist and the reception of latter's reports to prove her claim of self-defense on
the theory of battered woman syndrome.

The SC remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological/psychiatric opinion
on the plea of battered woman syndrome. The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has
been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.

The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the
crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while
asleep. Hence the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.

Issue:

1) whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus

2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Held:

On the first case, the court ruled that indeed, from the totality of evidence presented, there is no doubt
that appellant was a severely abused person. However, The Court did not find sufficient evidence that
Marivic Genosa became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome that would clearly and fully
demonstrate teh essential characteristics of the syndrome. Moreover, Marivic's killing of Ben was not
completely justified under the circumstances. self- defense since the existence of Battered woman
syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in
the context of self-defense.

Nevertheless, the court deemed it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that
mitigate her criminal liability. the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of
the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. The second circumstance, on the other
hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing.

On the second legal issue, There is no showing of the victim's position relative to appellant's at the time
of the shooting. the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or
argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailants aggression.

Valentin Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 72119

Petitioner Valentin Legaspi invoked his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern
in a special civil action for Mandamus against defendant civil service commission. Legaspi requests
information for the civil service elegibilities as a sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City of
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Aguas. However, the Solicitor Genral challenges the petitioner's
standing on which he contends that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of
the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned; petitioner failed to show his actual
interest in securing the information; and there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to
furnish the information he seeks.

Issue: W/N the petitioner can invoke his constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern.

Held:

Yes, the information sought by the petitioner is of public interest or public concern. Legaspi has the right
to know who are, and who are not civil service eligible. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of
public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of
civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the
civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Wherefore, writ of
mandamus is granted.

White light titanium corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist & Development Corporation vs City of Manila

G.R. No 122846

On December 3, 1992, then City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed Ordinance No. 7774 prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishment in the City of
Manila. Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) prayed that the Ordinance be declared
invalid and unconstiutional since it was authorize by P.D. No 259 to admit customers on a short time
bases and to charge wash up rates for a 3-hour stay. On Deecember 21, 1992 White Light Corporation
(WLC) file motion to intervene stating that the Ordinace directly affect their business interests as
operators of drive-in hotels and motels in manila.
Thereafter on the 28th of December of the same year, RTC directed the City from enforcing the
Ordinance to which the City contended that the latter is a legitimate exercise of power. The case was
then elevated to Court of Appeals where it reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance. Hence the petitioners came to the Court via petition for review on
certiorari contending that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of power.

Issue: w/n Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power

Held: No, the supreme court rules that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by
the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears
to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The validity of the ordinance must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to procedure
prescribed by law but it must also conform to the substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. But governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. However well intentioned the
Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance violates the constitutional right to privacy of the
patrons. Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

Wherefore, the Court declared the Ordinance unconstitutional

Harry Stonehill vs. Jose Diokno

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

Issue: whether or not the 42 search warrants to search the premises of the petitioners offices,
warehouse and/or residences are null and void.

Facts: A total of 42 search warrants against petitioner, Harry Stonehill et.al and the corporations of
which they were officers, were issued on different dates by the Respondent prosecutors, to seize and
take possession of personal properties as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds
or fruits of the offense". The petitioner alleged that the aforementioned search warrants are null and
oid, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court. They prayed that the decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void. Moreover, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondent-Prosecutors.
On the other hand, respondents-prosecutor answered that the search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with the law and that the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein
petitioners. Hence this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction.

Held: With regard to the warrants of three residences, the court rules that the searches and seizures
made therein are illegal. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question, would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
victims, caprice or passion of peace officers. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the
effects to be searched for and seized.

While those which are seized on the premises of the petitioners offices, the court ruled that the latter
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the document, papers, and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporation adverted to, since the right to object to the admission
of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong,
and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. Hence, motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises.

Roel Ebralinag vs. The Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu

G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993

Facts: 43 high school and elementary students, who belong to religious group of Jehovahs Witnesses, in
towns of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan, Cebu province were expelled from their
classes by the public authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as require by Republic Act No. 1265 and by Department Order No. 8 of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.

The petitioning students, assisted by their parents, filed a consolidated special civil actions for Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition against the respondent, the Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu.
The former contend that the latter acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion by ordering their expulsion without notice and hearing, hence, violating their right to due
process, free public education, and right to freedom of speech, religion and worship.

On the other hand, the respondent relied on the ruling of Gerona, et al. vs Secretary of Education, et al.
where the expulsions were upheld. It provided that 'The National flag is not an image but a symbol of
the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. If the exercise of said religious
belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield
and give way to the latter.' On November 27, 1990, a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was issued, thus, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioners violated their freedom of religion

Held: The court ruled that the expulsion of the petitioners is not justified, as cited in the opinion of
Justice Fernando in German vs. Barangan, Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to
the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of
man to his Creator. The students did not engage in disruptive behavior as they quietly stand at attention
to show their respect to those who choose to participate during the flag ceremony.

Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that
violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted
authorities. Moreover, the expulsion will violate their right as Philippine Citizens under Section 1, Article
XIV of 1987 Constitution.

The Court upholds the petitioners' right under our Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on
account of their religious beliefs. Wherefore, the petition is granted and the expulsion orders by the
respondent are annulled and set aside.

Sarmiento III vs. Mison

G.R. No. L-79974 December 17, 1987

Facts: President Corazon Aquino appointed Salvador Mison as Office Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Guillermo Carague as Secretary of the Department of Budget. The petitioners, Ulpiano
Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla questioned the appointment made by the President Aquino, they said
that the appointment is unconstitutional on the ground of its not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointment. Hence, the petition of prohibition to enjoin Mison from performing the
functions as a Office Commissioner and Carague from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's
salaries and emoluments.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment is unconstitutional

Held: No. Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with
the consent and confirmation of the CoA.

2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;

3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration
of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. The first group are the only public officers appointed by the president which requires the
confirmation of COA. The position of Mison does not belong to the first group, hence, his appointment
need not be confirmed by the COA.

Moreover, 1987 Constitution framers deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments except
appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Hence, the
Court ruled that the appointment of Salvador Mison is constitutional and is thus entitled to exercise the
full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining
thereto.

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000.

Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa assailed the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein.

Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas. Hence, this suit
for prohibition and mandamus.

Issue: Whether or not IPRA is unconstitutional.

Held: The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession
of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains.

The assailed law grants ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by
the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands.

However, ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains, specifically in Section 57 of the
IPRA, does not mean to "manage and conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the
ICCs/IPs "priority rights", meaning giving preference as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, in the development or exploitation thereof. Thus, having priority rights over the
natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The right of ownership and possession by
the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.

Wherefore, after deliberation , the Court en banc voted and reached a 7-7 vote. With no majority vote
obtained, the petition, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, was dismissed.