History and Philosophy in Science Teaching

See
discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226927644
History and philosophy in science teaching
Article in Interchange June 1989

DOI: 10.1007/BF01807043
CITATIONS READS
796 4,481
1 author:
Michael Matthews
UNSW Sydney
90 PUBLICATIONS 2,893 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
Feng Shui and Science Education View project
All content following this page was uploaded by Michael Matthews on 18 October 2014.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Contents
Preface iii
Acknowledgements v
1 Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science 3

Michael R. Matthews
2 Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science? 21

Peter Slezak
3 Teaching History and Philosophy of Science: Experience at IIT Kanpur 39

P.R.K. Rao
4 Multiculturalism in Science Education and the Question of Universalism. 51

William W. Cobern & Cathleen C. Loving
5 Varieties of Constructivism and their (Ir-)Relevance to Science Education 71

Peter Slezak
6 Social Constructivism and the Science Wars 85

Peter Slezak
7 Re-examining the Image of Science in the School Science Curriculum 111

William W. Cobern
8 Linking Science Pedagogy with History and Philosophy of Science

Through Cognitive Science: A Proposal 133
Amitabha Gupta
9 Conceptual Change in the Learning of Science 167

Stella Vosniadou
10 How did Galileo Discover the Law of Free Fall? An Epistemological

Reconstruction of the Episode 177
Nagarjuna G.
11 Introducing History of Science in Science Education: A Perspective

from Chemical Education 197
Prajit K. Basu
12 Multicultural Mathematics, Anti-racist Mathematics: What can that be? 213

George Gheverghese Joseph
2
13 Infinite Series Across Three Cultures: Background and Motivation 227
14 How should Euclidean Geometry be Taught? 243

C. K. Raju
15 The Axiomatic Method: Its Origin and Purpose 263

S. D. Agashe
16 Approaches to the Periodic Table 281

Rudolf Kraus
17 Alternative Frameworks in Electricity 291

A.B.Saxena
18 Common Mans Science 303

Rakesh Popli
19 Attitude Towards Science: An Analysis 321

Daya Pant
20 Emergence of Science Textbooks in TamilEncounter of Modern

Science with Traditional Knowledge Forms 343
T.V. Venkateswaran
Index 367
Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science
Michael R. Matthews
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. Email: m.matthews@unsw.edu.au
Science teachers contribute to the overall education of students, thus they need some
moderately well-formed view of what education is, and the goals it should be pursuing.
Teachers and administrators need some conception of an educated person, as this is the
telos of their individual classroom teaching and policy development. Teachers need to
keep their eyes on the educational prize, the more so when social pressures increasingly
devalue the intellectual and critical traditions of education.
The conviction that the learning of science needs to be accompanied by learning
about science is basic to liberal approaches to the teaching of science. If students
do not learn and appreciate something about scienceits history, its interrelations
with culture, religion, worldviews, and commerce, its philosophical and metaphysical
assumptions, its epistemology and methodologythen the opportunity for science to
enrich culture and human lives is correspondingly minimised. If science is taught
merely as a technical subject devoid of its cultural and philosophical dimensions, then
the positive results of science education are less able to fructify in society. We have
some inkling of this situation of lost cultural opportunities when we look at the purely
technical teaching of the sciences in the former USSR where the wide-spread teaching
of science did not appear, with a few courageous exceptions, to generate critical and
independent thinking, in many parts of contemporary southern USA where racism and
belief in creation science go hand-in-hand with sophistication in technical science, and
perhaps in Japan where it seems that technical science is taught fairly well, but the
scientific competence gained seems not to contribute very much to Japanese cultural
understanding or philosophy (on this complex matter see Kawasaki 1996).
The Science Literacy Crisis

It is widely recognised that there is a crisis in Western science education. Levels of
science literacy are disturbingly low. This is anomalous because science is one of the
greatest achievements of human culture. It has a wonderfully interesting and complex
past, it has revealed an enormous amount about ourselves and the world in which we
live, it has directly and indirectly transformed the social and natural worlds, and the
human and environmental problems requiring scientific understanding are pressing
yet, disturbingly, students and teachers are deserting science.
This flight from the science classroom by both teachers and students has been
depressingly well documented. In the US in the mid-1980s it was estimated that each
year 600 science graduates entered the teaching profession whilst 8,000 left it (Mayer
1987). In 1986, 7,100 US high schools had no course in physics, and 4,200 had no
course in chemistry (Mayer 1987). In 1990 only four states required the three years
of basic science recommended by the sobering 1983 report A Nation at Risk, the rest
2 Science Teaching: The Role of HPS
allowed high school graduation with only two years science (Beardsley 1992, p. 80).
Irrespective of years required, seventy percent of all school students drop science at
the first available opportunitywhich is one reason why in 1986 less than one in five
high school graduates had studied any physics. In 1991 the Carnegie Commission
on Science, Technology and Government warned that the failings of science education
were so great that they posed a chronic and serious threat to our nations future
(Beardsley 1992, p. 79). And the American National Science Foundation charged that
the nations undergraduate programs in science, mathematics and technology have
declined in quality and scope to such an extent that they are no longer meeting na-
tional needs. A unique American resource has been eroded (Heilbron 1987, p. 556).
The Second International Science Study indicated that the scientific knowledge of US
citizens was among the lowest in the industrialised world (Anderson 1989).
In the US, science illiteracy is disturbingly high among the educated classes. A 1986
survey of 1,000 college students in Connecticut, Texas, and California revealed that
58% believed in a literal Adam and Eve, and 25% thought that humans and dinosaurs
once lived together (Harrold & Eve, 1987). A survey of US biology teachers estimated
that 35% believe that psychic powers can be used to read other peoples minds, 30% per
cent reject the theory of evolution, and 20% believe in ghosts (Martin, 1994, p. 359).
In the UK, recent reports of the National Commission on Education and the Royal
Society have both documented similar trends. One commentator has said that wher-
ever you look, students are turning away from science . . .. Those that do go to university
are often of a frighteningly low caliber (Bown 1993, p. 12). In Australia in 1989 science
education programmes had the lowest entrance requirement of all university degrees.
A 1991 study in New Zealand by the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology
revealed how little citizens of that country knew and cared about science. The study
(based on the US tests of Jon Miller) of 1012 representative adults showed that:
Fully 90% were scientifically illiterate, having less than a minimum understand-
ing of the processes, terms and social impact of science.
Only 13% were even attentive or interested in science, with an even smaller
percentage of women in the sample being interested.
Only 3% were both literate and interested; that is most of the 10 per cent who
were scientifically literate, were not interested in science!
Overall there was a negative attitude to science. (MORST 1991, p. 4).
There are complex economic, social, cultural, and systemic reasons for this rejection
of science. These are beyond the scope of teachers to rectify. But there are also
educational reasons for the rejection of science that are within the power of teachers
and administrators to change. In 1989, for example, a disturbing number of the very
top Australian school science achievers gave too boring as the reason for not pursuing
university science. It is these curriculum and pedagogical failings that the history and
philosophy of science (HPS) can help rectify.
Michael Matthews 3
Science and Cultural Health
Studies of scientific illiteracy reveal a situation that is culturally alarming, not just
because they indicate that large percentages of the population do not know the meaning
of basic scientific concepts,1 and thus have little if any idea of how nature functions and
how technology works, but because they suggest widespread antiscientific views, and
illogical thought.
The defense of science in schools is important, if not necessary, to the intellectual
health of society. Pseudoscientific and irrational world views already have a strong
hold in Western culture; antiscience is on the rise.2 Newspaper astrology columns
are read by far more people than science columns; the tabloid press, with their Elvis
sightings and Martian visits, adorn checkout counters and are consumed by millions
worldwide each day. A 1991 Gallup Poll revealed that nearly half (47%) of all US
citizens believe that human life began on earth just a couple of thousand years ago
(Smith, Siegel & McInerney 1995). A study at one Canadian university found that a
majority of students believed in astrology, extrasensory perception, and reincarnation;
while another estimated that 11% of US citizens claim to have seen a ghost (Cromer
1993, p. 34). Surveys conducted over a three year period at the University of Texas
revealed that 60 per cent of students thought that some people could predict the future
by psychic powers, 35% believed in Black Magic, and the same percentage believed in
ghosts. A recent survey by the Australian Institute of Biology of 4,225 first-year biology
students from 17 universities in all States showed that one in eight (12%) believed that
God created man pretty much in his present form at one time within the last 10,000
years. Old-fashioned chemistry sets are no longer even marketed, while tarot cards
and crystals are available on almost every street corner.
When thought becomes so free from rational constraints, then outpourings of racism,
prejudice, hysteria and fanaticism of all kinds can be expected. For all its faults, science
has been an important factor in combating superstition, prejudice and ignorance. It
has provided, albeit falteringly, a counterinfluence to the natural inclinations of people
to judge circumstances in terms of their own self-interest. It instills a concern for
evidence, and for having ideas judged not by personal or social interest, but by how the
world is; a sense of Cosmic Piety, as Bertrand Russell called it. These values are under
attack both inside and outside the academy. When people en masse abandon science,
or science education abandons them, then the world is at a critical juncture. At such a
time the role of the science teacher is especially vital, and in need of all the intellectual
and material support possible.
1 Jon D. Miller has conducted a series of large-scale studies on scientific literacy in the US. On the basis of
ability to say something intelligible about concepts such as molecule, atom, byte, in 1985 he judged only 3%
of high-school graduates, 12% of college graduates, and 18% of college doctoral graduates to be scientifically
literate. See Miller (1983, 1987, 1992.)
2 For discussion of the anti-science phenomena see Passmore (1978), Holton (1993), Gross & Levitt (1994),
and Grove (1989).

International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group
My work grows out of, and is a contribution to, the International History, Philosophy,
and Science Teaching Group. This is a heterogenous group of teachers, scientists,
educators, historians, mathematicians, philosophers of education and philosophers of
science who have, since 1989, staged four international conferences3 and have ar-
ranged the publication of many special issues of academic journals devoted to HPS
and science teaching.4 Some basic papers in the field have been gathered together
and published in my History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching: Select Readings (OISE
Press, Toronto, and Teachers College Press, New York, 1990). These might be useful
for further reading. The International History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching Group
is also associated with a new journal devoted to the subject of this paperScience &
Education: Contributions from the History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science and
Education.5
The Rapprochement between History, Philosophy, and Science Education

In 1985 a paper was published titled Science Education and Philosophy of Science:
Twenty-Five Years of Mutually Exclusive Development (Duschl 1985). This was an
account of the missed opportunities and shortsighted curricular projects that resulted
from the development of science education largely separate from the disciplines of
history and philosophy of science. Pleasingly, in recent times there has been some
rapprochement between these fields. The well-documented crisis in science education
and analyses of its causes and remedies are resulting in both the theory and, impor-
tantly, the practice of science education becoming more informed by the history and
philosophy of science.
The present rapprochement between HPS and science education represents in part
a renaissance of the long-marginalised liberal, or contextual, tradition of science edu-
cation, a tradition contributed to in the last hundred years by scientists and educators
such as Ernst Mach, Pierre Duhem, Alfred North Whitehead, Percy Nunn, James
Conant, Joseph Schwab, Martin Wagenschein and Gerald Holton. The once-upon-a-
time widespread acceptance of this liberal view of science teaching can be attested to
by a comment made in a popular science teacher education text written over sixty years
3 The proceedings of the 1989 Tallahassee conference are available in Hergret (1989, 1990); those of the
1992 Kingston conference are in Hills (1992); the 1995 Minneapolis conference in Finley et al. (1995). The
1999 conference was held in Pavia, Italy, and information can be obtained from Professor Fabio Bevilacqua,
Dipartimento di Fisica, A. Volta, Universita di Pavia, Via A.Bassi 6, 27100 Pavia, Italy. The 2001 conference
is being held in Denver, Colorado, USA and information can be obtained from William McComas, Program
Chair School of Education, WPH 1001E University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA 90089-0031, USA
Email: mccomas@usc.edu
4 The journal special issues include the following: Educational Philosophy and Theory 20(2), (1988);
Synthese 80(1), (1989); Interchange 20(2), (1989); Studies in Philosophy and Education 10(1), (1990); Science
Education 75(1), (1991); Journal of Research in Science Teaching 29(4), (1992); International Journal of
Science Education 12(3), (1990); and Interchange 23(2,3), (1993).
5 The journal is published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The
Netherlands. It is available at reduced rates through the international HPS & ST group (inquiries to the
author).
Michael Matthews 5
ago. The author, F.M. Westaway, writes that a successful science teacher is one who:
. . . knows [his/her] own subject . . . is widely read in other branches of science . . . knows how to
teach . . . is able to express [him/her self] lucidly . . . is skillful in manipulation . . . is a logician
. . . is something of a philosopher . . . is so far an historian that [he/she] can sit down with a
crowd of [students] and talk to them about the personal equations, the lives, and the work
of such geniuses as Galileo, Newton, Faraday and Darwin. More than all this, [he/she] is an
enthusiast, full of faith in [his/her] own particular work. (Westaway, 1929, p. 3)
This is a nice sketch of the liberal, realist and contextual approach to the teaching
of science that I advocate. If universities, and colleges of education, produced an
abundance of such science teachers, many of the Western worlds science education
problems would be diminished.
The liberal tradition is characterized by a number of educational commitments.6
One is that education entails the introduction of children to the best traditions of their
culture, including the academic disciplines, in such a way that they both understand
the subject discipline, and know something about the disciplineits methodology, as-
sumptions, limitations, history and so forth. A second feature is that, as far as is
possible and appropriate, the relations of particular subjects to each other, and their
relation to the broader canvas of ethics, religion, culture, economics and politics should
be acknowledged and investigated. The liberal tradition seeks to overcome intellectual
fragmentation.
One part of the contribution of HPS to science teaching is to connect topics in
particular scientific disciplines, to connect the disciplines of science with each other,
to connect the sciences generally with mathematics, philosophy, literature, psychology,
history, technology, commerce and theology. And finally, to display the interconnections
of science and culturethe arts, ethics, religion, politicsmore broadly. Science has
developed in conjunction with other disciplines, there has been mutual interdepen-
dence. It has also developed, and is practiced, within a broader cultural and social
milieu. These interconnections and interdependencies can be appropriately explored
in science programs from elementary school to graduate study. The result is far more
satisfying for students than the unconnected topics that constitute most programs of
school and university science. Courses in the sciences are too often, as one student
remarked, forced marches through unknown country without time to look sideways.
The routine topic of pendulum motion, for instance, when taught in such a way that
includes consideration of its history and philosophy, results in the following kind of
integrated learning experience for students. The science of pendulum motion connects
with important topics in religion, history, philosophy and literature.7
Contributors to the liberal tradition believe that science taught from such a per-
spective, and informed by the history and philosophy of the subject, can engender
understanding of nature, the appreciation of beauty in both nature and science, and the
6 There is a large literature on the theory and practice of liberal education. Peters (1966, chs. 1, 2) and
Bantock (1981, ch. 4) are useful introductions. See also Dressel (1979) and Mark (1994). The contributions
to Obler & Estrin (1962) focus on the contribution of science to a liberal education, as do the arguments in
Holton (1973) and Schwab (1945).
7 For further details see Matthews (1999).
RELIGION HISTORY SCIENCE PHILOSOPHY LITERATURE
2 3
1 NDULU
PE
M
MO
T I ON
6 5 4
1. The Design Argument 4. Romantic Reaction

2. European Voyages of Discovery 5. Idealisation and Theory Testing
3. Aristotelian Physics and Methodology 6. Industrial Revolution
Figure 1: HPS-informed curriculum.

awareness of ethical issues unveiled by scientific knowledge and created by scientific
practice.
The liberal tradition maintains that science education should not just be an edu-
cation or training in science, although of course it must be this, but also an education
about science. Students educated in science should have an appreciation of scientific
methods, their diversity and their limitations. They should have a feeling for method-
ological issues, such as how scientific theories are evaluated and how competing theo-
ries are appraised, and a sense of the interrelated role of experiment, mathematics and
religious and philosophical commitment in the development of science. All students,
whether science majors or others, should have some knowledge of the great episodes in
the development of science and consequently of culture: the ancient demythologizing
of the world picture; the Copernican relocation of the earth from the centre of the solar
system; the development of experimental and mathematical science associated with
Galileo and Newton; Newtons demonstration that the terrestrial laws of attraction
operated in the celestial realms; Darwins epochal theory of evolution and his claims
for a naturalistic understanding of life; Pasteurs discovery of the microbial basis of
infection; Einsteins theories of gravitation and relativity; the discovery of the DNA
code, and research on the genetic basis of life. They should, depending upon their
Michael Matthews 7
age, have an appreciation of the intellectual, technical, social and personal factors that
contributed to these monumental achievements. Clearly all of these goals for general
education, and for science education, point to the integration of history and philosophy
into the science curriculum of schools and teacher education programmes. Teachers
of science need to know something of the history and nature of the discipline they are
teaching.
James Conant in the early 1950s expressed this perennial undercurrent in science
education when he said Being well-informed about science is not the same thing as
understanding science . . . What is needed is methods for imparting some knowledge of
the tactics and strategy of science (Conant 1951). Conant realised that understanding
sciences local tactics (methods and processes of science), and the more global strategies
(methodology and epistemology of science) required familiarity with the history of
science, and some knowledge of the philosophy of science. For Conant, and the liberal
tradition more generally, school science should be taught in such a way that it not only
brings about scientific understanding, but also that it contributes to what is now called
cultural literacy (Hirsch 1987).
Philosophy and Technical Science Education

The rapprochement between HPS and science education is not only dependent upon the
virtues of a liberal view of science education: a good technical science education also
requires some integration of history and philosophy into the program. Knowledge of
science entails knowledge of scientific facts, laws, theoriesthe products of science; it
also entails knowledge of the processes of sciencethe technical and intellectual ways
in which science develops and tests its knowledge claims. HPS is important for the
understanding of these process skills. Technicalor professional as it is sometimes
calledscience education is enhanced if students know the meaning of terms that
they are using and if they can think critically about texts, reports and their own
scientific activity. Their abilities as scientists are enhanced if they have read examples
of sustained inquiry, clever experimentation, and insightful hypotheses.
The US science educators James Rutherford (now director of the AAAS Project
2061) and Joseph Schwab both stressed the importance of pupils acquiring skills in
scientific method, but they recognised behind method lay important issues of method-
ology. Methodology is the theory of method, it is the explanation of why method works,
of why particular methods results in scientific knowledge. The distinction is somewhat
akin to that between a chef and someone who follows a cookbook recipe. The chef
knows why water is added after flour and baking powder to a cake mix, why certain
flours but not others are used in sauces and so on. Following a cookbook does require
its own skills and these are not to be minimised, but successful following of cookbooks
does not make people chefs. Training in cookbook recipes is not the same as the
education of a chef. The latter requires some understanding of why the recipes work,
why the ingredients are chosen, what the alternatives could be and so on. Likewise
competence in scientific method, processes and skillsmeasuring rolling balls, lighting
bunsens, choosing equipment, drawing graphs, devising hypotheses, thinking of control
conditions, locating errors, etc.are all important competencies and are not be to
minimised, but such competencies do not make students scientific; they do not make
them any wiser about how these processes relate to the creation or testing of scientific
knowledge. Method may not require philosophy but methodology does. And in as much
as technical science education aims to develop an appreciation of both scientific method
and methodology, then philosophy needs to be part of science education.
Consider for instance common laboratory work. Students might conduct an exper-
iment on bodies rolling down an inclined plane, or on the period of different length
pendulums, or on the ratio of tall versus short pea plants in different generations
of plants. These experiments might vary from, at the one end, routinised teacher
directed cookbook following, to at the other end, genuine open inquiry experiments. In
all cases there are important scientific method and process skills to be acquired; with
the inquiry experiments requiring more of the cognitive skills of hypothesis generation
and experimental design. But across the spectrum there are methodological questions
that transcend the simple method skills. How does the data relate to the phenomena?
How do descriptions relate to observations? What can be legitimately inferred from
the data? How do singular statements (the experimental data) bear upon universal
statements (supposed scientific laws)? In what circumstances can experimental data
falsify hypotheses or laws? In what circumstances, if any, can data verify laws? How
can data confirm laws? These questions all give rise to standard methodological issues
about induction, falsification, theory dependence of observation, the epistemological
status of theory, the ontological status of theoretical terms, and so on. These questions
are the bread and butter of philosophy of science, and students can be encouraged to
dine on them.
Others have made the same point about logic and science education. A 1966 paper in
The Science Teacher is titled Use Philosophy to Explain the Scientific Method (Berlin
& Gaines 1966). An informative 1977 paper, drawing on Matthew Lipmans Philosophy
for Children material, and published in Science Education is titled Philosophic Inquiry
and the Logic of Elementary School Science Education (Wagner & Lucas 1977). The
reasoning dimension of science competence has been recognised in curriculum doc-
uments. Ehud Jungwirth in a comprehensive study of the issue, lists a number of
curriculum statements that make reference to critical-logical-analytical thinking skills
(Jungwirth 1987).
Alfred North Whitehead expressed this view of good technical education when, just
after World War II, he said:
The antithesis between a technical and a liberal education is fallacious. There can be no ade-
quate technical education which is not liberal, and no liberal education which is not technical:
that is, no education which does not impart both technique and intellectual vision. (Whitehead
1947, p. 73)
A common occurrence in science classrooms is a child asking: If no one has seen

atoms, how come we are drawing pictures of them? Such a child is raising one of the
most interesting questions in philosophy of science: the relationship of evidence to
models, and of models to reality. Good science teachers should encourage such ques-
tions and be able to provide satisfactory answers, or suggestions for further questions.
Michael Matthews 9
To reply I do not know, or because it is in the book is to forego the opportunity
of introducing students to the rich methodological dimensions of science. Einstein
caught this philosophical dimension of science when he once described physicists as
philosophers in workmens clothes. Science teachers, as well as being competent in
science, psychology, pastoral care, crisis management and everything else demanded
of them, need also to be philosophers. Students commonly ask: Why are we studying
this? How do we know this is true? Does this make sense to anyone? Teachers should
take advantage of such questions to widen the intellectual horizons of their students,
to give them a sense that there are many big issues about that deserve reflection and
consideration.
Philosophy is not far below the surface in any scientific investigation. At a most ba-
sic level any text or scientific discussion will contain terms such as law, theory, model,
explanation, cause, truth, knowledge, hypothesis, confirmation, observation and
so on. Philosophy begins when students and teachers slow down the science lesson
and ask what these terms mean and what the conditions are for their correct use. All
of these concepts contribute to, and in part arise from, philosophical deliberation on
issues of epistemology and metaphysics: questions about what things can be known
and how we can know them, and about what things actually exist in the world and the
relations possible between them. Students and teachers can be encouraged to ask the
philosophers standard questions: What do you mean by ? and How do you
know ? of all these concepts. Such introductory philosophical analysis allows
greater appreciation of the distinct empirical and conceptual issues involved when for
instance Boyles Law, Daltons model, or Darwins theory is discussed. It also promotes
critical and reflective thinking more generally.
Lee Shulman, a US educational researcher and policy analyst, has developed this
feature of the teachers role with his notion of Pedagogical Content Knowledge. Of this
he has said:
To think properly about content knowledge requires going beyond knowledge of the facts or
concepts of a domain. It requires understanding the structures of the subject matter . . . Teach-
ers must not only be capable of defining for students the accepted truths in a domain. They
must also be able to explain why a particular proposition is deemed warranted, why it is worth
knowing, and how it relates to other propositions, both within the discipline and without, both
in theory and in practice. (Shulman 1986, p. 9)
The abilities sought by Shulman are enhanced if teachers are interested in and
familiar with the history and philosophy of whatever subject they are teaching. The US
National Standards in Science Education group is urging teachers to ask themselves
and their students not just what do we know in science, but how do we know what we
know. These are routine methodological questions that lead into and are answered by
the philosophy of science.
Current Curriculum Proposals

Integration of HPS and science education has been proposed recently by numerous
government and educational bodies. Among these have been the American Association
for the Advancement of Science in two of its very influential reports Project 2061 (AAAS
1989) and The Liberal Art of Science (AAAS 1990); the British National Curriculum
Council (NCC 1988); the Science Council of Canada (SCC 1984); the Danish Science
and Technology curriculum, and in The Netherlands, the PLON curriculum materials.8
In these cases HPS is not simply another item of subject matter added to the science
syllabus; what is proposed is the more general incorporation of HPS themes into the
content of curricula. The American Association for the Advancement of Science, in its
Project 2061 proposal, has written that:
Science courses should place science in its historical perspective. Liberally educated students
the science major and the non-major alikeshould complete their science courses with an
appreciation of science as part of an intellectual, social, and cultural tradition. . . . Science
courses must convey these aspects of science by stressing its ethical, social, economic, and
political dimensions. (AAAS 1989, p. 24)
The AAAS in its proposal for the reform of college science teaching, The Liberal
Art of Science, recognises that science education is enriched, and is more faithful to its
subject, if aspects of the interesting and complex interplay of science and philosophy
can be conveyed in the classroom. It says:
The teaching of science must explore the interplay between science and the intellectual and
cultural traditions in which it is firmly embedded. Science has a history that can demonstrate
the relationship between science and the wider world of ideas and can illuminate contemporary
issues. (AAAS 1990, p. xiv)
The advocates of a contextual approach to science teaching are not just educational
dreamers. There has been a tradition of attempts to teach science in an HPS-informed
or liberal manner. The strengths and weaknesses of these attempts can be examined.
Perhaps the outstanding example was the Harvard Project Physics course developed for
schools in the early 1960s by Gerald Holton, James Rutherford and Fletcher Watson. 9
Over sixty studies of the effectiveness of the program were published (Welch 1973)
and these were all positive and encouraging. Measures such as retention in science,
participation of women, improvement on critical thinking tests and understanding
of subject matter all showed improvement where the Project Physics curriculum was
adopted. Another example of a widely adopted HPS-influenced course was the Yellow
Version of the BSCS Biology course developed by John Moore and Joseph Schwab. 10
8 The British National Curriculum is documented in NCC (1988). It is discussed in Akeroyd (1989), Ray
(1991), and Solomon (1991). The Danish curriculum in the History of Science and Technology is discussed
in Nielsen & Nielsen (1988), and Nielsen & Thomsen (1990). In The Netherlands there has been a Physics
in Society course since 1981 (Eijkelhof & Swager 1983), and since 1972 various materials generated by
the PLON project have incorporated a HPS dimension (Project Curriculum Development in Physics, PO
Box 80.008, 3508 TA Utrecht, The Netherlands). The Project 2061 proposals are contained in AAAS (1989)
and republished in Rutherford & Ahlgren (1990); they are discussed in Stein (1989). A discussion of STS
programmes and a guide to the literature can be found in McFadden (1989) and Yager (1993).
9 Fifteen per cent of US high school physics students were following this program at its peak, and it was
widely used outside the US. The philosophy behind this program can be read in Gerald Holton (1978a), and
in the symposium published in The Physics Teacher (1967, vol. 5 no. 2). Other evaluations of Harvard Project
Physics can be found in Aikenhead (1974), Brush (1978, 1989), Russell (1981), and Welch & Walberg (1972).
10 This was first published in 1963 and went through four editions up to 1980.
Michael Matthews 11
Contributions of HPS to Science Education
The inclusion of history and philosophy of science does not, of course, provide all the
answers to the present science education crisisultimately these answers lie deep in
the heart of culture and economics. But the history and philosophy of science has a
contribution to make to the overall task of improving science teaching and learning.
Aspects of this contribution might be itemized as follows:
HPS can humanize the sciences and connect them to personal, ethical, cultural,
and political concerns. There is evidence that this makes science and engineer-
ing programmes more attractive to many students, and particularly girls, who
currently reject them.
HPS, particularly basic logical and analytic exercisesDoes this conclusion fol-
low from the premises? and, What do you mean by such and such?can make
classrooms more challenging, and enhance reasoning and critical thinking skills.
HPS can contribute to the fuller understanding of scientific subject matterit can
help to overcome the sea of meaninglessness, as Joseph Novak once said, where
formulae and equations are recited without knowledge of what they mean or to
what they refer.
HPS can improve teacher education by assisting teachers to develop a richer and
more authentic understanding of science and its place in the intellectual and
social scheme of things. This has a flow-on effect, as there is much evidence that
teachers epistemology, or views about the nature of science, affect how they teach
and the message they convey to students.
HPS can assist teachers appreciate the learning difficulties of students, because
it alerts them to the historic difficulties of scientific development and conceptual
change. Galileo was forty years of age before he formulated the modern conception
of acceleration, despite prolonged thought he never worked out a correct theory
for the tides. By historical studies teachers can see what some of the intellectual
and conceptual difficulties were in the early periods of scientific disciplines. This
knowledge can assist with the organization of the curriculum and the teaching of
lessons.
HPS can contribute to the clearer appraisal of many contemporary educational
debates that engage science teachers and curriculum planners. Many of these
debatesabout constructivist teaching methods, multicultural science education,
feminist science, environmental science, inquiry learning, science-technology-society
curricula and so forthmake claims and assumptions about the history and epis-
temology of science, or the nature of human knowledge and its production and
validation. Without some grounding in HPS, teachers can be too easily carried
along by fashionable ideas which later, sadly, seemed good at the time.
There are various ways in which the interplay between science and philosophy can
be conveyed: reading of selections from original sources; joint projects with history, so-
cial science, divinity or literature classes; dramatic reenactments of significant episodes
in the history of science; essays on selected themes; debates on topical matters; or low-
level philosophical questioning about scientific topics being studied or practical work
being conducted. All philosophy of science begins with analytical and logical matters:
What does a particular concept mean? How do we know the truth of a proposition? Does
a conclusion follow from the premises adduced? These analytic and logical questions
and habits of thought can be introduced as early as preschoolas Matthew Lipman
and the Philosophy for Children programs attestand they can be refined as children
mature (Lipman & Sharp 1978). Susan Johnson and Jim Stewart (1991) provide a nice
example of the incorporation of philosophy of science into a high school genetics course.
They focus on the three Ps of science: problem posing, problem solving, and persuasion
of peers.
School courses in Science-Technology-Society (STS) are another area in which sci-
ence courses connect with philosophy, particularly ethical and political philosophy. A
1990 Department of Education guide to STS education issued by the provincial govern-
ment of Alberta, CanadaUnifying the Goals of Science Educationgives prominence
to teaching about the nature of science. Its reading list includes the work of Hawking,
Einstein, Holton, Kuhn, Latour, Polanyi and Ravetz. A recent list of common STS topics
includes: abortion, AIDS, endangered species, genetic engineering, organ transplants,
nuclear war, space exploration, and waste management (Rubba et al.1991). These STS
courses in England, Holland, Canada, and the US11 deal explicitly with political and
ethical issues involving notions such as justice, equality, the fair distribution of goods,
responsibility and the likeall of which are clarified by philosophical analysis, and
by reference to the history of these ideas. Without philosophical input, STS courses
run the risk of just repeating fashionable and shallow ideology about pollution, nuclear
energy, conservation and so on. This was seen in the 1940s in Science for Consumers
courses. Shallow views on these vital matters tend to be blown away at the first gust
of national- or self-interest that the student encounters upon leaving school.
There is not, of course, a single HPS-informed view of science or of science education.
There are two broad camps discernible in the literature: those who appeal to HPS to
support the teaching of science, and those who appeal to HPS to puncture the perceived
arrogance and authority of science. The second group stress the human face of science,
the fallibility of science, the impact of politics and special interests, including racial,
class and sexual interests, on the pursuit of science; they argue for skepticism about
scientific knowledge claims. For this group, HPS shows that science is one among a
number of equally valid ways of looking at the world, it has no epistemic privilege;
its supposed privilege derives merely from social considerations and technological suc-
cess. This group includes those influenced by postmodernist philosophy, and certain
sociologies of science.
11 See the two NSTA Yearbooks Redesigning Science and Technology Education (Bybee et al. 1984) and
Science, Technology, Society (Bybee 1985), and their volume The Science, Technology, Society Movement
(Yager 1993).
Michael Matthews 13
Conclusion
There are many reasons why study of the history and philosophy of science should
be part of preservice and in-service science teacher education programs. Increasingly
school science courses address historical, philosophical, ethical and cultural issues
occasioned by science. Teachers of such curricula obviously need knowledge of HPS.
Without such knowledge they either present truncated versions of the curricula, or
repeat uncritical gossip about the topics mentioned. Either way their students are
done a disservice. But even where curricula do not include such nature of science
sections, HPS can contribute to more interesting and critical teaching of science.
Beyond these practical arguments for HPS in teacher education, there are com-
pelling professional arguments. A teacher ought to know more than just what he or
she teaches. As an educator, they need to know something about the body of knowledge
they are teaching, something about how this knowledge has come about, how its claims
are justified and what its limitations are. Teachers should have a feel for, or appreci-
ation of, the tradition of inquiry into which they are initiating students. HPS fosters
this.
Education systems have a responsibility to identify and transmit the best of our
cultural heritage. Science is one of the most important parts of this heritage. The
history and philosophy of science allows science teachers to better understand their
own social and professional responsibilities as part of a great tradition.
References
Aikenhead, G.: 1980, Science in Social Issues: Implications for Teaching, Science
Council of Canada, Ottawa.
Aikenhead, G. S.: 1974, Course Evaluation II: Interpretation of Student Performance
on Evaluation Tests, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 11, 2330.
Akeroyd, F.: 1989, Philosophy of Science in a National Curriculum, in D.E.Herget
(ed.), The History and Philosophy of Science in Science Teaching, Florida State
University, pp. 1522.
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS): 1989, Project 2061:
Science for All Americans, AAAS, Washington, DC. Also published by Oxford
University Press, 1990.
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS): 1990, The Liberal Art of
Science: Agenda for Action, AAAS, Washington, DC.
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS): 1993, Benchmarks for
Science Literacy: Draft, AAAS, Washington DC.
American Physical Society (APS): 1986, Report of the Committee on Education - 1985,
Bulletin of the American Physical Society 31(6), 10331034.
Anderson, O.: 1989, The Teaching and Learning of Biology in the United States,
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, New
York.
Bantock, G.: 1981, The Parochialism of the Present, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Beardsley, T.: 1992, Teaching Real Science, Scientific American pp. 7886.
Berlin, B. and Gaines, A.: 1966, Use Philosophy to Explain the Scientific Method, The
Science Teacher 33(5).
Biological Science Curriculum Committee (BSCS): 1992, Mapping and Sequencing the
Human Genome: Science, Ethics and Public Policy, BSCS, Colorado Springs, CO.
Blake, D.: 1994, Revolution, Revision, or Reversal: Genetics-Ethics Curriculum,
Science & Education 3(4).
Bown, W.: 1993, Classroom Science goes into Freefall, New Scientist pp. 1213.
Brush, S.: 1969, The Role of History in the Teaching of Physics, The Physics Teacher
7(5), 271280.
Brush, S.: 1989, History of Science and Science Education, Interchange 20(2), 6070.
Bybee, R. (ed.): 1985, Science, Technology, Society, NSTA, Washington. Yearbook of the
National Science Teachers Association.
Bybee, R.W. Carlson, J. and McCormack, A. (eds): 1984, Redesigning Science &
Technology Education, National Science Teachers Association, Washington DC.
Cordero, A.: 1992, Science, Objectivity and Moral Values, Science & Education 1(1), 49
70.
Cromer, A.: 1993, Uncommon Sense: The Heretical Nature of Science, Oxford
University Press, New York.
Cross, R. and Price, R.: 1992, Teaching Science for Social Responsibility, St Louis Press,
Sydney.
Dressel, P.: 1979, Liberal Education: Developing the Characteristics of a Liberally
Educated Person, Liberal Education 65(3), 313322.
Duschl, R.: 1985, Science Education & Philosophy of Science Twenty-five, Years of
Mutually Exclusive Development, School Science and Mathematics 87(7), 541
555.
Eger, M.: 1989, The Interests of Science and the Problems of Education, Synthese
80(1), 81106.
Michael Matthews 15
Eijkelhof, H. and Swager, J.: 1983, Physics in Society: New Trends in Physics Teaching
IV, UNESCO, Paris.
Gross, P. and Levitt, N.: 1994, Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels
with Science, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Nielsen, H. and Thomsen, P.: 1990, History and Philosophy of Science in the Danish
Curriculum, International Journal of Science Education 12(4), 308316.
Harrold, F. and Eve, R.: 1987, Patterns of Creationist Belief Among College Students,
in F. Harrold and R. Eve (eds), Cult Archaeology and Creationism: Understanding
Pseudoscientific Beliefs about the Past, University of Iowa Press, Ames.
Herget, D. (ed.): 1989, The History and Philosophy of Science in Science Teaching,
Florida State University, Tallahassee FL.
Herget, D. (ed.): 1990, The History and Philosophy of Science in Science Teaching,
Florida State University, Tallahassee FL.
Hills, S. (ed.): 1992, The History and Philosophy of Science in Science Education, two
volumes, Queens University, Kingston.
Holton, G.: 1973, Physics and Culture: Criteria for Curriculum Design and Modern
Science and the Intellectual Tradition, In his, Thematic Origins of Scientific
Thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Holton, G.: 1978, On the Educational Philosophy of the Project Physics Course,
In his, The Scientific Imagination: Case Studies, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, pp. 284298.
Holton, G.: 1993, Science and Anti-Science, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Husserl, E.: 1954/1970, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phe-
nomenology, Northwestern University Press, Evanston.
Johnson, S. and Stewart, J.: 1991, Using Philosophy of Science in Curriculum
Development: An Example from High School Genetics, in M. Matthews (ed.),
History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching: Selected Readings, OISE Press,
Toronto, Ontario, pp. 201212.
Jungwirth, E.: 1987, Avoidance of Logical Fallacies: A Neglected Aspect of Science-
education and Science-teacher Education, Research in Science & Technological
Education 5(1), 4358.
Kawasaki, K.: 1996, The Concepts of Science in Japanese and Western Education,
Science & Education 5.
Lipman, M. and Sharp, A. (eds): 1978, Growing Up with Philosophy, Temple University
Press, Philadelphia.
Mark, H.: 1994, What is a Liberal Education?, New Directions for Higher Education
85, 3136.
Martin, M.: 1986, Science Education and Moral Education, Journal of Moral Educa-
tion, Reprinted in M. Matthews (ed.), History, Philosophy and Science Teaching:
Selected Readings, OISE Press, Toronto, 1991, pp. 102114.
Martin, M.: 1994, Pseudoscience, the Paranormal, and Science Education, Science &
Education 3(4).
Matthews, M.: 1994, Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science,
Routledge, New York.
Matthews, M.: 1999, Time for Science Education: How Teaching the History and
Philosophy of Pendulum Motion can Contribute to Science Literacy, Plenum
Publishers, New York.
Matthews, M. (ed.): 1991, History, Philosophy and Science Teaching: Selected Read-
ings, OISE Press, Toronto.
Mayer, J.: 1987, Consequences of a Weak Science Education, Boston Globe .
McFadden, C.: 1989, Redefining the School Curriculum, in D. Herget (ed.), The
History and Philosophy of Science in Science Teaching, Florida State University,
Tallahassee, pp. 259270.
Miller, J.: 1983, Scientific Literacy: A Conceptual and Empirical Review, Daedalus,
112(2), 29-47.
Miller, J.: 1987, Scientific Literacy in the United States, in E. David and M. OConnor
(eds), Communicating Science to the Public, John Wiley, London.
Miller, J.: 1992, The Public Understanding of Science and Technology in the United
States, 1990, National Science Foundation, Washington DC.
Ministry of Research Science and Technology (MORST): 1991, Survey of Attitudes to,
and Understanding of, Science and Technology in New Zealand, Publication No.4,
MORST, Wellington.
Musschenga, B. and Gosling, D. (eds): 1985, Science Education and Ethical Values:
Introducing Ethics and Religion into the Science Classroom and Laboratory,
Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC.
National Commission on Excellence in Education: 1983, A Nation At Risk: The
Imperative for Education Reform, US Department of Education, Washington DC.
National Curriculum Council (NCC): 1988, Science in the National Curriculum, NCC,
York.
Michael Matthews 17
Nielsen, H. and Nielsen, K.: 1988, History of Technology in Education - Why and How,
in C. Blondel and P. Brouzeng (eds), Science Education and the History of Physics,
pp. 5168.
Nielsen, H. and Thomsen, P.: 1990, History and Philosophy of Science in the Danish
Curriculum, International Journal of Science Education, 12(4), 308-316.
Obler, P. and Estrin, H. (eds): 1962, The New Scientist: Essays on the Methods and
Values of Modern Science, Doubleday, New York.
Passmore, J.: 1978, Science and Its Critics, Rutgers University Press, Rutgers NJ.
Peters, R.: 1966, Ethics and Education, George Allen and Unwin, London.
Ray, C.: 1991, Science Education, Philosophy of Science, and Scientific Prejudice,
Science Education 75(1), 8794.
Rubba, P. et al.: 1991, The Effects of Infusing STS Vignettes into the Genetics
Unit of Biology on Learner Outcomes in STS and Genetics: A Report of Two
Investigations, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 28(6), 537552.
Russell, T.: 1981, What History of Science, How Much and Why?, Science Education
65, 5164.
Rutherford, F. and Ahlgren, A.: 1990, Science for All Americans, Oxford University
Press, New York.
Schwab, J.: 1945, The Nature of Scientific Knowledge as Related to Liberal Education,
Journal of General Education, 3, 245-266. Reproduced in I. Westbury and
N. Wilkof (eds), Joseph J. Schwab: Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978,
Science Council of Canada (SCC): 1984, Science for Every Student: Educating Canadi-
ans for Tomorrows World, Report 36, SCC, Ottawa.
Shulman, L.: 1986, Those Who Understand: Knowledge Growth in Teaching, Educa-
tional Researcher 15(2), 414.
Smith, M.U. Siegel, H. and McInerney, J.: 1995, Foundational Issues in Evolution
Education, Science & Education 4(1), 2346.
Solomon, J.: 1991, Teaching About the Nature of Science in the British National
Curriculum, Science Education 75(1), 95104.
Wagner, P. and Lucas, C.: 1977, Philosophic Inquiry and the Logic of Elementary School
Science Education, Science Education 61(4), 549558.
Welch, W.: 1973, Review of the Research and Evaluation Program of Harvard Project
Physics, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 10, 365378.
Welch, W. and Walberg, H.: 1972, A National Experiment in Curriculum Evaluation,
American Educational Research Journal 9, 373383.
Westaway, F.: 1929, Science Teaching, Blackie and Son, London.
Whitehead, A.: 1947, Technical Education and Its Relation to Science and Literature,
In his, The Aims of Education and Other Essays, Williams & Norgate, London.
Yager, R. (ed.): 1993, The Science, Technology, Society Movement, National Science
Teachers Association, Washington DC.
Ziman, J.: 1980, Teaching and Learning about Science and Society, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?
Peter Slezak
University of New South Wales, Australia. Email: p.slezak@unsw.edu.au
The place of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) in the science curriculum derives
from the rationale for teaching science itself. The point is best appreciated by means
of an illustration. We see one familiar rationale for teaching science in the remarks of
Collins & Pinch (1992):
It is nice to know the content of scienceit helps one to do a lot of things such as repair the
car, wire a plug, build a model aeroplane, use a personal computer to some effect, know where
in the oven to put a souffle, lower ones energy bills, disinfect a wound, repair the kettle, avoid
blowing oneself up with the gas cooker, and much much more. (Collins & Pinch 1992, p. 150)
Such a utilitarian view of science has consequences not only for how science is
taught, but also for how research is pursued. If seen primarily in terms of its use-
fulness, even this practical aspect of science may be jeopardised, for curiosity-driven re-
search is not merely a dispensable luxury, but the very mechanism of scientific progress.
Thus, the prosaic, pragmatic conception of science education of Collins and Pinch is
a view which might be thought to leave out something important. It is no accident
that this view of science and its value in the curriculum is articulated by sociologists
who are among the foremost proponents of a constructivist and relativist conception
according to which science is not to be understood in terms of its rational, intellectual,
explanatory content but rather as a merely consensual, negotiated and culturally con-
tingent convention based on interests and politics. This approach has been an avowedly
deflationist one, skeptical of the claims of science as a privileged form of knowledge and,
therefore, concerned to demote it from its exalted status and unwarranted pretensions.
The view of science as merely instrumentally useful, at best, is in keeping with
a widespread anti-science sentiment, indeed hostility, which has fuelled the recent
science wars (Gross & Levitt 1994). Laudan (1990, p. x) has scathingly described
sociological relativist views as the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of
anti-intellectualism in our time. The charge of anti-intellectualism points to the aspect
of social constructivism which has the most direct pedagogical implications. Such meta-
scientific, philosophical views will inevitably have some influence on the teaching of
science content. On such constructivist views (Ashmore 1993, Pinch & Collins 1984)
there is no more warrant for teaching currently accepted science than discredited
theories since there are no intellectual grounds to distinguish between them, only social
and political ones (see Slezak 2000).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, we may note an actual example of science
teaching which is informed by a different outlook, namely, one which seeks to convey
a picture of science as the highest achievements of the human intellect. Densmores
(1995) text reconstructs the central argument of Newtons Principia and suggests what
it means for a student to make the attempt to appreciate Newtons achievement:
20 Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?
. . . one can feel the sense of adventure and intrigue, the challenge of solving the puzzle. It can
be viewed as one views many games and puzzles people buy and play voluntarily for fun. It
can be viewed as one views a good detective story: all the clues are there . . .. (Densmore 1995,
p. xxxi)
This conception is in the spirit of those such as Jacob Bronowski (1960, 1964, 1978)
who writes of science as the highest romantic adventure with intellectual, aesthetic
and inspirational qualities equal to those of the arts. Indeed, beyond these, Bronowski
has emphasized the fundamental moral dimension of science which echoes the values
emphasized by Popper and other philosophers of science.
The Inevitability of HPS in the Curriculum.

The contrast between the foregoing views of science raises precisely the issue of whether
or not it is possible to teach the content of science without explicitly addressing issues
about science. I will suggest that HPS cannot be avoided in the science curriculum
simply because some position on fundamental questions will be implicitly assumed
even where it is not explicitly addressed. Arguably, therefore, it is better to address
such conceptions openly as part of science teaching rather than to insinuate them
tacitly. However, this, in turn, requires familiarity with the range of opinions and
doctrines in the discipline of HPS. The value of a self-conscious concern with meta-
scientific issues is attested by Einstein in the following remarks:
How does a normally talented research scientist come to concern himself with the theory of
knowledge? Is there not more valuable work to be done in his field? I hear this from many
of my professional colleagues; or rather, I sense in the case of many more of them that this
is what they feel. I cannot share this opinion. When I think of the ablest students whom I
have encountered in teachingi.e., those who distinguish themselves by their independence of
judgement, and not only by mere agilityI find that they had a lively concern for the theory
of knowledge. They liked to start discussions concerning the aims and methods of the sciences,
and showed unequivocally by the obstinacy with which they defended their views that this
subject seemed important to them. (Einstein 1916, quoted in Holton 1973)
As if responding directly to Collins and Pinch, Einstein adds:

. . . For when I turn to science not for some superficial reason such as money-making or ambi-
tion, and also not (or at least exclusively) for the pleasure of the sport, the delights of brain-
athletics, then the following questions must burningly interest me as a disciple of this science:
What goal will and can be reached by the science to which I am dedicating myself? To what
extent are its general results true? What is essential, and what is based only on the accidents
of development? (Einstein 1916, quoted in Holton 1973)
Naive Philosophy of Science

Just as people have a naive, intuitive, commonsense understanding of the physical
world which is Aristotelian, so they have a naive meta-knowledge or commonsense
conception of the nature of science itself. Thus, what philosophers have dubbed the
pessimistic historical meta-induction is, in fact, the most widespread view among
laypersons and the scientifically illiterate. Echoing a popular skepticism, Laudan
(1981, p. 232) has argued that a difficulty for realism is the fact that the history of
Peter Slezak 21
science offers a long list of successful theories which turn out to be wrong. Specifically,
they appear to be nonreferential with respect to central explanatory concepts and
posits. Thus we no longer believe in the existence of crystalline spheres, bodily humors,
phlogiston, caloric, vital forces or the luminiferous ether, inter alia. The pessimistic
meta-induction is captured in Glymours (1992) observation:
Since all [scientific] theories in history have been false, . . . we should conclude that the methods
of science do not generate true theories; hence our present scientific theories, which were
obtained by the same methods, are false as well. (Glymour 1992, p. 126)
Even if knowing little else, everyone is aware that science is historically changeable.
The important question, then, is what conclusions may be drawn from this undeniable
fact about the history of science. For non-experts, the mutability of science seems
to warrant a general belief in the need to remain open minded about miraculous
or paranormal phenomena which are contrary to accepted scientific theories. Thus,
for example, a standard popular response to skepticism about psychic phenomena
is to cite the supposed lessons of the history of science and its ever changing body
of beliefs. This lesson is taken to dictate an open-mindedness about unorthodox
and even disreputable theories rather than dogmatic dismissal. This tolerance is
allegedly inferred from earlier mistakes and is often justified with the slogan They
laughed at Galileo too. However, an apt answer which has been given by skeptics is
Yes, but they laughed at Bozo the clown too. Being unorthodox is not, in itself, a
virtue.
Recruited in this way as support for some currently unfounded pseudo-science, the
argument from history is entirely vacuous despite being almost universally seen as
self-evident. The insight is only the wisdom of hindsight, because it cannot provide
grounds for deciding what to believe in any given case today. However difficult to
explicate, warranted belief must be based on the usual considerations of evidence,
explanatory coherence, comprehensiveness, elegance, and whatever other factors play
a role. None of these are weighted differently in the light of the historical mutability
of science. Based on past practice, knowing only that what we believe tomorrow will
be different from what we believe today carries no specific implication or prescription
for current beliefs. Nevertheless, generally deployed in this way, an inexplicit, naive
philosophy of science is taken to warrant either credulity or global skepticism.
Closed Mind or Open Mind?

In his characteristically ironic way, Bertrand Russell (1925) has noted a well-known
feature of education:
A certain percentage of children have the habit of thinking; one of the aims of education is to
cure them of this habit. (Russell 1925, p. 378)
When faced explicitly as a question about the place of HPS in the curriculum, the
issue of open-mindedness poses a seeming paradox. Undeniably, one of the central
features of science emphasized by many scholars has been its critical nature. Popper
(1963) has emphasized that the origin of science among the Presocratics was specif-
ically founded in their inauguration of a tradition of critical inquiry as opposed to
dogmatic acceptance of orthodoxy. The same moral has been emphasized by schol-
ars such as Guthrie (1962) and Farrington (1961) who share Poppers view that the
essence of the scientific enterprise was first captured by these Milesian Greeks in their
commitment to criticism as the means for improving and advancing our understanding
of the world. For Popper, this theme of conjectures and refutations found expression in
his doctrine of falsifiability as the mark of science, distinguishing it from metaphysics
or other pseudo-scientific inquiries. Thus, he asserts Criticism is the lifeblood of all
rational thought (Popper 1974). In view of this widely held conception of science, an
acute paradox is presented by T.S. Kuhn who writes:
To turn Sir Karls view on its head, it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that
marks the transition to science. (Kuhn 1970b, p. 6)
For those wishing to teach science as an embodiment of rationality and critical think-
ing, it is important to reconcile this Popperian conception with Kuhns radically alter-
native picture of science as founded on dogmatism. In a famous essay The Essential
Tension, Kuhn observes that:
. . . exclusive exposure to a rigid tradition has been immensely productive of the most conse-
quential sorts of innovations. . . . each of [the natural sciences] acquired something like that
technique [of rigid education] at precisely the point when the field began to make rapid and
systematic progress. (Kuhn 1959, pp. 229-231)
The dilemma for science educators arises from recognizing the divergence between
the rhetoric and the reality of scientific practice. The theme of Kuhns essay is the
tension between open and closed mindedness, that is, between convergent and diver-
gent thinking . Divergent thinking is the flexible or lateral thinking characteristic of
creative discovery and innovation. Kuhn explains:
The basic scientist must lack prejudice to a degree where he can look at the most self-evident
facts or concepts without necessarily accepting them, and, conversely, allow his imagination to
play with the most unlikely possibilities . . .
. . . divergent thinking [is] the freedom to go off in different directions, . . . rejecting the old
solutions and striking out in some new direction.
. . . gigantic divergences lie at the core of the most significant episodes in scientific development.
(Kuhn 1959, p. 226)
Kuhn notes that a common criticism of science education complains that it empha-
sizes narrow or convergent thinking at the expense of creative, divergent thinking.
This criticism suggests We have attempted to teach students how to arrive at correct
answers that our civilization has taught us are correct . . .. Outside the arts . . . we have
generally discouraged the development of divergent thinking abilities, unintentionally.
Kuhn acknowledges that this characterization of our educational practice is eminently
just, but he askes whether it is equally just to deplore the product that results. Kuhn
is pointing to the function of science education and textbooks as indoctrination, and to
the crucial role of such indoctrination in the very success of science.
In an ironic defence of dogmatism Kuhn explains:
Peter Slezak 23
But both my own experience in scientific research and my reading of the history of sciences
lead me to wonder whether flexibility and open-mindedness have not been too exclusively
emphasized as the characteristics requisite for basic research.
. . . normal research, even the best of it, is a highly convergent activity based firmly upon a
settled consensus acquired from scientific education and reinforced by subsequent life in the
profession.
Let me try briefly to epitomize the nature of education in the natural sciences . . .. The single
most striking feature of this education is that, to an extent totally unknown in other creative
fields, it is conducted entirely through textbooks . . . written especially for students. . . . There
are no collections of readings in the natural science. Nor are science students encouraged
to read the historical classics of their fieldsworks in which they might discover other ways
of regarding the problems discussed in their textbooks, but in which they would also meet
problems, concepts, and standards of solution that their future professions have long since
discarded and replaced. . . . These books exhibit concrete problem solutions that the profession
has come to accept as paradigms, . . . Nothing could be better calculated to produce mental
sets . . . Even the most faintly liberal educational theory must view this pedagogic technique
as anathema. . . . Education in the natural sciences seems to have been totally unaffected
by [attitudes encouraging divergent thinking, open-mindedness and creativity, innovation
etc.]. . . . It remains a dogmatic initiation in a pre-established tradition that the student is
not equipped to evaluate. (Kuhn 1959, pp. 228-229)
Kuhns view reverses a traditional conception of science and how it should be taught.
For example, on such a view one common picture of the Galileo affair is mistaken, since
the orthodox Aristotelianism of the Catholic Church was not essentially different in its
conservatism from that of science itself.
History of Science as Subversive

Conventional goals of science teaching have been articulated in authoritative and influ-
ential policy documents as inductive generalization from data, a venerable conception
seen in historical figures such as Herschel and Planck. However, such pronouncements,
like other methodological doctrines, are impossible to reconcile with the actual practice
of scientists themselves as revealed by the historical record. In this regard, history
has a subversive effect in undermining widely held prejudices about science. Thus, for
example, S. Brush (1974) writes:
Once it has been pointed out that in Galileos statement, I have discovered by experiment
some properties of [motion], the words by experiment were added in an English translation
and do not appear in the original Italian version, it is hard to maintain the traditional faith in
Galileos empiricism. (Brush 1974, p. 1170)
Another distinguished historian of science remarks on Isaac Newton in the same vein:
If the Principia established the quantitative pattern of modern science, it equally suggested
a less sublime truththat no one can manipulate the fudge factor quite so effectively as the
master mathematician himself. (Westfall, quoted in Brush 1974, p. 1167)
Contrary to a naive empiricist views, Newtons approach is characterised by Densmore:

This attempt to give science a logically sound deductive basis constituted a radical departure
from Francis Bacons inductive method, which was very influential at the time [and more
recently]. Bacon advocated collecting many and varied instances of the phenomena under study
and trying to see patterns.
By contrast Newton used minimal experimental data. . . . Everything was deduced, using
mathematical demonstrations, from these few observation-based conclusions about how our
world works. (Densmore 1995, p. xxi)
However, more surprising perhaps than Newtons failure to employ inductive methods
is his commitment to quite radically different principles not usually thought compatible
with scientific method. Thus, Newton writes in his Principia:
I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men for the belief of a Deity;
and nothing can rejoice me more than to find it useful for that purpose.
Evidently, Newtons goal was to demonstrate the dependence of matter on God. West-
fall notes:
He sought as well to plumb the mind of God and His eternal plan for the world and mankind
as it was presented in the biblical prophecies. (Westfall 1980, p. 105)
In the famous passages of the General Scholium of Book Three in Newtons Philosophiae
Naturalis Principia Mathematica, Newton not only utters his famous hypotheses non
fingo, that is, his unwillingness to speculate about the occult causes of gravitational
action at a distance. More remarkably, though rarely noted, is the fact that Newton
also expresses a conception of a designer deity:
This most elegant arrangement of the sun, planets, and comets could not have arisen but by the
plan and rule of an intelligent and powerful being. And if the fixed stars be centers of similar
systems, all these, constructed by a similar plan, will be under the rule of One . . .
He governs everything, not as the soul of the world, but as lord of all things. And because of
his dominion, he is usually called Lord God Universal Emperor . . . And from true absolute
rule it follows that the true God is living, intelligent, or in the highest degree perfect. He is
eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, he endures from eternity to eternity,
and is present from infinity to infinity. He reigns over everything, and knows everything that
happens or can happen. . . .
The whole diversity of created things according to places and times could only have arisen
from the ideas and will of a being existing necessarily. . . . And this much concerning God,
to discourse of whom, at least from the phenomena, is the business of natural philosophy.
(Newton, in Densmore & Donahue 1985)
Such passages in the midst of the scientific theorising require us to qualify precon-
ceptions about what is the properly scientific part of Newtons work, and they serve
to remind us of the arbitrariness of dismissing in retrospect those parts which we may
now regard as pseudo-scientific or religious. These distinctions appear not to have been
meaningful to Newton himself. This is of course, the lesson of Kuhns (1970) work.
A further example is instructive. A common conception of science as driven by
empirical data is amusingly illuminated by anecdotes about Einstein:
But you dont seriously believe, Einstein protested, that none but observable magnitudes
must go into a physical theory? Isnt that precisely what you have done with relativity? I
asked in some surprise. . . . Possibly I did use this kind of reasoning, Einstein admitted, but
Peter Slezak 25
it is nonsense all the same. Perhaps I could put it more diplomatically by saying that it may be
heuristically useful to keep in mind what one has actually observed. But on principle, it is quite
wrong to try founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. In reality the very opposite
happens. It is the theory which decides what we can observe. (Heisenberg 1971, p. 63)
In the autumn of 1919, in the course of a discussion with a student, Einsteinnow aged
40handed her a cable which had informed him that the bending of light by the sun was
in agreement with his general relativistic prediction. The student asked what he would have
said if there had been no confirmation. Einstein replied, Then I would have to pity the dear
Lord. The theory is correct anyway. (Pais 1994, p. 127)
This last anecdote is interesting in part because the confirmation of the bending of
light was cited by Karl Popper as the very exemplary case of falsifiability. Einsteins
attitude reveals how little scientists conform to Popperian conceptions of rationality.
However, more forceful than such anecdote is the systematic study of episodes such as
the famous Eddington expedition referred to in the story by Pais. Earman and Glymour
(1980) reveal that the entire episode is a case study of Duhem-Quine adjustment of aux-
iliary hypotheses in order to save a favoured theory faced with recalcitrant evidence.
They write:
The initial reception of special relativity in English speaking countries was almost uniformly
hostile or disdainful. . . . One may imagine that in order to turn the tide of opinion the eclipse
results must have been unequivocal. They were not. (Earman & Glymour 1980, p. 50)
In truth, while some aspects of Eddingtons [1919] handling of the deflection of light were in the
finest traditions of science, others were not. As he confessed in Space, time and gravitation, he
was not altogether unbiased. The bias showed in his treatment of the evidence: he repeatedly
posed a false trichotomy for the deflection results, claimed the superiority of the qualitatively
inferior Principe data, and suppressed reference to the negative Sobral results. (His discussion
of the red-shift was sometimes no better . . .)
. . . all that was necessary to establish the red-shift prediction was a willingness to throw out
most of the evidence and the ingenuity to contrive arguments that would justify doing so.
. . . The red-shift was confirmed because reputable people agreed to throw out a good part of
the observations. They did so in part because they believe the theory; and they believed the
theory, again at least in part, because they believed that the British eclipse expeditions had
confirmed it. Now the eclipse expeditions confirmed the theory only if part of the observations
were thrown out and the discrepancies in the remainder ignored: Dyson and Eddington, who
presented the results to the scientific world, threw out a good part of the data and ignored the
discrepancies.
This curious sequence of reasons might be cause enough for despair on the part of those who
see in science a model of objectivity and rationality. That mood should be lightened by the
reflection that the theory in which Eddington placed his faith because he thought it beautiful
and profoundand, possibly, because he thought that it would be best for the world if it
were truethis theory, so far as we know, still holds the truth about space, time and gravity.
(Earman & Glymour 1980, pp. 84-85)
Contextual Approach: Is Content Knowledge HPS-free?

For the reasons indicated, there seems to be no alternative to a contextualist approach
as advocated by Matthews (1992, p. 12) in which students learn about the nature of
science simultaneously with learning the substantive content of science. In particular,
the intention is not that HPS topics be extraneous, added on to science courses, or that
HPS be substituted for content knowledge. Rather these themes should be integrated
into the curriculum material itself as an intrinsic part.
No one expects children to solve the realism/instrumentalism debate, nor should they learn
catechism-like that there were fifteen reasons why Galileo was right and the cardinals wrong.
Rather they are expected to appreciate something of the intellectual issues that are at stake
in these matters; to appreciate that there are questions to ask and to begin to think not just
about answers, but what would count as answers, and what kinds of evidence would support
our answers. (Matthews 1992, p. 14)
The understanding of content knowledge cannot be HPS-free because even learning

the bare facts and theories of science inherently requires understanding such things as
the evidential warrant for one theory and why it might be preferred over another, what
counts as an explanation, refutation etc. For example, how else can one explain why
evolution is to be preferred to creationism without some appeal to weight of evidence,
explanatory force and other such concepts central to the philosophy of science? Not
least of all, this example inevitably raises the issue of demarcation between science
and pseudo-science which has been a central theme in the philosophy of science at
least since David Hume and Immanuel Kant.
The educational significance of such philosophical questions is brought into sharp
relief in the text-book and curriculum debates concerning creation science which have
recently been revived in the USA (See Ruse 1988, Laudan 1988).
Paradox of HPS in Science Teaching

If, as just suggested, science cannot be taught as bare content, facts, theories and
formulae without some implicit philosophical doctrine, an apparent paradox arises
from the need to make such doctrine explicit. The theories of HPS are themselves
controversial and changeable. The alternative to not teaching HPS explicitly seems to
be that of teaching more or less controversial philosophical views which are themselves
less secure than the science content itself. Thus, for example, teaching physics by
integrating something of the history of Galileo confronts the difficulty of finding a non-
controversial picture. Galileo has been seen in the following ways. William Whewell
(1840) wrote
Galileo was an inductivist and empiricist with prepondering inclination towards facts, and did
not feel, so much as some other persons of his time, the need of reducing them to ideas. (Quoted
in Matthews 1992, p. 19)
David Brewster (1830) suggested Galileo was a Baconian inductivist, while Ernst
Mach (1883) and the positivists suggest that Galileo did not supply us with a theory
of the falling of bodies, but investigated, wholly without preformed opinions, the actual
facts of falling. Alexandre Koyre (1939) claimed that Galileo was a Platonist who
invented some experiments, while Stillman Drake (1978) argued that Galileo was a
patient experimentalist. Notoriously, Paul Feyerabend (1975) argued that Galileo was
an anarchist, dadaist and propagandist with no method. Finally, Stillman Drake
(1971) disputes a common view in claiming that Galileo fought not against religion or
the church but against authority. In light of these diverse accounts, it would seem that
HPS becomes something like Bertrand Russells parody of animal psychology:
Peter Slezak 27
Animals studied by Americans rush about frantically, with an incredible display of hustle and
pep, and at last achieve the desired result by chance. Animals observed by Germans sit still
and think, and at last evolve the solution out of their inner consciousness. (Russell 1960, p. 33)
Matthews (1992) has characterised this as the hermeneutical problem which has
important intellectual virtues, despite the inherent difficulty:
The hermeneutical problem of interpretation in the history of science, far from being an em-
barrassment or impediment to the use of history, can be the occcasion to introduce students to
the significant questions of how we read texts and interpret events, to the complex problems of
meaning: students know from their everyday life that people see things differently, the history
of science is a natural vehicle for illustrating how this fact impinges on science itself. (Matthews
1992, p. 22)
A Role for History: The Bias of Science Textbooks

Following the theme of his Essential Tension noted earlier, a new sensitivity to history
giving rise to this hermeneutical problem was inaugurated by T.S. Kuhns (1970)
landmark work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions which opened with observations
on the role of history and, in particular, the function of science textbooks.
History if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive
transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed. That image has pre-
viously been drawn, even by scientists themselves, mainly from the study of finished scientific
achievements as these are recorded in the classics and, more recently, in the textbooks from
which each new scientific generation learns to practice its trade. Inevitably, however, the aim
of such books is persuasive and pedagogic; a concept of science drawn from them is no more
likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image of a national culture drawn from
a tourist brochure or a language text. This essay attempts to show that we have been misled
by them in fundamental ways. Its aim is a sketch of the quite different concept of science that
can emerge from the historical record of the research activity itself.
. . . historians confront growing difficulties in distinguishing the scientific component of past
observation and belief from what their predecessors had readily labeled error and super-
stition. The more carefully they study, say, Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry, or
caloric thermodynamics, the more certain they feel that those once current views of nature
were, as a whole, neither less scientific nor more the product of human idiosyncrasy than those
current today. If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can be produced
by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific
knowledge. If, on the other hand, they are to be called science, then science has included bodies
of belief quite incompatible with the ones we hold today. (Kuhn 1970a, p. 1)
Science & Subjectivity

One reaction to Kuhns work was a concern about its irrationalism in portraying
science as the product of psychological and social forces rather than the pure cognitive
force of evidence and argument. I. Scheffler wrote:
That the ideal of objectivity has been fundamental to science is beyond question. The philo-
sophical task is to assess and interpret this ideal: to ask how, if at all, objectivity is possible.
This task is especially urgent now, when received opinions as to the sources of objectivity in
science are increasingly under attack.
The notion of a fixed observational given, of a constant descriptive language, of a shared
methodology of investigation, of a rational community advancing its knowledge of the real
worldall have been subjected to severe and mounting criticism from a variety of directions.
The overall tendency of such criticism has been to call into question the very conception of
scientific thought as a responsible enterprise of reasonable men. (Scheffler 1967, p. 1)
This was undoubtedly an over-reaction to the work of Kuhn, though it seems am-
ply warranted in relation to the more extreme sociological doctrines which saw their
origins in Kuhns book. Acknowledging the non-rational elements in the science does
not mean abandoning a conception of scientific thought as a responsible enterprise of
reasonable men, but only the need for reconciling these elements into a more subtle
and complex overall picture.
Such a reconciliation is unquestionably a difficult and perhaps as yet unattained
ideal. This poses a difficult question for the educator because the old verities and
comforting stereotypes about science and its virtues appear to be false. How, then,
can science be taught in a way which is consistent with its history and sensitive to its
vagaries.
Should the History of Science be Rated X?

In view of the subversive nature of the history of science in the ways we have seen, one
answer to the foregoing question offered ironically by S. Brush (1974) is censorship.
. . . young and impressionable students at the start of a scientific career should be shielded
from the writings of contemporary science historians . . . [because] these writings do violence
to the professional ideal and public image of scientists as rational, open-minded investigators,
proceeding methodically, grounded incontrovertibly in the outcome of controlled experiments,
and seeking objectively for the truth . . .. (Brush 1974, p. 1164)
My point is that, if science teachers want to use the history of science, and if they want
to obtain their information and interpretations from contemporary writings by historians of
science rather than from the myths and anecdotes handed down from one generation of text-
book writers to the next, they cannot avoid being influenced by the kind of skepticism about
objectivity which is now so widespread.
. . . I do not know how science teachers are going to respond to the new historical interpreta-
tions. So far, most teachers seem to have ignored them.
. . . I suggest that the teacher who wants to indoctrinate his students in the traditional role of
the scientist as a neutral fact-finder should not use historical materials of the kind now being
prepared by historians of science: they will not serve his purposes. (Brush 1974, p. 1170)
Realism vs Instrumentalism
A striking feature of contemporary science is the way in which it evokes philosophical
disputes essentially identical to those arising at the origins of modern science with the
scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. Specifically, we see this illustrated in
a book by Jauch (1989) titled Are Quanta Real? Significantly, the work is in the form of
a Galilean dialogue which is particularly apt in view of the fact that the issues raised
are identical with those at the heart of the Galileo affair. The issue between Cardinal
Bellarmine and Galileo was centrally concerned with the literal interpretation of the
Copernican heliocentric theory in view of the contrary teachings of Aristotle and the
Bible. The question at the heart of contemporary quantum physics is remarkable for
being identical with the one facing Galileos Copernicanism as we see in van Fraassens
(in Cushing et al. eds. 1984, p. 171) question regarding quantum theory: He asks:
Peter Slezak 29
How could the world possibly be the way physical theory says it is? For Bellarmine,
as for quantum theorists today, the issue was the need to save the appearances and
whether any further commitment to the literal claims of the theory was justified. This
was, of course, the question raised in Osianders notorious preface to Copernicuss De
Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium of 1543. The correspondences of Bellarmine and
Galileo reveal the same contrasting attitudes as those seen today (see appendix).
We see the dilemma for Galileo raised in an acute form today at the very inception
of quantum theory with Max Plancks treatment of Black-Body radiation in 1900. The
classical Rayleigh-Jeans theory led to a distribution law for energies irreconcilable
with observations and even with the finiteness of the total energy of the radiation (the
so-called ultra-violet catastrophe). Norton (1994) explains the problem arising from
the fact that Plancks ad hoc model managed to save the appearances by what Planck
himself regarded as physically meaningless mathematical tricks.
. . . [Plancks] discontinuity theory was by no means a popular theory, and understandably so. It
required the falsity of a quite fundamental supposition of classical physics. The mere fact that
the discontinuity [quantization] hypothesis saved the phenomena was certainly not sufficient
to force its acceptance. Why should one not hope that the phenomena would be saved by some
less traumatic variant of the classical theory that preserved continuity? (Norton 1994, p. 16)
In view of the experimental confirmation of the most counter-intuitive features of

quantum theory including Bohrs predictions against those of Einsteins EPR thought-
experiment, the difficulties of accepting the literal meaning of quantum theory are
hardly less today. As Feynman (1965, p. 129) has quipped, despite its unprecedented
success, nobody understands quantum mechanics.
By contrast with instrumentalism and related anti-realist doctrines, Putnam (1975,
p. 73) has said that the positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy
that doesnt make the success of science a miracle. However, one might rhetorically
ask What success? Thus, the philosophers standard theoretical entity, the electron,
serves to bring the difficult issues into relief. An affirmative answer to the question
Are electrons real? is faced with the history sketched by Bain and Norton (1998):
For Thomson (1897), the electron was an electrified particle obeying Newtonian dynamic. For
Einstein (1905) the electron had instrinsic mass and relativistic dynamics; for Bohr (1910) the
electron had a mix of classical and discrete properties; for Pauli (1925) the electron obeyed a
non-classical exclusion principle; for Jordan and Wigner (1928) the electron was an excitation
of a fermionic field; for Wigner (1939) the electron had a spin 1/2 and was the irreducible
representation of a Poincare group; for Glashow, Salam and Weinberg (1967) the electron
has massless left-handed and right-handed parts uniting to form a massive particle through
interactions with a scalar Higgs field; and the current standard model (1990) takes the electron
to be a member of first of three generations of similar leptonic particles related in a non-trivial
way to three generations of hadronic quarks.
Anti-realism might be thought to follow from such a litany, but Hacking (1982)
suggests that philosophers have placed too much emphasis on theory and not enough
on experiment. Hacking explains:
No field in the philosophy of science is more systematically neglected than experiment. Our
grade school teachers may have told us that scientific method is experimental method, but
histories of science have become histories of theory. (Hacking 1982, p. 248)
No wonder that scientific antirealism is so permanently in the race. It is a variant on the
spectator theory of knowledge [that is, Berkeleys idealism]. (Hacking 1982, p. 258)
I proceed from experimental practice. . . . [From] an interest in real life physics as opposed to
philosophical fantasy science. (Hacking 1982, p. 259)
Once upon a time, it made good sense to doubt that there were electrons. . . . The best reason
for thinking that there are electrons might have been success in explanation. But the ability to
explain carries little warrant of truth. . . . Antirealism about any submicroscopic entities was
a sound doctrine in those days. Things are different now. The direct proof of electrons and
the like is our ability to manipulate them using well-understood low-level causal properties.
(Hacking 1982, p. 256/258)
. . . engineering, not theorizing, is the best proof of scientific realism about entities. (Hacking
1982, p. 258)
Of course, Hackings final comment makes it difficult to see how one might ascribe
reality to black holes which are hardly amenable to engineering in the way he seems
to have in mind. Nevertheless, my concern here has been only to point to the ways in
which the deepest questions of the history and philosophy of science bear directly on the
manner and substance of science teaching. Toulmin (1970) has indicated the intimate
intertwining in which, for example, both Planck and Mach had been influenced in
different ways by the philosophical ideas of Immanuel Kant. Toulmin suggests that the
positivism of Mach worked its way into the very fabric of theoretical physics, shaping
Bohrs interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Physics and philosophy have had a continuous relationship, but a fluctuating one. . . . In
certain periods, physical scientists have been content to acknowledge their partnership with
philosophers, and even to see their own fundamental theories and methods as resting on
metaphysical foundations. (Toulmin 1970, p. ix)
As Matthews notes:
If science has developed as a dialogue with metaphysics . . ., then to teach science as a soliloquy
in which science just talks to itself and grows entirely by self-criticism is to impoverish the
subject matter. (Matthews 1992, p. 36)
References
Ashmore, M.: 1993, The Theatre of the Blind: Starring a Promethean Prankster, a
Phoney Phenomenon, a Prism, a Pocket and a Piece of Wood, Social Studies of
Science 23, 67106.
Bain, J. and Norton, J.: 1998, What Should Philosophers of Science Learn from the
History of the Electron?, unpublished manuscript.
Boden, M. (ed.): 1994, Dimensions of Creativity, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Boyd, R.: 1983, On the Current Status of Scientific Realism, Erkenntnis 19, 4590.
Reprinted in Boyd, Gasper and Trout, eds. The Philosophy of Science, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 1991, 195-222.
Boyd, R. G. P. and Trout, J. (eds): 1991, The Philosophy of Science, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
Peter Slezak 31
Brody, B. and Grandy, R. (eds): 1989, Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 2nd edn,
Prentice-Hall.
Bronowski, J.: 1960, The Commonsense of Science, Penguin Books, London.
Bronowski, J.: 1964, Science and Human Values, Penguin Books, London.
Bronowski, J.: 1978, The Visionary Eye, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Brown, J.: 1991, The Laboratory of the Mind, Routledge, London.
Brown, J.: 1994, Smoke and Mirrors: How Science Reflects Reality, Routledge, London.
Brush, S. G.: 1974, Should the History of Science be Rated X?, Science 183, 11641172.
Capra, F.: 1975, The Tao of Physics, Bantam, New York.
Collins, H. and Pinch, T.: 1992, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know About Science,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Cushing, J.: 1998, Philosophical Concepts in Physics: The Historical Relation Between
Philosophy and Scientific Theories, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Cushing, J. and McMullin, E. (eds): 1989, Philosophical Consequences of Quantum
Theory: Reflections on Bells Theorem, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre
Dame.
Cushing, J.T. Delaney, C. and Gutting, G. (eds): 1984, Science & Reality, University of
Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame.
Densmore, D.: 1995, Newtons Principia: The Central Argument: Translation, Notes
and Expanded Proofs, Green Lion Press, Santa Fe.
Drake, S.: 1957, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, Doubleday Anchor, New York.
Duhem, P.: 1906/1962., The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Athenaeum, New
York.
Earman, J. and Glymour, C.: 1980, Relativity and Eclipses, Historical Studies in the
Philsophy of Science 11(1), 4985.
Farrington, B.: 1961, Greek Science, Penguin Books, Middlesex.
Feynman, R.: 1965, The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Fine, A.: 1986, The Shaky Game, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
Finocchiaro, M.: 1989, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History, University of
California Press, Berkeley.
Fodor, J. A.: 1984, Observation Reconsidered, Philosophy of Science 51, 2343.
Giere, R.: 1988, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Giere, R. (ed.): 1992, Cognitive Models of Science, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, Vol. XV, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Glymour, C.: 1992, Realism and the Nature of Theories, in W. S. et. al. (ed.),
Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Gorman, M.: 1992, Simulating Science: Heuristics, Mental Models and Technoscientific
Thinking, Indiana University Press, Bloomington.
Grim, P. (ed.): 1990, Philosophy of Science and the Occult, SUNY Press, New York.
Gross, P. and Levitt, N.: 1994, Higher Superstition, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore.
Guthrie, W. K. C.: 1962, A History of Greek Philosophy: The Earlier Presocratics and
the Pythagoreans, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hacking, I.: 1981a, Do we see through a microscope?, Philosophical Quarterly 62(4).
Reprinted in B. Brody and R. Grandy eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science,
2nd edition, Prentice-Hall, 1989, 29-43.
Hacking, I.: 1982, Experimentation and Scientific Realism, Philosophical Topics,
Vol. 13. 71-87, Reprinted in R. Boyd, P. Gasper & J.D. Trout eds., The Philosophy
of Science, Bradford/MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991, 247-260.
Hacking, I. (ed.): 1981b, Scientific Revolutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hanson, N.: 1958, Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Heisenberg, W.: 1971, Physics and Beyond, Harper & Row, New York.
Hirschfeld, L. and Gelman, S. (eds): 1994, Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in
Cognition and Culture, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Holton, G.: 1973, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein, Harvard
Univerity Press, Cambridge.
Holton, G.: 1978, The Scientific Imagination, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hoyningen-Huene, P.: 1993, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhns
Philosophy of Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Jauch, J. M.: 1989, Are Quanta Real? A Galilean Dialogue, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington.
Koestler, A.: 1972, The Roots of Coincidence, Hutchinson, London.
Peter Slezak 33
Kuhn, T. S.: 1959, The Essential Tension, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies
in Scientific Tradition and Change, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1977, pp. 225239. Also reprinted in R. Boyd, P. Gasper & J.D. Trout eds., The
Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford/MIT Press, 1991, 139 -147.
Kuhn, T. S.: 1970a, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago University Press,
Chicago.
Kuhn, T. S.: 1970b, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?, in I. Lakatos and
A. Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Kuhn, T. S.: 1977, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and
Change, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
Lakatos, I.: 1978, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Laudan, L.: 1981, A Confutation of Convergent Realism, Philosophy of Science 48, 19
48. Reprinted in Boyd, Gasper & Trout eds, 1991, 223-245, and in Leplin ed.,
1984, 218-249.
Laudan, L.: 1983, The Demise of the Demarcation Problem, in R. Cohen and L. Laudan
(eds), Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 111127.
Laudan, L.: 1988, Science at the Bar - Causes for Concern (Reply to Ruse), in M. Ruse
(ed.), But Is It Science?, Prometheus Books, Buffalo.
Laudan, L.: 1990, Science And Relativism, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Leplin, J.: 1984, Scientific Realism, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Margolis, H.: 1993, Paradigms and Barriers, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Matthews, M.: 1994, Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science,
Routledge, New York.
Matthews, M. (ed.): 1989, The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy: Selected
Readings, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis.
Matthews, M. R.: 1992, History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching: The Present
Rapprochement, Science & Education 1, 1147.
Maxwell, G.: 1962, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities, in H. Feigl and
G. Maxwell (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III,
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Reprinted in Brody and Grandy eds.,
Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 1989, 21-28.
Miller, A.: 1986, Imagery in Scientific Thought, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Norton, J.: 1998, How We Know About Electrons, unpublished manuscript.
Norton, J. D.: 1994, Science and Certainty, Synthese 99, 322.
Pais, A.: 1994, Einstein Lived Here, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Pinch, T. and Collins, H.: 1984, Private Science and Public Knowledge: The Committee
for the Scientific Investigation of the Paranormal and its Use of the Literature,
Social Studies of Science 14, 52146.
Popper, K.: 1963, Back to the PreSocratics, in Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge
& Kegan Paul, London, pp. 136-165.
Popper, K.: 1974, Replies to my critics, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl
Popper, Vol. 2, Open Court, La Salle.
Putnam, H.: 1975, Mathematics, Matter and Method, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Ruse, M.: 1984, A Philosophers Day in Court, in A. Montague (ed.), Science and
Creation, Oxford University Press.
Ruse, M. (ed.): 1988, But Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in the Cre-
ation/Evolution Controversy, Prometheus Books, Buffalo.
Russell, B.: 1960, An Outline of Philosophy, Meridian Books, Cleveland.
Russell, B.: 1961, What I Believe, in R. Egner and L. Denon (eds), The Basic Writings
of Bertrand Russell, 1925, Simon & Schuster, New York.
Salmon. M. Earman, J. Glymour, C. et. al. (ed.): 1992, Introduction to the Philosophy of
Science, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Savage, C. (ed.): 1990, Scientific Theories: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, Vol. XIV, Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis.
Scheffler, I.: 1967, Science and Subjectivity, Bobbs Merrill, New York.
Slezak, P.: 1996, Review of Paul Davies The Mind of God, Science & Education 5, 201
212.
Slezak, P.: 2000, Radical Social Constructivism, NSSE Yearbook. forthcoming.
Sorensen, R.: 1992, Thought Experiments, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Thagard, P.: 1988, Computational Philosophy of Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Thagard, P.: 1992, Conceptual Revolutions, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Toulmin, S. (ed.): 1970, Physical Reality, Harper & Row, New York.
Peter Slezak 35
Tweney, R.D. Doherty, M. and Mynatt, C. (eds): 1981, On Scientific Thinking, Columbia
van Fraassen, B.: 1976, To Save the Phenomena, Journal of Philosophy 73(18), 62332.
Reprinted in Boyd, Gasper and Trout eds., 1991, 186-194.
van Frassen, B.: 1980, The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
West, T.: 1991, In the Minds Eye, Prometheus Books, Buffalo.

Westfall, R.: 1980, Never at Rest, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Teaching History and Philosophy of Science: Experience at IIT Kanpur
P.R.K. Rao
Formerly of Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, India
As this book is about teaching and history, before I recall my fading memory traces
of my experience of teaching history and philosophy of science at IIT (Indian Institute
of Technology)-Kanpur, let me begin by reminding you of two cautionary remarks of
George Bernard Shaw, Teaching, he said, is ineffective except in those instances in
which it is superfluous. Perhaps, there is an element of truth in the claim that our
students learn inspite of us rather than because of us! About history, Shaw maintained
that the only lesson that we can learn from history is that nobody learns from it.
These two indictments, whatever their truth, can help moderate our, excessive en-
thusiasm for and expectations of innovations in science education. Moreover, nothing
warrants the presumption that every civilized, vibrant nation must necessarily be also
a scientifically advanced nation.
The kind of concerns and circumstances that prompted some of us at IIT Kanpur to
introduce a programme of courses in history of science, scientific method, science and
technology and its linkages with society are best captured by the observations of the
first and the last programme leaders of the KanpurIndo-American programme which
helped establish IIT Kanpur with the participation of a consortium of nine leading
American Universities. The first programme leader, Normal Dahl had observed that
IIT Kanpur has been an irrelevant factor in the industrial and social progress in India
. . . a kind of isolated island of academic excellence but not part of the mainstream of
Indias development. This assessment worried some of us for we were imbued with
the idea that institutions like IIT Kanpur were set upto to be able to attend to the
scientific and technological needs of the country. What distressed us even more and
drove home our failure as educators was the telling observation of the last programme
leader Mr. Oakely. He said that IIT Kanpur students face no technological background
problems of adjustment in M.I.T., one of the foremost symbols of high-technology west,
and the same students show considerable enthusiasm when, possibly for the first time
in their education, they are exposed to the ideas of growth of technology and its relation
to percieved technological needs specific to a country.
Science is a selective cognitive enterprise. The nature of that selectivity, to my mind,
is succintly described by Hertz in the introduction to his book, Principles of Mechanics.
We form images or symbols of objects such that the logically necessary consequences
of those symbols or images are the same as the materially necessary consequences
of the objects that correspond to the symbols or images. What is interesting in Hertzs
account is the feature of the considerable freedom that exists in the formation of images
or symbols of objects even as they must obey the above stipulated important limitation.
In the cognitive enterprise called science, while we are necessarily performing, what
Hans Jonas has called the primary ontological reduction of the actual objects of the
38 Teaching HPS
world (as for example, point masses in place of extended physical objects in rigid body
dynamics), there is no unique way of performing that primary ontological reduction.
Earlier, successful scientific practices, cultural influences, environmental pressures,
socioeconomic factors etc., may contingently further constrain a particular scientific
community in exercising the freedom involved in primary ontological reduction, but the
existence of that freedom is the condition of possibility of what we understand by the
term creativity. Our failure as teachers at IIT Kanpur consisted in not even sensitizing
our students to the idea that science is a human and historical practice, let alone
provoking them to draw on their creativity to perform such fruitful primary ontological
reductions which will enable them to attend to the scientific and technological needs
of the society to which they belong. Undoubtedly we have been quite successful in
training our students to use established recipes in their chosen disciplines. But we
have not even attended to the more important problem of orienting them so that they
perceive a relevant segment of reality around them, perform novel primary ontological
reductions, formulate the pertinent problems and solve them creatively.
Our failure, it then appeared to us, can be traced, at least in part, to the situa-
tion in which not only lay man but also practicing scientists are so overwhelmed by
the products of science that they pay scant attention to the processes by which the
enterprise of science manufactures knowledge. One disastrous consequence of this
lack of self-reflexivity, particularly in a third world country like India, has been the
gradual weakening of critical, social and political forces that could mediate between the
requirements of autonomy of the expert scientific community and the developmental
needs of the country.
The above account should have made it clear that even in an institution like IIT
Kanpur famous for its flexibility in procedures it is not going to be easy to introduce
new courses that do not fall within the framework of established disciplinary divisions.
Fortunately for us, at that point of time there was a circular from the Ministry of Edu-
cation which desired the introduction in IITs and other educational institutions courses
devoted to historical practices in India related to temple architectures, ship-building,
metallurgy and other indigeneous pre-industrial technologies. We took advantage of
this particular circular and constituted a committee, with Prof. Mohini Mullick as
the chairperson, to look into the possibilities of introducing courses in history and
philosophy of science with particular reference to India. A few years later this course
on History of Scientific Ideas was introduced as an open elective in the third year of
the four year programme.
We also conducted a five day workshop in 1982 on the development of a curriculum
in philosophy of science, history of science, science and technology and society. Based
on the discussions which took place in that workshop we subsequently formulated some
courses. We also made a largely unsuccessful effort to see that each instructor delivers
some three to four lectures on the historical aspects of whatever subject he is teaching
in a semester. Many faculty members thought it to be a waste of time particularly when
they have so much syllabus to cover. As always, there are notable exceptions: Prof.
Amitabh Ghosh who is currently the Director of IIT Kharagpur, and Prof. A.K. Biswas
who used to offer a course on history of science in India.
Rao 39
More often than not any effort to have faculty engagement with or study of any
historical, philosophical aspects of science met with resistance. Responses varied from
What is in it there for me? to Will it help me to publish more often?
It was probably in 1982 that the course on History of Scientific Ideas was offered for
the first time IIT Kanpur. There were five of us as instructors (Professors Mohini Mul-
lick, A.P. Shukla, K.S. Gandhi, V.K. Jairath and myself) sharing eight lectures each and
we had three students (two of them were students of physics and the third of computer
science)! None of the instructors was a professional historian. I must confess that even
today it is not clear to me whether it was a setback or an advantage. Perhaps it is both.
On the one hand, we have the eminent scientist and equally well known historian of
science, Truesdell, assuring us that it is the standard claim of scientists that most
historians do not have sufficient grasp of science, itself to understand the facts rather
than the mere circumustances of its history. On the other hand, we are alerted by the
J.B. Cohen, that Professional historians are wont to complain of the attempts of the
scientist whose approach to history often sufferes from the consequences of a purely
scientific training. Kuhn, in his paper, The Relations between History and History
of Science (Daedalus, Vol. 100, No. 2) discuss the problem of teaching of history of
science. I am inclined to believe that the problem involved is more complex than one
of teaching or of history or of science. We may remind ourselves of Kants famous
injunction that history without philosophy is blind and philosophy without history is
sterile. But we all know the consequences of riding two horses at the same time. The
Nobel laureate poet, Czeslaw Milosz in his Charles Eliot Norton lectures at Harvard
in 1982 summarized the situation thusas far as poets are concerned: Many learned
books on poetry have been written, and they find, at least in the countries of the west,
more readers than poetry itself. This is not a good sign, even if it may be explained both
by the brilliance of their authors and by their zeal in assimilating scientific disciplines
which today enjoy universal respect. A poet who would like to compete with those
mountains of erudition would have to pretend that he possesses more self-knowledge
than poets are allowed to possess. What is the case with a poet is also in good measure
the case with a scientist or a historian or in fact with any one who is engaged in
making valid knowledge claims. The necessarily historical character of the knowledge
system of science and the limited role that the individual practicing scientist plays in
the production of cognitive goods by and large restricts the span of his philosophical,
historical, ethical and social concerns in that production. This restriction of concerns
not merely at the level of the individual practitioner of science but also at the level
of knowledge claims of science detracts from the secular character of science in so far
as it resists the critical examination of its own founding (un)concerns in its practices.
And as long as this situation prevails, not only teaching of history of science will be
plagued by charges of only attending to the mere circumustances if its history or to the
counter-charges of the distorting consequences of a purely scientific training, but more
importantly, the freedom available in performing primary ontological reductions that
are comensurate with the philosophical, historical, ethical and social concerns cannot
be pressed into service for the generation of knowledges that are genuinely liberating.
The course, History of Scientific Ideas, has by now been offered for more than ten
40 Teaching HPS
years by me and Prof. A.P. Shukla (See Appendix B for a topic outline of the course).
The number of students who registered in the course at any given time never exceeded
twenty five. But one notable feature is that there always used to be a sizeable number
of auditors, some times as many as the creditors of the course. It is interesting to
know that between eighty to hundred thousand candidates appear in the joint entrance
examination of the IITs and out of them about three hundred get admitted into each
IIT. They are admittedly a bright lot but they are innocent of philosophy and ignorant
of history. History to them is a boring chronology of events and philosophy a waste of
time. Moreover, in their schools they are indoctrinated with received cannon of what
science is. To break the consequent resistance on their part and sensitize them to the
idea that science is a historical activity and there can be alternative creative punc-
tuations of reality more adequate to the lived life-world than those of contemporary
science, I used to resort to pedagogical-shock treatment, so to speak: I would circulate
an excerpt from the famous preface of the book, Order of Things, by Michel Foucault
(see Appendix D) in which he talks about a particular Chinese encyclopaedia in which
animals are taxonomically ordered in ways that cannot even be conceived by many
of us. Or I would distribute two excerpts on social order in early Hindu society, one
by Ananda K. Coomaraswamy and another by Kosambi (see Appendix A). Both refer to
the same empirical domain but each gives an interpretation which is antithetical to the
other, Coomaraswamy interprets the entire social order in terms of the requirements
of ritual sacrifices. Kosambi, on the other hand, interprets the same social formation
in terms of Marxist categories. I would invariably describe the episode in which Neils
Bohr and Heisenberg went to the Kronberg Castle in Denmark. Here is what Bohr said
as recapitulated by Heisenberg:
Isnt it strange how this castle changes as soon as one imagines that Hamlet lived here. As
scientists we believe that a castle consists only of stones, and admire the way architects put
them together. The stone, the green roof with its patina, the wood carvings in the church,
constitute the whole castle. None of this should be changed by the fact that Hamlet lived
here, and yet it is changed completely. Suddenly the walls and the ramparts speak a different
language. The courtyard becomes an entire world, a dark corner reminds us of the human soul,
we hear Hamlets To be or not to be. Yet all we really know about Hamlet is that his name
appears in a thirteenth-century chronicle. No one can really prove that he really lived here.
But everyone knows the questions Shakespeare had him ask, the human depths he was made
to reveal, and so he too had to be found a place on earth here, in Kronberg.
I would draw on Carrs little book, What is History?, to drive home the idea that
history is a continual dialogue of the present with the past and therefore historical
truths are not frozen collection of facts but, like scientific truths, are eternally revisable
in light of new evidence and new frameworks of interpretation. Sometimes, a little
mischievously, I would ask the students to imagine what would have happened if the
Michelson-Morley experiment (which rendered ether the emperors new clothes) were
conducted before the earlier truth of geocentric theory was declared falsel in favour of
the new thruth of heliocentric theory!
There is another important aspect of the course which I would like to mention.
I used to give on a regular basis reading assignments. Each student was asked to
submit a written summary of the article assigned and argue for his/her agreements and
Rao 41
disagreements with the epistemological or ontological or methodological or historical or
realist/anti-realist claims explicitly or implicitly made by the author of the article. One
of my favourites is the article on roots of atomic physics from the book, Physics and
Philosophy, by Heisenberg. Another is the article, The Dematerialization of Matter,
by N.R. Hanson. A third interesting paper, I often used to assign, is Nobel Laureate
biologist, George Walds Innovation in Biology. Sometimes, to place in evidence the
changing and the now discarded scientific vocabulary and the important role played
by text-books in influencing the cognitive orientation of future practitioners of science,
I would assign for reading an eighteenth or nineteenth century scientific article or
selection from a text-book. The main purpose of these assignments, as that of the
course, is to let the student see for himself that whether or not science describes reality
as it really is, as history of science demonstrates, it attempts to describe that reality
by seeing it through a contingently chosen cognitive grid and that he and his relevant
community can draw on their cognitive resources to choose another cognitive grid more
suited to the life-world they belong to.
Appendix C also includes a sample examination paper. I take advantage of its
inclusion (the statement by Mazlish) to contest if not dispel the widespread belief
that science and the church are in continuous conflict. In point of fact what one finds
from the history of science is that many men of the establishment of the church made
significant contributions to the enterprise of science in the latters formative years. The
men of God believed that reason can be enlisted in support of faith which of course to
them was of paramount importance.
A word about student and faculty response to the course. The student reaction
surveys always elicited a negative response to the idea of dropping the course from
the curriculum. And more often than not they also expressed the view that there is
a significant change in their understanding of the nature of scientific activity and its
place in society. More surprisingly, many faculty who were earlier on suspicious about
the usefulness of this course based on whatever reports they probably got from others
began to consider the course as conceptually interesting and rigourous.
Finally, let me briefly state my views on the importance of courses on history and
philosophy of science in science education. I do not believe that teaching such courses
will make the students more creative scientists. Firstly, we do not have, and, I believe,
we can never have, an algorithm for transforming people into creative scientists or
artists or whatever. When Gauss was once asked as to how he finally succeeded in
proving a theorem the proof of which eluded him for several years he is supposed
to have answered: By divine inspiration. An element of mystery must always en-
velop the creative act. Secondly, the kind of self-reflexive, critical attitude that one
develops through studies in history and philosophy of science, I suspect, dampens the
bold, aggressive, adventurous asumption-making disposition that one asociates with
creativity. What I have argued for in the previous pages is that study of history
and philosophy of science suggests that doing science creatively involves performing a
primary ontological reduction of the objects of the world and that there are no grounds
for believing that only one such reduction is possible. If my claim is valid, study of
history and philosophy of science enables us to recognize what it takes to be creative.
42 Teaching HPS
It does not make us creative. For we may lack the requisite capacity to perform primary
ontological reduction even though we know that is what we must do to be considered
creative. Moreover, such recognition is not necessary for one to be creative.
There can be other reasons for the importance of study of history and philosophy of
science. Many of us as teachers have often encountered the situation in which a student
who is admitted into, say, computer science programme considers that we are imposing
an unnecessary burden on him when we prescribe a course on electromagnetic theory
or chemistry. What is not recognized by him is that transporting ideas from one domain
into another can sometimes help better understanding of ideas in the, latter domain
and may even facilitate creativity. Transporting the familiar idea that all history
is contemporary history may help recognize that scientific truths are not ahistorical
truths. Above all, the study of history and philosophy of science can be an intellectually
enriching experience in so far as that study allows us to see the limits of liberation
that can be secured by the dominant knowledge system of our times. Indicating the
limits of a subject taught is an important responsibility of the teacher as the German
scientists and intellectuals of the second world war generation painfully realized. The
post second world war commission for university reform in Germany came up with the
following recommendation: Every lecturer in the university must have the ability: 1.
To see the limits of his subject material in his teaching to make the students aware of
these limits and to show them that beyond these limits forces come into play which are
no longer entirely rational, but arise out of life and human society itself. 2. To show
in every subject the way that leads beyond its own narrow confines to broader horizons
of its own, I am inclined to believe that study of history and philosophy of science can
help a teacher in his efforts to acquire those abilities.
Appendix A
1. Hinduism by Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Philosophical Library, New York
The Social Order: Where there is agreement as to the nature of mans last end,
and that the way by which the present and the paramount ends of life can be
realised is that of sacrificial operation, it is evident that the form of society will be
determined by the requirements of the Sacrifice; and that order (yatharthata) and
impartiality (samadrsti) will mean that everyman shall be enabled to become, and
by no mis-direction prevented from becoming, what he has it in him to become.
We have seen that it is to those who maintain the Sacrifice that the promise is
made that they shall flourish. Now the Sacrifice, performed in divinis by the
All-worker (Visvakarma), as imitated here demands a cooperation of all the arts
(visva karmani), for example, those of music, architecture, carpentry, husbandry
and that of warfare to protect the operation. The politics of the heavenly, social
and individual communities are governed by one and the same law. The pattern
of the heavenly politics, is revealed in scripture and reflected in the constitution
of the autonomous state and that of the man who governs himself.
In this man, in whom the sacramental life is complete, there is a hierarchy of
sacerdotal, royal; and administrative powers, and a fourth class consisting of the
Rao 43
physical organs of sense and action, that handle the raw material or food to
be prepared for all; and it is clear that if the organism is to flourish, which is
impossible if divided against itself, that the sacerdotal, royal and administrative
powers, in their order of rank, must be the masters, and the workers in raw
materials their servants. It is in precisely the same way that the functional
hierarchy of the realm is determined by the requirements of the Sacrifice on
which its prosperity depends. The casted are literally born of the Sacrifice. In
the sacramental order there is a need and a place for all mens work: and there is
no more significant consequence of the principle, Work is Sacrifice, than the fact
that under these conditions, and remote as this may be from our secular ways of
thinking, every function, from that of the priest and the king down to that of the
potter and scavenger, is literally a priesthood and every operation a rite. In each
of these spheres, moreover, we meet with professional ethics. The caste sys-
tem differs from the industrial division of labor, with its fractioning of human
faculty, in that it presupposes differences in kinds of responsibility but not in
degrees of responsibility; and it is just because an organisation of functions such
as this, with its mutual loyalties and duties, is absolutely incompatible with our
competitive industrialism, that the monarchic, feudal and caste system is always
pianted in such dark colors by the sociologist, whose thinking is determined more
by his actual environment than it is a deduction from first principles.
The Aryans had little difficulty in penetrating to within 50 miles of the Yamuna
river. The thinner forest of the region could be burnt down. But the social
organisation necessary for settling the land cleared by fire went beyond the simple
tribe. The lowest castefor caste had developed within the tribewas now called
sudra possibly from the tribal name (e.g. the Oxydrakoi on the lower Indus who
fought against Alexander). These were helots who belonged to the tribe or clan
group as a whole in much the same manner as the tribal cattle, without the
membership rights of the tribe as granted to the three upper castes. These three
higher castes were properly recognised as Aryan and full members of the tribe:
kshatriya (warrior and ruler), brahmana (brahmin priest), vaisya (the settler who
produced all the food surplus by agriculture and cattle breeding). The word varna
came to mean one of these four class castes, which constituted a class structure
within such of the tribes as had reached advanced forms of property-holding and
indulged in trade exchange on a sufficiently large scale. This was not true of
every single Aryan tribe, many of whom continued undifferentiated while others
had only the arya-sudra (free v. helot) division. That the sudra was not bought
and sold as in ancient Greece and Rome was due to no kindness on the part of the
Indo-Aryans. It was simply that commodity production and private property had
not developed far enough.
The existence of the sudra caste had a peculiar effect upon later Indian society.
Chattel slavery in the sense of classical European (specifically Graeco-Roman)
antiquity was never to be of any size or importance in the means and relations
of production in India. The expropriable surplus could always be produced by
44 Teaching HPS
the sudra. The development of caste foreshadowed a general class society beyond
the exclusiveness of a tribe. A few of the brahmins had begun to officiate for
more than one clan or tribe, which implied some type of relationship between
several groups. A few brahmins at the other end of the economic scale had
begun to advance into the dense forest to the east, in fairly small groups with
their own cattle; sometimes even as individuals with no property and no arms for
defence or hunting. Their harmlessness was obvious, and they were of the utmost
importance in coming to terms with the food-gathering Naga savages of the forest,
whom they often joined, or with whom they lived on friendly terms. Their sole
protection was their poverty and manifestly innocuous nature. The traders, on
the other hand, were convoyed at need by armed kshatriyas who would protect
them against the aborigines (nishada). These kshatriyas grew into mercenary
groups ready to fight in anyones service for hire.
2. Hinduism by D.D. Kosambi
Without mincing words, the ritual books say: Like a vaisya . . . tributary to an-
other, to be eaten up by another, to be oppressed at will . . .. Like a sudra . . .
the servant of another, to be the primary producers, were to be enclosed be-
tween the two upper castes during the sacrificial procession of the whole tribe,
to make them submissive. After this the basic class nature of caste need hardly
be doubted, though it was still class on a primitive level of production. The first
taxes were called bali because they were gifts brought to the chief at the sacrifice
by members of the tribe or clan. There was a particular official known only at this
transitional period, the king apportioner (bhaga-dugha). His job seems to have
been the proper sharing out of the bali gifts among the tribal kings immediate
followers, and perhaps assessment of taxes as well.
Appendix B
Outline of the course on history of scientific ideas
1. Historical study as a means of understanding the nature of scientific mode of

thinking and its place in life and society. Role of philosophy of science in the
study of history of science; metatheoretic concerns. Brief accounts of scientific
method: Inductivism; Falsificationism; Methodology of Research Programmes;
Paradigmatic shifts and scientific revolutions, Science as an extended metaphor.
2. Greek Thought as the bed-rock of Western civilization or the fabrication of a myth.
Ionian Nature-philosophy, Pythagoreanism, Eleaticiam, Atomism, Sophism, Pla-
tonism, Aristotelianism. Hellenistic Science: Mathematics, Astronomy, Mechan-
ics.
3. Arab Ascendancy and Islamic Science: Brief outline of the contributions to phi-
losophy, mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, medicine.
4. Middle Ages and European Intellectual Resurgence: Rediscovery of Greek Thought,
Translation of Greek Texts, Aristotelian Scholasticism Interplay of Faith, Rea-
Rao 45
son, Doubt, Criticism and Innovation. Copernican Revolution, Baconian empiri-
cism, Galilean Platonism, Cartesian split of the Res Extensa and Res cogitans,
Newton the last great magician, Newtonian Synthesis of the clockwork Universe,
Mechanization of the World Picture, Leibnitzian Mathesis Universalis.
5. Nineteenth century as the Golden/Silly Age of Science; Development of Math-
ematics. Astronomical, Kinetic, Atomic, Energetic, Psychophysical, Statistical,
Morphological, Genetic Views of Nature. Microcosm after the microscope, Macro-
cosm after the telescope, matter after the chemical Balance, life after vivisecton,
Man after Darwin, Society after Marx, Psyche after Freud. Twentieth centurys
Relativistic dethronement of common-sense, perceptions and Quantum mechani-
cal mixed metaphors. Unity of Science vs Unity of Man.
6. From Plantocracy to Technocracy or the Historical Evolution of Institutions of Sci-
ence: Mercantile Capitalism, Colonies & Plantations; Slave Trade and Saving the
Heathens; Seed-beds of Science in Botanical Gardens and Monasteries. Scientis-
tic Movements, Birth of Acadamies of Science and Technical Schools, Emergence
of the Scientist and the rise of the Expert; Migration of Science from Italy to
England to France to Germany to U.S.A. Innovating Innovation and Managers of
Science and Technolgy.
7. Indian Science: Colonial, Nationalist and Post-Independence phases. Parasitic
character of and lopsided institutionalization of Science. Peoples Science Move-
ments. The question of Alternative Sciences.
Text-Books
Chalmers, A.F.: 1982, What Is This Thing Called Science?, University of Queens-
land Press, St. Lucia, Qld.
Dijkterhuis, E.J.: 1986, The Mechanization of the World Picture, tr. by C. Dik-
shoorn, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Merz, J.T.: 1903-1914, A History of European Thought in the 19th Century, W. Black-
wood & Sons, Edinburgh, London.
Appendix C
Sample Examination Paper
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur
Science, Metascience, Society
SE 862-History of Scientific ideas
II Mid Semester Examination
Time: 1 hour OPEN NOTES 11.3.86

Maximum length of answer for each question: 300 words
46 Teaching HPS
Q.1.
In the Temple were, forged the hammers which destroyed the Temple. (A. France )
Bacon, Galileo and Descartes can veritably be called the founders of the method
of modern science. Identify the most important idea in each case, which became a
foundation stone of Science and show how this self-same idea has become historically
transformed into a better sapping science of its virality.
Q.2.
The warfare of Science with theology in christendom . . . . . . is simply part of a continuing conflict
a conflict which takes its rise from the contradictory nature of man: rational and irrational,
creator of his own conditions, and conditioned by forces seemingly beyond his control. The
tension generated by these warring elements is not a mere transient phase of mans existence:
as long as he remains human, it will be his problem and his glory. When it ceases we will be no
longer recording history, which by definition deals with human beings. (D. Mazlish)
Logic and reason have been put to service of christian dogma and study of nature
and science, both simultaneously and, to the mutual exclusion of each other. Elaborate
on this dynamical process by the historical development of European thought from 11th
to the middle of 16th century, as a concrete example.
Q.3. Every significant institution, individual, or thought of the past, must be a product
of the travails of its times. And we can benefit by it only if we can currently relate its
relevance and irrelevance with the present. Comment in this light on any four of the
following:
1. Pythagoras
2. Aristotelian causality
3. Hellenistic Astronomy
4. Ishale at-Kindi
5. Brethren of sincerity
6. Newtonian synthesis
Format of answers: You are expected first to elaborate on the views propounded on
these topics in the lectures, and then give reasons for your agreement or disagreement.
Appendix D
The Order of Things by Foucault, Preface, p. xv.
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered,
as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thoughtour thought, the
thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geographybreaking up all the
ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild
Rao 47
profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten
with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. This passage
quotes a certain Chinese encyclopaedia in which it is written that animals are divided
into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens,
(f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j)
innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just
broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies. In the wonderment
of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means
of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the
limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.
References
Carr, E.: 1974, What is History?, Penguin, London.
Coomaraswamy, A.: Hinduism, Philosophical Library, New York.
Foucault, M.: 1970, The Order of Things, Tavistock Publications, London.
Hanson, N. R.: 1958, The Dematerialization of Matter.
Heisenberg, W.: 1958, Physics and Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin Edition.
Kuhn, T.: 1971, The Relations between History and History of Science, Daedalus
100(2).
Wald, G.: 1958, Innovation and Biology, Scientific American 199, 100.
48 Teaching HPS
Multiculturalism in Science Education and the Question of
Universalism
William W. Cobern
Western Michigan University, USA. Email: bill.cobern@wmich.edu
Cathleen C. Loving
Texas A&M University. Email: cloving@tamu.edu
Introduction
Is science universal? Only recently has this question been given any serious consid-
eration at all. In the tradition of science as practiced in the West for the past 300
years and in the tradition of school science, the answer has been, Of course science is
universal. As Richard Dawkins likes to put it, there are no epistemological relativists
at 30,000 feet. But today some will say, Not so fast! Dawkins offers a brute definition
of universality completely devoid of any nuance of understanding and equally devoid
of relevance to the question at hand. No one disputes that without an airplane of fairly
conventional description, a person at 30,000 feet is in serious trouble. The question of
universality does not arise over the phenomena of falling. The question of universality
arises over the fashion of the propositions given to account for the phenomena of falling,
the fashion of the discourse through which we communicate our thoughts about the
phenomena, and the values we attach to the phenomena itself and the various ways
we have of understanding and accounting for the phenomenaincluding the account
offered by a standard scientific description. In todays schools there are often competing
accounts of natural phenomena especially where schools are located in multicultural
communities. There are also competing claims about what counts as science. The
purpose of our paper is to examine the definition of science put forward from multicul-
tural perspectives in contrast to a universalist perspective on science, i.e., the Standard
Account. We will argue that good science explanations will always be universal even
if we do incorporate indigenous knowledge as scientific and broaden what is taught as
science. What works best is still of interest to most and although we hate to use the
word hegemonyWestern science would co-opt and dominate indigenous knowledge
if it were incorporated as science. Therefore, indigenous knowledge is better off as a
different kind of knowledge that can be valued for its own merits, that can play a vital
role in science education, and can maintain a position of independence from which it
can critique the practices of science and the Standard Account.
Multicultural Perspectives on Science

If there are different ways of accounting for a phenomena of nature then it is possible
that some people will reject some of these accountsincluding the account offered
by Western scienceand accept others. Gibson (1996) tells of a time when she was
working at a rainforest scientific station on a South Pacific Island and a conversation
50 Multiculturalism in Science Education
she had with an indigenous Islander. The Islander commented that Westerners only
think they know why the ocean rises and falls on a regular basis. They think it has
to do with the moon. They are wrong. The ocean rises and falls as the great sea
turtles leave and return to their homes in the sand. The ocean falls as the water
rushes into the empty nest. The ocean rises as the water is forced out by the returning
turtles. Is this Islander scientific because he has accurate knowledge of the ocean
tides that affect his island? Is he unscientific because his explanation for tidal action
is scientifically inappropriate? Is science universal because the standard scientific
account for tidal action applies to all local occurrences of tidal phenomena? Or, does
one grant the obvious brute factuality of actual phenomenon but reject universalist
claims for standard scientific accounts of actual phenomenon? Matthews well states
the universalist perspective of the Standard Account:
Just as volcanic eruptions are indifferent to the race or sex of those in the vicinity, and lava
kills whites, blacks, men, women, believers, non-believers, equally, so also the science of lava
flows will be the same for all. For the universalist, our science of volcanoes is assuredly a
human construction with negotiated rules of evidence and justification, but it is the behavior
of volcanoes that finally judges the adequacy of our vulcanology, not the reverse. (Matthews,
1994, p. 182)
The undeterred critic, however, will still ask: Though the phenomenon are experien-
tially universal, cant one argue that scientific accounts are not universal since such
accounts are not universally accepted?
The resolution of such questions hinges on the definition of science, including the
concept of universality, and this resolution is of considerable importance for both ed-
ucators and the public at large. When a discipline earns the title science it acquires
the authority to promulgate truthful and reliable knowledge, control over education
and credentials, access to money and manpower, and the kind of political clout that
comes from possessing knowledge that is essential yet esoteric (Fuller, 1988, p. 177).
In science education the definition of science is a de facto gate keeping device for what
can be included in a school science curriculum and what cannot. A very large amount of
money, for example, has been spent in the USA on litigating the question of whether or
not creation science can be properly included as an aspect of school science (Nelkin,
1983; Overton, 1983). Moreover, if science is deemed universal it not only displaces
scientific pretenders such as creation science, it as well displaces any local knowledge
that conflicts with it. Kawagley, Norris-Tull & Norris-Tull (1998, p. 134) argue that
such a narrow view of science not only diminishes the legitimacy of knowledge derived
through generations of naturalistic observation and insight, it simultaneously devalues
those cultures which traditionally rely heavily on naturalistic observation and insight.
The record is fairly clear. Around the globe where science is taught, it is taught at
the expense of indigenous knowledge and this precipitates charges of epistemological
hegemony and cultural imperialism.
People feel passionately about these issues. The passions in the academy have run
so high that the controversies have been dubbed the Science Wars (Nature, 1997).
At school levels, the struggle is over multicultural approaches to science and science
education within multicultural situations. Actions taken are at times extreme. In
Cobern & Loving 51
1987, the Portland Oregon School District published the African-American Baseline
Essays, a set of six revisionist essays providing resource materials and references for
teachers on the knowledge and contributions of Africans and African-Americans. The
science baseline essay, written by Hunter Havelin Adams (1990), has serious problems,
but it is widely distributed because of the current pressure on school districts to incor-
porate multicultural material into the classroom coupled with the dearth of this kind of
material. Hundreds of copies of the Baseline Essays have been sent to school districts
across the country and they have been adopted or are being seriously considered by
school districts as diverse as Fort Lauderdale, Detroit, Milwaukee, Atlanta, Chicago,
Prince George County, MD, and Washington, DC. Even more widely distributed is its
predecessor, Blacks in Science: Ancient and Modern, edited by Ivan Van Sertima (1984).
Vine DeLoria, who is involved with Indian science education through the American
Indian Science and Engineering Society (AISES) has recently published a book entitled
Red Earth, White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of Scientific Facts (DeLoria,
1995). These supplements on multicultural science, expressly intended to raise the
self-esteem of students, adopt a triumphalist approach to the material. That is, they
present the achievements and the beliefs of the group described as superior and antic-
ipatory to the achievements and beliefs of modern Western science. Thus, the Dogon of
Mali supposedly studied Sirius B, which is invisible to the naked eye, hundreds of years
ago. The Egyptians foreshadowed the Theory of Evolution thousands of years ago;
the Egyptians also anticipated many of the philosophical aspects of quantum theory
(Adams, p. 21), and they knew the particle/wave nature of light (p. 26).
The Baseline Essays and similar publications represent a radical revisionist histo-
riography of science and culture. There are other examples of multicultural materials
for science education that are far less controversial. Books such as Robertta Barbas
(1995), Science in the Multicultural Classroom: A Guide to Teaching and Learning
and the Addison Wesley (1993) teachers guide, Multiculturalism in Mathematics, Sci-
ence, and Technology: Readings and Activities bring culture into the science classroom
for pedagogical purposes without rewriting history. The nature of science implicit in
these books, however, represents a subtle change from standard accounts. Looking
elsewhere, the question of how science is to be defined is brought into clear relief (e.g.,
Kawagley, Norris-Tull, & Norris-Tull, 1998; Snivley & Corsiglia, 1998). With specific
reference to First Nations people in Canada and the Yupiaq people of Alaska, one finds
that indigenous knowledge is reclassified as sciencebut not science according to the
Standard Account and therein lies the controversy.
Multiple Culture-based Sciences?

The Standard Account of science can be called Western given its historic origins in
Ancient Greek and European culture. Speculative thought about Nature, natural phi-
losophy and later what became known simply as science have always been engaged with
Western culture. The Western experience with science has been a long one and in a
sense they have matured in consort, but not without trials. There has been, on the one
hand, a disintegrating effect on traditional values and forms of representation, and, on
the other hand, a progressive integration into the dominant culture . . . of the scientific
mentalitythe values, content of knowledge and patterns of action which underlie
scientific practice and are formed by it (Ladriere, 1977, p. 12). This disintegrating
effect appears to have been recognized by Charles Darwin who late in life lamented:
I have said that in one respect my mind has changed during the last twenty or thirty years.
Up to the age of thirty, or beyond it, poetry of many kinds . . . gave me great pleasure, and even
as a schoolboy I took intense delight in Shakespeare. . . I have also said that formerly pictures
gave me considerable, and music very great, delight. But now for many years I cannot endure
to read a line of poetry: I have tried to read Shakespeare, and found it so intolerably dull that
it nauseated me. I have also almost lost my taste for pictures or music . . . I retain some taste
for fine scenery, but it does not cause me the exquisite delight which it formerly did. . . . My
mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections
of facts . . . (quoted in Owens, 1983, p. 38)
And of course the European Romantic poets echoed this lament (see Barber, 1963).
Moreover, Europe was an expansionist culture, and European exploration, conquest
and colonization of lands beyond Europe brought Western science to those lands and
their inhabitants. In these parts of the world where Western science is experienced as
a relatively new phenomena, the interaction of science with culture has taken a more
violent form and the disintegrating effects have been much more sharply experienced
(Ladriere, 1977, p. 14). Indeed, colonial education designed for indigenous peoples
used science as the tool of choice to modernize and supplant indigenous culture. In the
words of one colonialist: A literate nation is provided with the means for substituting
scientific explanations of everyday eventssuch as death, disease, and disasterfor
the supernatural, non-scientific explanations which prevail in developing societies . . .
(Lord, 1958, p. 340). A more reflective colonial teacher remarked, . . . In common with
so many others, I used to think that we could get rid of Bantu stupidities by suitable
talks on natural science, hygiene, etc., as if the natural sciences could subvert their
traditional lore or their philosophy (Tempels, 1959, p. 29). The point is, the West
judged the rest of the world by its own measure of choice, Western science and Western
technology, and used education to enforce change on those societies found deficient.
According to Adas (1989, p. 4) European perceptions of the material superiority of
their own cultures, particularly as manifested in scientific thought and technological
innovation, shaped their attitudes toward and interaction with peoples they encoun-
tered overseas. Why? Because:
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, most European thinkers concluded that the
unprecedented control over nature made possible by Western science and technology proved
that European modes of thought and social organization corresponded much more closely to
the underlying realities of the universe than did those of any other people or society, past or
present. (Adas, 1989, p. 7)
Western scientists did have scientific interests in the rest of the world. Many areas
of the globe became field sites for the practice of Western science by Western scientists
(Basalla, 1967). Darwins voyage on the Beagle is surely the best known example of
Western scientific development derived from non-European field work. When scien-
tists occasionally took note of indigenous knowledge of Nature, that knowledge was
distinctively labeled ethnoscience (e.g., Berlin, 1972; Behrens, 1989; Boster & Johnson,
Cobern & Loving 53
1989)never simply science. This is not to say that such indigenous knowledge was
regarded as without value. There is a long tradition of Western science finding value
in indigenous knowledge especially as an aide to pharmaceutical discovery (Linden,
1991). But, finding value in indigenous knowledge is not the same as conferring the
title, science, and admitting indigenous knowledge of Nature to the Standard Account.
In the 1990s, non-Western people and some scholars within the West began to for-
mally and overtly resist this imperial Western attitude toward indigenous knowledge
of Nature. This movement was abetted by the program for the social study of science,
founded in the 1970s at Edinburgh (Bloor & Barnes, 1996), which argued that all sci-
ence is socially contingent and culturally embedded. New epistemological perspectives
such as multiculturalism (Stanley & Brickhouse, 1994), post colonialism (McKinley,
1997), and post modernism (Lyotard, 1995) rose to challenge the conventional Western
wisdom on the relationship between science and culture and the Standard Account
itself. In education Hodson (1993, p. 686) maintained that science curricula often
portray science as located within, and exclusively derived from, a western cultural
context. The implicit curriculum message is that the only science is western science. . .
Dr. Thom Alcoze is Native American and a forestry professor at Northern Arizona Uni-
versity. In a taped interview for a science teacher development project (Smithsonian
Institution, 1996b) he poignantly presented a different perspective on science.
Science is often thought of [pause] America has science. Mainstream America has science.
And if you are a minority culture in this country you dont have science. We started looking
for Indian science where science is expressed in Indian tradition. And found it with plants,
starting off. Medicines. And of course the stereotype is well Indian medicine is just superstition
and mumbo-jumbo, slight of hand, and basically its a witch doctor kind of thing [pause] a
stereotype. A lot of strange noises and dancin and singin and a lot of shakin but thats all it
is [pause] superstitious. Its not real. What we found out when we looked for facts, we found
that even today in modern America there are over 200 medicines in the pharmacopoeia that we
use that have direct origins in Native American medical practice. Yes, in fact Indian people did
have science. They were using science all the time. They werent using scientific terminology.
They did not publish in scientific journals [pause] thats kind of facetious at that time. But the
issue of science then started to be redefined in my definition of what science is all about when
we started to see that science is just another word for nature.
Dr. Alcoze last sentence is of critical importance. He says, science is just another
word for nature and therefore American Indians being greatly knowledgeable about
Nature had scientific knowledge of their own. This idea is further developed in Kawa-
gley et al., (1998, p. 134): We contend that no single origin for science exists; that
science has a plurality of origins and a plurality of practices. They contend that there
is no one way to do or think about science (p. 139). As their case in point, they contend
that Yupiaq culture in southwestern Alaska holds a body of scientific knowledge and
epistemology that differs from that of Western science (p. 133).
Much of Yupiaq scientific knowledge is manifested most clearly in their technology. One may
argue that technology is not science. However, technology does not spring from a void. To
invent technological devices, scientific observations and experimentation must be conducted.
Yupiaq inventions, which include the kayak, river fish traps . . . represent technology that could
not have been developed without extensive scientific study of the flow of currents in rivers, the
ebb and flow of tides in bays, and the feeding, resting, and migratory habits of fish, mammals,
and birds. (Kawagley et al., 1998, p. 136)
Science from this perspective refers to descriptive knowledge of Nature developed

through experience with Nature. The definition of science used here is consistent with
Ogawa (1995, p. 588) who refers to science simply as a rational perceiving of reality
and which then allows him to argue for the existence of legitimate multi-sciences.
The knowledge described above is from a domain of knowledge that Snively & Cor-
siglia (1998) call Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK). It is the descriptive ecologi-
cal knowledge about Nature that First Nations peoples in Canada and Native Americas
in the USA have acquired through long years of experience with their natural environ-
ment, and which has been vital to their survival. Snively & Corsiglia (1998) show that
this knowledge can be quite insightful and has much to offer Western science. For
example, they tell the story of a Nisgaa fisherman in British Columbia who noticed
that the Dungeness Crabs he typically harvested were exhibiting strange behavior
patterns. The crabs were marching past the dock at the mouth of the Nass River,
rather than staying in the deep water of Alice Arm (Snively & Corsiglia, 1998, p. 22).
He grew concerned about possible industrial pollution of the Alice Arm waters from a
nearby molybdenum mine and later his concerns were shown to be well founded. Given
the life and practice of the Nisgaa this intuition should come as no surprise.
Among the Nisgaa, and among other aboriginal peoples, formal observation, recollection, and
consideration of extraordinary natural events is taken seriously. Every spring members of
some Nisgaa families still walk their salmon stream to ensure spawning channels are clear of
debris and that salmon are not obstructed in their ascent to spawning grounds. In the course of
such inspection trips, Nisgaa observers traditionally use all of their senses and pay attention
to important variables: what plants are in bloom, what birds are active, when specific animals
are migrating and where, and so forth. In this way, traditional communities have a highly
developed capacity for building up a collective data base. Any deviations from past patterns
are important and noted. (Corsiglia & Snively, 1997, p. 25)
Similar accounts obtain for people living traditional lives in many other regions of
the world from Australia to Africa (see Warren, 1991 & 1997).
Multicultural Science in the Classroom

The reasons for including such examples of knowledge as part of the Standard Account
or the reasons for expanding the definition of science under the Standard Account,
have to do with education. Proponents of a multiplicity view of science argue that
this will better serve the needs of students coming from diverse cultural backgrounds
and will help to change the culturally corrosive effect that Western science has had
on non Western cultures. The Harvard-Smithsonian Video Case Studies in Science
Education (Smithsonian Institution, 1996a & 1996b) project on classroom science
provides a glimpse of how this multicultural perspective on science can play out in a
science classroom. The project produced videotape case studies of teachers. Each tape
shows vignettes of a teacher teaching science interspersed with interview segments
with the teacher and a science education expert. One of the case studies was done at an
elementary school in Flagstaff, Arizona where the students come from American Indian
Cobern & Loving 55
Nature is viewed as sacred
Humans are part of the web of life
Humans should live in harmony with nature
The entire world is viewed as being alive
Technology should be low impact
Figure 1: Native American views about nature (Simthsonian Institution, 1996b).

and non-Indian families. Donna is a fifth grade teacher and she has been teaching a
unit on ecology. She also has drawn in her Native American students by collecting
information on Indian culture. This information is publicly displayed on a large poster
board in the classroom (see figure 1).
Pointing to the poster board, the teacher speaks to her students.
Donna: We were talking earlier in here about looking at different cultures and finding ideas
form cultures that might help us understand science better. Now, some of the traditional Native
American views about nature are on this chart. Can you find one [Native American view] that
helps us to understand this cycle of decompositions? (Smithsonian Institution, 1996b)
At this point a number of students raise hands. The teacher calls on them to speak
and she asks each student to explain the relationship of the Native American viewpoint
to decomposition. Later, Donna is asked in an interview about the purpose of such
activities.
Donna: My goal would be that all children would feel that they have a very important heritage.
No matter what heritage they come from. And to be a scientist doesnt mean that you have to be
any particular race or any particular gender or from any particular culture but that all people
have contributed to the body of knowledge which we call science. (Smithsonian Institution,
1996b)
In this vignette, Donna has set a very nice stage with her Native American poster
about views of nature. From here she can go on to have her class study what science
has learned about ecological cycles, balances of nature, decomposition, etc. Loving (in
press) and Cobern (1995a) offer similar views on using local culture to promote science
learning.
One would only hope that along the way, reference might be made back to the poster
to see if science supports, ignores or rejects ideas from ones culture and what evidence
there is to support that. In Donnas case above the controversial questions are about
her meaning for the world science and will she lead her students to understand that
there are different legitimate ways of thinking about Nature? Nature is viewed as
sacred is one such legitimate way but it is not the way of science. Thus, we would
want to know if Donna intends to help her students cognitively construct two different,
though complementary, explanations for the same phenomena? Or, will the students
learn the multiplicity view that all of this simply represents different forms of science?
The Universality of Science
As much as we support science teaching that is both informed by culture and sensitive
to culture, the issues raised by TEK and multicultural perspectives on science must
not be accepted uncritically. We say this not in defense of science and the Standard
Account. We think that science has shown itself sufficiently useful and remarkable
to humanity that there will be no withdrawal of science from modern life. And, it is
arguable that science would suffer little harm if, for the purposes of curriculum, TEK
and similar domains of knowledge were declared scientific tomorrow. In contrast, such
an action would actually be counterproductive with respect to the concerns people have
about indigenous knowledge being shut out of science by the Standard Account. Before
developing that thought, however, we clarify our meaning of the Standard Account and
the case for universality.
Defining the Standard Account

Lovings (1991) Scientific Theory Profile gives a good indication of the breadth of philo-
sophical views on the nature of science. Philosophers of science run the gamut from
rationalist to naturalist, anti-realist to realist, and the many combinations within these
ranges. Within the philosophy of science and scholarship on the nature of science
resides the important question of demarcation. How can science be distinguished
from other intellectual domains? How does science differ from (say) historiography or
theology or philosophy? According to Gieryn, Bevins, and Zehr (1985, p. 392) the goals
of demarcation are the (1) differentiation of a valued commodity uniquely provided
by science, and (2) exclusion of pseudo-scientists . . . and these goals are important
for scientists establishment of a professional monopoly over the market for knowledge
about nature (also see Gieryn, 1983). The demarcation of science from other disci-
plines, however, is not easily accomplished. Laudan (1983, pp. 8-9) argues that,
philosophers have been regarded as the gatekeepers to the scientific estate. They are the ones
who are supposed to be able to tell the difference between real science and pseudo-science. . . .
Nonetheless, it seems pretty clear to many of us. . . that philosophy has largely failed to deliver
the relevant goods. Whatever the specific strengths and deficiencies of certain well-known
efforts at demarcation . . . it can be said fairly uncontroversially that there is no demarcation
line between science and non-science, or between science and pseudo-science, which would win
assent from a majority of philosophers.
Though we do not wish to minimize the philosophical complexity of the issue to

which Laudan refers, nor are we immune to the ideological influences upon the Stan-
dard Account (Hesse, 1980), there is a pragmatic view to science broadly acceptable
in the scientific community and described in accounts by scientists themselves, such
as biologist Frederick Grinnell (1987) and physicist A.F. Chalmers (1982). In addition,
science educators (Driver, Leach, Millar and Scott, 1996) who thoughtfully examined
the range of philosophical, historical and sociological views of science were able to
arrive at critical areas of consensus and were helpful in our Standard Account. The
following is what we understand that definition of the Standard Account of science to
be. In providing this definition we have kept in mind Laudans (1996, p. 24) point that
Cobern & Loving 57
what we need to provide is a way of distinguishing reliable knowledge claims from
unreliable ones.
1.0 Science is a naturalistic, material explanatory system used to account for

natural phenomena that ideally must be objectively and empirically testable.
1.1 Science is about natural phenomena. It is not about the things that humans
construct such as economic systems nor is it about spiritual phenomena. Here we
concur that TEK is about natural phenomena.
1.2 The explanations that science offers are naturalistic and material. It follows from
point 1.1 that scientific explanations are not about the spiritual, emotional, economic,
aesthetic, and social aspects of human experience. Snively & Corsiglia (1998) recognize
that with respect to TEK this aspect of the Standard Account poses a problem even
though TEK is about natural phenomena. They note that many scientists refuse to
recognize TEK as science because of its spiritual base, which they regard as supersti-
tious and fatalistic (p. 30). In response, they argue that spiritual explanations often
incorporate important ecology, conservation, and sustainable development strategies
(p. 30); but nevertheless, they still assert that the spiritual acquisition and expla-
nation of TEK is a fundamental component and must be promoted if the knowledge
system is to survive (Johnson, 1992 quoted in Snively & Corsiglia, 1998, p. 31).
1.3 Science explanations are empirically testable (at least in principle) against natural
phenomena (the test for empirical consistency) or against other scientific explanations
of natural phenomena (the test for theoretical consistency). Science involves collect-
ing data (i.e., evidence) and a scientific explanation must be able to account for this
data. Alternatively, science involves the testing of proposed explanations against data
(Driver et al, 1996, p. 43). This concept is nicely captured by Duschl in an interview
where he is commenting on the activities of some 1st graders. The 1st grade class
are experimenting with sound. The children have some ideas about sound and they
test some of these ideas using rubber bands stretched over geoboard pegs. About this
episode, Duschl remarks:
When kids are given the same phenomena to observe, they see very different things. Their
personal interpretations of the ideas are very different. And when we listen to the children in
circle you can hear this and see it. This is an opportunity to get this consensus that we want, to
get some discussion because the scientific ideas just arent any ideas. They are ideas grounded
in evidence. (Smithsonian Institution, 1996a)
Duschl tells us that the scientific ideas just arent any ideas. They are tested ideas.
They are tested either in the physical world following from point 1.2, or they are tested
for theoretical consistency with other scientific explanations, which in turn were tested
in the physical world.
Moreover, scientific testing strives to be objective. In recent years this value in
science has been derided as objectivism . . . a universal, value-free process (Stanley
& Brickhouse, 1994, p. 389; also see Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Perhaps some people
have overextended the concept of objectivity. In our view of the Standard Account,
objectivity refers to the goal that experimental outcomes are not to be prejudged nor
unreasonably constrained by prior belief, that data is collected fairly and accurately,
and that research methods are executed with fidelity.
Is it possible that TEK is tested knowledge? Borrowing a phrase form Sagan (1996,
p. 251), Kawagley et al., (1998, p. 137) maintain that Yupiaq traditional knowledge
reflects an understanding of the natural world based on a massive set of scientific
experiments continuing over generations. No one would doubt that the Yupiaq, along
with every other group of people that ever lived, have and continue to engage in trial
and error experimentation. People try different shampoos until they find the one they
like best but few would consider such experimentation scientific. It is not scientific
but it is an effective and valuable process. Similarly, the building up of traditional
knowledge through trial and error interactions with Nature has produced important
knowledge. But, it lacks the formal, controlled features of scientific experimentation.
1.4 Science is an explanatory systemit is more than a descriptive ad hoc accounting of

natural phenomena. Science seeks to parsimoniously explain how things work invok-
ing only natural causes and these explanations are woven into a system of theoretical
thought. Theories, however, are typically under-determined, that is they go beyond
the available data and are therefore conjectural. Scientists chose between competing
theories based on criteria such as accuracy of prediction, internal consistency and data
consistency, breadth of scope (the more encompassing the theory, the more it is valued)
simplicity and fruitfulnessall based, however, on human judgement (Driver et al.,
1996). To this aspect of the Standard Account, the sociology of science adds that
human judgment does not exist in a vacuum. It exists and is exercised within the
context of social and cultural life. There is an inherently social aspect to all knowledge
construction. Thus, for example, to understand how Darwin came to his formulation
of evolution it is not sufficient to know about the voyage of the Beagle, his various
observations, his knowledge of domestic breeding practices and the like. One must
also take into account the cultural environment in which Darwin lived (Cobern, 1995a;
Desmond & Moore, 1991).
Moreover, it must be noted that scientific explanation (point 1.2) and scientific
theory (point 1.4) represent two complementary levels of scientific knowledge (alterna-
tively, the difference between what students think of as description and explanation
in the theoretical scientific sensesee Horwood, 1988 and Matthews, 1994). The
first level is strongly related to direct human experience. Thus, for example, the
location of salmon at any one time of the year can be explained in terms of the salmons
lifecycle, where evidence relating to locality and lifecycle are both directly observable.
This explanation has considerable creditability regardless of cultural variation. In
contrast, credibility at the second level is much more culturally dependent. At the
second level, scientific theory would further explain that lifecycle can be viewed as an
idealized pattern of sequenced events that is applicable across a great many organisms.
Here credibility depends on how accustomed people are to abstract scientific theoriz-
ing. In a different culture, people would find it more credible to explain lifecycle
Cobern & Loving 59
as the purposeful course of life uniquely belonging to each creature. Horton (1994)
has demonstrated that much of traditional African thought at the lower level does not
differ substantially from scientific explanation. The significant differences are at the
secondary level with the webs of significance (Geertz, 1973) that give meaning to
those first level explanations. Similarly, here is the fundamental problem with taking
TEK as scienceTEK is embedded in a spiritual system of meaning that cannot easily
be ignored, nor should it be ignored.
2.0 The Standard Account of science is grounded in metaphysical commit-

ments about the way the world really is (e.g., see Burtt, 1967; Cobern, 1991 &
1995b). These commitments take the form of necessary (or first order) presuppositions.
They are not descriptive of what science is but what science presupposes about Nature.
By themselves these necessary presuppositions are probably not sufficient motivation
for any individual to be involved with science, hence any individual scientist or science
teacher likely will have augmented these necessary presuppositions with other (sec-
ondary) presuppositions that are personally necessary. Our focus, however, is on the
metaphysical minimum for science.
2.1 Science presupposes the possibility of knowledge about Nature. Realists view
this as actual knowledgeHuman thinking holds the potential for recognizing and
understanding the actual order and causality inherent in the phenomena of Nature.
Idealists view this as instrumental knowledgeHuman thinking holds the potential for
constructing viable understanding about the instrumental order and causality in the
experience of natural phenomena. Roger Penrose and Stephen Hawking, respectively,
are exemplars of the two positions (Hawking & Penrose, 1996). Closely linked to the
possibility of knowledge are the presuppositions of order and causality.
2.2 Science presupposes that there is order in Nature. The fact that the orbit of
the earth can be represented as a mathematical equation or that tidal action can be
estimated within predictable limits of accuracy is evidence of order. Realists view this
order as actual orderThere is order in nature. Idealists view this as instrumental
orderHuman experience with Nature is amenable to ordered thinking about experi-
ence with Nature. Historically, presupposed order in Nature was profoundly important
to the development of science in Europe. Gernet (1993-94), following the pioneering
work of Needham (1969), notes the crippling effect the lack of this presupposition had
on the development of Chinese science.
2.3 Science presupposes causation in Nature (Collingwood, 1940). For example, rain is
causally linked with factors such as air temperature and humidity. Given enough water
vapor in the atmosphere and the right air temperature, it is going to rain. Realists view
this causation as actual causation. Cause and effect are inherent attributes of Nature.
Idealists view this as instrumental causationCausal thinking is amenable with the
human experience with Nature.
3.0 Nevertheless, what ultimately qualifies as science is determined by con-
sensus within the scientific community. Thus, simply offering an idea which
fits all these parameters will still not be science until judged so by the community
of science. As we noted above, the problem is that there is no perfect account of science
that clearly represents all of science, past and present, and just as clearly eliminates all
endeavors that scientists do not consider to be science. In the final analysis a human
judgment must be made. However, the community of scientists is a community that
requires that scientific knowledge be made public and withstand public scrutiny and
testing. Thus, in the long run there can be no conspiracies to include or exclude any
domain of thought.
The Universality of Science

Much of the multicultural literature on science seems to be saying that the problem
with the Standard Account is that it is taken to be the only account of science. It is an
exclusive and universally appropriate account. But we wonder if this really is the bone
of contention among multiculturalists? Is it the alleged universality of science or is it
the intellectual exclusiveness of science according to the Standard Account? We ask
this because the post-colonialist arguments rejecting the universality of science seem
to be arguments more about the exclusivity of science. It seems to us that even if the
definition of science were broadened to include what is now excluded one would still
have a universal science. Indeed, if there is no universal concept of science then how
can anything be either included or excluded as science?
It can be instructive to consider a different type of example altogether. Around the
globe football is a widely recognized sporting game. We in America have a game called
football but it is significantly different from what the rest of the world calls football.
In fact, the rest of the world for the sake of clarity refers to the American game as
American football to distinguish it from real football. With enough political agitation
and economic clout those of us Americans who resent this form of marginalization
could possibly get the rest of the world to broaden its definition of football. The
term football still is universal (we now all agree that the game of football includes
the varieties played in the USA and elsewhere) but it now has a new meaning that is
general enough to include what many previously took to be two rather distinct games.
Undoubtedly, there are other games played with a ball and the feet. If the proponents
of these games agitate as successfully as did the American footballers, where will the
process end? In our opinion, this is anti-reductionism made absurd and the end result
is that everyone loses. Diversity is lost. Meaning is lost. Communication is lost.
We thus conclude that the real difficulty multiculturalists have with the Standard
Account is not its claim to universality, but its exclusiveness. Though technically
difficult to accomplish, conceptually the Standard Account could be broadened by sim-
ply getting a consensus in the science community for the rewriting of the definition
of science in a more inclusive form. Then one could have Maori science or First
Nations science, (or for that matter, Christian science and Islamic science, etc.)
just as football could be broadened to include American football. We could be even
more inclusive by simply taking science to be knowledge of Naturebut one needs to
Cobern & Loving 61
reconsider why would anyone want to do any of these things? Early in this article we
quoted from Kawagley et al (1998, p. 134) on the relationship between the Standard
Account and indigenous knowledge:
such a narrow view of science not only diminishes the legitimacy of knowledge derived through
generations of naturalistic observation and insight, it simultaneously devalues those cultures
which traditionally rely heavily on naturalistic observation and insight.
We see in this statement that some people are troubled about the dominant intellectual
position that modern Western science has come to hold in the public square. It is a po-
sition of dominance that tends to disenfranchise competitors. One way for competitors
to regain that franchise is to oust Western science. Another way to regain access to the
public squareand this is the approach many multiculturalists appear to be takingis
to get ones ideas included in the definition of the dominant player, in this case Western
science or the Standard Account.
If such a thing were to ever happen it would be a pyrrhic victory for indigenous
knowledge. The new additions to science (TEK or any other form of indigenous knowl-
edge) would soon face serious negative consequences. They would first lose their dis-
tinctiveness as a form of thought as they became absorbed by the dominant discourse
of science, that is the Standard Account. They would lose because the new additions
would inevitably be taken as mere tokens of cultural inclusiveness rather than as se-
rious participants in the discourse of science. This tokenism would be reinforced by the
inability of the new additions to compete where Western science is strongesttechnical
precision control, creative genius and explanatory power. And, the new additions would
lose by being co-opted into the cultural chauvinism scientism now holds in much of
modern life. Snively & Corsiglia (1998) rightfully question where is the wisdom in
science? As an incorporated part of science, that critique and challenge would be much
more difficult to make.
The Problem of Scientism

The problem facing TEK and other forms of indigenous knowledge, as well as other
domains of knowledge such as the arts and literature and religion, is the problem of
scientismthe cultural hegemony science. The problem is not that science dominates
at what it does best: the production of highly efficacious naturalistic understanding
of natural phenomena. The problem is that too often science is used to dominate the
public square as if all other discourses were of lesser value. This is a hierarchic view
of knowledge with science placed at the epistemological pinnacle (see figure 2). For
example, the National Academy of Science out of fear over religious incursions in school
science issued this statement:
In a nation whose people depend on scientific progress for their health, economic gains, and
national security, it is of utmost importance that our students understand science as a system
of study, so that by building on past achievements they can maintain the pace of scientific
progress and ensure the continued emergence of results that can benefit mankind. (NAS, 1984,
p. 6)
Natural
Sciences
Social Sciences
Other Knowledge Domains
Figure 2: Epistemological pyramid.

More recently the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) endorsed a sim-
ilar perspective in the Proposed ICSU Programme on Capacity Building in Science
(ICSU, 1996). The document epigram equates the global gap of well-being with the
global imbalance of science and technology development. The ICSU intends to:
demonstrate to the world that having the capacity to understand and use science is economi-
cally, socially and culturally profitable. Indeed, the very habitability of the planet will depend
on global popular consensus. As such, the spread of scientific culture, of scientific ways of
thinking, and of knowledge is tied to the fate of humanity. (p. 1)
About these statements we can say, of course, few people question the productive
role that science has played in the development of modern life including medicine
and contributions to good health, nor the economic gains due to technical innovations
grounded in science (though the relationship between science and technology is not
nearly so straightforward as these statements from the science community suggest).
These claims by NAS and ICSU, however, are vastly overstated and singularly one-
sided. Good health, economic well being and national security depend on many things
only one of which is science. Moreover, as important as science surely is, it does not
have an uncontested claim to be the most important of these many factors. Curiously,
though the National Academy of Science and the ICSU appear eager to accept credit
for good technological innovations there is no parallel acceptance of technological dis-
asters. If the science community wants credit for developing high yield grains that
ease food shortages, how can the same community refuse credit for DDT? Something is
wrong with this portrayal of science (we might even say betrayal of science). Garrard
and Wegierski (1991, p. 611) suggest an explanation:
It can be argued that technology and scientific positivism constitute the dominant ideology of
Western civilization today. Technology has indeed become, as Heidegger noted, the metaphysics
of our age, a totalistic form of secular religion ultimately incompatible with the existence of
rival, non-technological assumptions, beliefs, or thought systems.
The problem for TEKas well as for so many other domains of knowledgeis not
the exclusivity of science as per the Standard Account but the transmogrification of
science as scientism in the public square.
Cobern & Loving 63
Epistemological Pluralism
When there is a gatekeeper and you persuade the gatekeeper to let you in, although
you may have influenced the gatekeeper you have also conceded his legitimacy as
gatekeeper. Similarly, getting TEK into the school curriculum as science does not
address the fundamental problem that led to the devaluing of TEK and other forms of
indigenous knowledge in the first place. The task for educators is to develop curricula
that value knowledge in its many forms and from its many sources. Therefore bringing
TEK into the science classroom is an excellent thing to do. It offers students a chance
to see how the practice of science can benefit from the insights of another domain of
knowledge. It helps students see that some of the insights from science can be arrived
at by other epistemological pathways. And, it helps students see what is unique about
sciencewhat science can do that other domains of knowledge cannot do.
We therefore reject positions of scientific and epistemological relativism. Not all
thoughts are equal. Not all ways of thinking are parallel. But life is a complicated
affair and the skillful navigation of life requires a diverse repertoire of thought and
reason. And what is essential for a suburbanite American to understand about Nature
will not be satisfactory for a Nisgaa fisherman living in a very different world. Thus,
what we value is the best thinking for a given situation and the wisdom to change
ones thinking when situations change. We advocate epistemological pluralism and the
ability to wisely discriminate amongst competing claims. This last point is important
because the issues of life typically cross epistemological categories. It is not always
obvious in the public when a problem does or does not call for a scientific solution.
Should the USA spend four billion dollars to build a Super Collider? The scientific
answer is probably yes since the Collider would help make important advances in
physics. But, America is not building the Super Collider because science was out bid by
the competing discourse of economics. In other situations we may find other domains of
knowledge acting in consort with science. Snively & Corsiglia (1998) give a number of
examples of ecologists and biologists profiting from the TEK of indigenous people. The
Native American Forestry Program at Northern Arizona University (1997) provides
another example where science and traditional knowledge work in consort.
In other situations, however, science rightly precipitates and influences cultural
change. Consider the following situation. At a recent NARST session a researcher
read the script of dialogue between an Australian Aborigine and a health care worker
indicating totally different perspectives regarding the value and use of high-protein
foods. The food is valued as nutrition, especially for children, in the West and valued
as gifts in adult relationships to the Aborigines. The result of the latter perspec-
tive is continued high infant mortality for children under two years of age despite
health care workers careful use of Socratic methods to dignify the alternate views
while educating the Aborigines. From the perspective of traditional Aboriginal life,
that of a hunter/gatherer culture, the elevated social and political status of the elders
makes their health critical to the success of the tribe. From that perspective they
were correct to reject the science-based position. However, cultures cannot maintain a
status quo in the face of environmental change and expect to survive. The fact that the
researcher was involved with an education program for Aboriginal peoples indicates
that the researcher knew this fully well. Thus in this case the possible cultural changes
precipitated by science education regarding young childrens need for high protein food
are likely to be in the groups long term best interests.
The unfortunate fact of this last example is that the researcher represented the
Aboriginal rationale for distributing the best food to important adults as equally scien-
tifically valid as is a distribution based on confirmed nutritional value and nutritional
need at various stages of human physical development. But if all explanations are
mistakenly valorized as scientifically valid (and there is no attempt at understanding
the best scientific explanations), we are reduced to relativism of the worst kind. Privi-
leging what knowledge is of most worth in science class is not the same as denying the
value of other forms of knowledge (Loving, 1997). What is at issue here is the learning
of when scientific knowledge should be appropriated over other competing domains of
knowledge because it is the best knowledge available for the particular situation.
Conclusion
Our position in this article is that science can be defined with sufficient clarity so as to
maintain a coherent boundary for the practical purposes of school science curriculum
development. That boundary excludes most forms of indigenous knowledge, if not
all, just as it excludes art, history, economics, religion, and many other domains of
knowledge. Being exclusive, however, does not confer science with any privilege vis- a-
vis other domains. Science is properly privileged only within its own domain for that
is where its strength lies. When TEK and other forms of indigenous knowledge are
devalued it is not because of the exclusive nature of the Standard Account of science.
It is because someone is involved in the scientistic practice of extending scientific
privilege from its proper domain in science and technology into other domains. The
solution is to resist this scientistic practice by emphasizing throughout schooling the
concept of epistemological pluralism, bearing in mind that pluralism,
is not relativism. . . Pluralism is the civil engagement of our differences and disagreements
about what is most importantly true. Against the monism that denies the variety of truth,
against the relativism that denies the importance of truth, and against the nihilism that
denies the existence of truth, we intend to nurture a pluralism that revives and sustains the
conversation about what really matters, which is the truth. (First Things, 1995, p. 12)
Bearing also in mind that truth is never under the sole proprietorship of any single
domain of knowledgenot even science.
References
Adams, H.H.I.: 1990, African and African-American Contributions to Science and
Technology, Multnomah School District, Portland Public Schools, Portland, OR.
Adas, M.: 1989, Machines as the Measure of Man: Science, Technology, and Ideologies
of Western Dominance, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Cobern & Loving 65
Addison-Wesley: 1993, Multiculturalism in Mathematics, Science, and Technology:
Readings and Activities, Addison-Wesley, New York.
Albanese, A., Neves, M. C. D. and Vicentini, M.: 1997, Models in Science and in
Education: A Clinical Review of Research on Students Ideas about the Earth
and its Place in the Universe, Science & Education 6(6), 573590.
Barba, R. H.: 1995, Science in the Multicultural Classroom: A Guide to Teaching and
Learning, Needham Heights, Allyn and Bacon, MA.
Barber, B.: 1963, Tension and Accommodations Between Science and Humanism,
American Behavioral Scientist (7), 38.
Basalla, G.: 1967, The Spread of Western Science, Science 156, 611622.
Behrens, C. A.: 1989, The Scientific Basis for Shipibo Soil Classification and Land Use:
Changes in Soil-plant Associations with Cash Cropping, American Anthropologist
91(1), 83100.
Berlin, B.: 1972, Speculations on the Growth of Ethnobotanical Nomenclature,
Language in Society I, 5186.
Bloor, D. and Barnes, B.: 1996, Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Boster, J. S. and Johnson, J. C.: 1989, Form and function: A comparison of expert and
novice judgments of similarity among fish, American Anthropologist 91(4), 866
888.
Burtt, E. A.: 1967, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science,
Routledge and K. Paul, London, UK.
Chalmers, A. F.: 1982, What is This Thing Called Science?, University of Queensland
Press, Victoria, Australia.
Cobern, W. W.: 1991, World View Theory and Science Education Research, NARST
Monograph No. 3, National Association for Research in Science Teaching, Man-
hattan, KS.
Cobern, W. W.: 1995a, Belief and Knowledge: Unnecessary Conflict in the Science
Classroom, in F. Finley (ed.), Proceedings of the History and Philosophy of Science
and Science Teaching, HPSST, Minneapolis, MN.
Cobern, W. W.: 1995b, Science Education as an Exercise in Foreign Affairs, Science &
Education 4(3), 287302.
Collingwood, R. G.: 1940, An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, London.
Corsiglia, J. and Snively, G.: 1997, Knowing Home: Nisgaa Traditional Knowledge and
Wisdom Improve Environmental Decision Making, Alternatives Journal 32(3), 22
27.
DeLoria, V.: 1995, Red Earth, White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of Scientific
Facts, Scribner, New York.
Desmond, A. and Moore, J.: 1991, Darwin - The Life of a Tormented Evolutionist,
Warner Books, New York.
Driver, R., Leach, J., Millar, R. and Scott, P.: 1996, Young Peoples Images of Science,
Open University Press, Buckingham, GB.
First Things: 1995, Putting first things first, First Things (51), 1113.
Fuller, S.: 1991, Social Epistemology, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indi-
anapolis.
Garrard, G. and Wegierski, M.: 1991, Oh Canada? an Essay on Canadian History,
Politics, and Culture, The World & I 6(1), 589613.
Geertz, C.: 1973, The Interpretation of Culture, Basic Books, New York.
Gernet, J.: 1993-1994, Space and Time: Science and Religion in the Encounter between
China and Europe., Chinese Science 11, 93102.
Gibson: 1996, Personal Communication.

Gieryn, T. F.: 1983, Boundary-work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-
science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, American
Sociological Review 48(6), 781795.
Gieryn, T. F., Bevins, G. M. and Zehr, S. C.: 1985, Professionalization of American
Scientists: Public Science in the Creation/Evolution Trials, American Sociological
Review 50(3), 392409.
Grinnell, F.: 1987, The Scientific Attitude, Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S.: 1989, Fourth generation evaluation, Sage, Newbury
Park, CA.
Hawking, S. W. and Penrose, R.: 1996, The Nature of Space and Time, Scientific
American 275(1), 6065.
Hesse, M.: 1980, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science,
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, IN.
Hodson, D.: 1993, In search of a rationale for multicultural science education, Science
Education 77(6), 685711.
Cobern & Loving 67
Horton, R.: 1994, Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK.
Horwood, R. H.: 1988, Explanation and Description in Science Teaching, Science
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU): 1996, Proposed ICSU Programme on
Capacity Building in Science, Author, Batavia, IL.
Kawagley, A. O., Norris-Tull, D. and Norris-Tull, R. A.: 1998, The Indigenous
Worldview of Yupiaq Culture: Its Scientific Nature and Relevance to the Practice
and Teaching of Science, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 35(2), 133144.
Ladriere, J.: 1977, The Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and Technology,
UNESCO, Paris, France.
Laudan, L.: 1983, The Demise of the Demarcation Problem, in R. Lauden (ed.), The
Demarcation Between Science and Pseudo-science, Vol. 21, Virginia Tech Center
for the Study of Science in Society, Working Papers, Blacksburg, VA, pp. 735.
Laudan, L.: 1996, Beyond Positivism and Relativism, Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
Linden, E.: 1991, Lost Tribes, Lost Knowledge, TIME 138(12), 4656.
Lord, E.: 1958, The Impact of Education on Non-scientific Beliefs in Ethiopia, Journal
of Social Psychology 47, 339353.
Loving, C. C.: 1991, The Scientific Theory Profile: A Philosophy of Science Models for
Science Teachers, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 28(9), 823838.
Loving, C. C.: 1997, From the Summit of Truth to the Slippery Slopes: Science Educa-
tions Journey Through Positivist-postmodernist Territory, American Educational
Research Journal 34(3), 421452.
Loving, C. C.: 1998, Cortes Multicultural Empowerment Model and Generative
Teaching and Learning in Science, Science & Education 7, 533552.
Lyotard, J. F.: 1995, Toward the Postmodern, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands,
NJ.
Matthews, M. R.: 1994, Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of
Science, Routledge, New York.
McKinley, E.: 1997, Science Education from the Margins: The Uneasy Selfhood of a
Postcolonial Woman, Adelaide, Australia. Paper presented at the annual meeting
of ASERA.
National Academy of Sciences: 1984, Science and Creationism: A View from the
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.
Nature: 1997, Science Wars and the Need for Respect and Rigour, Nature
385(6615), 373.
Needham, J.: 1969, The Grand Titration, George Allen & Unwin, London.
Nelkin, D.: 1983, Legislating Creation in Arkansas, Society 20(2), 1316.
Northern Arizona University: 1997, Native American Forestry Program, School of
Forestry, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ.
Ogawa, M.: 1995, Science Education in a Multiscience Perspective, Science Education
79(5), 583593.
Overton, W. R.: 1983, The Decision in McClean v. Arkansas Board of Education, Society
20(2), 312.
Owens, V. S.: 1983, Seeing Christianity in Red & Green as Well as in Black & White:
Propositional truth is not the Whole Truth, Christianity Today 27(13), 3840.
Sagan, C.: 1995, The Demon-haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark, Random
House, New York.
Smithsonian Institution: 1996a, Case Study: Ingrid, Author, Cambridge, MA.
Smithsonian Institution: 1996b, Case Study: Donna, Author, Cambridge, MA.
Snively, G. and Corsiglia, J.: 1998, Rediscovering Indigenous Science: Implications for
Science Education, CA. Paper presented at the National Association for Research
in Science Teaching, San Diego.
Stanley, W. B. and Brickhouse, N. W.: 1994, Multiculturalism, Universalism, and
Science Education, Science Education 78(4), 387398.
Tempels, P.: 1959, Bantu Philosophy, Presence Africaine, Paris, FR. Tranlsated by
C. King.
Van Sertima, I.: 1984, Blacks in Science: Ancient and Modern, Transaction Books, New
Brunswick, NJ.
Warren, D. M.: 1991, Using Indigenous Knowledge in Agricultural Development. World
Bank Discussion Paper No. 127, The World Bank, Washington.
Warren, D. M.: 1997, Conservation of Indigenous Knowledge Serves Conservation of
Biodiversity, Alternatives Journal 23(3), 2627.
Varieties of Constructivism and their (Ir-)Relevance to Science
Education
Peter Slezak
University of New South Wales, Austrialia. Email: p.slezak@unsw.edu.au
Introduction
The post-modernist affectation in the title, referring to the (ir-)relevance of construc-
tivism, is intended to reflect the ambiguities which prevail under this broad head-
ing and their varied implications. Despite these unclarities, the doctrines under this
heading enjoy an extraordinary popularity among educators. Paul Cobb (1994, p. 4)
has referred to the fervor that is currently associated with constructivism and Paul
Ernest has written:
In the past decade or two, the most important theoretical perspective to emerge in mathematics
education has been that of constructivism. . . . Ironically the attacks on radical constructivism
. . . which were perhaps intended to fatally expose its weakness, served as a platform from
which it was launched to widespread international acceptance and approbation. (Ernest 1995)
In an important clarification of the varieties of constructivism, D.C. Phillips (1997,

p. 152) has noted that Arguably it is the dominant theoretical position in science and
mathematics education and he remarks:
Across the broad fields of educational theory and research, constructivism has become some-
thing akin to a secular religion. (1995, p. 5)
Phillips distinguishes the sociological form of constructivism from the psychological

variety. The psychological variety of constructivism is a theory of individual mental
activity principally championed by Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995) and its origins can
be seen in Kant, Berkeley and Piaget, among others. There is a third variety of
constructivism which deserves to be clearly distinguished from the others, namely,
the constructive empiricism of van Fraassen (1980) which has received no attention
among educationalists, though it has been among the most important recent views in
the philosophy of science. This doctrine is a form of anti-realism or instrumentalism
whose provenance can be traced by at least as far as Osianders notorious preface to
Copernicus De Revolutionibus and the Galileo affair, and still a major issue in the
philosophy of science.
The educational implications of these doctrines are markedly different, and in this
article I will be concerned to draw these out clearly. First, I will suggest that, despite
its overwhelming influence among educationalists, the radical constructivism of von
Glasersfeld has absolutely no pedagogical consequences at all. By contrast, the so-
ciological variety of constructivism at the centre of the recent Science Wars has the
most dramatic, and largely unnoticed, implications for education, to be discussed in
the following article. Finally, van Fraassens constructive empiricism has importance
70 Constructivism and Science Education
for educators as a part of the broader role of history and philosophy of science in any
sound science curriculum, discussed in the paper Does Science Teaching Need HPS?
(See the article on page ??.)
Radical Constructivism: Epistemology, Education and Dynamite

Ernst von Glasersfeld has remarked To introduce epistemological considerations into
a discussion of education has always been dynamite (quoted in P. Ernest 1995, p. xi).
I am concerned to give an analysis of the explosive mixture.
A symptom of the problem may be seen in the remarkable range of philosophical
issues raised in the educational literature. These include extremely abstruse, esoteric
questions whose relevance to any practical or theoretical problem in education is surely
doubtful. Thus, among the topics discussed are Berkeleyan idealism, Cartesian du-
alism, Kantian constructivism, Popperian falsifiability, Kuhnian incommensurability,
Quinean underdetermination, truth, relativism, instrumentalism, rationalism and em-
piricism, inter alia. By seemingly plausible increments, we are led from the classroom
to the most arcane problems of metaphysics.
Education Learning Psychology Knowledge Epistemology Metaphysics.
Thus, Gergen (cited in Steffe & Gale eds. 1995, p. xii) sees certain lapses in Cartesian
epistemology and the mind-body split, though the concievable bearing of this on
educational matters remains obscure. Likewise Steffe (1995, p. xiii) contrasts various
constructivist approaches with the Cartesian model, suggesting that they differed
from the Cartesian model in viewing knowledge in a nondualistic manner so as to
avoid to mind-body split of endogenic (mind-centred) and exogenic (reality-centred)
knowledge (1995, p. xiii). In passing, we might note that the mind-body split is a
different issue from that of the objective reality of a mind-independent world, though
Steffe seems to conflate these. Unfortunately, Steffe also neglects to explain how
Cartesian dualism might have the slightest bearing on science teaching, or anything
else for that matter. As a card carrying materialist, like most philosophers today, I
doubt that I am a better teacher for that reason. Some of my best friends are dualists,
and great teachers. Not least, Descartes own exemplary foundational contributions to
modern science and mathematics were hardly inhibited by his alleged lapses.
Such examples suggest that we might be highly suspicious of constructivist claims
of von Glasersfeld and Gergen, among others, suggesting that for 2,500 years since
the origin of science in ancient Greece, we have been somehow seriously misguided
in our conceptions of knowledge and science (see von Glasersfeld in Steffe & Gale
eds. p. 6). Thus, von Glasersfeld suggests that his conception of constructivism arose
out of a profound dissatisfaction with the theories of knowledge in the tradition of
Western philosophy and he has suggested that adopting his constructivism could
bring about some rather profound changes in the general practice of education (1989,
p. 135). His radical recommendation is: Give up the requirement that knowledge
represents an independent world (in Steffe & Gale eds. pp. 6-7). This is, of course,
Berkeleys notorious idealism and undoubtedly a radical proposal. However, despite
Slezak 71
these extravagant claims, we will see that the educational recommendations which
von Glasersfeld actually offers are rather modest.
Commonsense Realism
The prominent role of such metaphysical problems in the educational literature is
perplexing in a way which goes beyond the intrinsic puzzles of the issues themselves.
Undoubtedly, the issue of realism remains a central one in philosophy, though even here
an important warning has been recently voiced by Hilary Putnam (1994) in his Dewey
Lectures. Putnam notes that The besetting sin of philosophers seems to be throwing
the baby out with the bathwater as each new generation or fashion ignores the insights
of earlier periods. In particular, concerning the disputes over realism, Putnam says
that it is important to find a way to do justice to our sense that knowledge claims are
responsible to reality without recoiling into metaphysical fantasy (1994, p. 446). The
responsibility proposed by Putnam is a familiar, commonsense, naive realism.
It is surprising enough that philosophers need to be reminded not to lose sight of
commonsense realism. That educationalists need the same advice is somewhat harder
to explain. Like Berkeley, Kant is explicitly cited by von Glasersfeld as one of the
sources for his constructivism, though it is instructive to ponder how one might derive
educational implications from the Critique of Pure Reason. Kants transcendental
idealism as an attempt to find an alternative to a pure phenomenalism is an unlikely
basis for pedagogical theory or instructional interventions.
Piagets Construction of Reality?

von Glasersfeld sees important consequences following from a persons cognitive iso-
lation from reality. However, Kants idea that knowledge of the world and of the
self are two aspects of the same schema is not a denial of the objective reality of
a mind-independent world as von Glasersfeld appears to think. Kants idea is also
expressed by Piaget, clearly acknowledging a knowable objective world beyond our
sense-data. Despite being chargeable with at least flirting with idealism (Boden 1979,
p. 79), Piaget (1975) says that his epistemological position is very close to the spirit
of Kantianism (Insights and Illusions of Philosophy, p. 57)both in its constructivism
and in its sensitivity to the need to avoid Berkeleyan idealism.
Thus Margaret Boden writes:
Piaget is aware that as a constructivist he must be careful to avoid idealismor, to put it
another way, that he must answer the sceptics challenge that perhaps all our so-called knowl-
edge is mind-dependent illusion. He tries to buttress his commonsense realism by appealing
to the biological basis of knowledge. (Boden 1979, p. 79)
Piaget himself explains clearly:

. . . So to attribute logic and mathematics to the general coordinations of the subjects actions is
not an idealistic overestimation of the part played by the subject; it is a recognition of the fact
that, while the fecundity of the subjects thought processes depends on the internal resources
of the organism, the efficacy of those processes depends on the fact that the organism is not
independent of the environment but can only live, act, or think in interaction with it. (Piaget
1971, p. 345)
Although the title of Piagets (1955) book The Construction of Reality in the Child
is suggestive of the constructivist doctrines which von Glasersfeld has championed,
Piagets own text leaves little doubt about the significant difference between these two.
Thus, while von Glasersfeld is at pains on every occasion to emphasize the unknowa-
bility of reality and the need to abandon notions of objectivity and truth, Piaget by
contrast, writes in an altogether different mood. The conclusion of his book is titled
The Elaboration of the Universe and he asks how the world is constructed by means
of the instrument of the sensorimotor intelligence. In particular, Piaget speaks of the
shift from an egocentric state to one in which the self is placed . . . in a stable world
conceived as independent of personal acitivity (p. 395). Elsewhere Piaget explains:
. . . the universe is built up into an aggregate of permanent objects connected by causal relations
that are independent of the subject and are placed in objective space and time. Such a universe,
instead of depending on personal activity, is on the contrary imposed on the self . . .. (p. 397)
. . . During the earliest stages the child perceives things like a solipsist who is unaware of
himself as a subject and is familiar only with his own actions. But step by step with the
coordination of his intellectual instruments he discovers himself in placing himself as an active
object among the other active objects in a universe external to himself. (p. 397)
Thus Piaget is quite unselfconscious in speaking about the existence of an indepen-

dent reality:
Accommodation of mental structures to reality implies the existence of assimilatory schemata.
. . . Inversely, the formation of schemata through assimilation entails the utilzation of external
realities to which the former must accommodate . . .. (p. 398)
He explains that the dual processes of assimilation and accommodation lead to a

shift from egocentrism to an objectivity and enables the subject to go outside himself
to solidify and objectify his universe . . . (p. 402).
Elsewhere Piaget writes:
The theory of knowledge is therefore essentially a theory of adaptation of thought to reality,
even if in the last analysis this adaptation (like all adaptations) reveals the existence of an
inextricable interaction between the subject and the objects of study. (1972, p. 18)
The problem is that of determining how knowledge comes to terms with the real
world, and therefore what relationships obtain between subject and object (ibid, p. 6).
These are ways of talking which von Glasersfeld has emphatically repudiated, and
so it is evident that his version of constructivism is quite different from Piagets.
The Philosophical Urge

von Glasersfeld has explicitly drawn his constructivist stance from what he takes to be
the insights of Berkeley and Kant. He says Berkeleys insight
. . . wipes out the major rational grounds for the belief that human knowledge could represent
a reality that is independent of human experience. (von Glasersfeld 1995, p. 34)
. . . Kants transcendental philosophy . . . is a purely rational analysis of human understanding
and provides a model that is in many ways fundamental to the constructivist orientation. (von
Glasersfeld 1995, p. 39)
Slezak 73
von Glasersfeld is evidently suffering from what Rorty (1979) has called the philo-
sophical urge, namely, to say that assertions and actions must not only cohere with
other assertions and actions but correspond to something apart from what people
are saying and doing . . . (1979, p. 179). By contrast, in the spirit of Putnams (1994)
second naivete, Rorty says that a Quinean naturalism questions whether, once we
understand . . . when and why various beliefs have been adopted or discarded, there is
something left called the relation of knowledge to reality left over to be understood
(1979, p. 178).
Aside from the question of its possible bearing on pedagogy, von Glasersfeld is
evidently led into his Berkeleyan worries by failing to distinguish questions of epis-
temology from questions of metaphysics. That is, he conflates questions concerning
the reliability of knowledge with the question of metaphysical realism. In the follow-
ing quotation we see the former concern in the first paragraph and the latter, quite
different concern in the second:
In most departments of psychology and schools of education, teaching continues as though
nothing had happened and the quest for immutable objective truths were as promising as ever.
For some of us, however, a different view of knowledge has emerged, . . . This view differs from
the old one in that it deliberately discards the notion that knowledge could or should be a
representation of an observer-independent world-in-itself . . .. (von Glasersfeld 1989)
Again, we see a non-sequitur from a concern about the reliability of knowledge to

idealism:
The existence of objective knowledge . . . has been taken for granted by educators. Recent
developments in the philosophy of science and the historical study of scientific accomplishments
have deprived these presuppositions of their former plausibility. Sooner or later, this must have
an effect on the teaching of science. . . . I am presenting an alternative theory of knowing that
takes into account the thinking organisms cognitive isolation from reality. (von Glasersfeld
1989, p. 121)
Any solution to our cognitive isolation from reality is unlikely to help solve the
problem of objective knowledge since the arguments for realism are not the same as
arguments for this latter problem. That is, the epistemological problem of objective
knowledge is left untouched by recoiling into the metaphysical fantasy of Berkeleyan
idealism. Rather, the current philosophical answer to the epistemological problem is
the acknowledgement that there is no absolutely certain foundation. Instead, philoso-
phers settle for a fallibilistic naturalism captured in Quines epigraph from Neurath:
Wie Schiffer sind wir, die ihr Schiff auf offener See umbauen mussen, ohne es jemals in einem
Dock zerlegen und aus bestend Bestandteilen neu errichten zu konnen. (Otto Neurath, quoted
as epigraph in Quine 1960)
That is, we are like the sailor who must repair his ship while sailing in it. The
entire ship may be rebuilt, but only one plank at a time. von Glasersfelds concerns
about metaphysics are addressed in Quines following remarks:
Ontological questions, under this view, are on a par with questions of natural science. (Quine
1961a, p. 45)
. . . our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individu-
ally but only as a corporate body. (Quine 1961a, p. 41)
Hence it is meaningless, I suggest, to inquire into the absolute correctness of a conceptual
scheme as a mirror of reality. Our standard for appraising basic changes of conceptual scheme
must be, not a realistic standard of correspondence to reality, but a pragmatic standard. (Quine
1961b, p. 79)
Charitably construed, von Glasersfelds concerns may be seen as expressingif not

a post-epistemological view as he is pleased to call it, or a successor epistemology
as Gergen (p. 23) says,the familiar epistemological position of Quine himself. von
Glasersfelds notion of viability seems best understood as a coherentist position
concerned with what he calls the goal of a coherent conceptual organization of the
world as we experience it, (Steffe & Gale eds. p. 7) and the goal of constructing as
coherent a model as possible of the experiential world (ibid, p. 8). It is in this sense
that we may acknowledge that von Glasersfelds words need not be construed as an
idealism or solipsism as they have often been taken. Instead, they can be read as a
Quinean holism and fallibilism. It is in the spirit of von Glasersfelds constructivism
and in keeping with his insistence on rejecting an unknowable ontological reality to
read his remarks as a Quines holism since this seems to be the sense of some of von
Glasersfelds remarks. Thus he says: I claim that we can define the meaning of to
exist only within the realm of our experiential world and not ontologically. (ibid, p. 7).
The talk of ontology is misleading and confusing here, however, because, following
Quine, our ontological commitments are ipso facto the posits of our theories and have
nothing to do with an inaccessible, unknowable reality lying beyond our experience,
our theories or the veil of ideas. It is this repeated emphasis on an inaccessible or
unknowable reality by von Glasersfeld which warrants the repeated charge of idealism.
Direct Objects of Knowledge

von Glasersfeld is victim to a notorious problem in philosophy concerning the direct
objects of perception and knowledge. This is the problem of the veil of ideas which
seems to intervene between the mind and the world and which has posed the difficulty
for philosophers at least since the Cartesians, Malebranche and Arnauld, through
Locke and Berkeley and the sense-data theories of A.J. Ayer in the 20th Century. In
psychology, too, the problem has given rise to Gibsons ecological or direct realism as
a response to traditional representationalist theories (see Slezak 1999). We see this
clearly in von Glasersfelds articulation of his doctrines:
. . . it is this construction of the individuals subjective reality which, I want to suggest . . . should
be of interest to practitioners and researchers in education . . .
One of Vicos basic ideas was that epistemic agents can know nothing but the cognitive struc-
tures they themselves have put together. . . . God alone can know the real world . . . In contrast,
the human knower can know only what the human knower has constructed. (von Glasersfeld
1989)
For constructivists, therefore, the word knowledge refers to a commodity that is radically
different from the objective representation of an observer-independent world which the main-
stream of the Western philosophical tradition has been looking for. Instead, knowledge refers
to conceptual structures . . .. (von Glasersfeld 1989, p. 123)
Slezak 75
It is precisely this idea that we know only our own ideas or conceptual structures
directly rather than the world which is the source of the traditional puzzle. Putnam
(1994) provides a succinct diagnosis of this disastrous idea:
. . . our difficulty in seeing how our minds can be in genuine contact with the external world
is, in large part, the product of a disastrous idea that has haunted Western philosophy since
the seventeenth century, the idea that perception involves an interface between the mind and
the external objects we perceive. (Putnam 1994)
Besides this disastrous idea, the conflation of the metaphysical problem of realism
with epistemology is encouraged by much post-modern post-positivist post-epistemological
writing. Thus, for example, in their recent book Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1995) deny
their own idealism, but accuse all their sociogical constructivist colleagues of this
charge (see Slezak 1997, 2000). Nevertheless, despite being explicitly repudiated by
Bloor, as by von Glasersfeld, such disavowals are not quite enough to exculpate them
since there are grounds for seeing a confusion in their writings between idealism and
fallibilism. They reject the external world when they evidently wish to reject absolute,
infallible truth claims.
Whatever may be the educational interest in these matters, von Glasersfeld is at
least in good philosophical company. His worry about the gap between thought and
reality mediated by ideas is the familiar one posed by Locke and Malebranche and,
more recently, by John McDowell (1994) in his significantly titled work Mind and
World. However, in the present context, whatever the philosophical merits of von
Glasersfelds concerns, the question is how these bear on any issue of conceivable
educational interest.
Epistemology or Pedagogy?
Apropos this very issue, at a meeting von Glasersfeld was explicitly asked whether
constructivism is to be understood as an epistemology or pedagogy. His answer is
most revealing for what it fails to say. von Glasersfeld responded by restating the
formula of Berkeley: . . . there is no way of checking knowledge against what it was
supposed to represent. One can compare knowledge only with other knowledge (1993,
p. 24). The questioner is unlikely to have found this answer satisfying. Other questions
sought to clarify the differences between constructivism and idealism. Again, von
Glasersfelds answer is rather unhelpful, simply re-iterating that we can only know
what our minds construct and that the real world remains unknowable and that
I could be one of Leibniz monads (1993, p. 28). Teachers might wonder how this
could help them in the classroom. When pressed on this question concerning the
implications of contructivism for a theory of instruction, von Glasersfeld suggests that
there are many. These include the following: It is . . . crucial for the teacher to get some
idea of where they [the students] are, that is, what concepts they seem to have and
how they relate them (1993, p. 33). This inference seems a modest recommendation
which is far from the rather profound changes promised. Similar platitudes are
typical:
Asking students how they arrived at their given answer is a good way of discovering something
about their thinking. (1993, p. 33)
Whatever a student says in answer to a question (or problem) is what makes sense to the
student at that moment. It has to be taken seriously as such, regardless of how odd or wrong
it might seem to the teacher. To be told that it is wrong is most discouraging and inhibiting for
the student. (1993, p. 33)
If you want to foster students motivation to delve further into questions that, at first, are of no
particular interest (from the students point of view), you will have to create situations where
the students have an opportunity to experience the pleasure inherent in solving a problem.
(1993, p. 33)
We may assume that such profundities are what K. Tobin (1993) has in mind when
he refers to constructivism as A paradigm for the practice of science education. Tobin
has his own deeply insightful contributions to offer:
A most significant role of the teacher, from a constructivist perspective, is to evaluate stu-
dent learning. In a study of exemplary teachers, Tobin and Fraser found that these teachers
routinely monitored students in three distinctive ways: they scanned the class for signs of
imminent off task behavior, closely examined the nature of the engagement of students, and
investigated the extent to which students understood what they were learning. If teachers
are to mediate the learning process, it is imperative that they develop ways of assessing what
students know and how they can represent what they know. (Tobin & Tippins 1993, p. 12;
emphasis added)
In brief, good teachers make sure students pay attention and understand the lesson!
Inevitably one wonders how differently a teacher might do things if not operating from
a constructivist perspective.
From the Metaphysical to the Mundane

We have seen von Glasersfeld promise:
. . . if the theory of knowing that constructivism builds up on this basis were adopted as a
working hypothesis, it could bring about some rather profound changes in the general practice
of education. (von Glasersfeld 1989, p. 135)
Elsewhere he has suggested that taken seriously radical constructivism is a pro-

foundly shocking view which requires that some of the key concepts underlying edu-
cational practice have to be refashioned. Among these profoundly shocking recom-
mendations he suggests the following:
. . . students will be more motivated to learn something, if they can see why it would be useful
to know it.
Teaching and training are two practices that differ in their methods and, as a consequence,
have very different results. . . . rote learning does not lead to enlightenment.
. . . in order to modify students thinking, the teacher needs a model of how the student thinks.
Students should be driven by their own interest.
. . . talking about the situation is conducive to reflection.
To engender reflective talk requires an attitude of openness and curiosity on the part of the
teacher, a will to listen to the student . . .
Slezak 77
These are all undoubtedly sound recommendations, though hardly deserving to
be regarded as profoundly shocking. Indeed, such platitudes are characteristic of
constructivist instructional advice, though they are typically dressed up in a gratuitous
technical jargon which serves only to hide their banality. Thus, it is instructive to
subject an example to careful analysis.
Driver et al. (1995) writes:
. . . learning science involves being initiated into scientific ways of knowing. Scientific entities
and ideas, which are constructed, validated, and communicated through the cultural insti-
tutions of science, are unlikely to be discovered by individuals through their own empirical
inquiry; learning science thus involves being initiated into the ideas and practices of the scien-
tific community and making these ideas and practices meaningful at an individual level. The
role of the science educator is to mediate scientific knowledge for learners, to help them make
personal sense of the ways in which knowledge claims are generated and validated, rather than
to organize individual sense-making about the natural world. (Driver et al. 1995, p. 6)
A critical reading of the foregoing passage reveals it to reduce without remainder to

the following:
Learning science involves learning science. Individuals cannot rediscover science by them-
selves. So, the role of teachers is to teach.
Consider the first sentence of Driver et al. . . . learning science involves being
initiated into scientific ways of knowing. The ring of plausibility, if not profundity,
in this assertion derives from its being pure tautology. Learning science presumably
means, or may be paraphrased as, being initiated into scientific ways of knowing.
Likewise their remark that The role of the science educator is to mediate scientific
knowledge for learners is like saying that the role of the butcher is to mediate animal
products for consumers or the role of the bus driver is to mediate automotive vehicular
transportation for commuters. Their assertion is merely a circumlocution for saying
that the role of teachers is to teach. It is perhaps tedious to pursue this analysis
in exhaustive detail, but the illustrations serve to indicate a widespread tendency to
recast truisms in pretentious polysyllabic jargon to create a superficial illusion of deep
theory. Tobin and Tippin (1993) provide another typical illustration:
Constructivism suggests that learning is a social process of making sense of experience in
terms of what is already known. In that process learners create perturbations that arise from
attempts to give meaning to particular experiences through the imaginative use of existing
knowledge. The resolution of these perturbations leads to an equilibrium state whereby new
knowledge has been constructed to cohere with a particular experience and prior knowledge.
(Tobin & Tippins 1993, p. 10)
Translation: Students sometimes learn new things.

A most significant role of the teacher, from a constructivist perspective, is to evaluate stu-
dent learning. In a study of exemplary teachers, Tobin and Fraser found that these teachers
routinely monitored students in three distinctive ways: they scanned the class for signs of
imminent off task behaviour, closely examined the nature of the engagement of students, and
investigated the extent to which students understood what they were learning. If teachers
are to mediate the learning process, it is imperative that they develop ways of assessing what
students know and how they can represent what they know. (Tobin & Tippins 1993, p. 12)
Translation: Good teachers make sure students pay attention and understand the
lesson.
Tobin and Tippins conclude their article with the following remarks:
. . . it is our contention that constructivism is an intellectual tool that is useful in many edu-
cational contexts. . . . We do not claim that use of constructivism as a referent is the only way
to initiate changes of . . . a comprehensive and significant scope, but from our experience we
can assert that constructivism can assume a dialectical relationship with almost every other
referent in a process that culminates in a coherent world view consisting of compatible referents
for action. (Tobin & Tippins 1993, p. 20)
Translation: Constructivism is consistent with some other theories.

Constructivist buzz-words serve to give an air of profundity but all have ordinary
synonyms which reveal the platitudinous nature of the assertions they are used to
make. These include the following list:
mediating negotiating appropriating
discursive practices community of discourse social construction
meaning-making appropriating meaning interventions
co-construction of knowledge dialogic interaction process symbolic realities
cultural tools representations perturbations
negotiation of meaning in enculturation
social interaction
Thus we can see how we might render an ordinary phrase in a more impressive
manner: Instead of merely saying talking among teachers and students we can say
the discursive practices that support the coconstruction of scientific knowledge by
teachers and students (Driver et al. 1994, p. 9). Instead of saying simply that teachers
explain new ideas we can say the teachers role is characterized as that of medi-
ating between students personal meanings and culturally established mathematical
meanings of wider society (Cobb 1994b, p. 15). Rather than the truism that teachers
and students exchange ideas we can say speaking from the sociocultural perspective,
[we] define negotiation as a process of mutual appropriation in which the teacher and
students continually coopt or use each others contribution (Cobb 1994b, p. 14). Where
someone might wish to say only that students figure things out for themselves in
class with others, a more impressive rendering would be learning is characterized
by the subjective reconstruction of societal means and models through negotiation
of meaning in social interaction and students interactive constitution of the class-
room microculture (Cobb 1994b, p. 15). Learning through lessons in school is better
rendered as students subjective reconstruction through teachers and students in-
teractive constitution of the class-room microculture (Cobb 1994b, p.15). And saying
that students learn different things at different times may be recast as Rather
than successive equilibrations, . . . learning may be better characterized by parallel
constructions relating to specific contexts (Cobb 1994a, p. 7).
The following dictionary may be helpful for translating between constructivese and
English.
Slezak 79
Constructivese English
cultural apprenticeship learning
neutralizing a perturbation learning something new
personal construction understanding
and meaning making
the mediation process teaching
involving intervention
and negotiation with an
authority
community of discourse group
communities characterized different groups
by distinct discursive practices
appropriate experiential scientific data and
evidence, cultural tools theories
and conventions of the
science community
dialogic process talking
discourse practices talking
unbroken contingent flow of talking
communicative interaction
between human beings
the way in which novices talking in class
are introduced to a
community of knowledge
through discourse in the
context of relevant tasks
The discursive practices kids in school dont do
in science classrooms differ the same thing as
substantially from the scientists
kids in school practices
of scientific dont do the
argument and enquiry that
same thing take place within
various as scientists communities
of professional scientists
engagement paying attention
off task behaviour not paying attention
experiential constraints of the real world
the ever-present
socio-physical context
Between Metaphysical and Mundane

Though intended to be entertaining, the foregoing analysis has a serious purpose. It is
in the venerable tradition of C.W. Mills (1959) expose of Talcott Parsons pretentious
grand theory. Mills reduced long passages of Parsons sociological verbiage to a brief
platitude. Here, too, the serious question raised is whether there is any substance be-
hind the mystification of jargon-ridden polysyllabic prose, or whether, in Orwells (1946)
phrase, it merely gives the appearance of solidity to pure wind. I have suggested
that the psychological variety of radical constructivism has little to offer between the
metaphysical and the mundane.
References
Barnes, B. Bloor D. Henry, J.: 1996, Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Boden, M.: 1979, Piaget, Fontana, London.
Cobb, P.: 1994a, Constructivism in Mathematics and Science Education, Educational
Researcher 23(7).
Cobb, P.: 1994b, Where Is the Mind? Constructivist and Sociocultural Perspectives on
Mathematical Development, Educational Researcher 23(7), 1320.
Driver, R. Asoko, H. Leach, J. Mortimer, E. and Scott, P.: 1994, Constructing Scientific
Knowledge in the Classroom, Educational Researcher 23(7), 512.
Ernest, P.: 1995, Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning, The Falmer
Press, London. Preface by Series Editor, E. von Glasersfeld.
McDowell, J.: 1994, Mind and World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Mills, C.: 1959, The Sociological Imagination, Oxford University Press, New York.
Orwell, G.: 1946, Politics and the English Language, The Penguin, 1946, Essays of
George Orwell, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1984.
Phillips, D.: 1995, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Many Faces of Construc-
tivism, Educational Researcher 24(7), 512.
Phillips, D.: 1997, How, Why, What, When, and Where: Perspectives on Constructivism
in Psychology and Education, Issues in Education 3(2), 151194.
Piaget, J.: 1955, The Construction of Reality in the Child, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London.
Piaget, J.: 1971, Biology and Knowledge, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.
Piaget, J.: 1972, Psychology and Epistemology: Towards a Theory of Knowledge,
Penguin, Harmondsworth.
Piaget, J.: 1975, Insights and Illusions of Philosophy, Meridian Books, New York.
Putnam, H.: 1994, Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry Into the Powers of the
Human Mind, The Journal of Philosophy XCI(9), 445517. The Dewey Lectures
at Columbia University 1994.
Quine, W.: 1960, Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Slezak 81
Quine, W.: 1961a, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, From a Logical Point of View, Harper,
New York.
Quine, W.: 1961b, Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis, From a Logical Point of View,
Harper, New York.
Rorty, R.: 1979, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
Slezak, P.: 1997, Review of Barnes, Bloor & Henry: Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological
Analysis, Metascience 11, 4452.
Slezak, P.: 1999, Situated Cognition: Empirical Issue, Paradigm Shift or Conceptual
Confusion?, in J. Wiles and T. Dartnall (eds), Perspectives on Cognitive Science,
Ablex Publishing Corporation, Stamford.
Slezak, P.: 2000, Radical Social Constructivism, in D. Philips (ed.), National Society for
the Study of Education (NSSE) Yearkbook, Forthcoming.
Steffe, L.: 1995, Title, Publisher.
Steffe, L. and Gale, J. (eds): 1995, Constructivism in Education, Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Inc., New Jersey.
Tobin, K. (ed.): 1993, The Practice of Constructivism in Science Education, AAA Press,
Washington D.C.
Tobin, K. and Tippins, D.: 1993, Constructivism as a Referent for Teaching and
Learning, in K. Tobin (ed.), The Practice of Constructivism in Science Education,
AAA Press, Washington D.C., pp. 321.
van Fraassen, B.: 1980, The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
von Glasersfeld, E.: 1989, Cognition, Construction of Knowledge, and Teaching,

Synthese 80, 121140.
von Glasersfeld, E.: 1993, Questions and Answers about Radical Constructivism, in
K. Tobin (ed.), The Practice of Constructivism in Science Education, AAA Press,
Washington D.C.
von Glasersfeld, E.: 1995, Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning,
The Falmer Press, London.
Social Constructivism and the Science Wars
Peter Slezak
University of New South Wales, Australia. Email: p.slezak@unsw.edu.au
The dispute concerning Social Constructivism has emerged from being an isolated
and esoteric epistemological debate among relatively few academic scholars to being
a notorious public scandal. Challenges to traditional conceptions of science which
severely polarised philosophers, historians and sociologists have erupted into heated
public disputesthe so-called Science Wars. The issues at stake concern the most
fundamental questions about the nature of science, and these controversies have be-
come prominent in educational literature where a variety of constructivist doctrines
have become entangled (see Phillips 1997b and Matthews 1998).
If social constructivist doctrines are correct, the implications for science education
are revolutionary. On these views, knowledge is merely a consensus upon arbitrary
convention; and education involves not learning as a cognitive process of reason and
understanding, but merely conformity to power and political interests. There could be
no more fundamental challenge to education than the one posed by social construc-
tivism, since it purports to overturn the traditional conception of knowledge. The self-
advertising grandiosely proclaims: The foundations of modern thought are at stake
here (Pickering 1992).
A major battle in these Science Wars has been fought over the book Higher Supersti-
tion by Paul Gross and Norman Levitt (1994), which brought the polemics surrounding
social constructivism to wide popular attention. Adding piquancy and greater public
attention to social constructivism was the fallout from the Sokal Hoax . Unwittingly,
the editors of the journal Social Text published a spoof article written in post-modernist
style by the mathematical physicist Alan Sokal without realizing that it was deliberate
nonsense (Sokal and Bricmont 1997).
In their different ways, the Sokal article and the Gross and Levitt book exposed
what they claim to be the bankrupt, fraudulent and pernicious nature of social con-
structivism in a broad variety of post-modern guises. The colourful epithets and purple
prose conveyed the enormity of what Gross and Levitt call the post-modernist game of
intellectual subversion (1994, p. 85) and philosophical styrofoam (1994, p. 98).
Even in the more sober academic literature there had been outrage about social
constructivism going well beyond normal intellectual disagreement. The disputes in
the technical journals have been characterised by ad hominem assaults of an unusual
ferocity. For example, Mario Bunge (1991) described most of the work in the field as
a grotesque cartoon of scientific research. In a similar vein, the philosopher David
Stove (1991) called these doctrines a form of lunacy which is so absurd, that it eludes
the force of all argument (1991, p. 31), a philosophical folly and a stupid and dis-
creditable business whose authors are beneath philosophical notice and unlikely to
benefit from it. In his scathing remarks, Stove describes such ideas as an illustration
84 Social Constructivism
of the fatal affliction and corruption of thought in which people say bizarre things
which even they must know to be false. Larry Laudan (1990b, p. x) who has been among
the first philosophers to make systematic critical analyses of social constructivism, has
characterized this rampant relativism as the most prominent and pernicious man-
ifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time. Laudans charge of anti-intellectualism
points to the source of concern for educators.
Ideas or Ideology? Pedagogy or Propaganda?

In important clarifications of the varieties of constructivism, D.C. Phillips has noted
that Arguably it is the dominant theoretical position in science and mathematics
education (1997b, p. 152) and he remarks Across the broad fields of educational
theory and research, constructivism has become something akin to a secular religion
(1995, p. 5). Phillips (1997b) distinguishes the sociological form of constructivism of
interest here from the psychological variety and observes: It is the work of the social
constructivists that had drawn the most dramatic attention in recent years; clearly
they have touched a raw nerve (1997b, p. 154). As Phillips notes elsewhere, the reason
for this is that There is a lot at stake. For it can be argued that if the more radical of
the sociologists of scientific knowledge . . . are right, then the validity of the traditional
philosophic/epistemological enterprise is effectively undermined, and so indeed is the
pursuit of science itself (1997a, p. 86). The doctrines of social constructivism take
scientific theories to reflect the social milieu in which they emerge and, therefore,
rather than being founded on logic, evidence and reason, beliefs are taken to be the
causal effects of the historically contingent, local context. Accordingly, if knowledge is
the product of external factors rather than internal considerations of evidence and
reason, then it is an illusion to imagine that education might serve to instil a capacity
for critical thought or rational belief. Education becomes indoctrination and ideas are
merely conformity to social consensus.
Before examining these doctrines in detail, it is worth observing a symptomatic
view of education and its goals arising from social constructivism. Where traditional
views see scientific knowledge as a source of insight, creativity and aesthetic pleasure,
sociologists see something less exalted. Instead of fostering independent thought and
the pleasures of intellectual curiosity, science is offered as having a mere utilitarian,
pragmatic value, at best. Thus, Collins and Pinch (1992) writing specifically on science
education in schools suggest It is nice to know the content of scienceit helps one
to do a lot of things such as repair the car, wire a plug, build a model aeroplane . . .
(1992, p. 150). To be sure, science has such practical uses, but this prosaic view seems
to leave out something essentialnamely, the intellectual dimension, the role of the
creative mind in providing an understanding of the world. Instead of conceiving of
science education as fostering such intellectual values as understanding and critical
thinking, Collins and Pinch recommend that a science education should attend to the
social negotiation, myths and tricks of frontier science as the important thing
(1992, p. 151).
The relativism of social constructivist theories makes it impossible for teachers to
offer the usual intellectual grounds for distinguishing science from nonsense. Since
Slezak 85
the rational virtues of theories are taken to be irrelevant to their status, one cannot
complain that some views are false or implausible or otherwise lacking rational, cogni-
tive merit. For example, one cannot teach that Soviet Lysenkoism or Hitlers racialism
were perversions of scientific truth. Their very success in winning consensus counts as
exemplary scientific achievement according to social constructivist doctrines.
What is Social Constructivism?

A few special difficulties must be faced in attempting to characterise the field of social
constructivism. First, in the years since its recent re-invention and promotion by the
Edinburgh School, (Bloor 1976, Barnes 1974a, 1974b) there has been a fragmentation
among various factions which cannot be traced in detail here. Second, the history
of these changes is clouded by the questionable tactics of the constructivists. Never-
theless, the original, fundamental ideas must be understood despite having become
obscured in its more recent manifestations (Woolgar 1988).
David Bloors (1976) small book Knowledge and Social Imagery launched the so-
called Edinburgh Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK),
and the appeal of this work was its iconoclastic approach to old-fashioned theories.
Bloor self-consciously hoped to displace traditional philosophy and epistemology. In
brief, the sociological enterprise announced the rejection of the very idea of science
as a distinctive enterprise. This effacing of any distinction between science and other
institutions is summarized by S. Woolgar (1988) as the rejection of the following tradi-
tional core assumption:
The persistent idea that science is something special and distinct from other forms of cultural
and social activity . . . Instead of treating them as rhetorical accomplishments, many analysts
continue to respect the boundaries which delineate science from non-science. (Woolgar 1988,
p. 26)
On this view, not only is the very distinctiveness of science merely some kind of pro-
paganda victory, a further assumption to be rejected is the curiously persistent view
that the objects of the natural world are real, objective and enjoy an independent pre-
existence (Woolgar 1988, p. 26). In place of the traditional misconceptions about
science and the independent pre-existence of the world, social constructivism proposed
an amalgam of idealism and relativism according to which scientific theories are merely
fictions, the product of social forces, interests and other contingent, historical aspects
of the milieu in which they arise. That is, scientific theories are not explanatory or
descriptive of the world, but are rhetorical accomplishments by some community
of discourse and constituted entirely by social consensus. Even scientific discovery
is a matter of interpretative practice, and genius has no bearing on the pattern of
discovery in science (Brannigan 1981. See the discussion in Slezak 1989.)
These are not merely radical or even revolutionary claims. They can only be de-
scribed as extravagant doctrines which might be expected to require compelling ar-
guments. In the absence of any arguments, sociologists had a ready explanation for
the predictable incredulity of philosophers. Foreshadowing the provocation of later
works, Bloors preface to the first edition of his book already hints darkly that the
inevitable resistance by philosophers to his doctrines will be due, not to their unargued
absurdity, but to uncomfortable secrets that they would wish to hide. Bloor asserts
that his approach to science from a sociological point of view encounters resistance
because some nerve has been touched. He announces his bold intention to despoil
academic boundaries which contrive to keep some things well hidden (Bloor 1976,
p. ix). Bloor was right about some nerve having been touched, though he misdiagnosed
the nature of the irritation. He devotes an entire chapter of his landmark book to a
kind of psychoanalysis of his opponents by speculating about the sources of resistance
to the Strong Programme which he attributes to hidden, indeed primitive, motives
involving the fear of sociologys desacralizing of science and its mysteries. One might
suggest alternative reasons for the resistance to his sociological doctrines, but Bloor
sees only repressed impulses concerning the sacred and the profane leading to a
superstitious desire to avoid treating knowledge naturalistically (Bloor 1976, p. 73).
Bloor imagines that the threatening nature of any investigation into science itself
has been the cause of a positive disinclination to examine the nature of knowledge
in a candid and scientific way (1976, p. 42). However, this disinclination to examine
knowledge and the need to keep it mystified through fear of desecration is difficult to
reconcile with the fact that every philosopher since Plato has been centrally concerned
with the problem of knowledge and its justification. The inordinate space devoted to
such fatuous speculations signifies the pre-eminent place they occupy in the social con-
structivist enterprise as a substitute for serious, or indeed any, philosophical analysis.
Knowledge As Such: Contexts, Contents and Causes

In his manifesto, Bloor had declared that the central claims of the Strong Programme
he launched were beyond dispute (1976, p. 3), and Barnes begins an article asserting
that in the short time since its advent developments have occurred with breathtaking
speed and the view that scientific culture is constructed like any other is now well
elaborated and exemplified (Barnes 1981, p. 481).
This level of self-congratulatory hyperbole has prompted Thomas Gieryn (1982,
p. 280) to comment upon these defences and re-affirmations as expressions of hubris
and exaggerations passing as fact. Gieryn (1982, p. 293) has suggested that the
radical findings of the new sociology of science are new only in a fictionalized reading
of antecedent work. In particular, Robert Mertons article on The Sociology of Knowl-
edge (Merton 1957) had specifically enunciated the central doctrine of the Strong
Programme:
The Copernican revolution in this area of inquiry consisted in the hypothesis that not only
error or illusion or unauthenticated belief but also the discovery of truth was socially (histori-
cally) conditioned. . . . The sociology of knowledge came into being with the signal hypothesis
that even truths were to be held socially accountable, were to be related to the historical society
in which they emerged. (Merton 1957, p. 459)
Although it had appeared in different guises before in Hegel, Marx, and Durkheim, the
radical idea at the heart of the Strong Programme was to go beyond those sociological
studies which stopped short of considering the actual substantive content, the ideas, of
Slezak 87
scientific theories as an appropriate domain for sociological investigation. Previously,
sociological studies paid attention only to such things as institutional politics, citation
patterns and other peripheral social phenomena surrounding the production of science,
but had not ventured to explain the cognitive contents of theories in sociological terms.
Since this crucial point has been obscured, its importance for appreciating subsequent
developments cannot be overstated. The opening sentence of Bloors book asks Can
the sociology of knowledge investigate and explain the very content and nature of
scientific knowledge? (Bloor 1976, p. 1)that is, knowledge as such, as distinct from
the circumstances of production.
The alleged failure of previous sociological studies to touch on the contents of scien-
tific belief was portrayed by Bloor as a loss of nerve and a failure to be consistent (1976,
p. 8). Karl Mannheim, for example, is characterised as failing to extend his approach
from knowledge of society to the knowledge of nature. The relativist challenge derives
from this thorough-going application of the sociological principle which seeks to explain
the hitherto exempted knowledge claims. The ambitions of Bloors program are explicit,
for he complains that previous sociologists, in a betrayal of their disciplinary stand-
point have failed to expand and generalise their claims to all knowledge: . . . the
sociology of knowledge might well have pressed more strongly into the area currently
occupied by philosophers, who have been allowed to take upon themselves the task of
defining the nature of knowledge (Bloor 1976, p. 1).
Causes and Case Studies

The extensive body of case studies repeatedly invoked by sociologists to answer their
critics has been taken to establish the thesis that the contents of scientific theories and
beliefs have social causes, in contradistinction to psychological ones. The causal claim
concerns such things as connections between the gross social structure of groups and
the general form of the cosmologies to which they have subscribed (1976, p. 3). That is,
the cognitive content of the beliefs is claimed to be causally connected with immediate,
local aspects of the social milieu. Of this general thesis, Bloor asserts The causal link
is beyond dispute. Indeed, Bloor (1981) and Shapin (1979) were evidently unable to
believe that anyone might question the causal claims of the Strong Programme except
on the assumption that they must be unfamiliar with the extensive literature of the
case studies. However, in a parallel with Durkheim and Mauss (1903/1963), the claims
of social determination of beliefs are all the more extraordinary in view of the failure
of these case studies to support them. Critics have challenged precisely the bearing of
these studies on the causal claims, and so repeatedly citing the burgeoning literature
is to entirely miss the point.
Of course, scientific discoveries have always necessarily arisen in some social milieu
or other. However, establishing a causal connection requires more than merely charac-
terising the social milieu. These more stringent demands have not been met anywhere
in the voluminous case studies in the SSK literature. Thus, although Steven Shapin
has acknowledged that the task is the refinement and clarification of the ways in which
scientific knowledge is to be referred to the various contextual factors and interests
which produce it, (1979, p. 42) and that we need to ascertain the exact nature of
the links between accounts of natural reality and the social order, nevertheless his
much-cited case study of phrenology offers only a variety of anthropological approaches
leading at best to a postulation of homologies between society and theories which
may serve as expressive symbolism or perhaps function to further social interests
in their context of use. This argument falls far short of demonstrating the strong
claims of social determination, for it is a truism to assert, as Shapin does, merely that
Culture [taken to include science] is developed and evaluated in particular historical
situations (1979, p. 65). Shapin undertakes to refute the accusations of empirical
sterility by a lengthy recounting of the considerable empirical achievements of the
sociology of scientific knowledge (1982, p. 158). But he is simply begging the question
with his advice that one can either debate the possibility of the sociology of scientific
knowledge or one can do it. Casting more horoscopes does not address concerns about
the causal claims of astrology.
When is a Cigar Just a Cigar?

The local, historical determination of scientific theories entails that theories would
have been different had the social milieu been different. We are inevitably led to ask:
Would Einstein have theorised E = mc3 , or would Newton have enunciated an inverse
cube law of gravitation, had their societies been different? The model of such empir-
ical studies was Formans (1971) much-cited work which attributes the development
of quantum physics to the prevailing milieu in Weimar Germany. However, in the
same vein, we might inquire: Did Godels Incompleteness theorem arise from some
lacunae in the Viennese social order of 1930? This example invokes the same sug-
gestive metaphorical connections adduced by social constructivist case studies. There
is, at best, a kind of affinity claimed between the social context and the contents of
the theory in question. Thus, Shapin cites homologies between society and nature
and sees theories as expressive symbolism which can be exploited to serve social
interests. Given the tenuous nature of such homologies between theories and the
Zeitgeist, the distinction between parody and serious claims is difficult to discern.
Shapins Rorschach homologies between theory content and social context recall the
Freudian interpretation of dreams which involved a similar decoding of an allegedly
symbolic connection. Likewise, sociology pretends to disclose the hidden meaning
underlying our scientific theories. We may have imagined that 19th century theories of
phrenology were about the brain, but they were really expressing a social experience
and about the differentiation and specialization [in the social order] perceived by the
bourgeois groups (Shapin 1979, p. 57). Godels Incompleteness theorem, too, undoubt-
edly expresses a collective longing for wholeness and fulfillment among the Viennese
intelligentsia. However, in the spirit of Freuds famous remark one is tempted to ask:
When is a cigar just a cigar?
The Social Construction of Social Constructivism

It is instructive to look at a recent, authoritative and sympathetic statement of so-
cial constructivism in a book whose co-authors include two of its foundersScientific
Slezak 89
Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis by Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996). As founders of
the field, these authors are uniquely well qualified to offer the book to anyone seeking
a text in the sociology of scientific knowledge. However, borrowing earlier words of one
of its authors, this sociological enterprise appears to contrive to keep some things well
hidden (Bloor 1976, p. ix). A study of the index is revealing. Georg Cantor, infinite
cardinal numbers and the continuum hypothesis get several entries whereas social
constructivism and the Strong Programme get none at all. In view of the status of
the Strong Programme, being the radical new approach proclaimed with great fanfare
as revolutionizing the study of science and epistemology, its omission is revealing.
The Duhem-Quine thesis, mentioned en passant in an obscure footnote, gets no index
entry either, though the book is an extended essay on the alleged consequences of this
philosophical doctrine.
Other omissions from the index are equally curious. The truth of the teleological
view of rationalist philosophers was originally presented by Bloor (1976) as entailing
the falsity of the sociological programme. The teleological view takes beliefs to be
explained by reasons. This rationalist view is taken by Bloor to be diametrically
opposed to the sociological account of belief since only the latter is supposed to ascribe
causes to beliefs. In the second edition of his foundational text, Bloor (1991) has
reaffirmed his commitment to the tenets of the original Programme. Thus, in view of
the decisive, foundational status of this diametrical opposition, as we will see presently,
it is striking that this issue, too, has disappeared without trace in more recent accounts.
This re-writing of history makes it impossible to understand both the social construc-
tivist doctrines themselves and the scandal they have generated. However, failure to
mention a vital, potentially refuting, doctrine is illuminated by certain judicious and
unacknowledged changes in the text of the second edition of Bloors book (see Slezak
1994).
The following questions encapsulate some of the fundamental issues on which the
disputes about social constructivism have centreda kind of diagnostic class test for
Social Studies of Science 101:
1. What is the Edinburgh Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowl-
edge, what were its central tenets, and what was its self-proclaimed, radical
novelty regarding the content of scientific theories?
2. What is the esential characteristic doctrine of social constructivism and what
is its relation to rationalist, teleological and psychologistic approaches of
traditional epistemology? How are the latest views in the sociology of science
related to their earlier formulations twenty years ago?
3. What is the Duhem-Quine thesis of underdetermination of theory by evidence?
How does it relate to the theory-laden nature of observation? What follows from
these theses for the determinants of theory-choice in science?
4. What kinds of empirical evidence have been offered as support for the theories
of the sociology of scientific knowledge and how exactly do they bear upon the
claims? Are theory contents caused by social contexts?
5. Which epistemological stance does the new sociology of science adopt?
(a) Realism (b) Idealism (c) Relativism

(d) All of the above (e) None of the above
6. What are the scope and limits of sociological approaches to science in relation to
individual psychology?
As indicated, students who might wish to use the latest book of Barnes, Bloor and
Henry as a text to study for the foregoing test would fail. These questions cannot be
answered by a conscientious study of the book, though any teacher would recognise
them as elementary ones basic to understanding the field. Cryptic references to issues
such as the rationalist philosophies against which the entire sociological enterprise
was directed are left entirely unexplained and so the innocent reader will not be able
to understand or assess the current claims. These failings might indicate only that
the book is an inadequate text, which would not be unusual. However, the lapses and
omissions appear to disguise a shift from vital doctrines which have become untenable.
Idealism
The book begins encouragingly, if somewhat mystifyingly for the newcomer, by ac-
knowledging the existence of reality. This admission will undoubtedly be comfort-
ing to those harbouring doubts about the matter, but it arises at all only through
certain naive confusions. For their part, Barnes, Bloor and Henry are concerned to
distance themselves from thosewe are to assume othersociologists who they say
Occasionally . . . may have given this impression of denying the existence of tables
and chairs. Nevertheless, they admit that most other sociology of knowledge is, in fact,
idealist. In repudiating this stance these authors emphasize their own contrasting
naturalistic view, but on such good authority, then, idealism must be regarded as a
central philosophical issue for the understanding of social constructivism.
Notwithstanding these authors disclaimers, warrant for the charge of idealism
against them too arises partly from their own misconceptions regarding the rationalist
theories they oppose and partly from the social constructivism to which they remain
firmly committedactually an amalgam of idealism and relativism. An unavoidable
temptation towards idealism arises from the sociologists desire to deny that science
describes an independent world. Consequently, the opposing rationalist philosophy
of science has been seen as committed to a metaphysical realism involving access to
absolute truth about a world behind appearances. While science attempts to discover
the nature of an independently existing reality, this concern is not a metaphysical
thesis about some Kantian things-in-themselves. It is simply the truism that we
take our best theories literally to be talking about something. The reaction to the
ordinary practice of science as some kind of philosophical error requiring sociological
remedy is simply a mistake, since the virtues and status of science as an enterprise
are independent of such metaphysical questions. Realists and idealists alike can enjoy
the fruits of scientific knowledge. Specifically, whether or not scientific theories are
Slezak 91
socially constructed is an issue to be determined by arguments entirely independent of
idealism. Nevertheless, Barnes et al. offer their own naturalist stance as the contrast
with idealism, but their naturalism is simply a demand for empirical explanation in
terms of causes. However, Berkeley, like all other idealists, was an empiricist in good
standing in this sense, and one can be an idealist at the same time as being committed
to empirical, naturalistic science. Idealism is a metaphysical doctrine concerning the
overall status of our scientific theories as such, and not a specific approach to expla-
nation within the overall enterprise like naturalism. The dispute concerning idealism
is entirely indifferent to any debate about the practices of empirical inquiry as such
and, therefore, asserting credentials as naturalistic does not even amount to a plea
of innocent to the charge of idealismmuch less grounds for acquittal.
Revealing comments support the charge of idealism despite their disavowals. Barnes
et al. (1996, p. 48) point out that it is not the existence of nature which accounts
for certain behaviours and that attention to nature will not adjudicate the merits
of our theories and classifications. Of course, if appeal to nature, meaning empirical
evidence, cannot adjudicate our theories, it is not clear what would do so. We see here
the social constructivist dogma that scientific theories are somehow unconstrained by
the way things are in the world. However, Barnes et al. are confusing the supposed
indirectness of our knowledge of the world, its inaccessibility beyond the veil of ideas,
with the bearing of empirical evidence on our scientific theories. Stressing the former
kind of inaccessibility does not establish the latter kind. This is precisely to confuse
idealism with relativism.
The declaration of Barnes et al. that they are not idealists, then, is paradoxical
since it poses the following dilemma: Which reality is the one the sociologists profess
to believe in? Do they believe in an inaccessible Kantian ding an sich after all? Or
do they believe in the rationalists world as conveyed by our true (i.e. best) theories?
In wishing to deny the former, they end up denying the latter and, thereby, become
idealists as well as relativists. In brief, their needless entanglement in such notorious
problems is symptomatic of sociologists absurd pretensions to overthrow the subject
that used to be called philosophy (Bloor 1983).
Relativism
Despite characterising their book as focussed on basic foundations, Barnes et al.
explain that it gives little prominence to such issues as relativism. Indeed, this
prefatory mention of relativism is the only one in the book. However, even more
than idealism, relativism has been the central, distinctive theoretical doctrine of social
constructivism and the source of most dispute. Neglecting to discuss it is like a text on
evolution professing to concentrate on basic foundations and choosing to give little
prominence to natural selection. The authors recent reticence about their own central
doctrines is a telling feature of their work (Barnes and Bloor 1982).
Relativism is the claim that knowledge has no warrant beyond belief acceptance
itself. It is often a non-sequitur from the recognition that there is no absolute certainty.
However, given that there can be no absolutely secure knowledge, the alternative to
relativism is fallibilism: the idea that reliable knowledge is possible through revision
and improvement. Relativism is at the heart of social constructivism because the
supposed absence of constraints of independent reality is assumed to leave no other
grounds for adjudicating claims. Specifically, the freedom from a constraining reality is
taken to warrant appeal to a sociological account of theory acceptance. Relativism,
then, is the spurious assumption that there can be nothing more to say about the
goodness of our theories if one cant meaningfully compare them to an independent,
inaccessible reality. However, the question of realism has been the subject of a vast
philosophical literature, and both sides of this dispute accept the rational force of
evidence and the usual considerations of explanatory virtue such as comprehensive-
ness, coherence and simplicity as grounds for rational theory choice. Thus, Cardinal
Bellarmines instrumentalism did not involve a challenge to the intellectual merits
of Galileos Copernicanism as such. More recently, van Fraassens (1980) celebrated
constructive empiricism is concerned to save the phenomena without postulating
a hidden underlying reality, but this does not entail rejection of the usual rational
considerations governing theory choice. Social constructivists mistakenly conclude that
the inaccessibility of things in themselves behind the veil of our theories (whatever
this might mean) precludes saying anything sensible about their cognitive virtues.
However, rationalist talk of observation, confirmation, evidence and truth etc., is
within the sociologists own preferred framework on our side of the veil, as it were, ac-
cording to which, as Bloor says, all we have and all we need are the theories themselves.
Indeed, Bloors view could be a version of Quines (1960) well-known metaphor of the
fabric or web of our knowledge, also articulated in his famous epigram from Neurath
concerning the sailor quoted on page ??. That is, we are inescapably dependent on our
theories even as we seek to revise them. But, in terms of the metaphor, what counts as
a repair of our boat is not a matter of arbitrary convention; social constructivism wants
to scuttle it.
Theory Choice: Underdetermination of Theory by Evidence

One consideration, above all, has been widely taken to warrant the appeal to soci-
ological factors in the explanation of scientific theory choice. An attempt is made
to exploit the so-called Quine-Duhem thesis concerning the underdetermination of
theory by evidence (Laudan 1990a). The thesis means that there can be no direct
inference from observational data to any particular theory since there must be indefi-
nitely many theories equally compatible with the same empirical evidence. Therefore,
other considerations must be invoked to explain the preference of scientists for one
theory over another which is equally consistent with the observational or experimental
data. However, a non-sequitur from this thesis has become a foundational tenet of
social constructivism. Thus, when distilled to its essence, Bloors (1976) manifesto
involves a spurious inference from underdetermination to social construction. How-
ever, underdetermination is neutral among the various alternative resources which
might be invoked to explain theory choice beyond conformity with the evidence. It
has to be shown independently why it might be social factors rather than some others
(say, astrological) which are the operative ones in determining theory choice among the
possible alternatives consistent with the evidence.
Slezak 93
Setting the pattern for subsequent discussions, Bloor relies on this issue as the
central thesis of his book. Evidently no argument is thought necessary for this non-
sequitur and Bloor gives none. In view of the foundational status that this book and
this argument have acquired, the situation is sufficiently peculiar to deserve empha-
sis: The problem with Bloors discussion and the general reliance on this doctrine in
social constructivism is not merely that the arguments are weak or open to challenge
in some way. Rather, no arguments of any kind are offered whatsoever.
C. Boorse (1975) has pointed out that the underdetermination of theories by all
possible observational evidence does not make them indistinguishable on other criteria
such as simplicity, fecundity, coherence, comprehensiveness, explanatory power, and so
on. These are, of course, the kinds of rational considerations typically invoked by the
rationalist or teleological account. Part of the problem may have arisen from an
excessively literal construal of theory choice which cannot be considered as an actual
selection among equivalent available alternatives. Historians, above all, should recog-
nise that the problem is typically to find even a single theory that is consistent with the
observations. Accordingly, what is termed choice is more appropriately described as
the psychology of scientific invention or discoverythe subject of a burgeoning research
literature (Langely, Simon et al. 1987; Tweney, Doherty & Mynatt 1981; Gorman 1992;
Giere 1992).
Consensus as Conventional
Social constructivism rests on this idea that alternative theory choices are not only
available, but equally good. Of course, this is the claim for the conventional character
of science and is the locus of sociological relativism. Barnes et al. assert, Conventions
could always be otherwise . . . (Barnes, Bloor & Henry 1996, p. 154), presumably
entailing that knowledge might have been negotiated differently had the local interpre-
tive milieu been different and, thereby, inviting the facetious question about Newtons
inverse cube law. Indeed, undaunted by its absurdity, Barnes et al. embrace precisely
such a paradoxical idea even in the case of arithmetical laws (Barnes, Bloor & Henry
1996, p. 184). However, on their own account, given the underdetermination of theory
by evidence, the sociologists must be committed to the possibility of a consensus settling
on a vast range of possible laws via the contingent, collective accomplishment of fact
production by local cultural traditions. Unconvincingly, Barnes et al. suggest that
the consensus on 2 + 2 = 4 is due merely to pragmatic reasons connected with the
organization of collective action and the fact that it is probably easier to organize
than a different convention such as 2 + 2 = 5. The fact that it might also be easier to
believe is somehow not considered relevant.
Impartiality
Merton, like Mannheim, argued that theories judged to be correct and founded on
rational considerations are not in need of sociological explanation in the way that false
and irrational theories are. In this sense, traditional conceptions relegated sociology
to the dross of science, to its residue of false and irrational beliefs. Bloors revival of
the Durkheimian view was explicitly rescuing sociology from this ignominious role by
asserting the appropriateness of sociological explanations for all of science regardless
of evaluative judgements such as truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality, success
or failure. Our own cosmology and science in general, like those of the Zuni, were to be
shown as reflections of the social milieu.
Bloors complaint is directed at asymmetrical approaches such as Imre Lakatoss
rational reconstruction of episodes in the history of science which sought to explain
correct scientific theories as products of reasoned thought and, therefore, not requiring
resort to sociological explanations. Bloor regards this approach as having the effect of
rendering science safe from the indignity of empirical explanation (Bloor 1976, p. 7),
but for Lakatos only sociology was to be excluded from accounts of successful science
since good reasons are a species of explanation themselves. Analogously, veridical
perception does not need explanation in the same way as misperception or illusion. We
do not ordinarily seek explanatory causes in the case of normal veridical perception,
not because we assume that there is no scientific explanation, but because we assume
it to be of a certain general sort. Thus, we dont explain normal vision, but seek the
cause of failure such as the influence of alcohol, disease and so on. In the same way,
we do not seek to explain why the train stays on the tracks but only why it fails to
do so. Again, this asymmetry does not mean that we believe there is no cause or no
explanation for the train staying on the tracks. However, this is the absurd view which
Bloor imputes to rationalist philosophers such as Lakatos. Notice that Bloor takes
Lakatos to hold that a rational reconstruction of beliefs implies that they are thereby
shown to lack empirical explanation altogether (Bloor 1976, p. 7). In his Knowledge
and Social Imagery (1976), Bloor characterized the autonomy view he is opposing:
One important set of objections to the sociology of knowledge derives from the conviction that
some beliefs do not stand in need of any explanation, or do not stand in need of a causal
explanation. This feeling is particularly strong when the beliefs in question are taken to be
true, rational, scientific or objective. (Bloor 1976, p. 5)
Elsewhere Bloor characterizes the opposing view as the claim that nothing makes
people do things that are correct but something does make, or cause, them to go wrong
and that in the case of true beliefs causes do not need to be invoked (1976, p. 6). Bloor
intends to make an absolute distinction between the teleological view which inclines
its proponents to reject causality (1976, p. 10) on the one hand, and the causal
viewthat is, the sociological approach of the Strong Programme. On Bloors own
account, the viability of the Strong Programme rests on the tenability of this dichotomy
and, in particular, the falsity of the teleological model. There could be no more crucial
issue for the constructivist programme.
L. Laudan (1981) has characterized Bloors acausal attribution to philosophers as
an absurd view which cannot plausibly be attributed to any philosopher at all. In
particular, the approach of Lakatos does not deny the existence of causes in cases of
rationally held beliefs, but only assumes that reasons are themselves a species of cause
(see Phillips 1997a). However, in a remarkable passage, Bloor (1981) responded to
Laudan by attempting to deny these patent and quite explicit earlier intentions. Bloors
Slezak 95
discomfort was understandable, since the entire edifice of the Strong Programme rests
on this claimed opposition. Indeed in the second edition of his book, in the crucial
section on the Autonomy of Knowledge dealing with the problem of causation, we
discover certain judicious changes to the original text whose rationale is clearly to
avoid the criticisms made by Laudan (see Slezak 1994). It must be noted that these
alterations to the original text are somewhat difficult to reconcile with Bloors prefato-
rial assertion that attacks by critics have not convinced me of the need to give ground
on any matter of substance and, therefore, he says I have resisted the temptation to
alter the original presentation of the case for the sociology of knowledge apart from
minor spelling and stylistic changes (Bloor 1991).
Bloors predicament, if not his tactic, is understandable since his statement of the
conditions under which the programme retains its plausibility left no room for compro-
mise and no way out. Bloor had declared forthrightly:
There is no doubt that if the teleological model is true then the Strong Programme is false.
The teleological and causal models, then, represent programmatic alternatives which quite
exclude one another. (Bloor 1976, p. 9)
If the rationalist teleological autonomy view is not the acausal, anti-empirical

strawman that Bloor imagined, then its merits need to be confronted seriously. How-
ever, this means finding a way to reconcile social constructivism with the full weight
of considerations from cognitive science. This, in turn, means trying to downplay or
expunge the hostility to internal, mental or psychological accounts of rational belief
which was a central part of the social constructivist programme.
Social Constructivism as Born-again Behaviourism

The purported causal connection between ideas and social context is a version of stimulus-
control theory akin to that of Skinnerian Behaviourism and, not suprisingly, in his later
work Bloor (1983) explicitly endorses such notorious theories. In characterising oppos-
ing rationalist or teleological views, quoting Wittgenstein, Bloor refers to explanations
which postulate mental states as infected by the disease of psychologism (1983, p. 6).
Bloors frontal assault on the explanatory force of mental states is an intrinsic part
of the defence of the radically alternative sociological approach to explaining science,
but this bold stance left his programme vulnerable to a case on the other side whose
strength he had greviously underestimated. For example, Bloors programme depends
on rejecting the reality of mental states such as images. However, this position is thirty
years and a major scientific revolution too late (see Kosslyn 1980, 1994; Slezak 1995).
The pattern is consistent and instructive. Thus, Bloor has dismissed Chomskys
review of Skinners Verbal Behaviour with a passing footnote, and a reference to it as
the fashionable, standard criticism of behaviourism (Bloor 1983, p. 191). But this
reveals only a failure to comprehend its significance. One might have expected some
indication of the weaknesses of the review and why this merely fashionable criticism
is to be ignoredparticularly since neither Skinner himself nor other behaviourists
replied to it. In fact, the Chomsky review is generally regarded as having precip-
itated the downfall of the tradition of behaviourism in psychology. Bloors cavalier
handwaving is rather more misleading than these comments suggest. Chomskys ideas
foreshadowed in this review became the foundations of the dramatic developments of
the Cognitive Revolution (see Gardner 1987). Bloors failure to indicate the magnitude
and import of these developments is comparable to defending Creationism today by
dimissing the Origin of Species as merely fashionable and failing to let ones readers
know anything of modern biology founded on Darwins theory.
Newtons Principia as Conditioned Response

Since behaviourism is a doctrine concerning psychology, it is at first sight suprising
that it has been recruited to the cause of social constructivism. However, behaviourism
serves Bloor as an ally, since it denies the explanatory role of internal mental states
and is thereby in diametrical opposition to the rationalist or teleological point of view
which the Strong Programme is also battling. If scientific beliefs are to be construed
as the causal effects of an external stimulus, they are precisely analogous to Skinner-
ian respondents or operants and, therefore, science is the result of conditioning or
Thorndikes Law of Effect. In short, the deep insight of social constructivism is that
Isaac Newtons Principia is to be explained as something like a rats bar-pressing in
response to food pellets.
Bloors (1991) protest that his views are entirely consistent with cognitive science
cannot be taken seriously and can be asserted at all only because Bloor now pretends
that the sociological thesis at stake is merely whether or not there are social aspects to
science. This position is significantly different from the claim that knowledge is socially
constructed and constituted. This weak and uncontroversial thesis is not the original
doctrine propounded whose inconsistency with cognitive science was evident from the
accompanying assault on the postulation of mental states. The very blandness of this
claim for social influences testifies to the misrepresentation of the debate. The truism
that there are social dimensions to science would hardly have generated the opposition
and controversy evoked by the Strong Programme. Significantly, Bloors sociological
colleagues have reacted differently: their vehement attacks on cognitive science and
artificial intelligence have been both telling and more ingenuous. Their strenuous
attempts to discredit the claims of cognitive science in effect acknowledge the threat
posed to the central sociological doctrines (see Slezak 1989). Indeed, H.M. Collins
(1990) among others, has been explicit on this point, seeing the claims of artificial
intelligence (AI) as a crucial test case for the sociology of scientific knowledge (Slezak
1991a).
Revolt Against Reason

Recent social constructivism is essentially the same doctrine characterised in an earlier
generation by Karl Popper (1966) as the revolt against reasona rejection of certain
ideals of truth and rationality which, however difficult to explicate, are nonetheless
central to the Western heritage. Popper saw the same tendencies in Hegel which he
bitterly denounced as this despicable perversion of everything that is decent (1966,
p. 49). There can be little doubt about the close affinities between Hegels doctrines and
Slezak 97
those of social constructivism: Popper observes that for Hegel, History is our judge.
Since History and Providence have brought the existing powers into being, their might
must be right . . . (1966, p. 49). The unmistakable parallel is seen in their essentially
similar answers to Poppers fundamental question who is to judge what is, and what
is not objective truth? He reports Hegels reply that The state has, in generalto
make up its own mind concerning what is to be considered as objective truth and
adds: With this reply, freedom of thought, and the claims of science to set its own
standards, give way, finally to their opposites (1966, p. 43). Hegels doctrine expressed
in terms of the State is essentially the same idea that political success is ipso facto
the criterion of truth. As we will see presently, precisely this idea is resuscitated in
Latour and Woolgar, Pinch and Collins and the entire enterprise of contemporary social
constructivism. The idea is a historical relativism according to which truth is merely
political and dependent on the Zeitgeist or spirit of the age. It is a view which Popper
charges with helping to destroy the tradition of respecting the truth (1966, p. 308, fn 30)
and his discussion of Hegels bombastic and mystifying cant is striking in its aptness
to recent sociology of science, echoed by Gross and Levitt, Laudan and Stove, among
others. Popper warns against the magic of high-sounding words and the power of
jargon to be found in doctrines which are
. . . full of logical mistakes and of tricks, presented with pretentious impressiveness. This
undermined and eventually lowered the traditional standards of intellectual responsibility and
honesty. It also contributed to the rise of totalitarian philosophizing and, even more serious, to
the lack of any determined intellectual resistance to it. (1966, p. 395)
Laboratory Life Under the Microscope

Perhaps most obvious cause for such concern is another foundational classic of social
constructivism, Laboratory Life by Latour and Woolgar (1979). This work is self-
consciously subversive, rejecting the rules of logic and rationality as a merely coercive
orthodoxy (Woolgar 1988) and has the avowed goal of deflating the pretensions of
science both in its knowledge claims and in its claims to the possession of a special
method. Among its iconoclastic goals, the book professes to penetrate the mystique,
(Latour & Woolgar 1979, p. 18) dissolve the appearances and reveal the hidden realities
of science-in-the-making at the laboratory workbench. This study proposes to give an
expose of the internal workings of scientific activity (1979, p. 17).
Discovering certain puzzling questions concerning the nature of science, Latour and
Woolgar conclude that there is no such thing. In their celebrated work they declare that
all of science is merely the construction of fictions (1979, p. 284). Latour explains the
insights emerging from the new discipline:
Now that field studies of laboratory practice are starting to pour in, we are beginning to have a
better picture of what scientists do inside the walls of these strange places called laboratories
. . . The result, to summarize it in one sentence, was that nothing extraordinary and nothing
scientific was happening inside the sacred walls of these temples. (Latour 1983, p. 141)
. . . the moment sociologists walked into laboratories and started checking all these theories
about the strength of science, they just disappeared. Nothing special, nothing extraordinary, in
fact nothing of any cognitive quality was occurring there. (Latour 1983, p. 160)
Needless to say, the implications of such insights must be revolutionary, not least of all
for science education, the foregoing remarks being approvingly quoted in a teachers
journal in an article recommending a radical new vision of the reality of the scientific
process (Gough 1993).
For constructivists, science education is presumably only socialization into power,
persuasion and propaganda. Rather than learning as a cognitive process involving rea-
soning, logic and understanding, education involves merely the observance of arbitrary
practices and political interest. Although Latour and Woolgar do not explicitly address
the questions of most direct interest to educators as such, their characterization of
science clearly suggests the appropriate role of the teacher.
Each text, laboratory, author and discipline strives to establish a world in which its
own interpretation is made more likely by virtue of the increasing number of people
from whom it extracts compliance. (Latour & Woolgar 1986, p. 285)
On this conception, presumably the function of science teacher is that of principal
agent for the extraction of compliancemore like camp commandant than traditional
instructor.
Constructing the World

The state government of Indiana in the last century considered a bill which would have
conveniently legislated the value of the mathematical constant to be exactly 4. This
effort is a paradigm, if rather literal, example of negotiating or legislating the truth.
Sociologists could only complain on the grounds that the bill did not gain a majority
among legislators. As a facon de parler, the thesis of constructing facts has a sensible
reading according to which the theory or description of a substance, are settled upon
and perhaps even socially negotiated in a certain sense. However, playing on the
words, one can also choose to construe such banalities as something more paradoxical
and seemingly profoundnamely that objects and substances themselves did not have
an independent existence and were socially constructed. In like manner, one might say
that Copernicus removed the earth from the centre of the universe, but asserting this
literally would be an attempt at humour or evidence of derangement. Nevertheless, it is
just this sort of claim for which the work of Latour and Woolgar has been acclaimeda
defining text in the genre of ethnomethodology of science.
Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande/Academics

The authors own description of their project in Laboratory Life reads more like a
parody than a serious inquiry. Upon entering the Salk Institute for a two-year study
Professor Latours knowledge of science was non-existent; his mastery of English was
very poor; and he was completely unaware of the existence of the social studies of
science (1986, p. 273). It is from this auspicious beginning that the revolutionary
insights into science were to emerge.
These apparent liabilities are portrayed as a unique advantage, since he was thus
in the classic position of the ethnographer sent to a completely foreign environment
(1986, p. 273). However, the idea that the inability to understand ones human sub-
Slezak 99
jects is a positive methodological virtue is surely a bizarre conception. For Latour
and Woolgar, however, it is intimately connected with their doctrine of inscriptions.
The meaninglessness of the traces, spots, points and other recordings is a direct
consequence of Latours admitted scientific illiteracy. Predictably enough, from the per-
spective of complete ignorance, all these meaningful symbols are indiscriminable and
must, therefore, be placed in the category of unintelligible markingsinscriptions.
Avoiding the possibility of understanding their subjects behaviour is justified on the
grounds that, just as the anthropologist does not wish to accept the witch-doctors own
explanations, so one should remain uncommitted to the scientists rationalizations.
The absurdity of such an attitude follows from the simple failure to appreciate the
difference between understanding the native and believing him.
Persuasion by Literary Inscription and Achieving Objects by Modalities

It is from a point of view of ignorance and incomprehension that Latour will rely on a
simple grammatical technique in order to discern the true significance of the papers:
Activity in the laboratory had the effect of transforming statements from one type
to another (1986, p. 81). Specifically, the rationale of the laboratory activities was
the linguistic exercise of transforming statements in various ways in order to enhance
their facticity. Thus, we see how Latour and Woolgar arrive at their constructivist
conclusions. They explain a laboratory is constantly performing operations on state-
ments (1986, p. 86) and it is through this process that a fact has then been consti-
tuted (1986, p. 87) by social negotiation and construction. In short, the laboratory
must be understood as the organisation of persuasion through literary inscription
(1986, p. 88). These are the grounds on which we must understand their claims that
substances studied in the lab did not exist prior to operations on statements (1986,
pp. 110, 121). An object can be said to exist solely in terms of the difference between
two inscriptions (1986, p. 127).
Poison Oracles and Other Laboratory Experiments

From the meaninglessness of the inscriptions and his revelation that the scien-
tificity of science has disappeared (Latour 1983, p. 142). Latour is led inexorably
to a nave but nagging questionnamely, if nothing scientific is happening in lab-
oratories, why are there laboratories to begin with and why, strangely enough, is the
society surrounding them paying for these places where nothing special is produced?
(1983, pp. 141-2).
. . . in the back of his mind there remains a nagging question. How can we account for the fact
that in any one year, approximately one and a half million dollars is spent to enable twenty-five
people to produce forty papers? (Latour & Woolgar 1979, p. 70)
This question is undoubtedly a deep mystery if one systematically refuses to un-

derstand the meaningfulness of the inscriptions on these papers. From this vantage
point, Isaac Newtons notebooks would be indiscriminable from random fly droppings
undoubtedly an important lesson for the science classroom.
On the analogy of anthropologists refusal to bow before the knowledge of a prim-
itive sorcerer (1979, p. 29). Latour and Woolgar refuse to accept the authority of our
best science, saying We take the apparent superiority of the members of our labora-
tory in technical matters to be insignificant, in the sense that we do not regard prior
cognition . . . as a necessary prerequisite for understanding scientists work (1979,
p. 29). Ironically, though rejecting our best science in this way, they happily counte-
nance the magical transformation of physical substances into inscriptions. However,
more than being an absurd affectation, their irreverent approach amounts to an
arrogance that elevates ignorance to a methodology. Since prior cognition, is not
necessary for understanding a scientists work, Latour and Woolgar see themselves as
competent to adjudicate the merits of advanced scientific theories. These astonishing
anti-intellectual ideas defy comment and should not require serious response. Equally,
the corrosive educational values implied in such an outlook should be obvious.
This affectation of an Evans-Pritchard among the Azande is anthropological strangeness
in a rather different sense of the term: no anthropologist was ever so strange. Given
his method, Latour naturally finds the activities in the laboratory incomprehensible.
Unwilling to allow his incomprehension to become a liability, it becomes the deep
insight of Laboratory Life. The behaviour of the scientists not only appears mean-
ingless, it is meaningless. In their conclusion, Latour and Woolgar reveal that A
laboratory is constantly performing operations on statements . . . , (1979, p. 86) and
the activities of the laboratory consist in manufacturing traces, spots and points with
their inscription devices. The production of papers with such meaningless marks is
taken to be the main objective of the participants in essentially the same way that the
production of manufactured goods is the goal of any industrial process. This is the view
of science as sausage factory.
There is some unintended irony where Latour and Woolgar take their own confusion
to be typical and presumptuously extrapolate their own predicament asking Is there
any essential distinction between the nature of our own construction and that used by
our subjects? (1979, p. 254). To their rhetorical question they say: Emphatically, the
answer must be no (1979, p. 254). Based on their own experience, it is not difficult
to see why Latour and Woolgar might arrive at the conclusion that science is a more
or less arbitrary construction and negotiation with fictions and that nothing of any
cognitive quality was occurring in scientific laboratories.
Derridadaism: Readers as Writers of the Text

A measure of the perversity of this work is the fact that in the new edition of their
book, Latour and Woolgar tell us that laboratory studies such as their own should,
after all, not be understood as providing a closer look at the actual production of
science at the workbench, as everyone had thought, since this view would be both
arrogant and misleading, (1986, p. 282) by presuming some privileged access to the
real truth about science that will emerge from a more detailed observation of the
technical practices. Instead, Latour and Woolgar explain that their work recognizes
itself as the construction of fictions about fiction constructions (1986, p. 282). This is
the textualism of Derrida combined with a much-vaunted reflexivity. They continue:
Slezak 101
. . . all texts are stories. This applies as much to the facts of our scientists as to the
fictions through which we display their work (1986, p.284). Their own work, then,
just like all of science, has no determinate meaning since It is the reader who writes
the text (1986, p. 273).
Here we see a deconstructionist affectation that conveniently serves to protect La-
tour and Woolgar against any criticism. Where Bloor professes to adhere to the usual
principles of scientific inquiry, Latour and Woolgar engage in a game which Lehman
(1991) has aptly called Derridadaism. They evade criticism by adopting deconstruc-
tionist double-talk and affecting a nihilistic indifference to the cogency of their own
thesis. In keeping with the principle of reflexivity, they embrace the notion that their
own text (like the science they describe) has no real meaning, being an illusory, or
at least, infinitely renegotiable concept (Latour & Woolgar 1986, p. 273). Reflecting on
the controversies surrounding their work, Latour and Woolgar observe that defenders
and critics alike have engaged in this futile spectacle in which they have debated
the presumed intentions of the authors. This spectacle is, of course, just the exercise
of scholarly criticism. Latour and Woolgar now reveal that the real meaning of a
text must be recognised as illusory and indeterminate. The question of what the
authors intended or what is reported to have happened are now very much up to the
reader. This Rorschach inkblot view of their own work is undoubtedly correct in one
sense, if only because Laboratory Life is in many respects incoherent and unintelligible.
For example, some of the diagrams offered as explanatory schemas are impossible
to decipher. It is sobering to consider how science teaching might be conducted in
accordance with this model of scholarship.
Balance of Forces
Though implications of social constructivism are not drawn out by the authors, they are
close to the surface and not difficult to discern. Thus, once Latour and Woolgar reject
the intrinsic existence of accurate and fictitious accounts per se, the only remaining
criterion for judgement is judgement itself. . . . the degree of accuracy (or fiction) of
an account depends on what is subsequently made of the story, not on the story itself
(1986, p. 284). There are no grounds for judging the merits of any claim besides the
modalizing and demodalising of statements, a purely political question of persuasion,
propaganda and power. Thus they suggest that the very idea of plausibility of any
work, including their own, is not an intellectual or cognitive question, but simply a
matter of political redefinition of the field and other such transformations involving
shift in the balance of forces. In particular, the current implausibility of their own
theory is only due to its relative political disadvantages rather than the lack of any
intellectual merits (1986, p. 285). One could hardly find a more open endorsement of
the doctrine that Might is right.
Education: Truth as Power

There could be no more fundamental challenge to education than the one posed by
these approaches, since their radical claims purport to overturn the entire edifice and
foundations of our scientific knowledge. Thus, a leading partisan of the sociology
of scientific knowledge has suggested that no less than The foundations of modern
thought are at stake here (Pickering 1992, p. 22). All sides of the dispute may agree
on this, at least.
Social constructivist writings exemplify discourse that George Orwell (1946) desribed
as giving an appearance of solidity to pure wind and that is largely the defence of
the indefensible. Orwells essay Politics and the English Language warned that such
language is like a cuttlefish squirting out ink prevents clear, critical thinking and,
thereby, the capacity to see through ideological mystification. Orwell sees the proper
use of language as an instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing
thought, and he argued that subverting this function will have a deleterious effect
by producing a reduced state of consciousness, the anaesthesia of a portion of ones
brain.
The bearing of social constructivist doctrines on these educational questions is starkly
brought out in Chomskys remarks:
It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies. This, at least,
may seem enough of a truism to pass without comment. Not so, however. For the modern
intellectual, it is not at all obvious . . .. (Chomsky 1969, p. 257)
Chomsky goes on to quote Martin Heidegger who remained a card-carrying Nazi

even after the Second World War. In a pro-Hitler declaration, echoing social construc-
tivist ideas, Heidegger asserted truth is the revelation of that which makes a people
certain, clear and strong in its action and knowledge. Chomsky remarks ironically
that it seems for Heidegger it is only this kind of truth that one has a responsibility to
speakthe truth which comes from power. In the same vein, we have seen Latour and
Woolgar assert that the success of any theory is entirely a matter of, not persuasion,
but politics and power, extracting compliance. On this theory a repressive totalitarian
regime must count as a model of scientific success.
Concerns with the revolt against reason are also seen expressed by Christopher
Norris (1992) who writes of Baudrillard as among those located in the wider fashion
for pragmatist, anti-foundationalist or consensus-based theories of knowledge (1992,
p. 16). Baudrillard appllies the constructivist, contextualist, inscriptionalist approach
and concludes that the 1991 Gulf War did not happen: There is no reality behind the
discourse concerning the Gulf War. History, like science, is a fictive construct. Norris
writes of the intellectual and political bankruptcy of doctrines which lead to such
conclusions.
Mertonian Norms: The Ethos of Science

On such a theory, it is impossible to distinguish fairness from fraud in science, since,
after all, both are ways of constructing fiction. In the absence of the usual distinc-
tions, the scientist who fraudulently manufactures his evidence cannot be meaningfully
distinguished from the honest researcher whose data are also constructed, albeit in
different ways. The problem arises from social constructivists rejection of the famous
Slezak 103
Mertonian norms of universalism, communism, disinteredness and organized skepti-
cism which constitute the ethos of science (Merton 1942). Merton described these
as institutional imperatives, being moral as well as technical prescriptions,that
affectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be binding on the
scientist. As Merton observes, these institutional values are transmitted by precept
and example, presumably in the course of the scientists education. It is difficult to see
how someone committed to the social constructivist view can either teach or conduct
science according to the usual rules in which truth, honesty and other intellectual and
ethical measures of worth are taken seriously.
Facticity and Maintaining Ones Position

In articulating the same political view of scientific claims, constructivist authors stop
short of openly encouraging cheating and other forms of dishonesty in science, but there
can be no mistake about the clear entailments of their theory. Thus, when examining
a dispute concerning the claims of parapsychology or astrology, Pinch and Collins
(1984) draw attention to symmetries in the attempts of opponents to maintain their
commitmentsin one case to orthodox science and, in the other, to the paranormal.
However, from the standpoint of scrupulous sociological neutrality or impartiality
regarding the intellectual merits of the case on each side, there can be no way to
discriminate the relative merits of the arguments and evidence itself.
In the case study, both sides make questionable attempts to protect their favoured
theory against contrary evidence and, indeed, the scientists apear to have been less
than completely forthright about some disconfirming evidence. Pinch and Collins wish
to generalise from this example to a thesis about science as a whole by construing it
as a typical case, that is, as evidence of the way in which public scrutiny removes the
mystique of science and exposes its socially constructed, negotiated character. Such
expose serves to dissolve the facticity of the claims.
Pinch and Collins are unwilling to see such episodes as anything other than the
way science always operatesnot because all scientists are dishonest, but because
the very distinction relies on being able to discriminate fact from fiction. When the
scientists finally admit their error and revise their earlier stance in the light of falsi-
fying evidence, they are ridiculed by Pinch and Collins for their grandiose, mythical
pretensions and for appearing to adopt a mantle of almost Olympian magnanimity
(1984, p. 536). The scientists are reproached for failing to re-appraise their under-
stading of scientific method and to learn about its active characterthat is, the way
in which facts, previously established by their presentation in the formal literature
[sic], can be deconstructed (1984, p. 538) by public scrutiny of the informal, behind-
the-scenes reality of science. Remarkably, however, Pinch and Collins suggest that the
right lesson about science was that, provided they had been prepared to endorse the
canonical model in public while operating in a rather different way in private, they
could have maintained their position (1984, p. 539). In other words, if they had been
even more dishonest, they would have been rightin the only sense of right possible,
that is, they would have maintained their position. The status or facticity of a claim
is just a matter of how the claim is publicly presented (1984, p. 523) and the literature
can either construct or dissolve the facticity of the claims. If we drop the jargon,
their point is simply that truth is what you can get away with. Heidegger would be
impressed.
Altering the Grounds of Consensus: Affirmative Action?

In practice, through the feigned suspension of judgement, social constructivism has led
to a tacit, or even explicit, advocacy of discredited or disreputable pseudo-science. Pinch
(1993) and Ashmore (1993) go so far as to defend the supposed merits of unorthodox
and rejected theories on the grounds of equity. Not least, this policy includes the case of
fraud since it is to be seen as an attributed category, something made in a particular
context which may become unmade later (Pinch 1993, p. 368). Ashmore proposes a
radical skepticism concerning the expose of notorious cases of misguided science such
as that of Blondlots N-rays. Amid the usual jargon-laden pseudo-technicality, such
an approach amounts to promoting the alleged scientific merits or deserts of such
discredited cases. Thus, Pinch writes of making plausible the rejected view (Pinch
1993, p. 371) and Ashmore is prefectly explicit: To put it very starkly, I am looking
for justice!in a rhetorically self-conscious effort to alter the grounds of consensus
(1993, p. 71). Again, the educational implications for the curriculumshould hardly
need drawing out. The impartiality defended by social constructivism has come to
mean something like affirmative action for bullshit (in H. Frankfurts (1988) technical
use of this philosophical term).
Writing on the Science Wars in India, Meera Nanda (1997) discusses the direct
political consequences of such epistemological egalitarianism. Specifically, she is con-
cerned with the way in which social constructivist doctrines give legitimacy to various
ethno-sciences such as Hindu ways of knowing in opposition to Western, Euro-
centric, Northern science. Nanda expresses increasing unease [with] the transna-
tional alliance that has emerged around the idea that the rationality of modern science
encodes Western and imperialistic social-cultural values. She echoes the concerns we
have already seen expressed by Popper, Chomsky and Norris:
But when science is joined to culture at the hip in the constructivist fashion, it also opens the
door to the so-called enthno-scienceHindu science, Islamic science, third world womens
sciencewherein scientific rationality is subordinated to the forms of life of different com-
munities. When the existing social values are allowed to decide the validity of knowledge,
knowledge loses whatever power it has to critique these often oppressive values.
. . . The oppressed Others do not need patronizing affirmations of their ways of knowing, as
much as they need ways to challenge these ways of knowing. They do not need to be told that
modern science is no less of a cultural narrative than their local knowledges, for they need the
findings of modern science, understood as transcultural truths, in order to expose and challenge
local knowledges. (Nanda 1997)
Conclusion: Education as Intellectual Self Defence

To the extent that the doctrines we have seen encourage the anaesthesia and reduced
state of consciousness of which Orwell spoke, teachers have a special responsibility
to foster clear thinking. The extent to which citizens can think independently and
critically has immense consequences for our lives and very survival. In the spirit of
Slezak 105
Orwells concerns, Chomsky (1969) has documented the extent to which elite culture,
the so-called intellectuals and the education system, perform a crucial propaganda
function fostering necessary illusions and, thereby, serving the interests of privilege
and power. In the face of such forces, he suggests that what is needed is the kind of
intellectual self-defence that has always been the ideal of a liberal education.
. . . Traditionally the role of the intellectual, or at least his self image, has been that of a
dispassionate critic. Insofar as that role has been lost, the relation of the schools to intellectuals
should, in fact be one of self-defence. (Chomsky 1969, p. 251)
References
Ashmore, M.: 1993, The Theatre of the Blind: Starring a Promethean Prankster, a
Phoney Phenomenon, a Prism, a Pocket and a Piece of Wood, Social Studies of
Science 23, 67106.
Barnes, B.: 1974a, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
London.
Barnes, B.: 1974b, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, London.
Barnes, B.: 1981, On the Hows and Whys of Cultural Change, Social Studies of Science
11, 48198.
Barnes, B. and Bloor, D.: 1982, Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowl-
edge, in M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, pp. 2147.
Barnes, B., Bloor, D. and Henry, J.: 1996, Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis,
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Bloor, D.: 1976, Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Bloor, D.: 1981, The Strengths of the Strong Programme, Philosophy of the Social
Sciences, Vol. 11, pp. 199213. Reprinted in J. R. Brown (ed.) Scientific Rationality:
The Sociological Turn, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984, p. 85.
Bloor, D.: 1983, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge, Columbia University
Press, New York.
Bloor, D.: 1991, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edn, The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Boden, M.: 1979, Piaget, Fontana, London.
Boorse, C.: 1975, The Origins of the Indeterminacy Thesis, Journal of Philosophy
72, 369887.
Brannigan, A.: 1981, The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Bunge, M.: 1991, A Critical Examination of the New Sociology of Science, Philosophy
of the Social Sciences 21(4), 52460.
Chomsky, N.: 1969, American Power and the New Mandarins, Penguin, Har-
mondsworth.
Collins, H.: 1990, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, MIT
Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Collins, H. and Pinch, T.: 1992, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know About Science,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Durkheim, E. and Mauss, M.: 1903, Primitive Classification. Translated and edited
with introduction by R. Needham, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1963.
Forman, P.: 1971, Weimar Culture, Causality and Quantum Theory 1918-1927, in
R. McCormmach (ed.), Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, University of
Philadelphia Press, Philadelphia, pp. 1115.
Frankfurt, H.: 1988, On Bullshit, The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophi-
cal Essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Gardner, H. E.: 1987, The Minds New science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution,
Basic Books, New York.
Giere, R. (ed.): 1992, Cognitive Models of Science: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, Vol. XV, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Gieryn, T.: 1982, Relativist/Constructivist Programmes in the Sociology of Science:
Redundance and Retreat, Social Studies of Science 12, 279297.
Gorman, M.: 1992, Simulating Science: Heuristics, Mental Models and Technoscientific
Thinking, Indiana University Press, Bloomington.
Gough, N.: 1993, Laboratories in Schools: Material Places, Mythic Spaces, The
Australian Science Teachers Journal 39, 2933.
Gross, P. and Levitt, N.: 1994, Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels
with Science, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Kosslyn, S.: 1980, Image and Mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Kosslyn, S.: 1994, Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
Langley, P. Simon, H.A. Bradshaw, G.L. and Zytkow, J.M.: 1987, Scientific Discovery:
Computational Explorations of the Creative Process, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Slezak 107
Latour, B.: 1983, Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World, in K. Knorr-
Cetina and M. Mulkay (eds), Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of
Science, Sage, New York.
Latour, B. and Woolgar, S.: 1979, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific
Facts, Vol. 11, Sage, London, pp. 173198. Reprinted in J.R. Brown (ed.), Scientific
Rationality: The Sociological Turn, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984.
Laudan, L.: 1990a, Demystifying Underdetermination, in C. W. Savage (ed.), Scientific
Theories: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIV, University of
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Laudan, L.: 1990b, Science and Relativism, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Lehman, D.: 1991, Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man,
Simon & Schuster, New York.
Matthews, M. R. (ed.): 1998, Constructivism in Science Education: A Philosophical
Examination, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Merton, R.: 1942, Science and Technology in a Democratic Order, Journal of Legal and
Political Sociology 1. Reprinted as Science and Democratic Social Structure, in his
Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press, New York, 1957.
Merton, R.: 1957, The Sociology of Knowledge, Social Theory and Social Structure,
Free Press, New York.
Nanda, M.: 1997, The Science Wars in India, Dissent, Winter 44(1).
Norris, C.: 1992, Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War,
Lawrence & Wishart, London.
Orwell, G.: 1946, Politics and the English Language, The Penguin, 1946, Essays of
George Orwell, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1984.
Phillips, D.: 1995, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Many Faces of Construc-
tivism, Educational Researcher 24(7), 512.
Phillips, D.: 1997, How, Why, What, When, and Where: Perspectives on Constructivism
in Psychology and Education, Issues in Education 3(2), 151194.
Phillips, D.: 1997a, Coming to Grips with Radical Social Constructivisms, Science &
Education 6(1-2), 85104.
Pickering, A.: 1992, Science as Practice and Culture, The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
Pinch, T.: 1993, Generations of SSK, Social Studies of Science 23, 363373.
Pinch, T. and Collins, H.: 1984, Private Science and Public Knowledge: The Committee
for the Scientific Investigation of the Paranormal and its Use of the Literature,
Social Studies of Science 14, 521546.
Popper, K.: 1966, The Open Society and Its Enemies,Volume 2, Hegel and Marx,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Quine, W.: 1960, Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Shapin, S.: 1979, Homo Phrenologicus: Anthropological Perspectives on an Historical
Problem, in B. Barnes and S. Shapin (eds), Natural Order: Historical Studies of
Scientific Culture, Sage, London.
Shapin, S.: 1982, History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions, History of
Science 20, 157211.
Slezak, P.: 1989, Scientific Discovery by Computer as Empirical Refutation of the
Strong Programme, Social Studies of Science 19, 563600.
Slezak, P.: 1991a, Artificial Experts, Social Studies of Science 21, 175201.
Slezak, P.: 1991b, Bloors Bluff: Behaviourism and the Strong Programme, Interna-
tional Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5(3), 241256.
Slezak, P.: 1994, The Social Construction of Social Constructionism, Inquiry 37(2), 139
157.
Slezak, P.: 1995, The Philosophical Case Against Visual Imagery, in P. Slezak, T. Caelli
and R. Clark (ed.), Perspectives on Cognitive Science, Ablex, Norwood.
Sokal, A. and J. Bricmont, J.: 1997, Intellectual Impostures, Profile Books, London.
Stove, D.: 1991, The Plato Cult and Other Philosophical Follies, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford.
Tweney, R. Doherty, M. and Mynatt, C. (eds): 1981, On Scientific Thinking, Columbia
van Fraassen, B.: 1980, The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Woolgar, S.: 1988, Science: The Very Idea, Tavistock Publications, London.
Re-examining the Image of Science in the School Science
Curriculum
William W. Cobern
Western Michigan University, USA. Email: bill.cobern@wmich.edu
Introductory Remarks
My task is to address the question of how the scientific community views the public
understanding of science and whether there needs to be a re-conceptualization of the
challenge to foster the public understanding of science, and also whether there is a
need to re-examine assumptions. I am compelled to begin by acknowledging a debt to
an important book, Inarticulate Science, written by Edgar Jenkins and his colleagues
at Leeds. Inarticulate Science is an outstanding contribution on the concept of the
public understanding of science and I think of my contribution today on this topic as a
footnote. My perspective is somewhat different in that I have school settings in mind
rather than adult learning (also see Lewenstein, 1992). I want to address the question
of how the science community should think about the public understanding of science
with respect to what happens in schools; and by school I mean K-12 school plus the
undergraduate science education of non-science university majors. Also, I make my
remarks from a cultural perspective in that I think it is important to think about how
scientific ideas contribute to and influence the worldviews we construct for ourselves.
Specifically, I am interested in science as an aspect of different systems of meaning
that people construct for making sense of their worlds: An aspect of meaning because
science is not the entire ball game except for a few people who chose to elevate science
to the level of metaphysics; different systems because even among scientists there
are differences as to how science is used in the construction of meaning.
I also want to preface my remarks by noting that I am of course speaking from
my experiences as an American science educator. What is happening in the USA,
however, does not appear to be unique (see Gaskell, 1996; Sjberg, 1996). For example,
several industrial nations including Norway are involved in the Third International
Mathematics and Science Study (National Research Council, 1996) for what appear to
be the same reasons. UNESCO is promoting Project 2000+ which has a parallel form
in the USA. The slogan Science for All can be heard worldwide; but, I also think that
given the enormous size of the American scientific and education establishments along
with publishing interests that what happens in the USA can hardly go unnoticed or
unfelt. Nonetheless I will be at pains not to appear overtly Yankee-centric.
The structure of my remarks will be as follows. I begin with a celebration of science
but then move on to discuss what concerns the scientific community has about the pub-
lic. From here I address the key problematic element within the scientific community
itself, the epistemology of scientific positivism. This epistemology creates considerable
110 Image of Science in Science Curriculum
difficulties for the community of science within the public square.1
Finally, I begin with the end. Let me say at the onset where I am headed. Yes,
the science community does need to re-conceptualize the challenge and re-examine
its assumptions about the public understanding of science. The science communitys
historic perspective on the public is grounded in the legitimate interests of science;
but, the promotion of the public understanding of science needs to be grounded in
the publics legitimate interests in science. The distinction between the prepositions
of and in is crucial and I owe this insight to physicist Martin Eger (1989). Egers
distinction is similar to Zimans (1984, 1991, 1992) science insiders and outsiders,
which was also adopted by Jenkins (1992) and Layton et. al. (1993).
A Celebration of Science
What is the scientific community? Ask a scientist and he or she is likely to say
that the community of science is composed of the science departments and science
laboratories at universities and research institutions. This community surely includes
scientific journals and professional societies and meetings. We might also be able
to agree that university science textbooks serve as a kind of unofficial canon for the
scientific community. Above all these, the people we call scientists form the scientific
community. I do not think it is helpful to think of science as something separate from
the people who construct, write about, teach or learn scientific knowledge. Regarding
the scientific community, we live at a time when that community finds itself in the
throes of considerable angst. It is an angst not only about the publics apparent lack
of scientific understanding but also about an apparent lack of public esteem for science
and scientific ways of thinking.
Paradoxically this angst is being endured at the same time that government agen-
cies are pursuing another round of science education reforms for the improvement
of science learning. In the USA, the National Science Teachers Association (NSTA)
and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) have proposed
new science curriculum frameworks. There is a new set of national science standards
promoted by the National Academy of Science (NAS) and endorsed by both NSTA and
AAAS. NAS and AAAS are organizations clearly within the boundaries of the scientific
community and though NSTA is a teachers organization, it is an organization closely
related to the community of science. Hence the efforts of these organizations strongly
reflect the interests of the scientific community. Yet there is this angst evident by
the recent spate of literature scientists and fellow travelers have written to explore
the problem of anti science (e.g., Bishop, 1995; Crease, 1089; Durant, 1990; Dyson,
1993; Gross & Levitt, 1993; Holton, 1993; Ruse, 1994; Theocharis & Psimopoulos,
1987). That this literature strikes a resonant chord within the community of science is
evident from the laudatory reviews and letters to the editor published in the mainline
scientific press. My position will be that the angst is well founded but the description
of the problem is wholly wrong headed. To paraphrase the words of Pogo, a famous
1 The term public square is a metaphor based on the concept on a town square and was coined by
Neuhaus (1984).
Cobern 111
cartoon character, the science community should be saying we have met the enemy and
he is us!
This seems a very negative remark but I am not launching another round of science
bashing. In fact I want to move quickly now to a celebratory stance. There is much in
science to celebrate. I personally cannot think of a time when I was not interested in
science. Typical of many students I do not remember much science being taught in my
elementary grade classrooms. What I remember is the power and the wonder of the
Pacific Ocean to the west of our home and the majesty of the Sierra Nevada mountains
to the east. I recall the fascination of flight whether the flight of birds or of airplanes.
I remember being glued to the television set through the great events of the Apollo
missions. From junior high school on I do remember my science classes. Not because
my science teachers were exceptional. They were not. I do not recall ever having
a science teacher I would call an exceptional teacher whereas I clearly recall a high
school English teacher who was a superb teacher. As research has shown, there are
students who seem almost naturally drawn to science; and it appears to matter little
what happens in school science, these science enthusiasts continue inexorably along
the scientific pathway (see Costa, 1993, 1995). School science is a de facto natural
selection device for screening the majority of students out of science (West, 1996).
I admit to having mixed feelings about my experiences as a university student but
more than anything else that has to do with the time period. It was the late sixties
the height of the Vietnam Warand it was difficult to be a university student at a
time of national crisis. But if I think only of my science studies I have to say it was a
heady experience. Take for example the long laborious and grueling hours spent in a
Drosophila laboratory working out genetic arrangements and chromosomal structures
for fruit flies. To my friends in other disciplines this was certainly the best example of
a silly and boring use of ones time. I can only describe the experience as heady because
we were actually working out the physical mechanisms that made the particular fruit
fly look the way it did. And then to actually photograph the chromosomes, what a
thrilling experience! A year later we took the next step and actually extracted DNA.
Again, what a thrilling experience not only to know nature at such a fundamental level,
but to touch nature at such a fundamental level. At the time of these experiences we
also met some of the great stars of scientific research. I had the honor of studying
biology with Paul Saltman and physical chemistry with Stanley Miller. We had guest
lectures by Gunther Stent and Max Delbrock. Who needs Mel Gibson when you have
just been to a lecture by Linus Pauling? Perhaps this is hyperbole but these experiences
lend themselves to positive exaggerationat least for the science enthusiast.
Indeed, the heroic stories of scientific investigations were almost as good as any
film. One story that has long fascinated me is the story of identifying the DNA syn-
thesis enzyme because it seemed the perfect example of Karl Poppers conjectures and
refutations. In 1957 Arthur Kornberg isolated a polymerase enzyme from Escherichia
coli bacteria that would synthesize DNA in vitroconjectured and confirmed. Well,
confirmed yes; but was the conjecture true? John Cairns was a doubter and he set
about searching countless quantities of E. coli bacteria attempting to find a mutant
strain of E. coli lacking Kornbergs enzyme but still capable of reproducing itselfthat
is, replicating its own DNA. His attempt at refutation was successful and Kornbergs
enzyme though originally confirmed as a DNA synthesis enzyme turned out to have
a different function in the natural setting of a cell. Perhaps this a minor story in
the history of biology but the broader history of molecular genetics can take on epic
proportions. One of the best accounts of this history is suggestively titled, The Eighth
Day of Creation (Judson, 1979). The less than subtle allusion is of course to the Bibles
account of the seven days of creation.
The stories of scientific success were important beyond their explicit purpose of
teaching scientific concepts. The stories bolstered student confidence in science. For
example, when we did those DNA extraction experiments, the truth is that we students
only understood portions of what was being done. If any of us had been vigorously
pressed to answer how we knew that sticky stuff on the glass rod was really DNA,
we would have struggled to answer. We knew in part but much else we accepted on
the basis of scientific authority vested in the professor and laboratory instructor. Why
wouldnt we? We had heard the stories. It never occurred to us that we had faith in
science and scientists. Several years later the basis for that faith was dramatically
reaffirmed for me. My wife and I were expecting our first child. As it happened,
Alex was born several weeks pre-mature and suffered from fetal respiratory distress
syndrome. Upon birth his lungs had not opened fully and the fetal duct that allows
blood to bypass the lungs of an unborn baby had failed to close at birth. We were living
in San Diego at the time and Alex was immediately transferred from the hospital of his
birth to the University of CaliforniaSan Diego teaching hospital. This hospital had a
neonatal research ward where one of the specialty interests by Gods grace happened to
be fetal respiratory distress syndrome. Perilous days followed but Alex pulled through
with no lasting ill effects. Had he been born only a few years earlier and with this
syndrome, he would not have lived through his first twenty-four hours. Why wouldnt
I acknowledge the authority of science?
The excitement I felt as a student of science and the power I witnessed with my sons
full recovery are grounded in the powerful ideas and methods that science has uniquely
contributed to our culture in the 20th century. Cultural historian O.B. Hardison re-
marked that no examination of modern culture can exclude the influence of science
and technology, and one that underestimated their influence would be irresponsible
(1989, p. xi). There is cultural capital in science that properly belongs to everyone.
The science community will endorse this perspective and this is what science for all
should at the least be about. The science community, however, is not always so noble.
For example, the National Academy of Science in its attempt to ward off religious
incursions in the public square told American science teachers:
In a nation whose people depend on scientific progress for their health, economic gains, and
national security, it is of utmost importance that our students understand science as a system
of study, so that by building on past achievements they can maintain the pace of scientific
progress and ensure the continued emergence of results that can benefit mankind. (1984, p. 6)
The fact that this statement so blithely ignores the complex and ambiguous relation-
ship between science and technology and between science and economic development
Cobern 113
(Drori, 1996), casts doubt on the Academys sincerity. Indeed some would see in this
statement an attempt by the science community to protect its privileged status to
control the discourse in certain segments of the public square, particularly the schools.
Lynda Birke (1990) asks whether the drive to educate the public about science is merely
an exercise in public relations and labor recruitment. Who will really benefit? For a
profitable discussion of these questions see Bishop (1995), Goodstein (1995), and Kevles
(1995).
Anti Science Sentiment

Setting aside the contentious question of motive, the science community in its desire
that the public understand and esteem science finds itself concerned with the alleged
low levels of public scientific literacy. There is no point in once again rehearsing well
known statistics (see Yager et. al., 1996) except to say that Science & Engineering
Indicators-1996 has very recent American data and the 1996 National Research Coun-
cil report has comparative data on industrial nations. Suffice it to say, the scientific
community which is largely responsible for financing surveys of public scientific liter-
acy is not very happy with the figures. Nor has it been for a very long time. Layton
et. al. (1993, p. 8) report that, by the opening of the twentieth century laments were
common about the failure of science to be assimilated into the common understanding.
What distinguishes the last twenty years is a slow rise in what the scientific community
has called anti-science and irrationality.
Science & Engineering Indicators-1996, funded by the National Science Foundation
(USA), is an important document on the current status of American science and engi-
neering. The writers chose to highlight the fact that about 40% of Americans express
much confidence in the science community which is higher than confidence placed in
the US Supreme Court. The other side of this fact, however, is that 60% of Americans
are less than confident in the science community. Some 30% are less than sure that
the benefits of scientific research outweigh the harmful results and a full 10% view
science as more harmful than beneficial. These statistics, strikingly inconsistent with
Americas status as a scientific giant, have been fairly steady since the late 1970s when
the eminent historian of science Lynn White (1979, p. 73, emphasis added) asked:
Why has the level of antagonism toward science so clearly risen in our society during the past
decade or so, to a point where many professionals feel not only angered at the mixed public
appreciation of their efforts but also threatened by declining support of their researches?
To which he answered,
The problem is public alienation. For a variety of reasons a significant part of the general public
has become distrustful of those goals, values and methods [of science].
Whites article appeared in the inaugural issue Science 80 which was a magazine
published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) for the
specific purpose of improving the American publics understanding of science.
Through the 1980s, however, the science community perceived continued outbreaks
of dissatisfaction with science in the form of anti-evolutionism and spiritualism (Holton,
1992). In the 1990s scientists found that anti-science was no longer confined to K-
12 schools and unscientific parents. Anti-science had infected the very institutions of
rationality, the universities. This perception motivated Gross and Levitt to write their
book, Higher superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science, published
in 1993. Two years later, Gross and Levitt working with the New York Academy of
Sciences brought together,
about 200 worried scientists, doctors, philosophers, educators, and thinkers. . . [because] there
is a growing danger, many said, that the fabric of reason is being ripped as under, and that
if scientists and other thinkers continue to acquiesce in the process, the hobbling of science
and its handmaidensmedicine and technology among themseems assured. (Browne, 1995,
p. E2, emphasis added)
The meeting was titled, The Flight from Science and Reason. Those committed to
ripping reason asunder included feminists such as Sandra Harding (1993) who raises
questions about the nature of objectivity in science. They include Molefi Asante (1992)
and Ivan Sertima (1987) who are proponents of Afrocentrism and concepts of African
rationality. There are multiculturalists in general (e.g., Grant, Sleeter, & Anderson,
1986). Still worse are the strong proponents of the social study of science such as
Bruno Latour (1987) and Steve Fuller (1991) who advocate a social constructivist view
of scientific knowledge. Worst of all the offending academics are the critical theorists
such as Henry Giroux who writes about critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux & McLaren,
1989) and the literary critic Stanley Fish who is the editor of the radical cultural
studies journal, Social Text.
Can science get any respect? asked Kevin Finneran (1996, p. 95), editor of Issues
in Science and Technology. One would hope so but in the same year that Higher
Superstitions was published, the eminent physicist Freeman Dyson published, Science
in Trouble, in which he commented that attacks against science are likely to become
more bitter and more widespread in the future. . . (1993, p. 524, emphasis added).
Perhaps with that ominous prediction in mind, one scientist recently attempted to
deliver a knock out punch to the radical social constructivists. Alan Sokal is a physi-
cist at New York University and he wrote a manuscript titled, Transgressing The
Boundaries: Towards A Transformative Hermeneutics Of Quantum Gravity (1996b),
which he submitted to Social Text for review and possible publication. Subsequently
Social Text published the article only to have Sokal within days of the publication
announce that the article was a hoax. Sokal had submitted a nonsense manuscript
which by its acceptance for publication exposed the radicals as academic charlatans, in
his opinion of course. In his own words:
For some years Ive been troubled by an apparent decline in the standards of intellectual rigor
in certain precincts of the American academic humanities. But Im a mere physicist: if I find
myself unable to make head or tail of jouissance and differance, perhaps that just reflects my
own inadequacy. So, to test the prevailing intellectual standards, I decided to try a modest
(though admittedly uncontrolled) experiment: Would a leading North American journal of
cultural studieswhose editorial collective includes such luminaries as Fredric Jameson and
Andrew Rosspublish an article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b)
it flattered the editors ideological preconceptions? The answer, unfortunately, is yes. (Sokal,
1996a, p. 1)
Cobern 115
I doubt that Sokal landed a knock out punch but there is no doubt about the ruckus
that ensued.2 Moreover, Sokal may not respect the people at Social Text but he must
worry about them and other radical social constructivists. Why else would he even give
them a second thought? Indeed, what has happened to the scientific community that
one of its distinguished members finds enemies in academe that must be combated in
such a non academic fashion? This is a question that will surely occupy the sociologists
of science for sometime to come.
Scientific Positivism
I do not disagree that there are extremes of social constructivism antithetical to science
and to the celebration of science that I have offered. To some extent Alan Sokal has
done all scholarship a favor by exposing the excesses of extremist social constructivism.
One should also be concerned that legitimate criticism of the scientific community not
be lost in these intellectual skirmishes involving extreme positions. It is in the scientific
communitys best interests to heed legitimate criticism. If scientists willingly join the
cultural debate about science, science can grow in stature (Finneran, 1996, p. 96). If
they do not, the scientific community will by default affirm Martin Heideggers quip
that scientists do not think.
As I tried to convey in my celebration of science, science can be exhilarating. It is
exhilarating to realize that one can know so much about the natural world and to feel
that one can discover so much more. Earlier I also hinted that the scientific community
should look within itself as the community considers the current problems with the
public and science. Along with being exhilarating, science is also seductive. It can
seduce one to the nave materialism that what one knows by science is fundamental
reality, when in fact the debates over the nature of scientific knowledge with respect
to ontological realism are as current today as they ever were (see, e.g., Hawking &
Penrose, 1996). Science can also be deceptive. It can deceive one into thinking that one
has privileged knowledge. Indeed, the cultural point of discussion that I think is most
crucial is the point of epistemological position. How should the scientific community
seek to position science with respect to other domains of knowledge in the public
square? For the better part of the 20th century that question has been answered by a
philosophy of logical positivism which sought to banish metaphysics from philosophy,
because its theses cannot be rationally justified (Holton, 1992, p. 45) leaving sense
perceptions as the only admissible basis of human knowledge and precise thought. In
philosophy, positivism is yesterdays news, a failed project (Walsh, 1967), but what
might be called scientific positivism (Gilmer, 1995) or colloquial positivism hangs on.
Scientific positivism roughly represents a classical view of realism, philosophical ma-
terialism, strict objectivity, and hypothetico-deductive method. Though recognizing
the tentative nature of all scientific knowledge, scientific positivism imbues scientific
knowledge with a Laplacian certainty denied all other disciplines, thus allowing the
2 Those interested in this strange affair should consult website <http://www.nyu.edu
/gsas/dept/physics/faculty/sokal/index.html> for a full account including plus Sokals original article.
Moreover, the University of Kansas held a conference in 1997 devoted to the topic of, Science and its critics:
A meeting to promote dialogue between the two cultures, where Sokal was the featured speaker.
Natural
Sciences
Social Sciences
Other Knowledge Domains
Figure 1: Epistemological pyramid.

scientific community to make an a priori status claim with regard to knowledge. Thus
the scientific community projects in the public square a pyramid view of epistemology
(figure 1) with the natural sciences, of course, occupying the top most position.
This view of scientific knowledge has long been endemic in the schools (Duschl,
1985; Nadeau & Desautels, 1984; Settle, 1990; Smolicz & Nunan, 1975) and is what
gives rise to the cultural critics charge of hegemony (Cobern & Aikenhead, in press;
Harding, 1993). Though philosopher of science Michael Ruse was speaking specifically
of evolutionary biologists, I think his remark is too often apropos of the general scien-
tific community: Scientists tend to treat evolution as a kind of religion. . . . Evolution-
ists tend to be as fervent true Believers as Creationists. . . (Ruse, 1993, p. 353). The
term true believer was made popular by the blue collar philosopher Eric Hoffer (1966)
whose book titled, The True Believer, investigated the nature of mass movements.
Science has the characteristics of a mass movement and:
It can be argued that technology and scientific positivism constitute the dominant ideology of
Western civilization today. Technology has indeed become, as Heidegger noted, the metaphysics
of our age, a totalistic form of secular religion ultimately incompatible with the existence of
rival, nontechnological assumptions, beliefs, or thought systems. (Garrard & Wegierski, 1991,
p. 611)
Unfortunately, this ideology couples the science community with what I call the
Four Western Imperatives of the late 20th century:
1. The Imperative of NaturalismAll phenomena can ultimately and adequately be

understood in naturalistic terms.
2. The Scientistic ImperativeAnything that can be studied, should be studied.
3. The Technocratic ImperativeAny device that can be made, should be made.
4. The Economic ImperativeMaterial well being is the highest good.
Further discussion of these statements is beyond the scope of my topic. What I

want to point out is that these imperatives lead to a blinkered view of life that fosters
Cobern 117
a cynicism that soon gives way to longing. Moreover, with regard to science, the first
two imperatives cut the very ground from beneath science. Philosopher Hendrick Hart
(1980, p. 6) observed that the positing of the ultimacy of rationality unmasks itself
as a belief which cannot be rationally justified . . . Indeed, in our times belief in reason
is increasingly characterized as a commitment to reason which itself lacks rational
grounds. Similarly, in our times belief in science is increasingly characterized as a
commitment to science which itself lacks rational grounds. And, that claim to epistemo-
logical privilege has not gone unnoticed. The radical relativism that so severely vexes
people like Sokal, Gross, and Levitt is a classic case of having sown to the wind, one
now must reap the whirlwind. In other words, the radical social constructivists have
simply turned empiricisms searing analysis back upon the scientific community itself;
and the more the scientific community protests this ill treatment, the more vulnerable
it looks.
The Deconstruction of Science

The problem of scientific positivism cannot fairly be attributed to the science commu-
nity on the whole. Many scientists staunchly reject the notion that science can be
properly understood in the terms of scientific positivism. The proponents of scientific
positivism, however, such as Richard Dawkins and Francis Crick are a very vocal
bunch. If we are to believe Dawkins then we need to understand that the universe
is essentially pointless and we as mature adults better get used to the idea and get
on with our lives. Crick offers his astonishing hypothesis as an explanation for this
pointlessness:
The Astonishing Hypothesis is that You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior
of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. (1994, p. 3)
These ideas resonate with the fashionable nihilism found in certain segments of
modern western culture. Given this view of science, E.A. Burtts comments of 1967
become prophetic:
The world that people thought themselves living ina world rich with colour and sound, redo-
lent with fragrance, filled with gladness, love and beauty, speaking everywhere of purposive
harmony and creative idealswas crowded now into minute corners of the brains of scattered
organic beings. The really important world was a world hard, cold, colourless, silent, and dead;
a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable motions in mechanical regularity.
(1967, pp. 238-239)
To better understand the radical social constructivist critique of science, it is in-

structive to take what has happened in science as an analogy of what has happened in
literary studies. Figure 2 depicts the traditional concept of hermeneutic interpretation.
A literary text is taken as the product of its authors intentions. Thus, there is an
obviously direct interaction between author and text. A reader of the text attempts to
understand the authors intent. This involves a direct interaction with the text (reading
the text) and an indirect interaction with the author. The interaction with the author
must be indirect because our interaction with the author is mediated by the text. In
Author
(Melville)
Direct Indirect
Interaction Interaction
Text Reader
(Moby Dick) Direct of Text
Interaction
Figure 2: The deconstruction of text.

so far as we are able to assume that the author is sane, we can approach the text
as something meaningful that can communicate to the reader ideas that the author
intended. Of course, authors with greater writing talent will be better communicators.
Similarly, there is a tradition of hermeneutics in natural philosophy that is depicted in
figure 3.
Nature may be taken as a meaningful whole either because there is a Creator of
the whole (as in theistic traditions) or for other transcendent values one holds about
Nature. Nature understood holistically expresses itself in a myriad of natural phenom-
ena. The Natural Philosopherwho is our modern day scientistinteracts directly
with natural phenomena through his or her studies and indirectly with Nature as a
whole. The assurance that Nature transcends the experience of natural phenomena
is as well the assurance that natural phenomena are deeply meaningful. They have
meaning that transcends the brute facts of experience.
But literary studies have changed. Many modern day literary critics will tell you
that the purpose in reading a text is not primarily to understand the authors intent
but to deconstruct the text, as shown in figure 4. In modern literary interpretation,
the text is considered the product of social forces that impinged upon the writer of
the text. The reader of the text, thus, attempts to understand not the writers intent
(as if there actually were an author), but to understand the social forces that acted
upon the author (who is more writer than author). Rather than an indirect interaction
with an author who directly communicates intention through his or her text, there is
an indirect interaction with the social forces. Hence, the text must be deconstructed
rather than simply readthe words cannot be taken at face value (see figure 5).
Similarly, in recent years science has become an act of deconstruction as shown in
figure 6, at least as science is portrayed by the scientific positivists. There is no Nature
as Naturethat is, no holistic understanding of a meaningful Naturehence all that
is available to humans are the brute observations of natural phenomena.
Cobern 119
Author of Nature/
Nature qua Nature
Indirect
Direct
Interaction
Interaction
Natural Natural
Phenomena Direct Philosopher
Interaction
Figure 3: The hermeneutic circle of natural philosophy.

What we call Nature is merely the experience of natural phenomena. Scientific
meaning proceeds from the deconstruction of natural phenomena and the re-representation
of our experiences of natural phenomena as a naturalistic conceptual system. The
arresting point about this is that Nature as an inherently meaningful concept is sepa-
rated from any meaningful relationship with natural phenomena; hence, the situation
is analogous to the separation of author and text in radical literary criticism. Hence,
rather than looking to natural phenomena as a way to understand Nature and to
Nature as the guarantor for the essential rationality of our endeavors to understand
Naturewhich would be the traditional scientific perspectivewe are left with only
the scientific re-representation of our experiences of natural phenomena. Without
Nature as our guarantor, science itself is open to deconstruction as depicted in figure 7.
The radical sociologist of scientific knowledge thus attempts to understand not the
intent of scientific knowledge as written by an author (author as scientist), but to
understand the social forces that acted upon the scientist (as a writer) resulting in
the scientific text.
It is my assertion that the reasons that have brought us to the deconstruction of
science have to do with the inordinate influence of scientific positivism on the academic
and public perception of science. What is needed at the school level, is an alternative
understanding of science.
An Alternative View of Science and the Public

Yes, the science community does need to revamp its conceptualization of the publics
understanding of science if the public is to be well served and if science is to prosper.
We can begin, however, with a celebration.
1. We can affirm that science is part of the cultural heritage that belongs to all
people. The exhilaration that I felt as a student of science should be available to
Author
(Melville)
Text Reader
Interaction

all who wish to avail themselves of it. The benefits to my family should be benefits
available to all; that is, all who wish to avail themselves of these benefits.
2. Science is part of the cultural heritage that belongs to all people, but it is not
the sole constituent of that heritage, neither is there any consensus on its rank
ordered position in that heritage. Historian O.B. Hardison (1989, p. 70-71) noted
that, The science of the late twentieth century asks man to understand himself in
the light of his own reason detached from history, geography, and nature, and also
from myth, religion, tradition, the idols of the tribe, and the dogmas of the father.
This request is an invitation to alienation. Doing this not only places science at
the top of the epistemological pyramid (figure 1), it removes science from the pyra-
mid. Science has powerful ideas such as the conservation of energy, homeostasis,
ecological systems, change through time, uniformity, and empirical-experimental
inquiry. There are also other powerful ideas such as freedom, democracy, rule of
law, human dignity, moral rectitude, social solidarity, and transcendence. What
the scientific community must understand about people, is that science along with
history, art, language, technology, and religion are pendants on a wonderfully
intricate mobile of everyday thought, touch one and the rest tremble and change
position in sympathy (Hardison, 1989, p. xiv).
3. There are legitimate differences between the interests of science and publics in-
terest in science. These differences will preclude any consensus on sciences rank
ordered position in our cultural heritage. The template for school science through
undergraduate education, however, has traditionally served the interests of sci-
ence. In science education it is common to hear of the scientific pipeline (fig-
ure 8). This is a metaphor for a flow system that delivers scientists and science re-
Cobern 121
Socio-cultural
Forces on Melville
Indirect
Direct
Interaction
Interaction
Text Reader
Interaction

lated graduates; and, as such, this is a system where the educational experiences
of the many are dictated by the needs of a very few. Even when interdisciplinary
science curricula are adopted, they often continue to serve the interests of science.
These curricula acknowledge that students have other disciplinary interests but
do so for the purpose of manipulating those interests to meet the traditional
objectives of science education. Thus, these other disciplinary interests become
paths to science and the paths are clearly secondary to the destination, which is
science. Moreover, one is likely to find that the destination, science, will occa-
sionally critique those other disciplinary paths and starting points. For example,
we may hear that the starting point is very distant from science and it will be
difficult to build this path but the community of science and science teachers
must try for the good of the learners and for the public. What is not an option is
the critique of science by those other disciplinary interests that science education
is manipulating. This is a problem against which the Science-Technology-Society
curricula are making some inroads.
4. Moreover, the publics variable interests in science will inevitably lead to different
conceptualizations and valuations of science. Earlier I mentioned that being
a student during the height of the Vietnam war. Many of my friends had a
very different valuation of science because of what they perceived as an unholy
alliance between the community of science and a military-industrial complex
that developed and produced weapons. The rhetoric of value neutrality was not
tenable when the science community having taken credit for such things as the
Green Revolution now denied any responsibility for Agent Orange and the like.
Thus they place a low value on science and sometimes a negative value.
There are, however, more common examples than this one. In a recent study
researchers talked with ninth graders about their views on nature. The objective
Author of Nature/
Nature qua Nature
Natural Modern
Phenomena Direct Scientist
Interaction
Figure 6: Science as deconstruction.

was to gain insight on the extent to which science was used in everyday thinking
(Cobern, Gibson & Underwood, 1995).3 One of the students, Ann, spoke of nature
as something one can know about through science.
Ann: Nature is knowable. . . We can learn to understand many things about nature through
personal experience, school and science. Science itself provides us with technology which
in turn increases our scientific knowledge. Technology helps provide us with many wants
which, of course, increases our pleasure. It also uses resources. (ATG.n6, Narrative in
Cobern et al., 1995, p. 24)
This appreciation of science, however, is not where her discussion with the re-
searchers began. Note the emphasized words.
Ann: To me, nature is beautiful and pure because it is Gods creation. Nature provides
both aesthetic and emotional pleasure and I need it for self renewal. I like to go where you
cant see any influence by man. When Im out in nature I feel calm and peaceful. It is a
spiritual feeling and it helps me understand myself . . . This leads me to ask questions that
Id like to find answers to. The pleasure I get from nature is enhanced by the mysteries I
see in it. (ATG.n6, Narrative in Cobern et al., 1995, p. 24, emphasis added)
Anns conceptualization of the natural world has significant aesthetic and reli-
gious elements. Nature in her view is something friendly that you can joyously
be part of.
Now consider Mr. Hess. He is Anns physical science teacher and he who sat
for the same research interview as did Ann. He began his discussion in marked
contrast to Ann.
3 The research was funded by a National Science Foundation grant (RED # 9055834)
Cobern 123
Author of Nature/
Nature qua Nature
Text Sociologist of
Direct Science
Interaction (Edinburgh School!)
Figure 7: The deconstruction of science.

Mr. Hess: Nature is orderly and understandable. The tides and the rotation of the earth,
the seasons and so forth are examples of order in nature. That the planets and the stars
are governed by physical forces and any deviations are simply because we have not yet
discovered the other part of natures orderliness. According to chaos theory even things
that appear to happen randomly have patterns. I think that everything has patterns. . . .
As a science teacher I feel that with enough scientific knowledge all things are understand-
able . . . . I think that the more we understand about matter itself, and the more we know
about how to make things, the more predictable nature will be. Scientific or reductionistic
thinking is very powerful. I feel that once we know enough about the minutia of the world,
breaking it down by using the scientific method, scientists tearing it apart and analyzing
the parts of nature and seeing how they interact, that we will be able to predict just about
anything about nature. (WWC.t6, Narrative in Cobern et al., 1996, emphasis added)
In contrast to Ann, her science teachers conceptualization of nature showing

the integration of scientific themes is essentially monothematic. It is classical
scientific positivism and could hardly differ more from his student, Ann. Fig-
ure 9 is a generalized concept map of Nature drawn from interviews with high
school science teachers and college science professors. Although our studies show
marked differences between biologists and physicists (Cobern et al., 1996), they
are consistent with respect to the centrality of science in their thinking. The
ninth grade students of our studies and the non science college majors showed
substantial variability in their conceptualizations of nature and integration of
scientific themes and concepts. Figure 10 is a generalized concept map of Nature
drawn from interviews with students and shows the extent of variation.
Occasionally one finds a student who talks very much like a science teacher or
professor. Most do not, but this does not mean that the students are unscientific.
For example, it is possible to have an aesthetically oriented view of life that
incorporates scientific thinking. Not aesthetics manipulated for the purposes
of science, however. I have in mind Pythagorean viewpoint where the artistic
Elementary
School Leavers
Science and
Science related
Graduates
High General Elementary Secondary

School College Teachers Teachers
Graduates Graduates
Figure 8: The science education pipeline.

person would value learning science because of the beauty and elegance of its
representations. Near the end of Keplers Harmony of the World (1619) he wrote,
I thank thee, Lord God and Creator, that you have permitted me to see the beauty
of your work and creation. J.B.S. Haldane in this century wrote:
As a result of Faradays work you are able to listen to a wireless. But more than that,
as a result of Faradays work, scientifically educated men and women have an altogether
richer view of the world. For them, apparently empty space is full of the most intricate
and beautiful patterns. So Faraday gave the world not only fresh wealth but fresh beauty.
Benoit Mendelbrots pioneering work with fractal geometry is another area of

science and mathematics where aesthetic elements have blurred traditional dis-
ciplinary boundaries. My own view is that the different conceptualizations of
science should be encouraged; and in addition to the aesthetic, these could be
economic, religious, contemplative, environmentalist and others.
5. The community of science can help itself by engaging the public in good-faith
discussions about these different conceptualizations and valuations of science. By
good-faith I mean that the scientific community does not presume that it holds a
privileged position in the discussion. For example, a typical scientist to use a
Kuhnian term is a puzzle-solver who looks at a scientific solution with the pride
of mastery as if to say, Here is an important natural phenomenon and I know
how it works! The scientist should not assume, however, the moral neutrality of
his or her discovery. During the Vietnam era, and I think this continues today, the
public is very interested in the moral implications of scientific work. The Human
Genome Project or fetal tissue research are only two of many examples. In a very
informative study Tobias (1990) found that for some well educated people, science
lacks interest because it appears to them that scientists do not ask important
questions such as about the morality of what they do.
6. An important point of discussion especially with respect to school science, is
the compatibility of science with very different perspectives. It is important to
Cobern 125
Other Ideas of secondary
Nature
importance
for
example primarily conceptualized as
understood
via
aesthetic
religious Science understood
via Environment
recreational
contempative/emotional
which requires provides
relational provides
economic to
Essential
Conservation sustain Resources
Philosophy of leading Questions to ask

to about Nature Discovery
Nature Development
which facilitate
for
and Extraction
example
Utilization
Management
Order in Nature Acceptable Acceptable
to
methods of explanations of
Comprehensibility give
investigation natural phenomena
of Nature
Figure 9: A scientists view of nature.

acknowledge that not all ideas and worldviews that people hold will be compatible
with science. It is also important to recognize that learning science in even the
most enlightened of settings will bring about change. The important question is
about when change is warranted and when it is not.
Concluding Remarks
So, yes, the scientific community does need to re-conceptualize the challenge and re-
examine its assumptions about the public understanding of science. The scientific
communitys historic perspective on the public is grounded in the legitimate interests of
science; but, the promotion of the public understanding of science needs to be grounded
in the publics legitimate interests in science. Professor John Polkinghorne, president
of Queens College, Cambridge, who is a physicist and Anglican priest, recently made
the following remarks in Scientific American:
Everyone has a metaphysicsa worldviewjust as all people speak prose, whether they are
aware of it or not. Science can and should contribute to that worldview, but it should by no
means monopolize it. Unless you are one of those biologists so flushed with the recent success of
your discipline that you are moved to claim that science is all, you will want to locate scientific
understanding within a wider view of knowledge that gives equally serious consideration to
other forms of human insight and experience. (Polkinghorne, 1996, p. 121, emphasis added)
It is time that the science community and school science education began to do just
this: to locate science within a broader view of knowledge.
Philosophical
Orientation
Primarily Primarily
Toward
Naturalistic Religious
Range Range
Classical
Atheism Deism Fundamentalism
Theism
Nature
Has Can be Can be

or or
Status Changeable Orderly Knowable Mysterious
Can be Balance of Both By

or
Expansion Discipline
Dynamic
Type Type
Mundane Special
Types Can be or Can be or
Aesthetically Religious Emotionally Teleonomic Teleologic Science Unspecified

or Focus on
Complementarily Environment
Majority view
Figure 10: Non-scientists views of nature.

References
Asante, M.K.: 1992, Kemet, Afrocentricity & Knowledge, Africa World Press, Inc.,
Trenton, New Jersey.
Birke, L.: 1990, Selling Science to the Public, New Scientist 127(1730), 4044.
Bishop, J. M.: 1995, Enemies of Promise, The Wilson Quarterly 19(3), 6165.
Browne, M. W.: 1995, Scientists Do a Slow Bunsen Burn, The Arizona Republic pp. E2
E3.
Burtt, E. A.: 1967, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science,
Routledge and K. Paul, London, UK.
Champagne, A.: 1996, Scientific Literacy: What Does it Mean - and How May we Get
There? Perspectives from Reviews of Initiatives and Efforts in the US, Science,
Technology and Citizenship .
Cobern 127
Cobern, W. W. and Aikenhead, G.: 1998, Culture and the Learning of Science,
in B. Fraser and K. G. Tobin (eds), The International Handbook on Science
Education, Part Two, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands,
pp. 3952.
Cobern, W. W., Gibson, A. T. and Underwood, S. A.: 1995, Everyday Thoughts About
Nature: An Interpretive Study of 16 Ninth Graders Conceptualizations of Nature.
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the, National Association for Research
in Science Teaching, ERIC #ED381401, San Francisco, CA.
Cobern, W. W., Gibson, A. T. and Underwood, S. A.: 1996, The Different Worlds of
Biology and Physics Science Teachers. Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the National Association for Research in Science Teaching.
Costa, V. B.: 1993, School Science as a Rite of Passage, Journal of Research in Science
Teaching 30(7), 649668.
Costa, V. B.: 1995, When Science is Another World: Relationships Between Worlds of
Family, Friends, School, and Science, Science Education 79(3), 313333.
Crease, R. P.: 1989, Top Scientists must Fight Astrology - Or All of Us will Face the
Consequences, The Scientist 3(5), 9 & 11.
Crick, F.: 1994, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul,
Scribners, NewYork.
Drori, G. S.: 1996, Science for National Development: Myth and Reality in the
Globalization of Science. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association, New York.
Durant, J.: 1990, The Art of Science, The Listener 123(3150), 1415.
Duschl, R. A.: 1985, Science Education and the Philosophy of Science: Twenty-
five Years of Mutually Exclusive Development, School Science and Mathematics
85(7), 541555.
Dyson, F. J.: 1993, Science in Trouble, American Scholar 62(4), 513525.
Eger, M.: 1989, The Interests of Science and the Problems of Education, Synthese
81(1), 81106.
Finneran, K.: 1996, Can Science Get Any Respect?, Issues in Science and Technology
13(1), 9596.
Fuller, S.: 1991, Social Epistemology, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indi-
anapolis.
Garrard, G. and Wegierski, M.: 1991, Oh Canada? An Essay on Canadian History,
Politics, and Culture, The World & I 6(1), 589613.
Gaskell, G.: 1996, The Eurobarometer Surveys: Rationale and Results from the
1991 and 1993 Surveys and Plans for the 1996/97 Project. Concrete Illustrations
Relating to Public Understanding of Biotechnology. Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Science, Technology and Citizenship, Oslo.
Gilmer, P. J.: 1995, Commentary and Criticism on Scientific Positivism, Science and
Engineering Ethics 1(1), 7172.
Giroux, H. A. and McLaren, P. (eds): 1989, Critical Pedagogy, the State, and Cultural
Struggle, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York.
Goodstein, D. L.: 1995, After the Big Crunch, The Wilson Quarterly 19(3), 5360.
Grant, C. A., Sleeter, C. E. and Anderson, J. E.: 1986, The Literature on Multicultural
Education: Review and Analysis, Educational Studies 12(1), 4771.
Gross, P. and Levitt, N.: 1993, Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels
with Science, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.
Harding, S. (ed.): 1993, The Racial Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future,
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN.
Hardison, O. B. Jr.: 1989, Disappearing Through the Skylight: Culture and Technology
in the Twentieth Century, Viking Penguin, New York, NY.
Hart, H.: 1980, Toronto: The Association for the Advancement of Christian Scholarship.
Hawking, S. W. and Penrose, R.: 1996, The Nature of Space and Time, Scientific
American 275(1), 6065.
Hoffer, E.: 1966, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements,
Perennial Library/Harper & Row, New York.
Holton, G.: 1992, How to Think About the Anti-science Phenomenon, Current
Contents/Social & Behavioral Sciences (45).
Holton, G.: 1993, Science and Anti-science, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Jenkins, E. W.: 1992, School Science Education: Towards a Reconstruction, Journal of
Curriculum Studies 24(3), 229246.
Jenkins, E. W.: 1996, Scientific and Technological Literacy for Citizenship: What
Can We Learn from Research and Other Evidence?, Science, Technology and
Citizenship .
Judson, H. F.: 1979, The Eighth Day of Creation: The Makers of the Revolution in
Biology, Simon and Schuster, New York.
Kevles, D. J.: 1995, The Crisis of Contemporary Science: The Changed Partnership,
The Wilson Quarterly: Science 19(3), 4152.
Cobern 129
Latour, B.: 1987, Science in Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Layton, D., Jenkins, E., Macgill, S. and Davey, A.: 1993, Inarticulate Science?
Perspectives on the Public Understanding of Science and Some Implications for
Science Education, Studies in Education Ltd., Nafferton, Driffield, East Yorkshire.
Lewenstein, B. V. (ed.): 1992, When Science Meets the Public, American Association for
the Advancement of Science, Washington DC.
Nadeau, R. and Desautels, J.: 1984, Epistemology and the Teaching of Science, Science
Council of Canada, Ottawa, Canada.
National Academy of Sciences: 1984, Science and Creationism: A View from the
National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.
National Research Council: 1996, Mathematics and Science Education Around the
cworld: What Can We Learn?, National Academy Press, Washington, DC.
National Science Board: 1996, Science & Engineering Indicators - 1996, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, DC.
Neuhaus, R. J.: 1984, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America,
William B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan.
Polkinghorne, J. C.: 1996, Heavy Meta, Scientific American 275(5), 121123.
Ruse, M.: 1993, Booknotes, Biology and Philosophy 8(3), 353358.

Ruse, M.: 1994, Struggle for the Soul of Science, The Sciences 34(6), 3944.
Sertima, I. V.: 1987, The Black Valhalla: An Introduction, Journal of African
Civilizations 9, 530.
Sj/oberg, S.: 1996, Science, Technology and Citizenship: Raising the Issues and Setting
the Scene. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Science, Technology and
Citizenship, Oslo.
Smolicz, J. J. and Nunan, E. E.: 1975, The Philosophical and Sociological Foundations
of Science Education: The Demythologizing of School Science, Studies in Science
Education 2, 101143.
Sokal, A.: 1996a, A physicist Experiments with Cultural Studies, Lingua Franca
pp. 6264.
Sokal, A.: 1996b, Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, Social Text (46/47), 217252.
Theocharis, T. and Psimopoulos, M.: 1987, Where Science has Gone Wrong, Nature
329(6140), 595598.
Tobias, S.: 1990, Theyre Not Dumb, Theyre Different: Stalking the Second Tier,
Research Corporation, Tucson, AZ.
UNESCO: 1993, Project 2000+ Declaration. A report from the International Forum on
Scientific and Technological Literacy for All, Chap. ED-93/CONF.016/6, UNESCO,
Paris, France.
Walsh, W. W.: 1967, Metaphysics, Nature of, in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Vol. 5, Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, p. 303a.
West, P.: 1996, Basic College Science Courses Filter Out Most Students, National
Science Foundation, Washington, DC.
White Jr., L.: 1979, The Ecology of Our Science., Science 80 (AAAS) 1(1).
Yager, R. E., Lutz, M. V. and Craven III, J. A.: 1996, Do National Standards Indicate
the Need for Reform in Science Teacher Education?, Journal of Science Teacher
Ziman, J.: 1984, An Introduction to Science Studies: The Philosophical and Social
Aspects of Science and Technology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Ziman, J.: 1991, Public Understanding of Science, Science, Technology, & Human
Values 16(1), 99105.
Ziman, J.: 1992, Not Knowing, Needing to Know, and Wanting to Know, in B. V.
Lewenstein (ed.), When Science Meets the Public, American Association for the
Advancement of Science, Washington DC, pp. 1320.
Linking Science Pedagogy with History and Philosophy of Science
Through Cognitive Science: A Proposal
Amitabha Gupta
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, India. Email: ag@hss.iitb.ernet.in
Introduction
The curriculum for science education at present both at the school and the post-school
levels emphasizes narrow specialization of only technical material. All the cognate
subjects in the curriculum are arranged horizontally and the students move through
schools and colleges vertically from level to level of successive stages of specialization.
The teaching materials of the program are structured in a hierarchical order mainly
around narrower and still narrower technical content as the student moves up at
higher levels. This is considered to be undesirable. In what follows I would like to
first argue for integrating science education with philosophy, history and sociology of
science with the help of cognitive science, secondly, suggest a model of integration, and
finally, illustrate the model with two examples.
Section 1 deals with issues relating to narrow science education programmes that
currently exist, the misconceptions about science that may arise from such science
education programmes, and a possible model for science studies that may remedy it.
Section 2 suggests that science studies based on a straight forward Philosophy and
History of Science may get entangled in unnecessary controversies/debates and fail to
integrate the technical content and the insights into scientific practices. The section
first identifies two such conventional debates in science studies and discusses one
debate, viz., whether scientific knowledge is the creation of the individual scientist or
a product of society, and offers a possible resolution by adopting the cognitive-historical
approach. In Section 3 the same is done for another debate, viz., whether scientific
knowledge is objective or subjective. The discussions on both the debates shows how
Cognitive Science and Case Study based approach can act as unifying factors. This is
illustrated with the help of examples of scientific work illustrated with two case studies:
one on scientific experiment and the other on introduction of new concepts and a
scientific law.
1 The Paradoxical Nature of the Conventional Science Education Programme

The consequences of this narrow, isolated, fact-oriented science education are as fol-
lows:
i. Although the teachers and the textbooks of science mostly claim to stick to facts
and to exclude idle philosophic talk, they end up creating misconceptions pre-
cisely about these facts, may be not by deliberate instruction but by implication.
132 Science Pedagogy through Cognitive Science
Philipp Frank4 has given examples of textbook formulation of laws of physics,
e.g., the law of inertia, and shown that in that formulation no physical facts
whatsoever can be logically derived from the law, and the law is inapplicable to
any actual situation in the physical world. This means that textbook formulation
often is not physical but purely metaphysical.
ii. It is true that valid scientific knowledge is often intuitive, the acquisition or
assessment of which is based on practical experience in learning science, research,
and active participation in scientific work and scientific community. It has been
said that valid science is what is recognised as valid by scientists and can sel-
dom be identified as a formal logical property of scientific discourse. And yet those
who enter into a scientific career in which their earlier fact-oriented training is
not derived from any exposure to the actual processes of creative scientific work
and research, may have no personal experience of the fundamental importance
of the mistakes, groping and criticisms in the generation of new and reliable
knowledge or the importance of inventive imagination or of the limitations and
uncertainties of the so-called scientific methods. The reason for this is that our
fact-oriented science education program has lost contact with living experience
of scientific work and research, since it has been turned into a banking system,
in which the teachers deposit a certain amount of factual knowledge with the
students and retrieve it during the examination essentially treating the student
as no more than a memory bank.
iii. Finally, as a consequence of increasingly narrowing hierarchical arrangement
of factual content and rigid standards of valid scientific knowledge or proof, a
student of science forms the opinion that the scientific view is the only legitimate
view, ignoring all questions concerning its scope and the legitimacy of other al-
ternatives. Since in his narrow and exclusive science education the student is
taught to treat only science as valid he naturally makes an inference that it must
be valid in other regions as well.
The irony of the present science education program is that whereas it really intends
to impart nothing but facts and to remain neutral regarding any attempts to incor-
porate discussions about science, it creates, in the process of teaching, a vacuum. The
influence of the isolated technical scientific content on the total attitude of the student
towards science forces him to fill up this vacuum. In the absence of any conscious
provision for providing an over-view of science and thereby protecting students from
narrow blinkers or nave euphoria just as much as from the false and hostile ideas
about science, this vacuum is filled up by many misconceptions. As a result, myths
about science abound and a mystique of science prevails.
4 Frank, P.: 1961, The Place of the Philosophy of Science in the Curriculum of the Physics Students, in
Modern Science and Its Philosophy, Collier Books, New York, 224-252.
Gupta 133
1.1 Misconceptions about Science Implicit in Conventional Science Education
Programme
What are some of these misconceptions? First, science is claimed to provide absolute
truth, completely objective and pure description, and, therefore, should be considered
the only authority for belief and the only source of reliable knowledge. The overempha-
sis on mathematical and formal aspect of science, the authoritarian manner in which
scientific knowledge is imparted, and the total absence in science education of initial
doubt, the element of surprise, inventive imagination, creative criticism lend credence
to the belief that scientific knowledge is absolute. The manner in which scientific exper-
iments are conducted in a school or college laboratory shows that an experiment on, say,
Boyles law, amounts merely to observe a series of values of the pressure and volume
of the gas, which can be plotted on a nice smooth curve confirming a mathematical
relationship between relevant variables. Accounts of Boyles own experiment could give
a contrary picture. Besides, the absolute knowledge view of science has been reinforced
by another widespread misconception that there exists a master procedure or method
underlying all scientific work and the successful application of this unique infallible
method is what validates scientific knowledge. P.W. Bridgman, J.B. Conant and many
other practicing scientists have claimed that science is what scientists do and the
search for the Method is futile as there are not one but many methods.
Secondly, science education conveys the impression that science is hard, objective,
and value free as opposed to humanistic studies that are soft, subjective, and value-
laden. Reacting to this many have argued that science dehumanises, that the conse-
quences flowing from science are preponderantly evil, trivial or false by comparison
with what can be derived from other sources, such as poetic insight, religious revela-
tion, mystical experience or self-knowledge. This polarization of attitudes is the basis
of C.P. Snows two cultures and Holtons Distinction between the New Apollonians
and the new Dionysians. There are two aspects of this: (a) this polarization is simple
minded and misconceived, augmented, on the one hand, by the way science is taught
obstinately, scornfully, neglectful of all the humanistic issues that arises within their
domain and humanists, on the one other hand, exhibit corresponding scorn and neglect
for science; and (b) the myth of value-freedom and objectivity of scientific knowledge
has been questioned by the sociologists of knowledge. The works of Kuhn, Merton,
Bloor, Barnes and others have emphasised the role the scientific community plays in
the production of scientific knowledge: the invisible colleges, the peer review, author-
ity, consensus, norms and recognition of the scientific community.
Thirdly, a widespread impression, which prevails among many students and prac-
titioners of science, is that science possesses a unique world picture, an overall sci-
entific representation, such as the mechanistic world picture or materialism, i.e., the
world picture that all phenomena are by-products or epiphenomena of the ultimate
constituents of matter. The belief in such a world picture makes the scientist confident
that science can provide valid answers to all questions since they follow from the same
source, i.e., a single, unique world picture. History of science has exploded the myth of
such a world picture. Moreover, we know that even if it exists it does not show up in
our science education since it is totally fragmented to provide such a unified view.
Fourthly, since Bacon in 16th century the view that knowledge is power has turned
science into a means to gain control over nature. Consequently, many subscribe to
the nave eupheria that all our problemsdisease, poverty, and hungercan be done
away with by the deliberate application of scientific knowledge. This belief is the basis
for massive investment in science and technology. However, this faith is somewhat
misplaced as it is impossible to calculate the relevance of any particular fundamental
research to any particular human need, e.g., the work of Faraday and Maxwell on
electromagnetism could hardly have been predicted to lead to phenomenal development
of electrical and electronic industries. Therefore, the whole question of how to guide
science towards solution of practical problems will remain open and quite unanswer-
able.
These influential myths about science, direct products of the narrow, isolated, and
over-specialised science education, may be given a common name, i.e., scientism. Of
course, the origins of scientism can be traced back to the rise of modern science in
the 17th century with its fundamental insistence on the value of scientific methods of
investigation and argument. Based on it, the pioneers of modern science were able
to make a break-through in their attempts to understand nature, when approaches
other than science were dominant. In recent times, however, science has taken a
more dominant place in every sphere and scientism has assumed a more extreme,
threatening and doctrinaire form with blind belief in the success of technical scientific
knowledge and an addiction to science.
1.2 Empirical Evidences and the Need for Removing the Misconceptions
There is some evidence, based on at least two empirical studies5 , that the current sci-
ence education programs, by concentrating on objectivity and validity of science, by its
disciplinary specialization and fragmentation, by glorifying the rational, mathematical
and analytic aspects without any reference to intuitive, imaginative, subjective aspects,
do project the doctrine of scientism as the official image of science.
The fact of the matter is that while designing science curricula, the influence of the
technical scientific content on the total attitude of the student towards science itself
cannot be ignored. From the point of view of a good educational strategy, it is important
to make sure that students and those concerned with the promotion of science do
acquire the appropriate standards and norms of scientific practice, and not wrong
intellectual habits and false standards of scientific proof. Moreover, whenever scientific
knowledge and technology are hoped to be twin pillars of social transformation, the
base for science is dangerously weak if the vision concerning the place and scope of
science among students and practitioners of science is narrow. Yet, it is not clear how
it can be achieved without some self understanding of science, i.e., without making
a conscious and deliberate effort to critically discuss science, rather than learning it
5 (i) Mead, M. & Metraux, R.: 1956, Image of the Scientist among High-School, Students, Science, 126,
384-390.
(ii) Ahlgren, A. & Walbery, M.J.: 1973, Changing Attitudes Towards Science Among Adolescents, Nature,
254, 187-190.
Gupta 135
merely by rote. Current science education program stubbornly repudiates any such
responsibility leaving it totally to chance and intuition. As a result some have pleaded
forcefully that science education programs will produce better educated science stu-
dents if they are taught a little less science as such, and a little more about science.
Thus the main objective of integrating teaching and learning of science with teach-
ing about science or understanding science will be (i) to display the developing char-
acter of scientific endeavour by incorporating historical awareness, and (ii) to foster a
critical attitude on the part of the learner.
1.3 Current Approaches to Science Studies

In the recent past systematic and rigorous disciplines have evolved with a view to
create understanding of science, such as History of Science, Philosophy of Science,
Sociology of Science. Here one must guard oneself against the possibility of falling
into the trap of any of the exclusive disciplinary approaches.
Integration of understanding science with science education program will be effec-
tive only if the starting point is living science itself. The philosophical and historical
discourse must emanate from this source. Understanding of science will continue
to remain poor if we add to the traditional presentation of science some philosophic
spice or ice topping, rather than giving to the presentation of a given scientific topic
itself a philosophic or historical or sociological orientation. We have to make use of
the philosophic, historical and sociological insights that have grown up on the soil of
science.
Constituent disciplines of the Science Studies, such as Philosophy of Science, His-
tory of Science and Sociology of Science, themselves have grown into vast disciplines
and many issues in them are unresolved.
1.4 A proposal: Cognitive Science Based Model for Integration

The task will be to argue our way to a provisional model for analyzing the process of
scientific development such that the model will facilitate integration of the traditionally
conflicting tasks of teaching science and understanding of science.
The model for analyzing the process of scientific development that I would like
to propose is based on the evolutionary growth of knowledge approach of Toulmin,
Shapere, Lakatos and Laudan. It is a model in the sense of developing a theoretical pat-
tern showing the interrelations of different questions and concepts based on cognitive,
historical and critical awareness. This approach is often called cognitive-historical.
The model requires that for an improved understanding of scientific ideas one must
know the conditions under which it originated, the questions, which it answered, and
the functions it was created to serve. The model will present the world of science, as a
scientist knows it by enabling the student of science to put appropriate kind of thinking
cap, to use Butterfields expression, so that the student becomes a participant in the
scientists quest for understanding nature. In order to do this the model will retrace
the steps and describe the processes by which certain end results or finished ideas in
science are seen to emerge. However, while retracing the steps the model will combine
intellectual-social-historical and technical material. The continuity and change that
are characteristic of an evolving intellectual tradition must be related to the processes
of transmission by which scientific ideas in question are passed from one generation of
scientists to the next.
The starting point of this enterprise must be scientific concepts, activities (such as
observation, experiment etc.), or actual problems that the scientist encounters. Both
Conant and Toulmin have shown how the process of scientific development can be
seen as an organic (not so much as a quantitative) growth process of investigations
yielding ideas, which in turn provide material for new investigations, out of which
emerge further ideas. Problems leading to introduction of new concepts and solutions,
which in turn giving rise to new problems, whose solutions pose new problems again
and lead to the generation of further concepts, and so on.
The most distinctive feature of this dialectic sequence of observation and ideas/concepts
in the scientific tradition/domain is that the men who carry it in any particular gen-
eration regard the ideas to which their training exposes them in a sufficiently critical
spirit, i.e., in a spirit of innovation by a desire to build up a more adequate, detailed,
and/or elegant synthesis of the knowledge transmitted to them, in a spirit of genuine,
first hand curiosity. Thus the critical question that will be raised, according to Toulmin,
at a specific time in the course of scientific development will take the form:
. . . given that concepts c1 , c2 , . . ., are in some respect inadequate to the explanatory needs of
the discipline, how can we modify/extend/ qualify them, so as to give us the means of asking
more fruitful empirical or mathematical questions in this domain?6
The model of scientific development, i.e., the pattern of responses given to the above
question if one examines the history of a scientific discipline, can be specified by the
Darwinian Theory of evolution, Toulmin7 draws the following analogy as described by
the Table 1 below:
6 Toulmin, S.: 1974, Rationality and Scientific Discovery Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, K.
Schaffner & R. Cohen (eds.), D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 394.

7 Toulmin, S.: 1972, Human Understanding, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1, 121-123, 135-144
Gupta 137
Organic Evolution Conceptual Change

Unit of study comprised of Species Scientific discipline
Individual organisms Concepts, methods, aims
Units of variation Mutant forms within the Conceptual variants within

population at t1 the discipline at t1
Units of effective These t1 variants dominant Those t1 variants dominant

modification within the population at t2 within the discipline at t2
Mechanism of selection Differential reproductive Need for deeper

pressure understanding
Table 1: Evolution: Organic and Conceptual

Following the above analogy Toulmin maintains that conceptual development within
a scientific discipline is a natural selection imposed by disciplinary pressure on a set
of conceptual variants. Understanding science or scientific concepts will result from
seeing the conceptual evolution in the analogy of the question and answers regarding
the phylogeny and ecology of biological evolution. This is exhibited in the following
Table 28 :
Evolution of species Conceptual evolution

Phylogeny Ecology HS PS
Question From what By what From what By what
succession of sequence of succession of sequence of
precursors has responses to precursor responses to
this species environmental concepts has disciplinary
descended? pressures did the this set of pressure did
species acquire concepts this set of
its present form? descended? concepts arise?
Answer A tree Application of A History of A rational

of descent theory of a scientific reconstruction of
natural selection discipline scientific growth
Table 2: Conceptual evolution
Thus, understanding of science, in the sense of adequacy or fruitfulness of scientific

ideas, can be obtained, according to Toulmins evolutionary model, by seeing in how
8 Toulmin, S.: 1974, Rationality and Scientific Discovery, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, K.
Schaffner & R. Cohen (eds.), D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 402-3.

many ways novel scientific ideas or concepts may, in conditions of its introduction,
be better adapted than its predecessors or rivals. For example, the merits of the
Copernican revolution can be understood precisely in this way. Its merits did not lie
in its simplicity in comparison with the Ptolemaic system. According to Toulmin the
Copernican system was better adapted to the new conceptual framework that was
emerging i.e. the celestial dynamics of Kepler, Brahe and finally Newton.
The attempts to create understanding of science by Conant, (in terms of tactics
and strategies of science), by Lakatos, (in terms of Methodology of Scientific Research
Programme (MSRP)), and by Laudan (in terms of judgements embodying preferred
intuition), are similar, for all to invoke the notion of evolution and its variants (such as
change, growth, progress) without explicit reference to biological evolution. Never-
theless, the evolutionary model may provide a basis for integrating teaching of science
and understanding science/teaching about science without falling into the trap of any
of the exclusive disciplinary approach.
2 Two Debates
There are two basic debates in the current literature in Philosophy of Science and
Socio-Historical studies in science:
the first debate concerns the agency responsible for the construction of scientific
knowledge: whether it is the creation of the individual scientist or a product of
society.
the second debate relates to the nature of scientific knowledge: whether it is
objective or relative to a conceptual perspective, and
I shall review these debates and show that a closer attention to the underlying
cognitive issues help us to resolve them.
2.1 Debate 1: Construction of Scientific KnowledgeIndividual or the Social

The debate centers around the issue regarding the agency that is responsible for the
production of scientific knowledge: whether it is a product of society or the creation
of the individual scientist. Many researchers in science studies have viewed, mistak-
enly I believe, that the rise of cognitive science is a vindication of the individualistic
explanations of scientific knowledge and an attempt to reduce social to the individual.
2.1.1 Sociology of Knowledge

The proponents of sociology of knowledge (e.g. Bloor 1976, 19839 , Brown 1984, 1989,
Barnes 198210 , Collins 198511 ,) have eschewed the psychological and cognitive studies
9 Bloor, D.: 1976, Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
Bloor, D.: 1983, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge, Columbia University Press, New York.
10 Barnes, B.: 1982, T.S. Kuhn and Social Science, Macmillan, London.
11 Collins, H.M.: 1985, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, Sage, Beverley
Hills.
Gupta 139
of science and claimed that scientific knowledge is entirely a product of social interac-
tions and influence.
Latour and Woolgar (1986) have proposed a ten-year moratorium on cognitive ex-
planations of science. For them what matters is the communication and interrelations
among the scientists based on public documents. These documents clearly exist outside
the mental representation of individual scientists. They are the shared property of the
scientific community and public embodiment of scientific theories. Latour and Woolgar
showed how in the laboratory the inscription devices (i.e. initial records that are
harder to read and more open to attack are transformed by the experimenter later into
published transcripts that become powerful weapons in arguments) and external repre-
sentations or documents exert influence on other scientists. Latour (1987) 12 examines
the function scientific texts, diagrams, schematic representations etc. fulfill in creating
understanding within a scientific community. He calls these public embodiments im-
mutable and combinable mobiles that in the process of scientific communication often
mutate and facilitate an improved or different understanding.
The anti-cognitivism of Latour and Woolgar (1979)13 and Collins is shared by Downes
(1993). He accuses the cognitivists of cognitive individualism and claims that they
subscribe to the thesis that a sufficient explanation for all cognitive activities can be
provided by an account of autonomous individual cognitive agents. He finds that the
cognitivists are guilty of reducing social explanations to psychological explanations.
According to the sociologists of scientific knowledge, the reductionism of the social
to psychological is not possible for various reasons:
i. Durkheim showed that social facts are irreducible and have an existence of their
own. Following this idea, Downes distinguishes three levels of the social aspects
of science and claims that each has an independent existence and none can be
reduced to psychology: (a) scientific documents, particularly classics, as Kuhn,
Latour and Woolgar showed, have an independent, external existence, provide a
paradigm for the individual scientist and influence his problem solving approach.
(b) social interactions among scientists, as can be found in complex laboratories,
are based on cooperation where individual scientist is not entirely responsible for
the final scientific outcome, and (c) much of the decision making processes of the
individual scientist are guided by external social considerations and influences,
e.g., decisions regarding what funding agency to approach, how to formulate
the research proposal so that it would be acceptable, the choice of the research
project, the journal and conference where the research paper is to be published or
presented.
ii. Collins (1990) gives the following reasons for which he claims that science is
social: (a) the routine servicing of scientific belief reveals that it is the scien-
tific group which determines how an individual scientist checks the validity of
12 Latour, B.: 1987, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Open
University Press, Milton Keynes.

13 Latour, B. & Woolgar, S.: 1979, Laboratory Life, Sage, Beverly Hills and London.
beliefs. The hypothesis formulated by an individual scientist is communicated to
another who may reply by communicating additional evidence, counter-evidence,
alternative hypothesis or rebuttal. This may help in assessing the validity of the
hypothesis, (b) the assessment of the validity of the hypothesis may result from
communication, debate and finally in the form of social consensus arrived at by a
scientific community that no further change is necessary, and (c) transmission of
new experimental skills require apprenticing with an experienced researcher, a
face-to-face interaction, some form of social exchange and communication based
often on visual representations. This mode of communication is radically different
from transmission of information by simply reading text-books or journal articles.
Thus, according to Collins the persuasive force of experiments resides outside the
conduct of the experiment itself. It resides in the judgements made by other
scientists about the quality of the experiment. Of course, any experiment can
be challenged because of technical competence with instruments and data analy-
sis, theories of instrumentation, correctness of computation and interpretations,
theoretical plausibility. However, acceptance or rejection of a result ultimately
rests outside the experiment itself in the evaluative judgements made by groups
of experts.
iii. Social phenomena are far too complex and the reduction of sociology to psychology
does not seem to be tractable. No reduction has been carried out fully.
2.1.2 The Cognitive Turn in Science Studies

The so-called cognitive turn in science studies has resulted due to the following impor-
tant realizations:
i. that both the words science (which comes from the Latin word sciencea meaning
knowledge) and the word cognition (co = together, gnocere = knowledge) have
knowledge in common. Science is taken to be a major paradigm of a knowledge-
producing enterprise and Cognitive Science studies the underlying mechanisms
responsible for the production, acquisition and deployment of knowledge, includ-
ing scientific knowledge.
ii. that the exclusively a priori, speculative and normative approach to traditional
epistemology is to be replaced by an empirical and naturalistic approach treating
cognitive activities and phenomena as natural phenomena. The traditional epis-
temology has undergone radical changes as it became apparent that an important
resource for a naturalistic account of knowledge is Cognitive Science.
iii. these mechanisms presuppose that the human mind or artificial intelligent de-
vices can function based only on representational structures and processes that
operate on them to produce new structures. These structures may include linguis-
tic expressions, concept trees, schemas, cognitive maps, mental models, diagrams,
visual images etc.
Gupta 141
In the traditional epistemology, Kant for example, provided such an account of the
underlying mechanism for the possibility of scientific knowledge by adopting a specula-
tive and apriori approach. Kant asked the question as to what sort of mechanism would
make mathematical and natural scientific knowledge possible and gave a description
of such a mechanism.
In the 1950s, Kuhn and Hanson used psychological ideas, particularly from the
Gestalt school, in order to explain certain phenomena in scientific observation. How-
ever, due to the progress made in Cognitive Science since 1950s there is a better
understanding of the cognitive mechanisms involved in many scientific activities and
practices.
A survey of the relevant literature shows that the Cognitive Science based ap-
proach complements the traditional historical approach (both internal and external),
the sociological approach, and the philosophical concern for the epistemology of sci-
ence, by providing an enriched understanding of how scientists generate and evaluate
scientific ideas. For example, the volume, (No. XV), entitled Cognitive Models of
Science, published in 1992 by R.N. Giere14 in the series Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science presented the work of psychologists, historians, researchers in
Artificial Intelligence and philosophers who had employed ideas and methodologies
from Cognitive Science in order to study the underlying cognitive mechanisms for
explaining and understanding scientific practices.
Moreover, there are major studies on scientists and scientific theories from the
cognitive point of view. A few examples of such studies may be mentioned here. Dar-
den has identified the cognitive strategies that contributed toward the development of
Mandelian genetics. Giere has used psychological and sociological ideas to improve our
understanding of the recent developments in geology and physics. Based on the case
study on plate tectonics, Solomon shows how certain cognitive heuristics play a crucial
role in scientific decision making. Nersessian has drawn on ideas from cognitive psy-
chology to help understand the developments in electro-magnetic theories made possi-
ble by the contributions of Faraday, Maxwell and Einstein. Churchland has discussed
the nature of theories and explanations from the perspective of computational neuro-
science. Thagard has used computational and cognitive theories to help understand
the structure and growth of scientific knowledge.
2.1.3 A False Dichotomy

Many historians and researchers of science studies feel that the dichotomy between
cognitive and sociological, or the internal and the external history is a false one. Shapin
(1982) and Nersessian argue that undoubtedly sociological insights and methods have
enriched our understanding of science, but the concern of science studies is not to
figure out what discipline in science studies is most fundamental and support the
reductionist position. The concern rather is to provide a better understanding of the
nature of scientific thinking by integrating the individual and group level of knowledge
production practices. Nersessian says:
14 Giere, R.N., (ed.): 1992, Cognitive Models of Science, Univserity of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
As to the question of what factors are or are not pertinent to historical explanation, we need
to keep in mind that history is an empirical subject. It should not adopt a priori a position
on what is the essential level of analysis for an historical understanding of science.. . . What
factors are or are not salient in specific historical cases remains an open and largely empirical
question
The understanding of the complexities and the limitations of cognitive activities of

the individual scientist is as important in our historical understanding of the processes
and products of science as the constraints imposed on them by society. We must admit
that after all science is a product of the interaction of the human mind with the world
as well as with other humans and also the most cerebral among other human activities
and enterprises. We need an account of how and what cognitive activities of the
individual scientists contribute to the construction of scientific knowledge as well as
the manner in which such constructions are constrained by society. Hence, cognitive
and social-historical analyses are reciprocal. There is no need for sacrificing one for the
other.
An integrated approach to the understanding of certain scientific practices can
demonstrate that the dichotomy between individual and the social is false and need to
be corrected. The scientific practices that can illustrate the integrative approach are:
scientific experiment (including thought experiment), scientific reasoning (including
analogical reasoning), model building and representation (imagery and visual repre-
sentation), theory change. We will discuss only one example of the scientific practice in
terms of this integrative approach, viz., scientific experiment.
2.1.4 Scientific Experiments

Although the final products of scientific experiments, viz., the observational data and
the generalization or law are universally acknowledged as important, the process of
experimentation by which new interpretation is given, meaning is made and the ex-
perimenters practices are revealed, is a largely neglected aspect of science. Studies
on scientific experiments collected by J.B. Conant in Harvard Case Histories in Exper-
imental Science (1984), Rom Harre in Great Scientific Experiments (1981), and David
Gooding, Trevor Pinch and Simon Schaffer (eds.) in The Uses of Experiment - Studies
in the Natural Sciences (1989) have somewhat mitigated this neglect.
Examples of experiment can be cited in the science of antiquity. Empedocles of
Akragas in Sicily (c. 450 BC) is said to have made an experiment with clepsydra to
demonstrate the effect of air pressure. Duhem, Randal and Crombie have isolated
and studied an important medieval methodological tradition, from the 13th into 17th
century, elaborated rules for drawing sound conclusions from experiment and observa-
tion. Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme belonged to this tradition.
Another tradition of experiment views the experimenter as a reader of the
Book of Nature. According to this tradition experiments should be looked upon as
scriptural interpretation provided the experimenter hits upon the appropriate language
and technique of reading. This tradition found its most celebrated articulation in
Galileo who regarded Nature as a divinely authored book written in the language
of mathematics. This tradition often takes experiments as premediated and is also
Gupta 143
identified with what is known as the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition or the deductive,
or sometimes the mathematico-experimental (according to a 17th century tradition) or
the hypothetico-deductive tradition.
However, there is an essential and qualitative difference between the older forms
of experiment and those carried out in science since 17th century. This is due to
the emergence of the so-called Baconian sciences. For Bacon knowledge is not an end
in itself and it provides us power over nature. However, nature does not voluntarily
reveals its secrets. We can gain knowledge by coercing nature to answer our questions.
The role of experiment is essentially to constrain nature and force nature due to the
forceful intervention of the experimenter to show how it behaves under previously
unobserved, often non-existent, conditions. Bacons book Novum Organum gives a
systematic account and his attitude towards experiment. This influenced The New
Philosophy or Experimental Philosophy enshrined in the Charter and advocated by the
Royal Society. This tradition is often identified with the inductive tradition.
The social aspect of experiment relates to the fact that experiments are powerful
resources for persuasion, argumentation and conviction. The experimenter is always
conscious of the third party, other than nature and himself, and directs his efforts to
establish a particular reading of nature and its behaviour as more valid than others.
The cognitive aspects of experiment include the active, rather than the passive
role, the experimenter plays in realizing the phenomena or producing a novel phe-
nomenon by instrumental manipulation. However, this cognitive role of experiment,
which was used to learn how to manipulate and represent new aspects of nature,
gradually changed to the epistemologically significant role in which experiment was
used to defend theoretical claims about nature. The relation between the experiment
and epistemology is quite close and can be seen clearly when we raise the question
as to what makes an experiment, or a set of experiments, believable. Franklin (1989)
enumerates a number of experimental strategies or arguments designed to establish the
validity of an experimental result or observation. They are:
i. looking at the same phenomena with different pieces of apparatus,

ii. prediction of what will be observed under specified circumstances,
iii. regularities and properties of the phenomena themselves which suggest they
are not artifacts. Hacking (1983) calls this intervention where the predicted
observation increases our belief in both the proper operation of the apparatus
and in its results,
iv. properties of the phenomena as validitions of an existing theory,
v. explanation of observations with an existing accepted theory of the phenomena,
vi. elimination of alternative explanations,
vii. calibration and experimental checks for validating results and providing a nu-
merical scale for the measurement of the quantity involved,
viii. statistical validation (combined with theoretical predication).
Nickles (1989) demonstrates how experiment enables the empirical justification of

theory. In the received view in philosophy of science the context of discovery and discov-
ery arguments were eliminated from the logicality of justification. Nickles introduces
and makes a case for generative justification, i.e., the use of empirical knowledge to
support theories, which include that knowledge, or using what is known to construct
new experimental trials. He argues that the generative justification is different from
the consequentialist or hypothetico-deductive methodologies. Nickles claims that the
body of taken-for-granted knowledge, embodied in skills, instruments etc. is necessary
to the construction of evidential arguments. The received view also claims that
knowing how to produce a phenomenon or datum is irrelevant to showing that it is
the case. Nickles concept of generative justification closes the gap between knowing
how and knowing that.
Gooding (1990) enriches our understanding of how representations the scientists
construct, often with the help of experiments, correspond to the way things really
are. Gooding, in a series of articles since 1980, grapples with the problem of how to
access and unravel the procedural knowledge a scientist has which may shed light
on his experimental practices. This leads him to investigate the role of experimental
practice in conceptual innovation. Goodings concept of experimental map is an effort to
construct graphical representations that depict sequences of experimental procedures
acting on physical and conceptual objects. The maps display how experimentation pro-
vides multiple possible pathways between goals and solutions of the scientist. Gooding
has applied the mapping technique to uncover the procedural knowledge Faraday had
from Faradays experimental practices, laboratory records, which revealed the cognitive
and social dimensions of Faradays experimental practices. Goodings experimental
maps are similar to the analytical tools used by the cognitive scientists known as
think-aloud protocols. These are the records of every verbalizable thought a subject
had during a problem-solving task. Faradays record keeping and his diaries and
the detailed autobiographical narration in Keplers Astronomia Nova approximate to
think-aloud protocols.
2.1.5 A Case Study: Galileos Experiment with Freely Falling Bodies

The Case Study of Galileos experiment on freely falling motion illustrates the follow-
ing:
i. what were the generative justifications provided by Galileo for his claim (the so-
called Distance Theorem) that
. . . the distances traversed during equal intervals of time by a body falling from rest, stand
to one another in the same ratio as the odd numbers beginning with unity?
ii. Galileo was aware of the fact that observation of vertically falling bodies involved
difficulties, as the motion would be very fast. Hence for the purpose of under-
standing the nature of vertical motion based on experiment, it would be necessary
Gupta 145
to slow down the motion on an inclined plane. However, Galileo felt the necessity
of justifying as to whether the slowed down motion on the inclined plane and the
vertical motion of freely falling bodies are the same and whether the same law
would hold for both the motions.
iii. the question of the reliability of the experiment allegedly performed by Galileo
and Galileos resolution of the problem of the reliability and epistemic justifica-
tion of the knowledge claim regarding the law of freely falling bodies.
2.1.5.1 Controversy about Galileo as an Experimentalist

Controversy about Galileo as an Experimentalist
Galileos so-called inclined plain experiment construed as providing generative justifi-
cation for the law of freely falling bodies shows that Galileo was not an inductivist. He
was not what Ernst Mach represents him to be, i.e., Galileo as a strict experimentalist.
Mach claims that modern experimental science was born with Galileo as he
. . . did not stop with the mere philosophical and logical discussions, but tested it by comparison
with experience15
Thus Galileo was considered the father of modern observational and experimental
methods. As opposed to this Aristotle saw the experiments performed, but would not
believe the evidence of experience, although in Biology Aristotle was a down-to-earth,
hard-boiled realist.
Galileo himself seems to be responsible for this impression as he sometimes uses
the word experience/experiment (e.g. in the statement at the beginning of Two New
Sciences) in a way that one would be led to the traditional picture of Galileo that he
was the founder and earliest successful practitioner of modern experimental science.
Or Galileo was the man who relied on experiment and Aristotle was one who denied
the validity of experience. This is bolstered by the image of Galileo confounding his
Aristotelian adversaries at Pisa and experimentally disproving Aristotelian dynamics
by dropping weights of various sizes from the Leaning Tower.
History of Science, however, dispels these misconceptions based on anecdotes/traditional
pictures/historically nave attitudes. It instills a sense of historical skepticism, makes
us more cautious about relying on facts as one has not yet the time to check some of
these episodes closely. It also urges the need for more accuracy in the description of the
creative part of the scientific work/intellectual development and growth of science/the
part relating to the process rather than the final product.
2.1.5.2 Historically Sensitive Account

Historically Sensitive Account
Historically sensitive account Galileos role as an observational/experimental scientist
reveals that
a. Galileo was hardly an extreme empiricist; he was much addicted to

15 Mach, E.: 1960, The Science of Mechanics, translated by T.J. McCormack, Open Court, La Salle, 135.
. . . thought experiment in which he imagined what the consequences would be if one did
so and so16 .
The thought experiments of Galileo are particularly well described by Butterfield

in his book. Within the ancient and medieval traditions many experiments on
close scrutiny turn out to be thought experiments. A thought experiment is the
construction in mind of potential experimental situations the outcome of which
could safely be foretold from previous knowledge or everyday experience.
b. the so-called experiments taken as generative justification would provide an al-
together different view of Galileo as an experimentalist. Generative justification
includes (i) the body of taken-for-granted knowledge which is embodied in the
prevailing instrumentations, skills, etc. necessary for the epistemological warrant
of the experiment and (ii) the persuasive force which often resides outside the
conduct of the experiment.
c. Some of Galileos experiments were re-enacted by his contemporaries. In the
case of the ball on the inclined plane, Galileos contemporary, Father Mersenne,
actually tried it in the hope of duplicating Galileos confirmation of the supposed
exact direct proportion between the square of the time and the displacement in
the uniformly accelerated motion. But he failed to find such a fit. Mersenne
contradicts the accuracy of Galileos claim that
. . . the times of descent, for various inclinations of the plane, bore to one another precisely
the ratio which . . . had been predicted . . . Also . . . there was no appreciable discrepancy
in the results. (Two New Sciences, p. 179)
Galileo also claimed that the measurement of time was so accurate

that the deviation between two observations never exceeded one-tenth of a pulse-beat
Such accuracy was not possible because of (i) the difficulties in the synchronization
of the rolling ball and the timing device, especially when time is being measured by
certain crude devices used at that time such as water-clock or pulse-beat, and (ii)
friction and rotational inertia.
Lane Cooper17 also casts doubt about Leaning Tower experiment. To be sure, Galileo
did make observations and performed rough checks of his results, but the experimental
method and inductive method of the new science was really, from the historical point of
view, the creation of the new generation of scientists, including such heroic experimen-
talists as Robert Boyle, Robert Hook and Isaac Newton (especially his work on Optics)
and the members of the Royal Society.
16 Butterfield, H.: 1949, Origins of Modern Science, Macmillan, 71.
17 Cooper, L.: 1935, Aristotle, Galileo and the Tower of Pisa.
Gupta 147
2.1.5.3 Galileos Lineage to the Platonic-Pythagorean Tradition
Galileos Lineage to the Platonic-Pythagorean Tradition
Instead, Galileo belonged to the Platonic-Pythagorean (Idealist) Tradition: This tra-
dition is associated with the assumption that (a) the underlying reality is that of
number, (b) abstraction and idealization is inevitable in understanding Nature, and (c)
mathematics must be applied to the understanding of the physical phenomena. This is
in clear opposition to the Aristotelian tradition, which created a clear cleavage between
mathematics and physics.
Galileos adherence to the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition is evidenced by his own
statement that the Book of Nature is written in the language of mathematics. To the
question whether the ship experiment was really been done, Salviati (the spokesman
of Galileo) replied
I without experiment [experience] am certain that the effect will follow as I tell you, because it
is necessary that it should, (Dialogue concerning Two Chief World Systems)
Alexaneder Koyre18 emphasized Galileos mathematical as opposed to his experi-

mental method. Koyre attacked the traditional empiricist interpretation of Galileo and
subscribed to Galileos modified empiricism or tempered rationalism, i.e., Galileo did
thought-experiment in the course of developing his theories, and referred to experience
primarily a final check in order to be sure that he hadnt gone wildly astray. For it
is thought pure unadulterated thought, and not experience sense-perception, as until
then, that gives the basis for the new science of Galileo Galilie (M & M, p. 13). Giorgio
de Santillana also supports the same view. He says19 : Galileo uses facts only as a
check, as discriminator between necessary and wishful arrangement. According to
William R. Shea20 :
Galileos Platonic conception of scientific procedure implies a predominance of reason over mere
experience. While Colombo and Lagalla constantly appeal to untutored experience, Galileo
calls upon mathematics to interpret nature. The crucial distinction no longer lies between
mental and factual, but between mathematical and crudely empirical. Experimentsbe they
mathematical or realare equally valid if they are set up in accordance with the requirements
of mathematics
2.1.5.4 Galileos Technique of Geometric Representation and Modeling

Galileos Technique of Geometric Representation and Modeling
The mathematics Galileo used consisted of Euclids geometry and Eudoxus equality of
ratio. Galileo did not use the notation v as s/t since be believed that no arithmetical
operation, such as division, can be performed between two inhomogeneous physical
quantities. Galileo represented both time and distance in terms of line segments.
For him it did not make any sense to divide one line segment by another. Moreover,
following his precursors Galileo represented uniform and uniformly accelerated motion
in terms of rectangle and triangle respectively.
18 Koyre Alexaneder, Etudes Galieenes (1938), Metaphysics and Measurement, (1968)
19 deSantillana, G.: 1968, Reflections on Men and Ideas, 175.
20 Shea, W.R.: 1972, Galileos Intellectual Revolution, 155
Nor could Galileo have formulated the equations s = v0 t + 1/2at2. This is because
of the fact that he did not have the advantage of using the concept of instantaneous
motion as calculus was not available to him. Instead Galileo went on to show that
ratios of displacement from rest vary as the ratios of squares of the corresponding time
intervals. He states this in the form of a Theorem. The geometrical representation
of the Theorem is as follows: HL : HM :: AD 2 : AE 2 (where HL and HM are line
segments representing distance and AD and AE representing time). He proves the
theorem geometrically using results of similarity of triangle and equality of ratios.
Galileos lineage to the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition is evident in his attempt
(a) to represent physical problems in terms of geometry and resorting to arithmetical
modeling in terms of ratios, (b) deduce the results in the form of proof in the framework
of Euclids geometry and Eudoxus equality of ratio, and (c) interpret the conclusions
thus arrived at back to the physical world.
2.1.5.5 Galileos Brand of Empiricism

Galileos Brand of Empiricism
Nevertheless there has been a resurgence of interest in Galileos empiricism based on
discovery of historical evidence in Galileos manuscript S. Drake, R.H. Naylor, Thomas
Settle21 , showing that he did, in fact, perform some experiments.
These reports of what Galileo actually says he did are attempts to comprehend the
methodology he is reputedly so famous for having developed. One important aspect of
this methodology has to do with experiments and what Galileo thought they accom-
plished and what they actually mean. It is one thing to ask whether or not he dropped
the steel balls from the Tower of Pisa, it is quite another to ask why he would have
thought it important to do so just in case he ever did22 .
2.1.5.6 Abstraction & Idealization in Galileo

Abstraction & Idealization in Galileo
Without any shred of doubt Galileo resorted to abstraction and idealization. In think-
ing away the resistance of air to the motion of the falling body, Galileo explicitly
introduces idealization into scientific thought. He recognizes that progress can be made
in understanding nature without immediately dealing with natural phenomenon in all
their actual detail and complexity; that refinements can be developed subsequently
through successive approximation. The bulk of our study of in physics is confined to
such simplified and idealized situations. One can hardly put the justification in clearer
terms than Galileo himself did:
21 Drake, S., Galileos Experimental Confirmation of Horizontal Intertia: Unpublished Manuscripts, ISIS
Naylor, R.H., Galileos Simple Pendulum
Naylor, R.H., Galileo: The search for the Parabolic Trajectory;
Naylor, R.H., Galileo: Real Experiment & Dialectic Demonstration.
Settle, T., Galileos use of Experiment as a tool of Investigation, A Experiment in the History of Science
22 Shea, W.R.: 1972, Galileos Intellectual Revolution
Gupta 149
As to perturbations arising from the resistance of the medium, this is . . .. Considerable and
does not, on account of its manifold forms, submit to fixed laws and exact description. Thus if
we consider only the resistance which the air offers to motions studied by us, we shall see that it
disturbs them all and disturbs them in an infinite variety of ways corresponding to the infinite
variety in form, weight, and velocity of the projectiles . . .. Of these properties . . . infinite in
number . . .. It is not possible to give any exact description; hence in order to handle this matter
in a scientific way, it is necessary to cut loose from these difficulties; and having discovered and
demonstrated the theorems in the case of no resistance, to use them and apply them with such
limitations as experience will teach.
. . . Just as the computer who wants his calculations to deal with sugar, silk and wool must
discount the boxes, bales and other packing, so the mathematical scientist, when he wants
to recognize in the concrete the effects which he has proved in the abstract, must deduct the
material hindrance, and if he is able to do so, I assure you that things are in no less agreement
than arithmetical computations. The errors, then lie not in the abstractness, not in geometry
or physics, but in a calculator who does not know how to make a true accounting.
2.1.5.7 The Role of Experiment & Observation in Galileos Science

The Role of Experiment & Observation in Galileos Science
Galileo, carrying forward the work of the medieval thinkers, constructed a kinematical
theory in his Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Concerning Two New Sci-
ences Pertaining to Mechanics and Local Motion (1638), which bears similarity to that
of the Axiomatic structure in Euclidean geometry. The central question in the rivalry
between Aristotelian and Platonic-Pythagorean traditions in Galileos thought is the
role of the abstract mathematics and idealization, and its relation to the role of sense
perception and practical experience.
Galileos thought on this issue has led many scholars (e.g. Koyre, Burtt, Drake,
Settle) to debate his affiliation either to Platonism or to empiricism and experimental
science:
i. Galileo did not belong to the experimental tradition in which (a) conditions would
be artificially created to show how nature would behave under previously unob-
served, often previously non-existent circumstances, e.g., vacuum created by air
pump, (b) the experimental conditions could be manipulated to coerce nature to
answer questions; what Francis Bacon described as twisting the lions tail.
ii. Galileo also differed from the Greeks who performed experiments with inflated
pigs bladder that resist compression or experiment with clepsydra and pipette as
direct evidence for the corporeality of air.
iii. For Galileo experiments are designed to test already formulated hypothesis in
order to make it more evident, rather than deriving the hypothesis on the basis
of experimental data. Thus, for Galileo, the job of observation/experience and
experiment is to render his basic mathematical principles immediately evident.
2.1.5.8 Quotations from Galileo on his Views on Experiment

Quotations from Galileo on his Views on Experiment
Ex Suppositione: Conditions under which a mathematical definition will be veri-
fied in nature to a determinate degree of approximation
Believe me, if I were again beginning my studies, I should follow the advice of Plato and
start with mathematics, a science which proceeds very cautiously and admits nothing is
established until it has been rigidly demonstrated.
Starting with Definitions, Axioms Galileo proved two Theorems which were es-
sentially numerical:
(a) In Uniformly Accelerated Motion the spaces D1 , D2 , D3 . . . which are traversed in

successive time interval bear to one another the ratio 1,3,5,7,. . . i.e. odd numbers. (The
Distance Theorem),
(b) The spaces described by a body falling from rest with Uniformly Accelerated Motion
are to each other as the squares of the time intervals. (Time Square Law).
Galileo, then, claims that without experiment this formulation is correct and
says:
No, and I do not need it, as without any experience I can affirm that it is so, because it
cannot be otherwise, it is necessary that it should.
Then goes on to show that the law thus obtained yield, on interpretation, empiri-
cally testable predictions in terms of direct measurement.
The request which you as a man of science, make, is a very reasonable one; for this is
a customand properly soin those sciences where mathematical demonstrations are
applied to natural phenomena, as is seen in the case of perspective (optics) astronomy,
mechanics, music, and others where the principles, once established by well-chosen ex-
periments, become the foundations of the entire superstructure. I hope therefore it will
not appear to be a waste of time if we discuss at considerable length this first and most
fundamental question upon which hinge numerous consequences of which we have in this
book only a small number placed by the Author, who has done so much to open a pathway
hitherto close to minds of speculative turn. So far as experiments go they have not been
neglected by the Author; and often, in his company, I have attempted in the following
manner to assure myself that the acceleration actually experienced by falling bodies is
that above described.
2.1.5.9 Conclusions Regarding Galileos Attitude to Experiments and their Implica-

tions for Science Education
Conclusions Regarding Galileos Attitude to Experiments and their Implications for
Science Education
Since antiquity experiments formed an integral part of scientific activities. However,
our notion of experiment during this period underwent radical changes (Section 2.1.4
above). Galileo adopted a very special approach to experiment. According to the
Received View Galileo was the father of modern experimental science. The specific
nature of his approach to experiment is not clearly spelled out in our discussion of
Galileo in the text books.
The Case Study here removes some of these misconceptions and enables us to get
a better understanding of Galileos attitude towards experiment based on Toulmins
Gupta 151
notion of conceptual evolution and Nickles notion of generative justification. For
Galileo the purpose experiment, such as the incline plane experiment, was not to
find the law in its original discovery, but simply to make certain that in fact uniform
acceleration as Galileo described may actually occur in nature. So far as Galileo was
concerned, the truth of his law of falling bodies (i.e., V t) was guaranteed by its
exemplification of the simplicity of nature (what Holton calls a Thematic Presup-
position) and the relations of integers, and not merely by a series of experiments or
observations. Galileo used empirical knowledge to support theories already arrived at
and justified through some other means).
The Case Study also demonstrates that the notion of generative justification re-
solves the conflict between individual versus social origin of ideas and effects
unification by looking at both the sources. It is also cognitive-historical as the Table
3 below shows:
History of Science: Succession of precursor concepts & Philosophy of Science: Responses to disciplinary
techniques and social determinants pressure---a rational reconstruction
Concept Formation Techniques Epistemic Justification & Reality
Rational: Metaphysical Empirical/

Platonic- experimental
Pythagorianism
Social: Classification Definition Geometric Discovery &

Inheritance of of Motion of Uniform representation Proofs of
concepts & & Non- & shift from Mean-Speed
techniques uniform Aristotelian & Distance
from the motion qualitative to Theorems
precursors of quantitative
Galileo analysis
Individual: Organizing the Justifying the Galileo's
Concepts & concepts definitions & experiment
inherited in an hypothesis on was designed
techniques the principle to test already
axiomatic
developed by framework & of simplicity formulated
Galileo constructing hypothesis
proofs therein
Geometric
representation
& Modeling
Hypothesis: V t Incline Plane
Experiment
Table 3: Generative Justification Account of Galileos Experiment on Freely Falling
Bodies
The cognitive-historical Case Study based on generative justification account
of Galileos experiment on freely falling bodies has the following implications for
science education. The Case Study
i. provides the students a more accurate view about the role Galileo assigned to
experiment in his scientific work by removing some of the misconceptions about
Galileos notion of experiment,
ii. emphasizes the importance of modeling and representation in science education.
Piaget and his followers (e.g. McKinson and Renner (1971), A.B. Arons (1990))
observed the gap in the early education in mastering reasoning involving ratios
that poses serious impediments to learning science. This gap is especially evident
while dealing with comparisons of inhomogeneous physical quantities, such as
distance and time, acceleration and time or mass and volume. The Case Study
shows that Galileos analysis of uniformly accelerated motion in terms of ratio
and its geometric representation was more natural than sudden introduction of
the relevant algebraic formula, and
iii. attempts to resolve the conflict between individual versus social origin of sci-
entific ideas with the help of Toulmins notion of conceptual evolution and Nickles
notion of generative justification.
3 Debate 2
3.1 The Debate Relating to the Nature of Scientific Knowledge: Whether it is ob-
jective or relative to a conceptual perspective
It is said that before philosophy of science took what is sometimes called the cognitive
turn (mentioned in 2.1.2 above), it was preceded by two phases, viz.,
the so-called linguistic turn emphasizing on objectivity and rationality of scientific
knowledge and
the socio-historical turn (mentioned in 2.1.1 above) highlighting the relativis-
tic socio-historical nature of scientific knowledge (also called the conceptual
perspective approach)
3.1.1 Linguistic Turn

For several decades Philosophy of Science was dominated by the logical empiricist
approach, which had two main aspects: (i) the claim that scientific theory involves
a double language, i.e., an observation language and a theoretical language, and the
later could be translated completely in terms of the former by reducing the theoretical
terms contained in the theoretical language to the observational terms of the former
language denoting sensations. (ii) the main problem in philosophy of science is to
search for an appropriate method and logic of justification and confirmation of scientific
laws and theories and not how they are arrived at in the first place. The main objective
of the logical empiricists was to investigate how, using only the techniques of formal
logic, scientific knowledge could be linked with sense experience.
The epistemological underpinning of the logical positivistic view was to provide a
strong foundation to science by claiming that the observation sentences are the ones
which precisely provide this foundation as they are the direct expressions of given
experience, and hence, are certain, indubitable, incorrigible reports of the empirical
world. All other knowledge is logically derived from them. The item (i) above explains
the objectivity and realism of scientific theory and knowledge and (ii) accounts for
scientific rationality.
Gupta 153
3.1.2 Socio-historical Turn: Relativistic Conceptual Perspective Approach to Phi-
losophy of Science:
The relativistic socio-historical view was advocated very forcefully by Hanson, Kuhn
and Feyerabend. The role of the conceptual perspective on the epistemology of
science is significant as it determines the class of legitimate problems, delimits the
standards for their acceptable solution, and specifies the epistemic grounds involved
in the historical and sociological factors responsible for the discovery, development and
acceptance or rejection of scientific theories. The main emphasis within the relativistic
socio-historical view on Philosophy of Science was to study of the internal and external
historical factors responsible for theory change and the epistemological and ontological
theories that provide justification for such changes.
Thus, Philosophers of Science began to pay more attention to historical and psy-
chological factors that influence scientific work and practices. On the other hand, the
historians of science derived more inspirations from the work of the sociologists, sub-
scribing to the claim that scientific knowledge is a social product. Their investigation
of the social context of science for the proper understanding of scientific practices gave
the discipline of historiography of science a sociological turn.
However, in contrast with a static model of human knowledge of the logical posi-
tivists the proponents of the conceptual perspective and the socio-historical view of
science provided a dynamic account of scientific knowledge.
3.1.3 False Dichotomy Again: Unending Controversies

The socio-historical approach to the evolving nature of scientific knowledge takes the
canons for evaluating what to admit as scientific knowledge not only as relative to a
given conceptual perspective, but also as variable from one historical period to another.
Although the canons of rationality and justification change and are relative, but the
conditions characterizing the nature of knowledge, as spelled out in the Logical Posi-
tivistic view on Knowledge, i.e., construing knowledge as justified true belief, remain
the same.
In spite of its role in exposing the deficiencies of a static, ahistorical and extreme
empirical nature of scientific knowledge of the Logical Positivists and replacing it
by a more historically sensitive account of scientific knowledge based on an analysis
of actual scientific practices, the conceptual perspective approach led to an extreme
epistemic relativism. The epistemic view turned out to be so permissible as to accept
anything as knowledge as long as any science permits it to enter into its domain and
to take any change in the canons leading to corresponding change in what counts as
knowledge. This goes against the very basic notion of science as an enterprise
providing objective knowledge where the central aim of science is to find out
how the world really is.
3.2 Epistemic Norms and the role of the Cognitive-ecological Factors in the Ac-
quisition of Knowledge: Naturalization of Epistemology and the Demise of the
Inferential Justificatory Account of Knowledge
The recent developments indicate that a viable epistemology of science not only needs
to take into account the actual scientific practices as revealed by socio-historical stud-
ies, but also establish linkages with Cognitive Science and its programme of natural-
ization of epistemology. This may provide a way out of the impasse due to subjectivism
and relativism to which the Conceptual Perspective analysis reduced the contemporary
philosophy of science and its epistemology.
The historical account of the development of science show that despite sceptical
warnings the success of scientific investigations enabled us to gather much useful
knowledge about the universe. This is what impressed our philosophical forebears,
such as Locke and Kant, who were concerned with the task of understanding the
nature of science as a paradigmatic knowledge-yielding enterprise that is concerned
with employing conceptual devices aimed at discovering how the world really is and the
characteristic regularities of the real world. In view of the new sceptical onslaughts,
such as Gettier type paradoxes and riddles of induction this task has assumed new
importance.
3.2.1 Cognitive Processes and Ecological Factors

If one of the goals of epistemology is to account for the way science comes to have
knowledge of how the world really is, then one must pay more attention to the cognitive
processes, including the ecological factors, involved in acquiring this knowledge. An
understanding of the nature of epistemic norms will remain incomplete as long as it
is not integrated into a more comprehensive account of the cognitive and ecological
factors and their interactions that form part of the functioning of the epistemic agent.
Only in the recent past more attention is being paid to the role of the cognitive and
ecological factors in such important issues in philosophy of science as scientific observa-
tion/experiment, formation of concepts and categorization, model building and theory
change. This section attempts to provide an outline of this approach and its relevance
to the formulation of epistemic norm.
3.2.2 Scientific Knowledge and Naturalization of Belief and Knowledge: The Interaction-
Information Theoretic Account of Observation and Belief/Knowledge
The cognitive, ecological, interactive and information theoretic approach, advocated,
among others, by Goldman23 , Dretske24 , Barwise and Perry25 , J.R. Anderson26 , J.J. Gib-
son, may be construed as denial of the justificatory account of knowledge (involving the
23 Goldman, A.I.: 1986, Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
24 Dretske, Fred: 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, MIT Press/Bradford, Cambridge, Mass.
25 Barwise, J. & Perry, J.: 1983, Situations and Attitudes, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
26 Anderson, J.R.: 1990, The Adaptive Character of Thought, Hillsdale, Erlbaum, NJ.
Anderson, J.R.: 1991, The adaptive nature of human categorization, Psychological Review, 98, 409-429
Anderson, J.R.: 1991, Is human cognition adaptive?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14, 471-517
Gupta 155
base statement and inductive inferential view).
Epistemic acts, such as observation, according to this view, is said to involve suc-
cessive type of states or situations where information flows from one type of state or
situation to another. Thus, in observation the information that x is P, where x and
P are features of the physical world is carried from the object to the sense organs or
receptors through a process of interaction between the two. This interaction relation
leading to information flow is based on a nomic regularity/constraint holding between
state or situation type where one involves the other, e.g. the fact that the X-ray has
such and such a pattern carries information about/involves/indicates that Jackie has
a broken leg.
3.3 The Issue of Appropriate Framework for Representing Information

The dominating view on representing information, belief and knowledge has been var-
iously called the language centered, propositional or symbolic/syntactic view.
In the context of Cognitive Science and AI, this view has been endorsed by Fodor 27 ,
Pylyshyn28 and Newell and Simon29 . The theses of language of thought or mentalese
and physical symbol system hypothesis forcefully articulated the language centered,
propositional or symbolic syntactic view on representing information, belief and
knowledge.
This language centered, propositional or symbolic/syntactic view is faced
with several difficulties :
i. the symbol grounding problem: How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol
tokens, manipulated solely on the basis of their arbitrary shapes be grounded or
connected up with the world in the right way?
ii. the frame problem: Assuming that an intelligent agent is capable of planning and
problem solving and given the fact that she is acting, can we specify in symbolic
formalism what changes and what remains constant in the particular domain?
Classical symbolic systems are monotonic, whereas planning and problem solving
invariably involve new experience and change.
iii. the problem of induction: Mere symbolic representation does not lend itself eas-
ily to model judgements of similarity and to identify projectible predicates that
denote natural kinds. Both Goodman and Quine taught us that these issues are
intimately related to the problem of induction.
The basic problem with systems using propositional and symbolic representation is
that they are disjoint from non-symbolic system (i.e. the world). Hence, there must be
some point where the information from the world is presented in symbolic form.
27 Fodor, J.A.: 1981, Representations, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
28 Pylyshyn, Z.: 1984, Computation and Cognition, Bradford/MIT Press, Cambridge,MA.
29 Newell, A. & Simon, H.: 1976, Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search, CACM, 19,
113-116
3.3.1 Two Important Issues
There are two important issues here:
i. how a system using propositional or symbolic representation takes in informa-

tion from a non-symbolic world? This is what S. Harnad30 called the Symbol
Grounding Problem.
ii. how does a cognitive system distinguish and grasp non-logically the predicates
that denote natural kinds or natural properties, which represent things that exist
in reality, make the scientific laws describe the processes that actually take place
in nature or scientific induction possible?
3.3.2 Conceptual Space Approach as a Framework for Representing Information:

An Information Theoretic Approach to Observation and Concept Formation
Many cognitive scientists31 claim that symbolic and cognitive structures are percep-
tually grounded. This, however, involves an analysis of (a) what role the information
at the sub-symbolic level play in the explanation of in various epistemic, knowledge
acquisitive and cognitive acts, such as observation, and (b) how (a) lead to formation
of concepts and categories, which finally give rise to formulation of knowledge at the
linguistic level.
J.J. Gibson32 and David Marr33 (especially while dwelling on his first two modules,
viz., Primal Sketch and 2 1/2 D) provided an analysis of 3.3.2. (a) mentioned above
with specific reference to visual information.
Gibson offers an analysis of optical information in which appearance in the sense of
the way things are is directly given in visual information and not inferred. Therefore,
his view is sometimes called Theory of Direct Perception (TDP). TDP comprises of
two separate investigations:
one involves examining the perceiving organism,

the other concentrates on the what of perception, examining the visible world
external to the organism.
Gibson terms the latter inquiry Ecological optics, which involves finding envi-
ronmental properties that can be uniquely and invariantly specified in the structure of
the reflected ambient light in the form of an optic array. The structure of the reflected
ambient light depends upon the structure of the surface of the perceived object. Unlike
30 Harnad, S.: 1990, The Symbol Grounding Problem, Phisica D 42, 335-346.
31 Johnson, B.: 1987, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Cognition, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, Ill.
Lakoff, G.: 1987, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.
Langacker, R.W.: 1987, Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, 1, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.
32 Gibson, J.J.: 1950, The Perception of the Visual World, Houghton Mifflin, Boston
Gibson, J.J.: (1966), The Senses Considered as Perceptual System, Houghton Mifflin, Boston
Gibson, J.J.: 1979, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Houghton Mifflin, Boston
33 Marr, David: 1982, Vision, Freeman, San Francisco
Gupta 157
the radiant light from a light source, the structure of the reflected ambient light is
responsible for the perception of distance, depth, motion etc. For Gibson the structure
of the reflected ambient light does not carry/convey information, it is information.
The job of the perceptual system is merely to pick up the information by orienting,
adjusting, resonating and tuning to the light input. Thus Gibson treated the problem
of perception as that of recovering from sensory information valid properties of the
external world.
However, as Marr points out, Gibsons analysis is incomplete. Gibson failed to real-
ize the fact that the detection of physical invariant, like image surfaces, is exactly and
precisely an information-processing and cognitive problem. Secondly, Gibson vastly
underrated the sheer difficulties of such detection.
Marr, then, goes on to provide an elaborate analysis of how the information provided
at the Primal Sketch and 2 1/2D levels lead to identification and categorization of 3-D
objects as we ordinarily recognize them.
3.3.3 Gardenfors Notion of Conceptual Space

The analyses of Marr and Gardenfors appear to be complementary to each other and
are relevant to 3.3.2. (b) mentioned above.
Peter Gardenfors34 offers an answer to the second issue by suggesting a hybrid three
tier cognitive system with (a) sub-conceptual, (b) conceptual and (c) higher symbolic
level. For the traditional empiricist thinkers, such as Locke and Hume, the bridge be-
tween the external world and mind was provided by impressions, ideas and associations
between them. Marr also accepts a three level analysis in which sub-conceptual level
of primal sketch and 2 1/2D plays an important role in modeling perceptual knowledge.
Gardenfors, however, introduces a nonlinguistic and non-logical way of representing
information and knowledge in terms of his theory of Conceptual Space in which the
objects of the representation no longer form a language or have even a propositional
structure. Gardenfors treats his knowledge representation framework as cognitive
and bases it on analogical representation. He treats this as an alternative to linguistic,
propositional or Fregean representation and shows its drawbacks.
For Gardenfors conceptual space is a cognitive entity, which he claims is ontologi-
cally prior to any form of language. A conceptual space is a set of pre-linguistic quality
dimensions that are closely connected to what is produced by our sensory receptors.
Typical example of quality dimensions is color, length, weight, temperature, time etc.,
which represent various qualities of objects by assigning properties to them and speci-
fying relations between them. Each quality dimension has a geometrical, topological or
metrical or just an ordering structure, rather than syntactic or logical structure, as in
symbolic models, or associations, as in connectionist model.
Gardenfors quality dimensions are psychological dimensions and not scientific or
theoretical ones. For example, he distinguishes the psychological interpretation of hue
34 Gardenfors, P.: 1990, Induction, conceptual spaces and AI, Philosophy of Science, 57, 78-95
Gardenfors, P.: 1991, Framework for Properties: Possible World vs. Conceptual Spaces, Acta Philosphica
Fennica, 49, 383-407
Gardenfors, P.: 1992, Three Levels of Inductive Inference Lund University Cognitive Studies, 9
in terms of the color wheel and the scientific or theoretical interpretation in terms of
wavelengths of light. However, for him the quality dimension precedes and provides
the basis for symbolic and conceptual representation.
How does Gardenfors notion of conceptual space grasp non-logically the predicates
that denote natural kinds or natural properties, which represent things that exist in
reality and also make induction possible and distinguish them from other properties?
3.3.4 How are the Basic Projectible Predicates get Established?

Gardenfors makes a constructive use of his notion of conceptual space and uses it as
a basis for formulating a new criterion of what a property is. He goes on to represent
a property as a region in a conceptual space. And defines a natural property as repre-
senting a space which is convex in the following sense: if a pair of points a and b are in
the region, then all points between a and b are also in the region.
This definition of natural properties makes them perceptually grounded, i.e., for
these properties there is a direct link between the convex region of the conceptual space
with its quality dimensions and perception.
According to Gardenfors the predicates green and grue differ from each other, be-
cause green designates a property that can be represented in a convex region, while
grue cannot be represented by a convex region, because the predicate grue involves
both color as well as time dimensions (i.e. an object has the property grue, if it is
examined before time t and determined to be green, or it is not examined before time t
and it is blue).
3.3.5 Natural Properties, Similarities and Induction

Gardenfors contends that the projectible predicates are the predicates, which designate
natural properties and that only these predicates make inductive inferences possible.
He also goes on to define a relation of comparative similarity in terms of a conceptual
space by letting two objects count as more similar to each other the closer their set of
properties is located in the underlying conceptual space.
Gardenfors claims that humans generally agree as to which properties are the
projectible ones. This suggests that humans have close to identical psychological con-
ceptual spaces. The evolutionary theory and natural selection explain why our way of
identifying natural properties accords so well with the external world as to make our
inductions tend to come out right and demonstrate that our inductive capacities are
dependent on the ecological circumstances under which they have evolved.
3.4 Case Study on Galileo: The Cognitive-historical Aspects of Science

My intention in the Case Study on Galileo is not to demonstrate that the current ideas
on properties, projectible predicates and concept formation are present in Galileos
work. That would amount to doing, what Butterfield called, whig history.
What I would, however, like to show is that Galileo was concerned with the prob-
lem of the fit between his law abstractly arrived at within an axiomatic framework
Gupta 159
by providing a geometric representation of the physical problem and the physical phe-
nomenon he was investigating. He resolved this by
making a distinction between primary and secondary qualities and insisting that
the law must be couched only in terms of primary qualities, and
appealing to certain thematic presuppositions, e.g. simplicity, while justifying his
choice of a hypothesis or law.
The new science Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) was involved in developing was con-
fronted with many methodological, epistemological and metaphysical issues. He says:
My purpose is to set forth a very new science dealing with a very ancient subject. There is, in
nature, perhaps nothing older than motion, concerning which the books written by philosophers
are neither few nor small; nevertheless I have discovered by experienza some properties of it
which are worth knowing and which have hitherto not been either observed nor demonstrated.
Some superficial observations have been made, as, for instance, that the free motion [natu-
ralem motum] of a heavy falling body is continuously accelerated; but to just what extent this
acceleration occurs has not yet been announced . . . (Italics mine)
In relationship with Galileos scientific claim contained in the last sentence in the
quote there are several cognitive/epistemological questions How do we know?, Why
do we believe in something?, What is the evidence for?, How did Galileo develop
the scientific concepts?, How did he go on to justify the introduction of a concept
? Another set of partly scientific, partly sociological problems arises with regard the
validation and acceptance of scientific theories. Moreover, there are the metaphysical
problems concerning reality of entities that transcend our senses or the assumption
of certain properties that can form the basis for doing science, e.g. in Galileos case, the
primary qualities.
Understanding what Galileo contributed goes much beyond the law of freely falling
motion and the concept of uniformly accelerated motion he formulated or being able to
calculate how fast the stone falls when we drop it from a certain height. Understanding
the ingredients of his scientific inquiry and imagination must form an integral part,
not as additional material to the calculation, but as issues intrinsically arising out of
the understanding and presentation of the technical material in order to develop the
capacity for abstract reasoning based on practice and experience, problems relating
to relevant concept formation, modes of appropriate reasoning/thinking, perceiving
relationships. This effort may include removing certain misconceptions.
From this point of view Galileos main achievements were
welding together the works of the anti-Aristotelians of the past two centuries
or so and develop a Philosophy of Science by raising certain methodological
issues.
presenting a consistent, reasonable conceptual scheme that was descriptive rather
than teleological, i.e. he was not concerned with final causes.
3.4.1 The Methodological Issues Raised by Galileo
Galileos concern with the fit between an abstract mathematical theory and its ap-
parently arbitrary definitions and facts that they are designed to explain. He asks
the question: How does an abstract mathematical theory and its apparently arbitrary
definitions fit the facts? Fruitful insight as to what was Galileos answer can be derived
from what Galileo himself emphasizes in his approach:
Galileo was acutely conscious about the fact that he was defining new concepts
and not discovering objects. He was concerned that the definition should best fit the
natural phenomena. In the Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Concerning
Two New Sciences he says:
Since all definitions are arbitrary, I may . . . be allowed to doubt whether such a definition as
above, established in an abstract manner, correspond to and describe that kind of accelerated
motion which we meet in the nature in the case of freely falling bodies.
. . . some have imagined helices and conchoids as described by certain motions which are not
met within nature and have very commendably established the properties which these curves
possess in virtue of their definitions, but we have decided to consider the phenomena of bodies
falling with an acceleration such as actually occurs in nature and to make this definition of
accelerated motion exhibit the essential features of observed accelerated motions.
Galileo formulates his hypotheses regarding the nature of motion first and then
goes on check them in terms of experiments and not the other way around.
3.4.2 Galileos Solution

Galileo was looking for an answer to the same problem we discussed in the Section 3.3
above. Galileos solution to this problem is based on
i. his belief in one of the metaphysical/thematic Presuppositions, viz., simplicity of

nature. Galileo invokes this in the following way:
. . . in the investigation of naturally accelerated motion we were led, by hand as it

were, in following the habit and custom of nature herself, in all her various
other processes, to employ only those means which are most common, simple
and easy. For I think no one believes that swimming or flying can be accomplished in a
manner simpler or easier than that instinctively employed by fishes and birds.
When . . . I observe a stone initially at rest falling from an elevated position and con-
tinually acquiring new increments of speed, why should I not believe that such in-
creases occur in a manner, which is exceedingly simple and rather obvious
to everybody? If now we examine the matter carefully, we find no addition
or increment more simple than that which repeats itself always in the same
manner. (Emphasis mine)
Proceeding on this principle of simplicity in nature Galileo considers two hypothe-

ses which are both simple, viz.
(1) V T (2) V D: speed increase in proportion to distance traveled.

Gupta 161
He rejects (2) on grounds that are not completely sound (as he thinks that this
simple assumption leads to an inconsistency, while the other does not) and adopts
(1), largely because he has the deeply rooted hunch that it is correct.
ii. Galileos distinction of qualities: Galileo makes a distinction between:
Primary qualities: those qualities which admit of systematic quantitative
description relative to a scale, e.g. distance, length, shape, size, time, position
. . ..
Secondary qualities: those qualities, which exist only in the mind of the
perceiver, e.g. taste, odour, sound, colour, etc.
In IL SAGGIATORE Galileo writes:
I think that these tastes, odors, colors, etc., on the side of the object in which they seem to
exist, are nothing else than mere names, and hold their residence solely in the sensitive body;
so that if the animal were removed, every such quality would be abolished and annihilated.
Nevertheless, as soon as we have imposed names on them, particular and different from those
of the other primary and real accidents, we induce our selves to believe that they also exist just
as truly and really as the latter.
Galileos criterion of demarcation and the criterion of acceptability. Galileo

withdraws the attention of science from the realm of unquantifiable secondary
qualities, i.e., he restricts the scope of science to assertions about primary quali-
ties and their relation alone, and
excludes taleological explanation from the range of permissible discourse in Sci-
ence.
Consequently, Aristotelian explanation of freely falling bodies in terms of natural
motion towards natural place does not qualify as scientific explanation, because it
fails to explain the phenomenon. According to Galileo, it is not a bona fide sceintific
explanation to claim that a motion takes place in order that some future state may be
realized.
3.4.3 Conclusion
A review of the second debate, the survey of the recent work on concept formation in
Cognitive Science and the Case Study of Galileo provide evidence that go on to show
that the information about the way the world is and theorizing about it may lead to
objective claims regarding the world provided the processes of the formation of concepts
involve an account of (a) the interaction between the features of the physical world and
the cognizer, and (b) the information about the features of the world is represented and
revised in a frameworks which also includes the sub-symbolic level.
Galileos answer to the problem was based on (i) his belief in one of the Thematic
Presuppositions, viz., simplicity of nature, (ii) his classification of properties in terms of
primary (quantifiable) and secondary qualities, and his demand that scientific concepts
are articulated in terms of primary qualities alone, and (iii) his abandonment of the
secondary qualities as well as teleological explanations.
3.5 Final Remarks on the Implications of the Case Studies for Science Education
Programme
The Case Studies on Galileo that I have chosen may appear to be antiquirian. This
is deliberate. Galileos scientific writings and scientific work are instructive in more
sense than one. It provides a rich context for many important pedagogical issue, such
as introduction and proper understanding of new concepts, distinction between obser-
vation and inference, model building and mathematical representation, formulation of
hypothesis, laws and their linkages to observation and thematic presuppositions, the
question of justification, etc. The standard textbook presentation of Galileos kine-
matics suppresses the intellectual history, the context and the process of scientific
inquiry by hurrying through the final product in the form of the laws he formulated.
As a result it fails to use this significant episode at an early stage of science with
relatively simple subject matter as an illustration of various facets of modern scientific
thought and inquiry. Our science pedagogy would be immensely richer by incorporating
an examination of such intellectual dimensions and putting a little less emphasis on
technical science.
Pedagogy of science ostensibly enables the students to also learn strategies and
tactics of problem solving and generating representations of scientific knowledge. The
Received View on the cognitive processes involved in such procedures, such as induction
or linear conception of experimental discovery, appears to be highly deficient (Nerses-
sian, 1989 and Gooding, 1989). The Cognitive-historical and generative justification
approaches discussed above in the case studies can provide different realistic exem-
plars of scientific problem solving. Thus, the standard laboratory experience can be
supplemented by incorporating such exemplars, which will give students an opportu-
nity to examine other problem solving procedures or to develop their own insights into
constructing or changing representations of conceptual structures in science.
Conceptual Change in the Learning of Science
Stella Vosniadou
University of Athens, Greece. Email: svosniad@compulink.gr
Why is Science Learning Difficult?

Cognitive science and science education research has shown that students have a great
deal of difficulty understanding science concepts. This applies even to students who
perform above average in terms of test scores and teacher evaluations, and even after
many years of science instruction (e.g., diSessa, 1993). In addition to the difficulty
of understanding, science learning seems to be accompanied by misconceptions. Mis-
conceptions have been noted in practically all subject areas of science. Hundreds of
misconceptions enough to fill out tens of volumes have been reported in the literature. 1
How can we find out why science learning is so difficult?
For many years now, researchers in this area have realized the need to pay more
attention to the actual content of the pupils ideas, and to understand how these ideas
develop in order to formulate a coherent theoretical framework for guiding research
in science education (see for example, Driver and Easley, 1978, Novak, 1977). It is
only on the basis of such a developmental theory that we can make informed decisions
about the design of science curricula as well as about instruction. In this paper I will
argue that cognitive developmental research can provide rich descriptions of the knowl-
edge that students have about science at different ages and about how this knowledge
changes. I will describe some of the findings regarding the processes of conceptual
change in science derived from research in my lab and will draw their implications
for instruction. I hope that in the process the readers will find some answers to the
question: Why is science learning difficult?
The Conceptual Change Approach

A few years ago I attended a workshop on the topic of learning and teaching science.
The workshop was composed mostly of researchers and teachers in science education
and a few developmental psychologists who did research on the development of science
concepts. I was very surprised to discover that main theoretical framework that guided
the science educators teaching and research was basically an empiricist framework.
What I mean by an empiricist framework is the idea that learning science involves
mainly the enrichment of prior experiences. According to this framework, knowledge
is continuous, it develops from concrete to abstract, and is mainly characterized by
enrichment. What we need to do when we teach science is expose children to rich
hands-on experiences. Through these experiences they are going to eventually learn
science.
1 See the Proceedings of the First and Second International Seminars on Misconceptions in Science and
Mathematics edited by J.D. Novak (1987) and Helm, Hugh and Novak (1983).
164 Conceptual Change in the Learning of Science
In this framework there is no realization that childrens initial knowledge, based
on their every day experiences may stand in the way of understanding the currently
accepted scientific ideas. The conceptual change approach to be described below is a
very different approach. More specifically, the following claims are being made about
the process of learning science.
i. The human mind has developed, through evolution, specialized mechanisms to

pick up information from the physical and social world. This results in very quick
and efficient learning that starts immediately after birth. Some kinds of things
are easy to learn, not because what is learned is less complex but because human
beings are prepared through evolution for this kind of learning. This seems to
apply to the learning of language and to intuitive physics. Intuitive physics is
the knowledge about the physical world that develops early in infancy and allows
children to function in the physical environment.
ii. Learning which is acquired early in life and which is not subject to conscious
awareness and hypothesis testing can stand in the way of learning science. This
happens because scientific explanations of physical phenomena often violate fun-
damental principles of intuitive physics, constantly confirmed by everyday expe-
rience. After all, the currently accepted scientific explanations are the product
of a long historical development of science characterized by revolutionary theory
changes that have totally restructured our representations of the physical world.
iii. Conceptual change is required in the learning of many science concepts (and
not only science). This is because the initial explanations of phenomena in the
physical world are not unrelated and fragmented but are organized in an intuitive
framework theory.2 That constrains the process of acquiring further knowledge
about the physical world and can cause misconceptions. Many misconceptions
can be explained as synthetic models formed by individuals in their effort to
assimilate new scientific information into their framework theory. The change
of the framework theory is difficult because it represents a coherent explanatory
system based on everyday experience and is tied to years of confirmation.
From a conceptual change point of view the questions that are important to answer
are questions such as the following: What is the nature of initial conceptual structures?
Are they actually organized in a coherent theoretical framework? If so, how do these
theoretical frameworks change? How is conceptual change achieved?
In the pages that follow I will argue that children do have an initial, intuitive,
framework theory about the physical world. I will argue that this theory has content.
I will describe this content in terms of presuppositions, beliefs, and mental models. I
will also argue that this framework theory has a structure and I would describe this
structure in terms of framework theories and specific theories. Another issue I would
2 The term theory is used to denote a causal explanatory framework. We do not claim that framework
theories are similar to those of scientists and we further assume that they are not available to conscious
awareness and hypothesis testing.
Vosniadou 165
like to raise here is the issue of metaconceptual awareness. It appears that young
children have conceptual structures that are relatively well organized but they are not
metaconceptually aware of the knowledge that they have. By that I mean that they
are not aware of the actual beliefs and presuppositions that constrain the knowledge
acquisition process, neither do they recognize that these beliefs are hypotheses subject
to falsification. This is a very important difference between childrens theories (to
the extend that we can call them theories) and scientific theories. When we come to
conceptual change, I will tell you about synthetic models and what they are. Finally, I
will pay a lot of importance to the sequence in which concepts are acquired in a given
subject-matter area.
The Observational Astronomy Research Project

Let me give you a general description of the kind of research that my colleagues and
I have been doing. We started this research when I was in the United States, at
the University of Illinois, with William Brewer. We investigated elementary school
childrens understanding of observational astronomy. The studies that we did were
about the shape of the earth, about the day and night cycle, explanations of the seasons
and of the weather, and of the phases of the moon/explanations of the phases of the
moon. We tried to understand how childrens knowledge in this area changes during the
elementary school years (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, 1994). We also conducted a great
deal of cross-cultural research. I had a student, at that time, Ala Samarapungavan,
who came to India to do a study of Indian children (Samarapungavan, Vosniadou, &
Brewer, 1997). I did several studies in Greece, while a student in anthropology from the
University of Illinois went to Samoa and collected data from children there (Vosniadou,
1994). Other people took our questionnaire and did studies in Australia, England,
Germany, etc.
The methodology we use is that of a clinical interview in which children are asked
questions from a pre-designed questionnaire. The children are also asked to make
drawings and/or play dough models, or select among ready made physical models. We
pay a lot of attention to the distinction between factual and generative questions. A
factual question is a question like What is the shape of the earth? and a generative
question is a question like If you were able to walk for many days would you be able
to reach the end of the earth? Is there an end to the earth?
The difference between the two types of questions is the following. Factual questions
can be answered if the children have memorized in a superficial way information taught
at school. It is possible however that children do not really understand the information
taught at school. When children say that the day/night cycle happens because the earth
turns around its axis, do they really understand this explanation? Do they know what
its implications are? Or is it the case that they have memorized the explanations given
in school without really understanding them. The generative questions try to find this
out.
Generative questions ask children to think about situations to which they have not
been exposed in the regular school. We present them with a new, productive problem
that they have to solve. If they have really understood the scientific explanation, then
they can give a scientific answer. For example, if they have understood how the day
and night cycle happens through the earths rotation, they can provide scientifically
correct answers to questions like What do we need to do in order to make it day time
always in Bombay? It is possible, however, that when we ask children the generative
question mentioned above they say things like the following: you need to make the
moon disappear or you must have the sun in the sky all the time. The kinds of
answers we get from the factual questions are very different from the kinds of answers
we get from the generative questions.
On the basis of childrens responses we try to understand childrens representations,
or their mental models. We are interested in finding out whether children use the same
mental representation to answer all the questions in a consistent fashion. Indeed we
have found that it was possible to account for approximately 85% of the childrens
responses on the basis of the consistent use of one of a small class of mental models of
the earth (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992) and of the day/night cycle (Vosniadou & Brewer,
1994).
In the case of the shape of the earth we have identified six different kinds of mental
models held by elementary school children (in our American sample). These models
represent the intuitive view of the earth as a flat, supported rectangularly-shaped
physical object, the scientific view of the earth as a physical unsupported, astronomical
object, as well as a number of intermediate views (see figure 1). Most of the children
in our sample used mental models of the earth that showed a combination of intuitive
and scientific views. We have identified four such mental models: the disc earth, the
dual earth, the hollow sphere and the flattened sphere. According to the disc earth, the
earth is both round and flat and has an end or edge from which people can potentially
fall. In the dual earth, children think that there are two earths: a flat one on which we
live and a spherical one which is a planet in the sky. The children who believe in the
hollow sphere model think that the earth is spherical outside but the people live on flat
ground inside the earth. Finally, according to the flattened sphere, the people live on
the outside of the earth but on flattened pieces of ground.
If we examine all these representations, we see that they have some things in
common. What they have in common is that they all try to incorporate on the one
hand the information that the earth is spherical, coming from instruction, and on the
other hand, the information they receive from everyday observation that the earth is
flat and people live on top of this flat earth. They represent an attempt to synthesize
initial, intuitive beliefs about the earth with currently accepted scientific information.
For this reason we have called them synthetic models.
We have explained the formation of synthetic models by assuming that childrens
understanding of the scientific concept is constrained by certain beliefs or presupposi-
tions that have their origins in their intuitive framework theory. One is the belief that
the earth is basically flat, and the other is the belief that the objects on the earth need
to be supported, otherwise they will fall down. We know from psychological studies
that even 6-7 month old infants understand that when you drop an object it will fall on
the ground. This evidence has been interpreted to indicate that young infants form an
elementary up-down gravity concept.
Vosniadou 167
Scientific Model
Sphere
Flattened Sphere
Synthetic
Hollow Sphere Models
(a) (b)
Dual Earth
Disc Earth
Initial
Models
Rectangular Earth
Figure 1: Mental models of the earth.

If it is indeed the case that children hold a belief in up-down gravity then we wonder
how this belief can make it difficult for them to understand how people on the outside
of a spherical earth live without falling down! I have looked at the curricula used
to teach astronomy in Greece and in the United States and I have never found any
attempt to explain to young children how it is possible for people to live on the spherical
earth without falling, or how it is possible for the earth to be spherical and flat at the
same time. Information regarding the spherical shape of the earth is introduced by
the teachers in the classroom in a straightforward, factual manner. Often, a globe is
used, or sometimes the teachers show a picture of the globe in a book, or a picture of
the earth as we see it from the moon. Teachers usually believe that it is very easy to
understand that the earth is spherical and that the concept of a spherical earth does
not really require any explication.
So there is no explanation provided to children of how it is possible for the earth to
be spherical and flat at the same time, despite the fact that our everyday perception is
of a flat earth. And there is no attempt to say anything about gravity and to explain
how it is possible for people to live on the spherical earth without falling down. Gravity
is a concept addressed later on when children are taught about mechanics, not in the
context of observational astronomy.
What I am trying to say is that the kind of instruction we give to children is
inadequate. It does not provide explanations to the legitimate questions that the
children may have, assuming that they have formed a representation of the earth on
the basis of their everyday experience. Teachers of science and curricular designers
do not take into consideration that children may have formed such possible initial
representations of the earth. They think (based on the empiricist framework described
earlier) that since children have not been instructed in science, they do not know
anything about the earth. They also think that the concept of a spherical earth is
such a simple and easy to understand concept. I remember that when we started these
studies we actually wondered whether we would find any children who will have a
conception of the earth different from the spherical one. We were so immersed in this
tradition ourselves and I remember we had to go to preschoolers to find out that they
indeed believed the earth to be flat.
In an attempt to explain these findings we came to the idea of an intuitive frame-
work theory of physics. The idea is that from very early on children construct a
framework theory of physics that contains the ontological presuppositions that define
what is a physical object and how physical objects move in space. So you would find here
the information that physical objects are solid and stable, that the space is organised
in the direction of up and down, and that physical objects fall down when we drop
them. The framework theory also contains some epistemological presuppositions like
the presupposition that things are as they appear to be (appearance is reality).
So the idea is that such a framework theory of physics is formed very early on and
forms the basis of our physical knowledge. Obviously, we have a great deal of physical
knowledge, otherwise we would not be able to move around in the physical world.
It is further assumed that the framework theory constrains the way we interpret
observations such as that the ground extends along the same plane over a great dis-
tance, that the sky is located above the ground, that the sun, the moon, and the stars
are in the sky, and that there is ground or water below the ground. The interpretations
of such observations are used to form intuitive theories, about the earth, the day/night
cycle, the seasons, etc.
We make a distinction between presuppositions that belong to the framework theory
and beliefs that belong to more specific-theories. We think this distinction is important
because it can explain why some beliefs are easier to change than others. For example,
it is not very difficult to change the belief that the earth is supported by ground, or that
the earth does not move, or even that the earth is flat. But, it appears that it is very
difficult to change the up/down gravity presupposition and the organization of space
in terms of the direction of up and down. These presuppositions constrain childrens
understanding and explain synthetic models in which the earth is represented as round
or spherical but where the people live on its top or inside it.
To summarize, the results of our experiments showed a relatively small number
of the mental models of the earth, that could be grouped into initial, synthetic and
scientific. The synthetic models are constrained by certain underlying presuppositions,
such as that the organization of space is in terms of the direction of up and down
Vosniadou 169
1. The sun goes down, 2. The sun goes down, to

on the ground, behind the other side of the
mountains, and the earth, and the moon
moon comes up. comes up.
3. The earth rotates in an 4. The earth rotates in an

up/down direction. The east/west rotation. The
moon and sun are located sun and moon are located
at opposite sides. at opposite sides.
Figure 2: Mental models of the day/night cycle.

and that gravity pulls physical objects down to the ground. These two presuppositions
seem to be the main barriers to childrens understanding of the spherical shape of the
earth. If our hypotheses are correct, it means we need to pay particular attention to
such presuppositions, when we teach the shape of the earth. If we deal with these
presuppositions we have a better chance of being more successful in teaching children
the spherical shape of the earth.
Before finishing I would like to say that teachers are not aware of the ideas and
misconceptions that students have. Usually science is taught in a factual way, where
teachers explain the scientific view and then ask a few questions to see if the scientific
explanation can be repeated. Sometimes teachers are really afraid to ask too much.
Because in some areas like science they feel themselves insecure about their knowledge
of science. They do not want to raise any questions because they feel they might not be
able to answer. The communication that goes on in the classroom is very superficial. It
is a big problem in science education that the teachers are not well trained in science
themselves and this affects their ability to teach science.
There is an additional point I would like to make here. I would like to show you the
importance not only of presuppositions, like the up/down gravity or the organization of
space in terms of up/down, but also of the particular representations or mental models
that the students have. When new information comes in, it is often interpreted in terms
of some kind of a situation model, a mental representation which is formed at the time
(based on prior knowledge) to help the individual incorporate the new information to
the knowledge base. These mental representations can exert important influence on
learning of science.
The figure 2 shows various explanations of the day/night cycle. The first explanation
(1) is in terms of the sun going down, hiding behind the mountains, and the moon
going up. When you look at this explanation of the day and night cycle, usually night
is interpreted by the sun either going down, or hiding behind the mountains or clouds
and at the same time the moon coming up or getting out of the clouds. The sun and the
moon are associated. The sun creates the day and the moon creates the night. So the
sun goes down when the moon comes up. If the childs representation of the earth is
that it is a flat earth supported by ground, then of course they cannot understand the
explanation of the day/night cycle in terms of the earths rotation. Sometimes we tell
them that the earth moves but the way they understand the earths movement is like
an up/down motion similar to what you get in an earthquake. They cannot understand
the rotational movement if they do not have representation of the earth as a sphere in
space.
As we can see here, the representation of the earth, constrains the kinds of explana-
tions of the day/night cycle that can be formed. We have not found even a single child
who had a flat representation of the earth and also gave a scientific representation of
the day/night cycle.
Children who had flat representation of the earth gave us initial, non-scientific,
explanations of the day and night cycle. But some of the children who had formed
spherical representations of the earth also gave us initial explanations. We have in-
terpreted this evidence as indicating that the change from a flat to a spherical earth
shape is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the scientific explanation of the
day/night cycle. It is only when you have spherical types of representations of the
earth that more advanced scientific explanations of the day/night cycle, that assume
the earth to be rotating or the sun to be revolving round the earth, can take place.
As I said, the representation of the earth imposes additional constraints on how one
understands the day/night cycle. Let us now see how the two different representations
of the earth as a sphere and as a hollow sphere affect explanations of the day/night
cycle. When children have formed a spherical representation of the earth, then they
can understand that the earth can rotate. However, they usually interpret rotation as
an up/down rotation rather than a left/right rotation around the earths axis.
So the usual explanation of the day/night cycle, even in the children who have
understood that the earth rotates, assumes that the earth rotates in a up/down fashion.
Usually, the sun is supposed to be located at the top and the moon is located at the
bottom of the earth. You can understand that this is a very easy transition from the
previous representation where the sun and moon went up and down. All you have to
do is to make the earths movement circular. You can see how easy it is to go from the
previous representation to this representation once your idea of the shape of the earth
changes. So the sun is now up there, and the moon down below the earth, and it is not
that the sun and the moon that go up and down, but it is the earth that moves in a
circle. When we are up here it is day and when we go down it is night and when it is
night it is always dark in the sky where the moon is present. This is a nice synthetic
model. This is a prevalent explanation of the day and night cycle by the children who
suppose to understand the scientific explanation.
Now let us examine the children who have a hollow sphere model of the earth.
How do you explain the day and night cycle if you think that we are inside a hollow
Vosniadou 171
sphere and when the earth and the moon are supposed to be located on top of you?
These children interpret the earths rotation to be an east/west rotation. Obviously,
these children do not interpret the rotation as up/down, since they do not know about
the earths gravity and they think that people will fall down if they are outside the
earth. So their model is one of sideways i.e. east/west rotation rather than up/down
rotation. As the earth rotates, people go from the place that is day, where the sun is
located, to the place where is night, where the moon is located. This is the model of the
day/night cycle found in many of the explanations of the children with a hollow sphere
model. They often try their best to take into consideration all the physical data that
they have at their disposal. When we point out to them that their explanations are
inconsistent, they try to repair the inconsistencies. They try to formulate explanations
that are empirically adequate and they get disturbed by logical inconsistency. We see
a lot of sensitivity to the issues of empirical adequacy and logical consistency even in
elementary school children.
We also looked at the geocentric and heliocentric models of the solar system. The
younger children think that the earth is located at the centre and the sun is revolving
around the earth (when they understand revolution). The older children believe in
heliocentric model. We have not found that there is particular difficulty in changing
from a geocentric to a heliocentric model of the solar system. What we have found is
that children have a great deal of difficulty in understanding the shape of the earth.
Once they understand the spherical shape of the earth and something about gravity,
then they do not have a great deal of difficulty in creating heliocentric models of the
solar system.
To sum up: I started by telling you about science education research, and how
research in science education is basically interested in instruction, how we cannot
have a theory of instruction before we understand some of the more basic things about
conceptual development, how concepts are organised, and how conceptual change takes
place. I mentioned some of the results from the studies on conceptual change in
observational astronomy. Still, developmental research focuses mainly on internal
process and not on the environmental variables that promote activity and cognitive
change. In order to be able to have the theory of instruction, we need to bridge the
developmental and science education approaches, inorder to produce a theoretical base
for a theory of learning and of instruction. We need to understand what are the
environmental variables that promote the kind conceptual change mentioned above.
References
diSessa, A.: 1993, Toward an epistemology of physics, Cognition and Instruction
10, 105225.
Driver, R. and Easley, J.: 1978, Pupils and Paradigms: A Review of literature related to
concept development in adolescent science students, Studies in Science Education
5, 6184.
Helm, H. and Novak, J.: 1983, Proceedings of the International Seminar: Misconcep-
tions in Science and Mathematics, Department of Education, Cornell University,
Ithaca, New York.
Novak, J.: 1977, An Alternative to Piagetian Psychology for Science and Mathematics
Education, Science Education 61, 453477.
Novak, J.: 1987, Proceedings of the Second International Seminar: Misconceptions
and Educational Strategies and Mathematics, Vol. II, Department of Education,
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
Samarapungavan, A. Vosniadou, S. and Brewer, W.: 1996, Thinking about the earth,
the sun and the moon: Indian Childrens Cosmologies, Cognitive Development
11, 491521.
Vosniadou, S.: 1994, Capturing and Modeling the Process of Conceptual Change,
Learning and Instruction 4, 4569.
Vosniadou, S.: 1998, From Conceptual Development to Science Education: A Psycholog-
ical Point of View, International Journal of Science Education 20(10), 12131230.
Vosniadou, S. and Brewer, W.: 1992, Mental Models of the Earth: A Study of Conceptual
Change in Childhood, Cognitive Psychology 24, 535585.
Vosniadou, S. and Brewer, W.: 1994, Mental Models of the Day/Night Cycle, Cognitive
Science 18, 123124.
inputnagarjun2.tex
Introducing History of Science in Science Education: A Perspective
from Chemical Education
Prajit K. Basu
University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India. Email: pkbsh@uohyd.ernet.in
In this paper I argue that it is as yet unclear whether history of science can play a
role in science education. I argue that whether history of science may or may not be
relevant for science education is a complex question and does not lend itself to an easy
answer. It is also an empirical issue whether history of science is effective in science
education. I also point out that there are certain reasons to think that one cannot use
history of science across the board to enhance science education.
What I am going to do is to first quickly enumerate the questions that arise in the
context of science education. One of them is that science education is an umbrella term
which means it is quite ambiguous and it needs to be sorted out. For my own edification
I have sorted it out for myself and I show that delineating various meanings of science
education tends to show that the role of history of science in science education should
be questioned even more threadbare. Next, I look at the general argument that history
and philosophy of science play an important role in science education. Again, I try
to show that the argument is not very straight forward, and we do not have really
a knocked down argument in favour of the claim that history of science can play a
significant role in science education. Thirdly, I look at certain concepts in chemistry and
explore whether history and philosophy of science can play any role in the instruction
of those concepts in the classroom situation.
1 Varieties of Science Education.

Straight forwardly science education will depend upon first answering the question:
What should we include in science? Should we include both natural sciences and social
sciences? Can we include history? Because history used to be a part of sciences or
natural philosophical concerns long time ago. In fact, as E.H. Carr points out, history
is included in sciences in all European languages except in English.1 Lastly, should
one include philosophy? After all natural sciences were known as philosophy a couple
of hundred years ago. Philosophy is supposed to be mother of all sciences. Now,
this brings us to the question of demarcation that how will one decide what should be
included in science? How does one separate out science part from the non-science part?
And the question is can philosophy help? It is indeed a bit ironic that one has to take
help of philosophy to settle the issue whether science can be separated out from the
other non-science intellectual endeavours when one is wondering whether philosophy
is a part of science or not. This attempt to disambiguate science from other non-science
endeavours has been addressed by scholars, and there have been claims that it would
1 Carr, E. H.: 1974, What is History? Penguin, London, p. 56.
174 Chemical Education
be possible to separate out science from the non-science in terms of method. Science
is supposed to follow a method. It is this method which characterises science, and
disambiguates it from non-science. However, the last (almost) 50 years of work in
philosophy of science clearly brings out that it is remarkably difficult to really pin
down a single method which informs science. This raises the possibility that there may
be various kinds of methods that are employed in science, by the scientists, and there
may even be a problem of plurality of methods based on discipline specificity.
Now this is so much for what to include in science and what to exclude, and the
problems in deciding, therefore, science from the non-science aspect. There is also the
problem that science is taught from secondary to high school, to college, to university
and so on. This implies that science is introduced slowly over a period of time and hence
there is some kind of gradation of content. This gradation of content, it seems to me, is
indicative of certain demands. Keeping aside the issue about the specific scientific con-
tent that is involved in this gradation and how to achieve it and what is to be introduced
at what level of instruction, I think the demand at one level can be understood as: Do
we need science education for all school students, and do we need science education for
all college students, and should methods of science or scientific investigation be part of
science education? Finally, to put it a bit more contentiously, I shall use C.P. Snows
example that there exists an almost an unbridgeable gap between scientists and the
non-scientists. Snow used the example of second law of thermodynamics to make the
point that the non-scientists have no idea whatsoever about this law. So, the question
then is should we expect that all the non-scientists know the content of the second law
of thermodynamics, or, take the more recent example: What are Bucky balls?
The questions raised above highlight that there are problems regarding what we
expect the students at different levels to know. This, in turn, will have repercussions
on how and what should be introduced in different stages of science education. The next
is the question about science being a cultural enterprise. Here there are two aspects.
One is that of the scientific community (the smaller cultural group). The scientific
community has its own cultural norms regarding how to do science, what constitutes
good science, and what constitutes bad science and so on. I will outline some of these
later on when I come to chemical education. The second aspect is that science as a
cultural enterprise is embedded in the wider society or wider culture. To the extent
it is a part of the wider culture it will interact with the larger society in various ways
and the Science, Technology, and Society issues become important. The question then
is should these also be included in science education curriculum?
Last but not least, I think science education itself is a cultural enterprise. It
might be seen in the wider society as a certain kind of cultural initiation. Besides,
in the classroom situation, it is well known by now that students come with their own
conceptions and ideas. It is also equally well known how counter-intuitive some of
the scientific ideas or concepts of science are. If there is a counter-intuitive aspect
in scientific ideas, then, of course, these concepts will not match with the life world
domain concepts that the students bring to the classroom. So, there is an attempt in
science education which needs to be perhaps sensitive to the fact that science education
is an attempt to replace the world view of the students, which they get from their
Basu 175
cultural milieu. These students come to the science classrooms with their own ideas,
and there is an entirely different culture (of unintuitive scientific ideas) that she/he
has to confront. How will these two cultures match or interact? It is a question that
science educators must worry about.2
2 Role of History and Philosophy of Science in Science Education

Having made these preliminary remarks, I now go on to the question about the role
of history and philosophy of science in science education. I wish to begin with a set of
arguments offered by both the protagonists and the antagonists because that will high-
light the issue sharply. The protagonists point is that history and philosophy of science
does give a better picture of science than what is given in the textbook. A textbook, at
any level of science education, at present, often gives the students an erroneous picture
of scientists destroying all the irrational and old ideas and establishing new ideas. It
does not bring out the fact about science being a kind of human enterprise, or about
science being a social and cultural enterprise. But history and philosophy of science
can begin to give the students a better picture. The modern textbooks will not tell
the students about plurality of methods. It will almost indoctrinate the students that
there is one and only one method that is employed in science. It is not surprising that
any undergraduate student who has gone through school education claims that there
is one and only one method called scientific method. All these ideas can be gotten rid
of, at least the claim is, through introduction of history and philosophy of science in
science education. Students, through the help of historical episodes and philosophical
arguments, will be able to understand that some of these ideas about the method in
science are highly problematic.
Now once people have a better picture of what science is all about, then they can
decide on their own what science can do and what science can not do. This means
that they understand what the limitations of science are. They do not anymore expect
science to solve each and every problem of their lives or of the life of other individuals of
society at large. They know where to stop. This will indeed be a huge gain, if students
come out of the classrooms with this realization although it is not clear that this will
indeed be the major outcome of the instruction.
Secondly, introduction of history and philosophy of science will improve actual sci-
ence education or science instruction in classroom and laboratory. And here the way
things are supposed to work is that students basically follow the scientists in the
conceptual conflicts and within that course discover with them. Now I know that
discovery learning of certain sorts has been discredited long time ago. But here what
I have in mind is that the kind of discovery that students do with the scientists is
to recognize that scientists of the olden times had faced a whole lot of difficulties in
their work. The difficulty could arise either in clarifying a concept, or having clarified
the concepts to an extent, how to design experiments. The difficulty could also arise
from the open ended nature of the results of the experiments designed and the kind of
cultural conflicts the scientists had gone through as they had tried to see the bearing
2 Solomon, J., and Addinell, S.: 1983, Science in Social Context, Hatfield, Oxford.
of the evidence on the hypothesis and so on. Sometimes, in this process, the scientists
might have reached a blind alley. They had retracted their steps, had gone back and
thought about it and so on. This process is a messy affair. As the students get to
know those, and follow the scientists in their footsteps to what might be called the
appropriate or more correct theory or understanding the students discover as it were
along with the scientists. So, the students are in the position of the scientists taking
similar steps and they are facing the problem that the scientists were facing. This way
of learning, if this is how students do actually learn, will, perhaps, undermine their
faith in nave inductivism, which means the students will recognize that scientists do
not go out and make observations, and directly induce the results. Even if they take a
not very complicated experiment, they look at the observation, and they may not see
that this must be the relation between the properties that they have been looking for.
So this lack of obvious relation between the observations made during the course of
an experiment and the relation among properties they may be attempting to establish
does undermine that the theories or hypotheses in science are directly induced from
the observations.
I use the example of Antoine Lavoisiers arguments to elaborate the above position
a little more. Lavoisiers thesis about compound nature of some chemical substance is
a sophisticated position and this position tells us something insightful when one has a
complicated argumentation or complicated experiment going on. A lot of things happen
in science besides doing an experiment or thinking about the concepts. So, consider
Lavoisiers four experiments which are supposed to establish the compound nature of
water.3 It seems to me, as I went through the descriptions of these arguments, that
these (were, and still) are difficult experiments to do. In fact, these were indeed very
difficult experiments to do in the eighteenth century and these were not unproblematic
at that time. Very respectable scientists at that time, including Joseph Priestley, found
all kinds of problems with these experiments. Yet, there is something to be said about
the way Lavoisier presented his arguments and the way he presented the results of his
experiments.
Let me dramatize it, before I show what was interesting about Lavoisiers argument.
It is well known that, according to Lavoisier, a compound is classified as acidic if it had
oxygen in it as a chemical constituent. This is because the word oxygen (more correctly
oxygene) means acidic principle. So, any compound, at least binary, that has oxygen is
acidic. Yet Lavoisier failed to realize that water is not acidic. Water contains oxygen
and it is not acidic and to top it all, if one looks ahistorically, Joseph Priestley over
and over again pointed out that if water is synthesized, a little bit of acid could always
be detected in it.4 Now, with the hindsight it can be explained why that acid is there.
It is there simply because chemical substances, including elements, in the eighteenth
century, could not be purified completely. So, since water was synthesized by Lavoisier
by burning oxygen and hydrogen together in a vessel, and these gases could not be
purified completely there was always a bit of nitrogen and carbon dioxide in the vessel.
Carbon dioxide continued to remain there and the nitrogen became nitric oxide and a
3 Lavoisier, A.: 1965, Elements of Chemistry, trans. R. Kerr, Dover Publications, New York.
4 Priestley, J.: 1799, On the Phlogistic Theory, New York Medical Repository 2, 383-387.
Basu 177
little bit of acid was also synthesized by dissolution of these oxides in the water that
was synthesized by the combination of oxygen and hydrogen.
It is easy to see how the situation can become muddy. Lavoisier could have said that
the presence of acid proved his case. Water is a bit acidic because it contains oxygen.
Yet he is so driven by his own idea that water is a compound and if pure elements are
used in the experiment of synthesizing water from its constituents, then the reactants
will contain only pure hydrogen and pure oxygen. If these are put together and heated
water should be formed. He was more interested to point out that the acidity that one
would detect, in synthesized water, was because of impurity and not because water
by itself could be an acid. What he could have said that water was a very mild acid.
Although scientists had not realized that water was an acid, but it indeed was. Anyway,
the heart of the problem is that Lavoisiers belief was that if pure elements (for him
elements are like particles or made up of particles) were made to go through certain
kinds of reactions then only a certain kinds of compounds would be produced. This
is of course based on scientists accepting Lavoisiers understanding of the principle
of conservation of mass, principle of chemical elementarity, or principle of chemical
simplicity. So, underlying Lavoisiers arguments is the idealization of the reaction
protocols and this aspect of idealization is something that Michael Matthews brings out
in his argument, where he talks about Galileos experiments with pendulum.5 Clearly,
one can never get the kind of results that Galileo had reported. One really cannot
get those kinds of pure results. One needs to idealize. And what Lavoisier did was to
idealize and tried to show what an ideal chemical experiment would look like, and
drew conclusions from those experiments.
Now, if we go back to this question about science instruction and if we look at or if
we follow let us say Lavoisier in his trails, we will realize what kind of arguments that
the protagonists, for introducing history of science in science education, are employing.
What we need to do in order to do good science like Lavoisier or Galileo is to be able
to idealize in the right kind of context. It seems to me that this is a bit too much to
expect from high school students. If the students are put in the kind of conflict that
Lavoisier went through and are asked here you are at this stage: How will you proceed
and should you not idealize now, should you not think that the atoms are pure things
and when are they pure and you put them together will they behave in such and such
way. I think that is a bit too much to ask. For secondary science education at least at
7-8th standard when the idea of water as a compound is introduced it is a tall order
at least or at best, and at worst it will not lead to the kind of expectations that history
and philosophy of science is supposed to bring out in science instruction.
There is another argument of the antagonists. This is a well known argument
(H)istory of science is an academic discipline. If we include in history of science what
academic historians actually produce, the science students may not do justice to the
material that the historians have produced. If they do justice to the material, no initia-
tion to the paradigm based understanding and research is possible, where a paradigm
is understood in the way Thomas Kuhn had employed the term in his book The Struc-
5 Matthews, M. R.: 1992, History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching: The Present Rapprochement, Science
and Education, 1, 11-47.

ture of Scientific Revolutions. This is basically the heart of the argument that Kuhn, 6
Martin Kline,7 or Steven Brush8 has given. So, they conclude from this that either
history of science is not useful to train scientists or history of science will lead to
situation where it will not be possible to train scientists. So if someone is good in
interpreting history of science well, (s)he will not feel like doing science. The claim is
that to do science after having figured out that scientists do all kinds of stuff is a tall
order. At least it will begin to inhibit students from pursuing science, or it will not
serve the purpose of introducing scientific concepts through history of science.
There is a reply of course. Michael Matthews, as a major protagonist, claims that
one needs to introduce history of science in moderation5. It is not advisable to take the
research outputs of the historians of science and introduce that directly into high school
science curriculum. The point is well taken. However, it seems to me the counter reply
involves a certain kind of pragmatism. This pragmatism implies that the question,
What should be the outcome of science learning? needs to be first answered. In
science instruction there are some expectations at the end of instruction, and what
these expectations are need to be answered. It is not the same question as what was
actually the process of growth in science. If these two questions are different, then it is
a completely and totally empirical question whether the answer to the second question
has any bearing on the answer to the first. This is I think one point or one area where
the pragmatists or the people who suggest moderation in introducing history of science
in science education either fail to recognize or havent satisfactorily addressed.
3 History of Chemistry in Chemical Education

So much for general science education, and the role of history and philosophy of science
in science education. Now, I address specific question about chemical education. Taking
the last concern in the section above first, I first look at the response to the question:
What is the aim of chemical education? Here is what M. J. Frazer claims is the general
aim of chemistry should be like:9
to prepare students for professional career in science especially in chemistry,

to contribute to general education using chemistry as an instrument and
to inform future citizens of the country of the nature and the role which chemistry
plays in everyday life.
I shall dispose of the first aim with some preliminary remarks since I wish to
enquire the role of history of chemistry/science in achieving the other two aims at this
6 Kuhn, T. S.: 1977, The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research, in his The
Essential Tension, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 225-239.

7 Klein, M. J.: 1972, Use and Abuse of Historical Teaching in Physics, in, S.G. Brush and A.L. King, (eds.),
History in the Teaching of Physics, University Press of New England, Hanover.

8 Brush, S. G.: 1974, Should the History of Science be Rated X?, Science, 18, 1164-1172.
9 Frazer, M. J.: 1975, Up-to-date and Precise Learning Objectives in Chemistry, New Trends in Chemistry,
The UNESCO Press, Paris, IV, 43-53.

Basu 179
stage. I shall take up the role of history of science in achieving the first aim in some
detail in the next section. It may be seen that the first point is related specifically to
those students who will become chemists and the last two to more like chemistry for
citizens. Before I make the preliminary remarks regarding the first aim, I introduce
two other lists that tend to document in more detail what are the expectations of a
course in chemistry. Some of these courses are under the rubric of chemistry for
citizens. One list is organized after taking a poll among chemistry educators, as to
what should a course of chemistry for citizens at the secondary school level aim to
achieve.10 These aims include:
1. to assist the overall development and maturation of the student,

2. to show that science is a human activity and is a part of cultured persons world
view,
3. to provide an indication of the way scientists work by seeing relations between

concepts and validating these by empirical tests,
4. to instil an awareness of the profound and far reaching consequences of the uses
and abuses of science,
5. to show the historical continuity of the growth of science,
6. to generate a liking for science, and
7. to develop the facility for critical and unbiased observation.
It may be seen from the above list that there is not much emphasis in terms of
the objectives which require introducing lessons in terms of introducing STS. There is
something in the 4th point which is aimed at achieving an awareness of the profound
and far reaching consequences of uses and abuses of the science. Otherwise the
list underscores that there is or should be some attempt to introduce what may be
called the nature and method of science. There is an attempt to show the continuity
of growth of science and there by alerting them to science being a historical process.
Then the 6th one is interesting in that it takes that chemical education should attempt
to generate a liking for science and that is where the ideology for science education
comes in. The 7th point says that chemical education should develop the facility for
critical and unbiased observation. I am not sure what kind of unbiased observation
one will generate in chemical contexts. It is an aim which may be unattainable unless
an account of unacceptable biasedness is spelt out, argued for, and already in place.
I now take up the last list which is much more extensive and hence is more illumi-
nating. This list is prepared from the information sought from the research chemists
in USA.11 I first enumerate the list before taking up some of these in the rest of my
paper.
10 Idem.
11 Billing, D. E., Private Communication, referred in footnote 9 above, p. 52.
1. To develop and sustain an interest in science and in chemistry as a central,
supporting and challenging area of study
2. To develop a working knowledge of, and favourable attitude towards, scientific
methods of investigation, using chemistry as an example
3. To encourage the exercise of curiosity and creative imagination, and an apprecia-
tion of the role of such speculation in the selection and solution of problems, the
construction of hypotheses, and the design of experiments
4. To develop the ability to see, and the habit of looking for, inter-relationships
between individual phenomena, principles, theories, philosophies or problems
5. To develop an appreciation of scientific criteria and a concern for objectivity and
precision
6. To develop an understanding of the fundamental and unifying principles under-
lying the behaviour of atoms, ions and molecules, and an ability to apply these
principles to real problems involving materials in various physical and biological
conditions
7. To develop the skills, knowledge and habits required for the safe, efficient and
thoughtful manipulation of chemicals and apparatus in common laboratory pro-
cedures
8. To develop confidence and skill in the quantitative formulation of problems and
in the treatment of data
9. To develop in the student the ability and predisposition to think logically, to
communicate clearly by written and oral means, and to read critically and with
understanding
10. To promote the students understanding of science, technology, economic and so-
ciological factors in modern society, and of the contributions they can make to
improve material conditions and to widen mans imaginative horizons and his
understanding of the universe
11. To encourage the applications of chemical knowledge and skills to problems which
are of importance to the community, in particular the optimum use of natural
resources
12. To provide an opportunity for the development of the students motivation and
social maturity, including an appreciation of his own limitations in relation to a
career choice which will be fruitful to himself and to society
13. To develop the students understanding of the structure, values and procedures of
chemical industry, and the chemists professional role in such a situation
Basu 181
14. To develop a knowledge of, and familiarity with the use of, important sources of
chemical information
15. To make the student aware of the limitations of his disciplines and their methods
and to provide opportunities for him to understand, make and criticize value
judgements
16. To cope with individual differences in the abilities and interests of students,
so as to ensure the optimum development of each students potentialities for
achievement and satisfaction and
17. To draw upon staff interests and expertise in such ways that the teaching is
challenging and satisfying
This extensive list brings out some of the aims of chemistry courses and it is possible
to see that the list tries to achieve a range of expertise for chemistry learners. There are
efforts to introduce students to aspects of philosophy of science, the idea(s) of method
in science in general and in chemistry in particular. The interdisciplinary nature of
chemistry is another objective that is supposed to be achieved through chemistry in-
struction. There are a few which underscore the relations between science, technology,
and society. The last two are more close to the problems of day to day learning of
teaching chemistry. One interesting aim included in the list is that the students must
be able to understand the limitations of science in solving a wide ranging problems and
make value judgements. I think that goal is quite laudable although hardly satisfied
by any course in chemistry.
I wish to start with the first aim in the list above. It claims that one of the goals
of courses in chemistry should be to develop and sustain an interest in science and in
chemistry as a central, supporting and challenging area of study. There have often
been complaints that chemical education has fostered memorization of facts and very
many of them at that. As a result chemistry courses have been rather boring and have
driven good students away from chemistry. While responding to this challenge, various
curricula reforms were brought about in all areas of science including chemistry. The
courses developed by CHEM study, in USA, Nuffield Foundation, in UK, and the Scot-
tish Education Department, in UK, were intended to improve learning through science.
There were much more emphasis on understanding the principles of chemistry and less
emphasis on remembering facts. However, chemists began to complain soon that the
students continue to have poor understanding of chemistry. An interesting and pio-
neering article by R. J. Gillespie,12 written in 1977, and quoted somewhat approvingly
by M. Chastrette and C. N. R. Rao,13 in 1992, emphasized that chemistry training
requires remembering facts. Otherwise, there would be embarrassing response from
students, like Silver Chloride (AgCl) is a green liquid. More substantively, Gillespie
argues that, the principles that are taught in introductory courses are not a part of
12 Gillespie,
R. J.: 1977, IUPAC International Newsletter on Chemical Education, (6)
13 Chastrette,M., and Rao, C. N. R.: 1992, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching: An Overview Giving
Examples of Innovative Projects, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching, The UNESCO Press, Paris, VI, 9-14.
chemistry.14 Thermodynamics, Kinetic Theory, and Quantum mechanics are areas of
physics that have proved particularly useful in chemistry. These theories are useful
since these explain chemical facts and help understand the phenomena in chemistry.
This raises the question: What is chemistry? I now deal with this question briefly
before I get on with my task to look at the aims of chemistry and whether history of
chemistry/science can fulfil these aims.
It has been argued that chemistry is a central science.15 Now it is unclear in
what sense is it a central science. The notion of centrality has been viewed in more
than one way by chemists and scholars. Chemistry may be taken to be conceptually
central because it is conceptually networked with a variety of other disciplines. Often
chemistry is viewed this way because of its strong links with physics and biology. This,
however, does not mean that chemistry is foundationally central. In fact the present
wisdom is that (most of) chemistry is, in principle, reducible to physics. Yet another
kind of centrality is possible. It has been argued that chemical change, or lack of it,
is so much a part of everything with which we come in contact and everything we do,
it is in a very real sense the central science. Besides this what are the interesting
features of chemistry? Gillespie argues that chemistry is the science of various forms
and their transformations. In other words, it is the science of properties and reactions
of substances. He claims that
The preparations of new substances and their study of properties is one of the main activities
of the chemist whether (s)he is an industrial chemist preparing new semiconductors or new
drugs or an academic chemist preparing new compounds simply to find out how a previously
unexplored combination of element behaves.16
To quote Gillispie again,

The student who never goes into doing any more chemistry, never gets an opportunity to see
the application of the principles of any real chemistry. (S)he never learns what chemistry is
about. (S)he never learns anything about the fascination of making something new, something
that has been never made before: The synthetic aspect of chemistry. It is one of the aspects of
chemistry that distinguishes it from biology, from physics, and from other sciences. 17
I shall return to the issue of synthesis in the next section. The second list enu-
merated above subsumes the aims in the first list and is more akin to an elaboration
of items and 2 and 3 in the more extended third list. As mentioned above, when
we look at the list of aims mentioned against courses on Chemistry for Citizens, we
see that students are expected to internalize certain philosophical views about sci-
ence. This is supposed to be part of the result of a good chemical/science education.
A. J. Harrison points out quite appropriately that although research scientists think
navely that whatever they produce in the laboratory are ready for market, an array
14 Gillespie, R. J.: 1981, Chemistry: Fact or Fiction?, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching, The UNESCO
Press, Paris, V, 35-40.

15 Newbold, B. T.: 1981, Chemical Education: The Current Challenging Scene, New Trends in Chemistry
Teaching, The UNESCO Press, Paris, V, 22-28.

16 Gillespie, R. J.: 1981, Chemistry: Fact or Fiction?, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching, The UNESCO
Press, Paris, V, 36.

17 ibid.
Basu 183
of organizations mediate between the research scientists and the consumer. 18 Some
of these organizations include political/planning establishments, industrial groups, ju-
diciary, trade unions, consumer protection groups etc. A smooth liasion among these
various groups may as well depend upon persons with chemical/scientific training to be
members of these organizations and recognize the role of chemistry/science in bringing
about material difference to the society.
In order to achieve these goals, the chemical education must have a social dimen-
sion. This, however, may not mean that the general concepts of chemical systems and
chemical change are not within the grasp of the public. It implies instead that there
is no reason why chemistry courses should be more difficult than a course in history. 19
The success will be measured by the attitudes of the individuals towards themselves.
Have they grown in their confidence to extend their knowledge at the level of public
media? The emphasis is not whether they have only learnt certain techniques. The
social dimension is also captured by recognizing that learning of chemistry should
go hand in hand with its social application. The third social dimension is the social
nature of chemical discovery. Here, one may try to introduce through the study of
chemistry and of discoveries within it, Mertonian social attributes attending the prac-
tices of chemistry within a scientific community. A good way to achieve that will be to
introduce institutional history.20 A wider social history may also alert students to the
national, political, military, and industrial demands leading to orienting scientific work
in specific directions. This is one reason why history of chemistry/science may become
useful to chemistry/science education.
It has been argued that science provides opportunities for students to practice or use
some of the more obvious processes such as hypothesizing, observing and recognizing
patterns. However, many other subjects can provide equally good opportunities. To the
future citizens, the skills which are most important may be least specific to science.
Thus the philosophy of science training is claimed to be possible without explicitly
introducing philosophy of science.
4 History of Chemistry and Chemical Education

We can now get on with our attempts to answer the question about history of chemistry
and how this history might help chemical/science education. As mentioned above,
chemistry has been called a central science. Although the conceptual centrality is
doubtful, not much depends upon that one way or the other. Often chemical phenomena
are best understood or explained by appealing to chemical categories. This allows the
chemists to get on with their jobs. The common chemical concepts are generally of
high complexity since objectphenomenon relations in chemistry are generally quite
intricate. Some of the examples of basic chemical concepts include chemical species,
reaction mechanism, structure, conformation, stoichiometry or non-stoichiometry,
18 Harrison, A. J.: 1981, Chemical Education and the Expectations of Society, New Trends in Chemistry
Teaching, The UNESCO Press, Paris, V 19-21.

19 Idem., p. 20.
20 Fensham, P.: 1981, Social Content in Chemistry Courses, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching, The
UNESCO Press, Paris, V, 31-34.

and chemical equilibrium. Equally basic and fundamental concepts in chemistry are
those of element, mixture, and compound. It is worth exploring whether history of
chemistry can help understand these three basic concepts easily and accurately. And I
turn to that question next.
6-7 standard students are introduced this very elementary notion of distinction
between element, mixture and compound. Anyone who has gone through 6-7 standard
books developed by the National Council of Educational Research and Training, India,
is expected to understand what these concepts are. Yet it turns out that students have
remarkable difficulty in understanding the distinction and in applying the same in not
so straightforward instances. This I figured out only two days ago in this workshop. I
am thankful to the two teachers who have pointed this to me that the teachers or the
students who will become teachers and are enrolled in the B.Ed. program have shown a
remarkable inability to distinguish between a mixture and a compound, or an element
and a compound.
Suppose we wish to look at the distinction between the three concepts mentioned
above. The modern definition of a chemical element is that its atoms are of the same
kind. A mixture is defined by a sleight of hand as that which is neither an element
nor a compound. A compound is a result of a combination of at least two atoms, one
each belonging to two disparate elements. This seems to be one place where history of
chemistry may be expected to intervene since the history of the seventeenth and the
eighteenth century chemistry is rich with attempts made by the chemical philosophers,
of those days, to develop a set of criteria to disambiguate these concepts from each other
while attempting to disambiguate these objects of chemical investigation from those
of mechanical investigations. That gets to me thinking, that can I use the historical
attempts by the chemists of the 17th and the 18th centuries starting from Robert
Boyle up until Pierre Macquare when they tried to establish disciplinary autonomy of
what might be called chemical philosophy from mechanical philosophy? Basically the
attempt is to demarcate chemistry from physics. Because physics was in some sense
more professionalised at that time and chemistry was not, and because the chemical
philosophers felt that they did chemical philosophy in its own terms and they were very
good at it, and hence could as well claim some kind of disciplinary autonomy. But if one
wants to claim some kind of disciplinary autonomy, then (s)he must show that chemical
elements, chemical composites like mixtures, and chemical composites like compounds
are different from what might be called physical particles or mechanical particles,
and mechanical composites. Now how do we go about doing it. About 150 years of
philosophical and theoretical analyses were pressed into service starting form Boyle
and until Macquare.21 These attempts by the European chemical philosophers show
that these distinctions are tied to the notion of chemical and physical (mechanical)
properties and the distinction between them, and to the notions of chemical and phys-
ical (mechanical) operations and the distinctions between them. And these attempts
were circular, and the chemists had to get on with their jobs in spite of the lack of this
21 Basu, P. K.: 1996, Disciplinary Autonomy of Chemical Philosophy: A Philosophical Dilemma of the 17th
and the 18th Century Chemical Philosophers, Presented in Annual Australasian Association of History,
Philosophy, and Sociology of Science Meeting, Auckland.
Basu 185
resolution. The picture hence is not pretty. It does not help to introduce the historical
debate to clarify the distinction among the concepts. The history of chemistry here
is not much of help. This shows that if we want to bring to bear this 150 years of
debate into the classroom, no matter how much we want to impose on the history
it will not lead to a very pretty learning/instruction situation. It will rather be a
murky event for the teachers as well as for the students. The debate, however, will
be of enormous help for junior college or undergraduate college level students in a
different sense. It can show very clearly how scientists attempt to develop analytical
arguments to clarify the concepts they use. The sophisticated use of reasoning, appeal
to empirical observations relevant for the case in hand are examples which can help
train students to develop a critical and analytical inclination. But given that the above
chemical concepts are introduced at the 7th standard science curriculum, situation is
not conducive to introduce these philosophical and methodological intricacies.
I now come to another example which seems to resist introduction of history of
science by the very nature of the endeavour itself. It may be remembered that chemists
agree that synthesis of materials constitute an important aspect of chemistry. If chem-
ical synthesis is a part of chemical education, then one needs to ask whether it can
be historically packaged for teaching. The reasons for apprehension or question may
be because of the nature of the enterprise itself. Chemical synthesis, be it organic
or inorganic, in liquid state, gaseous state, or solid state, requires that materials of
certain kind are made to react to make a desired product. Of course, there are situa-
tions where scientists start a reaction without a specific product in mind. Historically
there have been various synthetic routes developed to arrive at a desired end. These
developments occurred through the application of specific knowledgethermodynamic,
reaction rates, stereochemistry or geometry of the starting materials or of product(s),
modes of interaction among the reactants. Yet these knowledge claims are in some
sense a reasonable guide at best. Their status is not that of a theory or a law explaining
or predicting phenomena. That much is obvious since failure of a synthesis process in
a new situation is not a serious evidence against these laws. I think that the logic of
the situation is somewhat different.
I am going to rely on Ian Hackings argument that experimenting or synthesising
is a kind of intervening.22 New phenomena or materials are created in laboratory
under carefully controlled conditions. Control of initial and boundary conditions (main-
tenance of relatively closed systems) is crucial to the emergence of the regularities
underlying various synthetic processes. However, this practical mediation makes the
practical application of the regularities problematic. The chemists design a synthetic
compound for it to perform a desired function. They want to be assured that the
compound will perform that function. But this can happen if the boundaries of the
system can be defined and fixed. But in a new synthesis that is rarely the case.
Now I want to begin to answer why that is so. If we remember that at times the
regularities arrived at or the laws cannot be expressed in a straight forward fashion
in terms of a universal generalization, then we realize that these statements of reg-
22 Hacking, I.: 1983 Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
ularities may contain a ceteris paribus clause. These are like P is a Q,other things
being equal. The explanations and predictions using these laws are somewhat shaky.
This is because the condition, other things being equal, may not obtain. This is what is
underscored, in the case of synthesis, by pointing out that the boundaries of the system
are not defined and fixed. The real world is complex and hence the conditions involving
the occurrence of P may be complex enough not to let Q happen. There are two ways
of getting around this. One way is to modify the real world environment to the extent
that it mimics the environment of the laboratory with the defined boundary conditions
which result in the regularity of if P then Q. So, basically what we do is, if we have a
synthetic route and we want to apply it to a new context, then what we need to be able
to do is as simple as change and modify the context in such a way that we can run our
synthesis. The other is to mimic the environment of the world in the laboratory, which
means to be able to say that here we have a complex situation and we need to mimic
this in the context of our synthetic route.23 That may be an expensive affair since the
world would keep changing and mimicking these variations in the laboratory may not
be viable. So the option in this case is then to take the law of nature or the regularity
of the world and attempt to modify the world. This attempt to modify the world may
not always be possible and given that seldom it is one law of nature or regularity
that is involved in the synthetic procedure, the open ended nature of synthesis and
the lack of viability and efficacy of various laws or regularities in various situations
becomes apparent. This open ended nature of chemical synthesis is apparent when
you look at the synthesis of some of the recent materials specially the superconducting
materials like one, two, three super conductors (Y Ba2 Cu3 O7 ), and Bucky ball, the C-60
molecule. Although both are designer materials, the actual synthesis of which required
extraordinary manipulations of the environment, and was assisted by a certain degree
of chance. If the expectation is that these ideas of chemical synthesis may be introduced
historically in science instruction, and these ideas will help in conceptual learning of
students regarding the nature of synthesis, it is not clear how that will be possible.
In the context of actual instruction in chemical synthesis through history, it is unclear
whether the instruction will give the students the correct picture. This is because
even if we learn how a certain kind of compound can be transformed into another
kind of compound, the next time a student wants to make anything new, and chemical
synthesis is all about making something new, the old information is never enough.
One has to be much more innovative to realize that one has to keep changing the
environment of the world such that the new synthetic law or new synthetic regularities
can play out their role and it is here I claim that historical lessons might not be of help.
However, there are some methodological lessons that one can draw from discussing
the history of synthesis of chemical compounds. One of these is to make the students
realize that synthesis is an open ended endeavor and whenever it comes to employing
chemical synthesis ideas in a new context one needs to be able to control the world in
a new environment. These are some of the tips that one can give. Chemical synthesis
is something that is taught at 11th or 12th standard. And it is unclear whether at that
23 Latour, B.: 1987, Science in Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Basu 187
level history of chemical synthesis can be employed to help science instruction in this
area.
In general conclusion, I become a bit more provocative by pointing out that science
education has a very strong cultural aspect. I come to that conclusion to an extent due
to the fact that when you look at the way the colonial science was introduced into the
Indian context it was to train the natives in moral issues. For the British, natives
were immoral. For those natives the colonizers needed to teach certain kinds of science
like arithmetic or geography and not anything else.24 The understanding was that the
natives would become morally equipped having gone through the training. This is not
to blame the British as such. Because the British tried to do on a similar line something
to themselves. In the 19th century BAAS introduced chemical analysis as part of the
chemical curriculum so as to give students some kind of mental training so that they
become logical.25 Now, the idea of introducing chemical analysis is because one can
use that method of chemical analysis to introduce what might be called a hypothetico-
deductive mode of reasoning. So, if one has a hypothesis that sodium metal burns
with a yellow flame, then one can predict that a salt containing sodium atom will test
positive in a flame test. Now one can do a qualitative test. If the colour of the flame is
yellow, hypothesis is confirmed and if the colour is something else, then the hypothesis
is disconfirmed. Since scientific knowledge is acquired and justified by this method,
people at large will be better off using this method in their daily life since they can all
be scientific in their outlook. And a citizen who is scientific is an asset to a countrys
well being. Thus, mental training is a part of a larger game plan to have people with
superior ability. So what one has to realize is that science education has this kind of
game plan in some form or the other.
24 Kumar, K.: 1997, Political Ideology of Education, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 42.
25 Layton, D., Davey, A., and Jenkins, E. W.: 1986, Science for Specific Social Purposes (SSSP): Perspectives
on Adult Literacy, Studies in Science Education, 13, 27-52.
Multicultural Mathematics, Anti-racist Mathematics: What can that
be?

University of Manchester, UK. Email: george.joseph@man.ac.uk
At a Conservative party conference, the then British Prime Minister, Ms. Margaret
Thatcher said: Children who need to know how to count and multiply are being taught
anti-racist mathematics, whatever that be. The background to Prime Ministerial
outburst is quite interesting, and I would like to believe that I had a part in it. A
week earlier, I addressed a conference of mathematics teachers from inner city schools.
The inner cities are where you find some of the most deprived areas of Britain, and
where teaching could be quite difficult. These are concentrations of ethnic minority
populations, particularly people of Asian and Afro-Carribbean origins. And for some
reason they unusually decided to televise snippets of that talk, and particularly a
question that I was asked as to what I thought of multicultural mathematics. To tell
you the truth, my interest or knowlege of multicultural mathematics at that time was
still in its embryonic stage. I thought it was a good thing, and certainly if it was tied up
with history which had tended to neglect or devalue the contributions of large sections
of the world populations to the subject. I tried to bring in history into my classroom
teaching, both at the school level as well as at the university level. I remember once
being absolutely amazed by how students, reacted when I introduced Non-Euclidean
geometry using history. Groups of students who previously found it totally irrelevant,
probably half of them sleeping, suddenly woke up.
So we were trying at the conference to find out what would engage the school
children of the inner city schools. It was around the time that Nelson Mandela was
in the news. If I remember correctly, a musical jamboree had been organised in his
honour. So somebody then asked how, using South Africa as an example, would one
teach mathematics. So I suggested that one way may be to split up the class into three
groups, blacks, whites and coloureds according to the proportion in the three groups
in South Africa, divide the area of the classroom according to the share of the land
available to the three groups and get each group to stand in the area allocated to them.
The result was a huge concentration of students representing blacks in a relatively
small area with hardly much space for them to stand and a lot of room for the students
representing the whites. The coloured (consisting mainly of Indians and mixed race)
were mainly concentrated into towns since there were restrictions during the apartheid
on their owning land elsewhere. One of them asked me would this be anti-racist? So I
said we could call it anti-racist mathematics.
What I was trying to show there was that for mathematics to be relevant to most
people, it should engage with peoples preoccupations, with peoples concerns and in-
terests. It does not really matter what is the subject that you take up but you have to
make it sufficiently interesting for the students. For example, a group of youngsters
190 Multicultural Mathematics, Anti-racist Mathematics
Western Sicily Hellenistic

Europe world
Jund-i-Shapur
(Persia)
China
Toledo Cordoba
(Spain) (Spain)
Baghdad India
(Iraq)
Cairo
(Egypt)
Figure 1: An alternative trajectory for the Dark Ages.

may be interested in the shapes and designs of the hubs on the wheels of cars. This
could offer some good examples of symmetry. In a way for many, mathematics is seen
as so remote, so irrelevant and so dull that they get turned off by the subject from their
young days, resulting in mathphobia.
At the same conference, a black teacher asked me whether there was any mathe-
matics in Africa before the colonial period. The question was revealing for underlying
it was a view of mathematics which we had consciously and subconsciouly imbibed of
considering it unthinkable that Africans could produce mathematical knowledge. The
view had fostered the myth that mathematics was a civilizing gift that Europe had
brought to the colonies, a Promothean spark that in time would enable the backward
natives to penetrate the secrets of science and technology and enter the world.
I asked the teacher to tell me what he meant by mathematics. He was surprised
when a distinction was made between Mathematics (with a capital M) and mathemat-
ics (with a small m). Mathematics with a capital M is a seminal discipline that some
of us make a living from and mathematics with the small m is what most of people
understand as mathematics and most people use as mathematics. There is a difference
between them. Mathematics with a small m is and has been a universal activity. No
society, however small or remote, has ever lacked the basic curiosity and number sense
that is part of the global mathematical experience. The need to record information that
gave birth to written language also brought forth a variety of number systems, each
with its own strengths and peculiarities. Why is this so difficult to accept and so often
ignored?
What I am going to argue is that (putting in as provocative a fashion as possible),
the answer lies in the nature of Eurocentrism. European mathematics had played
a considerable role in the self-consciouness of Europe, its perception of itself as the
greatest of cultures. It appropriated the contributions of non-Western cultures while
simultaneously making them invisible. The traditional view of the way mathematics
developed takes the form of a unilinear trajectory. Mathematics begins in Greece
around 600 BC and end around 400 AD. One then has the Dark Ages, followed by
Joseph 191
Egypt
Europe and her

Greece Hellenistic cultural
world dependencies
Dark Ages, Renaissance

but Greek
learning
Mesopotamia kept alive
by the Arabs
Figure 2: A modified Eurocentric trajectory.

the Renaissance which was partly a result of the discovery of Greek learning. After
that, devolopment of mathematics restarts and continues in Europe and her cultural
dependencies.
This is what I have described elsewhere as classical Eurocentric trajectory. But
there were already problems with this unilinear trajectory as early as first few decades
of the century. The work of scholars such as Neugebauer showed us higher level of
mathematics in Mesopotamia and Egypt and the debt owed by the early Greeks to
these civilisations.
The trajectory is now a little more complex. There is some recognition of Egypt
and Mesopotamia. And a growing recognition of the Arabs but mostly as custodians of
Greeks learnings, that is those who kept Greek learning alive before it was discovered
by Europe. Even within this modified trajectory there is no recognition of other math-
ematical traditions, for example, written traditions such as Chinese, Indian or Mayan
(in Central America).
But it is the notion of a stagnant period called the Dark Ages that poses serious
problems. Even European historians would now have doubts about characterising a
period by such a name. However, historians of mathematics continue to subscribe to
this outdated notions. In any case, the areas which were under darkness does not
include any area outside the Euroasian peninsula which has come to be referred to as
the separate continent of Europe. In the rest of the Asiatic and part of the African
world as well as the American continents, there were considerable developments going
on. Scientific knowledge was being transmitted across cultures, the catalyst being the
Islamic civilisation of the 9th to the 14th centuries (Figure 1).
I will refer to this mathematical tradition as Arab, since the texts and communi-
cation of that period took place in Arabic. There were contributions coming through
from the Hellenistic world, India and later China. Centers of learning changed from
Jund-i-Shapur (important even before the rise of Islam) to Baghdad, and then to Cairo
and later Cordoba and Toldeo in Spain. Some recent evidence indicates that there was
a movement later to North and West Africa (Magrheb). I wish I knew at the time of the
conference of mathematics teachers from inner city schools which I mentioned earlier
what I know now. I could have provided a better answer to the teacher who asked me
about mathematics in Africa.
Indian Brahmi
numerals, c. 300 BC
Indian Gwalior
numerals, c. AD 500
Western Arabic, Eastern Arabic,

or Gobar, c. 950 c. 800
European apices,
c. 1000
European (Durer),
c. 1500
Figure 3: The evolution of present-day numerals.

When one goes on to consider the nature and range of influences that went into
the making of Arab mathematics during the period of the so-called Dark Ages, one
has a very rich picture of multiculturalism in mathematics (Figure 1). There are
the Egyptian and Babylonian influences going into the formation of classical Greek
mathematics, the mathematics associated with names such as Thales and Pythagoras.
We then have a growing divergence between the classical Greek and Hellenistic tradi-
tions where the latter is associated with names such as Euclid, Apollonius, Archimedes
and Diophantus where new influences from Egyptian and Babylonian traditions make
themselves felt in Alexandria on the African continent. There are links between Hel-
lenistic and Persian traditions, where the transmissions are not necessarily through
books or written records but through trade and travel where the silk route must have
played an important role. And when we come to the influences on Arab mathematics,
the transmission of ideas from India becomes more important from around 850 AD.
This is clearly illustrated in the evolution of our number system (Figure 3).
The Figure shows the genesis of our number system, starting with the Indian
Brahmi system or possibly some Chinese variant, the introduction of zero, the estab-
lishment of a full positional system, the evolution of East and West Arab numerals, and
the transmission across Spain and Sicily westwards to Europe. A parallel movement
eastwards from India to Indo-China and South East Asia (Java, Sumatra). The simi-
larities between the Gwalior system of representing numbers to our own numerals are
sufficient for us to call our system Indo-Arab numerals or even Indian numerals.
So far I have been concentrating on a manifestation of Eurocentrism that takes
the form of omissions and appropriation. There is also another manifestation of
Eurocentrism which may be described as exclusion by definition. In this case, you are
excluding certain mathematical traditions by the way you define mathematics. Such an
exclusion is justified on the grounds that the traditions have not either been influential
in the evolution of modern mathematics or because it appears strange or because some
mathematicians (with a big M) consider that they do not satisfy the litmus test of what
is mathematics, notably the presence of proof.
By this form of deprivation, you are excluding some of the earliest representations
Joseph 193
Figure 4: One of the earliest representations of numbers in a cave.

of numbers and space. On our travels around Tasmania, we came across the following
drawings in a cave situated on a remote beach. It has been dated to period around
35,000 BC (Figure 4).
The intriguing question is: Did these drawing represent early numbers? Some of
their shapes are strangely reminiscent of early Mesopotamian numerals. There is a
pattern and consistency in the representation. We do not know what they are but
would it be unreasonable to assume that they are numerical symbols?
Let me take another case which I have discussed in The Crest of the Peacock. The
Ishango bone (Figure 5) and the latest dating of it in a new edition by Marshak puts
it around 18,000 BC. This is something I wish I knew about when asked whether
there was any mathematics in Africa. There have been all sorts of speculations about
what it was used for and what the representation on it signify. It is interesting to
note that the numbers represented at the bottom are prime numbers from 10 to 20.
Another row shows a form of duplication going on: 3, 6, 4, 8, 5, 10. The most plausible
explanation given by Marshak is that the bone is in fact a lunar calendar. The numbers
in each row adds up to 30. Was such a calendar important? Here, we should look
at the calendars in terms of the habitat and livelihood of the Ishango people. The
bone was found near Lake Edward on the borders of Zaire and Zambia. The Ishango
were probably some of the earliest people we know of who were both agriculturists
and food-gatherers/hunters. During the dry season they would come down the hills
to the lake to catch fish, hunt animals who came to drink water and gather sea food.
Near the end of the dry season they would move to the hills where they would plant
crops and live on their produce. There is sufficient archaeological evidence to support
this conjecture. The calendar would therefore be an important necessity to follow this
life style. Now I would describe this bone as a mathematical artefact since it was not
merely keeping tallies of kills etc which you find with some of the earlier bones, but it is
Figure 5: The Ishango bone.

a conceptual device useful for keeping account of the passage of time and synchronising
with economic activities of the inhabitiants.
Now consider another form of device which some have questioned about its mathe-
matical worth (Figure 6). The Figure is of an Inca Quipu (1400 AD). The Inca Empire
occupied an area which constitute the present-day Peru in South America. The drawing
is taken from a a book written by a Spanish commentator around the time of the
Spanish conquest. It is a fairly complex device for storing all sorts of information.
Numerical information could be stored using a positional number system with the help
of various types of knots, mainly consisting of figure of 8 knots, single knots and long
knots. In the illustration given, and on one of the strings, you will notice one small knot
represents one thousand, then a space followed by 3 Ss represent 300, 5 Ss represent 50
and 1 represents a unit. When taken together, the number represented in our notation
is 351. Each main cord is the sum of the numbers represented in the subsidary cords
and the sum of all main cords would give you the number in the top cord. This is quite a
complex system of retaining the information. There is a whole population census kept
on strings that looks like a cleaning mop. On that mop you have the information about
population by age, by sex and by two different ethnic groups with sub-totals and main
totals all still distinguishable. There are over 400 quipus in the Berlin museum itself
with other collections in London, Paris and the United States. There are hardly any in
Peru.
Consider another example from the same continent, the Mayan civilisation who on
the eve of the Spanish conquest of 1519-1520 occupied over 300,000 square kilometres
and covered present-day Belize, central and southern Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador
and Honduras. The Mayans had a highly developed numeration system (Figure 7).
Incidentally, when people say that the Indians were the only group to discover zero,
this is not correct because the Mayans also had a zero within a positional number
system. The Mayans used a vigesimal (or base 20) system and their symbol for zero
looked like an egg shell. Their positional system was irregular in that after units, 20 0 s,
instead of 400, they had 360 (i.e., 18 x 20). This irregularity may have been a result of
their using a number system for calendrical and astronomical purpose (Figure 8). As
a result, their system lacked the main strength of the Indian system of being able to
multiply or divide by 10 by adding or removing one of the zeroes from the right hand
side of the number.
They had other systems of number representation, including face numerals (Figure
Joseph 195
Figure 6: An Inca official holding the quipu. Inca abacus can be seen at the bottom
left.
9). Well worth showing children who are taken aback that boring numbers can be
represented by interesting and somewhat frightening facial representations. You could
have face numerals side by side with the bar and dots.
A question often asked is who is the earliest known woman mathematician? In
many histories of mathematics, the name of Hypatia crops up. But to provide some
alternative names, I would suggest Gargi, an early Indian woman astronomer and an
unknown mathematical scribe who is present in a Mayan representation (Figure 10).
Look at the person at the top right corner. How do you know that the person was a
mathematician? The Mayans had different way of representing mathematical scribes.
A common mode was to represent a human form with a mathematical document identi-
fied by dots and dashes (or Mayan numerals) under his/her armpit. It dates back to the
beginning of common era. It is interesting in that drawing that a deity is represented
as giving out the knowledge, coaxed by some of his human attendants. In the middle of
the illustration you see the knowledge being collected and being analyzed. The stone
3 9 18 20
= (1 x 7200) + (18 x 360) + (5 x 20) + 0 = 13780
Figure 7: Mayan numerals.

section shows you face numerals and basically tells the dates on a Mayan calendar. It
is a highly sophisticated system.
The question often asked is whether all these examples constitute mathematics. I
would say that it is mathematics with a small m. These were people who were thinking
in mathematical terms and in some cases using it for specific purposes, for constructing
calendars, keeping numerical records or embellishing myths. When talking about
myths, we have probably one of the earliest evidences in a recorded book from China
called Chou Pei (Figure 11). Students find this interesting. Ask them to count the
circles on the right and they soon discover it is a magic square of order 3.
Here is a more recent example of ethnomathematics, probably still in use in some
bazaars in Africa, Middle East and Persia (Figure 12). The background is that in
certain shops, when purchasing a carpet which entails a heavy outlay, you may agree on
terms whereby you pay the shop keeper in instalments. Assume that you have agreed
on the total cost of the carpet (principal), the rate of interest charged per month (r)
and the number of months over which payments have to be made (n). The shop keeper
can tell you very quickly what this mothly installment is. A student of mine carried
out a comparative study of the method we would use in modern mathematics with the
traditional method used by the shop keeper. Also under what circumstances would the
two methods be equal, i.e. when would M be M ? The rest of it is straight forward
maths where you expand a particular power series retain the first three terms and
doing that you get equation(4). You then carry out the substitutions shown in the above
figure. It is very clear if you did not have a calculator the traditional method would be
quite simple compared to the modern method where you have to calculate (1 + r) n .
Consider the example where n = 24 month, p = $3000 and the annual r = 12% you
would find that both methods produce answers very close to one another: traditional
method, M = $140 per month and by modern method M = $141.22 per month. So here
is the case where (some people call it ethnomathematics) the mathematics prevalent
in the market place is worth studying seriously. This is a problem that could be set
for senior classes. It is a useful corrective to students who are slightly contemptous
of old fashioned methods when they can fall back on their calculating machines. My
final example is taken from a group in the United States who you would not normally
associate with mathematical aptitudes, i.e, the African slaves who were forced to work
on cotton plantations in the South. Thomas Fuller was such a slave. He was brought
to Virginia at the age of 14 after being forcibly transported from his birth place in
West Africa and became well known as a calculating prodigy. At the age of 70 he
was tested to see how quickly he could do mental sums. He was asked the number
Joseph 197
Long-count
introduction glyph
(glyph of the deity who
is patron of the
month Cumku on the
sacred calendar)
9 baktuns 17 katuns
9 x 18(20)3 = 17 x 18(20)2 =
1 296 000 days 122400 days
0 tuns 0 uinals
0 kins 13 Ahau
(day on the sacred
calendar reached by
counting forward the
total number of days
on the long-count calendar
from the starting point of
the Mayan calendar)
Figure 8: A Mayan calendar.

of seconds in a year and a half and gave the correct answers in two minutes. He was
then asked the number of seconds a man has lived since his birth. He gave the correct
answer: 70 years 17 days and 12 hours (which was presumably his age at the time).
Asked a third problem, his answer took almost ten minutes, at least partly because the
problem was not stated correctly initially. Fuller was used by the anti-slavery groups
to counter the argument that the Africans were incapable of thinking. The main plank
of the pro-slavery position was that Africans were hardly human at all. They could not
handle abstract subjects such as mathematics and science. Incidentally, that was quite
a common view of black people. The political philosopher, David Hume (who is seen
even today as the epitome of rational thought), also had his own pseudo philosophy
relating to black people justifying them being treated differently. We would very rarely
come across Humes racist views in a political science book today just as Marxists never
talk about Karl Marxs views about blacks.
There are four dimensions to the interests in Fuller. These are calculation prowess
(i.e. a comparison between different mental prodigies), psychological (i.e., an interest in
abnormal mentalities) and liberatory (which I mentioned earlier as means of counter-
ing the inferiority argument) relating to blacks. But very few people, as far as I know,
until the study by Paulus Gerdes and John Fauvel, discussed the cultural dimension.
The question is: Where did Thomas Fuller learn to calculate? There were obviously no
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16
17 18 19 0
Figure 9: Mayan head variant numerals.

schools for slaves. The methods he learnt must have been something which was part
of his culture. We know that he originated from an area which had fairly sophisticated
methods of computation involving considerable mental work. The Yoruba method of
multiplication is an interesting and in some cases an efficient method. So the cultural
argument could be quite important in this context.
The last strand of my talk relates to a point I alluded to earlier. There is a widely-
held view that non-European mathematical traditions, however ingenious are their
computations and algorithms, lack an essential litmus test of good mathematics and
that is a concept of proof. To provide a clear focus to the discussion, let us concentrate
on Indian mathematics.
When certain historians distinguish between mathematical traditions of India and
West, they normally characterise the Indian tradition being algebraic, empirical and
having no rigorous proofs compared to Western (especially Greek) which is charac-
terised as geometric, abstract or anti-empirical and having rigorous proofs. Let me
illustrate this with a quotation from Morris Kline:
There is much good procedure and technical facility but no evidence that they considered proof
Joseph 199
Figure 10: Mayan representation of mathematicians.

at all. They had rules, but apparently no logical scruples. Moreover, no general methods or
new viewpoints were arrived at in any area of mathematics. It is fairly certain that the Hindus
(i.e., the Indians) did not appreciate the significance of their own contributions. The few good
ideas they had, such as separate symbols for the numbers, were introduced casually with no
realisation that they were valuable innovations. They were not sensitive to mathematical
values. (Morris Kline, 1972, p. 190)
I have taken Morris Kline as an illustration. I could take examples from other
authors as well, including G.E.R. Lloyd. But Kline is sufficient. Now I think Klines
view is based on a complete misconception. How did this misconception arise? Partly
because of the way that one sees the sources of Indian mathematics. When we look
at Aryabhatas Aryabhatiya we have merely statements of results. Proofs are often
found in commentaries. If you study the Bhaskara-Is commentary on Aryabhatiya, it
provides both flesh to Arybhatas cryptic verses as well as demonstrations. Now the
Western tradition, probably following on Greek tradition, has in the same text both the
statement of results as well as the proofs. Commentaries do not serve the same function
as in Indian mathematics. Remember, this is a tendency that runs right through
Indian mathematics upto Srinivas Ramanujan. Ramanujans lost notebooks contain a
number of results which has provided lifes work to a number of mathematicians. That
did not mean that there were no proofs at all.
Proofs have different purposes:
Psychological: To convince the student. Success depends on notation, a way in
which an arguement is formulated, organised and presented.
Social and Cultural: Proofs are social and cultural artefacts. How a proof works,
depends on how its intended audience come prepared to follow it. For instance,
the claims made by proofs about mathematical objects are culturally determined.
For example, consider the difference between Euclidean vs Navajo (or Indigenous
Australian) view of space. How space is viewed is an important element in proof.
Figure 11: Magic squares in China.

Logical: A Greek preoccupation: In Greek tradition, proof quite often concen-
trated just on logical elements.
Within the Indian tradition, demonstration or Upapatti (as it is known) primarily
depends on the audience you are aiming at. Clearly you use different proofs for
different audience. The important thing is that you have to convince a student and
also have to look at the background of the student to find out what they are coming
with. This is the reason that Euclidean geometry never received a receptive audience
in India at all before the coming of modern mathematics. There were various attempts
especially in Moghul times to introduce Euclidean geometry to Indian mathematics
but the attempts failed.
Just to illustrate this let me take an example that has been discussed by M.D. Srini-
vas.
Say what is the hypotenuse of a plane figure, in which the side and upright are equal to 15 and
20? Show the upapatti underlying the usual mode of computation.
The upapatti follows: It is two-fold, one ksetragata (geometric) and the other avyaktya (al-
gebraic). The geometric demostration must be shown to those who do not understand the
algebraic one. (Bhaskaracharyas Bijaganita)
Look at the Pythagorean theorem which is very familiar to everyone. This is taken
from Bhaskracharyas Bijaganita. The Figure asks that what is the hypotenuse of
a plane figure in which the side and the upright are equal to 15 and 20? Show the
Upapatti underlying the usual mode of computation. Then he goes on to say that you
have 2 different ways of demonstration.
One is the geometric demonstration for the people who have a strong visual sense and they
would be convinced by seeing and that is called Ksetragata. The other is the algebraic one. It
is important you show the right proof to the right people depending which is the one that they
understand best. The geometric is not shown to the algebraic and vice versa.
Joseph 201
Let P = Prinicpal; N = Number of Months; r = montly interest rate

M = Monthly Payment (using popular calculation) M = Monthly
Payment (using modern calculation) and I = Interest
N
M = 1 [P + I ] where I = 1P [12r]
N 2 12
So M =1 P +1 PNr (1) (POPULAR)

N 2
And r (1+r)N P
M= (2) (MODERN)
(1+r)N - 1
WHEN IS M M?
rP (3)
Rewrite (2) as M=
1
1-
(1 + r)N
1
Expand as a power series and retain first three terms
(1 + r)N
1 1 - Nr + 1 (N + 1)Nr2 (4)
(1 + r)N 2
Substitute (4) in (3) and simplify:

P where q = 1 (N + 1)r (5)
M 2
N (1 - q)
1 (6)
For small q (0 < q < 0.5), 1+q
1-q
Substitute (6) in (5) to get:
1 P + 1 P(N + 1)r M for large N and small r

M N 2
Example: N = 24 months, P = $3000, Annual r = 12%

M = $140 per month M = $141.22 per month
Figure 12: Popular calculation.

To conclude, the general tenor of my argument may be summed up in the following
way. Why is Eurocentrism an aspect that should be taken into account by anybody
who wants to use history in the teaching of mathematics? And I put it in the following
terms. Eurocentrism has prepared us to consider it unthinkable that the non-European
could produce mathematical knowledge. It fostered the myth (referring to the time
of colonisation) that mathematics was a civilizing gift that Europe got through the
colonies. The Promothean spark that in time would enable backward native to pen-
etrate the secrets of science and technology to enter the modern world. There was
a savage counterpart created to the western minds. There was an imperial ideology
legitimising the traditional mathematical development as a purely European product.
Even after the demise of Europe, the prejudices concerning the origins of mathematics
and science have been especially difficult to come back as they are still very functional
to the legitimation of the economic and the political supremacy of the western powers
in the contemporary world.
This is putting it in a very provocative fashion. I will end with a personal story.
Around the time that South Africa became independent, I was invited by the African
National Congress to advise on the restructuring of the mathematics curriculum par-
ticularly for the black universities but also for the schools. I found two very interesting
factors at work. First, I was amazed to find that in the black universities students could
complete a degree in mathematics without studying calculus. When one asked why this
was so, the answer was that under Apartheid, calculus was seen as too abstract for the
blacks. And this was a seriously-held view!
Second, in some of the white universities, black students could take courses under
strictly controlled circumstances. I was surprised at the conference to come across
a number of mathematics teachers who held diploma in biblical studies. What had
presumably happened was that some of the white universities actually taught them
mathematics but ended by giving them diploma in biblical studies. A number of people
knew what a diploma in biblical studies meant and it is possible that some of the
government officials had connived in perpetrating this fraud. But as long as there was
no threat of students being taught such subversive subjects as mathematics, nobody
complained. So, when people tell me there is no politics or culture in mathematics, this
sentiment has a hollow ring in the context of South Africa or even an inner city school
in England.
References
Joseph, G.: 2000, The Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Roots of Mathematics, 2nd
edn, Princeton University Press.
Nelson, D. Joseph G.G., W. J.: 1993, Multicultural Mathematics, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Infinite Series across Three Cultures: Background and Motivation

University of Manchester, UK. Email: george.joseph@man.ac.uk
The subject of the essay is infinite series across cultures, I will concentrate mainly on
the non-mathematical aspects relating to it.
Two powerful tools contributed to the creation of modern mathematics in the seven-
teenth century: the discovery of the general algorithms of calculus and the development
and application of infinite series techniques. Many of you have been introduced to cal-
culus, (i.e., the general algorithms of calculus consisting of differentiation, integration
and other techniques) and probably know that the names normally associated with
the development of that stream are Newton and Leibniz. The other stream was the
discovery and applications of infinite series and again the European names that are
associated with it are Mercator, Wallis, Gregory, Newton and Leibniz (Figure 1). These
two streams of discovery reinforced each other in their simultaneous development
because each served to extend the range of application of the other.
However, what is less known is that the origin of the analysis and derivations of
certain infinite series, notably those relating to the arctangent, sine and cosine, was not
in Europe, but an area in South India which now falls within the state of Kerala. From
a region covering less than a thousand square kilometres north of Cochin and during
the period between the fourteenth and sixteenth century, there emerged discoveries in
infinite series that predate similar work of Gregory, Newton and Liebniz by at least
200 years.
There are a number of questions worth asking about the activities of this group of
mathematicians/astronomers (from now on referred to as the Kerala School) apart from
technical ones relating to the mathematical content of their work. In this talk I will
consider specific questions relating to the social landscape in which the Kerala School
developed, the mathematical motivation underlying their interest in a particular se-
ries, the arctan series (and its special case, the pi series). To provide a cross-cultural
context, I will compare the Kerala work with those in China during the eighteenth
century and only briefly mention the European work of the seventh century since it
has had adequate exposure in the literature.
Let us begin with a brief introduction to the chronology, the actors and subject mat-
ter of Indian mathematics (Figure 2). Some of the earliest texts in Indian mathematics
were the Sulbasutras. These were essentially manuals for surveyors containing in-
structions constructing sacrificial altars (vedi) and locating sacred fires (agni) that had
to conform to certain shapes and measurements if they were to be effective instruments
of sacrifice. In trying to construct a circular altar equal to the area of a square altar, the
sulbkaras (i.e., the authors of these manuals of which three were important, namely
Baudhyana, Apastamba and Katyayana) came across the problem of what we would
now describe as the incommensurability of pi. And in constructing a square altar
204 Infinite Series
General Algorithms of
Calculus
(Newton and Liebniz)
CREATION OF MODERN
MATHEMATICS (17th C)
Discovery and Applications

of Infinite Series
(Mercator, Wallis, Gregory,

Newton and Liebniz)
Figure 1: Origin of calculus.

double the area ofanother square altar, they came across the problem of the incom-
mensurability of 2. Here we have the beginnings of an Indian preoccupation with
these two magnitudes which surfaces in a different form later in Kerala mathematics.
However, a more direct inspiration for Kerala mathematics were the works of Aryab-
hata and his commentator, Bhaskara-I (Figure 3).
In 499 AD (i.e., 1500 years ago) at the age of 23, Aryabhata, composed his seminal
text Aryabhatiya. An Arabic translation of the text entitled Zij al-Arjabhar was made
around 800 AD. The influence of the astronomical and mathematical ideas in the text,
both inside and outside India cannot be overestimated. His influence prevailed at least
in Kerala for about a thousand years. When we talk about the Kerala work we have
in mind the period from about the birth of Madhava (c. 1350 AD) to about 1600 after
which there are texts but they are not important (Figure 4).
What the Figures 2 and 3 indicate is that the history of Indian mathematics is
a very long one and so is the history of numeracy among its inhabitants. Being a
conference on science education, Figure 5 may be of special interest. It goes back to
a period around 300 BC and is from a Jaina text called Sthananga Sutra. The topics
starred were the ones taught to everyone and consisted of patiganita, kalasavrna, rajju
and possibly rasi as well. The other topics, namely yawat-tawat, varga, ghana, varga-
varga, vikalpa constituted more advanced mathematics. What it shows is a society
which valued numeracy and the skills of calculation were present among many of its
people.
The story of the discovery of Kerala mathematics sheds some fascinating light on
the character of the historical scholarship of the period. In 1832, Charles Whish read a
paper to a joint meeting of the Madras Literary Society and the Royal Asiatic Society
in which he referred to five works of the period, 1450-1850: Tantrasamgraha (A Digest
of Scientific Knowledge) of Nilakantha (1444-1545), Yuktibhasa (An Exposition of the
Rationale) of Jyesthadeva (fl. 1500-1610), Kriyakramakari (Operational Techniques)
of Sankara Variyar (c. 1500-1560) and Narayana (c. 1500-1575), Karanapaddati (A
Manual of Performances in the Right Sequence) of Putumana Somayajin (c. 1660-1740)
Joseph 205
1800 Sankara Varman (1800 - 1838) Sadratanamala
1700
1650 Putamana Somayaji (1660 - 1740) Karanpaddati
Achuta Pisharoti (1550 - 1621)

1550
Jyesthadeva (1530 - 1610) Yuktibhasa
1500 Narayana and Sankara Variar (b. c. 1500) Kriyakramakari

Chitrabhanu (1474 - 1550)
1450 Nilakantha (1444 - 1543) Tantrasamgraha
Aryabhatiyabhasya
Damodara (b. 1410)
1400
Paramesvara (1380 - 1460)
1350
Madhava (1340 - 1425)
1300
Figure 2: Indian mathematics: Kerala school.

and Sadratnamala (A Garland of Bright Gems) of Sankara Varman (1800-38) (Figure
6).
An important feature of the last four texts is their claim to have derived their main
ideas from Madhava (c. 1340-1425) and Nilakantha who are referred to as acharyas (or
teachers). It is possible that Madhava wrote a comprehensive treatise on astronomy
and mathematics, including sections on infinite series. And it is probably to the con-
tents of this text that others who came after him refer to in such glowing terms. Such
a work remains to be discovered.
These authors form part of a tradition of continuing scholarship in Kerala over a
period four hundred years from the birth of Madhava in 1340 to the probable death of
Putumana Somayajin in 1740. In the present state of knowledge of source materials
it is difficult to assign many of the developments to any particular person. The results
should be seen as produced by members of a school as it were, spread over several
generations (Figure 7).
Now what did their work consist of? Let me give you a flavour by quoting from
Jyesthadevas Yuktibhasa. This is a literal translation and relates to the arctan series
with the contents in the brackets inserted for purposes of clarity. Note that capital Sine
(Cosine) are sometimes called Indian sine (cosine) and is the product of radius and our
sine (cosine).
The product of given Sine and the radius divided by the Cosine is the first result. From the
first (and then the second, third, . . . etc.) results, obtain (successively) a sequence of results
by taking the square of the Sine as the multiplier and the square of the Cosine as the divisor.
Divide (the above results) in order by the odd numbers 1, 3, 5, . . . etc. to get the (full sequence
of) terms. From the sum of the odd terms, subtract the sum of the even terms. (The result)
becomes the arc. In this connection, it is laid down that the (Sine) of the arc of (that of) its
complement, whichever is smaller, should be taken here (as the given Sine); otherwise, the
206 Infinite Series
-3000
Harappan Period Weights and Measures
-1500
Satapatha Brahmana
Baudhayana Sulbasutras
-1000 Vedic Period
Apastamba
-500
Year Jaina and Buddhist Period Sthananga Sutra
0 Bakhshali Manuscript
Aryabhata Aryabhatiya
Brahmagupta Brahmasphutasiddhanta
500 "Classical" Period Bhaskara I Aryabhatiyabhasya
Mahavira Ganitasarasamgraha
Bhaskara II Lilavati
1000
Madhava
1500 Kerala Period Nilakantha Tantrasamgraha
Jyesthedeva Yuktibhasa
Figure 3: Chronology of Indian mathematics.

terms, obtained by the (above) repeated process will not tend to a vanishing magnitude.
There are a couple of interesting features about the Yuktibhasa. First, its most reli-
able version is in Malayalam and not Sanskrit. This is an important point since prac-
tically all major texts on Indian mathematics or astronomy were written in Sanskrit.
Second, there is no translation in English of the text available yet. This is unfortunate,
but the reason is simple. We require someone with an unusual combination of skills
to produce a good translation: someone conversant with old Malayalam (very different
from the present Malayalam), someone with knowledge of technical Sanskrit, some one
with a reasonable knowledge of mathematics and preferably astronomy and someone
who possesses what I would describe as mathematical imagination. I would like to
take this opportunity to pay tribute to Professor K.V. Sarma, who has a good modicum
of all these skills and who has over the last forty years with a single-minded devotion
and hard work brought to us the treasures of Kerala mathematics and astronomy.
Whenever I present seminars in different places and different continents on Kerala
mathematics, I am asked is there any Yuktibhasa available for them to read, and I say
they have to know Malayalam since there was a modern Malayalam translation fifty
years ago!
If the quotation of Jyesthadeva is put in modern notation, it becomes quite straight
forward. I will not go into the technical mathematics of this expression. But what we
have here is the well known arctan series, usually known as the Gregory series named
after James Gregory, a Scottish mathematician, who studied the series in 1671. In my
book, The Crest of the Peacock, I have argued that it should be called the Madhava-
Gregory series, since it has been attributed by a number of members of the Kerala
School to their founder, which would then predate its first appearance with a detailed
derivation three hundred years before Gregory.
There is another aspect to the Yuktibhasa which is interesting. As the very name
Joseph 207
-3000
Harappan Period Babylonian and Egyptian
Mathematics
-1500
Vedic Period "Chou Pei" - Earliest Chinese Text
-1000 Sulbasutras
Rise of Greek Mathematics
-500 Euclid's Elements
Jaina and Buddhist Rise of Chinese Mathematics
Year
Period Chinese "9 Chapters"
0 Rise of Mayan Mathematics
500
"Classical" Period Rise of Arab Mathematics
1000 Al-Khwarizmi's "Algebra"
Inca Quipu
Kerala Period
1500 Rise of European Mathematics
2000 MODERN MATHEMATICS
Figure 4: Time lines: India and the rest of the world.

Yuktibhasa implies, unlike any other Indian mathematical text known to me of that
and earlier periods, the text contains a detailed exposition of the rationale (or proofs)
usually in a verbal form, consisting of a mixture of technical terms and katapayadi
notation, a refinement of Aryabhatas alphabet-numeral system of notation.
It is from this rationale that one puts together the derivation of the arctan series
according to Kerala mathematicians. I will not consider the detailed derivation here.
Instead, a few words about the approach. The approach involves what is known as the
direct rectification of an arc of a circle, i.e., the summation of very small arc segments
and reducing the resulting sum to an integral. From the Madhava-Gregory series, the
Kerala School was able to derive the series for pi, known in mathematical literature as
the Leibniz series. I would suggest that in all fairness, it should be renamed Madhava-
Leibniz series.
Before I leave this subject, let me say something more about the method of direct
rectification that formed the basis of the Kerala approach to the derivation of a number
of infinite series. This may be of some interest to the mathematicians among you.
This is a very interesting geometric technique different from the method of exhaustion
used in the Arab and European mathematics. In the Kerala case we sub-divide an arc
into unequal parts and while in the other (Arab and European) case there is a sub-
division of the arc into equal parts. The different technique used in Kerala was not
because the method of exhaustion was unknown to the Indians. Indeed, it is likely
that Aryabhata used the method of exhaustion to arrive at his accurate estimate of
the circumference for a given diameter. The exhaustion method was probably avoided
because the calculation, involving working out the square roots of numbers at each
stage of the calculation, was a tedious and a time-consuming task. What we have here
208 Infinite Series
1. PATIGANITA (ETYMOLOGY : "SAND-CALCULATION")
(I) PARIKARMA : Number representation and the four

fundamental operations of arithmetic
(II) VYAVAHARA : (Arithmetic problems, including the
"Rule of three")
2. KALASAVRNA : Advanced treatment of fractions
3. RAJJU : Plane geometry calculations as carried

out by means of a rope
4. RASI : Mensuration of plane figures and solids
5. YAWAT-TAWAT : Study of that which is unknown or

algebra
6. VARGA : Problems involving square and square-root
7. GHANA : Problems involving cube and cube-root
8. VARGA-VARGA : Problems involving higher powers

and higher roots
9. VIKALPA : Permutations and combinations ()
Figure 5: Maths curriculum according to Sthnanga Sutra.

may be an interesting foundational difference between what I would call the Indian
approach and the Greek-Arab-European approach. In the Indian case, numbers were
merely entities to be operated on, and the stress was on operations rather than the
numbers themselves. As a result Indian mathematics steared clear of any philosophical
difficulties with incommensurability. For example, surds (karani) were accepted as
proper numbers from the time of the Sulbasutras and rules for handling them were
developed. In place of rational-irrational classification, a notion of exact-inexact
numbers may have prevailed.
What motivated the Kerala School to undertake the work that they did? The mo-
tivation may be found in a verse from Aryabhatiya which happens to be one of the
most famous verses in Indian mathematics. It tells you how for a given diameter you
calculate the circumference of that circle:
Add 4 to 100, multiply by 8, and add 62,000. The result is approximately (?) the circumference
of a circle whose diameter is 20,000. (Aryabhatas Aryabhatiya (Verse 10))
Certain historians of mathematics (such as Kay and Morris Kline) have argued that
the Indians were not aware of the fact that could never be exactly determined. I see
this confusion arising in the minds of these historians because of the mistranslation of
the word Asana as approximate or rough inaccurate value as in the quotation. The
word is more subtle term than that. What it conveys is the notion of unattainability.
Unattainable is something that one can never reach. Unless one understands this
one can not understand the interest of the Kerala School in this quotation.
Joseph 209
NILAKANTHA (b. 1444)

Aryabhatiyabhasya : "Commentary on Aryabhatiya"
Tantrasamgraha : "A Digest of Science"
JYE STHADEVA (Fl. 1550)

Yuktibhasa : "An Exposition of Rationale"
NARAYANA (fl. 1525)/SANKARA VARRIER (fl. 1550)

Kriyakramakari : "Performance in Correct Order"
PUTAMANA SOMAYAJI (c. 1660-1740)

Karanapaddati : "Operational Methods"
SANKARA VARMAN (1800 - 1838)

Sadratnamala : "A Garland of Pearls"
Figure 6: Major texts of the Kerala school.

Let me illustrate this point with a long passage from Nilakanthas commentary,
Aryabhatiyabhasya. It is worth reading carefully.
Why is only the approximate value (of circumference) given here? Let me explain. Because
the real value cannot be obtained. If the diameter can be measured without a remainder, the
circumference measured by the same unit (of measurement) will leave a remainder. Similarly,
the unit which measures the circumference without a remainder will leave a remainder when
used for measuring the diameter. Hence, the two measured by the same unit will never
be without a remainder. Though we try very hard we can reduce the remainder to a small
quantity but never achieve the state of remainderlessness. This is the problem. (Nilakanthas
Aryabhatiyabhasya (1500 AD))
What it shows is that Nilakantha and others understood the irrational nature of .
So the question is what did they do as a result? The following passage from Sankara
and Narayanas Kriyakramakari suggests a strategy:.
Thus even by computing the results progressively, it is impossible theoretically to come to a
final value. So, one has to stop computation at that stage of accuracy that one wants and take
the final result arrived at by ignoring the previous results.
Indian mathematicians were not generally preoccupied with the philosophical im-
plications of numbers as mathematical objects. Faced with irrationality, they tried to
arrive at as accurate an estimate as possible. And this is what is being suggested in
Kriyakramakari.
However, in applying the infinite series approach to estimate the circumference,
the Kerala mathematicians came across a serious difficulty. The problem is that the
Madhava-Leibniz series converges very very slowly. For example, summing the first 19
terms on the right hand side of: /4 = 1 1/3 + 1/5 . . . would give a highly inaccurate
estimate of as 3.194.
210 Infinite Series
Madhava (ca. 1340 - 1425) Paramesvara (ca. 1380 - 1460) Damadara

(b. 1410) Nilakantha (1444 - 1543) Chitrabhanu (1474 - 1550)
Narayana (ca. 1525 - 1610) and Sankara Variyar (ca. 1500 - 1560)
Damodara (b. 1410) Jyesthadeva (ca. 1500 - 1575) Achuta

Pisharoti (ca. 1550 - 1621)
Figure 7: Teacher-student lineage in the Kerala school. (The names underlined are
generally recognised as the major figures of the Kerala School.)
The problem was tackled in two directions: (a) rational approximations by applying
corrections to partial sums of the series; and (b) obtaining more rapidly converging
series by transforming the original series. There was considerable work in both direc-
tions as shown in detail in Yuktibhasa and Kriyakramakari. As an illustration of (a)
from the Yuktibhasa, consider the incorporation of the following correction term to the
Madhava-Leibniz series: Fc (n) = (n2 + 1)/(4n3 + 5n) where n is the number of terms on
the right hand side. Applying this correction where n = 11 , the implicit estimate of
is 3.1415926529 which is correct to 8 places. And this interest in increasing the accuracy
of the estimate continued for a long time, so that as late as the nineteenth century the
author of Sadratnamala estimated the circumference of a circle of diameter 10 18 as:
314, 159, 265, 358, 979, 324 correct to 17 places! What the work exhibits is a measure of
understanding of the concept of convergence, of the notion of rapidity of convergence
and an awareness that convergence can be speeded up by transformations. Similar
work was found in modern mathematics only as late as the end of the 18th century.
Incidentally, there was a whole range of other achievements of the Kerala School in
mathematics and astronomy which I will not discuss here, except to mention that using
very similar approaches they derived the Sine series, Cosine series and something that
I think is of interest to mathematicians in general, the Taylor series. So the ubiquitous
Taylor series was already known in India about two hundred and fifty years before it
entered modern mathematics.
To understand the context in which the mathematics developed, there is a need to
take a broad look at the social landscape of medieval Kerala society and seek answers
to the following questions:
What was the nature of the social structure of medieval Kerala?
What was the pivotal role of the Kerala temple?
How was scientfic knowledge acquired and disseminated in medieval Kerala?
Each of these questions could well provide enough subject matter for another essay.
Let me very briefly bring out a few points. When I initially started research on this
subject, I thought I found a fairly plausible explanation for the genesis of mathematics
and astronomy in this geographically remote part of India. In a way, why I found re-
search in this area very interesting was because it upset a whole lot of preconceptions,
including some of my earlier conjectures.
Joseph 211
METHOD OF DIRECT RECTIFICATION
+ Find the length of an arc by approximating it to

+
a straight line
+ Involves summation of very small arc segments and
+
reducing the resulting sum to an integral
INTERESTING GEOMETRIC TECHNIQUE: The tangent

is divided up into equal segments while at the same time
forcing a sub-division of the arc into unequal parts
+ Contrast with "method of exhaustion" in European and
+
Arab mathematics where there was a sub-division of
an arc into equal parts
+ Adoption of "infinite series" technique rather than the
+
"method of exhaustion" for implicitly calculating p was
not through ignorance of the latter in Kerala
A Foundational Difference In Approach
INDIAN : Numbers are entities whose value depends

on their efficacy in mathematical operations
EUROPEAN (GREEK) : It was from measurability that
countability and other operations stemmed
Figure 8: The approach.

As I mentioned before, the members of the Kerala School were predominantly Nam-
buthri Brahmins with a few who came from sub-castes, such as the Variyars and the
Pisharotis, traditionally associated with specific duties in the temple. Within a mainly
two-tier caste system, consisting of Brahmins and Nairs, two institutions operated
to strengthen and sustain the economic and social dominance of the Nambuthris to
a degree not known elsewhere in India: the janmi system of land-holding and the
Nambuthri control of vast tracts of land owned by temples. There were other factors
that helped to strengthen the economic and social powers of the Nambuthris. The Nairs
practised the marumakkattayam (matrilineal) system of descent without the formal
institution of marriage. Sexual alliances between Nair women and Nambuthiri men
were permitted, indeed sometimes encouraged, with children of such unions remaining
the sole responsibility of their mothers family. At the same time, the Nambuthris
operated a system of patrilineal descent (makkatayam), with a form of primogeniture
that allowed only the eldest son to inherit land and property and to marry Nambuthri
women. The eldest son was also required to provide for the material needs of his
siblings consisting of younger brothers and unmarried sisters (of whom there were
a number given the operation of the system).
Madhava and all those who knew and followed him lived and worked in large com-
pounds called illams in villages with predominantly Nambuthri settlements. Set well
away from roads to prevent contact with others, often surrounded by a high wall, each
illam had its own well for water, a tank for bathing and a number of outbuildings. Many
of these illams belonged to households that owned large landed properties and were
212 Infinite Series
very affluent. With their estates farmed by workers or tenants from lower castes and
often under the management of Nairs, the Nambuthris, and particularly the younger
sons, enjoyed considerable leisure and were expected to pass their time in study and
ritual observances.
These illams provided a base for the education of the young in Sanskrit works, in-
cluding mathematical and astronomical classics, notably the Aryabhatiya of Aryabhata
(b. 476 AD) and its commentaries. Not only was traditional knowledge transmitted
in these illams by rote, but they also provided a centre for research and scholarship.
Sometimes, the scholars wrote commentaries on the classics and in those commen-
taries they appended their own discoveries as additions and supplements. The short
distances between the illams, the role of the temple and political stability combined
to provide for long and stable development, usually based on generations of teacher-
student relationships. A study of their interaction with certain temple personnel (espe-
cially, the ambalavasis such as Sankara Variyar and Achuta Pisharoti) may shed light
both on how non-Brahmin Hindus were recruited into their circle as well the process by
which a wider dissemination of the results of their work in mathematics and astronomy
took place into the neigbouring areas, notably todays Tamilnadu.
Now even a cursory examination of the social background of the members of the
Kerala School would indicate that many were Nambuthri Brahmins. But Madhava
was not one. He was an Empran Brahmin: a member of a group who were trying
very hard to be identified as Nambuthris. Yet he was pursuing activities such as
studying mathematics and astronomy which per se did not constitute high status
activities. The most notable member after Madhava, Neelakanthan, belonged to the
highest rank among the Nambuthris. He was a somayagi, one of the select sub-caste
among the Nambuthris, who could carry out the soma sacrifices. But there were also
other members of the Kerala School who were not brahmins. There was, for instance,
Sankara Variar, where the name Variar indicated that he belong to the Ambilavasis, a
caste of temple servants. And similarly with Achuta Pischaroti. This would indicate
that the Kerala School were an interesting group following an interest in mathematics
and astronomy that did not have great social value or status, a group that to some
extent cut across caste lines and a group who had considerable interactions with the
temple personnel. Rajan Gurukkals study of the medieval history of Kerala and the
importance of the temple culture is particularly illuminating. The temple may have
fulfilled an important purpose: it served as an institution for acquiring and dissemi-
nating knowledge. lt was an influential organisation since it combined religious power
with secular power, being in many cases powerful landlords in their own right. The
temple served as a medium through which the Nambuthris exerted their power and
kept other groups in check. There are clearly parallels between the power of the Church
in medieval Europe and that of the Temple in medieval Kerala.
Another aspect, delving into the background of the members of the Kerala School,
would indicate that a number of the Nambuthris may have been younger sons. This
fact could lead to an interesting theory. As mentioned earlier, the Nambuthris followed
a strict system of primogeniture, so that all landed property went to the eldest son.
There was the additional twist. Only the eldest son could marry a Nambuthri woman.
Joseph 213
The younger sons never married but formed sexual partnerships with Nair women.
So we had a situation of a number of Nambuthris freed of all economic and family
responsibilities, a truly leisured class.
From these facts it would be a simple matter to posit the following scenario. A
group of younger sons, who had very little to do and coming from extremely well-
off circumstances, especially since in the Kerala context then, the Nambuthris were
also the biggest landlords exerting their control directly or through the temple, were
able to live a life of leisure. They had no family responsibilities and their religious
duties were confined to a few and not very demanding rituals. Some wrote erotic
poetry and a many others whiled away their time in other pursuits. But there were
a few who pursued their interest in astronomy and mathematics over a period of about
three hundred years, sustained by the institution of guru-chela prevalent among the
Nambuthris of that time. While this explanation is attractive, it would seem somewhat
simplistic. First, it does not account the presence and the important influence of non-
Nambuthris as members of the Kerala School. Second, this explanation ignores the
symbiotic nature of the relationship between the traditional jyotish who came from the
lowly Kaniyan caste and the Nambuthri jyotish. Third, the granthaveri (i.e., village
records) of Kerala of this period is full of information about the metrical precision of
a number of artisans and craftsmen (such as the carpenter, the trader, the builder
and the architect). A number of them showed some awareness of the developments
taking place in astronomy and mathematics during that period. The granthaverie and
temple records remain a good but relatively untapped source of information about the
calculating people of the period.
Incidentally, a study of the social context of Kerala mathematics has an additional
bonus. There is a deeply entrenched notion in standard histories of mathematics that
all non-European mathematics is utilitarian. A number of Indian scholars have fallen
into the same trap. They search for the motivation behind Kerala mathematics in as-
tronomy, navigation and other practical pursuits. One should never ignore the practical
motivation. After all many of the members of Kerala School were both mathematicians
and astronomers. The texts of that period cover both subjects. However, a lot of the
work on infinite series do not have any direct applications to astronomy. So what
led them on in their pursuit of knowledge? I have this vision, of a group of pure
mathematicians sitting around in Kerala between the 14th and 16th centuries, like
Hardy and Littlewood in Cambridge, indulging in their passion and probably boasting
of the fact that the mathematics that they did was of no use to anyone! Some of
them probably delighted in long and tedious calculations, such as the one reportedly
undertaken by Madhava in calculating the Sine tables to 12 places of decimals! About
a hundred years later the Arab mathematician, Jamshid al-Kashi, working in the
Samarkand Observatory obtained an implicit estimate for , correct to 16 places of
decimals, by circumscribing a circle by a polygon having 805306368 sides! There seemed
also in this case to a veritable fascination with numbers and a boundless delight in
calculation which was far removed from any utilitarian concern.
The mathematics produced by the Kerala School was not trivial nor elementary in
any sense. And this would bring into question another stereotype regarding Indian
214 Infinite Series
mathematics. Standard histories of mathematics would want us to believe that mathe-
matics in India which was elementary and involved mainly arithemetic, virtually came
to a stop with Bhaskara II in the 12th century. The existence and content of Kerala
mathematics would question this interpretation.
An important reason for taking a cross-cultural perspective in examining the devel-
opment of a particular area in mathematics is that it provides a useful indication of
differences in methods and motivations between different mathematical traditions. In
Europe, the details of the circumstances and ideas leading to the discovery of the arctan
series by Gregory and Leibniz are well-known. It was an important event because it
was a precursor to calculus. In an attempt to discover an infinite series representation
of any given trigonometric function and the relationship between the function and its
successive derivatives, Gregory stumbled on the arctan series. He took, in terms of
modern notation, d = d(tan)/(1 + tan2 ), and carried out term by term integration
to obtain his result. Leibnizs discovery arose from his application of fresh thinking to
an old problem, namely quadrature or the process of determining a square that has
an area equal to the area enclosed by a circle. In applying a transformation formula
(similar to the present-day rule for integration by parts) to the quadrature of the circle,
he discovered the series for arctan. It must be pointed out, however, that the ideas of
calculus such as integration by parts, change of variables and higher derivatives were
not completely understood then. They were often dressed up in geometric language
with, for example, Leibniz talking about characteristic triangles and transmutation.
The Chinese work is interesting for a different reason. Infinite series, as a math-
ematical object, was introduced into China divorced from its European context, i.e.,
calculus. The introduction of European mathematics into China began in the closing
decades of the sixteenth century, when the Chinese first came in contact with the
Jesuits. In their intention to spread their religion in China, the Jesuits arrived from
Europe bringing with them both new technological gadgets as well as scientific theories
which, though not updated with more recent discoveries in Europe, proved a sufficient
novelty and attraction for the educated classes. In 1601, the Italian Jesuit, Matteo
Ricci (1552-1601) began his translation of the first six books of Euclids Elements into
Chinese in 1607. Later, in the last few decades of the Ming dynasty, many astronomical
books were translated into Chinese. But most of the scientific books translated were
pre-Newtonian publications. In early Qing dynasty, after listening to a debate between
a Jesuit astronomer, Adam Schall, and a Chinese astronomer, Yang Guangxian, the
Kangxi Emperor, became interested in Western science. In answer to an invitation
to send more mathematicians and astronomers, Louis XIV of France sent a group led
by J. de Fontaney, the Kings mathematician, and asked them to make astronomical
observations, study the flora and fauna, and learn the technical arts of China. In
1690, the French Jesuits began teaching mathematics to the Emperor and his courtiers.
Pierre Jartoux, a French Jesuit, arrived in China in 1701 and taught at the court. He
introduced three results new to Chinese mathematics: the power series for sine, versed
sine and for which was derived from arcsine function. The last result was attributed
to Newton. For none of these results did Jartoux provide a proof. The calculus needed
was not known in China until the middle of the nineteenth century.
Joseph 215
Ming Antu (d. 1765) was an astronomer who worked with the Jesuits in cartography
and later on reforming the astronomical system. At the time of his death, he was
the director of the Imperial Board of Astronomy. In his book, Ge Yuan Mi Lu Jie Fa
(Quick Methods of Trigonometry and for Determining the Precise Ratio of the Circle)
contains the statement and proof of nine formulae, including the three formulae of
Master Jartoux. It is possible that Ming Antu was introduced to the three formulae by
Jartoux himself. His proofs are based on the generalisation of a method occurring both
in Chinese and European tradition: the method of the division of the circle. In China,
it is found in Liu Huis commentary on the premier text, Chiu Chang Suan Shu, from
the beginning of the Christian Era. The idea of the method is to approximate the
circle by inscribing polygons, the number of sides which is doubled at each step. This
method was extended by using continued proportions (lu) as an algebraic language, so
that it applies to the measurement of any arc. In 1720, Takebe Katahiro, a Japanese
mathematician, expressed for the first time the square of the length of the arc of the
circle as an infinite power series of the sagitta (or the cosine of the half angle). Both the
Chinese and Japanese derivation were heavily based on their common mathematical
tradition.
I will end by some stray reflections on certain intriguing connections between Ker-
ala mathematics and some subsequent developments. An interesting question is why
is it that Kerala school which came so close to the concept of the limit seem to shy away
from it? If they could have incorporated the limit into their work, calculus would have
been first established in Kerala. We know that Bhaskara II had already resolved the
idea of infinitesimal in his astronomical work. The missing element, in my view, was
the concept of limit. I would suggest that the answer may lie to some extent in the
nature of Indian mathematics.
To illustrate from a later period, consider the case of Master Ramachandra. In 1850,
Yesudas Ramchandra wrote a book in which he tried to revive the spirit of algebra so
as to resuscitate the native disposition of (the Indians) that had been eroded over the
centuries. The book was republished nine years later in England as a result of the
efforts of Augustus De Morgan, an English logician and mathematician. De Morgan
pointed out in the preface, Ramchandras essential contribution was the application
of the theory of equations as found in Bhaskara IIs Bijaganita to the solution of an
elementary problem in calculusthe obtaining of the maxima and minima of a function
. The function could be quadratic or of higher order. And he did this without the help
of differential calculus making the theory of equations as the starting point.
This attempt should be seen in the context of a widespread perception, even today,
that may be traced back to Colebrookes book on Indian algebra, first published in 1817.
This perception is well summed up by his remark that the Indians had cultivated
algebra much more, and with greater success than geometry; as is evident from the
comparatively low state of knowledge in the one and the high pitch of attainments
in the other. So that, according to De Morgan, one should see Ramchandras effort
as bridging the discontinuity between an Indian mathematical tradition which was
perceived as algebraically strong but geometrically weak and modern calculus with
Bhaskaras theory of equations serving as the bridge. Ramchandra certainly subscribed
216 Infinite Series
to this view while De Morgan believed that the strength of the book lay in drawing
upon the native resources and not on the imported science of his teachers. But
neither Ramchandra nor De Morgan saw the book as being useful only to the Indians.
Ramchandra wrote the book in the hope that his labours will be of some use to those
mathematical students who are not advanced in their study of the differential calculus,
and that the lovers of science, both in India and Europe, will give support to my
undertaking (Preface to Indian edition, p. v). And De Morgan, whose interest in the
pedagogy of mathematics teaching was well known, recommended that
selections from Ramchandras work might advantageously be introduced into elementary in-
struction in this country (England). The exercise in quadratic equation which it would afford,
applied as it is to real problems, would advantageously supersede some of the conundrums
which are manufactured under the name of problems producing equations. (Treatise, Preface
to English Edition, p. xiv-xv)
Yet this brave attempt at building a pedagogic bridge between two mathematical
traditions was a failure. The Treatise did not gain acceptance in any Indian school and
while there is the intriguing suggestion by Mary Boole, the widow of the renowned
algebraist, George Boole, that English students were being taught to solve problems
in maxima and minima by other simple devices similar in essence to Ramchandras
and probably superior in efficiency, the interest petered out there as well. The book
was reviewed poorly in India when it was first published though it picked up well after
De Morgans endorsementa characteristic common to many other Indian endeavours
which gain in value only after Western endorsement.
There is also another intriguing connection, which I will merely mention for you
to ponder, and that is between Kerala mathematics and Ramanujan. Here the idea
is that if one looks at some of the early works of Ramanujan (i.e., before he went to
England), these are a few problems that involved the series which he published in
an Indian mathematics journal. Some of these remind us of the Kerala work. This is
just a conjecture but it is worth pursuing. Remember that Ramanujan came from the
Iyengar Brahmin caste. The Iyengars are found right across what we would call Kerala
(although it was not part of Kerala but of the Madras Presidency at that time) and
Tamil Nadu. Ramanujans mother was, according to contemporary accounts, a well-
known local jyotish. She practised her arts not only in individual homes but in local
temples as well. A jyotish is usually well versed in calculation techniques. So instead of
treating Ramanujan as a freak, consider his background, including the possibility that
he may have been doing ethnomathematics which combined his natural ability with
what he learnt from the two English texts to form the basis of his remarkable work
later. Now there are cases of Iyengars and Nambuthris particularly around the areas
of northern Kerala, mixing together within the temple. The temple was, as I mentioned
earlier, an important centre for dissemination of knowledge.
We can extend our speculation further: Kerala mathematics travelling West. Two
connections I want to bring to you. One connection is through the Arabs and their links
with Kerala. Now, we know that the works of al-Haytham, the great Arab scientist,
particularly on geometric series, were known in some of the Madrassas in Kerala. So,
was it possible, that through the medium of the Arabs that some of the mathematics
Joseph 217
and astronomy of the Kerala School went west? But, more important connection was
the possible role of the Jesuits. There is evidence that Matteo Ricci on his way to
China spent some time in Cochin. In fact for a number of Jesuits who followed him,
Cochin was a staging post on the way to the China. As I mentioned earlier, the Jesuits
of that time were not merely priests but also scholars, very knowledgeable in science
and mathematics. In fact, if one wanted to be trained as a mathematician in Italy
at that time, we couldnt do better than go to a Jesuit school. A number of reports
that the Jesuits sent from India and China to their headquarters in Rome contained
appendices of a technical nature which were then passed on by Rome to those who
understood them, including the notable Italian mathematicians of those days such as
Cavalieri and Cardona and others. We require to follow this link closely, for at the
moment there is only circumstantial evidence. It is gratifying that research in this
area is starting. Finally, what about Kerala mathematics and China, any possible
links? The more I look at the works of Ming Antu and his associates, the more I see
some distinct resonance between their work and Kerala work. Again, the question is:
Did some of the information go to China through the medium of Jesuits? An intriguing
question!
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the need to rewrite the history of Indian
mathematics as it is presented in many historical texts. The new history should reflect
some of the more recent work done by the Indian scholars, people such as Gupta,
Shukla, Kuppana Sastri, Sarma, and Bag to mention a few. The excessive dependence
on work done during the last century as sources of information should surely decrease.
Otherwise, there is a danger of the same mistakes being repeated ad infinitum. And of
course, the medieval phase of Indian mathematics needs to be highlighted particularly
since it was crucial to the development of modern mathematics. Victor Katzs book is
one beacon of hope in that direction.
References
Edwards, C.: 1979, The Historical Development of the Calculus, Springer-Verlag, New
York.
Gurukkal, R.: 1992, The Kerala Temple and Early Medieval Agrarian System, Vallathol
Vidyapeetham, Sukapuram.
Hayashi, T. Kusuba, T. and Yano, M.: 1990, The Correction of the Madhava Series for
the Circumference of a Circle, Centaurus 33, 149174.
Jami, C.: 1988, Western Influence and Chinese Tradition in an Eighteenth Century
Chinese Mathematical Work, Historia Mathematica 15, 311331.
Joseph, G.: 2000, The Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Roots of Mathematics, 2nd
edn, Princeton University Press.
Marar, K. and Rajagopal, C.: 1944, On the Hindu Quadrature of the Circle, Journal of
the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 20, 6582.
218 Infinite Series
Rajagopal, C. and Rangachari, M.: 1986, On Medieval Keralese Mathematics, Archive
for History of Exact Sciences 35, 9199.
Rajagopal, C. and T.V.V., A.: 1951, On the Hindu Proof of Gregorys Series, Scripta
Mathematica 17, 6574.
Rajagopal, C. and Venkataraman, A.: 1949, The Sine and Cosine Power Series in Hindu
Mathematics, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal 15, 113.
R.V., T. and Aiyar, A. (eds): 1948, Yuktibhasa Part I, Mangalodayam Ltd., Trichur.
Sarma, K.: 1991, A History of Kerala School of Hindu Astronomy, Vishveshavaranand
Institute, Hoshiarpur.
Sarma, K. and Hariharan, S.: 1991, Yuktibhasa of Jyesthadeva, Indian Journal of
History of Science 26, 186207.
Whish, C.: 1835, On the Hindu Quadrature and the Infinite Series of the Proportion of
the Circumference to the Diameter . . ., Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society,
Great Britain and Ireland 3(part III), 509523.
Yan, L. and Shiran, D.: 1987, Chinese Mathematics: A Concise History, Clarendon
Press, Oxford.
How should Euclidean Geometry be Taught?
C. K. Raju
Centre for Studies in Civilizations, New Delhi, India. Email: c k raju@hotmail.com
Introduction
I grew up on the classical presentation of the Elements, as found in books like those
by Todhunter. It had one or two confusing points, but the work as a whole had a
certain persuasive charm and seductive beauty to it that still lingers with me. The
fascinating drawings of Japanese temple geometry1 are, to my mind, the best example
of something that today still evokes that sense of beauty. Some history is needed to
understand how geometry has reached the present state of ugliness and confusion in
the NCERT (National Centre for Education, Research and Training) texts (especially
the text for Class 9), and what should be done to correct it. Tracing the history also
helps to arrive at a clearer understanding of the Elements, needed for any corrective
process.
The Arabic-Islamic Tradition of Geometry

First, Euclidean geometry is also a strong Arabic-Islamic tradition. There are at
least three dozen known commentaries and translations of the Elements in Arabic,
including those of al Kind, Thabit Ibn Qurra, al Farabi, al Haitham, Ibn Sna, and
Nasiruddin at Tus. Unlike 19th century European historians, Arabs did not feel any
need to hide the fact that they got their initial knowledge of geometry from others: the
Haji Khalfa records2 that Caliph al-Mansur (754-775) sent a mission to the Byzantine
emperor, from whom he obtained a copy of the Elements among other Greek books.
Caliph al-Mamun (813-833) similarly obtained a copy of the Elements from Byzantium.
According to the Fihrist, a late Arabic index of books, al Hajjaj translated it twice in a
Haruni (for Harun ar-Rashid 786-809) and a later Mamuni version.
1 Japanese Temple Geometry Problems, San Gaku, Selected and translated by J. Fukugawa and D. Pedoe,
Winnipeg, Canada, 1989. I am indeed grateful to Prof. E. C. G. Sudarshan for presenting me with a copy of
this book.
2 T.L. Heath: 1956, The Thirteen Books of Euclids Elements, Dover Publications, New York, 1908, I, 75. It
should be pointed out that Heath has a curiously ambivalent attitude: while he prominently quotes the Haji
Khalfa at p. 75, to establish that Arabs had translated copies of the Elements, on p. 4 he asserts regarding
the apparently circumstantial accounts of Euclid given by Arabian authors that the origin of their stories
can be explained as the result of (1) the Arabian tendency to romance, and (2) . . . misunderstanding. He
goes on to assert (p. 4) that these accounts were intended to gratify a desire which the Arabians always
showed to connect famous Greeks in some way or the other with the East and cites (p. 4, note 6) the Haji
Khalfa to conclude that The same predilection made the Arabs describe Pythagoras as a pupil of the wise
Salomo, Hipparchus as an exponent of Chaldean philosophy or as the Chaldean, Archimedes as an Egyptian
etc. In short, Heaths attitude is to accept as true, from Arabic sources, whatever suits him, and to reject
everything else with some racist remarks.
220 Euclidean Geometry
It is necessary here to point out that translation usually meant rewriting the
book. This was particularly the case with the Elements, because the book apparently
never was entirely as elementary as it first seems. As recorded in the Fihrist, from
the earliest times of Heron of Alexandria, all commentaries and translations of the
Elements endeavoured to solve its difficulties, and explain the obscurities in Euclid. 3
Not the least of these obscurities concerns the name Euclid. The Arabs spoke of
Uclides, which they derived from Ucli, a key, and des, measure or particularly measure
of earth (= geo-metry), so that Uclides meant key to geometry.
Why was Uclides so important to Arabs? Why did so many key Arabic thinkers
rewrite Uclides? Why was Uclides a standard part of the curriculum of later Islamic
thinkers? The standard histories of geometry, being concerned almost exclusively with
the West, do not ever seem to have bothered to raise this question. The importance
of the question, in understanding the Elements, will become clear later on, when we
answer it.
Euclid the Geometer: A Name or a Person?

While the Arabic-Islamic tradition of the Elements is quite clear, it is not so clear that
there was any actual person called Euclid who wrote the Elements. The only Euclid
known to classical Greek tradition was Euclid of Megara, a contemporary of Plato.
When medieval Europe first came to know about the Elements and Aristotle from the
Arabs, Europeans thought that Uclides was a reference to Euclid of Megara. This
baseless belief about this standard text was taught in Universities like Paris, Oxford,
Cambridge for over five centuries: the first English translation of 1570, for instance,
attributed the Elements to Euclid of Megara.4 The scholarship of the late nineteenth
century has veered around to the view that it was impossible that Euclid of Megara
could have been the author. The reasons for this shift need to be made quite explicit.
If one discounts later Arab sources, as Heath does, our belief in the historicity of
Euclid rests wholly and solely on a single remark attributed to Proclus. In this remark,
Proclus is not particularly definite about Euclid, for his language admittedly shows
that he is the first to speak of Euclid, and is proceeding on speculative inferences about
events some seven centuries before his time:
All those who have written histories [of geometry] bring to this point their account of the
development of this science. Not long after these men [Hermotimus of Colophon and Philip-
pus of Mende] came Euclid, who brought together the Elements, collecting many of Eudoxus
theorems, perfecting many of Theaetetus, and also bringing to irrefragable demonstration the
things which were only somewhat loosely proved by his predecessors. He must have been born
in the time of the first Ptolemy, for Archimedes [who comes after the first Ptolemy] mentions
the Elements; and further, they say that Ptolemy once asked him if there was in geometry
any shorter way than that of the elements, and he answered that there was no royal road
to geometry. He is then younger than the pupils of Plato but older than Eratosthenes and
Archimedes; for the latter were contemporary with one another, as Eratosthenes somewhere
says.5
3 Heath, 21.
4 Heath, 109.
5 Proclus: 1992, A Commentary on the First Book of Euclids Elements, (Tr) Glenn R. Morrow, Princeton
Raju 221
If Proclus is right and Euclid was much younger than the pupils of Plato, then he
could not possibly have been Euclid of Megara,a contemporary of Plato. If, however,
Proclus is wrong about the date of Euclid, we could well conclude that he was also
confused about the person, in this vague paragraph, so we would be left with no basis
to believe in any person called Euclid. (The story about there being no royal road to
geometry has been told also about Alexander and Menaechmus; the relation of political
equality to the geometric equality in the Elements is considered later.)
Prior to Proclus, this Euclid, if at all there was such a person, did not have the
stature that he acquired in later times through the combined influence of Islamic and
Christian rational theology, and colonial history. No author prior to Proclus mentions
Euclid, though there are references to other historians of geometry like Eudemus,
Eudoxus, and Apollonius, a carpenter of Alexandria, who, according to Arab sources, is
said to have written a book in 15 sections to make geometry accessible to all. Claudius
Ptolemy, for example, does need to use geometry in the Almagest, e.g. the theorem
of Menelaus, but he makes no mention of Euclid, even though the Great Library of
Alexandria was still intact in Ptolemys time, and there is ample evidence that he
not only consulted it but relied on it heavily for his astronomical observations. It
is unconvincing to assert that Ptolemy had no need of the Elements since they were,
in a sense, elementary. All known commentaries on the Elements, such as those of
Heron, Porphyry, and Pappus, directly or indirectly mentioned in the Arabic literature,
postdate Claudius Ptolemy who comes over two centuries after Cleopatra, the last of
the Ptolemies who ruled Egypt.
In his commentary on Ptolemy, Theon of Alexandria (c. 4th century CE), too, does
not mention Euclid. In the same context, Theon, however, does refer to his book on the
Elements:
that sectors in equal circles are to one another as the angles on which they stand has been
proved by me in my edition of the Elements at the end of the sixth book.6
Proclus himself acknowledges, (in the beginning of the quotation) that he is the first
person to mention Euclid, stating that Euclid is NOT mentioned by earlier historians of
geometry. So, is this quote from Proclus adequate to establish the historicity of Euclid
or the antiquity of the Elements? Imagine for a minute that we are dealing with Arab
tradition rather than Greek tradition, and apply to Greek tradition, the standards of
critical historiography that Heath applies to Arabs. What would be the conclusion?
If one is not a rank racist, the least one can do is to explore alternatives to the tra-
ditional belief in the historicity of Euclid and the antiquity of the Elements. Perhaps
Proclus simply misjudged the antiquity of the Elements, like later Arabs misjudged the
antiquity of Proclus works.
It is also possible that Proclus attributes authorship to Euclid in the same way as
later Arabic texts attributed various works, including the works of Proclus, to Aristo-
tleafter all attributions were not so terribly important either to the Neoplatonists
University Press, 56. Heath p. 1, and footnotes 2 and 3. Heath omits the first sentence. His footnote 2 asserts
that the word 0o must mean flourished and not was born, on the grounds that otherwise part of
Proclus argument [for the existence of Euclid] would lose its cogency.
6 Heath, 46; emphasis Heaths, de-emphasis mine.
or to the Islamic rational theologians, as they were to later-day European historians
of science, or as they are to current-day information capitalism, where ownership is
decided on attribution. Arabic treatises customarily began by taking the name of
Allah, and after that attributing everything to a famous early source. This custom
can still be observed in relatively remote places like the Lakshadweep islands where
it has survived. The custom of attributing everything to an early sourcethe earlier
the betterwas a form of homage, and added authority to the text; it was not meant
to be taken literally. Among Greeks, Pythagoreans followed this custom of attributing
everything to Pythagoras, and the continuity of Pythagoreans with Neoplatonism is
well known.
Mathematics and Religion

The most plausible alternative, however, is the following. Given the politics of the
Roman empire in his timewith violent priest-led Roman-Christian mobs attacking
Neoplatonists, murdering the most brilliant among them like Hypatia, and invoking
state-support to smash or take over Neoplatonic places of worship,7 and burn down the
Great Library of Alexandriait would have been quite natural for Proclus, or someone
else between Claudius Ptolemy and Proclus, to have simply invented a Greek called
Euclid to give an appropriate pedigree to their own teaching. In this context one should
recognize that mathematics was then viewed not as a universal or secular science,
but as a key aspect of the religious and political philosophy of Neoplatonism. The chief
aim of Proclus prologue to the Elements is to bring out this dimension of mathematics
which he felt was neglected by some of his contemporaries.
Pythagoreans recognized that everything we call learning is remembering, . . . although evi-
dence of such learning can come from many areas, it is especially from mathematics that they
come, as Plato also remarks. If you take a person to a diagram, he says [Phaedo 73b], then
you can show most clearly that learning is recollection. That is why Socrates in the Meno uses
this kind of argument. This part of the soul has its essence in mathematical ideas, and it has a
prior knowledge of them . . ..8
The famous Socratic argument was as follows.

The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times and having seen
all the things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them
all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew
about virtue and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has all things, there
is no difficulty in her in eliciting or as men say learning out a single recollection all the rest, if
a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection.9
7 e.g. in 390 the temple of Seraphis and the adjacent library of Alexandria were burnt down by a violent
Christian mob. The magnificent temple of Dea Caelestis at Carthage remained open until c. 400; but many
laws were passed against pagan temples, and, in 401, the synod of Carthage twice asked the State to
implement these laws. Eventually, in 407 the Catholics forcibly took possession of Dea Caelestis and Bishop
Auerilus, Augustines lifelong friend, triumphantly planted his cathedra at the exact spot occupied by the
statue of the pagan goddess. H. Jedin and J. Dolan (eds) History of the Church, Vol. II, The Imperial Church
from Constantine to the Early Middle Ages, Tr. Anselm Biggs, Burns and Oates, London, 1980, p. 205.
8 Proclus, cited earlier, 45, p. 37.
9 Plato, Meno, 81-83.
Raju 223
Socrates then gave a practical demonstration of this by questioning a slave boy and
eliciting the right responses regarding geometry.)
For Proclus, then, mathematics was not a secular activity, but the key means of
propagating his fundamental religious beliefs. This is the concluding thought of part I
of his prologue:
This, then, is what learning (0 [mathesiz]) is, recollection of the eternal ideas in the
soul; and this is why the study that especially brings us the recollection of these ideas is called
the science concerned with learning ( 0 [mathematike]). Its name thus makes clear
what sort of function this science performs. It arouses our innate knowledge . . . takes away
the forgetfulness and ignorance [of our former existence] that we have from birth, . . . fills
everything with divine reason, moves our souls towards Nous, . . . and through the discovery of
pure Nous leads us to the blessed life.10
These religious beliefs were earlier championed within the Christian church by
Origen (also of Alexandria, and from the same school as Proclus). However, by Proclus
time, these religious beliefs (doctrine of pre-existence, equity) were exactly what were
being abusively opposed and cursed by the church and its key ideologues (Augustine,
Jerome, subsequently Justinian). It is well known that fundamental aspects of present-
day Christian religious dogma, such as resurrection (as opposed to pre-existence), eter-
nal (as opposed to temporary) heaven and hell, doctrine of sin (as opposed to essential
equity), etc., came about from the rejection of Origen and the acceptance of Augustine
during this period, starting from Constantine and ending with Justinian.
Therefore, Proclus, in writing on mathematics from the philosophical viewpoint,
was right in the eye of a religious storm, at its dead centre in Alexandria, and exposed
to great personal risk. Since Jerome had only just translated the Bible from Greek
into Latin, and Greek was still held in high regard in the Roman empire, inventing the
name Euclid, to give an early Greek legacy to his teachings would have been the most
natural strategy for Proclus.
If Euclid was indeed invented to escape from religious persecution, then it would,
have been entirely in keeping with the character of the Egypto-Greek Mysteries, if
the name Euclid had some mysterious significance, as the Arabs thought. Proclus
fears, incidentally, were quite genuine, for soon after him, the school at Alexandria was
permanently shut down, at about the time that Justinian cursed Origen of Alexandria.
Can Authorship be Attributed to a Single Individual?

There is another way of looking at the question of authorship. It is clear that, from
at least the time of Theon and Proclus, through the Arabic and European rationalists,
right down to the time of Hilbert, Birkhoff, and the US School Mathematics Study
Group, there has been a continuous attempt to remove the obscurities in the Elements,
and to update it. To look for a unique author for the Elements is like trying to trace
the origin of all the water in a mighty river back to its visually apparent source in a
small pond: this transparently neglects the vast underground drainage system that
contributes most of the water to the river on its way to the sea.
10 Proclus, cited earlier, 47, p. 38.
As for the apparent source itself, Europe got its knowledge of the Elements from the
decaying Arab empire, the Arabs got their knowledge of the Elements from the decaying
Roman empire, the Romans got their knowledge and culture from the decaying Greek
empire, and the Greeks, as Herodotus records, got their knowledge of geometry from
the Egyptians. As I have argued in detail, elsewhere,11 the typical pattern is that
the direction in which information flows has been from the vanquished to the military
victor, though this fact has often enraged the descendants of the military victors. There
is ample evidence that 18th-20th century CE European historians of science reinvented
history in a racist12 way to make it appear that this entire chain of information trans-
mission had a unique beginning in Greece. These historians did not represent the
Greek texts as merely one in a chain of translations and improvements into English,
from Latin, from Arabic, from Greek, and from Egyptian texts, but represented the
Greek text as the absolute beginning of this chainas the original creative fount of
practically all human thought! Since the geographical origin of the Elements (and all its
earliest commentaries) in Alexandria, in the African continent, could hardly be denied,
the name Euclid, suggesting a Greek legacy, was critical to the process of appropriation
via Hellenisation.13
Why was this appropriation first attempted? Why were the Elements so important
to the rational theologians of Christianity? This is a complex issue to which we will
return when we address the importance of the Elements for Islamic rational theology.
The Most Recent Clarification of Obscurities in the Elements

Let us first examine the most recent example of clarifying obscurities in the Elements.
In recent times, a major step to modify the teaching of Euclidean geometry was taken
in 1957 when the US School Mathematics Study Group issued its recommendations on
the teaching of geometry.14 That recommendation, followed the studies into the founda-
tions of geometry by Hilbert,15 Russell,16 and Birkhoff,17 etc. These authors addressed
11 C. K. Raju: (to appear), Interaction between India, China, and Central and West Asia in Mathematics
and Astronomy, in A. Rahman (ed), PHISPC, New Delhi, 1999.

12 Martin Bernal: 1991, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, 1, The Fabrication of
Ancient Greece 1785-1985, Vintage. The use of the term racist, as distinct from Spenglers term Eurocentric,
refers also to the technology gap and the industrial revolution. See, M. Adas, Machines as the Measure of
Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Western Dominance, Oxford, New Delhi, 1990. While Bernal does
not say much about the history of science per se (and neither do his detractors in the more recent debate
in Isis), it is clear that the resurrection of Euclid, after the belated discovery that he could not have been
Euclid of Megara, is very much in line with the belief in a nineteenth century pattern of fabricating a Greek
origin for everything under the sun. A closer look at the material basis (palimpsets etc.) of the conclusions
of classical scholars will make clear the enormous amount of tinted speculation that underlies this belief.
13 The Hellenisation itself proceeded by reference to the military conquests of Alexander and Julius Caesar,
and the in-between period of Ptolemaic rule. Consequently the importance of these conquests got amplified
out of all proportion to their global or even local significance.
14 School Mathematics Study Group: Geometry: 1961, Yale University Press.
15 D. Hilbert: 1902, The Foundations of Geometry, Open Court, La Salle.
16 B. Russell: 1897, 1908, The Foundations of Geometry, London.
17 G. D. Birkhoff: 1932, A Set of Postulates for Plane Geometry (based on scale and protractor), Ann. Math.,
33.
Raju 225
a variety of obscurities in the Elements. The most obvious of these obscurities may be
put into the following classes.
1. Unsound definitions: e.g., those of point, line, plane etc.

2. Missing definitions: but the corresponding notions are used: e.g. area.
3. Hidden assumptions: e.g. the correspondence of lines with real numbers. In
addition to these, there are subtler problems, relative to the current formalistic
notion of mathematics, such as
4. Axioms taken as self-evident truths (about empirical reality): this is also true
of the constructions used in proofs.
5. Redundant assumptions: e.g. the parallel postulate becomes redundant if one
admits reals and rigid motions, or the notion of distance.
In judging these obscurities in the light of current formalistic mathematics, one

must, of course, keep in mind that the present-day formalistic epistemology of mathe-
matics (axiom-definition-theorem-proof) itself historically originated from the analysis
and clarification of these obscurities in the Elements. Furthermore, one must also bear
in mind that there is nothing universal or natural about the formalistic approach, and
that it is steeped in a particular theological and cultural tradition.18
The Unreal and Meaningless as the Sole Concern of Mathematics

The obscurities of type (1) are clear enough. One can define something ostensively (e.g.
one can define the word dog by pointing to an instance of a dog) or one can define it in
other words. In the case of a geometric point, an ostensive definition seems somewhat
unsuitable: Platonic philosophy requires that geometry should deal with idealisations
that have no real existence. Hence one cannot point to a point. One can point to a dot
on a piece of paper; but no real entity like a dot can ever correspond to the ideal notion
of a geometric point which is required not to have any real existence.
The alternative is a verbal definition. Consider the definition in the Elements: A
point is that which has no part, or which has no magnitude. (The Heiberg version has
only the first part of this definition.) A person familiar with atoms and magnitudes may
not question this definition: but it communicates nothing to anyone else. (Besides, is
one talking of real atoms hereelementary particles of some sort? The particle which
is closest to a point is the electron. But the electron cannot be a Euclidean point, for
a circuit around a Euclidean point brings us back to where we started, whereas two
circuits around the electron are needed to return to the starting point, because the
electron has the paradoxical property of half-integral spin). Clearly, a verbal definition
18 C.K. Raju: 1999, Mathematics and Culture, in: Daya Krishna and K. Satchidananda Murty (eds)
History, Time and Truth: Essays in Honour of D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Kalki Prakash, New Delhi, 179-
193. Reprinted in Philosophy of Mathematics Education, 11, (1999). Available at http://www.ex.ac.uk/
PErnest/pome/art18.htm
of a non-real notion cannot avoid an infinite regress, for at no point can it terminate in
an ostensive definition.
Thus, Platonic philosophy, by its insistence that the ideal should be non-empirical,
eliminates both possibilities of an ostensive or a verbal definition, and the only option
left is that of current formalistic mathematics, which regards the notions of point, line,
etc., as meaningless, undefined notions. In other words, the current way of removing
the obscurities in the Elements is to adopt Russells definition of mathematics: Mathe-
matics may be defined as a subject in which we never know what we are talking about
. . .!19
Real Numbers and Euclidean Proportions

Obscurities of type (2) are examined later. Obscurities of type (3) are manifest in the
very first proposition of the Elements. The first proposition constructs an equilateral
triangle on a given segment AB. This process involves drawing two circles, the first
with centre at A and radius AB, the second with centre at B and radius BA. One
obscurity is that the two circles may fail to intersect, in the sense that the point of
intersection need not mathematically exist. If points on the circles correspond to (pairs
of) rational numbers, there may be gaps between them, such as the gaps between the
numbers 1, 2, 3. Indeed one is led to expect such gaps since the Euclidean
approach to
proportions suggests a reluctance to use irrational numbers like 2. It was the attempt
to clarify this obscurity in the first proposition of the Elements that led Dedekind to the
idea of the real line as something that could be cut without leaving any gaps. Needless
to say, the real numbers, as conceptualized by Dedekind are something necessarily
unreal, for there is no real process by which one can specify or fully name a real number
such as .
The SAS Theorem/Postulate

The other obscurity in the proof of Proposition I. 1 is this: why is the radius measured
out twice? Cant the first measurement of AB be re-used for BA? This is related to
the key obscurity concerning Proposition I. 4. This difficulty must have been noticed
by every schoolchild who did geometry using the older Theonine texts, like those of
Todhunter, current in India up to the end of the 1960s. In the Heiberg version,
Proposition 4 of the Elements states that:
If two triangles have the two sides equal to two sides respectively, and have the angles con-
tained by the equal straight lines equal, they will also have the base equal to the base, the
triangle will be equal to the triangle, and the remaining angles will be equal to the remaining
angles respectively, namely those which the equal sides subtend.20
In brief: if two sides and the included angle of one triangle are equal to those of
another triangle, then the two triangles are equal. We will refer to this as the Side-
Angle-Side proposition, or SAS for short.
19 The best that one can do is to interpret these meaningless notions using other meaningless notions like
sets: e.g., a point is an element of a set, a line is a subset etc.

20 Heath, p. 247.
Raju 227
The key obscurity is this. In the Elements the proof of this proposition involves
superposition: it involves picking up one triangle, moving it through space, rotating it
as necessary, and applying it to the other triangle. The later theorems on the equality
of triangles (with the exception of I. 8) do not, however, use this procedure: they rely
instead on SAS.
There is no doubt at all that physical motion in space is implied, and there is a
specific Common Notion or Axiom to enable this proof to go through. Common Notion
4 of the Heiberg version asserts Things which coincide with one another are equal
to one another.21 For those accustomed to reinterpreting this in terms of congruence,
it should be pointed out that this clearly applies to distinct geometrical objects that
are brought into contact, and superposed, through motion. Likewise, Axiom 8 of the
Theonine version asserts: Magnitudes which coincide with one another, that is, which
fill the same space, are equal to one another. If this is not a tautology, it must refer to
distinct objects which are made to coincide with each other, by moving them about.
Physical Movement and Motion without Deformation

The doubt that must have entered the mind of every schoolchild is the following. This
method of picking and carrying greatly simplifies the proofs of all other theorems and
riders: if it can be used in one place, why cant it be systematically used in other places
as well? My teacher had no satisfactory answer why it was all right to do this in one
place, but wrong to do it elsewhere. He simply said it is better not to do it, but could
not explain why. But one may attempt an answer as follows.
Picking and carrying line-segments is a common enough thing: one must do this
every time one ordinarily makes a measurement. But, by the late 19th century mathe-
maticians were sceptical about the very possibility of making a measurement: moving
an object might deform it. What sense did it make to say that a figure remained
identical to itself as it was moved about in space? A shadow moving on uneven ground
is continuously deformed; perhaps space itself is similarly uneven, so that any motion
may involve deformation, and measurement may require more complicated notions like
a metric tensor. The avoidance of picking and carrying in the proofs of the subsequent
theorems was interpreted, by the 20th century, as an implicit expression of this doubt
about the very possibility of measurement. It was argued against Helmholtz that mea-
surement required (a) the notion of motion; furthermore this motion must be without
deformation, so that it required (b) the notion of a rigid body, and neither of these was
the proper concern of the geometer, who ought to be concerned only with motionless
space. (The notion of rigid body depends on physical theory; e.g. the Newtonian notion
of rigid body has no place in relativity theory, for a rigid body would allow signals to
travel at infinite speed.)
Historically, this doubt about measurement was expressed as a doubt about (a) the
role of motion in the foundations of mathematics, and (b) the possibility and meaning
of motion without deformation. In favour of (a) the authority of Aristotle was invoked
to argue that motion concerned astronomy, and that mathematics was in thought
21 Heath, p. 224 et seq.
separable from motion. The authority of Kant was implicitly invoked to argue that
motion was not a priori, but involved the empirical, and hence could not be part of
mathematics. All these worries are captured in Schopenhauers criticism of the Theo-
nine Axiom 8 (corresponding to the Heiberg Common Notion 4) which supports SAS:
. . . coincidence is either mere tautology, or something entirely empirical, which belongs not
to pure intuition, but to external sensuous experience. It presupposes in fact the mobility of
figures; but that which is movable in space is matter and nothing else. Thus, this appeal to
coincidence means leaving pure space, the sole element of geometry, in order to pass over to the
material and empirical.22
In short, motion, with or without deformation, brought in empirical questions of physics,

and Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, all concurred that mathematics ought not to be based
on physics, but ought to be a priori, and that geometry ought to be concerned only with
immovable space.
The Synthetic and the Metric Axiom Sets

The Hilbertian reading of the Elements, hence denies the possibility of measurement,
so that the proof of Proposition 4 (SAS) fails. To preserve the structure of the Elements
it is then necessary to assume Proposition 4 as a postulate (the SAS postulate) that
cannot be proved from any more basic principles. This approach is called the syn-
thetic approach.23 One way to describe this approach is by distinguishing synthetic
instruments from those found in the common instrument box of school geometry. The
synthetic instruments are the straight edge (unmarked ruler) and collapsible compass.
The last term is De Morgans graphic description of the impossibility of measurement
with the synthetic approach: distances cannot be reliably picked and carried because
the synthetic compasses are loose and collapse as soon as they are lifted from the pa-
per. (Collapsible compasses may well be an accurate description of the then-prevailing
state of technology!) Hence, also the ruler is left unmarked. In this synthetic approach,
the term equal used in the original Elements is changed to the term congruence:
motion is replaced by a mapping, so that it is not necessary to transfer figures from
one place to another, one only needs to shift ones attention from one figure to the other.
The other way of clarifying the obscurity in the original Elements is to accept the
possibility of measurement, and to accept that the proof of Proposition 4 (SAS) is valid.
This is called the metric approach, and has been championed by Birkhoff. The main
problem with a full metric approach is that it completely devalues the Elements. Even
Proclus does not claim any originality for his Euclid; the value of the Elements derived
from the nice arrangement of the theorems, so that the proof of any theorem used
only the preceding theorems. With a full metric approach, even the arrangement
of theorems in the Elements loses its significance: it is quite possible to prove the
Pythagorean Theorem (I. 47), by cutting, picking and carrying, without recourse to
the preceding theorems.
22 Schopenhauer: 1844, Die Welt als Wille, 2nd ed, 130, cited in Heath, p. 227.
23 For
a detailed and easily accessible account, see E. Moise: 1963, Elementary Geometry from an Advanced
Standpoint, Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass.; B.I. Publications, Bombay, 1966.
Raju 229
The synthetic and metric approaches being so different, the problem is to choose
one of them.
It is in deference to the synthetic formulation of the Elements, that the proposition
4 of the original Elements is now taught as the Side-Angle-Side (SAS) postulate. This
permits one to continue teaching the Elements as a valid example of the deductive
method of proof used in modern mathematics.
This is unacceptable for several reasons.
1. A metric approach makes Euclidean geometry very simple: a straightforward

metric approach could prove the Pythagorean Theorem (Proposition I.47) in
one step, as in the YuktiBhasa proof.24 The synthetic approach was originally
motivated by the desire to justify the apparently needless complexity of the proofs
in the original Euclid. The justification was needed because of the importance
attached to this text by Christian rational theology. The justification was sought
by denying the possibility of picking and carrying segments without deformation;
hence, also, the possibility of measurement was denied. Thus, the synthetic
approach makes proofs more difficult, and is counter-intuitivefor it denies the
everyday ability to pick and carry, and compare and measure. (The ultimate
justification for denying the manifest flows from the Platonic-Kantian idea that
mathematics is a priori, and so ought not to be contaminated by the empirical.
The other way of looking at this idea is that it demands that mathematics ought
not to correspond to anything real, and hence ought to remain perfectly meaning-
less.)
2. The synthetic interpretation of the Elements substitutes the key term equal in
the original by the new term congruent. This key substitution clearly does not
work beyond Proposition I. 34. Thus, Proposition I. 35 states that Parallelograms
on the same base and in the same parallels are equal to one another. This
proposition asserts the equality of areas that are quite clearly non-congruent
(when not identical). It follows that one must either abandon all propositions after
proposition I. 35 (including the Pythagorean Theorem I. 47), or else one must
abandon the synthetic interpretation of the Elements. It does not help to try to
define a general area through triangulation, as Proclus contemporary, Aryabhata
did25 since the notion of area is not defined anywhere in the Elements, and the
usual formula for the area of a triangle is itself derived from I. 35. Some attempts
have been made to supplement the synthetic approach by axiomatically defining
area in a way analogous to the Lebesgue measure (overlooking the connection of
the Lebesgue measure to the notion of distance). Area, however, is an intrinsically
metric notion; indeed, it would be a rather silly enterprise to define area without
first defining length.
24 K.V. Sarma (Ed and Tr.): (to be published), The GanitaYuktiBhasa of Jyeshtadeva. For a description of
the proof, see , C.K. Raju, Mathematics and Culture, cited earlier.
25 Ganita 6-9. Aryabhatiya of Aryabhata (Eds and Trs) K. S. Shukla and K. V. Sarma, INSA, New Delhi,
1976, pp. 38-45.

The schizophrenic method of denying metricity until proposition I. 35, and admit-
ting it thereafter is only confusing to young minds. The whole project is born of the
compulsions of theology and racist history.26
The Current Text

We have substituted this with our own schizophrenic project. The schizophrenia de-
rives from multiple inheritance. The formal structure of our educational system: schools,
colleges, universities is patterned on the system prevalent in Europe, rather than the
indigenous tradition of pathshala-s or Nalanda and Takshashila. The educational
system in Europe was for several centuries quite explicitly oriented towards theological
concerns. With the rise of industrial capitalism, in the last hundred years or so,
there was a partial shift in the West towards more practical and utilitarian concerns.
Euclidean geometry, for example, is no longer taught in British schools.
Independent India accepted industrial capitalism, and the elite in this country still
continue to regard education as a means of forging links to the metropolitan centre,
so that even 50 years after independence most of the country remains illiterate, and
education remains the preserve of the elite for one excuse (shortage of government
funds) or another (need to commercialise). Education, furthermore, has been de-
moralised, and the theological concerns of the West have been substituted by elitist
chauvinism.
In line with the British legacy of bureaucracy, and the clerks dharma of evading re-
sponsibility, our school texts are produced in clerkdom (which still controls education),
by a duly constituted committee. The committee has sought to balance the require-
ments of industrial capitalism (which needs the products of education), with those
of chauvinistic history (which seeks to correct racist history without understanding
tradition).
These contradictory requirements are reflected in the current NCERT text for Class
9.27 On the one hand, this is how the NCERT text justifies the teaching of geometry
For instance, those of you who will become engineers, technicians and scientists will
not only find all this information useful but will also realise that you cannot do without
it. (Needless to say, there is no other concrete instance in the explanation which
occupies one paragraph in this vein of redundancy improving communication!) But
if practical usefulness were the sole justification for teaching geometry, then metric
geometry ought to be taught. Engineers, technicians and scientists, all, have no use
for geometry without measurement. (Not even relativists care much for spacetime
geometry based on the connection rather than the metric.)
On the other hand, a similar conclusion follows from the historical assertions with
which the NCERT exposition of geometry begins [pp. 123-124].
The Baudhayana Sulbasutras . . . contains [sic] a clear statement of the so-called Pythagoras
26 Martin Bernal, Black Athena, cited earlier.
27 A.M. Vaidya et al.: 1989, Mathematics: A Textbook for Secondary Schools, Class IX, NCERT, Ninth
Reprint Edition (sic) 1998, 124.
Raju 231
theorem. The proof of this theorem is also implicit in the constructional methods of the Sulba-
sutras.
The subtle way in which Western historians have exploited the notion of proof
seems to have quite escaped the authors of the text. Western historians have read-
ily conceded that Babylonians, Egyptians, Chinese, Indians all knew earlier that the
Pythagorean theorem was true. They have maintained, however, that none of them
had a proof, hence none of them knew why it was true: they knew of the theorem
only as an empirical fact which they did not quite comprehend, much as an ass might
know the theorem without comprehending it. Comprehension, therefore, still dawned
with the Greeks. To refer to constructional methods as implicit proofs is to miss the
central issue clarified above: the motivation for synthetic geometry is that empirical
knowledge is not only distinct from mathematics but that it cannot logically precede
mathematics. Hence, if the second sentence in the above quote is true, then the very
notion of mathematical proof would need to be changed to accept empirical inputs.
Needless to say, the committee does not intend any such revolutionary challenge to
mathematical authority which is entirely beyond its terms of reference!
Therefore, on the third hand (surely committees have at least three hands!), the text
lapses back into the synthetic geometry recommended by the US School Mathematics
Study Group. Like a proper committee report, the resulting text has included a little
something to suit every taste. So the text introduces the SAS postulate [p. 162] as
the SAS (Side-Angle-Side) Congruence Axiom, where axiom is to be understood as
follows [p. 125]: basic facts which are taken for granted (without proofs) are called
axioms. Axioms are sometimes intuitively evident. That is, an axiom, like a fact,
belongs to the domain of empirical and physical, rather than the intuitively a priori
exactly the thing that was denied to motivate the SAS postulate and the notion of
congruence in the first place! One wonders why, unlike most other committee reports,
this report was not left to gather dust!
The natural casualty is the student who has to digest the whole thing, and so may be
put off geometry for the rest of his life, especially if he is clear-headed. If congruence is
explained through superposition (Heiberg Common Notion 4, or Theonine Axiom 8),
as the text does (pp. 159-161), one has clearly a metric approach. Within a metric
approach, it is trivial to prove the synthetic congruence results proved in the textin
fact there is then no need for a SAS congruence axiom, one has a SAS theorem, the way
it was proved in the original Elements. To now prove these results, in the manner of
synthetic geometry, on the ground that one is teaching the axiomatic method, is to teach
the axiomatic method as a completely mindless and elaborate ritual that one must
complete on the strength of the state authority that NCERT enjoys. What children
are being taught is not the sceptical attitude which underlies the need for a proof, but
mindless obedience to rituals which cannot be justified.
The hotchpotch geometry in the NCERT text for Class 9 is indigestible because it
has mixed up the Elements by mixing up elements that ought not to be taken together
like diazepam and alcoholunless the object is to induce a comatose state. To make
the text digestible, one needs to sort out which geometry one wants to teach: metric,
synthetic, or traditional. Even if one wants to teach all three they should be kept in
separate compartments: it is NOT a good idea to make the synthetic notion of congru-
ence more intuitive by defining it metrically as the NCERT text does! The authors need
to appreciate the incompatibility of the metric and synthetic approaches, and the way
these differ from the traditional approach, which incorporates an altogether different
notion of mathematical proof.28
Traditional Geometry Distinguished from the Metric and the Synthetic

Enough has been said above about the incompatibility of the metric and synthetic
approaches; and I will briefly recapitulate the way in which both these approaches
differ from the traditional approach. First, the authoritative traditional literature
is the sutra literature; the sutra style is well-known for its extreme brevitylike a
telegraphic message, further distilled by digital compression. The sutra-s are not
intended to serve primarily a pedagogical function, and they are not intended to be
accessible to all. Consequently, they have no place for proofs. Texts dealing with
rationale, on the other hand, being less authoritative, have not been translated. The
key text on rationale, available in English translation,29 is the YuktiBhasa, which, as
stated earlier, proves the Pythagorean theorem in one step, by drawing the figure on
a palm leaf, cutting it, and rearranging the cut parts. An examination of rationale in
traditional geometry shows the following.
What distinguishes traditional geometry from both metric and synthetic geometry
is the traditional notion of proof (pramana). Though there have been many debates in
tradition on what constitutes pramana, the one ingredient that went unchallenged was
the physically manifest (pratyaksa) as a means of proof. The traditional notion is not
embarrassed by the empirical, and does not regard it as intrinsically inferior to meta-
physics. Both the Baudhayana and the Katyayana sulbasutra-s begin by explaining
the use of the rope for measuring areas. Aryabhata defined horizontal using a water
level, and a perpendicular using a plumb line. The proofs in the YuktiBhasa clearly
accept the physically manifest as a good argument. All this would horrify a modern-
day mathematician, who believes that mathematics is a priori, and certainly logically
prior to the physically manifest.
Asserting the sulbasutra tradition would clash with the entire tradition of education
in medieval and renaissance Europe, which was geared to theological purposes, and
hence reinforced the philosophy of the authorities like Plato, and later Kant which jus-
tified the deprecatory attitude towards the physical world. For Proclus, the key object
of teaching mathematics was not its military or political utility, which he regarded as
subsidiary, but its ability to make the student forget the practical concerns of everyday
life and thereby discover his real self.
the soul has its essence in mathematical ideas, and it has a prior knowledge of them . . . and
brings of them to light when it is set free of the hindrances that arise from sensation. For our
sense-perceptions engage the mind with divisible things . . . and . . . every divisible thing is an
28 For the traditional notion of pramana in relation to mathematics, see C. K. Raju, Mathematics and
Culture, cited earlier.

29 Another text dealing with rationale, the Karanapaddhati is now available in a Japanese translation,
being retranslated into English.

Raju 233
obstacle to our returning upon ourselves. . . .Consequently when we remove these hindrances
. . . we become knowers in actuality . . ..30
Rejecting this attitude is not a trivial matter for all of current-day mathematics de-
pends upon the belief that mathematics is a priori and divorced from the empirical.
Nevertheless, the fact is that the Nayyayika notion of proof proceeds from a realistic
philosophical standpoint directly opposed to Platonic idealism. Classical Indian tradi-
tion saw no need to regard mathematics as something necessarily metaphysical, and
consequently, there was no need for two separate procedures of validation: (1) a notion
of mathematical proof, and (2) criteria (such as logical and empirical falsifiability) to
decide the validity of a physical theory. Therefore, though metric, traditional Indian
geometry does not need to proceed from Birkhoffs axioms. Against this background,
various other considerations are summarised in Table 1.
The second key point about the notion of proof concerns inference (anumana), about
which different schools of thought had mutually different ideas which differed also from
the idea of logical deduction underlying the current metamathematical definition of a
mathematical proof (which defines a proof as a sequence of statements each of which is
either an axiom or is derived from some preceding axioms by the use of modus ponens
or similar rules of reasoning). The Lokayata explicitly rejected inference, at least in
the metaphysical domain (which includes modern mathematics), allowing its use only
for practical purposes. The Buddhist and Jaina traditions pose an even more funda-
mental question: what should be the logic underlying proof? If one insists on regarding
mathematics as metaphysical, as in the current formalistic approach, then what is the
justification for the use of a 2-valued truth-functional logic underlying mathematical
proof? Clearly, the formalistic approach cannot possibly answer this questionthereby
showing that allegedly universal mathematical truths ultimately rest on a narrow
base of authority, localised in the West. Despite the authority, the belief is purely
a matter of cultural prejudice, for the seven-fold classification (saptabhanginaya) of
the Jaina syadvada of Bhadrabahu cannot be accommodated within 2-valued logic,
while the four-fold negation used by the Buddha, Nagarjuna, and Dinnaga cannot be
accommodated within a truth-functional framework. The logic of the empirical world,
by the way, may be similarly quasi truth-functional, for quantum mechanics permits
Schrodingers cat31 to be simultaneously both alive and dead, without permitting any
arbitrary statement to be deduced from this contradiction.
The objectives of education, and the philosophical substance of the Elements

We now have before us, three distinct models of Euclidean geometry: synthetic, metric
and traditional . Which model one ought to teach depends upon the objectives of
education. The objectives of education in India prior to independence are well known,
especially Macauleys objectives of creating a cheap clerical workforce to help rule the
empire. In independent India, as things stand, educational objectives have largely been
30 Proclus,cited earlier, 45.
31 Fordetails of the relation of quasi truth-functional logic to von Neumanns postulates for quantum
mechanics, see C.K. Raju: 1994, Time: Towards a Consistent Theory, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht.
Type of geometry I II III IV

Metric Synthetic Euclidean Traditional
Fundamental (S, L, P, d, m) (S, L, P, B, ) Semi-idealized Real space

setup (not real, not
ideal)
Distance d Not mentioned Lenghts Measured with a
rope
Measure of an- m Not mentioned Only equality Measured physi-
gles and inequality cally (e.g., with a
with right angles plumb line)
Congruence for From d Given (for seg- Not mentioned Not mentioned
segments ments) (only equality, (equality
presumed pre- through pick
defined) and carry)
Congruence for From m Given (for an- Not mentioned Not mentioned
angles gles) (only equality, (only measured
presumed pre- equality)
defined)
SAS Theorem Postulate Theorem (differ- Similarity and
ently proved) rule of three
(equality a
special case)
Area Additional Not defined (else Not defined Explicitly
definition needed length would be (only equality, defined through
defined) presumed pre- triangula-
defined ) tion/rectangulation
Addition Real Numbers Congruence Geometric Floating point
classes construction numbers
Inequality
Proportion Real numbers Congruence Complex Rule of 3
classes + complex assertions using
assertions (using inequality and
betweenness, integer addition.
inequality, and Not in Book 1
integer addition)
Instruments Scale, protractor, Unmarked Not explicitly Rope
and compass (ge- straightedge stated
ometry box) and collapsible
compasses
Note: S = set of points, L = set of lines (subsets of points), P = set of planes (subsets of points), d =
distance, m = measure of angles, B = Betweenness relation, = congrence for segments/angles.
Table 1: A comparison of metric, synthetic, Euclidean and traditional geometry.

Raju 235
decided in clerkdom by appealing to precedents established in the West. So, before
deciding what the objectives of education ought to be, it would help to answer the two
questions that were postponed earlier. Why were the Elements so important to Islamic
and to Christian rational theology? Why were they such a necessary part of the theo-
logical curriculum? (This is the sort of thing that modern-day mathematicians do not
usually understand, since their education, geared to the needs of industrial capitalism,
encourages a narrow view of the world, together with an unquestioning acceptance of
the postulates and rules of inference laid down by mathematical authority.)
Very briefly, to understand this, one must situate Christian rational theology in
the context of the two traditions which it inherited. The first is that of Arabic-Islamic
rational theology, which reached medieval Europe through Averroes and the debate
that preceded him in Islam, and deeply influenced the beginnings of Christian rational
theology.
For the Arab rationalists (Mutazilah and falasifa) Uclides was important as a demon-
stration of Neoplatonic principles, which they accepted as a key aspect of their theology,
attributing it to Aristotle. The Arab rationalists aimed to deduce everything from the
two key principles of equity and justice. The Elements provided a model of how even the
physically manifest could be deduced, starting from the principle of equity. The notion
of equality in the Elements has obvious political and philosophical overtones of equity,
that are quite lost upon those now accustomed to thinking in terms of congruence: the
absence of a royal road to geometry was an assertion about the political content of
the Elements. Equity is contrary to Platonic ideas of the republic, and Proclus stated
aim in writing his commentary on the Elements was to inform people about its deep
philosophical contentthe doctrine of the oneness of humankind.
Secondly, Christian rational theology also inherited the legacy of the early Roman
church and its confrontation with Neoplatonism over the issue of equity. Though the
very early church doctrines clearly favoured equity, and Origens theology is barely
distinguishable from Neoplatonism, the state-church after Constantine, found this
doctrine of equity a gross political inconvenience. We have already noted the churchs
confrontation with Neoplatonism, ending with the closure of the Alexandrian school
and when Origen was formally condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council.32
Impelled by these contradictory inheritances, Thomist philosophy rejected equity
as irrelevant, and retained only the process of rational deduction. The philosophical
importance of the Elements was now confined to the process of rational deduction
which could be used to persuade the non-believer, since both Islamic rationalists and
al Ghazal accepted that God was bound by Aristotelian logic.
How should Geometry be Taught?

Against this background, we can finally turn to the question raised in the title of this
paper. Which geometry should be taught depends upon the objectives of education. In
a democracy these objectives should be decided by consensus, or majority, or, at least,
32 or, which amounts to the same thing, thought to have been so condemned for 1400 years. (Hair splitting
over the 5th Ecumenical council is irrelevant here.)

informed public debate. In India, bad governance by the elite has made this impossible.
We still follow a tightly hierarchical model: all knowledge is believed to reside at the
top management layer, even though it may be manifestly scientifically illiterate, or out
of date! Committees are nominated only to make a pretence of oligarchy; but those of
us with the slightest experience in committee formation know that the whole structure
aims to reflect the will at the very narrow top. This will is that the majority of people in
the country should be kept illiterate (so that they do not constitute a threat) and that
the cream of educated people should be exported to the West (since that financially
benefits the elite from which this creamy layer comes).
Under these circumstances, I cannot prescribe the objectives of education. But once
these objectives are laid down, the following should help to arrive at an answer to the
question raised in the title of this paper.
1. If the state policy is that education is justified by its linkages to industrial or infor-
mation capitalism (it is needed by future engineers, technicians and scientists)
it is not so clear that it is imperative to teach the classical method of proof. We
must then consider what is increasingly likely to happen in the future: a computer
simulation for which there is no numerical analysis, and no convergence proof.
According to Hilberts ideas this would not count as mathematics. Nevertheless,
such computer simulations may be increasingly used as the basis of everyday deci-
sions: such as decisions about large financial investments. Briefly, if mathematics
is to be justified by its utility, then one should be teaching practical mathematics
rather than formal mathematics. In the case of geometry, this means that the
synthetic approach should be rejected in favour of the metric approach, and that
even with the metric approach, one could omit teaching proofs. It is true that this
might compromise understanding; but if education is justified by its utility, one
might as well explicitly accept that understanding is of lesser importance, for the
time thus saved could be used to teach some more useful things.
2. If the objective of education is to establish linkages to tradition, this tradition can-
not be arbitrarily selected. The Neoplatonic origin of the Elements seems to me
undeniable. On the other hand, Neoplatonism links naturally to Indian tradition
not only through Islam and the sufi-s, but also through direct contact, and strong
conceptual similarities to Advaita Vedanta. The links were physical, with some
250 ships sailing annually to carry out a huge trade with the Roman empire.
They were also philosophical: Augustine, born some 50 years after Porphyrys
death, records that Porphyry (the very same student of Plotinus, who recorded
the Enneads and commented on the Elements) searched for a universal way for
the liberation of the soul in the mores and disciplina of the Indi.33 Therefore,
it needs to be spelt out what state policy enables us to say that a certain sort
of tradition at a certain point of time should be regarded as more valuable than
another tradition at a different point of time. For example, should one reject the
33 John J. OMeara,: 1982, Indian Wisdom and Porphyrys Search for a Universal Way in: R. Baine Harris
(ed), Neoplatonism and Indian Thought, Sri Satguru publications, Delhi, 6.

Raju 237
Buddhist or Jaina tradition, both of which rejected as wrong many more ancient
traditional things? Again, there is no reason why the medieval tradition in which
clearly Uclides was part of the talm, of, say, Abul Fazl, should not be deemed
to be as Indian a tradition as the sulbasutra-s. One cannot really say that the
more ancient thing is necessarily a more authentic part of ones tradition, for one
may quite recently have consciously rejected some ancient ideas like untoucha-
bility. Depending upon which tradition is officially approved as worth teaching,
one could then decide whether to teach one or more of traditional geometry, or
metric geometry (which trivialises the Elements), or synthetic geometry and the
method of proof (after resolving the issue over the method of proof to be adopted
in mathematics).
There is also the following question. Though the geometry of the sulbasutra-s has
been called ritual geometry because of the association of the sulbasutra-s with
the construction of vedis and citis, the fact of the matter is that this geometry
had purely practical significance, and lacked the theological orientation of the El-
ements, from the time of Proclus. Practical significance is something that changes
from time to time; to teach traditional geometry, devoid of its practical concerns
would be to do violence to the tradition by reducing practical considerations to
ritualistic ones.
3. If the objective is to teach a certain method of inference, or a certain method of
proof, it is not clear that Euclidean geometry is the best vehicle for it. One could
take syllogistic examples from elsewhere.
Conclusions
1. Our current school texts in geometry must be corrected to distinguish clearly
between metric and synthetic geometry.
2. One must decide which geometry to teachmetric, synthetic, or traditionaland
stick to teaching that geometry. It is NOT a good idea to motivate synthetic con-
cepts like congruence by appealing to the intuitive physical idea of superposition
which underlies metric notions.
3. If traditional geometry is also to be taught, the texts must further separate it
from formal metric and synthetic geometry: it is NOT a good idea merely to
claim priority, as the present text does, for traditional geometry is fundamentally
different, since the traditional notion of proof differs fundamentally from the
current metamathematical notion of proof. One should first decide which method
of proof one wants to teach, and then develop a mathematics based on that method
of proof.
4. If the aim in teaching the Elements is to teach formal axiomatics, the authors of
texts should distinguish between meaningless formal axioms and empirical facts.
If this is too hard a thing for educators to do, then it is too hard for schoolchildren
to understand, and formal axiomatics ought NOT to be taught to schoolchildren.
5. The Elements have long been part of the theological curriculum because of their
philosophical significance, first for Neoplatonists (to arouse recollection of ones
true Self), then for Islamic rationalists (rational deduction from equity), and
finally for Christian rationalists (rational deduction). Our objective in teaching
the Elements must be formulated in awareness of this significance, as also an
awareness of Neoplatonic linkages to Indian traditions directly and via the sufi-s.
6. Our objectives must also recognize that no individual tradition can claim to be
the unique Indian tradition either as regards the matter of proof (pramana), or as
regards the tradition of geometry: the sulbasutra-s, the YuktiBhasa, and Uclides
are all part of Indian tradition. Tradition should not be reduced to ritual by
separating it from its original context of practical usefulness.
7. If we choose to teach geometry purely for its practical utility, then this practical
usefulness needs to be clearly thought out in the context of future needs, to protect
education from rapid obsolescence.
The Axiomatic Method: Its Origin and Purpose
S.D. Agashe
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, India. Email: eesdaia@ee.iitb.ac.in
Introduction
This is an informal introduction to a formal paper that was published about 12 years
ago and has been reprinted here. It is also a brief description of what Prof. Amitabha
Gupta and myself have been trying to do in our elective courses, History and Philoso-
phy of Science and Logic and Foundations of Mathematics at the Indian Institute of
Technology, Bombay, over the last 25 years or so.
After I encountered some problems in my understanding of physics and mathe-
matics, I was led to a study of history and philosophy of science and mathematics. I
was forced to do a critical examination of a lot of what I had learnt. As a student,
of course, I was not expected to critically examine what I was being taught. This,
unfortunately, may be true of students anywhere! In our courses, however, we made
students critically examine what they were taught as science and mathematics, rather
than dogmatize about scientific knowledge.
I was then led to critically examine axiomatization. In such matters, we think it
is best to go back to the Masters. So before reading Aristotle, Kant or Mill, I started
reading Euclids Elements. I would urge you to have a first-hand look at Euclids
Elements before reading the paper. I have also appended the contents of Books I and
II as given in Mueller, 1981.
The starting point for an understanding of axiomatization, it seems to me, is Propo-
sition 14 of Book II: to construct a square equal to a given rectilineal figure. Why
bother to do this? What is square and rectilineal figure? What does equal mean?
The way geometry was taught to me, equal meant equal in area. Had I been bold
enough at that time, I would have asked my teacher: What do you mean by equal in
area? What is area of a figure? Why should I accept the formula that the area of a
rectangle is the product of its length and breadth? Further, what are length, breadth,
and product? And most importantly, why should we do all this?
Looking at Books I and II, starting with II. 14 in a backward direction, one can
see perhaps an intuitive notion of equality of figures as coincidence, and a notion of
inequality as a part-whole relationship. One can then see that a problem can arise
here with some pairs of figures: neither they coincide nor does one of them fit inside
the other. One problem leads to another, one notion leads to another and we are also
forced to make (or to grant) some assumptions. Having done this exercise, one sees in
This paper is reprinted from Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Volume VI, Number
3, May-August 1989, with permission from the author. The introductory section and the appendix are added
in this version.
240 Axiomatic Method
it a vision of an axiomatic approach. Please try to go through this exercise yourself,
and draw the figures.
As with Geometry, so with Arithmetic, Algebra, Mechanics, Electricity and Mag-
netism, etc. Over the years, we have been spending a lot of time with the Masters!
Euclidean Geometry and the Axiomatic Method

Euclids Elements constitutes the earliest extant substantial presentation of a body of
material in the axiomatico-deductive form.1 Through it the subject of geometry got
permanently associated with axiomatico-deductive formulation which was then viewed
as a method, so much so that the expression more geometrico (the geometric way)
became synonymous with axiomatico-deductive formulation. Thus arose the general
belief, especially in methodological quarters, that Euclids Elements and, in particular,
Euclids geometry were merely instances of the application of a previously thought
out/discovered/known method, and, thus, that the axiomatico-deductive method existed
prior to the axiomatico-deductive formulation of geometry.2
Using Euclids Elements as my principal evidence,3 I want to suggest that the true
state of affairs is the other way round. The axiomatico-deductive formulation of geome-
try emerged out of a successful attemptmost probably by some of Euclids predecessors
to solve some geometrical problems. Once this was done, it was seen by these geometers
and also, of course, by Euclid as an instrument of open-ended discovery. Only, then,
could the germs of a method be seen in it.
1 Although the name Euclid is almost synonymous with the word geometry, it should be noted that Eu-
clids Elements deals not only with geometry but also with (the natural) numbers, certain incommensurable
geometrical magnitudes (and thus indirectly with a special class of irrational numbers), and a theory of
general magnitudes. The Elements is divided into thirteen Books. Books I to IV, VI, and X to XIII deal
with geometrical topics. Books VII to IX are concerned with natural numbers. Book Va very interesting
one but, unfortunately, rather overlooked by physicists and philosophers of sciencecontains a theory of
general magnitudes, which is in many respects similar to algebra and lays the foundation of a theory of
measurement. Each Book contains a number of propositions, which are either assertions (or theorems,
in modern terminology), or problems. The theorems (for example, in Book I, Proposition 5: In isosceles
triangles the angles at the base are equal to one another, and, if the equal straight lines be produced further
the angles under the base will be equal to one another) are followed by a demonstration of the correctness
of the assertion (proof), ending in the proverbial Q.E.D. (in the Latin version). The problems (for example,
in Book I, Proposition 1: On a given finite straight line to construct an equilateral triangle) are followed
by a construction and a demonstration that the construction, indeed, solves the problem, ending with the
less familiar Q.E.F.. Some Books (I to VII, X and XI) have some definitions stated at the beginning. Only
Book I has some postulates and common notions following the definitions. (In todays terminology, these can
be called specific axioms and general axioms respectively).
2 Although both Euclids name and the subject of geometry have become synonymous with the axiomatic
method, unfortunately we do not find any elaboration of this method which says something about the genesis,
evolution or purpose of the method, either in Euclids Elements or in any extant work by his predecessors
(such as Plato and Aristotle, among others). There is, for example, no preface to the Elements. Plato,
of course, alludes frequently to the method of the geometers, and Aristotle has written in detail on the
demonstrative sciences.
3 My main source is the second revised edition of The Thirteen Books of Euclids Elements (3 vols.)
translated from the text of Heiberg with introduction and commentary by Sir Thomas L. Heath and published
by Cambridge University Press in 1925. The book was reprinted by Dover Publications, Inc., in 1956. The
contents of the Elements have been put together in the appendix in Ian Muellers Philosophy of Mathematics
and Deductive Structure in Euclids Elements published by M.I.T. Press in 1981.
Agashe 241
My view of the genesis of the axiomatic method emboldens me to suggest further
that in general a method, which is something consciously conceived, arises as the
result of reflection on an activity that is already being pursued intuitively. Again,
once the method is consciously conceived, it can engender new activity being pursued
consciously in accordance with the method, i.e. methodically.
The Geometrical Problems and their Solutions

If the axiomatic method arose as a result of reflection on some geometrical activity
being pursued intuitively, what could this activity have been? I suggest that this
activity was initiated by a problem which, although it is not explicitly posed in the
Elements, can be solved on the basis of another problem which is explicitly posed and
solved in Book II, Proposition 14, of the Elements: To construct a square equal to a
given rectilinear figure. This problem could well be called the problem of squaring
a rectilineal figure by analogy with the name of a well-known problem of Greek ge-
ometry: squaring the circle. (Euclid was not able to solve this latter problem, and
therefore, perhaps, does not mention it at all in the Elements). Let us note that Book II
ends with Proposition 14; I might say that our teaching and learning of geometryand
of the axiomatic method-ought to begin with this proposition which actually enunciates
a problem.
But why is this problem of squaring a rectilineal figure important? The compari-
son of two straight-line segments to find out whether they are equally long or not, and,
if not, to find out which one of the two segments is shorter and which the longer is,
practically speaking, a simple matter, if one is allowed to use a string or a rope.4 Euclid
solved this problem theoretically, allowing himself the use only of a straight-edge (to
draw a straight line joining two given points) and of a pair of compasses (to draw a
circle with a given centre and a given segment, of which that centre is an extremity,
as a radius of that circle, i.e. without using a pair of compasses as a pair of dividers).
In fact, this is reflected in his Postulates 1 and 3 of Book I. Euclids solution of this
problem of the comparison of two straight-line segments is given as Proposition 3 of
Book I: Given two unequal straight lines, to cut off from the greater a straight line
equal to the less.
The corresponding problem for plane rectilineal figures is far from easy, even prac-
tically speaking. We may, where possible, move one of the two given rectilineal figures
and try to place it on the other to see whether the two fit together perfectly, or whether
one of them can be fitted entirely within the other. (Common Notions 8 and 9 of Book I
reflect this approach. Common Notion 8: And things which coincide with one another
are equal to one another. Common Notion 9: And the whole is greater than the
part). But very often neither of these two things will happen, even if the figures
4 The comparison of two line segments to find out which one is the longer and which the shorter is perhaps
the earliest example of the idea of the comparison of two objects with respect to a given quality to detect which
one of the two has more and which one less of the quality. I have argued in another paper presented at
the workshop on The Genesis and Purpose of Quantification and Measurement that this idea of comparison
with respect to a quality is more primitive than the precursor of the notion of quantity. The Greeks, and in
particular Plato talked repeatedly of the notion of the more and the less, or the greater and the lesser
have some definite and simple shape such as that of a rectangle. However, should
both the figures be squares, superposition will always yield a solution; in fact, we need
not even superpose the squares: we need only compare their sides. Note that this
happy situation is based on the observation that any two right angles fit, and this
requirement is what perhaps led the geometers to define a right angle the way Euclid
does (Definition 10, Book I: When a straight line set up on a straight line makes the
adjacent angles equal to one another, each of the equal angles is right), and led Euclid
to put down his Postulate 4, Book I: And that all right angles are equal to one another.
Another important observation would have to be made before one could proceed
further with the problem. A given figure can be cut up or decomposed into parts and
these parts put together differently to obtain a different-looking figure. (This can be
easily seen by cutting up a square into two equal parts and putting these together to
obtain a rectangle). Now, two such figures are not equal (in the sense of Common Notion
8), but there is something special about them, namely, that their corresponding parts
are equal in the sense of congruence. At this point, the ancient geometers must have
realized that no further progress on the problem of comparison of figures was possible
unless one was willing to regard two figures, which were equal in parts, to be equal.
This is, of course, a weakening or widening of the notion of equality of figures, and
appears as Common Notion 2 in Book I: And if equals are added to equals the wholes
are equals. (The original Greek wording of this Common Notion does not suggest
the notion of addition in a numerical sense; rather, it suggests putting together
prostethe). This broadening of the original notion of equality as congruence allows one
literally to transform a given figure, i.e., change its form or shape, while retaining its
size, i.e., while keeping the new figure equal to the original figure. The problem of
comparison of two figures could now be reduced to the problem of transformation of
one figure into another through the techniques of dividing and putting together. But
the fact that squares can be compared with ease would have suggested the following
alternative. Suppose, instead of trying to convert one of the given figures into the other,
one tries to convert both the figures into squares; and, suppose, it turns out that the
converted squares are equal. Could we, then, assert that the two original figures were
equal? The astute Greek geometers saw that this was not justified unless the notion
of equality was weakened further; thus, we have Common Notion 1 of Book I: Things
equal to the same thing are also equal to one another.5
5 Thus far, I have accounted for three of the five Euclidean Postulates and four of the five Euclidean
Common Notions in Book I. (Mueller lists one more Postulate and four more Common Notions, but these are
not regarded as genuinely Euclidean and so are enclosed within square brackets). This leaves only one more
Common Notion (Common Notion 3): And if equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal
and two more Postulates; Book I, Postulate 2 is: To produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight
line and Book I, Postulate 5 is the so-called Parallel Postulate: If a straight line falling on two straight
lines make the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced
indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles. Postulate 2 is obviously
required in most constructions where a point is to be obtained by the intersection of two straight lines or
of a straight line and a circle. As regards Postulate 5, Euclid postpones the use of this postulate as far as
possible; it, is involved for the first time in proving Proposition 29: A straight line falling on parallel straight
lines makes the alternate angles equal to one another, the exterior angle equal to the interior and opposite
angle, and the interior angles on the same side equal to two right angles. In fact, this Proposition could
Agashe 243
Having agreed to the broadening of the notion of equality (of figures) through the
Common Notions 1 and 2, the problem of comparison of two figures is reduced to
the problem of squaring of a figure. Naturally, Euclid takes up the simpler case of a
rectilineal figure, and, thus, arrives at the statement of his basic problem in Books I
and II, Proposition II. 14: To construct a square equal to a given rectilineal figure.
How does Euclid solve the problem? Or, rather, how did Euclid, or some predecessor,
arrive at the solution we find given in the Elements? Certainly not by starting off with
the definitions, postulates and common notions, and brilliantly deducing one theorem
after another (there are forty-eight propositions in Book I and fourteen in Book II). The
problem was solved by reducing it, in turn, to one or more problems. This approach to
problem solving was discussed much later by Pappus under the name of the Method of
Analysis and Synthesis, but we find allusions to it already in Plato. The analysis part
involves the formulation of auxiliary or subsidiary problems in what later appears as
a back tracking when the solution is finally described in the synthesis part.
Although a triangle would be the simplest rectilineal figure, for obvious reasons Eu-
clid prefers to tackle the rectangle first. So the problem of squaring a rectilineal figure
is broken down into two sub-problems: (a) the problem of squaring a rectangle (this
construction is given in II.14) and (b) the problem of rectangulating any rectilineal
figure (this construction is given in I. 45).
Euclid solves (a) essentially by transforming a rectangle into a gnomon (which is an
L-shaped figure left when a smaller square is taken out of a bigger square; see shaded
area in the figure).
A gnomon is clearly a difference of two squares, and we
thus have the new problem of constructing a square equal
to the difference of two squares. This problem can be solved
perhaps if we succeed in solving the problem of constructing
a square equal to the sum of two squares; this is precisely
what the famous Pythagorean proposition amounts to, and it
is Proposition I. 47, the last but one proposition in Book I, the
last (48th) proposition being the converse of the Pythagorean
proposition. Of course, Pythagoras Theorem in the special
case of the isosceles right-angled triangle was known to
many civilizations before Euclid, and perhaps even before
Figure 1: A gnomon. Pythagoras, and its truth could be visually ascertained. It
must have been natural to conjecture that the theorem was
true for any arbitrary right-angled triangle, but this already presupposes a broadened
notion of equality of figures. Indeed, Euclid makes use of this broadened notion in
his proof of Pythagoras Theorem by dividing the square on the hypotenuse into two
well have been taken as a postulate in place of Postulate 5. (The converse of this Proposition is contained
in Propositions 27 and 28 which are proved without invoking Postulate 5, and this is incidentally the first
occasion for Euclid to talk about parallel lines). I have put the verb postpones in quotation marks, because,
according to the view that I am putting forward here, this was not a deliberate postponement by Euclid on
account of some inherent abhorrence of the parallel Postulate, as alleged by many critics, but rather it was
the last step along one line of progress in Euclids backtracking journey from Book II, Proposition 14 to the
Definitions, Postulates and Common Notions.
rectangles and showing the equality of these rectangles with the squares on the
corresponding sides. Now, getting convinced about the correctness of the Pythagorean
construction for the sum of two squares required further backtracking and ultimately
must have led to the inverted or backward construction of Book I, or something similar
to it, perhaps by some predecessors of Euclid. This involves, in particular, getting
convinced that the diagonal of a parallelogram splits it into two equal triangles, and
that under certain conditions two triangles are equal. (Incidentally, Common Notion
3 is demanded or postulated in claiming that the gnomon is equal to an appropriate
square.)
In his solution of problem (b), i.e., converting a rectilineal figure into a rectangle (in
fact, Euclid gives a stronger construction I. 45: to construct in a given rectilineal angle
a parallelogram equal to a given rectilineal figure, and to effect that the construction
I. 44: to a given straight line to apply, in a given rectilineal angle, a parallelogram
equal to a given triangle), Euclid uses the obvious fact that a rectilineal figure can be
easily decomposed into triangles, so that one is led next to the problem solved in I. 44.
To summarize, I wish to suggest that investigations into the problem of comparison
of two rectilineal figures led the Greeks before Euclid to the realization that some
concessions had to be made with regard to the notion of equality, which led to the
formulation and investigation of some subsidiary problems, leading finally to a number
of postulates, common notions and definitions. Having done this, they then reversed
the whole process of thinking, making it appear to posterity that, almost by a miracle,
from the small acorns of a few innocent-looking definitions and postulates mighty
oaks such as Pythagoras Theorem and II.14 could be grown. I have indicated this
with reference to Books I and II, but the same could be said about the other geometrical
books.
It should be noted, however, that the other non-geometrical books of Euclids Ele-
ments, namely, those on natural numbers and general magnitudes do not invoke any
postulates explicitly but are based only on definitions. So they could well have been
the result of an application in the forward direction of the axiomatic method discovered
by investigations in the reverse direction into some geometrical problems. Of course,
geometers after Euclidand even Euclid himselfdid carry out further geometrical
investigations in the forward direction, proving many interesting new theorems. Even-
tually, Lobachevskii, and Bolyai followed, non-Euclidean lines of exploration. This last
step, after some initial resistance, later turned into reluctance, and a considerable
delay of about fifty years led to our modern conception of the axiomatic method as
the method of mathematics, involving notions of definition, axiom and proof.
The Purposes of the Axiomatic Method

Having discussed the possible genesis of the axiomatic method in rather great detail,
I would like to turn to the several purposes or uses, to which it has been put subse-
quently.
Agashe 245
The Mathematical Use
As mentioned just above, the axiomatic method was put to use in mathematics no
sooner than it was discovered, and thus it was recognized to be a powerful instrument of
open-ended discovery or derivation. This had several consequences. Firstly, the process
of derivation or deduction came under close scrutiny giving rise to the subject of logic,
and I would venture the guess that Aristotles investigations into logic were stimulated
more by mathematics, particularly geometry, than by rhetoric or sophistic discourse.
Eventually, this led to the feeling that, logic was an engine of deduction which required
only the turning of a handle to churn out new propositions from old. Now, deduction
done by mathematiciansat least the human onesare not so mechanical as that, but
it is possible to automate the process of deduction, and this is, indeed, what has been
done recently by theorem-proving programs.
The second, and rather unfortunate, consequence was that the postulates and com-
mon notions, with the exception of Euclids parallel postulate, were regarded as being
true in some sense and so irreplaceable. Logic was then seen as an engine to derive
new, less obvious truths from old, more obvious, self-evident truths. I doubt if the
Greek geometers themselves regarded their postulates and common notions as self-
evident or true. Three of the five postulates are not about propositions, that is, about
any state of affairs in this world or in some other world. Rather, they are assumptions
about what can be done in an ideal world. Of the other two postulates, equality of all
right angles could have had some empiricism about it, but was finally assumed in order
for some constructions to work. Finally, the parallel postulate was necessitated by
the somewhat empirical fact that parallel straight lines cut by a transversal produced
equal angles, but this, too, was necessitated by the conception of a square, say, as
having all angles equal and right (Definition 22). (Euclids I.46 shows how to construct
a square: On a given straight line to describe a square). The common notions were all
required in order to surmount the problem of equality and comparability of (rectilineal)
figures.
Of course, there was a happy side to the view that the postulates and common
notions were self-evident. Thanks to the non-self-evident nature of the parallel pos-
tulate, it eventually emboldened geometers to abandon it, to replace it by something
equally non-self-evident and then, working the engine of deduction, squeeze out some
startling and almost false consequences. But this development, in its turn, had the
effect that henceforth axioms (to use a single word for postulates and common notions)
were deemed to be completely arbitrary and unprovable assertions, and, in an extreme
view, even meaningless and having no relation with truth or reality whatsoever. This
was accompanied by the view that definitions also were completely arbitrary, and one
merely defined some terms (the defined terms) in terms of some other terms (the
undefined or undefinable? terms). Now clearly, for Euclid, definitions were far from
arbitrary, though he stretched himself too far, trying to define almost every geometrical
term. But it must be noted that nowhere did he or any of his predecessors, say that
terms like part, breadthless length, extremity, etc., were undefined in the modern
mathematical sense of being devoid of any connotations. They were undefinable in
a relative sense; they were simply left undefined in Euclids formulation. There was
nothing either undefined (meaningless) or undefinable about them.
However, towards the end of the nineteenth century there did arise a widespread
view of mathematics that it consists of setting out some undefined terms and some
unproved propositions at the beginning; and then, after giving some definitions of
defined terms as and when one fancies, of proving or deriving some other assertions
on the basis of or from the unproved assertions using sheer logic or rules of inference.
The American mathematician Benjamin Peirce said, Mathematics is the science which
draws necessary conclusions; and Russell, 1901, confessed (with tongue-in-cheek hu-
mour): Thus mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what
we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. (One realizes, of course,
that mathematics is a creative or imaginative activity, and not a routine, mechanical
activity, because necessary conclusions do not follow easily or automatically from the
unproved assertions; rather, they have to be conjectured and then drawn out by hard
work.) This open-ended view of the axiomatic method in mathematics leads one to
believe that one is free to start with arbitrary undefined terms and arbitrary unproved
assertions, and then to make arbitrary definitions in order to draw the conclusions, too,
somewhat arbitrarily, i.e., as and when they occur to the mathematician, so that the
whole thing is a stupendous exercise in arbitrariness! Of course, Russell, 1919, himself
realized that this was not so, for he said (about twenty years after his earlier quip):
Mathematics is a study which, when we start from its most familiar portions, may be pursued
in either of two opposite directions. The more familiar direction is constructive, towards grad-
ually increasing complexity: from integers to fractions, real numbers, complex numbers, from
addition and multiplication to differentiation and integration, and on to higher mathematics.
The other direction, which is less familiar, proceeds, by analysing, to greater and greater
abstractness and logical simplicity; instead of asking what can be defined and deduced from
what is assumed to begin with, we ask instead what more general ideas and principles can be
found, in terms of which what was our starting-point can be defined or deduced. It is the fact
of pursuing this opposite direction that characterises mathematical philosophy as opposed to
ordinary mathematics. But it should be understood that the distinction is one, not in the subject
matter, but in the state of mind of the investigator. . . . The distinction between mathematics
and mathematical philosophy is one which depends upon the interest inspiring the research,
and upon the stage which the research has reached; not upon the propositions with which the
research is concerned.
I might add that many great mathematicians of the last hundred years or so have
contributed a lot to mathematical philosophy in Russells sense, because they have
contributed to the process of axiomatization of mathematics in the original Euclidean
sense. Further, it must be added that usually one stipulates one or more of the following
requirements for an arbitrary set of axioms, namely, that they must be consistent,
independent, complete, categorical.
The Cartesian Purpose

The use to which Descartes sought to put the axiomatic method was the establishment
of indubitable truths. A proposition about whose truth we are doubtful (such as I
exist) is sought to be established on the basis of some intuitively clear or indubitable
Agashe 247
propositions (such as I think). Thus, the axiomatic method is an instrument for
dispelling doubt and for creating certainty. Of course, the process of finding out whether
a seemingly doubtful proposition can, indeed, be indubitably established is one of
back-tracking, quite similar to the back-tracking in mathematics, where a conjectured
theorem is sought to be proved. But the difference is that, in mathematics we do not
bother about the truth of the axioms, whereas in the Cartesian approach the first
principles have to be indubitable and thus true.
Organization of Knowledge
Another use that has been found for the axiomatic method is that of organizing a body
of knowledge or systematizing a discipline. Here, it is supposed that we already have
a set of truths somehow obtained, but these truths are perhaps too many or seemingly
unrelated to each other. We then try to create some system or order by trying to discover
whether a small subset of them can serve as a set of axioms from which all the rest can
be derived. One may, of course, question the utility of such an enterprise. The whole
exercise of organization is to start with the knowledge base that is already there. This
base would include terms whose meanings we already know and assertions whose truth
we are already confident of. But, if this is so, why bother to define the already known
terms in terms of undefined terms, and to derive the already trustworthy assertions in
terms of some selected assertions? Perhaps one is trying to apply Ockhams razor here,
i.e., one is trying to obtain simplicity. But simplicity in the form of a small number
of axioms is won at the cost of complexity of derivations of the other truths from the
axioms.
Discovering Unknown Causes or Hypotheses

In this application of the axiomatic method, one starts with a known body of truths
with terms whose meanings are known. One then tries to discover a set of undefined
and unknown terms, a set of definitions of the known terms in terms of the undefined
and unknown terms; and, finally, a set of assertions whose truth is unknown in such
a way that the known truths, when reformulated using the definitions in terms of the
undefined terms, can all be derived from the axioms. This is, of course, the game of
(scientific) theory construction6 . What is the point of such a game? Well, after the
axiomatization, using the axiomatic method in the forward direction as an instrument
of discovery, one may stumble across new consequences of the axioms, which, when
reformulated using the known terms, give us propositions whose truth can then be
ascertained. Their truth is not guaranteed, because the axioms are not necessarily
(known to be) true. But the task of ascertaining the truth of new propositions can
produce new truths which, otherwise, we may not have bothered to look for. The axioms
could be called causes, hypotheses or principles of the body of knowledge or the science
that one is dealing with. Success in this approach at the initial stages depends upon
the size of the body of knowledge one starts with; usually, it does not pay to be too
6 One would immediately think of the Kinetic Theory of Gases as an example.
ambitious, but one may gradually enlarge the body of knowledge and simultaneously
modify the undefined terms, definitions and axioms, that is, the theory.
I may, finally add that perhaps one should not be too much preoccupied with truths.
Taking the cue from the initial axiomatization of geometry, one should perhaps be
equally concerned with problems, and should try to discover an axiomatization in the
course of the attempt to find acceptable solutions.
Appendix
The Contents of the Elements (from Ian Mueller: Philosophy of Mathematics and De-
ductive Structure in Euclids Elements, 1981).
I give here in an English translation, which varies in many minor ways from
Heaths, all of the first principles and propositions of the Elements as they are given in
the first hand in the body of the manuscript P. . . . Material which is added for clarity is
put in parentheses; material excluded by Heiberg is put in brackets.
Definitions (Horoi)
1. A point is that which has no part (hou meros outhen).

2. A line is breadthless length.
3. The extremities (perata) of a line are points.
4. A straight line is one which lies evenly (ex isou) with the points on itself.
5. A surface is that which has length and breadth only.
6. The extremities of a surface are lines.
7. A plane surface is one which lies evenly with the straight lines on itself.
8. A plane angle is the inclination (klisis) to one another of two lines in a plane which
meet one another and do not lie in a straight line.
9. And when the lines containing the aforesaid angle are straight, the angle is called
rectilineal.
10. When a straight line set up on a straight line makes the adjacent (ephexes) angles
equal to one another, each of the equal angles is right, and the straight line
standing on the other is called a perpendicular to that on which it stands.
11. An obtuse angle is an angle greater than a right angle.
12. An acute angle is an angle less than a right angle.

13. A boundary (horos) is that which is an extremity (peras) of something.
14. A figure is that which is contained by some boundary or some boundaries.
Agashe 249
15. A circle is a plane figure contained by one line [which is called its circumference
(periphereia)] such that all the straight lines falling upon it [upon the circumfer-
ence of the circle] from one point of those lying inside the figure are equal to one
another.
16. The point is called the center of the circle.
17. A diameter of the circle is any straight line drawn through the center and termi-
nated in both directions (ephhekatera ta mere) by the circumference of the circle,
and such a straight line also bisects the circle.
18. A semicircle is the figure contained by the diameter and the circumference cut off
by it.
[A segment (tmema) of a circle is the figure, either greater or less than a semicir-
cle, contained by a straight line and a circumference of a circle.]
19. Rectilineal figures are those which are contained by straight lines; trilateral by
three, quadrilateral by four, and multilateral those contained by more than four
straight lines.
20. Of trilateral figures, an equilateral traingle is that which has its three sides equal,
an isosceles triangle that which has only two of its sides equal, a scalene traingle
that which has its three sides unequal.
21. Further, of trilateral figures, a right-angled traingle is that which has a right
angle, an obtuse-angled that which has an obtuse angle, an acute-angled that
which has three acute angles.
22. Of quadrilateral figures, a square is that which is equilateral and right-angled,
an oblong (heteromekes) that which is right-angled but not equilateral, a rhombus
that which is equilateral but not right-angled, a rhomboid that which has its
opposite sides and angles equal to one another but which is neither equilateral
nor right-angled.
23. Parallel straight lines are those which, being in the same plane and being pro-
duced ad infinitum in both directions, do not meet each other in either direction.
Postulates (Aitemata)
1. Let it be postulated (aitestho) to draw a straight line from any (pas) point to any
(pas) point,
2. and to produce a limited straight line in a straight line,
3. and to describe a circle with any center and distance,
4. and that all right angles are equal to one another,
5. and that, if one straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles
in the same direction less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced
ad infinitum, meet one another in that direction in which the angles less than two
right angles are,
6. and that two straight lines do not enclose a space.
Common Notions (Koinai Ennoiai)
1. Things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another.
2. And if equals are added to equals the wholes are equal.
3. And if equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal.
4. And if equals are added to unequals the wholes are unequal.
5. And if equals are subtracted from unequals the remainders are unequal.
6. And doubles of the same thing are equal to one another.
7. And halves of the same thing are equal to one another.
8. And things which coincide with one another (ta epharmodzonta ep allela) are
equal to one another.
9. And the whole is greater than the part.
(Propositions)
1. On a given straight line to construct an equilateral triangle.
2. To place at (pros) a given point a straight line equal to a given straight line.
3. Given two unequal straight lines, to cut off from the greater a straight line equal
to the less.
4. If two triangles have the two sides equal to two sides respectively and have the
angle contained by the equal straight lines equal to the angle, they will also have
the base equal to the base, the triangle will be equal to the remaining angles
respectively, (namely) those which the equal sides subtend (hupoteinein)
5. The angles at the base of isosceles triangles are equal to one another, and if the
equal straight lines are produced further the angles under the base will be equal
to one another.
6. If two angles of a triangle are equal to one another, the sides which subtend the
equal angles will also be equal to one another.
Agashe 251
7. On the same straight line there cannot be constructed (ou sustathesontai) two
other straight lines equal to the same two straight lines (and) at (pros) a different
point, in the same direction, (and) having the same extremities as the original
straight lines.
8. If two triangles have the two sides equal to two sides respectively and also have
the base equal to the base, they will also have the angle contained by the equal
straight lines equal to the angle.
9. To bisect a given rectilineal angle.
10. To bisect a given limited straight line.
11. To draw a straight line at right anlges to a given straight line from a given point
on it.
12. To draw a straight line perpendicular to a given infinite straight line from a given
point which is not on it.
13. When a straight line set up on a straight line makes angles, it will make either
two right angles or angles equal to two right angles.
14. If relative to (pros) some straight line and a point on it, two straight lines not
lying in the same direction make the adjacent angles equal to two right angles,
the straight lines will be in a straight line with one another.
15. If two straight lines cut one another, they will make the vertical angles (hai kata
koruphen goniai) equal to one another.
16. If one of the sides of any triangle is produced, the exterior angle is greater than
each of the interior and opposite angles.
17. Two angles of any triangle taken in any way are less than two right angles.
18. The greater side of any triangle subtends the greater angle.
19. The greater angle of any triangle is subtended by the greater side.
20. Two sides of any triangle taken in any way are greater than the remaining side.
21. If two straight lines are constructed inside (and) on one of the sides of a triangle
from its extremities, the constructed straight lines will be less than the remaining
two sides of the triangle but will contain a greater angle.
22. To construct a triangle out of three straight lines which are equal to three given
straight lines; thus it is necessary that two taken in any way be greater than the
remaining one [because also the two sides of any triangle taken in any way are
greater than the remaining side].
23. To construct relative to a given straight line and a point on it a rectilineal angle
equal to a given rectilineal angle.
24. If two triangles have the two sides equal to two sides respectively but the angle
contained by the equal straight lines greater than the angle, they will also have
the base greater than the base.
25. If two triangles have the two sides equal to two angles respectively, but have the
base greater than the base, they will also have the angle contained by the two
equal straight lines greater than the angle.
26. If two triangles have the two angles equal to two angles respectively and one
side equal to one side, either the one adjoining (pros) the equal angles or the one
subtending one of the equal angles, they will also have the remaining sides equal
to the remaining sides respectively and the remaining angle to the remaining
angle.
27. If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the alternate (enallax) angles
equal to one another, the straight lines will be parallel to one another.
28. If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the exterior angle equal to
the interior and opposite angle in the same direction or the interior angles in the
same direction equal to two right angles, the straight lines will be parallel to one
another.
29. The straight line falling on parallel straight lines makes the alternate angles
equal to one another and the exterior angle equal to the opposite and interior
angle and the interior angles in the same direction equal to two right angles.
30. Straight lines parallel to the same straight line are also parallel to another.
31. To draw a straight line parallel to a given straight line through a given point.
32. If one of the sides of any triangle is produced, the exterior angle is equal to the
interior and opposite angle, and the three interior angles of the triangle are equal
to two right anlges.
33. Straight lines joining equal and parallel straight lines in the same direction are
themselves also equal and parallel.
34. The opposite sides and angles of parallelogrammic areas (parallelogramma cho-
ria) are equal to one another, and the diameter bisects them.
35. Parallelograms which are on the same base and in the same parallels are equal
to one another.
36. Parallelograms which are on equal bases and in the same parallels are equal to
one another.
Agashe 253
37. Triangles which are on the same base and in the same parallels are equal to one
another.
38. Triangles which are on equal bases and in the same parallels are equal to one
another.
39. Equal triangles which are on the same base and in the same direction are also in
the same parallels.
40. Equal triangles which are on equal bases and in the same direction are also in
the same parallels.
41. If a parallelogram has the same base as a triangle and is in the same parallels,
the parallelogram is double of the triangle.
42. To construct in a given rectilineal angle a parallelogram equal to a given triangle.
43. The complements (parapleromata) of the parallelograms around the diameter of

any parallelogram are equal.
44. To apply to (parabalein para) a given straight line in a given rectilineal angle a
parallelogram equal to a given triangle.
45. To construct in a given rectilineal angle a parallelogram equal to a given rectilin-
eal (figure or area).
46. To describe a square on (apa) a given straight line.

47. In right-angled triangles the squares on the side subtending the right angle is
equal to the squares on the sides containing the right angle.
48. If the square on one of the sides of a triangle is equal to the squares on the
remaining two sides of the triangle, the angle contained by the remaining two
sides of the triangle is right.
(Definitions)
1. Any right-angled parallelogram is said to be contained by the straight lines con-
taining the right angle.
2. Let any one of the parallelograms around the diameter of any parallelogrammic
area (together) with the two complements be called a gnomon.
(Propositions)
1. If there are two straight lines and one of them is cut into any number of segments,
the rectangle (orthogonion) contained by the two straight lines is equal to the
rectangles contained by the uncut straight line and each of the segments.
2. If a straight line is cut at random (hos etuchen), the rectangle contained by the
whole and both of the segments is equal to the square on the whole.
3. If a straight line is cut at random, the rectangle contained by the whole and one of
the segments is equal to the rectangle contained by the segments and the square
on the aforesaid segment.
4. If a straight line is cut at random, the square on the whole is equal to the squares
on the segments and twice the rectangle contained by the segments.
5. If a straight line is cut into equal and unequal segments, the rectangle contained
by the unequal segments of the whole with the square on the segment between
the sections is equal to the square on the half.
6. If a straight line is bisected and some straight line is added to it in a straight line,
the rectangle contained by the whole with the added straight line and the added
straight line is equal to the square on the straight line composed of the half and
the added straight line.
7. If a straight line is cut at random, the two squares together that on the whole and
that on one of the segments, are equal to twice and the rectangle contained by the
whole and the said segment and the square on the remaining segment.
8. If a straight line is cut at random, four times the rectangle contained by the whole
and one of the segments with the square on the remaining segment is equal to the
square described on the whole and the aforesaid segment as on one straight line.
9. If a straight line is cut into equal and unequal segments, the squares on the
unequal segments of the whole are double of the square on the half and the square
on the segment between the sections.
10. If a straight line is bisected and some straight line is added to it in a straight line,
the two squares together, that on the whole with the added straight line and that
on the added straight line, are double of the square on the half and the square
described on the straight line composed of the half and the added straight line as
on one straight line.
Agashe 255
11. To cut a given straight line so that the rectangle contained by the whole and one
of the segments is equal to the square on the remaining segment.
12. In an obtuse-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the obtuse angle
is greater than the squares on the sides containing the obtuse angle by twice the
rectangle contained by one of the sides around the obtuse angle, the one on which
the perpendicular falls and the straight line cut off outside (the triangle) by the
perpendicular towards (pros) the obtuse angle.
13. In acute-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the acute angle is
less than the squares on the sides containing the acute angle by twice the rect-
angle contained by one of the sides containing the acute angle, the one of which
the prependicular falls, and the straight line cut off inside by the perpendicular
towards the acute angle.
14. To construct a square equal to a given rectilineal (figure or area).
References
Heath, T.L. (trans.): 1925, The Thirteen Books of Euclids Elements, 3 Vols., Cambridge
University Press.
Mueller, I.: 1981, Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Struture in Euclids
Elements, M.I.T. Press.
Russell, B. A. W.: 1901, Recent work on principles of mathematics, International
Monthly, Vol. 4, pp. 83101. Reprinted as Mathematics and the Metaphysicians
in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, London, Longmans Green, 1918. Issued
as a paperback by Penguin Books Ltd. p. 75.
Russell, B. A. W.: 1919, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, George Allen and
Unwin Ltd. Reprinted by Simon and Schuster.
Approaches to the Periodic Table
Rudolf Kraus
University of Toronto, Canada. Email: rkraus@chass.utoronto.ca
Despite its value to students of chemistry in predicting the structure of an elements

electron orbitals, the periodic table was not developed on the basis of electronic struc-
ture. This is often overlooked by modern educators. A possible reason is that many
modern science textbooks are written by scientists, who have spent a great deal of time
and effort mastering their fields, but at the cost of historical training. Some sift though
the history of their discipline for only those ideas that support currently accepted
positions. Another common error shows all scientific research leading inevitably to our
present position. Famous discoveries and famous scientists risk complete reinterpreta-
tion in accordance with modern theory. This is poor history, and it is at best erroneous.
At its worst, it presents a distorted view of scientific thinking and scientific processes,
and engenders a misplaced faith in the authority of science.
I intend to show that a historical approach to the teaching of science benefits stu-
dents in several ways. By presenting chemical topics from a historical point of view,
students develop an appreciation for the development of science, and learn to see
theories as dynamic entities that change as new information is discovered. Historic
experiments, in general, rely upon common materials and use techniques and instru-
ments that can be easily duplicated. For example, Lavoisiers discovery of oxygen can
be duplicated with nothing more complicated than a spirit lamp, a magnifying glass,
and a supply of lead.
As a case-study, I have examined high-school chemistry textbooks with regard to
their presentation of the periodic table, including the CHEM Study program introduced
in the United States in the 1960s and a current text, Merrills Chemistry, one of the
current texts used by the Ontario Board of Education. These will be compared to
Mendeleevs own approach in his Principles of Chemistry, the 1891 edition.
The Chemical Education Material study, or CHEM Study, arose from a combination
of changes within the field of chemistry, and a general enthusiasm for curriculum
reform in the United States. The National Science Foundation awarded monies to
a group of university chemists who wished to reform secondary chemistry education.
These professors brought together a number of high-school teachers and university
chemists, and designed a new curriculum. As might be expected from such a group,
which contained only one specialist in education out of hundreds of members, there
was a strong influence from professional science.
The professional group introduced the periodic table after a discussion of atoms and
bonding. The structure of the periodic table was then revealed as a reflection of the
nature of electronic orbitals, and the order in which they fill. Instead of a systematic
description of the properties of elements, quantum mechanics was introduced. This
focused on the structure of the atom, and the filling of electron orbitals. Then, the
258 Periodic Table
authors showed that elements with similar electron structures have similar properties.
This kind of descriptive chemistry puts the cart before the horse, and was com-
pletely anachronistic. Historically, the similar properties of elements led chemists to
believe that their electronic structures were similar. Logically, deductive reasoning
built from facts to generalizations. The academics that wrote CHEM Study presented
their material in the opposite order. Why might this have been the case?
When considering their new curriculum, the CHEM Study, these authors did not
assess what the average student needed to know (as an employee and as a citizen).
Instead, they focused on the four percent of the class who were to become university
students of chemistry, and decided what knowledge would be useful for them. As an
example, here is a list of questions that were asked during the creation of the CHEM
Study. The underlying message behind these questions was that knowledge of chemical
processes is important, and CHEM Study only needed to adjust the proportions of the
various sub-disciplines of chemistry in their curriculum to be successful.
1. Should atomic structure and the nature of chemical bonding be discussed early or
late in the course?
2. Should the descriptive chemistry include a detailed discussion of some of the
recently discovered exotic compounds, or should it adhere rather closely to the
compounds that have relatively high stability under atmospheric conditions?
3. To what extent should algebra, as used in the gas laws and in equilibrium calcu-
lations, be included in the course?
4. To what extent should the gas laws themselves be treated, as contrasted with an
approach based more directly on kinetic theory and molecular motions?
5. To what extent should the text be based on laboratory experimentation already
performed by the student?
6. What is the most effective way of acquainting students with stoichiometry and
getting them to the point where they can work with it readily?
7. How useful is the mole concept, and is it reasonable to define the mole as a
number rather than continue to give its historical definition?
8. To what extent should various interpretations of experimental observations be
presented? For example, how many acid-base theories should be used in inter-
preting chemical reactions?
9. To what extent should the treatment of the elements attempt to cover the whole
periodic table in contrast to concentrating on a few selected elements?
10. How much treatment of radioactivity should be included?
11. What level of vocabulary should be used as compared with vocabulary usually
found in books at the high school level?
Kraus 259
12. How much emphasis should be placed on industrial practice and practical appli-
cations of chemistry?1
The need to teach atomic structure and chemical bonding was unquestioned despite
the fact that many great chemists and important chemical industries had prospered
without them. Instead, the CHEM Study questioned the extent of this need.
This academic bent was responsible for the assertion of theoretical considerations
like the atomic theory of structure, Avogadros hypothesis, and the kinetic molecular
theory of gases within the first three chapters in a cursory, authoritative manner. These
theories were to be proved in later chapters of the text; unfortunately many of these
so-called proofs relied on data that the student could not determine in the laboratory,
and lacked the background to understand. The worst offender was chapter fourteen,
entitled Why we believe in atoms, which cited the electrical nature of atoms, the
determination of charge/mass ratios in CRT tubes, evidence from X-ray diffraction,
and microwave and infrared spectroscopy as proof of the existence of atoms. Except
for the first, these experiments required equipment beyond the abilities and budget
of an average high-school. Even if they had been available, they relied on a host
of assumptions in optics, mechanics, the nature of light, and mathematics in order
to produce meaningful data, and these assumptions contradicted the spirit of inquiry
promoted in the introduction.2
Other evidence of academic motivation was seen in the vocabulary. Rather than use
the full names of chemical compounds (sodium chloride), or the common substances
that are equivalent (table salt), chemical abbreviations were used almost exclusively
(NaCl). Quantitative results were also emphasized, as can be seen in this sample
problem.
Exercise 11-4
Suppose that 0.099 mole of solid NaOH is added to 0.100 litre of 1.00 M HCl.
1. How many more moles of HCl are present in solution than moles of NaOH?
2. From the excess number of moles and the volume, calculate the concentration of
excess H+(aq)
3. Calculate the excess concentration of H+(aq) from the difference between the
initial concentrations of HCl and NaOH.3
The middle chapters of the book, from thirteen to eighteen, all dealt with subjects
that in my opinion are useless to the non-chemist. Practice in stoichiometry (mea-
surement of quantities consumed and produced in reactions), proof of the existence
of the atom, quantum mechanics, the nature of chemical bonding, electron orbital
hybridization, and cis-trans isomerism were perhaps not chosen with the interest of
1 Merill, R.J., and Ridgway, D.W.: 1969, The CHEM Study Story, W.H. Freeman and company, San
Francisco, p. 7.
2 CHEM Study: 1962, ChemistryAn Experimental Science, W.H. Freeman and company, San Francisco.
3 CHEM Study, Chemistry
260 Periodic Table
the public in mind. In addition to the difficulty of applying these theories, the ideas of
physicists Max Planck and Niels Bohr on the quantization of energy and structure of
the atom were adopted uncritically, as was the electron exclusion principle of Wolfgang
Pauli. Relatively simple practical applications of chemistry, such as developing film or
chemical batteries, were at best mentioned briefly in the laboratory manual. Practical
applications of chemistry are not only more concrete to the students, and thus more
easily taught, but accurately reflect the average students involvement with chemistry.
CHEM Study did address this problem in chapters nineteen to twenty-three. There
was a resurgence in the importance of laboratory work and descriptive chemistry. Stu-
dents investigated properties of carbon chemistry, halogens, the third-row elements,
alkaline earths, fourth and fifth-row transition metals, and some sixth and seventh-
row rare earths. Emphasis was placed on carbon rings in chapter nineteen, and the
radioactive properties of the rare-earths in chapter twenty-three. The last two chap-
ters, twenty four and twenty five dealt with biochemistry, and the chemistry of the solar
system, especially the chemical makeup of the third planet. Absent was a chapter on
chemistry in the workplace, or chemistry in the environment.4 While this descriptive
chemistry is well done, it comes late in the text, and attempts to survey most of modern
practice at the time, instead of treating fewer topics in depth.
While claiming to be a general course for all students, the CHEM Study course
presupposed a good grounding in algebra, and routinely used graphs and charts to
present data, as well as reporting quantities in terms of significant figures with ex-
ponential notation. Additionally, the emphasis on uncertainty calculations introduced
some statistics to the laboratory. The general student of chemistry must have been
well-versed in mathematics to have succeeded in this course.
All of these difficulties were particularly ironic because the writers of CHEM Study
promoted chemistry as an experimental science, or at least they claimed to. The full
title of their book was ChemistryAn Experimental Science.5 Within it, they claimed
that laboratory work was essential to understanding chemistry. This could be seen
clearly in the units of CHEM Study concerned with descriptive chemistry. They were
concerned with a systematic approach to the elements of the periodic table, studying
and learning their properties. Unfortunately, they were less concerned with common
chemicals familiar to students. This, coupled with their emphasis on vocabulary, re-
sulted in a sharp distinction between the laboratory and the real world for many
students.
In addition to discrepancies in the content of CHEM Study, there were problems
with method as well. The after the fact laboratory experiments, which were suppos-
edly meant to confirm the theories expounded in the text, actually promoted a dogmatic
kind of experimentation. The correct answers were already known to the students, and
of course the students found a way to reach them. This kind of thinking is not at all
similar to the processes of actual scientists, and can mistakenly teach the students that
there is one right answer which they would obtain if they were skillful experimenters.
Of course, this may be exactly what was meant by the writers of CHEM Study, but this
4 ibid
5 ibid.
Kraus 261
emphasizes the importance of scientists, not that of science.
CHEM Study had lost sight of the history of its own discipline; everything that
they taught reflected modern academic chemistry. This was a level of abstraction
that students neither wanted, nor needed. Even the biographies of famous scientists
included within the chapters reflected modern practice; many of the featured chemists
were practicing at the time of the study, and some were on the committee that produced
the textbook. Also implied is that there is no diversity of cultures, races or genders
among chemists. The students found this class difficult, and of limited value.
Many of the concepts taught in this course will never have application outside a
chemistry laboratory. Despite its claims at universality, CHEM Study seemed only
an attempt to bring high-school chemistry up to-date, reflecting both contemporary
progress in the field, and the expectations of undergraduate chemistry programs.
A second example of modern secondary chemistry comes from the Ontario Ministry
of Education. A close examination of one of their approved textbooks for secondary
chemistry, Chemistry, by Merrill, shows us a different approach.6 The Merrill book has
a better grasp of the history of science, and is careful in avoiding the school of Great
Man History. Mendeleev is presented in context as the best of several systematizers
of chemistry, whose periodic table was more complete than the efforts of Doberiner
and Newlands, and whose chemical periods were more developed than earlier ideas of
triads or octaves. This kind of history gives the student a better grasp of the nature of
science, and shows that scientific theories are selected on the basis of utility, not on the
basis of truth.
The Merrill writers discuss atomic structure in chapter four, and after covering
electron clouds and probability, move to the periodic table. According to them, the
periodic table is constructed in the following manner. Use the arrow diagram on
page 128 to determine the order of filling the sublevels. Each s sublevel can contain two
electrons . . . 7 Clearly, they have reinterpreted Mendeleevs efforts in terms of modern
electron orbital theory. Only four chapters later do the authors discuss periodic trends,
following this overview with a look at some typical elements.
This look is mostly superficial, with most of the classroom time devoted to the text
and the demonstrations of the teacher. Laboratory practice is limited to a cookbook
style similar to that of CHEM Study. For most of the laboratory questions, the correct
answers are given in the teachers manual, which undoubtedly creates the impression
that there is one right answer to get. This approach also assumes that the observations
of the students is unrelated to their conceptual systems. To their credit, the Merrill
writers have significantly reduced the amount of mathematics in their course, relative
to CHEM Study. Students no longer need to be mathematicians in order to be chemists.
While Merrills Chemistry has lesser theoretical approach than CHEM Study, it still
presents the periodic table ahead of the empirical evidence on which it was based. If
science is empirical and imaginative, then why not let the students find this evidence
6 Merill: 1995, Chemistry, Glencoe/McGraw-Hill, New York. This text is approved for the grade 13 OAC
program, which is a course for advanced students who have already had two years of general secondary
science.
7 ibid., p. 141.
262 Periodic Table
for themselves? Filling an unjustified framework with data contradicts this empirical
approach. Additionally, valence electrons, or any other kind of electrons, were unknown
to Mendeleev. His belief that indivisible atoms precluded any such ideas.
So how exactly did Mendeleev come upon the idea of the periodic table? The answer
to this question is of educational as well as historical value because it is unlikely
the student has understanding of the electronic configuration of atoms. Other means
should be used to convince the student of the structure and utility of the periodic table.
Dmitri Mendeleevs own chemistry textbook, Principles of Chemistry, the first to
ever present the periodic table as part of the curriculum, discusses different factors that
led to the periodic table. Electronic orbitals did not make the list. Thompsons discovery
of the electron was not foreseen by Mendeleev, who would have denied the possible
existence of sub-atomic particles. The factors that Mendeleev did cite for studying the
elements in a systematic way included isomorphism, (by which he means the analogy of
crystalline forms and analogous compounds), relations of volumes of these analogous
compounds, composition of their saline compounds, oxides and hydrides, crystalline
structures, and their atomic weights.
All of these properties can be investigated in the laboratory, and Mendeleevs own
students did so. Unlike the Ontario program and CHEM Study, Mendeleev did not have
a separate laboratory book, or lists of experiments for students to try. Instead, all of his
assertions could be demonstrated for, or performed by, the students. It was assumed
throughout the body of the work that the students would be confirming everything by
experiment. In the second appendix to his book, Mendeleev stated:
Under the all-penetrating control of experiment, a new theory, even if crude, is quickly strength-
ened, provided it be founded on a sufficient basis; the asperities are removed, it is amended
by degrees, and soon loses the phantom light of a shadowy form or of one founded on mere
prejudice; it is able to lead to logical conclusions, and to submit to experimental proof. Willingly
or not, in science we all must submit not to what seems to us attractive from one point of view or
another, but to what represents an agreement between theory and experiment; in other words,
to demonstrated generalization and the approved experiment.8
Role of experiment was not meant to be a demonstration of theory; it was a deter-

mination of theory. The importance of students gathering experimental data was clear
from the organization of Mendeleevs text. The periodic law was first fully explained
in the beginning of the second volume. All of the first volume was concerned with
descriptive chemistry, and we can safely assume that Mendeleev proceeded according to
the organization that he created for his textbook. Daltons law of multiple proportions
was verified through numerous tests, and when it had been confirmed, the students
used it to investigate the oxide types of various elements. The arrangement of the ele-
ments with respect to increasing atomic weight, oxide and hydride type, were the main
supporting evidence for the structure of the table. Mendeleev himself was careful to
support the Law of Periodicity with several tests that the students (or other chemists)
could easily repeat.
8 Dmitri Mendeleev: 1891, Principles of Chemisty, trans. George Kamensky. Longmans, Green, and Co.,
London, Vol. 2, p. 435.

Kraus 263
So, unlike the creators of CHEM Study, Mendeleev had a deep interest in the
experimental verification of scientific theory. He included a short paper in his textbook
on the application of one of Newtons queries to the field of Chemistry. Clearly, nothing
could be admitted as fact until it was supported by evidence. The evidence for his
periodic law was carefully and thoroughly presented with this idea in mind, making it
both good science and good pedagogy.
His careful examination of crystalline structure is a good example of Mendeleevs
commitment to experimental support. He reported that the angles of the prisms of
aragonite, strontianite, and witherite all belong to the rhombic system, and have the
following angles:9
CaCO3 116 100
SrCO3 117 190
BaCO3 118 300
Likewise, the crystalline forms of calc spar, magneseite, and calamine belong to the
rhombohedral system, with the following angles:
CaCO3 105 080
M gCO3 107 100
ZnCO3 107 400
As a result of this similarity, Mendeleev deduces that Zinc is more similar to Mag-
nesium than Zinc is to Calcium.
Other relations are gathered from the crystallization of certain salts with water,
and noting the amount of water of hydration. Since ferrous sulfate can hydrate itself
with seven molecules of water, we will immerse it in copper sulfate to determine the
hydration state of copper. Because the copper deposits in the same form as the iron,
both iron and copper must be analogs, both forming salts with seven molecules of water.
This idea is generalized to compounds of the form RX, where X is a univalent
element, and R is an element combined with it. Observing that only eight types of
compounds are observed in nature; RX, RX2 , . . . RX8 , Mendeleev deduces that there
must be only eight groups of elements. To determine the group that an element belong
to, its compounds with univalent hydrogen and bivalent oxygen are examined.
Mendeleevs approach to classification was largely empirical, and still fits well into
a modern laboratory setting. Students can be given a variety of common elements to
test for density, melting point, and crystal structure. For corroboration, oxides can
be prepared, and relative proportions can be determined. Once a sufficient number of
samples have been analyzed by the students, they should be in a position to group them
9 Ibid., v. 2, p. 2.
264 Periodic Table
in classes. After some discussion, the students can be given the data for other elements
which are not practical to measure in the lab, and assemble their own periodic table.
Once this has been completed, students will be able to appreciate periodic trends,
and see relations between neighboring elements. This provides a much better basis
for understanding electron orbitals and atomic structure than abstract mathematics
does. This also reflects the pedagogical arguments of Derek Hodson.10 He argues that
science teaching is much more teacher-directed in practice than the curriculum would
have us believe. In order to compensate for this, and return to the stated goals of the
curriculum, we should encourage teachers to learn something about the philosophy of
science, and create new curriculum to reflect that philosophy. This includes portraying
science as having a range and variety of methods which are applied when they are use-
ful, not in terms of an all-encompassing scientific method. The variety of collaborating
evidence which Mendeleev brings to support his Periodic Law is an example of this
range and variety.
Mendeleevs experimental approach is also supported by child psychologist Jean
Piaget, whose work describes stages of learning.11 Many students need examples from
which to generalize abstract rules. By conducting experiments without knowledge of
the correct results, these students will think for themselves. This will make further
generalization and abstraction easier. Mendeleevs inclusion of subjects like astronomy,
biology, geology, and meteorology allowed for better interrelations between sciences.
This in turn, benefits the students who are already familiar with these topics. The
Principles also incorporated chemical problems relevant to the economic development
of Russia. This kind of practical application provides even more concrete examples to
students, and educates future citizens about their country.
A lesson in the authority of science is the final benefit available with an approach
inspired by the Principles. Students will likely have confidence in their collective
efforts, and even more in Mendeleevs published results. Introducing an unknown
element, such as Argon, should cause quite a difficulty for the students. A noble gas
will be unreactive to their tests, and will not have a clear place in the table that they
have constructed. They will have to revise their table in order to include the noble
gases before these tensions are resolved. This can show the students that no theory is
perfect, and that the utility of a theory is not a measure of its validity.
While I have not examined this issue directly, the ideas of classification and tax-
onomy are not unique to Mendeleev. Other nineteenth century chemists were trying
to organize the list of elements into a structure.12 Taxonomy was an important part
of botany and zoology at the time, and can be considered an entire style of thinking,
because it was such a prevalent concern in the nineteenth century.13 The connections
10 Derek Hodson, Towards a More Philosophically-Oriented Science Curriculum, Science Education, v. 72.
11 Piaget, J.: 1970, Psychology and Epistemology, The Viking Press, New York, pp. 63-88.
12 The discovery of radioactivity would make this a much more difficult enterprise. For this reason, the
window in which a classification system was possible was limited. See Bensaude-Vincents Mendeleevs
periodic system of chemical elements, British Journal for the History of Science, v. 19, pp. 3-17.
13 For more information on styles of thinking, see Hacking, Style of Scientific Thinking or Reasoning:
A New Analytic Tool for Historians and Philosophers of the Sciences, ed. by Kostas Gavroglu, Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Boston, 1994, pp. 31-48.
Kraus 265
between societys concerns with classification and Mendeleevs own thinking are left
to the sociologist of science, but I am sure that this influence exists, and did influence
Mendeleev in some way.
An approach to chemistry that is closer to Mendeleevs is long overdue. Instead of
conducting experiments in which the goal is already known, the instructor should allow
the students to investigate chemical properties with less guidance than customary. As
laboratory tests proceed, students will see the relations between elements. At this
point, they are ready to appreciate Mendeleevs work, and not before. This approach
will challenge students to think for themselves, investigate unknown quantities, in
short, to practice the empirical method that is often advocated and seldom achieved.
Not only does this approach emphasize Mendeleevs chemical ideas, but it uses the
exact educational approach that he advocated. While famed as a chemist, Mendeleev
is also important as an instructor. He understood the need to support theories with
experiments, and advanced no theories to his students which he could not first prove.
Modern students would also benefit from this method of teaching. In addition to the
gain in chemical knowledge, a conceptual understanding of the periodic table aids
students in appreciating the difficulties of research, allows them to combine laboratory
results with experimental theory, and demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of
scientific authority.
266 Periodic Table
Alternative Frameworks in Electricity and Conceptual Change
A.B.Saxena
Regional Institute of Education, Ajmer, India.
1 Introduction
During the last couple of decades large number of studies have been conducted to
explore the nature of alternative frameworks (Driver and Easley 1978). These studies
have been conducted in different areas of physics such as force, motion, acceleration,
heat, light and electricity. (For a review of such studies, see for example, Driver et.
al. 1985, Novak 1987 Osborne and Freyberg 1985, Watts and Gilbert 1983). In view of
prevailing misconceptions in different areas, attempts have been made for conceptual
change (e.g. Eylon and Linn 1988: Saxena 1992, 1994, Smith et al. 1993, Shipstone
1988 Thorley and Woods 1997). Some models have also been proposed for this purpose
(e.g. Clement 1987, Driver and Oldham 1986, Gilbert and Watts 1983, Hashweh
1986, Smith et al. 1993) and the necessary conditions for conceptual change has been
discussed (Posner et al. 1982).
In this article, we shall confine ourselves to conceptions and alternative frameworks
related to current and its flow through resistors in a simple circuit. In the section
that follows, a review of students concept of current, and related difficulties shall be
presented. It is followed by discussion on the stability of these concepts and conditions
that are responsible for it. The effect of classroom instructions and its little impact on
the students previous ideas is significant in this respect.
Several strategies based on models for conceptual change have been used to achieve
it. These are discussed in the next section. Finally the implications of research findings
particularly in terms of curriculum construction and teacher education are discussed.
2 The Electric Current and Related Alternative Frameworks

Many studies have been conducted to map the students conception of (direct) current in
simple circuits at various levels of education, for example at primary level (Summers,
Kruger and Mant 1998), at secondary level (Saxena 1994, Shipstone 1984, 1988), and
at undergraduate level (McDermott and Shaffer 1992, Saxena 1990, 1996, Shipstone
1984). Cross-cultural studies have also been conducted (e.g. ASPEN 1991) to compare
their nature across the globe.
For example, at the lowest level, in some studies students have been, found to
predict lighting of the bulb with the help of one wire (Osborne 1981). As far as current
is concerned Shipstone (1984) observed four models of current. These are:
Model I: This is known as clashing current model. In this model current leaves both
the electrodes and is consumed as it passes through the various circuit elements such
as resistors bulbs etc.
268 Electricity and Conceptual Change
Model II: Contrary to clashing current model, in this model, current is assumed to flow
in one direction only. The current gets weakened as it passes through various circuit
elements. The element that is farthest from the anode receives the least current.
Model III: This model assumes that the current is shared between various components
in the circuit. The components having equal resistance get equal current. In this model
also, current is not conserved.
Model IV: This is the scientific model of current. It differs from Model II in the sense
that constant current flows in a series circuit and it does not get consumed.
Apart from these models, in some cases students use a model of current which
does not fit into any of these models. For example, in some cases the use of constant
current flowing out of the source has been reported (Cohen, Eylon and Ganniel 1982,
McDermott and Shaffer 1992). In this model, magnitude of current in the circuit
does not depend upon the circuit elements. Use of constant current model has been
reported in other studies as well (Saxena 1994). Another model known sequence model
(Shipstone 1984) has also been reported in the literature (e.g. Saxena, 1994). In this
model the current is affected down the stream only. It could be explained using (figure
1).
In this approach constant current is assumed to
+ V flow out of the source of current, say, cell. If the
resistor r2 is varied, its effect is only on the current
passing through the resistor r2 and not on current
passing through the resistor r1 .
r1 r2
Non-conservation of current in a series circuit
i.e. different amount of current passing through
Figure 1: A resistor. resistors r1 and r2 is also obtained using erroneous
use of Ohms law (Saxena, 1992). In this the current
passing through individual resistor is calculated as, current through resistor r1 = V /r1 ;
current through resistor r2 = V /r2 . Obviously, the current is not conserved. Non-
conservation of current is also reflected when students are asked to predict which bulb
would glow (figure 2), when bulb B2 is fused. Many students opine that bulb B1 would
glow and B3 would not (Saxena 1994, 1998).
This kind of model of current is also observed
+ when children attempt to light the bulb with one wire
only (McDermott and Shaffer 1992, Shipstone 1998).
The concept of resistors connected in series and
parallel is introduced at secondary level (Balasub-
ramanian et. al. 1985). However, even at under-
B1 B2 B3
graduate level, some students fail to recognise the

Figure 2: A bulb. type of connection (McDermott and Shaffer 1991,
Saxena 1992). They tend to categorise the connection
according to geometrical shape in the diagram rather than the actual connections. They
are also not able to predict the effect of connecting another resistor in parallel, on the
current and total effective resistance in the circuit.
McDermott and Shaffer (1991) provide in detail the difficulties faced by students
Saxena 269
while explaining the behaviour of electric current in a simple circuit. These are re-
lated to concept of current, potential difference, resistance and qualitative reasoning
of behaviour of electric current. Many students fail to recognize that a circuit diagram
represents only electric elements and connections and not actual physical or spatial
relationship of various elements. This poses considerable difficulty when students
were required to make connections according to a given circuit diagram. Students
while studying the transition from electrostatics to electrokinetics historically and
among students, Benseghir and Closset (1996) compared their thought processes. They
found that scientists use the electrostatics in early efforts to conceptualise the concept
of current. Similarly, part of the students reasoning in electrokinetics comes from
conceptual basis which includes a more or less intuitive knowledge of electrostatics.
3 Stability and Origin of Alternative Frameworks

The simple evidence of stability of alternative frameworks comes from the fact that
they persist despite formal education in school and college over a number of years.
Some of the studies cited earlier were conducted on undergraduate students (McDer-
mott and Shaffer 1991, Saxena 1992, 1996) and sixth-form college (Shipstone 1984).
In another study conducted on undergraduate students (Saxena 1998) for a period of
three years, students concept of current was evaluated annually using a questionnaire.
The results of the study indicated that the students exhibited many misconceptions
throughout the course of study. In many students alternative frameworks persisted
despite teaching for three years. These students had physics as one of the major subject
of study. In this context Aron (1995) states:
The pre- and mis-conceptions found to be widely prevalent among students in introductory
physics courses extend to students in upper division courses, to secondary school teachers, to
graduate students, and even to some university faculty members, the proportion of individuals
exhibiting such difficulties decreases significantly but does not drop to zero discontinuously
beyond introductory level.
Another study, conducted on students enrolled for electrical engineering programme

showed that spontaneous conceptions survive formal training and they had difficulty
in applying Ohms law. This predicament which persists after five semesters of formal
education in electronics, is apparently rooted in inadequate conception of voltage and
current (Metioui et. al. 1996). Further, it is found that lack of coherent links between
electrostatics and circuits in typical electricity instruction is responsbile for the high
degree of difficulty of that subject. Moreover, theorectical view also accounts for differ-
ences in success of students learning in the context of a standard high school physics
course (Gutwill et. al. 1996).
Many reasons have been given that could be responsible for the origin and persis-
tence of the alternative frameworks. Eylon and Linn (1998) argue that uniformity of
intuititve conception developed suggests that there must be well defined mechanism
behind the origin of alternative frameworks. However, there is no agreement on the
mechanism itself. It is suggested that the kinaesthetic or sense experiences make their
effect on the human beings much before they are able to formalise them. The common
misconception that it requires a force for a body to move with constant velocity comes
in this category of alternative frameworks.
Another source of origin of alternative framework is ascribed to metaphorical use of
language in everyday life. Much electric current is consumed when electric heater is
used falls in this category. Solomon (1983) is of the view that exposure to non-scientific
explanation through mass-media and other means could be one source of generation of
alternative frameworks. The inability of the learners to distinguish between scientific
world of the laboratory and the classroom and the life world of outside environment,
and to switch over from one world to another is the reason of many learners problems
(Solomon 1983). Mohapatra and Bhattacharya (1989) have suggested that induced in-
correct generalisation during teaching and outside could possibly be operating to gener-
ate alternative frameworks. Further, Mohapatra (1991) has suggested that the episodic
conceptualisation could also be the source of some alternative conceptions. Saxena
(1994) has suggested linguistic interference and world association of possible mecha-
nisms responsible for the development of alternative frameworks. With their continual
use over time for explanation of events and observations, these frameworks become
readily available at subconcious level and are integrated with procedural knowledge.
Hashweh (1986) points out that procedural knowledge is difficult to change. Further,
it could be due to linguistic interference as is observed in persistence of sentence
structure in the speakers native language to construct sentence in a new language.
Another explanation is cited in the form of Einstelling effect in which a previous con-
ception is strongly tied to certain features of the problem or situation through previous
experience. The situation is similar to stimulus-response conditioning in behaviourism.
4 Attempting Conceptual Change

As long as the existing conception continues to help understand some of the observa-
tions it does not get changed. Unless specific conditions are not created that question
the validity of existing conception, the conceptual change does not take place. So
long as the existing conception continues to serve, though in limited domain, it is
retained. Posner, Strike, Hewson and Gertzog (1982) suggest four necessary conditions
for conceptual change. These are:
1. Dissatisfaction with existing conception: Conceptual change occurs only when
one feels that minor change will not work. Dissatisfaction with the existing
conception is necessary for conceptual change.
2. The new conception should be intelligible: It is necessary for the learner to un-
derstand the new conception minimally. He should be able to represent it and see
how the experience can be structured on its basis.
3. The new conception must appear plausible initially: At the outset, the new
conception must appear to be able to solve problems and help understand situ-
ations, that cannot be dealt with the existing conception. It should also appear
consistent with coneptions already accepted by the learner.
Saxena 271
4. The new conception should be fruitful to the learner: Apart from the proper-
ties of being intelligible and plausible, the new conception should help achieve
something of value to the learner. It should have potential to explain new areas
of experiences, observations and domain.
For these reasons, exposure to a new idea through structured curriculum using
guided experiment for a short period may not be successful to make conceptual change
in many students. Such a situation was observed in an attempt to make conceptual
change (Saxena, 1992) wherein it was observed that, in one third of cases students
failed to solve similar problems. This could be due to variety of reasons. The time for
experimentation was nearly two hours. Students worked in small groups rather than
independently. Perhaps, working for a longer period individually and having more
learning experiences would have given better results.
One possible strategy to achieve conceptual change could be to make use of demon-
strations during teaching. However, all demostrations may not be meaningful to the
learner. Roth et. al. (1997) analysed in detail the characteristics of demonstrations
that help learning. On the basis of results obtained, it is suggested that in all activities
including conducting experiment, discussion about design of the experiment, explain-
ing the observations, representing the observations and their analysis are considered
as social practices in which students participate. The effective demonstration activity
should (Roth et. al. 1997):
engage students in talking about and representing phenomena;

engage students in discussion about scientific inquiry and construction of vari-
ables such as to produce a consistent theoretical framework and construction of
variables that allow them to keep account of systems despite change;
engage students in discusion about the mutually constituitive function of lan-
guage game and phenomenon, situated language, and knowledge which assist in
the seperation of signal from noise;
have students generate evidence and theory, set up a forum in which these are
hammered out, and decide on future evidence to be needed and constructed.
Another strategy for conceptual change has been to use examples and analogies
(Brown 1992, Clement 1987). To identify anchoring examples separate diagnostic test
is used. Conceptual change is obtained with the help of Socratic dialogue, bridging
analogies and anchoring examples. To be successful the examples must be under-
standable and believable to the students, the analogy must be clear to the students.
Otherwise, the analogy must be clarified by the teacher in order to be explicit. Finally
qualitative visualisable models may be developed to give mechanistic explanation of
the phenomena. Unless students are able to see in the same way as the teacher they
fail to evoke the desired phenonomena. To explain, the role of battery in a circuit with
a bulb, Shipstone (1985) suggested the analogy of boiler and radiator. Similarly, the
role of emf source is compared with water pump which can cause water to move from
conflict 2
Conception C1 Conception C2
explains
s
lain
co
exp
nf
ins
lic
pla
t
ex
Domain R1 1 Domain R2 Domain R3
Figure 3: A model for conceptual change based on Hashweh (1986). Conflict 1 and 2
are to be resolved for conceptual change.
a place of lower gravitational potential to a place of higher potential (Halliday and
Resnick 1987). At primary level Summers et. al. (1998) use bicycle chain analogy for
current. However, the use of analogies is not without suspicion. Duit (1991) warns
that the use of analogy create some dificulties for the learner because many scientific
phenomena can be explained using abstract concepts and sophisticated mathematical
techniques. Treagust, Harrison and Venville (1996) are not sure about the nature of
change obtained as a result of using an analogy because it is not conclusive whether
the analogy contributed to conceptual change or whether the analogy merely provided
students with a means to express themselves with the language which was otherwise
unavailable to them.
The instructional material provided to the students in support of the activities
conducted in the class plays an important role in making conceptual change. Smith,
Blakeslee and Anderson (1993) concluded that it requires the support of appropri-
ately designed instructional materials in order to use conceptual change strategies
successfully. Moreover, the conceptual change approach should probably be thought
of as a coherent approach to teaching rather than as a collection of individually useful
strategies.
4.1 The Process of Conceptual Change:

Several models for conceptual change have been suggested. The process of conceptual
change could be divided into four subprocesses (Hashweh 1986):
1. discarding of old conception,

2. acceptance of the new conception for consideration as an alternative,
3. conflict between the existing conception and the new conception, and
4. acceptance of the new conception and its availability for future use.
Diagramaticatly it could be represented as shown in figure 3. It shows that the

previous concept C1 is able to explain the observation in a limited domain R1. Exposure
to domain R2 generates conflict (1) as the existing concept C1 is not able to explain the
Saxena 273
View P
View P Time
View S3
(Instruction)
View S1 View S2 View S3 View S2
(View Equality)
View S1
(View Hierarchy)
Figure 4: Two routes for conceptual change (Thornton 1995).

observations in this domain. It is assumed that conflict (1) is resovled by adopting
concept C2 which better explains in domain R2. However adopting conception C2 does
not resolve conflict (1). Moreover, another conflict (2) occurs between conception C1
and C2. Both types of conflicts are to be removed for successful conceptual change.
Thornton (1995) suggests two possible routes of conceptual change: View equality
and View hierarchy. These are shown in figure 4. View equality shows equality among
three possible conceptions and, therefore, one could go from any of these views to the
desired view P . In view hierarchy, the three views S1, S2 and S3 are hierarchical in
the sense that someone holding the view S1 has to move through S2 and S3 inorder to
reach view P . Hence, he is less likely to reach to view P than those holding the view
S2 or S3. Sometimes combination of view equality and view hierachy could also occur.
Driver and Oldham (1986) has suggested five stage teaching model to obtain con-
ceptual change. The stages in this model are: orientation, elicitation of ideas, restruc-
turing of ideas, application of ideas and review. Restructuring of ideas is the most
crucial stage which includes clarification and exchange of ideas, exposure to conflicting
situations, construction of new ideas and their evaluation.
5 Implications
Teacher education is an important component to improve efficacy of teaching. There are
two important components that are to be paid attention to: (i) teaching strategy and
(ii) teachers attitude towards science (physics). The first part includes development
of teachers awareness towards students ideas about electricity, their conception of
current, potential difference etc., and procedural knowledge to employ Ohms law etc.
Further, it would encompass strategies that could be adopted to remove alternative
frameworks. Finally it includes the approaches that could be used in introducing the
scientific concepts related to electricity. Aron (1990) points out that two approaches
could be adopted to introduce electricity. One approach first introduces the concept of
charge and arrives at the concept of current at the later stage. The other approach first
introduces the concept of current and the concept of charge is brought in later. Either
of the two approaches could be adopted without encountering any difficulty.
Further, it implies that while planning and transacting the curriculum, the teacher
identifies the common alternative frameworks among the students, related to the
topic;
develops a list of activities that help to remove the identified alternative frame-
works; and
tests the efficacy of his/her approach.
This needs to be investigated and explored in the context of various topics. It is not
necessary that the same approach is adopted while teaching various topics. A technique
such as the drawing of concept maps requires its use over long duration before its gains
could be readily obtained. This is because students need practice before they obtain
mastery in drawing of concept maps. Moreover one could also reasearch on various
modes of using concept maps during teaching.
The second component of teacher education is concerned with teachers attitude.
Some suggestions are given below:
Science to be described as social activity rather than individualistic. The role of
cooperative work and social interaction to be given due importance.
Science is not to be taken as a value free pursuit, rather it be discussed in the
social, moral and ethical context.
Science to be considered as the result of creative, sometimes restructuring en-
deavour, rather than linear and accumulative.
Extreme inductivism, free observations and experimentation are to be discour-
aged. The role of hypothesis making and construction of coherent body of knowl-
edge is to be encouraged.
Finally, more and more research evidence is being obtained that shows students
competence is heterogeneous, not unitary. It depends upon interaction between in-
dividual and the context. Therefore, one single task would not do justice with the
evaluation of students competence because it hides the heterogeneity of performance
(McGinn and Roth 1988).
6 Conclusion
Electricity was taken in this paper as one example to illustrate the problems and
approaches related to teaching of physics. It shows that the classical approach of
teaching adopting transmission model is to be replaced by variety of strategies that
treat the learner as active agent, having his/her own ideas. Sensitivity of the teacher
in this regard can take him a long way to make the learning more meaningful.
Saxena 275
References
Arons, A. B.: 1990, A Guide to Introductory Physics Teaching, John Wiley & Sons, New
York.
Arons, A. B.: 1995, Generalizations to be drawn from results of research on teaching
and learning, in B. C. Tarsitani and M. Vicentini (eds), Thinking Physics for
Teaching, Plenum Press, New York, pp. 18.
ASPEN: 1991, (asian Physics Education Network), ASPEN- APTEA Workshop II on
Research for Students Conceptual Structures and Changes in Learning Physics .
ASPEN University of Philippines, Manila.
Benseghir, A. and Closset, J.-L.: 1996, The electrostatic electrokinetic transition:
Historical and educational difficulties, International Journal of Science Education
18(2), 179191.
Brown, D.: 1992, Using Examples and Analogies to Remediate Misconceptions in
Physics, Factors Influencing Conceptual Change, Journal of Research in Science
Teaching 29(1), 1734.
Clement, J.: 1987, Overcoming Students Misconceptions in Physics: The Role of
Anchoring Intuition and Analogical Validity, in J. Novak (ed.), Proceedings of
Second International Seminar: Misconceptions and Educational Strategies in
Science and Mathematics, Vol. III, Cornell University, Ithaca, pp. 8496.
Driver, R. and Easley, J.: 1978, Pupils Paradigms - A Review of Literature Related
to Concept Development in Adolescent Science Students, Studies in Science
Education 5, 6184.
Driver, R. et al.: 1985, Childrens Ideas in Science, Open University Press, Philadel-
phia.
Driver, R. and Oldham, V.: 1986, A Constructivist Approach to Curiculum Development
in Science, Studies in Science Education 13, 105122.
Duit, R.: 1991, On the Role of Analogies and Metaphors in Learning Science, Science
Education 75, 649672.
Eylon, Bet-sheva and Linn, M.C.: 1988, Learning and Instruction: An Examination of
Four Research Perspectives in Science Education, Review of Educational Research
58(3), 251301.
Gilbert, J. and Watts, D.: 1983, Concepts, Misconceptions and Alternative Conceptions:
Changing Perspectives in Science Education, Studies in Science Education 10, 61
98.
Gutwill, Joshna, et al.: 1996, Seeking the Causal Connection in Electricity: Shifting
Among Mechanistic Perspectives, International Journal of Science Education
18(2), 143162.
Halliday, D. and Resnick, R.: 1987, Physics, Part II, Wiley Eastern, New Delhi.
Reprinted p. 789.
Hashweh, Z.: 1986, Toward an Explanation of Conceptual Change, European Journal
of Science Education 8(3), 229249.
McDermott, L. and Shaffer, P.: 1991, Research as Guide for Curriculum Development:
An Example from Introductory Electricity. Part I Investigation of Student Under-
standing, American Journal of Physics 60(11), 9941003.
McGinn, Michelle, K. and Roth, W.: 1998, Assessing Students Understanding About
Levers: Better Test Instruments are Not Enough, International Journal of Science
Education 20(7), 813832.
Metioni, A. et al.: 1996, The Persistence of Students Unfounded Beliefs About Case
of Electrical Circuits; the Case of Ohms Law, International Journal of Science
Education 18(2), 193212.
Mohapatra, J.: 1991, The Interaction of Cultural Rituals and the Concepts of Science
in Student Learning: A Case Study of Solar Ecplipse, International Journal of
Mohapatra, J. and Bhattcharya, S.: 1989, Pupils, Teachers Induced Incorrect Gener-
alisation and the Concept of Force, International Journal of Science Education
41(4), 429436.
Novak, J. (ed.): 1987, Proceedings of Second International Seminar Misconceptions and
Educational Strategies in Science and Mathematics, Vol. III, Cornell University,
Ithaca, N.Y.
Osborne, R.: 1981, Childrens Ideas About Electric Current, New Zealand Science
Teacher 29(12), 9.
Osborne, R. and Freyberg, P.: 1985, Learning in Science: The Implications of Childrens
Science, Heinemann, Auckland.
Posner, G.J. Strike, K.A. Hewson, P.W. and Gertzog, W.A.: 1982, Accommodation of a
Scientific Conception: Toward a Theory of Conceptual Change, Science Education
68, 211227.
Roth, Wolff-Michael et al.: 1997, Why do Students Fail to Learn from Demonstrations?
A Social Practice Perspective on Learning in Physics, Journal of Research in
Science Teaching 34(5), 509533.
Saxena, A.B.: 1990, A Study of Students Misconceptions About Electricity, School
Science XXVII(2), 815.
Saxena, A.B.: 1992, An Attempt to Remove Misconceptions Related to Electricity,
International Journal of Science Education 14(2), 157162.
Saxena 277
Saxena, A.B.: 1994, Alternative Frameworks and Addressing Conceptual Change,
Regional College of Education, Bhopal.
Saxena, A.B.: 1996, An Analysis of the Students Concept of Current, Bulletin IAPT
13(5), 140143.
Saxena, A.B.: 2000, The Development of Concepts Related to Electricity Among College
Students - A Longitudinal Study, School Science XXXVIII(1), 2032.
Shipstone, D.: 1984, A Study of Childrens Understanding of Electricity, in Simple DC
Circuits, European Journal of Science Education 6(2), 185198.
Shipstone, D.: 1985, Electricity and Simple Circuit, in R. Driver, E. Guesen and A.
Tiberghien (ed.), Childrens Ideas in Science, Open University Press, Philadelphia,
pp. 3351.
Shipstone, D.: 1988, Pupils Understanding of Simple Electrical Circuits, Physics
Smith, E.L. Blakeslee, Theron, D. and Anderson, C.W.: 1993, Teaching Strategies
Associated with Conceptual Change Learning in Science, Journal of Research in
Science Teaching 30(2), 111126.
Solomon, J.: 1983, Learning About Energy: How Pupils Think in Two Domains?,
European Journal of Science Education 5(1), 4959.
Summers, M. Kruger, C. and Mant, J.: 1998, Teaching Electricity Effectively in
the Primary School: A Case Study, International Journal of Science Education
20(2), 153172.
Thorley, N. R. and Woods, K.: 1997, Case Studies of Students Learning as Action
Research on Conceptual Change Teaching, International Journal of Science
Teaching 19(2), 22945.
Thornton, R.: 1995, Conceptual Dynamics: Changing Students Views of Force and
Motion, in B. Tarsitani and M. Vicentini (eds), Thinking Physics for Teaching,
Plenum Press, New York, pp. 157183.
Treagust, D.F. Harrison, A.G. and Vanville, G.J.: 1996, Using an Analogical Teaching
Approach to Engender Conceptual Change, International Journal of Science
Education 18(2), 213229.
Watts, D. and Gilberts, J.: 1983, Enigmas in School Science: Students Conceptions for
Scientifically Associated Words, Research in Science and Technology Education
1(2), 16171.
Common Mans Science and Its Role in Making General Science
Education Meaningful
Rakesh Popli
Birla Institute of Technology, Ranchi, India.
1 Introduction
It is no exaggeration that general science education in India has been a disaster. Our
experience in villages of South Bihar1 and the city of Ranchi shows that science edu-
cation in primary, middle and high schools is not fulfilling its stated objectives2 in any
measure. It is neither enabling students to understand science concepts, principles
and theories nor to use the process of science in daily-life situations in solving prob-
lems, making decisions and extending ones own understanding. As far as inculcation
of a scientific outlook is concerned, the picture is even bleaker. Instead, science is
a burden on poor students who have to remember all the tongue-twisting keywords,
concepts, principles, derivations, explanations, etc. Other workers in various parts of
India have come across similar experiences.
This phenomenon is not confined to village children or first-generation learners.
Even urban children attending well-endowed schools often find science awesome and
burdensome. Many of these students may be able to score good marks in examinations
by dumping a lot of unconnected information into their short-term memories, but it is
neither intellectually enlightening nor practically useful.
For almost two decades, science education has been made compulsory for all stu-
dents in India upto class X. While the basic idea of enlightening all with the light of
science is unexceptionable, in practice the only thing it has given to a vast majority
of students is a formidable stumbling block on the path to matriculation. In the area
of science popularization too, efforts by prominent scientific organizations have hardly
stirred the general public. All this brings into sharp focus the question whether the
meaning and content of science for common people (and common children) has to be
the same as for professors Newton and Maxwell and their modern successors.
There is, therefore, need to review the scheme of science education as a part of
general education. This necessarily involves a reconsideration of the nature of science
itself-in particular, a consideration of how science interfaces with the day-to-day lives
of all people and how they can interact with and benefit from it.
1 Rakesh Popli: 1987, Popularization of Science Among Tribal Youth, Report of project supported by DST,
Govt. of India, Vikas Bharati Bishunpur. A part of this report deals with the interaction of high school
students with science curricula and concludes that these curricula are hopeless. See also, Rakesh Popli:
unpublished 1992, An Evaluation of Science and Mathematics Proficiency Levels of Rural School Students
in Ranchi District. This Report encompasses a survey of Class IV and Class VIII students of about 25 schools
each. The results are almost uniformly dismal, regardless of the quality of management of the schools.
2 National Council of Educational Research and Training: 1986, Science Education for the First Ten Years
of Schooling.
280 Common Mans Science
In this paper we review some aspects of the nature of science and point out why it is
found so difficult and alien by general public and students. We then propose the concept
of Common Mans Science (CMS) which can help make general science education lively
and meaningful. CMS is a community- and context-specific assortment of items from
the totality of science. It is related directly to natural phenomena in the lives of all
people of a community.
CMS is seen to be derived from two sources: (a) empirical facts, generalizations
and observations accumulated over generations, and (b) relevant parts of conventional
sciences dealing with subjects of interest to all people at appropriate phenomenological
levels. The nature of CMS is examined in some detail and it is distinguished from
traditional and folk sciences. Possible objections based on notions of oneness of
science and pre-scientific knowledge-systems are dealt with.
In the next part, a concrete but illustrative outline of the proposed curricula of
CMS at the primary (Class I-V) and secondary (Class VI-X) levels of school education
is given which would be conducive to the best intellectual appreciation of science as
well as practical benefit of all students in India. The role of CMS in senior secondary
and higher education and science popularization among communities at large is briefly
discussed.
2 Science in relation to the common man

2.1 The Nature of Science
The formulation of a scheme of science education as a part of general education requires
a consideration of the nature of science to some extent and of the purpose(s) of science
education in the overall scheme of general education. Therefore, we shall first look
into some aspects of the nature of science before defining Common Mans Science. The
term science used in this paper refers to the body of scientific knowledge of natural
phenomena, i.e. it does not cover social phenomena.
In the history of mankind, observation of natural phenomena, search for general-
izations and inter-relations, and utilization of such knowledge for practical benefit, has
been an important aspect of life. Some of these generalizations are rather limited in
scope; others have wide ranges of applicability. Some are directly and readily verifi-
able; others have been discovered and validated over many generations, for example,
that progeny born of marriages between close blood-relatives are more prone to some
diseases than other people.
What is conventionally called science is a narrower scheme whose scope is ex-
tremely wide in principle. It aims particularly at making vast generalizations and
bringing all phenomena within the ambit of a few laws. This includes not only phenom-
ena of day-to-day life but also those very far removed from ambient conditions. It covers
man-made phenomena, and even those that have never taken place. Similarly, the
objects of scientific investigations are not only those readily accessible to the general
public but all conceivable objects. Thus, for example, Newtonian mechanics is equally
applicable to the motions of a motorcar, a ball thrown up at any angle, a bird flying in
the sky, and the Moon.
Popli 281
The general principles and theories of science can embrace such a vast array of ob-
jects and phenomena only at a certain cost: these deal more with increasingly abstract
concepts and operations than with actual objects and phenomena of daily life. For
example, Newtonian mechanics deals with point-objects (particles), forces, momenta,
etc., which are all considerably abstract. Quantum mechanics, which covers even
wider ground, involves much more abstract entities like wave-functions. In Biology,
classification of forms of life becomes an exercise in abstraction if it is to cover all forms,
not only those of direct interest to a given community at a given time. The difficulty of
students and common people in interacting with science is to be viewed in this light.
Conventional science has been sub-divided into disciplines and sub-disciplines, of
which Physics, Chemistry and Biology are usually taught in general education. It is
interesting to note that these sciences differ from one another not only in content and
terminology but also in methods employed. For example, in Atmospheric Science and
Cosmology, hardly any experiment can be done. Biology does not follow the hypothetico-
deductive method followed in much of Physics. It may also be noted that there is no
unique basis for the division of science into branches: it is quite dependent on need.
An important aspect of scienceimportant from the point of view of general education
is phenomenology. It may be noted that a given body of phenomena may be understood
and discussed at various levels of abstraction or, we may say, various levels of phe-
nomenology. At the lowest level is that description which may be obtained by a direct
and simple observation with the bare senses. Above that, successively higher levels
of phenomenology and phenomenological theory can be conceived of. For example, the
rising and setting of the sun, the moon and the stars may be observed directly. The
monthly or annual variations in their timings may be tabulated systematically. The
same may be done with the phases of the moon. All these phenomena (plus eclipses) are
readily explained by a geocentric phenomenological theory in which the sun, the moon
and the stars revolve around the earth with various periods. The heliocentric (sun-
centred) theory represents a higher level of phenomenology which explains even more
phenomena like the planetary motions and the stellar aberration. Still higher levels
of phenomenology can encompass terrestrial motions too, albeit in a more abstract and
mathematical way. It would be nave and short-sighted to claim that one particular
level of phenomenology (say, heliocentric) was the truth or science and another level
(say, geocentric) was a false notion or not science.
2.2 Common Mans Science

By the term common man we do not mean a particular class of people, but refer to
the common denominator of lives of all people in a community. Thus, even a scientist
is a common man when not working as a specialist. Common Mans Science (CMS) is
that part of science which is relevant to life and problems of the common man. Just
as science curricula can have different contents and levels of treatment for various
purposes, say science for physicians or science for painters, CMS is to be considered
as that part of the totality of science which is (i) of use to the common man, and
(ii) accessible to him, i.e. the level of phenomenology is such that the common man
may understand and work with it. The science of food, water, human body, motions
of objects including vehicles, housing, weather, life of common plants and animals,
celestial objects and calendars, various consumer goods, etc. such are the topics which
make up the subject matter of CMS. But subject headings alone do not make CMS. In
order to distinguish CMS from the science of the above subjects taught conventionally
in schools, three important points may be noted.
First, CMS treats these subjects at an appropriate level of phenomenology. As
we have already discussed, taking up any aspect of nature at the level of general
principles or theories or high levels of abstraction means going far away from the actual
phenomena of concern to the common man. For example, in discussing food, a chemist
may be interested in different chemical constituents of food items and their various
reactions in the human body mediated by various enzymes. The common man is not
interested in details of these reactions. He is interested in the various practical char-
acteristics of whole food items, e.g. their digestibility, their mutual complementarity
or incompatibility, the energy and other benefits given by each, etc. He is interested
broadly in the general process of digestion and particularly in how this process is
helped or hindered by various spices, the state of the body and the state of the mind.
He is also interested in correlations like that of eating carrots with prevention and cure
of night-blindness.
Second, CMS does include the understanding of nature acquired by communities
over the ages, e.g. compatibility of specific spices with particular foods. Whether such
understanding is considered a part of science or pre-scientific is a matter of definition.
Either way, it can hardly be denied that much of this understanding of nature and
knowledge of its phenomena is useful and readily accessible to the common man. Parts
of it have been subjected to scientific investigation and validated, e.g. breast-feeding
being the best for babies and useful for mothers. Other parts may be at various stages
of investigation; yet others may not have been investigated yet. Certain pieces of such
traditional understanding have been further generalized by scientific researches and
made more abstract, without affecting the validity of the earlier understanding in its
limited domain. The geocentric understanding of the commonly observed motions of
celestial bodies is an example. Such understanding is a part of CMS unless proved
wrong by systematic investigation.
Third, the practice of CMS is integrated and practical rather than disciplinary. The
emphasis is on dealing with common phenomena of life in more and more systematic,
analytical and creative ways, not on delving into one particular narrow aspect of a phe-
nomenon to the exclusion of all others. Organization of the subject matter of CMS will,
therefore, be done largely in terms of departments of life, not in terms of conventional
scientific disciplines. Of course, this is not to rule out the inclusion of topics, theories
and principles of conventional disciplines needed for a practical understanding of life
phenomena.
2.3 Some Clarifications

Let us point out that CMS is to be distinguished from traditional sciences and folk
sciences. It is, of course, true that CMS bears a close relationship with these, is
community-specific in content and emphasizes continuity with earlier knowledge. How-
Popli 283
ever, the term traditional sciences usually refers to closed systems belonging to past
ages, whereas CMS is very much contemporary and open. Also, CMS is not bound
by any theoretical basis these sciences may have in ancient philosophies but utilizes
their phenomenology. Thus, for example, empirical facts of Ayurveda like properties of
various plant-products, in terms of their effects on the human body, are useful parts of
CMS, but not necessarily the underlying notions like the five elements (mahabhutas).
The overlap of CMS with folk sciences is obvious, but the former does not share the
superstitions and witch-craft which go with the latter. Besides, CMS freely draws from
the modern sciences where appropriate and useful. For example, knowledge about and
correct use of a modern drug like paracetamol can be a part of CMS. Results of the latest
investigations into sleep can be a part of CMS. Also, CMS seeks to utilize elements of
the method of science (e.g. experiment) within the common mans environment.
It may also be noted here that CMS is not just a collection of facts. It can enable one
to understand nature, to make simple calculations where the parameters are quantifi-
able, to experiment, to discover and to invent.
Some popularizers of science refuse, in the name of oneness or unity of science,
to recognize the distinct identity of CMS.3 One must ask what meaning they attach
to unity. If they simply mean that science encompasses all cognitively meaningful
statements about nature and its phenomena, then surely this unity does not preclude
partitioning of the one science into various sciences for purposes of convenience. Nor
can it prevent the common man from parameterising a given situation differently
from the conventional scientist. If unity means reducibility of all objects of nature
to elementary particles and all phenomena to a few fundamental laws, this reducibility
can be admitted, if at all, in principle only. Even when such reducibility is fully realized
in highly abstract terms, phenomenology will retain its importance in practice. After
all, dont biologists treat life in terms of cells and even whole organisms, and not
necessarily in terms of atoms of which these are made? Similarly, the common man
can understand nature at a level of phenomenology suited to his purposes.
Another objection may be raised by those who consider science to have a beginning
(a few centuries ago) and do not recognize the existence of any science outside the
particular system that was born then. They may object to the inclusion of any other
system like folk sciences into CMS. We would like to point out that whatever point of
time may be considered as the beginning of science, it must be admitted that some
knowledge and understanding of nature existed among various communities prior to
that. Not only that, a method of exploring nature existed. That understanding and that
method may be useful to the common man even today, depending upon circumstances.
A substantial part of folk knowledge may not have been scientifically validated yet,
but where a certain item has been strongly believed over many generations, and has
not been scientifically invalidated, it makes sense to consider it provisionally a part of
science. In conclusion, we may say that such knowledge may either be considered a
3 For example, Prof. B.M. Udgaonkar declared emphatically at the Fourth Peoples Science Congress held
at Mumbai in 1990 that, science being one, there could be no such thing as Peoples Science, and the
adjective Peoples qualified only the word Movement in Peoples Science Movement. He thereby implied
that there was no need to re-orient science education to make it relevant to the common public.
part of science or, if it is considered pre-scientific, it should be integrated into science
education. It would be irrational to let this philosophical issue stand in the way of the
common man benefiting from past experience.
3 CMS curricula in general education

3.1 The General Scheme
Before going into the curricula, it is pertinent to consider briefly the purpose of the
science part of general education. The main purpose, in our view, is (a) to develop a
scientific outlook and scientific appreciation of nature among all citizens, (b) to enable
them to solve their own day-to-day problems in a scientific manner, and (c) to be
generally aware of the emerging science and technology scenario, whether beneficial
or detrimental, and to be able to make personal and social decisions where necessary.
It may be noted here that a learning of the general principles and theories well
known to scientists, key concepts of physicists, etc. is not necessarily needed to ac-
complish (a), (b) or (c). And certainly it is not sufficient. Therefore, we do not agree
with decision-makers who insist on making the learning of key concepts, principles
and theories a major objective of general science education; this objective should apply
only to specialized education in conventional sciences.
Instead, the above purposes can be eminently served by making CMS an integral
part of general education at all stages. We have seen in the last section that phe-
nomenology relating to any topic (e.g. food) can be obtained at many different levels.
It follows that CMS relating to any topic of interest to the common man can be treated
at many different levels of sophistication. Hence, it is possible to design CMS courses
from the lowest to the highest stages of education.
In particular, the science part of primary and secondary education should be com-
pletely re-organized along the lines of CMS. This will mean allowing all children to
observe, understand and manipulate nature at a level of phenomenology naturally
suited to them and will ensure full scope for a flowering of their scientific creativity. In
secondary classes, attention may be focussed on phenomenology of practical subjects
like health, environment, mensuration and technology. Some rudiments of physical,
chemical and biological sciences, e.g., velocity, acceleration due to gravity, atoms and
molecules, micro-organisms, etc., will be needed in CMS, but in a phenomenological
way. Hypothetico-deductive systems like Newtonian mechanics and conventional elec-
trostatics, which can neither be directly verified by simple experiments, nor are of
practical use to the common man, may be left out.
At the senior secondary and tertiary levels, a separate stream may specialize in
conventional sciences as at present, but it would be desirable to continue CMS at a
suitably higher level for all students. It is suggested that CMS be taught at these
levels in two ways: (a) as general science which will enable all people to solve their own
problems related to health, environment, etc., and to understand community, national
and international issues, e.g., big dams and missile proliferation, besides familiarizing
them with the latest developments, e.g., laser-based communication systems, and (b) as
professional CMS courses which would prepare science teachers, science popularizers
Popli 285
and researchers tackling community-level science-related problems. In recent years,
some eminent scientists have called for school and college students devoting their
attention to certain problems at the phenomenological level, e.g., surveying the flora
and fauna in every corner of the country. In our view, such an activity would fit CMS
curricula in a natural way.
We now spell out detailed outlines for CMS curricula at the primary and secondary
stages of education. This exercise is only illustrative and is intended to give concrete
shape to the concept of general science education indicated above. No attempt has been
made here to prepare class-wise syllabi, nor to chalk out in detail the breadth and depth
at which the given topics are to be treated, partly because such details are location- and
community-specific. Such syllabi can be prepared, once the idea is accepted in principle.
It may be noted that the CMS curricula outlined below are meant for all students. It is
not our contention that some students should learn CMS and some others should learn
conventional sciences.
3.2 CMS curricula for the primary level (Age 6-11, Class I-V)
At the primary level, apart from the general considerations relating to CMS, we must
keep in mind the age-related needs of children. The general science curricula at this
stage should consist mostly of (a) inculcation of healthy habits, and (b) development
of elementary scientific skills of observation, experimentation, reasoning, classification
and manipulation. Observation starts in the earliest classes and slowly progresses to
involve other skills. Illustrative lists of topics are given below.
Inculcation of healthy habits : This is not something to cram but to do regularly.

Some discussion may be necessary.
Maintaining personal cleanlinesswashing the face and eyes, cleaning the
teeth, taking bath, wearing clean clothes, combing the hair, washing the
hands with soap and water after defecation and before meals.
Keeping surroundings clean; disposing of garbage properly.
Eating, sleeping and waking at the proper times. Playing.
Eating healthy foods and avoiding unhealthy ones (even if attractively packed
and aggressively advertised). Caution against junk foods and drinks.
Eating in the proper way: eating enough but not too much, washing up and
settling down (possibly with a small prayer) before eating, proper chewing,
washing up afterwards, etc.
Not suppressing bodily urges as for urination, defecation, sneezing, etc.
Keeping the correct posture, keeping eyes at sufficient distance from book,
notebook or TV.
Not handling electricity (A.C.), moving machines or medicines.
Development of scientific skills : This development takes place informally and in
an elementary way. For example, experiments for younger children (upto age 8)
are merely activities and demonstrations. In later classes, children start control-
ling particular parameters consciously. In any case, there is more of doing and
observing than of describing in scientific terms. Here is an illustrative list of
items.
(i) Observing the environment keenly and carefully, e.g.,
Trees, bushes, herbs, creepers in the environment; parts of a plant;
leaves of various trees (observing and copying the shapes);
animals, birds and insects; their various organs;
parts of the human body (those which can be seen and felt);
demands of the body (hunger, thirst, activity, rest and waste expulsion);
water bodies/water supply: where water comes from;
common machines/accessories and their functions, means of transport;
clothes and their materials, relation with season;
common cereals, pulses, vegetables, fruits, edible leaves and their respective
plants;
rising and setting of the sun, phases of the moon; recognizing a few stars,
planets and constellations; clouds.
(ii) Manipulation and experimentation, e.g.,
making various objects and geometrical shapes with clay;
making designs and toys with paper, plant parts and waste materials;
planting and growing useful plants; observing growth;
use of simple tools, e.g. spade, screw-driver;
experimenting with air, water, sunlight and shadows, magnet, lenses, mir-
rors, electric cells and lamp, etc.;
experimenting with sense-perception, e.g., binocular vision, visual illusions,
directionality of hearing.
(iii) Reasoning and classification, e.g.,
classification of things into living and non-living; animals and plants; ani-
mals, birds and insects; domestic and wild, etc.;
classification of water bodies into stagnant and flowing;
classification of foods according to solid/liquid state and according to taste;
understanding the reasons behind rules of hygiene;
classification of vehicles driven by muscle-power and by various fuels and
electricity; hence various forms of energy.
Popli 287
(iv) Concept formation: this should proceed informally and in relation with
phenomena observed, e.g.,
temperature (related to weather and fevers);

energy (related to various kinds of vehicles and equipment);
density (related to floats and sinks, rate of fall);
micro-organisms (related to curds-formation and infectious diseases);
oxygen, carbon dioxide, nitrogen (related to air and plant and animal life);
cause and effect (related to fuel and motion, fall and injury, etc.).
It may be noticed that many of the topics given in the above list are common with
the existing curricula. However, the emphasis in the CMS scheme proposed here is
different. For example, in classifying objects into living and non-living, our emphasis is
not on memorization of the points of contrast but on observation, preferably carried out
during outings into a rich environment, e.g. forest or garden, and on identifying classes
of objects, their behaviours and sequences of events. There should be no hurry to
jump to pre-determined conclusions or to dip into abstract analyses. Demonstrations of
various spectacular behaviours of air, water, etc. should be aimed at arousing childrens
curiosity rather than at proving some principles.
There is no room for formal definitions of work, energy, etc. and their relations with
force at this stage. It is abstract and useless. Nor are details of internal anatomy and
physiology included in the CMS curricula.
3.3 Curricula for the Secondary Level (Age 11-15, Class VI-X)
The CMS curricula at the beginning of the secondary stage have a significant overlap
with those at the late primary stage in terms of topics but there is a difference in the
level of treatment. Thus, while general observation is to be continued, the emphasis
is to shift gradually to a systematic study of phenomena. Observation is not the sole
source of information at this stage; knowledge is provided from textbooks too, but it is
still related to daily life for the most part.
The CMS curricula at this stage consist of matters of direct concern to the common
man, viz. (a) health, (b) environment, (c) mensuration and analytical aspects, and (d)
agricultural or industrial technology. In middle classes (VI-VIII) these subjects may
be treated mostly in terms of traditional parameters. However, as further details are
taken up, it will become necessary to bring in technical terms. Elements of physical
and biological sciences will, therefore, have to be taught, though in a phenomenological
way.
3.3.1 Health Science

In CMS, health science begins with understanding the importance of health and relat-
ing it to parameters under the direct control of the common man, e.g. food, sleep, work,
exercise, cleanliness, state of mind, etc. Children need not be burdened with unnec-
essary details of human anatomy and physiology or of cell structure or of pathological
tests. They should be made familiar with the phenomenology of health and disease,
and enabled to take elementary care of their health themselves.
It should also be noticed that, in health education under CMS, the inner observation
of the state of the body also plays an important role. For example, the natural rhythms
of the body are to be observed in this way. This inner observation, though alien to
conventional sciences, is an elementary skill for the common child. Given below is an
illustrative list of topics.
Holistic definition and supreme importance of health.

Pillars of health: balanced food and water, fresh air, balanced activity and rest,
right expulsion of wastes, right state of mind, cleanliness, being free from addic-
tions, vaccination.
Symptoms of health: appetite for good food, thirst, deep sleep, proper expulsion
of wastes, cheerful mind, desire for right activity and right relationships with
others.
Physical and mental hygiene.
Human body and its systems (broad idea).
Natural rhythms and balance of the body.

Natural capacity of the body to correct internal imbalances and deal with external
invasions (injuries, infections, etc.)
Signals and warnings given by the body and their significance, e.g. heaviness of
the stomach means a meal or snack should be skipped. Various possible causes of
headache, fever, etc. Preventing diseases by heeding warnings and taking timely
corrective measures.
Disease: breakdown of the first line of defence.
Exercises, play-activity, yoga and their importance.
How to eat.
Balanced food in terms of cereals, pulses, vegetables, etc.
Constituents of foodstuffs: proteins, energy-giving matters, vitamins and miner-
als. Implications for diet.
Processed, refined and preserved foods: need to avoid highly refined foods and
those containing added chemicals, junk foods and drinks.
Effects of different foodstuffs and spices on our bodies.
Popli 289
Broad idea of the process of digestion of food: various stages, time taken, involve-
ment of various chemicals (names of individual enzymes not necessary) and the
brain.
Importance of drinking water; how to keep water clean.
Importance of adequate and deep sleep. The sleep cycle. How to sleep.
Managing constipation and diarrhea. Self-examination of the stool.
Care of the eyes, ears, teeth, hair and skin.
For girls: menstrual cycle, its significance and related hygiene.
Common diseases, their causes, prevention and home remedies.
First aid; care of the sick, the young and the old.
Measuring body temperature and pulse rate: normal values.
Science and technology: helping and hindering mans health.
Different systems of medicine and the systems to be preferred in various condi-
tions.
Selecting and reporting to a doctor. Pathological tests.
Story of eradication of smallpox; attempts at eradicating/controlling malaria and
polio.
3.3.2 Environmental Science

At the secondary stage, a broad awareness of the abiotic and biotic factors of the
environment and their relationship with the common mans life is necessary. This
naturally brings in some chemistry and biology. It is recommended that the treatment
of environment in terms of technical parameters be taken up only after class VII or
VIII. An illustrative list of topics is given below.
Five basic constituents of non-living nature: air, water, soil, sunlight, and space.
Their importance for all life, their pollution and protection.
Air: importance, constituents, role of green plants in purification, pollution by
vehicles, industrial wastes, etc.
Water: importance, sources and cycle, pollution, purification and conservation,
drainage and soak-pit. Water-management.
Soil: formation, various types, pollution, erosion and protection.
Suns radiation: its energy being stored in plants and ultimately providing food to
every living being and most energy sources. Various colours and photon energies.
Space: pollution due to crowding, noise and radiation.
Forest: importance, how to reap resources, conservation and planting.
Foodstuffs: how to recognize pure/fresh/ripe/juicy fruits and vegetables. Common
adulterants and surface contaminants. Need to wash fruits, vegetables.
Clothing: various natural and artificial fibres; relation with season, health and
convenience.
Housing: materials and designs; elementary map- making.
Earthquakes, cyclones, floods and droughts. Their causes.
Various kinds of energy and sources, renewable and non-renewable. Need for
conservation. Tapping Suns energy.
Biosphere: variety of flora and fauna; friends and foes of man. Caution against
snakes, scorpions, flies, mosquitoes, etc.
Micro-organisms: friends and foes. Sterilization.
Simple experiments with air, water, soil, sun-light, plants and photo-synthesis.
Exploratory and constructive projects as per local conditions. (Examples: explo-
ration of tunnels and living places of rats, colonies of ants, etc.; making soak-pits,
tree-planting, preventing soil erosion.)
Natural resources: need for conservation. Mans survival needs versus secondary
ones.
Sanitation: importance and practical arrangements.
3.3.3 Mensuration and Analytical Sciences

The mensuration part of the proposed curricula will be found to have a considerable
overlap with conventional curricula. In the CMS scheme, however, the interface with
the common mans life is to be kept up. For example, in weights and measures, the
local units must also be taught and related to the standard units. Secondly, there is to
be a lot of emphasis on doing (making measurements, estimating by feeling and then
verifying by actual measurement).
The essential elements of the Gregorian, the Vikrami and other locally prevalent
calendars must form a part of studies. Their dependence on the motions of celestial
objects (as seen from the earth) should be explained and these matters demystified.
Watching of the night-sky and identifying its salient features should be an important
part of education at this stage. This should set the stage for critically examining many
superstitions and beliefs prevalent in the society.
A discussion of elementary Chemistry, Physics and Biology is inescapable in con-
temporary CMS. However, the criteria of accessibility to and usefulness for the common
Popli 291
man must be kept in mind. Thus, for example, there is no need of going over the entire
periodic table; mention of 20-30 elements should be enough. An illustrative list of
topics is given below.
Units of length, mass (weight), time, area and volume: quasi-quantitative, local
as well as standard.
Practice of making correct measurement. Rough-and-ready assessment.
Idea of extremely small objects (upto nuclei) and very large ones (galaxies).
The suns revolution as seen from the earth. The solar (Gregorian and Saka)
calendars.
The phases of the moon. The moons revolution around the earth. The lunar Hijri
and the luni-solar Vikrami calendars.
The shape and rotation of the earth. Day and night. The seasons.
Solar and lunar eclipses: description and explanation. Rahu and Ketu. Watching
an eclipse safely.
Sky-watching: recognizing the planets, some prominent stars and constellations.
The nature of stars, planets and comets.
Pressure: atmospheric and hydrostatic.
Mixtures, compounds and elements. Chemical reactions. Organic and inorganic
compounds. Common examples from environment and human physiology.
Metals and non-metals. Conductors, insulators and semi-conductors.
Horizontal motions of objects. Speed and velocity. Friction: sliding and rolling.
Acceleration. Vertical motion and acceleration due to gravity. Motion of projec-
tiles. Periodic motion.
Sound: wave-motion. Loudness and pitch. Decibel. Echo and reverberation.
Heat, heat transfer and relation with temperature. Thermal expansion and con-
ductivity.
Elements of electricity. Charge and current. Attraction and repulsion between
charges and between currents. The electric circuit. A.C. and D.C. voltages. Ohms
Law. Power and its calculation.
Attraction and repulsion between magnetic poles. Electro-magnets.
Behaviours of mirrors and lenses (broad idea).
The atomic nature of matter. Atoms and molecules. Parts of the atom: the
electron, the nucleus. Protons and neutrons.
X-rays and other radioactive radiations. Their effects on body tissues and genes.
Units of energy and power: Joule, calorie, Watt. Examples in mechanical, ther-
mal, electric areas. Calorific values of a few common foodstuffs and fuels.
Cell: smallest living part of the body. Different kinds.

Elements of genetics: how information about characteristics is written into each
cell and how these are transferred to offspring. Genes and DNA (elementary
ideas).
Things which can be quantified and those which cannot (at present).
Prevalent superstitions and their analyses. Reasons behind social customs.
3.3.4 Technology: Agricultural and Industrial

Under CMS, technology too is to be discussed at a phenomenological level. Thus,
computer chips as well as fertilizers can be discussed fruitfully without necessarily
going into details of electronics and chemical reactions. Here is an illustrative list of
topics.
(i) Agriculture:
Various crops and respective requirements of conditions (soil type, water, sun-
light, etc.). Crop rotation.
Seeds: indigenous, exotic and hybrid. Different requirements and yields.

Manures and composting; role of legumes in enriching the soil.
Fertilizers: different kinds and compositions. How to prepare solutions. When
and how to administer.
Management of pests and diseases. Use of neem and other domestic means.
Pesticides, their correct use and hazards.
Indigenous and foreign species of cattle and birds. Special requirements of foreign
breeds.
Biogas: concept, construction of plant, use.
Solar cooker, improved chulha, improved implements.
(ii) Industrial Technology:
Use of simple hand-tools. Study of a bicycle. Simple repairs.

Popli 293
Major parts of an automobile engine and their functions.
Household use of electricity and precautions. Power levels of various implements.
How electricity is generated and distributed (simple ideas).
Common domestic equipment (electric and non-electric), their parts and func-
tions, e.g. pressure cooker, kerosene stove, radio, TV, computer, etc. Maintenance
and simple repair.
Refined and processed foodstuffs: added chemicals including synthetic colours
and flavours. Unhealthy nature of all these, particularly ice creams, bottled
drinks, etc.
Soaps and detergents: their proper use and possible effects on skin. Caution.
Reading the list of ingredients and other information on a label.
Computer: concept, language and uses.
3.4 Science Popularization

If school science education needs a CMS orientation, science popularization needs it
even more. The subject matter of science popularization efforts is broadly along the
lines indicated under 3.2 and 3.3 above. Among educated communities, the terminology
of conventional science, e.g. proteins, X-rays, atmospheric pressure, etc. may be freely
used whereas, for the uneducated communities, the traditional parameters may be
used for the most part and new ones introduced slowly.
A word must be put in here about science popularization among housewives in
particular. Contrary to any impression that the phrase Common Mans Science might
give about CMS being male-oriented, the fact is that it concerns housewives more
than any other class of people. Indeed, it would not be too much of an exaggeration
to say that CMS essentially comprises the experience and wisdom of generations of
housewives, systematized and enhanced by modern scientific discoveries. Vigourous
programmes of CMS education should be launched for housewives living under various
conditions, e.g., rural, urban, etc.
There should be emphasis on understanding and defending the vital resources of
the common man, having confidence in the indigenous culture on the basis of scientific
understanding, attacking problems in a systematic way, and investigating matters
which appear mysterious (e.g. ghosts). Above all, innovation must be looked for, rec-
ognized and nurtured. Village and district level organizations (science centres) should
be started on a massive scale and entrusted with these responsibilities. Such centres
must be manned by CMS personnel including housewives rather than by conventional
scientists.
4 Conclusions
With education and research in conventional sciences getting more and more limited
to exotic phenomena, abstract theories, general principles and industrial processes far
away from the ambient conditions, scientific enlightenment of the common man and
solution of his ordinary problems is being neglected. In particular, general science
education is losing its direction and purpose. In the foregoing, we have pointed out the
doubly disastrous effect of the present science curricula at the school level: the students
are needlessly burdened with formalism which most of them cannot learn and cannot
use, while they do not get the opportunity to learn practical skills and attitudes that
they could well learn and use.
We have reviewed some aspects of the nature of science and formulated the concept
of common mans science, which readily makes an interface with the day-to-day lives of
all citizens and can play a crucial role in making general science education meaningful
and purposeful. Common mans science is that part of science which is at once useful
for and accessible to everybody in a community. CMS draws upon both traditional
understanding and modern science at a suitable level of phenomenology. We have
shown above how CMS is a distinct part of science, and how it relates to traditional
and folk sciences as well as conventional sciences.
We have pointed out that in as much as the purpose of general education is not to
make one an expert in any one discipline but to enable one to solve the problems of life,
and to have an intelligent appreciation of all that happens around one, the science part
of general education has to mean CMS. We, therefore, advocate CMS as an integral
part of general education at all stages.
At the primary school level, what is desirable is inculcation of healthy habits and
development of scientific skills of keen observation, experimentation, classification,
reasoning and manipulation with the hands and simple tools. At the secondary stage
(Class VI to X), some topics of particular interest to the common man can be taken up
for detailed and systematic study. These topics are (a) health, (b) environment, (c) men-
suration and analytical aspects, and (d) agricultural or industrial technology. From
Class VII onwards, elements of Chemistry, Physics and Biology, which are essential for
an understanding of all the above subjects, can be introduced explicitly under part (c).
All the above topics are to be taken up at an appropriate phenomenological level so as to
be directly accessible to and useful for the common man. The more abstract concepts,
general principles and theories (particularly the hypothetico-deductive systems like
Newtonian Mechanics) are to be left out of general education curricula, being of interest
to specialists alone. It has been further suggested that CMS be made an essential
subject at the senior secondary and higher stages of education too, enabling students
to relate science to matters of interest to the community, the country and the world
at large. Besides, professional CMS courses should be offered for would-be school
teachers, science popularizers and researchers.
The re-orientation of general science curricula along the lines of CMS should be seen
in the overall context of injecting sense into the otherwise mad, mad world of education.
The widely publicized slogansof making education child-friendly, reducing the weight
Popli 295
of the school-bag (which, according to the Yash Pal Committee, consists not so much of
reducing the amount of learning required as of making it learnable), and reversing
the increasingly anti-nature and anti-people trend in educationwill remain empty
slogans without curricular changes along the lines indicated in this paper.
Such changes in the education system are bound to have an enormous impact on
future generations. Children, liberated from the tyranny of senseless cramming and
given an opportunity to learn science in a natural and useful way, will be able to learn
more thoroughly and creatively. They will be able to raise questions about prevalent
customs and ways and, indeed, about the world of science and technology itself. Not
only will all students understand the nature around them better, but also those who go
on to specialize in sciences will make better and more creative scientists, having had a
thorough familiarity with phenomenology. Even those terminating their studies at the
matriculation level will be able to follow science and technology developments through
various media throughout their lives. Further, children of educationally backward
sections of the society will be able to compete on a more even ground, the natural
phenomenology being their home territory. We have actually seen both in tribal high
schools and in primary-level non-formal education centres that children take to CMS
as naturally as fish to water. This seems to be the only logical way of bringing about
social justice in educationa way which is advantageous to all and disabling to none.
It may be mentioned that even in so-called developed countries like U.S.A., there
is widespread concern about students not imbibing the concepts and principles of sci-
ence. They plan to pump even greater amounts of resources than before to make their
population scientifically literate.4 The situation in countries like India is different.
We do not have the same priorities as U.S.A. Every citizen here does not have to learn
the principles of science just because these are a part of the human heritage. Nor do
we have to struggle against the dogmas of medieval Europe. On the other hand, we
have a wealth of traditional wisdom that can be integrated with modern science. Also,
we have urgent problems of hunger, disease, superstition, stagnation in production,
and general ignorance. India can show the world how to utilize general education in
solving these problems, without giving up on advancement in conventional sciences, by
adopting the above approach.
Acknowledgement
Helpful discussions with Professor Dharmendra Kumar are gratefully acknowledged.
4 American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS): 1989, Science for All Americans (Project
2061), AAAS.
Attitude Towards Science: An Analysis.
Daya Pant
NCERT, New Delhi, India.
1 Introduction
Importance of bringing about improvement in the outcomes of learning of science can be
gauged from the time devoted to the teaching of science at school stage, right from the
junior school as environmental science through middle and secondary stage to senior
secondary school. Although, all the learners will not be studying science at a later
stage but as effective citizens they need to possess the skills and competencies for
understanding and use of science and technology in their daily life. It is useful for
making personal and public decisions on various issues, such as, polluting industries
and its locations, testing of drugs, use of banned drugs, and governmental decisions
regarding projects having a bearing on our environment (Miller, 1996). Understanding
of science means understanding the nature of science which involves developing not
only the appropriate skills and competencies but also the relevant attitudes and values
(Lederman, 1992) which are conducive to the learning of science in ways commensurate
with the socio-cultural mileu (Roth and Roychaudhry, 1994).
However, research relating to bringing about improvement in the learning outcomes
of the science students has not changed the situation much (Linn, 1992). Science
instruction mostly, involves reading out textbooks to students (Holiday, 1984). In a
country like India where curriculum varies from state to state, and other facilities, like
laboratories etc. which promote learning by doing are lacking, the textbooks assume a
central place in the teaching-learning of science and they almost dictate the curriculum
followed by the teachers and students (Gottfried and Kyle, 1992; Chiappetta et al.,
1993).
The text books not only provide instructional strategies to teach certain facts but
there is a hidden curriculum that is woven into these facts and their presentation
(Richardson, 1985; Watt, 1993; Kumar, 1989). This hidden curriculum influences the
values and attitudes students develop towards science and its use.
It is not only the content of science text, but the exercises, diagrams and the activi-
ties in the text also have importance for their potential influence on the understanding
of science (Holliday and Whittacker, 1978; Holliday, 1981). The messages that are
contained in them regarding nature of science, its methodology, and the attitudes and
values reflected in them influence their relevance in daily life (Jegede and Okebukola,
1991).
Therefore, the content along with these other aspects of the textbooks such as,
questions, figures, tables, diagrams, activities etc. may be analysed so as to assess
how do they present the nature of science, its methodology and social dimension.
298 Attitude Towards Science
2 Present study
This study analysed the content, including questions, figures, tables, diagrams etc.,
of the secondary school science textbooks published by NCERT (National Council of
Educational Research and Training). The analysis was carried out to ascertain if
the books adequately present an account of the nature of science, its methods and
processes, its linkages with society, and its use in daily life.
3 Procedure
The procedure involved using the criteria developed by science educationists (Chi-
appetta et al., 1987, 1993) partially modified (see Appendix A) to suit the specific
objectives of the present study and the results are set out in tables 2 to 11. Interrater
reliabiliability between the two raters was 90%.
Apart from the analysis using the criteria identified to assess the nature of science
and its representation, the book was also reviewed with reference to the psychological
view point of the learners and the criteria employed for analysis of the textual material,
generally, in respect of organization, presentation and lay out.
The results are discussed along with the overall organization of the textbook with
respect to the perspective the textbook presents to the reader on the nature and phi-
losophy of science.
4 Result and discussion

The analysis revealed that the four themes characterizing the nature of science, in-
cluding its methodology, thinking skills, and social linkages were not represented in a
balance manner in the IX and X class science text books. The themes and subthemes
used in the analysis are given in the Appendix A.
Total items I II III IV Total items of Percentage

analysed agreement agreement
106 74 10 3 9 96
Table-1: Table showing the agreement between two raters on the four themes of
nature of science.
These trends are also apparent in the analysis of the text books published in India
(Kapalli, 1998) and abroad (Chiappatta, et al., 1993) and they have important implica-
tions for the learning of science. Details are presented below:
4.1 Analysis of IX class text book

In this book the representation of the four themes was not quite proportionate as can be
seen from the table 2. (Figures in parenthesis inside all the tables indicate percentages
rounded off to nearest whole number.)
Theme I: Basic Knowledge of Science had fifty percent share followed by the theme
II, Investigative Nature of Science. The theme III, Processes of Science and the theme
Pant 299
Themes underlying nature of Science
Unit analysed I II III IV Total
Paragraphs 153 91 28 46 318
(48%) (29%) (9%) (15%)
Questions 102 171 4 12 289
(35%) (60%) (1%) (4%)
Figures 120 17 9 10 156
(77%) (11%) (6%) (6%)
Tables 17 2 19
(89%) (11%)
Highlights 12 6 5 4 27
(44%) (22%) (19%) (15%)
Total 404 287 46 72 809
(50%) (36%) (6%) (9%)
Table-2: The proportion of the four themes underlying the nature of science in IX class
textbook of NCERT.
IV Interaction of Science, Technology and Society, each getting less than ten percent
share of the total units analysed. The contribution of the paragraphs to the theme
III and IV is not quiet as unbalanced, as questions and figures. The theme III should
have been better represented through the intext questions, as good questions should
be aimed at encouragement of thinking and application among students. (Shepardson
and Pizzini, 1991).
The highlighted text infact, is relatively the most balanced component as far as the
presentation of different aspects of nature of science is concerned. The text has all the
ingredients of the material which if presented in the right proportion could make it a
better book. The sub theme categories introduced for the present analysis were found
represented in the text, although their proportion was not balanced (tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 8,
9, 10, and 11).
The nature of science as the knowledge of science was presented most frequently as
facts, principals and models as can be seen from table 3.
There is a need to portray it more as a product of joint efforts of scientists over
a period of time and also portrayal of the continuing efforts to improve upon them.
Even presentation of the hypothesis, resulting from the existing knowledge or the
new hypothesis which need to be worked upon in areas of ongoing activity were not
present in the text. The linkages of the present material with the information already
known/taught to them or material asking them to recall information was almost absent.
The nature of science as an investigative endeavour has been well represented in
this book, claiming one third of the total units as can be seen from table 4.
Although, all the aspects of investigative method are present, there is a concen-
tration of the material which requires them to make a calculation or requires them
to reason out an answer as compared to the material which requires them to learn
with the help of a graph or engages them in a thought experiment or activity. A new
category was added to this theme of the nature of science which involved highlighting
Subthemes within theme-I
Unit analysed a b c d Total
Paragraphs 143 7 3 153
94 5 2
Questions 3 99 102
(3%) (97%)
Figures 118 2 120
(98%) (2%)
Tables 17 17
Highlights 12 12
Total 293 9 102 404
(73%) (2%) (25%)
Table-3: The proportion of the subthemes within the theme I, Knowledge of Science in
IX class textbook of NCERT.
the lack of experience or bias in the students mind resulting in faulty reasoning or
different outcome of the experiment. Paragraphs and questions were presented in a
balanced manner presenting the different aspects of investigative nature of science.
But figures and tables did not present such balanced view of nature of science as
investigative. Tables especially could be an effective way of presenting the influence
of bias and lack of experience, on the outcomes of experiments and reasoning of stu-
dents. Apart from these lacunae, other aspects of investigative nature of science were
adequately highlighted in the text.
Science as a thinking process was not represented so well in this book as can be
seen from table 5.
Only six percent of the total units analysed depicted this theme, as a result there
was no material whatsoever available on empirical nature of science and objectivity of
science; within whatever limited material was presented in this theme, there was con-
centration on How a scientist experimented? and inductive and deductive reasoning
in science.
It is significant to note that there were only four questions which highlighted this
theme. Since, questions can focus the attention of the learners on the thinking pro-
cesses of science, therefore it is of utmost importance that there be enough questions
which highlight this theme. Tables could also have been used to depict at least two
important aspects of science as a thinking process historical development of an idea
and the way culture influences scientific thinking. Highlighted box items in the text
could be the model to introduce more of the units on thinking processes of science. One
subtheme introduced for this analysis regarding the role of culture on the scientific
thinking was found represented in the highlighted text.
However, more subject matter needs to be introduced to take care of the use of
assumptions in scientific thinking which is a very important aspect of the processes
of science and was not found in the text. Use of assumptions could be very easily
introduced through not only paragraphs but questions which make the learners think
at different outcomes with different assumptions. Even the highlighted text could have
Pant 301
Subthemes within theme-II
Unit analysed a b c d e Total
Paragraphs 25 2 26 11 27 91
(27%) (2%) (29%) (12%) (30%)
Questions 2 10 86 66 7 171
(1%) (6%) (50%) (38%) (4%)
Figures 6 1 1 9 17
(35%) (6%) (6%) (53%)
Tables 2 2
Highlights 2 1 3 6
(33%) (17%) (50%)
Total 35 13 113 80 46 287
(12%) (5%) (39%) (28%) (16%)
Table-4: Proportion of the subthemes within the theme-II Investigative Nature of

Science in IX class Textbook of NCERT.
been useful to put across this sub theme by quoting incidences where the assumptions
of scientist created difficulty in arriving at solutions.
The linkages between science, technology and society was represented by 9 percent
of the total units analysed. However, almost about half of the subject matter represent-
ing this theme presented the usefulness of science and technology for society as can be
seen from table 6.
One third of the total units were found devoted to the discussion of social issues.
Negative effects of science were not represented in the text book at all. A new category
introduced under this theme, limitations of science was found represented through few
units. The other aspects of interaction between science, technology and society such
as acceptance of divergent ideas across authority, groups, individuals, and careers in
science were not found discussed in the text.
Paragraphs represented only three aspects of interaction between science and so-
ciety, usefulness, and limitations of science for society, and social issues, while ques-
tions, figures and highlighted text represented only two aspects, usefulness of science,
and social issues. Tables completely omitted presentation of this theme. Figures
and questions could have very efficiently communicated the interaction of science and
technology with society especially negative effects of, and careers in science. Tables
showing the increase in number of industries in catchment area and resulting pollution
level of the rivers, figures depicting how industrial waste causes the water to get
polluted, ozone layer thinning down, green house effect etc. could be the phenomenon
which need to be highlighted in the text in a simplified manner. Besides, the utensils
which have possible health hazards due to aluminium coating etc. are the instances of
limitations of science and technology which ought to be communicated. The selection
of the particular information which communicates limitations of science or its negative
effect could be the subject decided by the writer keeping in view the developmental
level and previous knowledge of the learners.
Subthemes within theme-III
Unit analysed a b c d e f g h i Total
Paragraphs 9 4 9 3 2 1 28
(32%) (14%) (32%) (11%) (7%) (4%)
Questions 1 1 2 4
(25%) (25%) 50%
Figures 5 1 1 2 9
(56%) (11%) (11%) (22%)
Tables
(20%) (20%) (40%) (20%)
Total 15 6 10 4 5 5 1 46
Table-5: Proportion of the subthemes within the theme-III, Thinking Processes in IX

class textbook of NCERT.
4.2 Analysis of Xth Class Text book
Analysis of this book revealed that the nature of science is presented in a lop sided
manner just as in the IX class science text book as can be seen from table 7.
However, the relative proportion of the themes in this book was slightly different.
Science as knowledge and facts was represented by about half of the units analysed (47
percent) as can be seen from table 8.
In comparison with the paragraphs and the highlighted text, questions, figures and
tables presented knowledge of science in greater proportion; within this theme all the
different sub themes were found represented. However, there was concentration of
facts, concepts and theories, as well as recall of information in the content.
Investigative nature of science was presented by 11 percent of the units analysed
as can be seen from table 9.
Maximum contribution to this theme was made by questions, highlighted text and
figures, although overall representation of this theme was poor. There was concen-
tration of the reasoning aspect contributed by questions. The figures included more
instances of the subtheme which involved students in answering questions using ma-
terial such as, maps, tables etc. The paragraphs contributing to this aspects of nature
of science were very few but each one of the subtheme was covered through them even
though there was one paragraph of each kind. Except the new category added for the
analysis in the scheme which intended to look for material dealing with bringing out
of the students own bias and lack of experience influencing their reasoning, was not
found represented by any unit of analysis. Tables did not contribute to this theme,
although use of tables could have been made to ask learners to make a calculation,
and reason out answer etc. with the help of data which learners have to use to
answer questions, or examine to detect trends or make a critical assessment based on
observations presented. Highlighted text contributed, primarily, through a few units
to the thought experiment or the thought activity. Overall there is poor representation
of this theme in the text book.
Pant 303
Subthemes within theme-I
Unit analysed a b c d e f g Total
(61%) (11%) (28%)
Questions 6 6 12
(50%) (50%)
Figures 9 1 10
(90%) (10%)
Tables
Highlights 2 2 4
(50%) (50%)
Total 45 5 22 72
(63%) (7%) (31%)
Table-6: Proportion of the Subthemes within the theme-IV, Interaction of Science,

Technology and Society in X class textbook of NCERT.
The nature of science as thinking process was very poorly represented in X class text
as can be seen from table 10. Only six percent of the total units analysed represented
this theme. Except for the highlighted box items, all other units which presented this
theme were very few in number. Infact figures, questions and tables were, one each,
presenting this theme. The paragraphs presenting this theme of nature of science
constituted ten percent of total paragraphs, while highlighted text contributed maxi-
mally to this theme. Almost thirty percent of these units presented science as thinking
process inspite of the fact that there were few instances of each sub theme such as
how scientists experiment, how ideas develop over time, empiricity and objectivity of
science, and the use of assumptions.
However, within this theme almost all sub themes were found represented, except
those relating to the discussion of evidence and proof. More use of tables could have
been and questions could have been made apart from more paragraphs to highlight this
theme. Tabular material could highlight this theme effectively, for instance, listing
out the changes in the scientific research and concommitent changes in the society
and policy or sharp changes in science at different epochs will highlight the influence
of culture on the scientific thinking. Tabulating data supporting one hypothesis and
refuting the other and elaborating on the contextual facts causing variations could be
tabulated along side highlighting the discussions relating to evidence and proof.
Questions and figures could also highlight the thinking processes of science. Ques-
tions which promote thinking among students could be framed instead of those which
make students recall information provided in the text. For instance the text discusses
the natural resources and question is framed, Can you name one technology that
uses these resources? instead a question could be framed, Can you think of ways
in which the depletion of natural resources through technology could be restricted? or
Write how the technology which facilitates mankind can become counter productive?,
or Which characteristics of the birds are suitable for their survival? Figures which
Themes underlying nature of science
Unit analysed I II III IV Total
Paragraphs 109 10 28 156 303
(37%) (3%) (9%) (50%)
Questions 128 55 1 30 214
(61%) (26%) (0.47%) (13%)
Figures 56 7 1 18 82
(76%) (8%) (1%) (15%)
Tables 24 1 11 36
(67%) (3%) (31%)
(31%) (9%) (31%) (28%)
Total 316 75 41 235 667
(47%) (11%) (6%) (36%)
Table-7: The proportion of the four themes underlying the nature of science in X class
textbook of NCERT.
present evidence leading to different conclusions could be presented and students may
be asked to critically examine these as proof of different hypotheses.
The paragraphs presented all the sub-themes except two, namely, discussion of
evidence and proof, and influence of culture on scientific thinking. Both these aspects
of scientific thinking need to be emphasized through paragrapahs, tables, figures and
questions.
Interaction of science and technology with society was presented fairly adequately
claiming one third of the total units analysed as can be seen from table 11.
However, the various aspects of this interaction were not represented in a balanced
manner. Usefulness of science and technology was presented by 40% units, and social
issues by 48%, but negative effects of science and technology and limitations were
presented through 6 and 4% units respectively. Acceptance of divergent views across
individuals, authority levels and cultures was presented by two paragraphs but caraer
in science and technology were not presented at all. This absence of any mention
of careers in science and technology has a repercussion for the image of scientists.
Knowing that science is studied not only for becoming a scientist but also for pursuing
a career.
Over all inspite of adequate number of units, this theme presented the interaction
of science with society in terms of its usefulness and social issues. But the other
important aspects like negative effects of science, its limitations, the careers in science
and technology and existence of divergence and its acceptance across authority levels,
individuals and groups was not presented adequately.
Overall organization of the book: The two books were also reviewed from the point
of view of:
1. the presentation of the content and its implications for inculcation of the appro-
priate attitudes and values towards science,
Pant 305
Subthemes within theme I
Unit analysed a b c Total
(95%) (4%) (2%)
Questions 9 119 128
(7%) (93%)
Figures 51 5 56
(91%) (9%)
Tables 11 2 1 14
(79%) (14%) (7%)
Highlights 9 9
(100%) 9
Total 183 11 122 316
(58%) (4%) (38%)
Table-8: The proportion of the sub themes within the theme-I, Knowledge of Science
in X class textbook of NCERT.
2. the layout of the books in terms of figures, tables, and other features and
3. the students reactions to the overall organization of the book.
Presentation of the Content: The organization of the content of the textbook in-
fluences the levels of comprehension (Vidal-Abraca and Sanzose, 1998). The com-
prehension of the text in turn will have influence on the inculcation of appropriate
attitudes and values towards science and its relevance in life. Shallow comprehension
will not result in application of the knowledge to real life situations. On the other hand
deep levels of comprehension are likely to result in understanding the relevance of the
knowledge in real life and, hence the positive attitudes towards it.
The science curriculum framework sets apart the middle level science competen-
cies from secondary level science competencies. Therefore, the two books could have
been presented as a continuity with IX class textbook carrying a brief mention of
the expected competencies, attitudes and values related to science, supposedly de-
veloped among the students at middle stage; and those that are to be developed at
the secondary stage. Such an explicit statement of the objectives to be attained and
competencies to be developed at different stages, termed linking of the textual content,
enhances the comprehension of the text (Vidal-Abraca and Sansoss, IWB). Besides
linking the textual contents to the readers previous knowledge, the text could also
make a direct reference to the diferent aspects of the nature of science, such as, it
should essentially project science as not only the product but also as a process of
enquiry (Kapalli, 1998). However, the reference to the nature of science may be made
using the vocabulary and language suitable to the developmental level of the IX and V
class students.
The general planning of the book, and its contents may be guided by the perspective
explicitly stated in the first section. The logical linking up of the different chapters to
the perspective and their sequencing results in coherence of the ideas presented in the
Subthemes within theme-II
Unit analysed a b c d e Total
Paragraphs 2 1 2 1 4 10
(20%) (10%) (20%) (10%) (40%)
Questions 7 48 55
(13%) (87%)
Figures 6 1 7
(86%) (14%)
Tables
Highlights 1 2 3
(33%) (67%)
Total 9 1 10 49 6 75
(12%) (1%) (13%) (65%) (8%)
Table-9: Proportion of the sub themes within the theme-II, Investigative nature of
science in X class textbook of NCERT.
text (Vidal Abarca and San Joze, 1998). It would also help facilitate teachers task by
increasing comprehension of the students as it draws atttention to those aspects of the
text, which need to be highlighted while teaching and also while framing questions,
to adequately communicate the nature of science and its processes. Not only in the
beginning of the book but each chapter also needs to be put into focus. The chapters or a
few chapters together should carry a introductory block which provides the connection
between previous chapters and the forthcoming ones. Although in the present book
each chapter does begin with an introductory paragraph but it does not cover compre-
hensively the expanse of the information in the chapter, thereby leaving it to the reader
to sort out their own agenda in terms of the highlights and issues. In a science text
book, this gap may make the readers focus on the issues and content quite irrelevant
to nature of science and miss the objectives of learning of science widely not by a small
margin, as the readers tend to assimilate new information in the already conceived
cognitive structures. In the case of learning of science the previously conceived ideas
may be quite irrelevant and divorced from the reality, prompted sometimes by fantasies
or folklore.
Layout of the book: A review of the layout of the books revealed that they are
very dull and unattractive. The figures and tables are set out in very small print,
sometimes the figures are presented without any caption. When the figures appear
without caption its potential value for the students comprehension is much less, than
a figure independently appearing. As the figures make more visual impact on the
students and stay in their memory, they have to be presented complete with expla-
nation and labelling. Movement wherever necessary and possible should be depicted
to communicate conceptual understanding of the process, for instance in electric motor
or the dynamo the direction of movement of current or the magnetic coil etc.
The figures which are very small do not invite the attention of the reader, especially
the students at this stage. The figures are not appropriately drawn. Where there is
a need for real figures line drawings were shown and where line drawing would have
Pant 307
Subthemes within theme-III
Unit analysed a b c d e f g h i Total
Paragraphs 2 4 3 3 11 1 4 28
(7%) (14%) (11%) (11%) (39%) (4%) (14%)
Questions 1 1
Figures 1 1
Tables 1 1
Highlights 3 2 1 2 2 10
(30%) (20%) (10%) (20%) (20%)
Total 7 6 4 3 12 1 2 6 41
Table-10: Proportion of the sub themes within the theme-III, Thinking Processes in X
class textbook of NCERT.
served the purpose real figure, a bad one was shown. The transfer of the learning to
real life situation is hindered when the figures are not appropriately drawn or drawn
without the natural perspective. It becomes extremely difficult to identify them in real
life, for instance the figure of a moss or a touch-me-not plant when seen drawn out
of proportion, not knowing its real life dimensions, will hinder the recognition of the
plant in its real habitat. Sometimes the figures/gadgets are oversimplified and shown
diagrammatically which comes in the way of comprehension of the real life gadgets and
figures. The specific comments and instances which could be improved are given below:
IX class Text book: The figures in the chapters 1, 2 and 3 are very large whereas in
chapters 6, 7, 8 and 10, the figures are small. In chapter 14, on electricity, the figures
illustrating various kinds of electric circuits, connections, voltmeter and resistances in
series etc., are all hypothetical. In order to identify and set up an electric circuit in real
life the real life ammeter would have served the purpose better. It has been seen that
transfer of learning to handle these objects in real life is poor among students because
they do not comprehend the circuit from the incomplete diagramatic representation.
In chapter 16 even the figures of birds are drawings and not photographs. Based
on these figures the identification of plants and animals in real life situations becomes
extremely difficult. Even if the dimensional characteristics are given, the identification
is still quite difficult in real life situations. Only when these living creatures are shown
in appropriate real life perspective, their identification becomes easier.
X Class Text book: In the X class science textbook the figures (see Appendix B) are
often presented without the labelling of different parts (figures 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 3.4, 12.6).
The figure 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate the working of combustion engines but in the absence
of labelled parts in the figure, the interest and comprehension remains much below the
desired level.
Figure 2.4 shows distillation of petrol, the figure is entitled distillation tower but it
looks like a cylinder. A real photograph of the tower along with the diagrams would
communicate the process better. Figures 7.2 (c) on water contamination looks like a
puzzle as to how the water is being contaminated.
Other features: Glosarry of terms, concepts and explanations would have made a
difference by introducing certain specific references to the words, terms and concepts
that deal with the nature of science and these could be included in the glossary.
Subthemes within theme-IV

Unit analysed a b c d e f Total
Paragraphs 63 6 9 76 2 156
(40%) (4%) (6%) (48%) (1%)
Questions 9 1 2 18 30
(30%) (3%) (6%) (60%)
Figures 11 7 18
(61%) (39%)
Tables 8 3 11
(86%) (14%)
Highlights 5 5 10
(50%) (50%)
Total 96 7 11 109 2 225
(43%) (6%) (5%) (46%) (1%)
Table-11: Proportion of the sub themes within the theme IV, Interaction of Science,
Technology and Society in X class textbook of NCERT.
Students reactions to the organization of the book: There were 20 students

whose reactions were recorded. These twenty students were drawn from all sorts of
schools. There were 10 from public schools, 20 from government schools, and 10 from
central schools. There were fewer students from public schools because public schools
rarely prescribe textbooks of NCERT. They all were asked the same question: How
are your science books? Out of the total, twenty reported that the books were dull and
boring while others said they were o.k. These twenty reporting that the books were dull
and boring were asked an additional question: What about other books? In response
to this, there were twelve who said the same thing about the other books also, rest felt
that the other text books were alright.
In order to assess the understanding of the tables and graphs another question was
asked: What do you understand by this graph or figure? In case student did not
volunteer much information, supplementary questions were asked. The supplemen-
tary questions were: What do you understand by this table?, or Why this graph is
drawn?, or What can be found out from this table or graph? The students responses
revealed that they did not understand graphs or tables or the purpose they served.
5 Conclusion
Overall, in the IX class textbook there is a heavy focus on the knowledge aspect and
investigative aspect of the nature of science. In the former category more material
could be on history of science. In the latter category there was emphasis on deduc-
tions and reasoning out an answer and even content relating to answering a question
using material was present. However, there was no content devoted to inclusion of
Pant 309
investigative methods relating to the use of charts, tables, graphs or involving them in
experimentation or helping them become more aware of the personal biases that enter
into investigative processes. There is low concentration of material portraying, science
as thinking process and, the linkages of science with society.
In the former category more content could be added. However, the material needs
more emphasis on empirical nature of science and quantitative assessment as well as
the use of assumptions in thinking needs to be emphasied thereby strengthening the
need for learning the methods of science relating to qualitative assessment, and also
the values relating to the rationality and openness to evidence.
In the latter category whatever little content was present, protrayed the usefulness
of science for society and negative effects of science and technology, the emphasis on
careers, limitations of science and the portrayal of the democratic traditions, as against
the dogmatic and authoritarian, was absent.
Thus in the X class textbook the content was dominated by two themes underlying
the Nature of Science, Basic Knowledge of Science and Interaction of Science with
Society. The two other aspects of Nature of Science relating to Investigative method
and Thinking processing had very little presence, the latter having weightages almost
half of the former. Thus, the book lacks the emphasis on methods and processes of
science. The knowledge aspect presented science as facts and also as the history of
development of science.
Interaction between science and society presented the usefulness of science issues
but the negative aspects of science and its limitations were represented by negligi-
ble content while careers and the values of science that call for openness and anti-
dogmatism and authoritarianism were not mentioned at all. Out of the few units that
referred to the investigative nature of science most were aimed at calculation aspect
only. Similarly, the units that represented different processes of science and related
values were hardly one or two of each kind.
Thus while IX class textbook is tilted more in favour of presenting science as Basic
Knowledge and Investigative endeavor, X class books presents it as Basic Knowledge
and Social Interaction. Both the books lack emphasis on processes of science which are
responsible for inculcating the thinking skills and valuing process. Even the presen-
tation of science as social affair, its negative effects, and limitations of science aught
to be emphasied more so as that learners do not develop unjustifiable single minded
euphoria about omnipotency of science for all problems and ills of society.
Apart fram the content, the organization of the book needs to be more focussed and
contextualised with reference to the science related previous learning skills, compe-
tencies of the learners, and the objectives to be attained by present text content. Not
only overall content, each chapter has to be put in perspective dovetailing each figure,
graph, questions, tables etc. The vocabularly has to be brought to the level of the
reader. Textbooks, thus improved are likely to result in capturing the interest of the
students and, balanced development of science related comptencies in them.
6 Appendix A
Categories for analysing science textbooks:
The categories and subcategories (Chiappetta et. al, 1991a) have been described
and examples provided to enable comprehension of the rules of categorisation. Read
the categories carefully, before attempting to analyse the units in text.
1. Science as a body of knowledge: Science is characterised as a body of information

about various natural phenomena. Scientific knowledge has been arrived at by
the application of methods of science. Knowledge in science includes facts, con-
cepts and principles which are supported by evidence and are largely replicable.
The type of text included under this category is one from which the student
receives information. Textbook material in this category:
(a) Presents facts, concepts, laws and principles.

i. Facts: Can be observed or demonstrated by accurate observaion. For
example, humans have a vertebral column.
ii. Concepts: As facts accumulate, they begin to show certain relationships.
This pattern is referred to as a concept. For example, all animals pos-
sessing a vertebral column belong to a group called vertebrates.
iii. Law: A statement of a relation or sequence of phenomena invariable
under the same conditions. For example, Boyles law.
iv. Principle: Constituent of a substance giving distinctive quality or effect.
For example organic solvents dissolve organic compounds.
(b) Presents hypotheses, theories and models. Hypotheses and theories are
scientific speculations regarding relationships between facts.
i. Hypotheses: Invented to explain a set of facts, a speculation that remains
untested. For example, a hypothesis proposed by Sutton that genes are
present in a linear fashion on a chromosome.
ii. Theory: An invention by scientists which has empirical support and fits
known facts. It is arrived at inductively to explain a set of facts. A
hypothesis for which evidence is present, becomes a theory. For example,
Darwins theory of organic evolution.
iii. Model: This is arrived at deductively from observations. The DNA model
proposed by Watson and Crick was based on X-ray crystallographic pat-
terns. For example, the model of the solar system based on observations
and calculating distances.
(c) Asks students to recall information or knowledge which has been provided
previously in the textbook.
2. Science as a way of investigation: This category includes; those parts of the text
which stimulate thinking and doing by asking the student to find out. This
category involves the student in the processes of science such as observing, mea-
suring, classifying, inferring, recording data, making calculations, experimenting.
Paper and pencil, and hands-on activities are included. Textbook material in this
category:
Pant 311
(a) Requires the student to answer a question through the use of materials. For
example, fix a rubber band at one end and hold the other end with your
finger. Now pluck the rubber band and listen to the sound produced. Hear
the sound produced as the rubber band is stretched. Does the sound change
as you change the length of the band?
(b) Requires the student to answer a question or learn by the use of tables,
charts, i1lustrations and sources of information other than the textbook.
For example, look at the two figures. The bow in the X figure has potential
energy. It can exert force on the arrow and make it move.
(c) Requires the student to make a calculation. For example, a bus travels 200
mts in 40 seconds. In 1 second it will travel- metres.
(d) Requires the student to reason out an answer. For example, Would sea water
have a lower or higher boiling point than distilled water?
(e) Engages the student in a thought experiment or activity. For example, ants
are attracted to certain food items more than others. Devise an experiment
to find out what types of food attract ants.
(f) Presents the material and incidence which bring out how the students own
bias and lack of experience influence his observation. For example error in
reading the level of mercury and level of water could be due to inexperience.
3. Science as a way of thinking: This category would include the text material where
the student is told how the scientific enterprise operates. It includes the scientific
methods and problem solving.
This category is different from Catetory 2 in that the student does not have to
answer questions. Instead the student is told about how science in general or
a scientist in particular discovered, invented ideas, or experimented. Textbooks
material in this category;
(a) Describe how a scientist experimented. For example, Edward Jenner ob-
served that milkmaids showed very few incidents of small pox. He hypoth-
esised that they develop immunity because they came into contact with cow
pox. He experimented by taking serum from cows suffering from cow pox
and infecting healthy people. He observed that the inoculated people did not
succumb to small pox. He deduced that there is something in the serum of
cows that prevents small pox.
(b) Shows historical development of an idea. For example, in 1776, Alessandro
Volta discovered that when two strips of different metals are dipped in an
acid solution, an electric current begins to flow through the wire connecting
the two strips. This simple source of current or a cell is called a Voltaic cell.
The principle discovered by Volta was used to construct another cell with
an improved design by J.F. Daniel in 1836. This gave steadier current but
was cumbersome since liquid electrolytes were used. This disadvantage was
overcome by the invention by Lechlanche of the drycell in 1866.
(c) Emphasises the empirical nature of science. For example, the ionisation of
air produced by X-ray discharges electrified bodies. The rate of discharge
depended on the intensity of an X-ray beam. As a result, careful quantitative
measurements of the properties and effects of X-rays could be made.
(d) Illustrates the use of assumptions. For example, to assume how molecules
can rearrange and change, we assume they must be built of smaller frag-
ments called atoms. With this assumption, we can again explain diferences
between two molecules because they contain different atoms.
(e) Demonstrates how science proceeds by inductive and deductive reasoning.
For example, In Mendels experiments with pea plants, it was noticed re-
peatedly that when a pure tall plant was crossed with a pure dwarf plant,
the progeny was all tall. Subsequent experiments with pairs of this progeny
produced tall and dwarf plants with a 3:1 ratio. The results led him to think
that tallness was dominant over dwarfness.
(f) Shows cause and effect relationship. For example, Take an ice cube on a plate
and leave it on the table. After a while you notice that the ice has melted to
form water. Ths warm temperature of the room caused the ice to become
water.
(g) Shows evidence and proof. For example, Hypothesis: Number of chromo-
somes generally remains constant from cell division to division, thus each
successive generation would have twice the number of chromosomes their
parents had. However it is found that successive generations of the same
species have identical number of chromosomes. Thus the hypothesis is incor-
rect.
(h) Presents the scientific method or problem solving steps. For example, a
scientist first gathers information to identify the probability. He then collects
more information through observations, measurements, etc. He thinks over
the observations and possibilities. He tests each possibility by experiments
or repeated observations to collect data. He then calculates, compares and
draws conclusions.
(i) Presents material which brings out the influence of culture on scientific think-
ing. For example, not looking at the eclipsed sun or moon or offering prayer
during eclipse and holding in esteem plants.
4. Interactions of science, technology and society: Check this category if the intent
of the text is to illustrate the effect or impact of science on society. This aspect of
scientific literacy describes how science and technology helps or hinders mankind.
It involves social issues and careers. Nevertheless, in the presentation of this kind
of material the student receives knowledge and does not have to find out. Text in
this category:
(a) Describe the usefulness of science and technology. For example, we have
learnt to extract energy from animal wastes such as cowdung or plant wastes
Pant 313
like sugarcane bagasse. One successful method is to ferment animal wastes
in closed vessels and produce a gas called biogas. The waste from the biogas
plant can be used as manure in fields and plantations.
(b) Discusses the limitations of science and technology for society. When the text
presents material relating to the areas where science and technology has not
been able to solve problems due to the unresolved issues or new innovations
are required to help resolve issues, e.g. Polymer substances whin make up
garbage, their disposal is a severe problem and this puts a limitation on the
use of this technology.
(c) Describes the negative effects of science and technology. For e.g. sometimes
science is used in harmful ways. Once people learnt that certain substances
explode easily, they made bullets, bombs and crackers. These were devised
for our safety and security. Some people misused bullets to kill wild animals
and people.
(d) Discuss societal issues related to science and technology, e.g. Some people
feel that rain forests should be cut down. They argue that the cleared areas
can be used for farming, which is necessary to feed the growing population.
Other people believe rain forests should not be cut down. They point out that
good yields from crops are possible only for a few years. That is because the
tropical sun and large amounts of rain that these areas receive soon destroy
the soil by moving water. The good soil is carried away by erosion. Thus the
land becomes useless for farming.
(e) Brings out the acceptance of divergent ideas across individuals, and author-
ity levels or groups when the text reports material which makes explicit the
instances whom the thinking of a particular individual or cultural group or
person of rather lower authority level was acceptad by others for examination
or use, such as, use of technology developed in one part of the world being
used by others or a junior scientists paper or innovation being recognized by
senior irrespective of his experience or level of authority.
(f) Information about careers in science and technology. e.g. To prepare for a
mechanical enginering career, you should opt for subjects like mathematics,
physics and chemistry in high school.
7 Appendix B
Fig. 1.2
Fig. 1.3
Fig. 3.4
Fig. 1.4
Fig. 7.2 (c)
Figure 1:
Pant 315
Fig. 2.4 Fig. 12.6
References
AAAS: 1989, Project 2061: Science for All American, Author, Washington, DC.
Anderson, T.H. Beck, D. and West, C.: 1994, A Text Analysis of Two Pre Secondary
Science Activities, Journal of Curriculum Studies 26(2), 163186.
APEID: 1991, Values and Ethics, and the Science and Technology Curriculum, Principal
Regional Office for Asia and Pacific, Thailand.
Chiappetta, E.L. Sethna, G. and Fillman, D.: 1987, Curriculum Balance in Science
Textbooks, The Texas Science Teacher 16(2), 912.
Chiappetta, E.L. Sethna, G. and Fillman, D.: 1991, Procedures for Conducting Context
Analysis of Science Text Books, Department of Curriculum and Instruction,
Houston, Texas.
Chiappetta, E.L. Sethna, G. and Fillman, D.: 1993, Life Science Textbooks and
Scientific Literacy, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 30(7), 787797.
Dreyfus, A.: 1992, Content Analysis of School Textbooks: The Case of a Technology-
oriented Curriculum, International Journal of Science Education 14(1), 312.
Driver, R. Leach, J. Miller, R. and Scott, P.: 1996, Young Peoples Images of Science,
Open University Press, Philadelphia.
Etin, J.: 1990, Review of Research in Secondary Reading in Nigeria (1951-1958),
Journal of Reading 34(2), 8491.
Exline, J.: 1984, National Survey: Science Textbook Adoption Process, The Science
Teacher 51(1), 9293.
Fillman, D.: 1989, Biology Textbook Coverage of Selected Aspects of Scientific
Literacy with Implications for Student Interest, and Recall, of Text Information.
Unpublished dissertation. University of Houston.
Gallagher, J.: 1991, Perspective and Practicing Teachers Knowledge and Beliefs about
the Philosophy of Science, Science Education 75(1), 121134.
Garcia, T.: 1985, An Analysis of Earth Science Textbooks for Presentation of Aspects of
Scientific Literacy. Unpublished dissertation. Universtiy of Houston.
Gottfried, S. and Kyle, W.: 1992, Textbooks Use and the Biology Education Desired
State, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 29(1), 3549.
Harms, N. and Yoga, R.: 1981, What Research Says to the Science Teacher?, Vol. 3,
National Science Teachers Association, Washington, DC.
Hazen, R. and Trefil, J.: 1991, Science Matter, Doubleday, New York.
Hempal, C.: 1966, Philosophy of Natural Science, Prenlice Hall, New Jersy.
Hickman, F.: 1980, Preface. In Biological Science, An Inquiry Into Life, Teacher Edition,
BSCS, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, USA, pp. IX-X.
Holliday, W.: 1981, Selective Attentional Effects of Text Book Study Questions on
Student Learning in Science, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 18, 283
289.
Holliday, W.G. Whittaker, H. and Loose, K.: 1978, Differential Effects of Science Study
Questions. Paper presented at the National Association for Research in Science
Teaching, Toronto.
Hurd, P.: 1960, Biological Education in American Secondary Schools, 1890-1960, AIBS,
Washington, DC.
Jeqede, J. and Okebukola, P.: 1991, The Effect of Instruction on Socio-cultured Beliefs
Hindering the Learning of Science, Journal of Research in Science Teaching
28, 275285.
Kapalli, S.: 1998, Representations of Science: A Criteque of Science Education,
Perspections in Education, 14(3), 147153.
King, B.: 1991, Beginning Teachers Knowledge of Attitude Towards History and
Philosophy of Science, Science Education 75(1), 135141.
Kumar, K.: 1989, The Social Character of Learning, Sage Publication, New Delhi.
Lederman, N.: 1992, Students and Teachers Conceptions of the Nature of Science: A
Review of Research, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 29(4), 331359.
Pant 317
Lekin and Wellington, J.: 1994, Who Will Teach the Nature of Science Teachers Views
of Science and their Implications for Science Education, International Journal of
Linn, M.: 1992, Science Education Reform: Building on the Research Base, Journal of
Research in Science Teaching 29(8), 821840.
Miller, P.: 1996, Towards a Science Curriculum for Public Understanding, School
Science Review 77(280), 17.
OConnor, E.: 1993, Management Education for the Future: Learning to Think
Curriculum, (14), 6267.
Pizzini, E.L. Shepardson, D.P. and Abell, S.K.: 1991, The Inquiry Level of Junior
High Activities: Implications to Science Teaching, Journal of Research in Science
Teaching 28, 111121.
Ramanathan, S. and Siddiqui, N.: 1994, Representation of Science in Upper Primary
Science Textbooks: An Assessment, Indian Educational Review 29(1&2), 112.
Richardson, R.: 1985, The Hidden Messages at School Books, Journal of Moral
Roth, W. and Roychaudhry, A.: 1994, Physics Students Epistemologies and Views
about Knowing and Learning, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 31(1), 5
30.
Rutherford, F. and Ahlgren, A.: 1989, Science For All Americans, Oxford University
Press, New York.
Science A Textbook for Class X: 1989, National Council of Educational Research and
Training, New Delhi, India.
Shepardson, D. and Pizzini, E.: 1991, Questioning Levels of Junior High School Science
Textbooks and their Implications for Learning Textual Information, Journal of
Research in Science Education 75(6), 673682.
Tamir, P.: 1972, Understanding the Process of Science by Students Exposed to Different
Science Curricula in Israel, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 9(3), 239245.
Watt, S.: 1993, Science in the National Curriculum Developing an Anti-racist and
Multicultural Perspective, in A. Fyfe and P. Figueroa (eds), Education for Cultural
Diversity - The Challenge for a New Era.
Westbury, I.: 1985, Textbooks an Overview, in I. Hussen and T. Postlethwaite (eds), The
International Encyclopedia of Education Research and Studies, Vol. 9, pp. 5233
5234.
Science Textbooks in TamilEncounter of Modern Science with
Traditional Knowledge Forms.
T.V. Venkateswaran
Centre for Development of Imaging Technology, Thiruvananathapuram, India. Email: tvven@sancharnet.in
1 Introduction
Modern Educational systems instituted in India during the colonial period usually
evokes two responses among the scholars. One treats the educational edifice as a
valuable legacy, left by former rulers, albeit, unwittingly. The others, consider it as
diametrically oppositeas yet another instance of the metropolitan powers deliberate
attempt to keep down the hapless colonies for their exclusive benefit.
With the prefix modern to the word education, the first response focuses on the
social mobility that colonial education provided to hitherto suppressed and depressed
classes of people.1 The spread of ideas like democracy, scientific rationality, rationality
and nationalism is traced as a worthy benefaction, with the colonial educational system
regarded as having ushered in modernization.2 On the other hand, the alternative
focuses on how education was a mask of conquest3 a sort of tool to obtain the consent
of the oppressed; and how it colonized the minds. Gauri Viswanathan argues that
the introduction of literary studies in place of religion by the British operated a veiled
mechanism of social control to keep the Indian society governable without the excessive
use of violence.
Scholarship thus is intertwined in inescapable dualism, with weak explanatory po-
tential. The first response would be unable to explain how a well-articulated Macaulayan
colonial educational project could turn out to be a patronizing agent of change, ul-
timately leading to the demise of colonialism itself. On the other hand if modern
education was only a mask and a colonizing mind project, how could it generate a
class of people who vociferously opposed colonialism? Both these dualist responses
treat the recipient society as passive and fail to consider the possibility of natives ac-
tively engaging with the colonial project and re-appropriating elements in the colonial
educational system.
The way out is possibly to seek a solution in the mode of transmission and exchange
1 See Hardgrave, Robert: 1969, Nadars of Tamilnad, University of California Press, Los Angeles, for the
impact of education on caste structure. Specifically, the book takes the case study of how Nadars, a backward
community, acquired wealth and education and moved upwards in the caste hierarchy.
2 Ghosh, Suresh Chandra: 1995, The History of education in Modern India, Orient Longman, is a
representative of this view.

3 See Vishwanathan, Gauri: Masks of ConquestLiterary Study and British Rule in India, Columbia
University Press, New York. She argues that the introduction of literary studies in place of religion by
the British operated a veiled mechanism of social control to keep the Indian society governable without the
excessive use of violence.
320 Science Textbooks in Tamil
of knowledge between the metropolitan and colonial cultures. Extending the point
made by the sociology of science, this paper seeks to examine the native attempt
to divest western science of its European cultural codes and to assimilate modern
science into the native cultural cosmos. As Aparna Basu points out: education was
a central concern in the nationalist quest for self-identification for it was in education
that the cultural agenda of colonialism had been most succinctly expressed,4 and thus
an investigation into the content and character of textbooks on science during the
nineteenth century would be rewarding.
In the cultural ecology of colonialism, European missions, emergence of scientific
naturalism and social changes ushered in at the turn of the century, this paper at-
tempts to document the toils of native intellectuals in skillfully balancing the tra-
ditional and modern. Textbooks being one of the main conduits for the spread of
modern scientific knowledge, this paper specifically underscores the native effort
in neutralizing5 and domesticating6 the publication and dissemination of science
textbooks during the nineteenth century by Tamil intellectuals (vernacular literati). 7
2 Educational Policies and its Impact

During the nineteenth century there were mainly two types of educational systems in
Tamil Nadu: a.) an educational rooted in indigenous practices called Payal schools and
b.) Modern schools established by European missionaries and East India Company.
As every other society, Indian society too had its own traditional system of schools
for training the young and transmitting knowledge from generation to generation.
There were indigenous village schools,8 called Payal or patasalasin various parts of
Tamil Nadu to impart basic literacy, numeracy and to train children in various useful
arts. Dharam Pal claims that there was a Macaulayan programme of erasure of village
schoolsakin to that of de-industrialization. De-education under the colonial British
Raj may be argued; however, it remains that the education provided in these indigenous
schools were discriminatory, and was disproportionately in favour of the upper caste.
During 1835, while the Brahmin population constituted only one twentieth of that
in the Madras Province, out of every five students in patasalas, one was from the
4 Basu, Aparna: 1998, National Education in Bengal 1905-1912, in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (Ed), The
Contested Terrain, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 54-67.

5 Raina, Dhruv & Irfan Habib: 1996, The Moral Legitimization of, Modern Science: Bhadralog reflections
on theories of evolution, Social Studies of Science, 26, 9-42.

6 Raina Dhruv: 1997, The Young P C Ray and the Inauguration of the Social History of Science in India,
Science Technology & Society, 2, 1, 1-39.

7 I am aware of the fact that this expression of intellectuals smacks of elitism. The emergence of
modern (English) educated strata has diversely been characterized as middle class, elite and so on. I am
following K N Panickar, who, applying the Gramscian notion, uses intellectuals to characterize this strate.
Autodidact, as conceptualized by the Dhruv Raina and Irfan S Habib is more appropriate, nevertheless as
we are not focusing on specific individuals but wish to underscore a social class, we use the term Tamil
intellectuals. I am also aware that these Tamil intellectuals were not a homogenous group but were
internally differentiated. However, the contradictions within the Tamil intellectuals were more pronounced
consequent to the cultural politics since 1920s.
8 Pal, Dharam: 1983, The Beautiful Tree, Biblia Impex Pvt Ltd, New Delhi: A uncritical exalted
documentation of the indigenous schools surviving from earlier period to that of early Raj.
Venkateswaran 321
Brahmin community. Also, the education offered to various castes was not uniform;
it was skewed to fit to the students caste-designated role. Thus a Brahmin could learn
astronomy, logic, arithmetic and law, but a trader would be provided with education in
bazaar mathematics and so on. Higher education obviously was restricted to Brahmins
and a few other upper caste sections. It goes without saying that female education was
dismal and the education of Sudhra caste almost absent.
Radhakrishnan remarks that
the nature of indigenous instruction from the perspective of its stages and methods, character
and quality and prevalence and characteristics of domestic instruction showed its imperfection
and inadequacies. But viewed . . . from the perspective of Pre-British Indian Society, what we
perceive as its limitation was perhaps only some of the manifestations of an educational system
which was designed and developed to reproduce the society in all its discriminating dimension. 9
It is well documented that the Payal schools used classics and texts composed in
cadjan leaves, on the other hand, syllabus, schedule and prescribed textbooks were
absent. While the payal schools were discriminatory, in general the modern schools
established by the missionaries during the nineteenth century admitted students from
all classes of people.
As Keay notes, the payal schools were not replaced or erased but were gradually
incorporated into the mainstream modern school system.10 In fact, in South India, such
types of Payal schools did not completely fade away, but were progressively brought
under the control of the State.
To start with, it was the missionaries who instituted modern educational institu-
tions in Tamil province. Portuguese established a Tamil school as early as in 1567
and eight students began their course in language at Punnakayal, a coastal town in
southern Tamil Nadu.11 There is a reference to school master (by implication to school)
in an East India Company record of Fort St George dated 1678.12 However, it is not
known whether the school serviced only the whites or was open to the natives too.
Nonetheless, such efforts were far and few, and with the absence of printing presses,
hardly any textbooks were published. The age-old practice of committing to memory,
and the use of Cadjan leaves, were resorted too.
By the late eighteenth century, the Society for Promotion of Christian Knowledge
and the Danish Missions instituted schools and Rev Schwartz established a number
of schools at Tanjore, Ramnad and Sivaganga. Essentially the efforts were on the
part of various European missions who in addition to evangelical work also took upon
provision of school education.13 Evangelical belief in the transformation of human
9 Radhakrishnan, P.: 1986, Caste Discrimination in indigenous Indian education I: Nature and extent
of education in early, 19th century British India, Working paper No. 63, Madras Institute of Development
Studies, Madras.
10 Keay F. E.: 1989, Ancient Indian Education; An inquiry into its origin, development and ideas, Oxford
University Press, London.

11 Jayaseela, Stephen: 1998, Portuguese in Tamil Coast: Historical Explorations in Commerce and Culture
1507-1749, Navajothi, Pondicherry.

12 Gover, Charles: 1982, Report on the Results of Educational Census of Madras 1871, Government Press,
Madras, 45.
13 See for details, Satthianandan, S.: 1894, History of education in the Madras Presidency, Christian
Literature Society, Madras.

character through education and the conviction that conversion to Christianity re-
quired some amount of learning, promoted the cause of modern education in India. 14
Lalitha Jayaraman notes that15 in the period prior to 1833, the missionaries mainly
concentrated on establishing elementary school teaching through the medium of mod-
ern Indian languages . . .
While the East India Company as such was not keen on the spread of education
among its colonial subjects,16 during the 1820s, Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras
Presidency, took interest in the spread of education to the masses. Munro commis-
sioned district officials to gather information regarding the spread, reach, content and
structure of education then prevailing in various districts of Madras Presidency. Re-
flecting on the dismal state of affairs in education, he favoured the spread of education
in the Presidency at the Companys expenses. He promoted the establishment of one
school for Hindus and one for Muslims in each major town and at least one school in
each Talook (Tehsil). By 1830 there were 70 Talook schools and by 1835 it was only
81 all over the Madras Presidency, implying that the establishment of modern school
were essentially enclavist. While the provincial schools were conducted in the medium
of English and the Zilla through both English and Vernacular, the Talook schools were
essentially vernacular schools.
The policy of promoting education in the vernaculars received a set-back with the
flirtation of the British with the filtration theory of education, cogently advocated
by Macaulay in his famous 1835 minutes. Concurring with Maculay, Lord Bentinck
ordered that His Lordship in council is of the opinion that the great object of the
British Government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science
among the natives of India and that all the funds appropriated for the purpose of
education would be best employed in English education alone.17 The Macaulayan
minutes assiduously advocated English education in addition to class education, and
thus there was a fundamental change in the colonial educational policy. It argued:18
to place within the reach of higher class of natives the highest instruction in the English
languages and in European literature and science so as not only to improve the intellectual
and moral condition of the people, but also to train a body of natives qualified by their habits
and acquirements to take a large share and occupy higher situations in the civil administration
of the country.
The filtration theory argued that it is better to provide quality English education
to a small class of native people, who would be brown in colour but white in habits
14 Niranjana, Tejaswini: 1992, Siting Translation, Orient Longman, New Delhi.
15 Lalitha, Jayaraman: 1986, History of Education in the Madras Presidency 1800-1857, MPhil Thesis,
Madras University (unpublished), 62.
16 In the charter act of 1813, a provision was incorporated that made lawful but not obligatory on the part of
the East India Company to set aside funds for the revival and improvement of literature and encouragement
of the learned natives of India and for the promotion of knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of
the British territories in India. See Sharp, C.H.(Ed): 1920, Selections form the Educational Records 1781-
1839; Part I Calcutta, 22. But the efforts were taken earnestly only after a decade, in 1823.
17 Resolution of the 7th March 1835 in Sharp, C. H.(Ed): 1920, Selections form the Educational Records
1781-1839; Part I, Calcutta.

18 Cited in Satthianandan, S.: 1894 History of Education in the Madras Presidency, Christian Literature
Society, Madras.
Venkateswaran 323
and mentality. Thus the earlier policy of the East India Company to support oriental
educationeducation in Sanskrit, traditional knowledge and vernacular literature
were reversed.
The new Macaulayan policy had indeed definitely impeded the spread of vernacular
education in British Indian territories; nevertheless, in Madras Presidency it was not
completely arrested.19 Missionaries were also very active in Madras Presidency in pro-
viding elementary education; furthermore most of the missionary elementary schools
were consistently vernacular in the medium of instruction. However, the unrealistic
policy of exclusive English education did not last long, and the Governor General Lord
Auckland in his minutes of 1839 departed from the stringent policy of Bentinck and
noted that spread of mass education through English is not a feasible one. Further
he also pointed out that the vernacular education may be economical, than through
English, which require the employment of an English master on a salary at least two
or three times as high as would be adequate for a native master who had received an
English education and at the same time perfectly conversant in his own tongue.20
Further the minute desired that the leading facts and principles of our literature
and science be transferred by translation into vernacular tongues21 and argued the
justness and importance of the advice of the Honorable Court that such a series of class
books should be prepared under one general scheme of control and superintendence.
In conclusion the Government of India in its order22 stated that class book consisting
of selections from English work, or, of compilation drawn up and adapted for native
pupils should be prepared at the charge of education funds of all the presidency. A
system consonant with Lord Aucklands prescription was soon drawn-up by the Madras
Government and a scheme for bestowing annual prizes to vernacular compositions with
the object of procuring expositions of standard English works of the character 23 was
practiced.
The Educational Despatch of Sir Charles Wood in 1854, described as the Magna
Carta of Indian Education suggested a major deviation from the filtration theory of
education and advocated the spread of mass education at an elementary level. Though
this despatch also endorsed the desirability of English education at secondary and
higher levels of education, it accepted the use of vernacular at primary levels. The
despatch recommended to24
recur to the past scheme of education viz., the classical language of the East as the media
for imparting European knowledge. This object of extending European knowledge must be
19 Ghosh, Suresh Chandra: 1995, The History of Education in Modern India, Orient Longman, New Delhi.
20 C. H. Sharp (Ed), Selections form the Educational Records 1781-1839; Part I Calcutta, 1920, (p. 162).
21 ibid, 156-157.
22 Minute of the Governor General in Council, dated 21st Nov, 1839 in Sharp, C.H.(Ed): 1920, Selections
form the Educational Records 1781-1839; Part I, Calcutta, 147-170.

23 In 1841, Robertsons History of America was translated into Tamil and was given the annual price. The
textbook was latter prescribed a text book in the Madras University.

24 Educational Despatch 1854 (No. 49 Dated 19th July 1854) (Popularly referred to as Woods Despatch)
1854, (copy appended in the Arubthnot, J.(Ed), Selections from the Records of the Madras Government
No. II, Papers relating to Public Instructions, comprising of the proceedings of the Madras Department of
Public Instructions, Fort St George Press, Madras, 1855).
effected by means of the English language in the higher branches of institutions and by means
of vernacular language of India to the great mass of people.
and furthermore, that25

. . . we must emphatically declare that the education which we desire to see extended in India
is that which has for its object the diffusion of the improved arts, science, philosophy and
literature of Europe, in-short of European knowledge.
With the acceptance of the major recommendations of the dispatch, a Directorate of

Public Instruction (DPI) was instituted in each province to control and inspect over the
whole educational system.26 The despatch also advocated a system of grant-in-aid to
various agencies for the spread of education among the natives of India.27 Thus many
a payal schools as well as elementary schools established by the missionaries could
receive support from the state in the form of grant-in-aid. This resulted, progressively,
in brining much of the elementary educational institutions in the Madras Presidency
under the supervision of the state.
No. of Schools No. of Scholars

Schools under direct
Government management 73 2148
Under Government
inspection 112 4020
Missionary Schools
recieving Grant-in-aid 303 8973
Total 488 15141
Source: Report of the Director of Public Instruction for the year 1856-57
Table 1: Vernacular Schools in the Madras Presidency during 1856-57
The grant-in-aid system not only triggered the spread of the mass education, but
also ensured spread in terms of the caste groups who received modern education. Thus,
by 1872-73, the general average male literacy rate in the Madras Presidency was 5%
and in Madras district it was 18%. In the Presidency, Hindus had a literacy rate of
4.8%, Muslims 4.9%, Native Christians 7.4%, European and East Indians 63.3%, Jains
12.9% and others 18.4%.28 One of the significant consequences of modern education
was thatat least a few from the oppressed classes could receive education as much as
the Brahmins or caste Hindus. As the missionaries were arguing that education could
better ones social standing, those caste sections in the lower hierarchy could lay claim
for social mobility.
25 ibid, (p. 2).
26 ibid 34-41.
27 See Manickam, S.: 1988, Grant in aid and Christian mission in Madras, in Studies in Missionary
History, Christian Literature Society, Madras, 82.

28 Data compiled from The Report of the Administration of the Madras Presidency, 1872-73, Part II, Madras,
1873, 37.
Venkateswaran 325
Till about 1870, all schools other than under direct government management had
autonomy to choose the text book and also prepare their own scheme of studies. How-
ever, with the introduction of government exams, adoption of inspection, schools receiv-
ing grant in aid, inclusive of many a missionary schools, had to recourse to use of text
books approved by the government. The Textbook Review Committee in its report also
directed each province to set-up a text book committee to approve suitable textbooks
for use in school receiving government aid. In practice, in many a case it meant that,
it was only the textbooks produced by the government or prescribed by it were used.
The Education Code of 1881, while reducing the grants to the high schools and
colleges, increased the grants to the primary schools. The Hunter commission of 1882
also recommended the spread of elementary education and stated that29
while every branch of education can surely claim the fostering care of the state, it is desirable
in the present circumstance of the country to declare the elementary education of the masses,
its provision, extension and improvement to be that part of the educational system to which the
strenuous effort of the state should now be directed in a still larger measure than heretofore.
The Hunter commission also favoured progressive retraction of the Government

from the educational sector. It suggested a mode of grant-in-aid scheme to agencies and
also recommended vesting elementary schools with Municipal and Local boards. By
1922, in Madras Presidency, merely 4% of the students were attending the government
schools. The result was an expansion of elementary schools under private management.
Previously, though class books were prepared and published, the accent given were for
promotion of sound vernacular literature and most of such publications were used
as supplementary texts to instruction in the school. Meanwhile, Hunter commission
advocated that only books approved and prescribed by the government be used in the
schools receiving state aid. This resulted in production of books with specific character
and style of textbooks, even on topics such as sciences.
The net result of these policy changes was relatively widespread primary education
among the vernacular literati, mostly in vernacular medium, predominantly under
private management with modest autonomy in choice over textbooks.
3 Science for NativesEarly Nineteenth Century

It was the missionaries who took lead in propagating modern science in India. Even
the efforts by the colonial government in early period in the Madras Presidency were
essentially a missionary affair, with most of the compliers and authors of textbooks
being European missionaries.
Though the proclaimed aim of the public instruction was improved European lit-
erature and sciences, even during 1850s while, mathematics and geography were in-
troduced into the scheme of studies, natural sciences (natural philosophy & natural
history) were, mostly, absent from the scheme of studies for vernacular schools. In
Talook schools, which were essentially vernacular schools, the natural science was
not a separate subject of study, nonetheless, book titled Joyces Dialogue on Sciences
was a prescribed text for Tamil prose for 3rd and 4th classes. This book was a Tamil
29 Report of the Indian Education Commission 1882, Calcutta, 1883, 586.
translation of a English elementary work on physical sciences prepared by the Cal-
cutta School Book Society and published in Tamil and Telugu by the Madras School
Book Society around 1827. Halls Outline of Astronomy, Ed by Rev T.S. Pratt, was a
prescribed text for Tamil prose for 5th class. Later, a book titled Brief and familiar
sketch of Europe published by the Madras School Book Society was also used as a text
for Tamil prose. This book though, essentially on the history of Europe, information on
inventions, institutions and natural phenomena of Europe, thus providing additional
information on certain aspects of natural sciences.
Woods dispatch advocated provision of education in natural science and though
the subject did not find a place in the revised scheme of studies, it was suggested
that the pupils should be made to write from dictation, striking passages of history
or important facts of Natural Philosophy or Natural History being selection for that
object, so that their very copy book may be made to serve the purpose of common
place books. Moreover, lessons on natural science and inventions were included in
the vernacular language readers.
Thus we find the following in the Tamil readers published by the Director of Pub-
lic Instructions in the Madras Presidency: In the first reader, while there were no
substantial chapters on science, natural philosophic topics such as soul, heaven and
hell were included. But, the second book of lessons in reading, contained elementary
lessons on physiology, natural history, and astronomy. Lessons on head, eye, nose
and ear were part of physiology and animals such as cow, crow, ass sheep, cat and
so on where on natural history and seasons, and natural phenomena such as ice, ice
skating etc formed part of natural philosophy while lessons on stars, moon and sun
were taught as part of the astronomy. In the third book of lessons in reading, natural
history included lessons on minerals, vegetables and animals kingdoms. A chapter
on creation attempted to provide basics of natural philosophy, chapters on natural
phenomena such as atmosphere, dew, rain, lightning and thunder. The minerals such
as gold, silver, lead and tin, iron, copper and brass were part of mineralogy. Lessons
on vegetables included coconut, palmyra, cotton, grains, coffee, tea, tobacco and areca.
Swan, cock, hen, reptiles, bat etc. were on animal kingdom. Lessons on astronomy
provided basics on the sun, moon and the stars and few astronomical events such as
eclipse. The Brief sketch of Europe, though was primarily intended to teach history of
Europe was also a prose reader and it contents included manner, customs, institutions,
events, objects and scenery. Nonetheless, the natural phenomena observed in Europe
are described in terms of Natural History.
Rev Percival, a missionary and a professor of vernacular literature at the Presidency
College, prepared these series of Tamil readers, assisted by natives. While the series
were pruned of every Christian element, allusion to European outlook remained. Thus,
for example, chapter on creation was retained and the tone and tenor of the works were
natural philosophic in perspective.
Even the titles of books published before the 1870s provides evidence that the
publications by the missionaries on scientific subjects were in the paradigm of natural
philosophy. In the catalogue compiled by John Murdoch the following are classified
Venkateswaran 327
under Natural Science:30
1. On General Knowledge, Rev C Rhenius.

2. Tattuvanul Surukkam, [On astronomy, natural history in the form of question
and answer], anonymous, however a publication by missionaries.
3. On the Sub-division of Knowledge, Published by the Madras School Book Society
Depot, a translation of Dr. Ballantynes work.
4. Siruvar Kalvi Thunai, [Catechism of general knowledge], anonymous.
5. Thattuva Sastram, (Natural Philosophy), Rev E Sargent.
6. Catechism of Natural Philosophy, Rev E Sargent.
7. Joyces Scientific Dialogue, Madras School Book Society.
8. Lectures on Natural Philosophy, anonymous.
9. Oriental Astronomer, Rev HR Hoisington, [a complete system of Hindu Astron-
omy].
10. Halls Outline of Astronomy, Ed by Rev TS Pratt.
11. Astronomy, Christian Vernacular Education Society.
12. Wild Animals, anonymous.
13. Domestic Animals, anonymous.
14. A Reader on Natural History, published by the Madras Government.
15. Anatomy, Physiology and Hygiene, Dr Green.
16. Atma Vasa Vivaranam, [The house I live ina popular account of the human
body].
17. Chingalpat Civil Dispensary, anonymous (Government publication).
18. Health and How to Preserve It?, Dr Lowe.
19. Midwifery Adapted to India, Dr Green.
20. Bazaar Medicines, Dr Waring.
21. Asuva Sastram, [on horse], anonymous.
22. Maddu Vakadam, anonymous.
30 Murdoch, John: 1865, Classified Catalogue of Tamil Printed Books with Introductory Notices, (repub-
lished by the Tamil Development and Research Council).

23. Gun Powder Manufacture, anonymous.
24. Indigo Cultivation, anonymous.
(Note: the first 14 publications are on natural sciences and the rest on medicine,
technology etc.,) In addition to the above, four books on mathematics and 35 books on
traditional medicine were also noticed in the said catalogue of Tamil printed works.
While the Government schools and most of the other private schools not under the
missionary management essentially used the government textbooks, the missionaries
prepared their own textbooks and readers. In 1854, South Indian Christian Textbook
Society was formed to prepare textbooks with Christian elements. Latter in 1858 this
society was merged with the Madras Branch of the Christian Vernacular Education
Society (CVES). Many of the vernacular books issued by this society were chiefly for
the purpose of school education.
The book Thattuva Sastram (Natural Philosophy) by Rev E Sargent,31 a mission-
ary, appears to have been popular, as reprints of this book appeared as late as 1898.
The book was written drawing upon heavily from the works of Dr Arnott. The book
Thathuva Sasthram, firstly describes the32 atomic concept, physical forces of nature
(attraction, repulsion and inertia), mechanics, explanations of natural phenomena,
hydrostatics, pneumatics, hydraulics, acoustics, heat or caloric, light or optics, elec-
tricity (galvanism), magnetism (electric telegraphy), weightless matter and so on.
In the introduction the author, Rev Sergent, asserts that unlike humans, inferior
animals have no natural capacity to learn. The nature here implies the inclination
of God. However humans have innate capacity to learn from their parents and gather
knowledge through life experience and by exerting oneself.33 The author states:
During earlier days, prior to the proper pursuit of Natural Philosophy, deception was ga-
lore. People were misled and deceived by blending astronomy with astrology, chemistry with
alchemy. When various principles of natural philosophy became known in (the western) coun-
tries, superstition was eradicated.34
Natural philosophy was defined by the author as knowledge that describes prop-
erties of matter in the universe, laws of motion of the bodies and how the knowledge
is practically useful to man.35 The book also approvingly cites Francis Bacon, and
goes on to illustrate the contributions of Galileo, Boyle, Newton, Franklin, Herschel,
Laplace, and Davy.
The author, to illustrate the magnificence of the creation by the True God advances
the argument of prime mover. While some of the indian tradition also held the view of
God as the designer, christianity the way explained by the missionaries attempted
to show that the first cause was True God and the motion in the universe is the
grand effect and that the modern science provides ample evidence to this. the author
31 Rev E Sargent: 1874, Thathuva Sasthram, Church Mission Press, Palayamcotta, (in Tamil).
32 ibid, 16-17.
33 ibid, 1.
34 ibid, 3.
35 ibid, 6.
Venkateswaran 329
reasons that the study of natural philosophy is not only for material progress but
also for spiritual progressone who acutely studies natural philosophy will realize the
greatness, intellect and kindness of the creator (God).36
Rev Fish Green, an American missionary who established a medical mission at
Jaffna in the early nineteenth century observes that omen, black-magic and such non-
existent sasthras had their sway over people unchecked and they caused havoc. We
publish this book with the desire and intent to establish, Chemistry, the technique
of classifying elemental matter instead of Rasayana, Astronomy instead of Jothista
(astrology), True knowledge instead of false education, and eradicate superstition
in individuals as well as in society.37 He refuses to even consider Rasayana as
an equivalent and admissible term in Tamil for chemistry instead coins a new word
Chemistham.38
The Bhoomi Sasthram, by Rev Rhenius, considered to be the first science pub-
lication in Tamil, states to enlighten (native) Tamil as its object of publication.39
The condescending tone is hard to miss. The missionaries saw the task of teaching
natural philosophy as a way to civilize the natives. The missionary Murdoch was blunt
but forthright, when he wrote to his family at distant Glasgow, You ask about the
telescope that you sent me. It answers the purpose tolerably. I may mention that it
had considerable effect on the minds of youth in causing him to disbelieve Buddhism,
as it showed the mountains of the moon and the satellites of Jupiter. This may, perhaps,
surprise you. I have however only room to mention that the religion of the people is
quite opposed to European geography and astronomy, and, consequently, if the latter
are true, the former is false.40
It can be evidently seen that, in the Tamil publications of the missionaries, the
natural philosophy was so construed as to challenge the traditional knowledge of the
natives or to elucidate the alleged corroboration of the newly revealed religion and the
gospel by the truths of natural philosophy. Missionary Tamil publications on science
during the early nineteenth century highlighted the superstitions of the natives pur-
ported to wean away the heathen brethren from the path of ignorance and to lead them
to the true knowledge. At the same time it was also an effort to establish a connection
made by reason, between Christian truths and empirical knowledge.41
K N Panickar notes:42
Incorporation of colonial cultural elements was marked in the textbooks in the Indian lan-
guages produced by the government, Christian missionaries, voluntary organizations and pri-
vate individuals. These books both through diction and content guided the impressionable
36 ibid,11.
37 Green, F.: 1875, Chemistham, Nagercoil London Mission Press, Jaffna; in the preface to his book
Chemistham.
38 In the periodical Udyatharagai, Vol. I, Issue 1, the equivalent term for chemistry is left blank by Fish
Green. He articulates this view explicitly in his work Chemistham.

39 Fr Rhenius: 1832, Bhoomi Sasthram, Church Mission Press, Chennai.
40 Letter of 8th June 1847, reproduced in Henry Morris, The life of John Murdoch, Christian Literature
Society, Madras, 1906, 20.

41 Studdert-Kennedy, Gerald: 1998, Providence & Raj; Imperial mission and missionary imperialism, Sage,
New Delhi, 64.

42 Panickar, K. N.: 1995, Culture, Ideology, Hegemony, Thulika, New Delhi, 129.
minds of young children to a cultural universe alien to their life experience. . . . This was not
always achieved through a dismissal or denigration of indigenous culture, but by locating the
cultural ideals in the achievements of western society.
The dissemination of modern science by the missionaries had a close relationship

with their spiritual mission of spreading the word of Gospel and was closely linked to
the mundane colonial project of civilizing the natives. John Murdoch remarks that
. . . the aims of education are (1) to promote the temporal well-being of the people of
India (2) to elevate them intellectually (3) to raise their moral character.43 Treating
literature, philosophy and science as aspects of the one morally informed source of
authentic knowledge44 was a strategy of missionaries to ground morality and social
behavior in an analytical appreciation of institution, obligation and law.45 Tejaswini
Niranjana observes that missionaries . . . functioned as colonial agents in the forma-
tion of practice of subjectification, not only in their role of priests and teachers, but
also in the capacity of linguists, grammarians and translators.46 Furthermore she
argues that the discourse on education, theology, historiography and literature by the
missionaries was by setting up a series of opposition between tradition and modern,
developed and underdeveloped, and this discourse informed the ideological structure
of the hegemonic apparatus of colonial rule.
The colonial project is candidly unveiled in the report submitted by the DPI in 1868.
The report, while attempting to explain the not-so-impressive record in production
and dissemination of literature in the vernacular, notes that the substitution of new
literary books for those now possessed by the Hindus which have their roots in the
past history of the people, could only be effected very slowly47 which clearly indicates
the cherished hope that the European knowledge and western culture will replace the
indigenous.
As the consequence of these colonial cultural intrusion, more strongly felt during the
latter half of the nineteenth century, natives organized cultural defences by creating
alternative cultural practices or by revitalizing the traditional institutions. The intel-
lectual leaders were enchanted by modern science, especially its promise for material
progress.48 Thus, in their endeavor to decolonize the educational system the natives
never failed to negotiate a space for the reception of science and technology from the
west.49 At the same time, native intellectuals were also disenchanted with modern
science, especially natural philosophy, as this knowledge form not only had its origin in
the west, but was being used as a resource to deprecate native society. Eventually, as
Sabyasachai observes that . . . however critical, the reception [of modern science] was,
43 Murdoch, John: 1881, Education in India: A Letter to Rippon, Christian Knowledge Society Press,
Madras, 42.
44 Studdert-Kennedy, Gerald: 1998, Providence & Raj; Imperial mission and missionary imperialism, Sage,
New Delhi, 64-65.

45 ibid, 64.
46 Niranjana, Tejaswini: 1992, Sitting Translation, Orient Longman, 34.
47 Report of the Director of Public Instruction, July, 1868-69, Madras 1869, 59-60.
48 Raina, Dhruv & Habib, Irfan: 1996, The Moral Legitimization of Modern Science: Bhadralog reflections
on theories of evolution, Social Studies of Science, 26, 9-42.

49 Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi (Ed): 1998, The Contested Terrain, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 4.
Venkateswaran 331
inevitably on the agenda of the intellectual class.50
4 Science by Natives During Late Nineteenth Century

Thought the (in)famous Maculays minutes, Woods dispatch and numerous other gov-
ernmental reports advocated instruction in European literature and sciences, the in-
struction in natural sciences in vernacular schools were slow to materialize. Lack of
standard textbooks, incapacity to teach science in other than English medium, lack of
trained teacher with adequate knowledge in science while at the same time ease with
vernacular languages were presented from time to time as hurdles for instruction of
science in the vernacular schools.
By 1870s there was a renewed craving for introduction of science in vernacular
school education. Native associations such as British Indian Association, missionary-
educationist such as Murdoch as well as official government reports favoured introduc-
tion of instruction in science at vernacular schools. The British Indian Association in its
memorial to the Governer General lamented that at present an acquaintance with the
higher branches of knowledge can be obtained only by a study of the English language,
and it is this which presents the greatest obstacles to the general and rapid prorogation
of useful knowledge in the country and pleaded for education in vernacular languages
and also instruction in modern science.51 Murdoch in his Letter to Lord Ripon, Viceroy
remarked that instruction in natural science is a vexed question.52 Director of Public
Instruction in Madras Presidency, Powell concurred that it is unquestionable that
everywhere, the old curriculum of studies will have to make room for some new subjects
calculated to give a wider and a clearer view of nature and her laws, and to draw
forth the powers of observation implanted in man, but hitherto left undeveloped in
most countries, and especially in India . . .53 and that ordinary education will have
to embrace such subjects as a general knowledge of mans frame and constitution, the
elements of physics.54 But he cautioned hasty introduction of such subjects of study
in the lower schools and argued that observational and experimental science should
not just be an optional paper but a compulsory one in the university examinations like
FA and BA. Slowly, but inevitably, instruction in natural science was introduced and
gaining ground in the scheme of studies prescribed for vernacular schools.
In no less measure efforts in promotion of science education as a part of general
public instruction was impelled by educational developments back home. The Royal
Commission on Scientific Instruction favoured that instruction in the elements of
natural science can be, and eventually ought to be, made an essential part of course of
50 ibid
51 Memorial from the British Indian Association to the Victory and Governor General of India in Council,
Naik JP, Selections from Educational Records, Vol II, Development of University Education (1860-87),
National Archives of India, New Delhi, 1963, 6-28.
52 John, Murdoch: 1881, Education in India: A letter to his excellency the most Honble The Marquies of
Ripon, Viceroy and Governor General on India, CKS press, Vepery, Madras, 42.
53 Cited in Satthianandan, S.: 1894, History of Education in the Madras Presidency, Christian Literature
Society, Madras, 93-94.

54 ibid
instruction in every elementary school.55 The committee on revision of textbook in its
report recommended encouragement of the study of Sanskrit and physical sciences. 56
The Secretary to the Government of Madras Presidency conceded to the recommenda-
tion and requisitioned the Director of Public Instruction to submit his proposal for
introducing elementary textbooks on the subject into the ordinary school course. 57
Educational Code of 1881 as well as Hunter commission of 1882 echoed similar views
and elementary science education was incorporated into the school curriculum. These
culminated in a new code for grant-in-aid, that required the lower primary class have
two optional subjects and upper primary school four optional subjects among such
subjects of instruction like object lessons, sanitation, agriculture and few other sci-
entific discipline. To meet the new educational demand, text books in these areas were
produced from 1880s.
The marginalization of missionaries from the vernacular textbook publication was
further accentuated by certain developments in the metropolis. With the ascendancy
of scientific naturalism in England during the 1850s, the cultural competence of the
clergy to comment upon scientific discipline was called into question and clergy were
being relegated to the domain of the spiritual. Scientific disciplines such as magnetism,
galvanism (Electricity), geology and thermodynamics constructed in Europe were fast
displacing the traditional disciplinary boundaries such as natural history and natural
philosophy. In the new dispensation the scientific authorities were not Butler or Paley
but Huxley and Spencer.58 Huxleys series of science primers formed the basis for
preparation of textbooks in the vernacular in the Madras Presidency.59 Meanwhile, the
paradigm of natural sciences were also undergoing sea change. Scientific naturalism
was replacing natural philosophy as the paradigm and subsequently, the object of the
science education itself got changed. Though the Huxleys report still used the language
of mental and moral improvement, as the object of scientific instruction, in deference
to the then prevailing Victorian attitudes in England, goals such as, economical pros-
perity and social improvement were also gaining accentuation.60
With the rapidly changing social order under colonialism, new professions were
open for the modern educated natives and they constituted and articulated themselves
as the new middle class. Having received education in English language and culture,
they commanded a new authority in the colonial political society these educated na-
55 Cited in John, Murdoch: 1881, Education in India: A letter to his excellency the most Honble The
Marquise of Ripon, Viceroy and Governor General of India, CKS press, Vepery, Madras, 46.
56 Report of the Committee for the revision of English, Telugu and Tamil School Books in the Madras
Presidency, Government Gazette Press, Madras, 1874, 72.

57 GO (Edl) Government of Madras, 338, No. 5-9, 3rd Oct 1874.
58 Paley William: 1802, Natural Theology: Or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity,
Collected from the Appearance of Nature, the Woods Despatch of 1854 suggested it as a textbook.
Furthermore Huxley is cited with acceptance in the educational reports emanating during 1880s, especially
for the preparation of syllabus for science.
59 Committee of Madras School Book and Vernacular Literature Society invited person to prepare edited
translation of primers edited by Huxley. Report on the public Instruction in the Madras Presidency 1873-74,
Government Press, 1874, 94.
60 For contemporary reponse to Huxleys report and its implication for Indian Education see, John,
Murdoch: 1881, Education in India: A Letter to Lord Ripon, CKS Press, Madras.
Venkateswaran 333
tives self styled as the new middle class, sought made claims to the privileges and a
share of governance under the British political tradition. This emerging vernacular
literati, quite independently of their class and caste origins, were politically aware and
active as theorists, strategists, organizers and spokespersons on behalf of the emerging
autonomous social group of incipient national bourgeois.
The Tamil Brahmin, traditional custodian of knowledge, seamlessly took advantage
of modern education and the acquired benefits accruing out of it. Being the traditional
lawgiver, he could exercise his pre-existing hegemony in the civil society through his
caste status while his modern education gave him a new found authority in the colonial
political society.61 As Aparna Basu notes, along with the Bengali Bhadralok and the
Chitapavan of Maharastra, it was the Tamil Brahmin who assumed political hegemony
in the respective provinces.62 While the Tamil Brahmin retained his devotion to San-
skrit, on the other hand he was also a promoter of Tamil so as to hegemonize other
vernacular languages of the Madras province. Hence, among the vernacular languages
of the Madras province, Tamil was the forerunner. In addition another social group
that forged a self identity of Saiva Vellalars (which included caste groups such as
Vellalars, Mudaliars and Chettiyars) were also acquiring new status and power within
the colonial set-up.63 As Sabyasachi Bhattacharya notes contest between nationalism
in education with the colonial state (was) inseparably intertwined historically with
the contest for hegemony within the colonial society and during the late nineteenth
century most of the educated vernacular literati organized themselves into various
local socio-political organizations associated with educational service.64
The emergent forums were usually styled as scientific and literary societies. Read-
ing rooms, societies for debates and organizations championing for educational ad-
vancement as well as social reform were instituted in many provincial towns. As a
representative of these movements, the Villupuram Literary Society in 1882 and the
Villupuram Educational Society in 1885 were initiated with the objective to discuss
literature and science subjects and for educational and social reform.65 At the turn of
the century there were more than 100 such societies and reading rooms in various
provincial towns of the Madras Presidency. In these societies irrespective of their
religious persuasion, Indian intellectuals found in science a neutral pursuit that was to
become a common meeting ground and serve as a means of articulating counter colonial
political stance,66 and as K.N. Panickar observes being conduits for the dissemination
61 MSS Pandian: 1996, Towards National Popular, ntoes on self-respecters Tamil, Economic and Political
Weekly, Dec 21, 3323-3329. See also Arooran, K Nambi: 1980, Tamil Renaissance and the Dravidian
nationalism 1905-1940, Kudal Publishers, Madurai.
62 Basu, Aparna: 1974, The growth of education and political development in India 1898-1920, Oxford
University Press, 232.

63 See Irschik, Eugene F.: 1969, Politics and Social Conflict in South Indiathe Non-Brahman movement
and Tamil Separatism 1916-1929, University of California Press; also Washbrook, D. A.: 1976, The
Emergence of Provincial PolityThe Madras Presidency 1870-1920, Cambridge University Press
64 Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi: 1998, The Contested Terrain, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 6.
65 Tirumizi, S.A.I.: 1989, Scientific Associations in British India, NISTADS, New Delhi.
66 Habib, Irfan & Raina, Dhruv: 1989, Introduction of Scientific Rationality into India, a Study of Master
Ramachandra-Urdu Journalist, Mathematician and Educationist, Annals of Science, 46, 597-610.

of colonial ideology, these institutions provided a useful platform for intellectual ex-
change.67
Even as early as 1850s, educated literati of the Madras Presidency formed their own
society for the production and publication of vernacular textbooks. Madras Upayukta
Granda Karna Sabha (society for production of useful books) was established in 1847,
by the former native students of the Madras University, for the specific purpose of
production of vernacular textbooks. This society was active for few years, and many
of their textbooks were also used by the government and government aided schools.
Following the implementation of the new scheme of studies, that made compulsory for
all schools receiving grant-in-aid from the government, to use only government ap-
proved textbooks, even many a vernacular missionary school resorted to use of govern-
ment textbooks, rather than those published by the CVES.68 Meanwhile, in 1870s the
Madras School Book Society found in 1820 was refurbished as Madras School Book and
Vernacular Literature Society and was activated for the production of textbooks and
vernacular literature. This society, though received the patronage of the government,
had its own management committee, in which over a period of time natives came to
dominate.69 Having got the institutional space and the required cultural competency
through higher education, natives could by late nineteenth century lay claim to be
acceptable professional expert to dispense and purvey scientific knowledge.70 The edu-
cated native expert could now legitimately unseat the missionary expert in production
of textbooks in vernacular for school education.
With the persistent demands made by natives as well as missionaries, though with
diverse purposes, by the1880s, science was introduced into the elementary education as
a subject of study. This necessitated textbooks in Tamil. Initially, textbooks, were more
a handbooks for teachers in elementary schools than textbooks for direct use by the
students. The textbooks were styled as nature readers consisting of object lessons,
and were in the paradigm of Scientific Naturalism. Drawing upon the ideas of Huxley
and Tyndall, these works eschew anthropomorphism, anthropocentrism, and teleologi-
cal views of nature. These books emphasized empiricism and scientific rationality. The
following are representative titles published71 at the turn of the century that exemplify
67 Panickar, K.N.:1995, Culture, Ideology, Hegemony, Thulika, New Delhi, 88-89.
68 Murdoch laments that the sale of CVES books have fallen off considerably and investigating the reason
for it, it was found that in schools receiving grant-in-aid, teachers prefer to use the government textbooks,
and this trend was noticed even in the boarding schools of the missionaries. John, Murdoch: 1982, Education
as a Missionary agency in IndiaA letter to the Church Missionary Society, Caleb Foster, Vepery, Madras.
69 The members of the managing committee of the society in 1895 were: Mr Abdur Razak Sahib,
Mr Bilderbeek, Mrs Brander, Mr Krishnamachariyar, Mr Bangyya Chettiyar, Revt Sell, Mr Seshagiri

Sastriyar, Mr Staart, Mr Tamotharam Pillai, Mr Velupillai, Mr P Vijayaranga Mudaliyar.
70 Note that most of the native authors were college professors, school headmasters, educational officials or
other professionals.
71 See the following catalogues for a full list of textbooks produced and used during the late nineteenth
century: Madras State Bibliography of books 1867-1900 Tamil Development and Research Council, Volumes
published in 1961, 62, 63 and 64; Madras State Bibliography of books for the years 1911-15 and 1916-20
published respectively in the years 1974/77, and 1978; Classified catalogue of the Public Reference Library
1867-89, 1890-1900, 1901-10, 1911-15, 1916-20, 1921-25 published respectively in the years 1894, 1961,
1964, 1965, 1971.
Venkateswaran 335
the process of replacement of natural philosophy by scientific naturalism.
A. Periyanayagam, Bhouthiga Pustagam, 1903.

Diwan Bahadur Krishnamachariyar, Nature reader, 1904.
V. Koli Pillai, Elementary Pada RathinangalPrakurithi, Mulathava Rasayana
Sasthrangal 1910.
V.K. Narayanasamy Iyer, Iyarkai Porutpadam, Vol I and Vol II, 1910for elemen-
tary school teachers.
A. Sivaprakasa Iyer, Tavara Sastra Vina Vidai, 1910.
B. Narayanasami Iyer, Practical lessons in science and geography [Vol I & II]
1914/15.
J. Viswanathiya, Tavara Nur Churukam for kindergarten and primary classes
1912.
The Nature Readers72 by V Krishnamachariar, an active member of the SPCA (So-

cieties for Prevention of Cruality to Animals), and also once the secretary of MSB &
VLS, had the following lessons related to natural sciences: Morning light, the moon
and stars, sunshine and shadows, homely talk about animals and deeds of kindness
[our cow, the sheep, the stag, the horse and so on . . .], air around us, plants and flowers,
frog and duck, debate between the wind and the sun, seaside scenery, coconut tree, cart
and cycle, the Palmyra tree, the Banyan tree, a sparrows nest and birds house.
Samuel V Koil Pillai in preface to his book titled Civics, Nature Study and Elemen-
tary Science states that nature studyi.e., physics and chemistryshould be thought
in such a way so as to use drawings and easily available equipment to demonstrate and
by encouraging analytical approach by observation . . .73 The first part of the book was
on Civics. The second part was on Nature study and elementary science. The second
part had the following chapters: Botany [consisting of 14 lessons] Zoology [Consisting
of 24 lessons] Geology, Meteorology and Minerals [consisting of 34 lessons] the third
part of the book was devoted to health and temperance.
In his book titled Nature Study, V.K. Narayanasami Aiyar observes this subject
has been only recently introduced into the curriculum of studies . . . and it is not likely
that most elementary school teachers will be able at present to deal with the subject
effectively and intelligently . . . It is mainly with a view to give a sort of guide to
the elementary school teachers [that this book is published]74 This book supplies
materials for giving a course of lessons on (1) plants and animal life (2) the surface
of the earth (3) the simplest physical and chemical phenomena . . . for giving them an
72 Krishnamachariar, V.: 1905, Nature Readers, Madras, Preface iii-v.
73 Pillai, Samuel V Koil: 1912, Civics, nature study and elementary science, Kalaratnakaram press, Madras,
v-vi.
74 Aiyar V. K. Narayanasami: 1910, Nature Study, I and II, Ananda Steam Press, Preface i-viii and 1-5.
idea of climate, products etc., of their places and for enabling them to understand the
important rule of health and sanitation.
Subsequently, by 1920s the textbooks were cast in the modern disciplinary frame-
work of Natural sciences, and are so arranged to contain sections on physics, chemistry
and biology. A representative list of textbooks of this genre is:
K. Dooraisamy Iyengar, Iyarkai Sasthram, 1920. This book contained lessons on
physics, astronomy geology and so on.
B. Narayanasamy Aiyer, Practical textbook for science and geography. This book
has eight sections with 44 lessons. The sections are: Earth, Wind, Atmosphere,
Sky, health and sanitation and so on.
R.C. Kasthuri Rangaiyar, Iyarkai Arputhangal, 1911.
V. Krishnamachariyar, Iyarkai Porut Padam, 1920.
Discipline specific textbooks, such as on botany [for illustration see R. Gopala Iyers
Jeeva-Vargam]75 and on zoology commence to appear by 1920s. Also from the preface
and other notes in these text books one can gather that these books were no longer
guides and aids for teachers but were proper school textbooks (in the modern sense)
to be used by students for self study and instruction.
A detailed examination of the science textbooks in the nineteenth century divulges
certain trends. Modern science, as the colonial government and the missionaries in-
troduced it, located the achievements of sciences in European cultural ideals. In the
colonial and missionary literature science was frequently and habitually referred to as
European science or European knowledge.76 The natives too used the same idiom,77
but from the late nineteenth century subtle chances could be noticed, and more often,
science was prefixed with (naveenam) modern rather than European.78 These and
other cultural codes inscribed in the modern science transmitted from the metropolis
had to be removed or at least blunted. To receive modern science into his cosmos, the
Tamil intellectual had to first universalize science.79
It is with this intent that Sivachidampara Iyer argued:80
75 Iyer, R. Gopala: 1924, Jeeva-Vargam, Part I, Mc Millan & Co., Madras.
76 One needs only to just glance to the education reports-often the reference is to European science or
knowledge. See the writings of Murdoch for the illustration of missionaryio usage.
77 See for example the mast of the periodical Arivu Vilakam published since 1901, that the magazine will
publish articles on Indian Philosophy, English (Western) philosophy, English natural sciences, religious
truths . . .
78 As Panickar notes there was no articulated debate on the suitability of the use of the expression Western
science, however one can hardly fail to notice the use of neutral expressions such as Natural science or
modern (naveena) science in the popular Tamil publications from about the 1900s.
79 Universality of science was taken for granted by the Indian intellecutals. They did not face the question
whether science was western or new as in the case of China. About 1640 there was a discussion in Peking
as to whether the new science were primarily or primarily new. The Chinese objected to the word western
used by the Jesuits in the titles of the scientific books which they wrote and translated. They insisted that
it should be dropped in favour of new. Panickar, K. N.: 1995, Culture, Ideology, Hegemony, Thulika, New
Delhi, 10,ff.
80 Iyer, Sivachidambara: 1906-07, Arivu [Knowledge], Sentamil, 5,, 330.
Venkateswaran 337
Few psychologists maintain that every one is not endowed with rational capacity and that
the rational capacity of a person depends upon his race. While this claim cannot be totally
rejected the assertion can not be accepted. telegraphy, steam engines and such other wonder
mechanisms evident the intellect of the inventor and not manifest their race or social status.
Another intellectual, Ramaiyar81 argued that the discoveries are validated not by
looking at the race or colour of the discoverer but by proof (presented by him) and
further asserted that the [usage of] expressions such as Eastern science and Western
science are to be rejected.82 Tamilar Nesan, a monthly science magazine launched
by native intellectuals, argued, knowledge about means of earning a living may vary
among people and depend upon their profession. All the rest of knowledge is common
heritage of allfrom sweeper to a lord; [this knowledge] is essential for every one; and
by striving every one can acquire this knowledge.83 Similar sentiments to universalize
and legitimize modern science can be noticed in the writings of natives.
Sashtra Vichitram or Wonders of Science was a popular book by M. Natesan.84 As
the titleVichitramindicates, modern science is visualized as strange and queer
sasthram (science). A glance at the various articles in the Vidhya Varthamani, a Tamil
periodical devoted to education published since 1897 reveals the allusion to wonder,
strangeness and oddity of the modern science. The allusion to the strangeness and
oddity of modern science during this period is palpably obvious from the title of the
Tamil periodical Vinodha Vichitra Patrikai, published since the 1900s to popularize
science.
Thus it can be argued that the natives reasoned the notion of modern as novelty
something new. Naveenam, the expression used in Tamil to denote modern also im-
plies that which is novel, new. The telegraph, steam engines and such other modern
artifacts, and the emerging knowledge about Nature such as electricity, magnetism,
and so on, fascinated the imagination of the natives as being novel and new.85 In
the writings of the natives during the late nineteenth century, one can hardly fail
to notice the use of words such as Vinodham and Vichitram (wonder, strange, queer,
oddity) while referring to modern science. Through the metaphor of novelty the alien
knowledge was legitimized in the native cosmos.
That which belongs to the present is also suggested at by the expression naveenam.
The usage such as Naveena Ulagu (Modern world) implies an understanding of here
and now. This case is well illustrated by the writings of Ms M. Lakshmiyammal,
a regular columnist in Tamilar Nesan. While translating the article The future of
Economic and Scientific Thought a speech by Prof. Soddy, the article in Tamil was titled
as Eni Pzhaikum Vazhi (The way to prevail henceforth)that is, the modern science
81 Ramaiyar: 1923-24, Civilization and Progress, Tamilar Nesan, VIII, 250-60.
82 ibid
83 Editorial: 1917-18, Namadhu Sangam, Tamilar Nesan (in Tamil), I, 1-9.
84 Natesan, M.: 1888, Sastra Vichitram or wonders of Science, VN Jubilee Press. The book contains science
activities and simple elementary scientific principles, which were published as a serial in the periodical,
Viveka Chinthamani. The book was reprinted in 1902 and again in 1913. The popularity of this book could
be gauged from this.
85 Fascinated by the novel devices being invented, Vaidyanatha Iyer composed books on Submarine (2nd
Ed 1914, 3rd Ed 1915), Airship, Airplane (1915), Telegraphy and so on.

is construed and presented as knowledge required for the present age. In this article
she argues (in addition to stating the views of Prof. Soddy) that material progress and
moral progress are not necessarily antithetical. Recourse to modern knowledge is
thus justified by the logic that modern science is the knowledge of today and hence one
cannot flee from it.
This temporal logicthat the modern ensue after the ancient is also effectively
used to legitimize modern science without always necessarily needing to be contrite
about traditional knowledge forms. For now the natives could argue that the past is
superseded, besides the present is different from the past and hence each can have
its own rational; but only that these rationales are different. The rhetoric of temporal
logic also assisted the natives to overcome the colonial rhetorical demarcation between
tradition and modern. The traditional knowledge can thus be safely located in the
pastas ancient science, and the modern could be legitimately assimilated into the
native cosmos.
In this discursive strategy, the idea of progress and evolution came in handy for
the native intellectuals to insulate traditional knowledge forms as well as legitimately
assimilate modern science. Knowledge was now seen as an ever growing, evolving
entity. Tamilar Nesan averred that knowledge is not unchanging . . . but evolves . . .
and further it contended that . . . if we do not revitalize our traditional knowledge and
at the same time assimilate modern knowledge, which at present is lacking among us,
we would not be able to progress . . .86
V.K. Narayanaswamy Iyer elucidated that (our) ancestors held five elements [Pan-
cha Bhoothams]Prithvi (Earth), Appu (Water) Theyu (Fire) Vaayu (Air), Agasam
(Sky) to be the basic elements and that all the created materials are composed of
various combinations of these five basic elements. However, chemists maintain that
fire and sky have no mass (weight) and also that fire is an energy dependent on matter.
Therefore we shall look at the chemistry of the other three Pancha BhoothamsAir,
Water and Earth.87 This work is a typical exemplar of the genre that placed and
presented the modern science in the frame work of the traditional categories. The
chapters of this textbooks are classified as Air, Water, Earth, Fire (heat) and sky
(about natural phenomena, weather and so on). Ekambaranathaiyar, in his article
on poisonous snakes makes a remark on the traditional treatise Chitraduram, before
embarking to detail the modern antidotes and remedies for snakebites. He adduces
the Chitraduram as an ancient adage. Lakshmiyammal in the article on bacteriology
renders the word (concept) immunity as Vaishnava Shakthi in Tamil. In his work
Bhoogola Vasaga Pusthagam88 (Geography reader), S.K. Divasigamani, observed that
knowledge comes by open-eyes and working hand and that . . . in the lessons on the
sun, the moon and the stars, the facts are so explained as to enable the children to
understand something of Hindu Panchangam, thus to bring them in close relation
to the life they have to lead . . .. The textbook Vaana Sashtram (astronomy)89 by
86 Nesan, Tamilar: 1917-18, Namathu Sangam, I, 1-9.
87 Narayanaswamy Iyer, V.K.: General Elementary Science (in Tamil), 4th ed., 157.
88 Divasigamani, S.K.: 1925, Bhoogola Vasaga Pusthagam, Macmillan & Co., Madras.
89 Iyer, Balakrishna: 1913, Vaana Sasthram, Hindu Educational Trading & Co., Kumbakonam. Note the
Venkateswaran 339
Balakrishna Iyer elucidates the rational behind the Panchangam besides providing an
introduction to modern astronomy. These are in striking contrast to the representation
of the tradition in the hands of the colonialist, who paints it habitually as superstitious
or at the least superfluous beliefs indicative of the mental and moral depravation and
decadence of the indigenous culture. In contrast, in the narratives of the natives,
traditional knowledge form is neither deprecated nor eulogized, but is presented as
knowledge of the past. The repertoire of colonial binaries,90 tradition/modernity; civi-
lization/barbarism, is thus subdued by the natives in the narratives contained in the
textbooks authored by them.
The translation theory anticipates cultural refraction in the act of translation, and
the way certain concepts of Duncans geography primer were re-rendered into Tamil is
illuminating. While George Duncan in his original English version states that
Hindus hold the water of the Ganges sacred from Gangothri (Ganga Avatari) . . . however,
particular portions (are) held more sacred than the rest, to which pilgrims resort from all parts
of India to perform their oblations and to carry of the water to be used in future ceremonies . . .
However, J.M. Velupillai a native intellectual translating the same book into Tamil
for use in the schools states that91
the following six rivers dry up in summer, nevertheless, (rivers) originating in Himalayas much
flow will be there during the summer than in the other three seasons . . . among this there is no
other river as useful as Ganges . . . (Ganges) flows through thickly populated regions . . . May
be it is due to the immense benefit accruing to the people, that Hindus hold (Ganges) as sacred
water.
Thus it can be clearly seen that even translation was not just mechanically render-
ing what is in the source language into the target language, but an act of re-rendering,
and a kind of cultural translation. The process of drift, invention, mediation, and at
times even fabrication of links that did not exist before, form some of the repertoire of
narratives adopted by the natives to render modern science as legitimate within the
cultural cosmos.
5 Summary
Shapin92 suggests that diffusion of scientific knowledge across boundariesbetween
countries, between town and country, between social classesshould be seen as politi-
cal and a logistical problem. Transmission of knowledge between the colonial metropo-
lis and the colonized province, especially in the context of colonialism in the nineteenth
century Tamil Nadu provides an interesting location for study.
If the instruction in modern science through vernaculars was not shown same en-
thusiasm as that of spread of European literature by the colonialists, the prevailing
name of the publishers.
90 Sing, Jyotsna: 1996, Colonial Narratives; Discoveries of India in the Languages of Colonialism,
Routledge, 8.
91 Velupillai, J.M.: 1813, Bala Bhotha Boogola Sasthram, (Original by Duncan), CKS press, Madras, 10.
92 Shapin, Steven: 1982, Nibbling at the teats of Science; Edinburgh and the diffusion of science in the
1830s, in Ian Inkstar and Jack Morrell (Ed.), Metropolis and Province, science and British culture 1780-
1850, Hutchinson, 151-178.
Victorian ideology may have had a role, but the view that modern science is difficult to
convey through the vernaculars was entrenched among the colonialist and the educated
elite that even while addressing a memorial to the Viceroy for instruction on modern
science through the medium of vernaculars, the British Indian association admitted
that instruction of higher standard is not feasible in vernacular.
Thus, during the first half of the nineteenth century even while the instruction in
European literature and science was proclaimed time and again instruction in science
was scanty, that the Madras Mail, a daily English news paper lamented that: A
man may become a Master of Arts in Madras, without knowing why apple falls to
the ground, where rain comes from, what is the meaning of a burning stick, why he
has to breath constantly, or what sun means by occasionally disappearing at incon-
venient times.93 Nonetheless the topics on natural philosophy and natural history
that was found in the textbooks were embodied with natural theology. Before the
1880s most of the titles of science textbooks published were in the idiom of Natural
Philosophy and were primarily about basic principles of natural philosophy, astronomy,
natural history and geography/geology and further as noted earlier, authored mostly
by missionaries. The books on astronomy were contrasted with astrology and invari-
ably contained arguments about the popular belief about the eclipses.94 The books
on geology/geography argued the alleged evidences of the Christian Truths and were
afflicted with the Paleys Evidences.95 In the paradigm of natural philosophy during
the early nineteenth century, the ideology of Europe as the ideal was being promoted,
while traditional knowledge forms were being threatened and marginalised. As Julian
Martin96 notes natural philosophy was never a socially disengaged, purely intellectual
activity and natural philosophical pronouncements were believed to entail assertions
about the political order.
The colonial educational programme was seeking to hegemonise and dominate in
cultural terms, the native society. The Macaulayan flourish of Indian in blood but
European in taste was not an accidental slip, but the general urge. Thus the colo-
nial subject was the ideal of education. The native intellectuals were not passive to
these colonial maneuvers, but were actively engaged with the modern science being
introduced into colonial Tamil society as part of the colonial subjectification, during
the nineteenth century. There were a host of historical factors that contributed to the
natives acquiring determining role as purveyors of knowledge in the Tamil society even
under colonialism. In this process of reproduction of knowledge the native intellectuals
were also producing knowledge forms suited to their cultural and political require-
93 A plea for physical sciences in our school and universities, Madras Mail, 4th March, 1874.
94 Christian Vernacular Education Society, Graganangal Yerpadum Kararnangal, 1880; challenges the
traditional Hindu popular mythological belief on Rahu and Kethu being the cause of Eclipse and provides
scientific explanation to the eclipse. Christian Vernacular Education Society, Pagola Sasthramum Jothista
Sasthramum, 1891 aims to show belief in Jothista Sasthram leads to calamity.
95 Christian Vernacular Education Society, Yerimalaigalum Bhoomi Atherchiyum Sristipin Athisiyan-
galum, 1894; clearly alludes to the biblical creation and justification of Genesis based upon theory of
geology as understood at that period.
96 Martin, Julian: 1991, Natural Philosophy and its public concerns, in Stephen Pumfrey etal., (Ed), in
Science, Culture and Popular belief in Renaissance Europe, Manchester University Press, 116.
Venkateswaran 341
ments.
Due to the policy changes prompted by the Woods Despatch and the recommenda-
tions of the Hunter Commission, elementary education was spread in its reach in the
Madras Presidency and was progressively placed under private management. While
the native intellectuals were not able to completely recast the colonial policies in the
education sector, they could exercise a significant influence. With native intellectuals
acquiring education in English and modern science, the monopoly of missionaries in
printing and publication was disputed. By occupying a preeminent position in the
Madras School Book and Vernacular Literature Society, the natives sought an insti-
tutional base for challenging the missionary monopoly of production of vernacular
textbooks. When textbook publication was liberalized (but with government retaining
its power to scrutinize and approve), the natives published textbooks from their native
printing houses as well. Thus, by the turn of the century, the native intellectuals almost
displaced the missionaries from the textbook production scene. Gradually the native
intellectuals entered into publication and printing.
Native intellectuals, besides being educated in modern science were also the tra-
ditional elite of the society, and had to come to terms with the modern knowledge;
but the modern knowledge was being transmitted by the colonial system with western
cultural codes. Having got a determining role in the production of textbooks, the native
intellectuals, through the process of translation and composition of vernacular text-
books, divested modern science of its western cultural meaning. In the process, modern
science was not only neutralized but also domesticatedthat is, native intellectuals
redeemed whatever was salvageable from the traditional knowledge systems. Eventu-
ally the natives endeavored rendering modern science into the vernacular languages
and, in the process, reconfigured and domesticated modern science.
The dislodging of the European missionaries was further hastened by the shift
in knowledge form taking place in Europe. Scientific naturalism was fast replacing
natural philosophy, and clergy were being restricted to ecclesiastical domains and their
competency in scientific domain being questioned. At the turn of the century, the
native intellectuals who had by then acquired the right professional higher educa-
tion could claim to be more competent to compose science textbooks, rather than the
missionaries or colonial officials.
Through the process of translation, by establishing a series of transit points, the
native intellectual was attempting a trans-cultural conceptual bridge building. The
rhetorical repertoire of naveenam as novelty, here-and-now, of-the-present was de-
ployed to mollify the colonial binary of the traditional and modern. In the age of
nationalism when science came to be the measure of progress achieved by the nation, by
conjuring up a civilization and by salvaging parts of the past, the native intellectuals
waged a symbolic war. This study also confirms the conception put forth by Dhruv
Raina that the role of the history of science, in purveying of science, was one of es-
sentially lamenting the loss of golden past and a battle-cry for a resurgent India. 97
97 Raina, Dhruv: 2000, Lamenting the Past, Anticipating the future: A chronology of popular science
writing in India (1850-1914), in Narender K Shegal etal., (Ed), Uncharted TerrainEssays on Science
Popularisation in Pre-independence India, Vigyan Prasar, New Delhi.
Thus, through the process of science textbooks, the native Tamil intellectuals were
inventing a space for articulating a counter colonial perspective during the nineteenth
century. The reception of the modern science by the natives was not passive and
once they obtained space for inscribing their ideology in the textbook, they utilized
the opportunity. However, this study clearly shows that the reaction of the native to
reject modern science as unsuited to our culture or take a revivalist position were rare
during the nineteenth century.
In conclusion, following, Roger Cooter and Stephen Pumfery scientists, science
communicators and audiences define their relationship to something called science and
. . . that (the) relationship is embedded in the particularities of their different culture
and ideologies,98 it is contented that, as textbooks have a crucial role in shaping
the dogmas of the period, aside from seeing the efforts of the native intellectuals as
reproduction of modern science, it should also be viewed as production of ideology. 99
98 Cooter, Roger & Pumfrey, Stephen: 1994, Separate spheres and public places; reflections on the History
of science popularization and science in popular culture, History of Science, XXXII, 237-67.
99 Ideology in the sense of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.
Index
a priori, 118 frameworks, 289, 291, 296

A.F. Chalmers, 58 alternative framework
A.J. Ayer, 76 origin, 292
A.K. Biswas, 40 American Indian Science and Engineering Soci-
A.P. Shukla, 41, 42 ety, 53
A. France, 48 American Universities, 39
A. J. Harrison, 204 Amitabh Ghosh, 40
AAAS, 112, 317 Analytical
abiotic, 311 Sciences, 312
abstract analytical
concepts, 316 arguments, 207
concepts and operations, 303 Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, 42
cosmological picture, 178 anatomy, 309
concepts, 294 ancient philosophies, 305
theories, 316 Anderson, 4
abstraction, 283 Andrew Ross, 116
Abul Fazl, 259 antagonism, 115
academic chemist, 204 antagonists, 199
academic historians, 199 Antanio Favaro, 175
acceleration, 289 anthropology, 167
acid-base theories, 280 anti-Aristotelian way, 178
acidic, 198 anti-dogmatism, 331
acidic principle, 198 anti-evolutionism, 115
Adam Schall, 236 anti-foundationalist, 104
Adas, 54 anti-intellectualism, 21, 86
Advaita Vedanta, 258 anti-racist, 211
African-American Baseline Essays, 53 anti-racist mathematics, 211
Afrocentrism, 116 anti-realism, 71
ahistorically, 198 anti-realist, 58
AI, 98 anti-reductionism, 62
al Farabi, 241 anti-science, 21, 116
al Ghazal, 257 antiscientific views, 5
al Haitham, 241 Antoine Lavoisier, 198
al Hajjaj, 241 Apastamba, 225
al Kind, 241 Apollonius, 214, 243
al-Hayatham, 238 Arab and European mathematics, 229
Ala Samarapungavan, 167 Arab mathematics, 214
Alan Sokal, 85, 116 Archimedes, 175, 179, 214, 242
Alessandro Volta, 333 areas of physics, 204
Alexander, 243 Aristotelian, 163, 181
Alexandrian school, 180 causality, 48
Algebra, 262 conceptual scheme, 175
algebra, 280 dynamics, 29
alkaline earths, 282 logic, 257
Almagest, 243 Scholasticism, 46
alphabet-numeral system of notation, 229 view, 175
Alternative world-view, 176, 177
frameworks in electricity, 289 Aristotelian science, 185
alternative Aristotelianism, 46
conceptions, 292
Aristotle, 175, 178, 192, 242, 243, 249, 250, 257, Baudhyana, 225
261, 267 Baudrillard, 104
thesis, 183 Beardsley, 4
Arithmetic, 262 beginning of science, 305
arithmetic, 209 behaviour
Arnauld, 76 atoms, 202
Aron, 291, 295 ions, 202
Arthur Kornberg, 113 molecules, 202
artificial intelligence, 98 Behaviourism, 97
Aryabhata, 221, 226, 251 behaviourism, 97, 98
Aryabhatiya, 221, 226, 230 psychology, 97
Aryabhatiyabhasya, 231 behaviourists, 97
Ashmore, 106 Behrens, 54
Asian and Afro-Carribbean origins, 211 beliefs, 312
ASPEN 1991, 289 Benjamin Peirce, 268
astrology, 105 Benoit Mendelbrot, 126
Astronomical, 47 Benseghir and Closset, 291
Astronomy, 46 Berkeley, 71, 76
astronomy, 46, 169, 228, 286 Berkeleyan idealism, 72
Atmospheric Science, 303 Berlin, 54
atomic museum, 216
nature of matter, 314 Bernal, 246
structure, 280 Bertrand Russell, 5, 23
theory of structure, 281 Bhaskara-I, 221, 226
atomic physics, 43 Bijaganita, 222
atomic structure, 281 biochemistry, 282
Atomism, 46 Biogas, 314
Atomists, 179 biological
atoms, 199, 206, 279, 284, 334 condition, 202
Augustine, 245, 258 science, 309
Augustus De Morgan, 237 Biology, 303, 312
authoritarian, 135, 331 biology, 204, 286, 311
authoritarianism, 331 Biosphere, 312
autonomy view, 97 biotic factors, 311
Avogadros hypothesis, 281 Birkhoff, 245, 250
axiom, 255, 266 Birkhoff s axioms, 255
axiomatic Bishop, 112, 115
approach, 262 Bishop Auerilus, 244
method, 253, 262, 263, 266, 268, 269 Black-Body radiation, 31
axiomatico-deductive, 262 Blacks in Science: Ancient and Modern, 53
axiomatization, 261, 268 Bloor, 77, 89, 91, 9498, 103
Axioms, 253 Bloor & Barnes, 55
axioms, 255, 259 Bolyai, 266
Ayurveda, 305 bonding, 279
Boorse, 95
BAAS, 209 Boster & Johnson, 54
Babylonians, 253 botany, 286
Bacon, 48 Bown, 4
Baconian empiricism, 47 Boyle, 206
Baghdad, 213 Boyles law, 135, 332
balance of forces, 103 breast-feeding, 304
Barber, 54 Brethren of sincerity, 48
Barnes, 77, 95 Brown, 293
Basalla, 54 Browne, 116
Baudhayana Sulbasutras, 252 Bruno Latour, 116
Bucky ball, 208 CHEM
Bucky balls, 196 Study, 280285
Buddhist, 259 study, 203
and Jaina traditions, 255 Study program, 279
Burtt, 61, 119 Study Story, 281
Byzantium, 241 CHEM Study, 279, 281, 282
Chemical
C.P. Snows, 196 Education, 200
Cairo, 213 synthesis, 207, 208
calculus, 225 chemical
algorithms, 225 analysis, 209
differential,, 238 bonding, 280, 281
calendars, 312, 313 composites, 206
Caliph al-Mamun, 241 compounds, 281
Caliph al-Mansur, 241 concept, 205, 207
caloric constituent, 198
thermodynamics, 29 contexts, 201
carbon curriculum, 209
chemistry, 282 education, 196, 200, 201, 203, 205, 207
rings, 282 element, 206
Cardinal Bellarmine, 94 elements, 206
Cardona, 239 equilibrium, 206
careers facts, 204
science, 323 industry, 202
science and technology, 326 knowledge, 202, 287
Carr, 42 phenomena, 205
Cartesian, 76 philosophers, 206
purpose, 268 philosophy, 206
approach, 269 processes, 280
dualism, 72 reactions, 280
epistemology, 72 species, 205
model, 72 substance, 198
split, 47 synthesis, 208
Case Study, 163 chemical education
categorical aim, 200
thinking, 184 Chemical Education Material study, 279
view, 178 chemical knowledge
cattle and birds, 314 applications, 202
causal view, 96 Chemistry, 285, 303, 312
causality, 61, 96 chemistry, 44, 46, 200, 202204, 206, 207, 279,
Aristotelian, 48 280, 282, 287, 311, 335
order, 61 aims, 204
causation, 61 citizens, 201
Cavalieri, 239 courses, 203, 205
celebration of science, 111, 117 educators, 201
celestial bodies, 304 environment, 282
cell structure, 310 instruction, 203
central science, 204 laboratory, 283
centrality of science, 125 learners, 203
change, 165 physics, 206
characteristics, 304 solar system, 282
charge/mass ratios, 281 textbook, 284
Charles Darwin, 54 chemists, 201, 203, 206, 207
Charles Eliot Norton, 41 chemists and scholars, 204
Charles Whish, 226 Chiappetta, 332
Chiappetta et al., 319 Cohen, Eylon and Ganniel, 290
child psychologist, 286 Colebrooke, 237
childrens theories, 167 Collingwood, 61
China, 213 Collins, 21, 86, 98, 99
Chinese, 253 colloquial positivism, 117
Chinese encyclopaedia, 42 colonial
Chinese science, 61 science, 209
Chiu Chang Suan Shu, 237 common
Chomsky, 97, 104, 106 laboratory procedures, 202
Chou Pei, 218 common domestic equipment, 315
Christian rationalists, 260 Common Mans Science, 302, 303, 315, 316
Christian science, 62 common notions, 264
circuit diagram, 291 community of science, 62
cis-trans isomerism, 281 community- and context-specific, 302
citizen, 209 community-level, 307
clashing current model, 289, 290 compound, 198, 206, 208
classical approach of teaching, 296 compound nature, 198
classical Greek, 214 compound nature of water, 198
classical Greek mathematics, 214 compounds, 204, 206
classical Greek tradition, 242 comprehension, 327
classical view of realism, 117 computer science, 41
classification, 308, 316 concept
classification and manipulation, 307 of resistors, 290
classification and taxonomy, 286 charge, 295
classification of forms of life, 303 common mans science, 316
classification system, 286 convergence, 232
classroom current, 291, 296
teaching, 211 formation, 309
Claudius Ptolemy, 243, 244 fundamental, 206
Clement, 289, 293 limit, 237
Cleopatra, 243 map, 125
clinical interview, 167 proof, 220
Clothing, 312 conception of constructivism, 72
CMS, 302307, 309, 312, 314317 conception of current, 295
curricula, 306 conceptions
education, 315 alternative, 292
CMS curricula, 307, 309 conceptions of knowledge, 72
Cobern, 60, 61 concepts, 198, 201, 206, 207, 301, 317, 324, 332
Cobern & Aikenhead, 118 abstract, 316
Cobern, Gibson & Underwood, 124 and principles of science, 317
Cognitive chemistry, 195
Science, 133, 163 science, 165, 196
science, 137, 165 conceptual
cognitive learning, 208
conflicts, 175 structures, 166
developmental research, 165 Conceptual change, 166
entity, 159 conceptual change, 165167, 173, 175, 289, 293
psychologists, 178 295
revolution, 98 approach, 165
science, 98 conditions for, 292
structures, 76, 328 conceptual development, 173
turn, 154 conceptual scheme
Cognitive-historical, 164 Aristotelian, 175
cognitive-historical, 137 modern, 175
cognitively, 57 conceptual space, 159
conceptual systems, 283 Crease, 112
conceptual understanding of the periodic table, creation science, 52
287 creative imagination, 202
conceptualizations of science, 126 critical
conceptually networked, 204 assessment, 324
confidence and skill, 202 pedagogy, 116
conformation, 205 unbiased observation, 201
congruence, 259 critical-logical-analytical thinking, 10
Congruence Axiom, 253 crops, 314
conjectures and refutations, 24 cross-cultural
connectionist model, 159 research, 167
conservation of energy, 122 studies, 289
constant current, 290 CRT tubes, 281
Constituents of foodstuffs, 310 crtical thingking
constraints, 172 skills, 13
construction crystallization, 285
hypotheses, 202 cultural
constructive empiricism, 71, 94 capital, 114
constructivism, 71, 77, 80 chauvinism, 63
Kantian,, 72 enterprise, 196
social, 21, 8587, 91, 94, 95, 9799, 106, 117 hegemony science, 63
varieties, 71 imperialism, 52
constructivist, 21, 85, 104106 culture
programme, 96 expansionist, 54
teaching methods, 13 curricula, 302, 309
constructivists, 100 CMS, 306
content of science text, 319 reforms, 203
context science, technology and society, 13
discovery, 193 science-technology-society, 123
contextualised, 331 curriculum, 40, 242, 280, 286
contextualist, 104 construction, 289
continuum hypothesis, 91 educational implications, 106
conventional curricula, 312 hidden, 319
Conventional science, 303 Czeslaw Milosz, 41
conventional sciences, 302, 306, 310, 316, 317
conventionally, 302 D.C. Phillips, 86
convergence proof, 258 D. Mazlish, 48
convergent thinking, 24 Dark Ages, 212
Coomaraswamy, 42 Darwin, 47, 60
Copernican Revolution, 47 theory of organic evolution, 332
Copernican revolution, 140 theory, 98
Copernicus, 100 theory of evolution, 138
copper, 192 David Hume, 28, 219
Cordoba, 213 David W. Ridgway, 281
corporeal nature of the media, 185 day and night cycle, 167
Corsiglia & Snively, 56 day/night cycle, 167, 171
Cosmology, 303 De Caelo, 185
Costa, 113 De Motu, 175, 176
counter-inductive, 176 De Revolutionibus, 71
counter-intuitive, 176, 196, 251 Dea Caelestis, 244
course deconstruction
chemistry, 201, 203 science, 121
courses deconstructionist, 103
chemistry for citizens, 204 affectation, 103
cramming, 317 Dedekind, 248
deduction, 267 physical, 253
reasoning, 330 thought, 62
deductive domains
method of proof, 251 knowledge, 63
reasoning, 176, 322, 334 domains of knowledge, 117
definition, 266 dominant discourse of science, 63
science, 62 Drabkin, 175
DeLoria, 53 Driver, 5860, 289
demonstrations, 293 Driver and Easley, 165, 289
denser media, 192 Driver and Oldham, 289, 295
Densmore, 21 Drori, 115
Derek Hodson, 286 Drosophila, 113
derivation, 267 drugs, 204
derivations, 301 drycell, 333
Derrida, 102 dual earth, 168
Derridadaism, 103 dualism
Descartes, 48 Cartesian,, 72
Descartes, 72 Duit, 294
descriptive chemistry, 280, 282 Durant, 112
design of experiments, 202 Durkheim, 88, 89
Desmond & Moore, 60 Durkheimian view, 96
development Duschl, 59, 118
European thought, 48 dynamics, 180
mathematics, 213 Aristotelian, 29
science, 61, 279, 331 Dyson, 112
science concepts, 165
scientific skills, 307 E.H. Carr, 195
developmental level, 323, 327 eclipse, 313
dialectic, 138 eclipses, 313
differential ecological systems, 122
calculus, 238 Edgar Jenkins, 111
Diophantus, 214 Edinburgh Strong Programme, 87
disc earth, 168 education, 165, 255, 260
discourse and research, 316
science, 63 CMS, 315
discovery, 175, 176 health, 310
electron, 284 higher stages, 316
epistemic, 176 liberal, 10
Greek learning, 213 technical, 10
Disease, 310 educational implications for the curriculum, 106
disease, 317 educationally backward, 317
disequilibrium, 179 Edward Jenner, 333
diSessa, 165 Egyptians, 253
divergent thinking, 24 Einstein, 176
Dmitri Mendeleev, 284 Einstelling effect, 292
DNA, 114 Eleaticiam, 46
extraction, 114 electric current, 289, 291
model, 332 electrical
synthesis enzyme, 113 engineering programme, 291
Doberiner, 283 nature of atoms, 281
dogma, 48 electricity, 262, 289, 295, 296, 308
dogmas, 317 alternative frameworks, 289
dogmatic, 331 electrokinetics, 291
domain, 58 electromagnetic
empirical, 253 theory, 44
electron pluralism, 65, 66
exclusion principle, 282 position, 117
orbital hybridization, 281 presuppositions, 170
orbitals, 279, 286 pyramid, 64, 118, 122
structures, 280 reconstruction, 175
electronic relativists, 51
configuration, 284 epistemology, 11, 55, 75, 77, 111, 118, 156
orbitals, 284 Cartesian, 72
structure, 279 naturalization, 156
structures, 280 science, 156
electrostatics, 291, 306 Eratosthenes, 242
circuits, 291 Eric Hoffer, 118
element, 204, 206 Ernst von Glasersfeld, 71
and a compound, 206 Escherichia coli, 113
element, mixture and compound, 206 essentialism, 178
elementary particles, 305 estimating, 312
Elements, 241244, 257262 ethical, 41
Arabic-Islamic tradition, 242 ethnic minority populations, 211
elements, 280 ethnomathematics, 218, 238
empirical ethnomethodology of science, 100
consistency, 59 ethnoscience, 54, 106
explanation, 96 Euclid, 175, 214, 242246, 261, 262, 265
facts, 259 historicity, 243
inputs, 193 the geometer, 242
issue, 195 Euclidean geometry, 222, 241, 246, 251, 252, 255,
knowledge, 253 259, 262
naturalistic science, 93 Eudemus, 243
nature of science, 322, 331, 334 Eudoxus, 242, 243
observations, 193, 207 Eurocentric trajectory, 213
question, 200 Eurocentrism, 214
tests, 201 European
empirical-experimental chemical philosophers, 206
inquiry, 122 mathematics, 212
empiricism, 72 Evolution
empiricist, 28 theory of, 53
framework, 165, 170 evolution, 118
views, 25 East and West Arab numerals, 214
empiricity, 325 number system, 214
energy, 308, 312 evolutionary biologists, 118
energy and power, 314 examples and analogies, 293
enlightening, 301 exclusion by definition, 214
Enneads, 258 exclusivity of science, 62
environment, 306, 308, 309, 311, 316 existence of atom, 281
laboratory, 208 experimental science, 282
environmental science, 13, 311 experimentalist, 147
episodic conceptualisation, 292 experimentation, 307, 308, 316, 331
epistemic nature, 176 experiments, 312
discovery, 176 explanations
epistemic strength of the seasons, 167
discovery, 176 of the weather, 167
epistemological, 43, 52, 65 extracted DNA, 113
egalitarianism, 106 extremist social constructivism, 117
hegemony, 52 Eylon and Linn, 289, 291
perspectives, 55
pinnacle, 63 face numerals, 216, 217
facts, 324, 332 concepts in chemistry, 206
factual, 167 principles, 202
factual question, 167
falasifa, 257 G.E.R. Lloyd, 221
fallibilism, 77 Galilean
fallibility of science, 14 Platonism, 47
falsifiability world-view, 177
Popperian,, 72 Galileo, 48, 175, 199
Falsificationism, 46 experiments with pendulum, 199
Faraday, 126 Gardner, 98
Farrington, 24 Gargi, 217
feminist science, 13 Garrard & Wegierski, 118
fetal tissue research, 126 Garrard and Wegierski, 64
figure of 8 knots, 216 gas laws, 280
Fihrist, 241, 242 gases, 198
Finneran, 117 Gaskell, 111
First Nations science, 62 Gauss, 43
five elements, 305 Ge Yuan Mi Lu Jie Fa, 237
flattened sphere, 168 gedanken, 185
folk Geertz, 61
knowledge, 305 general
science, 302, 304, 316 education, 301, 306, 316, 317
food items, 304 principles, 306, 316
Foodstuffs, 312 principles of science, 303
force, 181, 289, 303 public, 301
balance, 103 science, 306
formal science curricula, 316
axiomatics, 259 science education, 200, 301, 306, 307, 316
definitions, 309 theories of science, 303
logic, 154 general aim of chemistry, 200
mathematics, 258 general education, 200
metric geometry, 259 generalization, 302
synthetic geometry, 259 generalization and abstraction, 286
formalism, 316 generative justification, 164
formalistic approach, 255 generative question, 167
foundations genetic arrangements and chromosomal structures,
geometry, 246 113
mathematics, 261 geocentric, 173, 303, 304
modern thought, 104 geocentric phenomenological theory, 303
four elements, 177 geography, 122, 209
Four Western Imperatives, 118 geology, 286
fourth and fifth-row transition metals, 282 geometric equality, 243
fractal geometry, 126 Geometry, 262
framework theory, 166, 170 geometry, 207, 241, 243, 250, 257259, 267
Francis Crick, 119 foundations, 246
Frederick Grinnell, 58 teach, 260
Fredric Jameson, 116 traditional, 254, 259
Freeman Dyson, 116 geometry of the sulbasutra-s, 259
Freud, 47 Georg Cantor, 91
Freyberg, 289 George Bernard Shaw, 39
Fuller, 52 George Boole, 238
function George Wald, 43
maxima, 237 Gernet, 61
minima, 237 Gibson, 51
fundamental Gieryn, 58
Gilbert and Watts, 289 Heath, 243
Gillespie, 203, 204 Hegel, 88, 98
Gillispie, 204 hegemony, 51, 118
Gilmer, 117 Heidegger, 64, 104, 106, 118
Giroux & McLaren, 116 Heilbron, 4
gnomon, 265 Heisenberg, 42, 43
goals of courses in chemistry, 203 heliocentric, 173, 303
gold, 192 theory, 42, 303
good pedagogy, 285 hellenistic
good science, 199, 285 astronomy, 48
Goodstein, 115 Persian traditions, 214
Gottfried and Kyle, 319 science, 46
Grant, Sleeter, & Anderson, 116 traditions, 214
gravity concept, 168 world, 213
Greek Helm, Hugh and Novak, 165
atomists, 177 Helmholtz, 249
thought, 46 Hendrick Hart, 119
Greeks, 253 Henry, 77
Gregorian, 312 Henry Giroux, 116
Gregorian and Saka, 313 hermeneutic
Gregory, 225 circle, 121
Gregory series, 228 interpretation, 119
Gross, 116, 119 hermeneutical problem, 29
Gross & Levitt, 5, 112 hermeneutics, 120
Gross and Levitt, 99 Hermotimus, 242
Grove, 5 Heron, 242, 243
growth Hertz, 39
science, 200, 201 Hesse, 58
growth of science, 201 hidden
Guba & Lincoln, 59 curriculum, 319
Gunther Stent, 113 higher
Guthrie, 24 mathematics, 268
Gutwill, 291 stages, 316
Gwalior system Hijri, 313
representing numbers, 214 Hilbert, 245, 246, 258
Hindu
Haji Khalfa records, 241 science, 106
Haldane, 126 society, 42
Halliday and Resnick, 294 historian, 85
halogens, 282 geometry, 243
Hamlet, 42 mathematics, 213
Hans Jonas, 39 science, 41, 200
Harding, 118 historical, 41, 43, 58
Hardison, 122 evolution of institutions of science, 47
Harun ar-Rashid, 241 aspects of science, 41
Haruni, 241 continuity, 201
Hashweh, 289, 292, 294 development of an idea, 333
Hawking & Penrose, 61, 117 episodes, 197
health, 306, 309, 316 relativism, 99
education, 310 historicity
science, 309 Euclid, 243
healthy histories
foods, 307 geometry, 242
habits, 307, 316 mathematics, 217
heat, 289 historiography, 53, 58
history, 42, 44, 122, 195, 211, 241 idealism, 77, 93
and epistemology of science, 13 and relativism, 92
and philosophy of mathematics, 261 Berkeleyan,, 72
and philosophy of science, 4, 6, 15, 21, 32, Idealists, 61
40, 43, 44, 72, 176, 195, 197, 199, 200, Idealists view, 61
261 idealize, 199
of chemical education, 205 idealized systems, 193
of chemical synthesis, 209 ideas of chemical synthesis, 208
of chemistry, 200, 204207 ideology for science education, 201
of development of science, 331 ignorant of history, 42
of Indian mathematics, 239 IIT Kanpur, 3941
of mankind, 302 IIT, Bombay, 261
of science, 9, 23, 3941, 43, 46, 96, 175, 195, imagination, 176
199, 200, 204, 207, 246, 283, 330 Immanuel Kant, 28
of science in India, 40 imperative
of scientific ideas, 40, 41, 46, 47 economic, 118
of synthesis of chemical compounds, 208 naturalism, 118
what, 42, 195 scientistic, 118
Hodson, 55 technocratic, 118
Holiday, 319 Imperial Board of Astronomy, 237
Holliday, 319 implications
Holliday and Whittacker, 319 curriculum, 106
hollow sphere, 168 for science education, 85
Holton, 5, 112, 115, 117 of research findings, 289
homeostasis, 122 of social constructivism, 103
Horton, 61 Inarticulate Science, 111
Horwood, 60 Inca Quipu, 216
hotchpotch geometry, 253 incommensurability, 72
Housing, 312 Kuhnian, 72
HPS, 21 Incompleteness theorem, 90
and science education, 6, 11 incorporeal, 183
in teacher education, 15 India, 213
human history of science, 40
anatomy, 310 industrial and social progress, 39
genome project, 126 Indian
humanistic astronomy, 228
issues, 135 Brahmi system, 214
studies, 135 geometry, 255
Humes racist views, 219 mathematics, 220222, 226, 228, 230, 239
hunger, 317 numerals, 214
Hunter Havelin Adams, 53 science, 47, 55
hydrostatics, 193 indigenous
Hypatia, 217, 244 culture, 315
hypotheses, 332 knowledge, 63
construction, 202 individual phenomena, 202
hypothesis, 209 individualistic, 296
hypothetico-deductive Indo-American programme, 39
method, 117, 303 Indo-Arab numerals, 214
mode of reasoning, 209 induction, 176
systems, 306, 316 inductive
generalizations, 178
Ian Hacking, 207 method, 25
Ibid, 192 reasoning, 176, 322, 334
Ibn Sna, 241 inductively, 176
ideal chemical experiment, 199 inductivism, 46, 296
inductivist, 28, 178 isomorphism, 284
industrial, 314 issue of synthesis, 204
and social progress in India, 39 Issues in Science and Technology, 116
chemist, 204 Ivan Sertima, 116
inertia, 134, 181 Ivan Van Sertima, 53
infinite
cardinal numbers, 91 J.B. Cohen, 41
infinite series, 225, 231 J.D. Novak, 165
inner observation, 310 J.F. Daniel, 333
innocent of philosophy, 42 J. de Fontaney, 236
innovation, 315 Jacob Bronowski, 22
inquiry learning, 13 Jaina, 259
inscriptionalist, 104 James Conant, 9
instruction, 165, 170 James Gregory, 228
instructional strategies, 319 James Rutherford, 9
instrumental Jamshid al-Kashi, 235
causation, 61 Japanese temple geometry, 241
knowledge, 61 Jean Piaget, 286
instrumentalism, 71, 72, 94 Jegede and Okebukola, 319
interaction of science with society, 331 Jenkins, 112
interaction of science, technology and society, 321, Jerome, 245
325, 330 John Cairns, 113
interdisciplinary John Fauvel, 219
nature of chemistry, 203 John McDowell, 77
science curricula, 123 John Polkinghorne, 127
interest Johnson, 59
science, 122, 123, 202 Jon D. Miller, 5
science and chemistry, 203 Joseph Novak, 13
interest in chemistry, 202 Joseph Priestley, 198
International History, Philosophy and Science Teach- Judson, 114
ing Group, 6 Jund-i-Shapur, 213
introduction Justinian, 245
zero, 214 Jyesthadeva, 226228
intuitive
framework theory, 168 K.S. Gandhi, 41
knowledge of electrostatics, 291 K.V. Sarma, 228
notion of equality, 261 K. Tobin, 78
physical idea, 259 Kant, 41, 71, 250, 254, 261
physics, 166 Kantian, 93
scientific views, 168 Kantian constructivism, 72
theories, 170 Kapalli, 327
investigative Karanapaddati, 226
nature of science, 320, 322324, 328, 331 Karl Mannheim, 89
processes, 331 Karl Marx, 219
Ionian Nature-philosophy, 46 Karl Popper, 113
irrational katapayadi, 229
numbers, 248 Katyayana, 225
theories, 95 Kawagley, 52, 53, 55, 56, 60, 63
irrationality, 96, 115 Kay, 230
Ishale at-Kindi, 48 Keplers Harmony of the World, 126
Ishango bone, 215 Kerala
Islamic mathematics, 226, 228, 235, 238
rationalists, 257, 260 school, 225, 228, 230
science, 46, 62, 106 Kevin Finneran, 116
thinkers, 242 Kevles, 115
key concepts, 306 Lebesgue measure, 251
khichdi geometry, 253 Lechlanche, 333
kinematics, 164, 180 Lederman, 319
kinetic molecular theory of gases, 281 Lehman, 103
kinetic theory, 204, 280 Leibnitzian Mathesis Universalis, 47
knots, 216 Leibniz, 225
knowledge levels
construction, 60 abstraction, 303
indigenous, 5153 phenomenology, 303
instrumental, 61 Levitt, 116, 119
nature, 89 Lewenstein, 111
procedural, 292 Library
representation, 159 Alexandria, 243
science, 171, 320322, 327, 331 Library of Alexandria, 244
scientific, 154 light, 289
social interaction, 331 particle/wave, 53
society, 89 liking for science, 201
validity, 106 limitations of science, 203
Kosambi, 42 limited, 302
Kosslyn, 97 Linden, 55
Kriyakramakari, 226, 231 linguistic
Kronberg Castle, 42 interference, 292
Kuhn, 24, 41 turn, 154
Kuhnian incommensurability, 72 linking of the textual content, 327
links with physics and biology, 204
laboratory, 207 Linn, 319
common procedures, 202 Linus Pauling, 113
experimentation, 280 Liu Hui, 237
Ladriere, 54 Lobachevskii, 266
Lakatos, 96 local units, 312
Lake Edward, 215 Locke, 76, 77
language, 166 logic, 99, 267
Laplacian certainty, 117 and reason, 48
Larry Laudan, 86 and science education, 10
lateral thinking, 24 Aristotelian, 257
Latour, 99102 formal, 154
Latour and Woolgar, 99, 102104 mathematics, 261
Laudan, 21, 58, 96 logical
Laudan and Stove, 99 deduction, 255
Lavoisier, 198, 199, 279 inconsistency, 173
Lavoisiers four experiments, 198 modality, 193
law positivistic, 154
free fall, 175 logical positivism, 117
inertia, 176 lunar, 313
nature, 208 calendar, 215
periodicity, 284 luni-solar, 313
Layton, 112, 115 Lynda Birke, 115
Leach, 58 Lynn White, 115
lead, 192 Lyotard, 55
learning
chemistry, 205 M.D. Srinivas, 222
science, 165, 166, 171, 320, 328 M.I.T., 39
skills, 331 M. Chastrette and C. N. R. Rao, 203
teaching chemistry, 203 M. J. Frazer, 200
through science, 203 Macauley, 255
Macquare, 206 Mayan civilisation, 216
Madhava, 226, 227 Mayer, 3
Madhava-Gregory series, 228 Mazlish, 43
Madhava-Leibniz, 231 McDermott and Shaffer, 289291
Madhava-Leibniz series, 229 McKinley, 55
Madras Literary Society, 226 measurements, 312
magic square, 218 mechanical
Magnetism, 262 composites, 206
mahabhutas, 305 particles, 206
Malebranche, 76, 77 philosophy, 206
Mamuni, 241 Mechanics, 46
manipulation, 308, 316 mechanics, 169, 262, 281
Mannheim, 95 mechanistic world picture, 135
Maori science, 62 media, 192
map the students conception, 289 medicine, 46
Marshak, 215 medium
Martin Eger, 112 quicksilver, 192
Martin Heidegger, 117 zero density, 192
Martin Kline, 200 Mendel, 334
Marx, 47, 88 Mendeleev, 283287
Marxist, 42 chemical ideas, 287
Mary Boole, 238 experimental approach, 286
materialism, 135 mensuration, 306, 309, 312, 316
mathematical mental
artefact, 215 models, 166, 168, 171
knowledge, 212 models of the earth, 168
philosophy, 268 prodigies, 219
proof, 253, 255 representation, 168
reasoning, 193 training, 209
mathematics, 46, 212, 245, 247, 253, 255, 258, Mercator, 225
261, 266268, 281, 283, 335 Merton, 95, 105
Africa, 212, 213, 215 Mertonian
Arab, 214 norms, 105
curriculum, 223 social attributes, 205
development, 213 meta-scientific, 21
devlopment, 47 metaconceptual awareness, 167
education, 71 metamathematical definition, 255
European and Arab, 229 metamathematical notion of proof, 259
higher, 268 metaphysical, 61, 82, 93, 134, 255
Indian, 222, 226, 239 domain, 255
Kerala, 226, 228, 235, 238 realism, 75, 92
logic, 261 metaphysicians, 177
modern, 251 metaphysics, 11, 32, 64, 72, 75, 111, 117, 118,
pedagogy, 238 127, 254
teachers, 211 meteorology, 286
mathemtics method
Arab, 214 chemical analysis, 209
Matteo Ricci, 236, 239 proof, 259
matter science, 197, 203, 305
atomic nature, 314 methodological, 43
Matthews, 52, 60 methodology and epistemology of science, 9
Mauss, 89 Metioui, 291
Max Delbrock, 113 metric, 255
Max Planck, 31, 282 metric and synthetic approaches, 254
Maxwell, 301 metric and synthetic geometry, 254
metric approach, 258 perspective, 56
metric geometry, 259 perspectives, 51, 58
metric, synthetic, or traditional, 259 science, 53, 56
Michael Matthews, 199, 200 science education, 13
Michael Ruse, 118 multiculturalism, 55
Michel Foucault, 42 mathematics, 214
Michelson-Morley experiment, 42 multiculturalists, 62, 63
Micro-organisms, 312 multisciences, 56
microwave and infrared spectroscopy, 281 Mutazilah, 257
Middle Ages, 46 mysterious, 315
Mill, 261
Millar, 58 N.R. Hanson, 43
Miller, 319 nave inductivism, 198
Ming Antu, 237 Nadeau & Desautels, 118
Ministry of Education, 40 Nalanda, 252
misconceptions, 165, 166, 171, 289, 291 Nanda, 106
about science, 133 Narayana, 226, 231
mixture, 206 NAS, 112
mixture and a compound, 206 Nasiruddin, 241
mixtures, 206 Native American views, 57
model natives, 209
Cognitive Science, 137 natural
statics, 180 kinds, 160
models, 332 motion, 180
current, 289 phenomena, 59, 120
modern philosopher, 120
academic chemistry, 283 philosophy, 53, 120, 195
conceptual scheme, 175 resources, 202, 312
electron orbital theory, 283 sciences, 118, 195
mathematics, 214, 225, 232, 251 naturalism
science, 48, 316, 317 Quinean, 75
scientific discoveries, 315 naturalist, 58, 93
secondary chemistry, 283 naturalistic, 59, 93
western science, 63 conceptual system, 121
modern view, 175 observation, 52
Mohapatra, 292 observation and insight, 63
Mohapatra and Bhattacharya, 292 nature, 122
Mohini Mullick, 40 and method of science, 201
mole concept, 280 and philosophy of science, 320
molecular motions, 280 and science, 48
molecules, 334 of chemical bonding, 281
Molefi Asante, 116 of electronic orbitals, 279
momenta, 303 of Indian mathematics, 237
moral issues, 209 of knowledge, 89
Morris Kline, 220, 230 of light, 281
MORST, 4 of objectivity in science, 116
motion, 289 of science, 15, 22, 27, 58, 85, 99, 283, 301,
motions of celestial objects, 312 302, 316, 319322, 324328, 330, 331
Mueller, 261, 264 of scientific activity, 43
Mullick, 41 of scientific knowledge, 117, 154
multicultural, 52, 53 of scientific mode, 46
communities, 51 of synthesis, 208
literature on science, 62 Nayyayika notion of proof, 255
materials, 53 NCERT, 241, 252254, 320, 323330
mathematics, 211 NCERT text, 253
Needham, 61 observation, 309, 316
Neils Bohr, 42 observational
Nelkin, 52 astronomy, 167
Neoplatonic, 258 astronomy research project, 167
Neoplatonic linkages, 260 observing, 308
Neoplatonic principles, 257 of Research Programmes, 46
Neoplatonism, 244, 257, 258 of science, 286
Neoplatonists, 244, 260 Ogawa, 56
Neugebauer, 213 Ohms law, 291, 295
Neuhaus, 112 omissions and appropriation, 214
Neurath, 94 omnipotency of science, 331
New Apollonians, 135 On Floating Bodies, 180
new Dionysians, 135 one right answer, 282
Newlands, 283 oneness, 305
Newton, 47, 98, 225, 301 Ontario Board of Education, 279
inverse cube law, 95 Ontario program, 284
notebooks, 101 ontological, 43
Newtonian presuppositions, 170
mechanics, 302, 303, 306, 316 realism, 117
notion, 249 ontology, 76
synthesis, 47, 48 optics, 281
Niels Bohr, 282 order and causality, 61
night-sky, 312 organic or inorganic, 207
Nilakantha, 226, 227, 231 organization, 320
nitric oxide, 198 origin
non-Euclidean, 266 alternative framework, 292
geometry, 211 origin of science, 24
non-European origins of modern science, 30
mathematical traditions, 220 Orwell, 104
mathematics, 235 Osborne, 289
non-living nature, 311 outcomes of learning of science, 319
non-science, 58, 195 Overton, 52
non-stoichiometry, 205 Owens, 54
Normal Dahl, 39 oxygen, 198
Norman Levitt, 85 and hydrogen, 198, 199
Norris, 104, 106 discovery, 279
Norris-Tull & Norris-Tull, 52 oxygene, 198
Norris-Tull, & Norris-Tull, 53
notion P.R.K. Rao, 41
inequality, 261 Pappus, 243, 265
rapidity of convergence, 232 paracetamol, 305
space and time, 176 paradigm, 100, 199
Novak, 165, 289 paradigmatic shifts, 46
NSTA, 112 parallel postulate, 267
number system, 214 parameters, 309
parapsychology, 105
O.B. Hardison, 114 partitioning, 305
Oakely, 39 Passmore, 5
objective pathological tests, 310
education, 258 pathshala-s, 252
knowledge, 75 Paul Gross, 85
objectivism, 59 Paul Saltman, 113
objectivity, 325 Paulus Gerdes, 219
and precision, 202 pedagogical, 53
of science, 322 pedagogoy
critical, 116 Plato, 242, 243, 250, 254, 265
pedagogy, 77 Platonic idealism, 255
good, 285 Platonic philosophy, 247
mathematics, 238 Platonic-Kantian, 251
Peoples science, 305 Platonic-Pythagorean Tradition, 149
Peoples science movements, 47 Platonism, 46
periodic law, 284, 286 Plotinus, 258
periodic table, 279, 280, 282284, 313 political
personal cleanliness, 307 philosophy, 14
perspective on science, 55 science, 219
Perspectives Polymer substances, 335
Multicultural, 51 polymerase enzyme, 113
Peru, 216 Popper, 22, 98, 106
pessimistic historical meta-induction, 22 Popperian
phenomenological, 302, 314 falsifiability, 72
theory, 303 porphyry, 192, 243, 258
phenomenology, 303306, 316, 317 positional
health, 310 number system, 216
practical subjects, 306 system, 214
Philippus, 242 positivism, 117
philosopher, 85, 118 Posner, 289
philosopher of science, 22 post colonialism, 55
philosophical, 41, 58 post modernism, 55
analysis, 206 post-epistemological, 76
arguments, 197 post-modernist, 71
aspects of science, 41 postmodernist philosophy, 14
materialism, 117 postulates, 265
views, 58 potential difference, 291, 295
views about science, 204 practical
philosophies, 202 applications of chemistry, 282
philosophy, 3, 42, 46, 54, 58, 76, 117, 195 mathematics, 258
of logical positivism, 117 skills, 316
of Neoplatonism, 244 pragmatic
of science, 911, 14, 23, 28, 40, 46, 71, 75, conception of science education, 21
176, 196, 203, 205 view, 58
science, 58 pragmatism, 200
phlogistic chemistry, 29 pragmatist, 104
phrenology, 90 pre-scientific, 304
physical knowledge-systems, 302
analogies, 181 presocratics, 24
condition, 202 primary
particles, 206 education, 307
science, 309 ontological reduction, 3941, 43, 44
systems, 193 school level, 316
physics, 41, 185, 204, 206, 250, 261, 289, 303, 312, prime numbers, 215
335 Principe, 27
physiology, 309, 310 Principia, 21, 98
Piaget, 71 principle, 202, 286, 301, 317, 332
Pickering, 104 and theories, 306
Pierre Jartoux, 236 chemical elementarity, 199
Pierre Macquare, 206 chemical simplicity, 199
Pillars of health, 310 chemistry, 203, 279, 284
Pinch, 21, 86, 99, 106 conservation of mass, 199
Pinch and Collins, 105 equilibrium, 179
planetary motions, 303 fundamental, 202
mechanics, 39 racist history, 252
unifying, 202 radical
problem solving, 333, 334 constructivism, 71, 72
procedural knowledge, 292, 295 relativism, 119
process of enquiry, 327 skepticism, 106
processes of science, 320, 332 social constructivist, 119
Proclus, 242245, 251, 254, 257, 259 social constructivists, 116, 117, 119
professional CMS courses, 306, 316 sociologist of scientific knowledge, 121
Proficiency Levels of Rural School, 301 radioactive properties, 282
Project 2000+, 111 radioactivity, 280
proof, 253, 266 Ramanujan, 238
deductive, 251 rampant relativism, 86
properties of elements, 280 rare-earths, 282
protagonists, 199 rarer media, 192
pseudo-science, 58, 106 rational, 56
pseudo-scientific, 26 reconstruction, 96
pseudoscience, 58 reconstruction of beliefs, 96
Pseudoscientific and irrational world views, 5 theology, 243, 251, 257
psychological form of constructivism, 71 rationalism, 72
psychologism, 97 rationalist, 58, 91, 94, 97, 98
psychologistic, 91 philosophers, 91, 96
psychologists, 165 philosophy of science, 92
psychology, 98 theories, 92
Ptolemy, 242, 243 view, 91
public rationality, 96, 99, 116
scientific literacy, 115 African, 116
square, 112, 117 and critical thinking, 24
understanding of science, 111, 127 Rayleigh-Jeans, 31
pure elements, 199 reaction mechanism, 205
pure hydrogen and pure oxygen, 199 reaction rates, 207
pure results, 199 real world experiments, 176
Putumana Somayajin, 226, 227 realism, 22
Pythagoras, 48, 214, 244, 265 realism/instrumentalism, 28
theorem, 253 realist, 58, 61
Pythagorean reason, 176
theorem, 250, 251, 254 reasoned thought, 96
viewpoint, 125 reasoning, 207, 307, 308, 316
Pythagoreanism, 46 mathematical, 193
Pythagoreans, 244 skills, 13
students, 322
qualitative rediscovery of Greek thought, 46
test, 209 reducibility, 305
visualisable models, 293 reductionistic thinking, 125
quantification and measurement, 263 relative density, 177
quantitative formulation of problems, 202 relativism, 66, 72, 93
quantum relativist, 21
mechanics, 31, 204, 279, 281, 303 relativistic, 178
theory, 31, 53 Relativistic Analysis, 178
questions, 322 Relativistic dethronement, 47
Quine, 94 relativity, 193
Quine-Duhem, 94 theory, 249
Quinean representations of numbers and space, 215
naturalism, 75 requirements, 314
underdetermination, 72 research
chemists in USA, 201
R. J. Gillespie, 203
cognitive developmental, 165 and technology, 39, 306, 311, 317, 323, 326,
scientists, 204 331, 334, 335
resistance, 291 and technology for society, 323
resistances, 192 and technology with society, 326
Richard Dawkins, 51, 119 anti, 115
Richard J. Merill, 281 antithetical, 117
ritual geometry, 259 basic knowledge, 331
Robert Boyle, 206 burden, 301
Robertta Barba, 53 celebration, 111
Roger Penrose, 61 central, 204
role of centrality, 125
chemistry, 205 centres, 315
history of chemistry, 200 cognitive enterprise, 39
history of science, 200 community, 62
Roth, 293 competencies, 327
Royal Asiatic Society, 226 computer, 41
rules of categorisation, 332 concept, 301, 317
Ruse, 112, 118 curricula, 55, 136, 165, 301, 303, 316
Russell, 248, 268 curriculum, 327
curriculum frameworks, 112
Sadratnamala, 227, 232 deconstruction, 121
Sagan, 60 definition of, 51, 52
Salviati, 175 dehumanises, 135
Samarapungavan, Vosniadou, & Brewer, 167 development, 61, 279, 331
Samarkand Observatory, 235 discourse, 63
Sample examination paper, 47 educationists, 320
Sandra Harding, 116 educators, 24
Sanitation, 312 empirical, 93
Sankara, 231 empirical nature, 322, 331, 334
Sankara Variyar, 226 epistemology, 156
Sankara Varman, 227 ethnomethodology of, 100
SAS postulate, 253 exclusivity, 62
Saxena, 289293 for all, 111, 114
school for common people, 301
Alexandrian, 180 for painters, 303
chemistry textbooks, 279 for physicians, 303
children, 211 good, 199, 285
education, 197, 302 growth, 200, 201
high, 301 historical activity, 42
Kerala, 225, 228, 230 historical aspects, 41
middle, 301 history of, 199
primary, 301 human activity, 201
science, 51, 52 in daily-life situations, 301
science curriculum, 52 instruction, 200, 209
science education, 315 interest, 122, 202
science textbook, 320 Islamic, 62
Schopenhauer, 250 learning, 165, 166, 171, 200, 320, 328
Schrodingers cat, 255 learning of, 165
science, 46, 51, 100, 195, 200, 209, 286, 301306, liking, 201
316, 322, 323, 331, 334 literacy crisis, 3
popularization among housewives, 315 methodological dimension, 11
wars, 21 nature, 331
alternative, 47 of pendulum motion, 7
and philosophy, 14 or scientific investigation, 196
and society, 331 pedagogy, 164
philosophical aspects, 41 ideas, 59, 111, 166, 196
philosophical dimension, 11 illiteracy, 101
popularization, 301, 302, 315 imagination, 175
principles, 301, 317 inquiry, 103, 293
purpose, 306 investigation, 304
society, 331 investigations, 113
Standard Account of, 53 knowledge, 810, 14, 55, 62, 86, 89, 92, 104,
standard account of, 66 116, 118, 121, 124, 125, 133, 135, 136,
teachers, 3 209, 213, 261, 332
teaching, 32 literacy, 115, 334
technology, and society, 196, 203 method, 39, 46, 197, 333, 334
theory, 301 methods of investigation, 202
thinking process, 331 model of current, 290
traditional, 302, 304, 305 organizations, 301
universal, 51, 52 outlook, 301, 306
universality of, 51 pipeline, 122
uses and abuses, 201 positivism, 111, 117, 119, 121
utilitarian view, 21 positivists, 120
wars, 52, 71, 85 progress, 63, 114
wars in India, 106 rationality, 106
western, 51, 53, 63 realism, 32
with society, 331 research, 325
science and technology revolution, 30, 46, 97
use, 319 skills, 316
science classrooms, 197 skills of observation, 307
science curricula text, 121
interdisciplinary, 123 themes and concepts, 125
science education, 5, 6, 8, 9, 24, 43, 51, 52, 56, 71, theory, 23, 60, 93, 94, 96, 102, 154, 167, 283,
78, 86, 100, 112, 123, 135, 171, 195 285
197, 199, 200, 205, 209, 226, 301, 306 thinking, 125, 322, 325, 326, 334
and logic, 10 truths, 44
curriculum, 196 understanding, 315
general education, 302 view of the earth, 168
multicultural, 13 ways of thinking, 112
programme, 164 world, 292
purpose, 302 description, 51
research, 165, 173 investigation, 302
science, technology and society, 40, 323, 334 knowledge, 66, 154
curricula, 13, 123 method, 286
science-technology-society, 14 theory, 93
scientific, 209, 306 theory construction, 269
enlightenment, 316 theory profile, 58
and epistemological relativism, 65 scientifically educated men and women, 126
and technological needs, 39 scientifically literate, 317
antirealism, 32 scientificity of science, 101
appreciation of nature, 306 scientism, 63, 64, 136
belief, 89, 98 scientist, 42, 200, 201, 207, 303, 306, 315, 323,
community, 40, 62, 111, 112, 117, 205 326, 333
concept, 5, 114, 168, 200, 295 Scott, 58
creativity, 306 second law of thermodynamics, 196
criteria, 202 secondary, 306, 309, 316
development and conceptual change, 13 school science textbooks, 320
disciplines, 41 education, 307
enterprise, 333 semiconductors, 204
experiments, 135 senior secondary, 306, 316
sequence model, 290 sodium metal, 209
Settle, 118 Sokal, 119
Shakespeare, 42 Sokal Hoax, 85
shape of the earth, 167, 173 solar, 313
Shepardson and Pizzini, 321 Solomon, 292
Shipstone, 289291, 293 solving problems of physics, 184
Side-Angle-Side, 248, 251 Sophism, 46
Signals, 310 sources, 302
Silver Chloride, 203 South America, 216
Simplicio, 175, 192 South Bihar, 301
sixth and seventh-row rare earths, 282 Spain, 213
Sjberg, 111 specific empirical statements, 178
Skinner, 97 specific-theories, 170
Skinnerian, 97, 98 speed, 192
Sky-watching, 313 spherical shape of the earth, 171
Slezak, 97, 98 spiritual phenomena, 59
slowness of motion, 183 spiritualism, 115
Smith, 289 Srinivas Ramanujan, 221
Smith, Blakeslee and Anderson, 294 stages of learning, 286
Smith, Siegel & McInerney, 5 stagnation, 317
Smolicz & Nunan, 118 standard account, 5153, 55, 56, 58, 6164
Snively & Corsiglia, 56, 59, 63, 65 standard units, 312
Snivley & Corsiglia, 53 Stanley & Brickhouse, 55, 59
social, 41 Stanley Fish, 116
constructivist view, 116 Stanley Miller, 113
activity, 296 state of equilibrium, 179
application, 205 statics, 180, 193
constructivism, 21, 8587, 9195, 9799, 106, stellar aberration, 303
117 Stephen Hawking, 61
constructivist doctrines, 87, 91, 104, 106 stereochemistry, 207
constructivist ideas, 104 Steve Fuller, 116
constructivist programme, 97 Steven Brush, 200
constructivist writings, 104 Sthananga Sutra, 226
constructivists, 94, 104 stoichiometry, 205, 280, 281
justice, 317 stories of scientific success, 114
nature of chemical discovery, 205 strategy
social sciences, 195 achieve conceptual change, 293
socio-cultural mileu, 319 conceptual change, 293
sociogical constructivist, 77 strict objectivity, 117
sociological, 58 Strike, Hewson and Gertzog, 292
form of constructivism, 71, 86 strong cultural aspect, 209
programme, 91 strong programme, 88, 89, 91, 9698
relativism, 95 structure, 205
relativist views, 21 atom, 279
sociologies of science, 14 periodic table, 279
sociologist, 85, 94, 95 structured curriculum, 293
of science, 117, 287 STS, 201
sociology, 95 education, 14
sociology of knowledge, 88, 89, 96, 97 students
sociology of science, 99 motivation and social maturity, 202
sociology of scientific knowledge, 87, 90, 91, 98, understanding of science, 202
104 understanding of technology, 202
Socratic dialogue, 293 students
sodium atom, 209 concept of current, 289
sodium chloride, 281 own bias, 324
reasoning in electrokinetics, 291 tertiary, 306
study textbook, 284
of chemistry, 205 Thabit Ibn Qurra, 241
of science and epistemology, 91 Thales, 214
sub-atomic particles, 284 Theaetetus, 242
sub-divided into disciplines, 303 theistic traditions, 120
subject matter of CMS, 304 Theocharis & Psimopoulos, 112
sulbasutra, 259 theological curriculum, 260
sulbasutra-s, 259, 260 theology, 48, 58, 252, 257
sulbasutras, 225, 230, 253 Theon, 243, 245
Summers, 294 Theonine, 248250
Summers, Kruger and Mant, 289 theorem of Menelaus, 243
super conductors, 208 theoretical
superstition, 305, 312, 314, 317 basis, 305
Sutton, 332 consistency, 59
swiftness of motion, 183 construction, 176
syllabi, 307 constructions, 193
symbolic models, 159 framework, 165, 166
Symptoms of health, 310 imagination, 176, 178
synthesis, 207, 208 model, 193
synthetic, 255 analysis, 206
approach, 258 theories, 202, 324, 332
aspect of chemistry, 204 scientific, 93
geometry, 253, 259 theory, 165
models, 167, 168, 170 knowledge, 104
electromagnetic, 44
T.L. Heath, 180 knowledge, 22
Tus, 241 theory of evolution, 4
Takebe Katahiro, 237 thermodynamic, 207
Takshashila, 252 thermodynamics, 204
Tantrasamgraha, 226 caloric, 29
Tasmania, 215 second law, 196
taxonomically ordered, 42 think logically, 202
Taxonomy, 286 thinking
Taylor series, 232 processes, 324, 329
teacher education, 289, 295 processes of science, 322, 325
teaching convergent, 24
and history, 39 divergent, 24
history and philosophy of science, 39 lateral, 24
classroom, 211 third planet, 282
geometry, 252 third world womens science, 106
physics, 296 Thomas Fuller, 218, 219
science, 165, 279, 319 Thomas Kuhn, 199
technical Thomist philosophy, 257
parameters, 311 Thompson, 284
terms, 309 Thorley and Woods, 289
technology, 306, 309 Thorndikes Law of Effect, 98
and scientific positivism, 118 Thornton, 295
agricultural, 316 thought
industrial, 316 activity, 324
teleological, 91, 97, 98 experiment, 176, 185, 321, 324, 333
teleological model, 96 experiment, 31
teleological view, 96 tidal action, 52
tempels, 54 TIMSS, 111
terminology, 315 Tobias, 126
Tobin & Tippins, 78 science, 62
Todhunter, 241, 248 concept of, 52
Toldeo, 213 science, 51, 62
total vacuum, 192 university science textbooks, 112
totalitarian, 99 Upapatti, 222
totality of science, 303 use of science and technology, 319
tradition of geometry, 260 uses and abuses of science, 201
traditional, 255, 316 utilitarian, 86
ecological knowledge, 56 view of science, 21
geometry, 254, 259
notion of proof, 254 V.K. Jairath, 41
parameter, 309, 315 vacuum, 186
representationalist theories, 76 valence electrons, 284
science, 302, 304, 305 validity of knowledge, 106
understanding, 316 van Fraassen, 71
wisdom, 317 varieties of constructivism, 71, 86
traditions vast generalizations, 302
Buddhist and Jaina, 255 verbal behaviour, 97
transcendental Victor Katz, 239
idealism, 73 Vidal Abarca and San Joze, 328
philosophy, 74 Vidal-Abraca and Sanzose, 327
transfer of the learning, 329 view
Treagust, Harrison and Venville, 294 equality, 295
treatment of data, 202 hierarchy, 295
triads or octaves, 283 of nature, 47
Truesdell, 41 vigesimal, 216
truth-functional logic, 255 Vikrami, 312, 313
Vine DeLoria, 53
Uclides, 242, 257, 259, 260 visual impact, 328
ultra-violet catastrophe, 31 vital resources of the common man, 315
unacceptable biasedness, 201 vocabularly, 331
unbiased observation, 201 void, 176, 192
underdetermination voltage and current, 291
Quinean,, 72 von Glasersfeld, 77
understand the phenomena in chemistry, 204 Vosniadou, 167
understanding, 304 Vosniadou & Brewer, 167, 168
nature, 305
chemistry, 203 W.H. Freeman, 281
nature and knowledge, 304 Wallis, 225
the universe, 202 Walsh, 117
understanding warnings given by the body, 310
science concept, 165 water as a compound, 199
UNESCO, 111 Watson and Crick, 332
uniformity, 122 Watts and Gilbert, 289
unifying Western science, 63
principles, 202 western science, 63
unilinear trajectory, 212, 213 William Brewer, 167
unity of science, 305 witch-craft, 305
universal Wittgenstein, 97
concept of science, 62 Wolfgang Pauli, 282
science, 62 woman mathematician, 217
universalist, 52 Woolgar, 99101
perspective, 52 working knowledge, 202
perspective on science, 51 world view, 111, 177, 178, 196, 201
universality, 51, 62 Galilean, 177
Aristotelian, 176, 177
Galilean, 178
X-ray crystallographic patterns, 332

X-ray diffraction, 281
Yager, 115
Yang Guangxian, 236
Yash Pal Committee, 317
Yesudas Ramchandra, 237
Yoruba method of multiplication, 220
YuktiBhasa, 254, 260
Yuktibhasa, 226, 227
Zaire, 215
Zambia, 215
zero, 216
introduction, 214
Zij al-Arjabhar, 226
Ziman, 112
zoology, 286
Index
a priori, 118 frameworks, 289, 291, 296

A.F. Chalmers, 58 alternative framework
A.J. Ayer, 76 origin, 292
A.K. Biswas, 40 American Indian Science and Engineering Soci-
A.P. Shukla, 41, 42 ety, 53
A. France, 48 American Universities, 39
A. J. Harrison, 204 Amitabh Ghosh, 40
AAAS, 112, 317 Analytical
abiotic, 311 Sciences, 312
abstract analytical
concepts, 316 arguments, 207
concepts and operations, 303 Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, 42
cosmological picture, 178 anatomy, 309
concepts, 294 ancient philosophies, 305
theories, 316 Anderson, 4
abstraction, 283 Andrew Ross, 116
Abul Fazl, 259 antagonism, 115
academic chemist, 204 antagonists, 199
academic historians, 199 Antanio Favaro, 175
acceleration, 289 anthropology, 167
acid-base theories, 280 anti-Aristotelian way, 178
acidic, 198 anti-dogmatism, 331
acidic principle, 198 anti-evolutionism, 115
Adam Schall, 236 anti-foundationalist, 104
Adas, 54 anti-intellectualism, 21, 86
Advaita Vedanta, 258 anti-racist, 211
African-American Baseline Essays, 53 anti-racist mathematics, 211
Afrocentrism, 116 anti-realism, 71
ahistorically, 198 anti-realist, 58
AI, 98 anti-reductionism, 62
al Farabi, 241 anti-science, 21, 116
al Ghazal, 257 antiscientific views, 5
al Haitham, 241 Antoine Lavoisier, 198
al Hajjaj, 241 Apastamba, 225
al Kind, 241 Apollonius, 214, 243
al-Hayatham, 238 Arab and European mathematics, 229
Ala Samarapungavan, 167 Arab mathematics, 214
Alan Sokal, 85, 116 Archimedes, 175, 179, 214, 242
Alessandro Volta, 333 areas of physics, 204
Alexander, 243 Aristotelian, 163, 181
Alexandrian school, 180 causality, 48
Algebra, 262 conceptual scheme, 175
algebra, 280 dynamics, 29
alkaline earths, 282 logic, 257
Almagest, 243 Scholasticism, 46
alphabet-numeral system of notation, 229 view, 175
Alternative world-view, 176, 177
frameworks in electricity, 289 Aristotelian science, 185
alternative Aristotelianism, 46
conceptions, 292
Aristotle, 175, 178, 192, 242, 243, 249, 250, 257, Baudhyana, 225
261, 267 Baudrillard, 104
thesis, 183 Beardsley, 4
Arithmetic, 262 beginning of science, 305
arithmetic, 209 behaviour
Arnauld, 76 atoms, 202
Aron, 291, 295 ions, 202
Arthur Kornberg, 113 molecules, 202
artificial intelligence, 98 Behaviourism, 97
Aryabhata, 221, 226, 251 behaviourism, 97, 98
Aryabhatiya, 221, 226, 230 psychology, 97
Aryabhatiyabhasya, 231 behaviourists, 97
Ashmore, 106 Behrens, 54
Asian and Afro-Carribbean origins, 211 beliefs, 312
ASPEN 1991, 289 Benjamin Peirce, 268
astrology, 105 Benoit Mendelbrot, 126
Astronomical, 47 Benseghir and Closset, 291
Astronomy, 46 Berkeley, 71, 76
astronomy, 46, 169, 228, 286 Berkeleyan idealism, 72
Atmospheric Science, 303 Berlin, 54
atomic museum, 216
nature of matter, 314 Bernal, 246
structure, 280 Bertrand Russell, 5, 23
theory of structure, 281 Bhaskara-I, 221, 226
atomic physics, 43 Bijaganita, 222
atomic structure, 281 biochemistry, 282
Atomism, 46 Biogas, 314
Atomists, 179 biological
atoms, 199, 206, 279, 284, 334 condition, 202
Augustine, 245, 258 science, 309
Augustus De Morgan, 237 Biology, 303, 312
authoritarian, 135, 331 biology, 204, 286, 311
authoritarianism, 331 Biosphere, 312
autonomy view, 97 biotic factors, 311
Avogadros hypothesis, 281 Birkhoff, 245, 250
axiom, 255, 266 Birkhoff s axioms, 255
axiomatic Bishop, 112, 115
approach, 262 Bishop Auerilus, 244
method, 253, 262, 263, 266, 268, 269 Black-Body radiation, 31
axiomatico-deductive, 262 Blacks in Science: Ancient and Modern, 53
axiomatization, 261, 268 Bloor, 77, 89, 91, 9498, 103
Axioms, 253 Bloor & Barnes, 55
axioms, 255, 259 Bolyai, 266
Ayurveda, 305 bonding, 279
Boorse, 95
BAAS, 209 Boster & Johnson, 54
Babylonians, 253 botany, 286
Bacon, 48 Bown, 4
Baconian empiricism, 47 Boyle, 206
Baghdad, 213 Boyles law, 135, 332
balance of forces, 103 breast-feeding, 304
Barber, 54 Brethren of sincerity, 48
Barnes, 77, 95 Brown, 293
Basalla, 54 Browne, 116
Baudhayana Sulbasutras, 252 Bruno Latour, 116
Bucky ball, 208 CHEM
Bucky balls, 196 Study, 280285
Buddhist, 259 study, 203
and Jaina traditions, 255 Study program, 279
Burtt, 61, 119 Study Story, 281
Byzantium, 241 CHEM Study, 279, 281, 282
Chemical
C.P. Snows, 196 Education, 200
Cairo, 213 synthesis, 207, 208
calculus, 225 chemical
algorithms, 225 analysis, 209
differential,, 238 bonding, 280, 281
calendars, 312, 313 composites, 206
Caliph al-Mamun, 241 compounds, 281
Caliph al-Mansur, 241 concept, 205, 207
caloric constituent, 198
thermodynamics, 29 contexts, 201
carbon curriculum, 209
chemistry, 282 education, 196, 200, 201, 203, 205, 207
rings, 282 element, 206
Cardinal Bellarmine, 94 elements, 206
Cardona, 239 equilibrium, 206
careers facts, 204
science, 323 industry, 202
science and technology, 326 knowledge, 202, 287
Carr, 42 phenomena, 205
Cartesian, 76 philosophers, 206
purpose, 268 philosophy, 206
approach, 269 processes, 280
dualism, 72 reactions, 280
epistemology, 72 species, 205
model, 72 substance, 198
split, 47 synthesis, 208
Case Study, 163 chemical education
categorical aim, 200
thinking, 184 Chemical Education Material study, 279
view, 178 chemical knowledge
cattle and birds, 314 applications, 202
causal view, 96 Chemistry, 285, 303, 312
causality, 61, 96 chemistry, 44, 46, 200, 202204, 206, 207, 279,
Aristotelian, 48 280, 282, 287, 311, 335
order, 61 aims, 204
causation, 61 citizens, 201
Cavalieri, 239 courses, 203, 205
celebration of science, 111, 117 educators, 201
celestial bodies, 304 environment, 282
cell structure, 310 instruction, 203
central science, 204 laboratory, 283
centrality of science, 125 learners, 203
change, 165 physics, 206
characteristics, 304 solar system, 282
charge/mass ratios, 281 textbook, 284
Charles Darwin, 54 chemists, 201, 203, 206, 207
Charles Eliot Norton, 41 chemists and scholars, 204
Charles Whish, 226 Chiappetta, 332
Chiappetta et al., 319 Cohen, Eylon and Ganniel, 290
child psychologist, 286 Colebrooke, 237
childrens theories, 167 Collingwood, 61
China, 213 Collins, 21, 86, 98, 99
Chinese, 253 colloquial positivism, 117
Chinese encyclopaedia, 42 colonial
Chinese science, 61 science, 209
Chiu Chang Suan Shu, 237 common
Chomsky, 97, 104, 106 laboratory procedures, 202
Chou Pei, 218 common domestic equipment, 315
Christian rationalists, 260 Common Mans Science, 302, 303, 315, 316
Christian science, 62 common notions, 264
circuit diagram, 291 community of science, 62
cis-trans isomerism, 281 community- and context-specific, 302
citizen, 209 community-level, 307
clashing current model, 289, 290 compound, 198, 206, 208
classical approach of teaching, 296 compound nature, 198
classical Greek, 214 compound nature of water, 198
classical Greek mathematics, 214 compounds, 204, 206
classical Greek tradition, 242 comprehension, 327
classical view of realism, 117 computer science, 41
classification, 308, 316 concept
classification and manipulation, 307 of resistors, 290
classification and taxonomy, 286 charge, 295
classification of forms of life, 303 common mans science, 316
classification system, 286 convergence, 232
classroom current, 291, 296
teaching, 211 formation, 309
Claudius Ptolemy, 243, 244 fundamental, 206
Clement, 289, 293 limit, 237
Cleopatra, 243 map, 125
clinical interview, 167 proof, 220
Clothing, 312 conception of constructivism, 72
CMS, 302307, 309, 312, 314317 conception of current, 295
curricula, 306 conceptions
education, 315 alternative, 292
CMS curricula, 307, 309 conceptions of knowledge, 72
Cobern, 60, 61 concepts, 198, 201, 206, 207, 301, 317, 324, 332
Cobern & Aikenhead, 118 abstract, 316
Cobern, Gibson & Underwood, 124 and principles of science, 317
Cognitive chemistry, 195
Science, 133, 163 science, 165, 196
science, 137, 165 conceptual
cognitive learning, 208
conflicts, 175 structures, 166
developmental research, 165 Conceptual change, 166
entity, 159 conceptual change, 165167, 173, 175, 289, 293
psychologists, 178 295
revolution, 98 approach, 165
science, 98 conditions for, 292
structures, 76, 328 conceptual development, 173
turn, 154 conceptual scheme
Cognitive-historical, 164 Aristotelian, 175
cognitive-historical, 137 modern, 175
cognitively, 57 conceptual space, 159
conceptual systems, 283 Crease, 112
conceptual understanding of the periodic table, creation science, 52
287 creative imagination, 202
conceptualizations of science, 126 critical
conceptually networked, 204 assessment, 324
confidence and skill, 202 pedagogy, 116
conformation, 205 unbiased observation, 201
congruence, 259 critical-logical-analytical thinking, 10
Congruence Axiom, 253 crops, 314
conjectures and refutations, 24 cross-cultural
connectionist model, 159 research, 167
conservation of energy, 122 studies, 289
constant current, 290 CRT tubes, 281
Constituents of foodstuffs, 310 crtical thingking
constraints, 172 skills, 13
construction crystallization, 285
hypotheses, 202 cultural
constructive empiricism, 71, 94 capital, 114
constructivism, 71, 77, 80 chauvinism, 63
Kantian,, 72 enterprise, 196
social, 21, 8587, 91, 94, 95, 9799, 106, 117 hegemony science, 63
varieties, 71 imperialism, 52
constructivist, 21, 85, 104106 culture
programme, 96 expansionist, 54
teaching methods, 13 curricula, 302, 309
constructivists, 100 CMS, 306
content of science text, 319 reforms, 203
context science, technology and society, 13
discovery, 193 science-technology-society, 123
contextualised, 331 curriculum, 40, 242, 280, 286
contextualist, 104 construction, 289
continuum hypothesis, 91 educational implications, 106
conventional curricula, 312 hidden, 319
Conventional science, 303 Czeslaw Milosz, 41
conventional sciences, 302, 306, 310, 316, 317
conventionally, 302 D.C. Phillips, 86
convergence proof, 258 D. Mazlish, 48
convergent thinking, 24 Dark Ages, 212
Coomaraswamy, 42 Darwin, 47, 60
Copernican Revolution, 47 theory of organic evolution, 332
Copernican revolution, 140 theory, 98
Copernicus, 100 theory of evolution, 138
copper, 192 David Hume, 28, 219
Cordoba, 213 David W. Ridgway, 281
corporeal nature of the media, 185 day and night cycle, 167
Corsiglia & Snively, 56 day/night cycle, 167, 171
Cosmology, 303 De Caelo, 185
Costa, 113 De Motu, 175, 176
counter-inductive, 176 De Revolutionibus, 71
counter-intuitive, 176, 196, 251 Dea Caelestis, 244
course deconstruction
chemistry, 201, 203 science, 121
courses deconstructionist, 103
chemistry for citizens, 204 affectation, 103
cramming, 317 Dedekind, 248
deduction, 267 physical, 253
reasoning, 330 thought, 62
deductive domains
method of proof, 251 knowledge, 63
reasoning, 176, 322, 334 domains of knowledge, 117
definition, 266 dominant discourse of science, 63
science, 62 Drabkin, 175
DeLoria, 53 Driver, 5860, 289
demonstrations, 293 Driver and Easley, 165, 289
denser media, 192 Driver and Oldham, 289, 295
Densmore, 21 Drori, 115
Derek Hodson, 286 Drosophila, 113
derivation, 267 drugs, 204
derivations, 301 drycell, 333
Derrida, 102 dual earth, 168
Derridadaism, 103 dualism
Descartes, 48 Cartesian,, 72
Descartes, 72 Duit, 294
descriptive chemistry, 280, 282 Durant, 112
design of experiments, 202 Durkheim, 88, 89
Desmond & Moore, 60 Durkheimian view, 96
development Duschl, 59, 118
European thought, 48 dynamics, 180
mathematics, 213 Aristotelian, 29
science, 61, 279, 331 Dyson, 112
science concepts, 165
scientific skills, 307 E.H. Carr, 195
developmental level, 323, 327 eclipse, 313
dialectic, 138 eclipses, 313
differential ecological systems, 122
calculus, 238 Edgar Jenkins, 111
Diophantus, 214 Edinburgh Strong Programme, 87
disc earth, 168 education, 165, 255, 260
discourse and research, 316
science, 63 CMS, 315
discovery, 175, 176 health, 310
electron, 284 higher stages, 316
epistemic, 176 liberal, 10
Greek learning, 213 technical, 10
Disease, 310 educational implications for the curriculum, 106
disease, 317 educationally backward, 317
disequilibrium, 179 Edward Jenner, 333
diSessa, 165 Egyptians, 253
divergent thinking, 24 Einstein, 176
Dmitri Mendeleev, 284 Einstelling effect, 292
DNA, 114 Eleaticiam, 46
extraction, 114 electric current, 289, 291
model, 332 electrical
synthesis enzyme, 113 engineering programme, 291
Doberiner, 283 nature of atoms, 281
dogma, 48 electricity, 262, 289, 295, 296, 308
dogmas, 317 alternative frameworks, 289
dogmatic, 331 electrokinetics, 291
domain, 58 electromagnetic
empirical, 253 theory, 44
electron pluralism, 65, 66
exclusion principle, 282 position, 117
orbital hybridization, 281 presuppositions, 170
orbitals, 279, 286 pyramid, 64, 118, 122
structures, 280 reconstruction, 175
electronic relativists, 51
configuration, 284 epistemology, 11, 55, 75, 77, 111, 118, 156
orbitals, 284 Cartesian, 72
structure, 279 naturalization, 156
structures, 280 science, 156
electrostatics, 291, 306 Eratosthenes, 242
circuits, 291 Eric Hoffer, 118
element, 204, 206 Ernst von Glasersfeld, 71
and a compound, 206 Escherichia coli, 113
element, mixture and compound, 206 essentialism, 178
elementary particles, 305 estimating, 312
Elements, 241244, 257262 ethical, 41
Arabic-Islamic tradition, 242 ethnic minority populations, 211
elements, 280 ethnomathematics, 218, 238
empirical ethnomethodology of science, 100
consistency, 59 ethnoscience, 54, 106
explanation, 96 Euclid, 175, 214, 242246, 261, 262, 265
facts, 259 historicity, 243
inputs, 193 the geometer, 242
issue, 195 Euclidean geometry, 222, 241, 246, 251, 252, 255,
knowledge, 253 259, 262
naturalistic science, 93 Eudemus, 243
nature of science, 322, 331, 334 Eudoxus, 242, 243
observations, 193, 207 Eurocentric trajectory, 213
question, 200 Eurocentrism, 214
tests, 201 European
empirical-experimental chemical philosophers, 206
inquiry, 122 mathematics, 212
empiricism, 72 Evolution
empiricist, 28 theory of, 53
framework, 165, 170 evolution, 118
views, 25 East and West Arab numerals, 214
empiricity, 325 number system, 214
energy, 308, 312 evolutionary biologists, 118
energy and power, 314 examples and analogies, 293
enlightening, 301 exclusion by definition, 214
Enneads, 258 exclusivity of science, 62
environment, 306, 308, 309, 311, 316 existence of atom, 281
laboratory, 208 experimental science, 282
environmental science, 13, 311 experimentalist, 147
episodic conceptualisation, 292 experimentation, 307, 308, 316, 331
epistemic nature, 176 experiments, 312
discovery, 176 explanations
epistemic strength of the seasons, 167
discovery, 176 of the weather, 167
epistemological, 43, 52, 65 extracted DNA, 113
egalitarianism, 106 extremist social constructivism, 117
hegemony, 52 Eylon and Linn, 289, 291
perspectives, 55
pinnacle, 63 face numerals, 216, 217
facts, 324, 332 concepts in chemistry, 206
factual, 167 principles, 202
factual question, 167
falasifa, 257 G.E.R. Lloyd, 221
fallibilism, 77 Galilean
fallibility of science, 14 Platonism, 47
falsifiability world-view, 177
Popperian,, 72 Galileo, 48, 175, 199
Falsificationism, 46 experiments with pendulum, 199
Faraday, 126 Gardner, 98
Farrington, 24 Gargi, 217
feminist science, 13 Garrard & Wegierski, 118
fetal tissue research, 126 Garrard and Wegierski, 64
figure of 8 knots, 216 gas laws, 280
Fihrist, 241, 242 gases, 198
Finneran, 117 Gaskell, 111
First Nations science, 62 Gauss, 43
five elements, 305 Ge Yuan Mi Lu Jie Fa, 237
flattened sphere, 168 gedanken, 185
folk Geertz, 61
knowledge, 305 general
science, 302, 304, 316 education, 301, 306, 316, 317
food items, 304 principles, 306, 316
Foodstuffs, 312 principles of science, 303
force, 181, 289, 303 public, 301
balance, 103 science, 306
formal science curricula, 316
axiomatics, 259 science education, 200, 301, 306, 307, 316
definitions, 309 theories of science, 303
logic, 154 general aim of chemistry, 200
mathematics, 258 general education, 200
metric geometry, 259 generalization, 302
synthetic geometry, 259 generalization and abstraction, 286
formalism, 316 generative justification, 164
formalistic approach, 255 generative question, 167
foundations genetic arrangements and chromosomal structures,
geometry, 246 113
mathematics, 261 geocentric, 173, 303, 304
modern thought, 104 geocentric phenomenological theory, 303
four elements, 177 geography, 122, 209
Four Western Imperatives, 118 geology, 286
fourth and fifth-row transition metals, 282 geometric equality, 243
fractal geometry, 126 Geometry, 262
framework theory, 166, 170 geometry, 207, 241, 243, 250, 257259, 267
Francis Crick, 119 foundations, 246
Frederick Grinnell, 58 teach, 260
Fredric Jameson, 116 traditional, 254, 259
Freeman Dyson, 116 geometry of the sulbasutra-s, 259
Freud, 47 Georg Cantor, 91
Freyberg, 289 George Bernard Shaw, 39
Fuller, 52 George Boole, 238
function George Wald, 43
maxima, 237 Gernet, 61
minima, 237 Gibson, 51
fundamental Gieryn, 58
Gilbert and Watts, 289 Heath, 243
Gillespie, 203, 204 Hegel, 88, 98
Gillispie, 204 hegemony, 51, 118
Gilmer, 117 Heidegger, 64, 104, 106, 118
Giroux & McLaren, 116 Heilbron, 4
gnomon, 265 Heisenberg, 42, 43
goals of courses in chemistry, 203 heliocentric, 173, 303
gold, 192 theory, 42, 303
good pedagogy, 285 hellenistic
good science, 199, 285 astronomy, 48
Goodstein, 115 Persian traditions, 214
Gottfried and Kyle, 319 science, 46
Grant, Sleeter, & Anderson, 116 traditions, 214
gravity concept, 168 world, 213
Greek Helm, Hugh and Novak, 165
atomists, 177 Helmholtz, 249
thought, 46 Hendrick Hart, 119
Greeks, 253 Henry, 77
Gregorian, 312 Henry Giroux, 116
Gregorian and Saka, 313 hermeneutic
Gregory, 225 circle, 121
Gregory series, 228 interpretation, 119
Gross, 116, 119 hermeneutical problem, 29
Gross & Levitt, 5, 112 hermeneutics, 120
Gross and Levitt, 99 Hermotimus, 242
Grove, 5 Heron, 242, 243
growth Hertz, 39
science, 200, 201 Hesse, 58
growth of science, 201 hidden
Guba & Lincoln, 59 curriculum, 319
Gunther Stent, 113 higher
Guthrie, 24 mathematics, 268
Gutwill, 291 stages, 316
Gwalior system Hijri, 313
representing numbers, 214 Hilbert, 245, 246, 258
Hindu
Haji Khalfa records, 241 science, 106
Haldane, 126 society, 42
Halliday and Resnick, 294 historian, 85
halogens, 282 geometry, 243
Hamlet, 42 mathematics, 213
Hans Jonas, 39 science, 41, 200
Harding, 118 historical, 41, 43, 58
Hardison, 122 evolution of institutions of science, 47
Harun ar-Rashid, 241 aspects of science, 41
Haruni, 241 continuity, 201
Hashweh, 289, 292, 294 development of an idea, 333
Hawking & Penrose, 61, 117 episodes, 197
health, 306, 309, 316 relativism, 99
education, 310 historicity
science, 309 Euclid, 243
healthy histories
foods, 307 geometry, 242
habits, 307, 316 mathematics, 217
heat, 289 historiography, 53, 58
history, 42, 44, 122, 195, 211, 241 idealism, 77, 93
and epistemology of science, 13 and relativism, 92
and philosophy of mathematics, 261 Berkeleyan,, 72
and philosophy of science, 4, 6, 15, 21, 32, Idealists, 61
40, 43, 44, 72, 176, 195, 197, 199, 200, Idealists view, 61
261 idealize, 199
of chemical education, 205 idealized systems, 193
of chemical synthesis, 209 ideas of chemical synthesis, 208
of chemistry, 200, 204207 ideology for science education, 201
of development of science, 331 ignorant of history, 42
of Indian mathematics, 239 IIT Kanpur, 3941
of mankind, 302 IIT, Bombay, 261
of science, 9, 23, 3941, 43, 46, 96, 175, 195, imagination, 176
199, 200, 204, 207, 246, 283, 330 Immanuel Kant, 28
of science in India, 40 imperative
of scientific ideas, 40, 41, 46, 47 economic, 118
of synthesis of chemical compounds, 208 naturalism, 118
what, 42, 195 scientistic, 118
Hodson, 55 technocratic, 118
Holiday, 319 Imperial Board of Astronomy, 237
Holliday, 319 implications
Holliday and Whittacker, 319 curriculum, 106
hollow sphere, 168 for science education, 85
Holton, 5, 112, 115, 117 of research findings, 289
homeostasis, 122 of social constructivism, 103
Horton, 61 Inarticulate Science, 111
Horwood, 60 Inca Quipu, 216
hotchpotch geometry, 253 incommensurability, 72
Housing, 312 Kuhnian, 72
HPS, 21 Incompleteness theorem, 90
and science education, 6, 11 incorporeal, 183
in teacher education, 15 India, 213
human history of science, 40
anatomy, 310 industrial and social progress, 39
genome project, 126 Indian
humanistic astronomy, 228
issues, 135 Brahmi system, 214
studies, 135 geometry, 255
Humes racist views, 219 mathematics, 220222, 226, 228, 230, 239
hunger, 317 numerals, 214
Hunter Havelin Adams, 53 science, 47, 55
hydrostatics, 193 indigenous
Hypatia, 217, 244 culture, 315
hypotheses, 332 knowledge, 63
construction, 202 individual phenomena, 202
hypothesis, 209 individualistic, 296
hypothetico-deductive Indo-American programme, 39
method, 117, 303 Indo-Arab numerals, 214
mode of reasoning, 209 induction, 176
systems, 306, 316 inductive
generalizations, 178
Ian Hacking, 207 method, 25
Ibid, 192 reasoning, 176, 322, 334
Ibn Sna, 241 inductively, 176
ideal chemical experiment, 199 inductivism, 46, 296
inductivist, 28, 178 isomorphism, 284
industrial, 314 issue of synthesis, 204
and social progress in India, 39 Issues in Science and Technology, 116
chemist, 204 Ivan Sertima, 116
inertia, 134, 181 Ivan Van Sertima, 53
infinite
cardinal numbers, 91 J.B. Cohen, 41
infinite series, 225, 231 J.D. Novak, 165
inner observation, 310 J.F. Daniel, 333
innocent of philosophy, 42 J. de Fontaney, 236
innovation, 315 Jacob Bronowski, 22
inquiry learning, 13 Jaina, 259
inscriptionalist, 104 James Conant, 9
instruction, 165, 170 James Gregory, 228
instructional strategies, 319 James Rutherford, 9
instrumental Jamshid al-Kashi, 235
causation, 61 Japanese temple geometry, 241
knowledge, 61 Jean Piaget, 286
instrumentalism, 71, 72, 94 Jegede and Okebukola, 319
interaction of science with society, 331 Jenkins, 112
interaction of science, technology and society, 321, Jerome, 245
325, 330 John Cairns, 113
interdisciplinary John Fauvel, 219
nature of chemistry, 203 John McDowell, 77
science curricula, 123 John Polkinghorne, 127
interest Johnson, 59
science, 122, 123, 202 Jon D. Miller, 5
science and chemistry, 203 Joseph Novak, 13
interest in chemistry, 202 Joseph Priestley, 198
International History, Philosophy and Science Teach- Judson, 114
ing Group, 6 Jund-i-Shapur, 213
introduction Justinian, 245
zero, 214 Jyesthadeva, 226228
intuitive
framework theory, 168 K.S. Gandhi, 41
knowledge of electrostatics, 291 K.V. Sarma, 228
notion of equality, 261 K. Tobin, 78
physical idea, 259 Kant, 41, 71, 250, 254, 261
physics, 166 Kantian, 93
scientific views, 168 Kantian constructivism, 72
theories, 170 Kapalli, 327
investigative Karanapaddati, 226
nature of science, 320, 322324, 328, 331 Karl Mannheim, 89
processes, 331 Karl Marx, 219
Ionian Nature-philosophy, 46 Karl Popper, 113
irrational katapayadi, 229
numbers, 248 Katyayana, 225
theories, 95 Kawagley, 52, 53, 55, 56, 60, 63
irrationality, 96, 115 Kay, 230
Ishale at-Kindi, 48 Keplers Harmony of the World, 126
Ishango bone, 215 Kerala
Islamic mathematics, 226, 228, 235, 238
rationalists, 257, 260 school, 225, 228, 230
science, 46, 62, 106 Kevin Finneran, 116
thinkers, 242 Kevles, 115
key concepts, 306 Lebesgue measure, 251
khichdi geometry, 253 Lechlanche, 333
kinematics, 164, 180 Lederman, 319
kinetic molecular theory of gases, 281 Lehman, 103
kinetic theory, 204, 280 Leibnitzian Mathesis Universalis, 47
knots, 216 Leibniz, 225
knowledge levels
construction, 60 abstraction, 303
indigenous, 5153 phenomenology, 303
instrumental, 61 Levitt, 116, 119
nature, 89 Lewenstein, 111
procedural, 292 Library
representation, 159 Alexandria, 243
science, 171, 320322, 327, 331 Library of Alexandria, 244
scientific, 154 light, 289
social interaction, 331 particle/wave, 53
society, 89 liking for science, 201
validity, 106 limitations of science, 203
Kosambi, 42 limited, 302
Kosslyn, 97 Linden, 55
Kriyakramakari, 226, 231 linguistic
Kronberg Castle, 42 interference, 292
Kuhn, 24, 41 turn, 154
Kuhnian incommensurability, 72 linking of the textual content, 327
links with physics and biology, 204
laboratory, 207 Linn, 319
common procedures, 202 Linus Pauling, 113
experimentation, 280 Liu Hui, 237
Ladriere, 54 Lobachevskii, 266
Lakatos, 96 local units, 312
Lake Edward, 215 Locke, 76, 77
language, 166 logic, 99, 267
Laplacian certainty, 117 and reason, 48
Larry Laudan, 86 and science education, 10
lateral thinking, 24 Aristotelian, 257
Latour, 99102 formal, 154
Latour and Woolgar, 99, 102104 mathematics, 261
Laudan, 21, 58, 96 logical
Laudan and Stove, 99 deduction, 255
Lavoisier, 198, 199, 279 inconsistency, 173
Lavoisiers four experiments, 198 modality, 193
law positivistic, 154
free fall, 175 logical positivism, 117
inertia, 176 lunar, 313
nature, 208 calendar, 215
periodicity, 284 luni-solar, 313
Layton, 112, 115 Lynda Birke, 115
Leach, 58 Lynn White, 115
lead, 192 Lyotard, 55
learning
chemistry, 205 M.D. Srinivas, 222
science, 165, 166, 171, 320, 328 M.I.T., 39
skills, 331 M. Chastrette and C. N. R. Rao, 203
teaching chemistry, 203 M. J. Frazer, 200
through science, 203 Macauley, 255
Macquare, 206 Mayan civilisation, 216
Madhava, 226, 227 Mayer, 3
Madhava-Gregory series, 228 Mazlish, 43
Madhava-Leibniz, 231 McDermott and Shaffer, 289291
Madhava-Leibniz series, 229 McKinley, 55
Madras Literary Society, 226 measurements, 312
magic square, 218 mechanical
Magnetism, 262 composites, 206
mahabhutas, 305 particles, 206
Malebranche, 76, 77 philosophy, 206
Mamuni, 241 Mechanics, 46
manipulation, 308, 316 mechanics, 169, 262, 281
Mannheim, 95 mechanistic world picture, 135
Maori science, 62 media, 192
map the students conception, 289 medicine, 46
Marshak, 215 medium
Martin Eger, 112 quicksilver, 192
Martin Heidegger, 117 zero density, 192
Martin Kline, 200 Mendel, 334
Marx, 47, 88 Mendeleev, 283287
Marxist, 42 chemical ideas, 287
Mary Boole, 238 experimental approach, 286
materialism, 135 mensuration, 306, 309, 312, 316
mathematical mental
artefact, 215 models, 166, 168, 171
knowledge, 212 models of the earth, 168
philosophy, 268 prodigies, 219
proof, 253, 255 representation, 168
reasoning, 193 training, 209
mathematics, 46, 212, 245, 247, 253, 255, 258, Mercator, 225
261, 266268, 281, 283, 335 Merton, 95, 105
Africa, 212, 213, 215 Mertonian
Arab, 214 norms, 105
curriculum, 223 social attributes, 205
development, 213 meta-scientific, 21
devlopment, 47 metaconceptual awareness, 167
education, 71 metamathematical definition, 255
European and Arab, 229 metamathematical notion of proof, 259
higher, 268 metaphysical, 61, 82, 93, 134, 255
Indian, 222, 226, 239 domain, 255
Kerala, 226, 228, 235, 238 realism, 75, 92
logic, 261 metaphysicians, 177
modern, 251 metaphysics, 11, 32, 64, 72, 75, 111, 117, 118,
pedagogy, 238 127, 254
teachers, 211 meteorology, 286
mathemtics method
Arab, 214 chemical analysis, 209
Matteo Ricci, 236, 239 proof, 259
matter science, 197, 203, 305
atomic nature, 314 methodological, 43
Matthews, 52, 60 methodology and epistemology of science, 9
Mauss, 89 Metioui, 291
Max Delbrock, 113 metric, 255
Max Planck, 31, 282 metric and synthetic approaches, 254
Maxwell, 301 metric and synthetic geometry, 254
metric approach, 258 perspective, 56
metric geometry, 259 perspectives, 51, 58
metric, synthetic, or traditional, 259 science, 53, 56
Michael Matthews, 199, 200 science education, 13
Michael Ruse, 118 multiculturalism, 55
Michel Foucault, 42 mathematics, 214
Michelson-Morley experiment, 42 multiculturalists, 62, 63
Micro-organisms, 312 multisciences, 56
microwave and infrared spectroscopy, 281 Mutazilah, 257
Middle Ages, 46 mysterious, 315
Mill, 261
Millar, 58 N.R. Hanson, 43
Miller, 319 nave inductivism, 198
Ming Antu, 237 Nadeau & Desautels, 118
Ministry of Education, 40 Nalanda, 252
misconceptions, 165, 166, 171, 289, 291 Nanda, 106
about science, 133 Narayana, 226, 231
mixture, 206 NAS, 112
mixture and a compound, 206 Nasiruddin, 241
mixtures, 206 Native American views, 57
model natives, 209
Cognitive Science, 137 natural
statics, 180 kinds, 160
models, 332 motion, 180
current, 289 phenomena, 59, 120
modern philosopher, 120
academic chemistry, 283 philosophy, 53, 120, 195
conceptual scheme, 175 resources, 202, 312
electron orbital theory, 283 sciences, 118, 195
mathematics, 214, 225, 232, 251 naturalism
science, 48, 316, 317 Quinean, 75
scientific discoveries, 315 naturalist, 58, 93
secondary chemistry, 283 naturalistic, 59, 93
western science, 63 conceptual system, 121
modern view, 175 observation, 52
Mohapatra, 292 observation and insight, 63
Mohapatra and Bhattacharya, 292 nature, 122
Mohini Mullick, 40 and method of science, 201
mole concept, 280 and philosophy of science, 320
molecular motions, 280 and science, 48
molecules, 334 of chemical bonding, 281
Molefi Asante, 116 of electronic orbitals, 279
momenta, 303 of Indian mathematics, 237
moral issues, 209 of knowledge, 89
Morris Kline, 220, 230 of light, 281
MORST, 4 of objectivity in science, 116
motion, 289 of science, 15, 22, 27, 58, 85, 99, 283, 301,
motions of celestial objects, 312 302, 316, 319322, 324328, 330, 331
Mueller, 261, 264 of scientific activity, 43
Mullick, 41 of scientific knowledge, 117, 154
multicultural, 52, 53 of scientific mode, 46
communities, 51 of synthesis, 208
literature on science, 62 Nayyayika notion of proof, 255
materials, 53 NCERT, 241, 252254, 320, 323330
mathematics, 211 NCERT text, 253
Needham, 61 observation, 309, 316
Neils Bohr, 42 observational
Nelkin, 52 astronomy, 167
Neoplatonic, 258 astronomy research project, 167
Neoplatonic linkages, 260 observing, 308
Neoplatonic principles, 257 of Research Programmes, 46
Neoplatonism, 244, 257, 258 of science, 286
Neoplatonists, 244, 260 Ogawa, 56
Neugebauer, 213 Ohms law, 291, 295
Neuhaus, 112 omissions and appropriation, 214
Neurath, 94 omnipotency of science, 331
New Apollonians, 135 On Floating Bodies, 180
new Dionysians, 135 one right answer, 282
Newlands, 283 oneness, 305
Newton, 47, 98, 225, 301 Ontario Board of Education, 279
inverse cube law, 95 Ontario program, 284
notebooks, 101 ontological, 43
Newtonian presuppositions, 170
mechanics, 302, 303, 306, 316 realism, 117
notion, 249 ontology, 76
synthesis, 47, 48 optics, 281
Niels Bohr, 282 order and causality, 61
night-sky, 312 organic or inorganic, 207
Nilakantha, 226, 227, 231 organization, 320
nitric oxide, 198 origin
non-Euclidean, 266 alternative framework, 292
geometry, 211 origin of science, 24
non-European origins of modern science, 30
mathematical traditions, 220 Orwell, 104
mathematics, 235 Osborne, 289
non-living nature, 311 outcomes of learning of science, 319
non-science, 58, 195 Overton, 52
non-stoichiometry, 205 Owens, 54
Normal Dahl, 39 oxygen, 198
Norman Levitt, 85 and hydrogen, 198, 199
Norris, 104, 106 discovery, 279
Norris-Tull & Norris-Tull, 52 oxygene, 198
Norris-Tull, & Norris-Tull, 53
notion P.R.K. Rao, 41
inequality, 261 Pappus, 243, 265
rapidity of convergence, 232 paracetamol, 305
space and time, 176 paradigm, 100, 199
Novak, 165, 289 paradigmatic shifts, 46
NSTA, 112 parallel postulate, 267
number system, 214 parameters, 309
parapsychology, 105
O.B. Hardison, 114 partitioning, 305
Oakely, 39 Passmore, 5
objective pathological tests, 310
education, 258 pathshala-s, 252
knowledge, 75 Paul Gross, 85
objectivism, 59 Paul Saltman, 113
objectivity, 325 Paulus Gerdes, 219
and precision, 202 pedagogical, 53
of science, 322 pedagogoy
critical, 116 Plato, 242, 243, 250, 254, 265
pedagogy, 77 Platonic idealism, 255
good, 285 Platonic philosophy, 247
mathematics, 238 Platonic-Kantian, 251
Peoples science, 305 Platonic-Pythagorean Tradition, 149
Peoples science movements, 47 Platonism, 46
periodic law, 284, 286 Plotinus, 258
periodic table, 279, 280, 282284, 313 political
personal cleanliness, 307 philosophy, 14
perspective on science, 55 science, 219
Perspectives Polymer substances, 335
Multicultural, 51 polymerase enzyme, 113
Peru, 216 Popper, 22, 98, 106
pessimistic historical meta-induction, 22 Popperian
phenomenological, 302, 314 falsifiability, 72
theory, 303 porphyry, 192, 243, 258
phenomenology, 303306, 316, 317 positional
health, 310 number system, 216
practical subjects, 306 system, 214
Philippus, 242 positivism, 117
philosopher, 85, 118 Posner, 289
philosopher of science, 22 post colonialism, 55
philosophical, 41, 58 post modernism, 55
analysis, 206 post-epistemological, 76
arguments, 197 post-modernist, 71
aspects of science, 41 postmodernist philosophy, 14
materialism, 117 postulates, 265
views, 58 potential difference, 291, 295
views about science, 204 practical
philosophies, 202 applications of chemistry, 282
philosophy, 3, 42, 46, 54, 58, 76, 117, 195 mathematics, 258
of logical positivism, 117 skills, 316
of Neoplatonism, 244 pragmatic
of science, 911, 14, 23, 28, 40, 46, 71, 75, conception of science education, 21
176, 196, 203, 205 view, 58
science, 58 pragmatism, 200
phlogistic chemistry, 29 pragmatist, 104
phrenology, 90 pre-scientific, 304
physical knowledge-systems, 302
analogies, 181 presocratics, 24
condition, 202 primary
particles, 206 education, 307
science, 309 ontological reduction, 3941, 43, 44
systems, 193 school level, 316
physics, 41, 185, 204, 206, 250, 261, 289, 303, 312, prime numbers, 215
335 Principe, 27
physiology, 309, 310 Principia, 21, 98
Piaget, 71 principle, 202, 286, 301, 317, 332
Pickering, 104 and theories, 306
Pierre Jartoux, 236 chemical elementarity, 199
Pierre Macquare, 206 chemical simplicity, 199
Pillars of health, 310 chemistry, 203, 279, 284
Pinch, 21, 86, 99, 106 conservation of mass, 199
Pinch and Collins, 105 equilibrium, 179
planetary motions, 303 fundamental, 202
mechanics, 39 racist history, 252
unifying, 202 radical
problem solving, 333, 334 constructivism, 71, 72
procedural knowledge, 292, 295 relativism, 119
process of enquiry, 327 skepticism, 106
processes of science, 320, 332 social constructivist, 119
Proclus, 242245, 251, 254, 257, 259 social constructivists, 116, 117, 119
professional CMS courses, 306, 316 sociologist of scientific knowledge, 121
Proficiency Levels of Rural School, 301 radioactive properties, 282
Project 2000+, 111 radioactivity, 280
proof, 253, 266 Ramanujan, 238
deductive, 251 rampant relativism, 86
properties of elements, 280 rare-earths, 282
protagonists, 199 rarer media, 192
pseudo-science, 58, 106 rational, 56
pseudo-scientific, 26 reconstruction, 96
pseudoscience, 58 reconstruction of beliefs, 96
Pseudoscientific and irrational world views, 5 theology, 243, 251, 257
psychological form of constructivism, 71 rationalism, 72
psychologism, 97 rationalist, 58, 91, 94, 97, 98
psychologistic, 91 philosophers, 91, 96
psychologists, 165 philosophy of science, 92
psychology, 98 theories, 92
Ptolemy, 242, 243 view, 91
public rationality, 96, 99, 116
scientific literacy, 115 African, 116
square, 112, 117 and critical thinking, 24
understanding of science, 111, 127 Rayleigh-Jeans, 31
pure elements, 199 reaction mechanism, 205
pure hydrogen and pure oxygen, 199 reaction rates, 207
pure results, 199 real world experiments, 176
Putumana Somayajin, 226, 227 realism, 22
Pythagoras, 48, 214, 244, 265 realism/instrumentalism, 28
theorem, 253 realist, 58, 61
Pythagorean reason, 176
theorem, 250, 251, 254 reasoned thought, 96
viewpoint, 125 reasoning, 207, 307, 308, 316
Pythagoreanism, 46 mathematical, 193
Pythagoreans, 244 skills, 13
students, 322
qualitative rediscovery of Greek thought, 46
test, 209 reducibility, 305
visualisable models, 293 reductionistic thinking, 125
quantification and measurement, 263 relative density, 177
quantitative formulation of problems, 202 relativism, 66, 72, 93
quantum relativist, 21
mechanics, 31, 204, 279, 281, 303 relativistic, 178
theory, 31, 53 Relativistic Analysis, 178
questions, 322 Relativistic dethronement, 47
Quine, 94 relativity, 193
Quine-Duhem, 94 theory, 249
Quinean representations of numbers and space, 215
naturalism, 75 requirements, 314
underdetermination, 72 research
chemists in USA, 201
R. J. Gillespie, 203
cognitive developmental, 165 and technology, 39, 306, 311, 317, 323, 326,
scientists, 204 331, 334, 335
resistance, 291 and technology for society, 323
resistances, 192 and technology with society, 326
Richard Dawkins, 51, 119 anti, 115
Richard J. Merill, 281 antithetical, 117
ritual geometry, 259 basic knowledge, 331
Robert Boyle, 206 burden, 301
Robertta Barba, 53 celebration, 111
Roger Penrose, 61 central, 204
role of centrality, 125
chemistry, 205 centres, 315
history of chemistry, 200 cognitive enterprise, 39
history of science, 200 community, 62
Roth, 293 competencies, 327
Royal Asiatic Society, 226 computer, 41
rules of categorisation, 332 concept, 301, 317
Ruse, 112, 118 curricula, 55, 136, 165, 301, 303, 316
Russell, 248, 268 curriculum, 327
curriculum frameworks, 112
Sadratnamala, 227, 232 deconstruction, 121
Sagan, 60 definition of, 51, 52
Salviati, 175 dehumanises, 135
Samarapungavan, Vosniadou, & Brewer, 167 development, 61, 279, 331
Samarkand Observatory, 235 discourse, 63
Sample examination paper, 47 educationists, 320
Sandra Harding, 116 educators, 24
Sanitation, 312 empirical, 93
Sankara, 231 empirical nature, 322, 331, 334
Sankara Variyar, 226 epistemology, 156
Sankara Varman, 227 ethnomethodology of, 100
SAS postulate, 253 exclusivity, 62
Saxena, 289293 for all, 111, 114
school for common people, 301
Alexandrian, 180 for painters, 303
chemistry textbooks, 279 for physicians, 303
children, 211 good, 199, 285
education, 197, 302 growth, 200, 201
high, 301 historical activity, 42
Kerala, 225, 228, 230 historical aspects, 41
middle, 301 history of, 199
primary, 301 human activity, 201
science, 51, 52 in daily-life situations, 301
science curriculum, 52 instruction, 200, 209
science education, 315 interest, 122, 202
science textbook, 320 Islamic, 62
Schopenhauer, 250 learning, 165, 166, 171, 200, 320, 328
Schrodingers cat, 255 learning of, 165
science, 46, 51, 100, 195, 200, 209, 286, 301306, liking, 201
316, 322, 323, 331, 334 literacy crisis, 3
popularization among housewives, 315 methodological dimension, 11
wars, 21 nature, 331
alternative, 47 of pendulum motion, 7
and philosophy, 14 or scientific investigation, 196
and society, 331 pedagogy, 164
philosophical aspects, 41 ideas, 59, 111, 166, 196
philosophical dimension, 11 illiteracy, 101
popularization, 301, 302, 315 imagination, 175
principles, 301, 317 inquiry, 103, 293
purpose, 306 investigation, 304
society, 331 investigations, 113
Standard Account of, 53 knowledge, 810, 14, 55, 62, 86, 89, 92, 104,
standard account of, 66 116, 118, 121, 124, 125, 133, 135, 136,
teachers, 3 209, 213, 261, 332
teaching, 32 literacy, 115, 334
technology, and society, 196, 203 method, 39, 46, 197, 333, 334
theory, 301 methods of investigation, 202
thinking process, 331 model of current, 290
traditional, 302, 304, 305 organizations, 301
universal, 51, 52 outlook, 301, 306
universality of, 51 pipeline, 122
uses and abuses, 201 positivism, 111, 117, 119, 121
utilitarian view, 21 positivists, 120
wars, 52, 71, 85 progress, 63, 114
wars in India, 106 rationality, 106
western, 51, 53, 63 realism, 32
with society, 331 research, 325
science and technology revolution, 30, 46, 97
use, 319 skills, 316
science classrooms, 197 skills of observation, 307
science curricula text, 121
interdisciplinary, 123 themes and concepts, 125
science education, 5, 6, 8, 9, 24, 43, 51, 52, 56, 71, theory, 23, 60, 93, 94, 96, 102, 154, 167, 283,
78, 86, 100, 112, 123, 135, 171, 195 285
197, 199, 200, 205, 209, 226, 301, 306 thinking, 125, 322, 325, 326, 334
and logic, 10 truths, 44
curriculum, 196 understanding, 315
general education, 302 view of the earth, 168
multicultural, 13 ways of thinking, 112
programme, 164 world, 292
purpose, 302 description, 51
research, 165, 173 investigation, 302
science, technology and society, 40, 323, 334 knowledge, 66, 154
curricula, 13, 123 method, 286
science-technology-society, 14 theory, 93
scientific, 209, 306 theory construction, 269
enlightenment, 316 theory profile, 58
and epistemological relativism, 65 scientifically educated men and women, 126
and technological needs, 39 scientifically literate, 317
antirealism, 32 scientificity of science, 101
appreciation of nature, 306 scientism, 63, 64, 136
belief, 89, 98 scientist, 42, 200, 201, 207, 303, 306, 315, 323,
community, 40, 62, 111, 112, 117, 205 326, 333
concept, 5, 114, 168, 200, 295 Scott, 58
creativity, 306 second law of thermodynamics, 196
criteria, 202 secondary, 306, 309, 316
development and conceptual change, 13 school science textbooks, 320
disciplines, 41 education, 307
enterprise, 333 semiconductors, 204
experiments, 135 senior secondary, 306, 316
sequence model, 290 sodium metal, 209
Settle, 118 Sokal, 119
Shakespeare, 42 Sokal Hoax, 85
shape of the earth, 167, 173 solar, 313
Shepardson and Pizzini, 321 Solomon, 292
Shipstone, 289291, 293 solving problems of physics, 184
Side-Angle-Side, 248, 251 Sophism, 46
Signals, 310 sources, 302
Silver Chloride, 203 South America, 216
Simplicio, 175, 192 South Bihar, 301
sixth and seventh-row rare earths, 282 Spain, 213
Sjberg, 111 specific empirical statements, 178
Skinner, 97 specific-theories, 170
Skinnerian, 97, 98 speed, 192
Sky-watching, 313 spherical shape of the earth, 171
Slezak, 97, 98 spiritual phenomena, 59
slowness of motion, 183 spiritualism, 115
Smith, 289 Srinivas Ramanujan, 221
Smith, Blakeslee and Anderson, 294 stages of learning, 286
Smith, Siegel & McInerney, 5 stagnation, 317
Smolicz & Nunan, 118 standard account, 5153, 55, 56, 58, 6164
Snively & Corsiglia, 56, 59, 63, 65 standard units, 312
Snivley & Corsiglia, 53 Stanley & Brickhouse, 55, 59
social, 41 Stanley Fish, 116
constructivist view, 116 Stanley Miller, 113
activity, 296 state of equilibrium, 179
application, 205 statics, 180, 193
constructivism, 21, 8587, 9195, 9799, 106, stellar aberration, 303
117 Stephen Hawking, 61
constructivist doctrines, 87, 91, 104, 106 stereochemistry, 207
constructivist ideas, 104 Steve Fuller, 116
constructivist programme, 97 Steven Brush, 200
constructivist writings, 104 Sthananga Sutra, 226
constructivists, 94, 104 stoichiometry, 205, 280, 281
justice, 317 stories of scientific success, 114
nature of chemical discovery, 205 strategy
social sciences, 195 achieve conceptual change, 293
socio-cultural mileu, 319 conceptual change, 293
sociogical constructivist, 77 strict objectivity, 117
sociological, 58 Strike, Hewson and Gertzog, 292
form of constructivism, 71, 86 strong cultural aspect, 209
programme, 91 strong programme, 88, 89, 91, 9698
relativism, 95 structure, 205
relativist views, 21 atom, 279
sociologies of science, 14 periodic table, 279
sociologist, 85, 94, 95 structured curriculum, 293
of science, 117, 287 STS, 201
sociology, 95 education, 14
sociology of knowledge, 88, 89, 96, 97 students
sociology of science, 99 motivation and social maturity, 202
sociology of scientific knowledge, 87, 90, 91, 98, understanding of science, 202
104 understanding of technology, 202
Socratic dialogue, 293 students
sodium atom, 209 concept of current, 289
sodium chloride, 281 own bias, 324
reasoning in electrokinetics, 291 tertiary, 306
study textbook, 284
of chemistry, 205 Thabit Ibn Qurra, 241
of science and epistemology, 91 Thales, 214
sub-atomic particles, 284 Theaetetus, 242
sub-divided into disciplines, 303 theistic traditions, 120
subject matter of CMS, 304 Theocharis & Psimopoulos, 112
sulbasutra, 259 theological curriculum, 260
sulbasutra-s, 259, 260 theology, 48, 58, 252, 257
sulbasutras, 225, 230, 253 Theon, 243, 245
Summers, 294 Theonine, 248250
Summers, Kruger and Mant, 289 theorem of Menelaus, 243
super conductors, 208 theoretical
superstition, 305, 312, 314, 317 basis, 305
Sutton, 332 consistency, 59
swiftness of motion, 183 construction, 176
syllabi, 307 constructions, 193
symbolic models, 159 framework, 165, 166
Symptoms of health, 310 imagination, 176, 178
synthesis, 207, 208 model, 193
synthetic, 255 analysis, 206
approach, 258 theories, 202, 324, 332
aspect of chemistry, 204 scientific, 93
geometry, 253, 259 theory, 165
models, 167, 168, 170 knowledge, 104
electromagnetic, 44
T.L. Heath, 180 knowledge, 22
Tus, 241 theory of evolution, 4
Takebe Katahiro, 237 thermodynamic, 207
Takshashila, 252 thermodynamics, 204
Tantrasamgraha, 226 caloric, 29
Tasmania, 215 second law, 196
taxonomically ordered, 42 think logically, 202
Taxonomy, 286 thinking
Taylor series, 232 processes, 324, 329
teacher education, 289, 295 processes of science, 322, 325
teaching convergent, 24
and history, 39 divergent, 24
history and philosophy of science, 39 lateral, 24
classroom, 211 third planet, 282
geometry, 252 third world womens science, 106
physics, 296 Thomas Fuller, 218, 219
science, 165, 279, 319 Thomas Kuhn, 199
technical Thomist philosophy, 257
parameters, 311 Thompson, 284
terms, 309 Thorley and Woods, 289
technology, 306, 309 Thorndikes Law of Effect, 98
and scientific positivism, 118 Thornton, 295
agricultural, 316 thought
industrial, 316 activity, 324
teleological, 91, 97, 98 experiment, 176, 185, 321, 324, 333
teleological model, 96 experiment, 31
teleological view, 96 tidal action, 52
tempels, 54 TIMSS, 111
terminology, 315 Tobias, 126
Tobin & Tippins, 78 science, 62
Todhunter, 241, 248 concept of, 52
Toldeo, 213 science, 51, 62
total vacuum, 192 university science textbooks, 112
totalitarian, 99 Upapatti, 222
totality of science, 303 use of science and technology, 319
tradition of geometry, 260 uses and abuses of science, 201
traditional, 255, 316 utilitarian, 86
ecological knowledge, 56 view of science, 21
geometry, 254, 259
notion of proof, 254 V.K. Jairath, 41
parameter, 309, 315 vacuum, 186
representationalist theories, 76 valence electrons, 284
science, 302, 304, 305 validity of knowledge, 106
understanding, 316 van Fraassen, 71
wisdom, 317 varieties of constructivism, 71, 86
traditions vast generalizations, 302
Buddhist and Jaina, 255 verbal behaviour, 97
transcendental Victor Katz, 239
idealism, 73 Vidal Abarca and San Joze, 328
philosophy, 74 Vidal-Abraca and Sanzose, 327
transfer of the learning, 329 view
Treagust, Harrison and Venville, 294 equality, 295
treatment of data, 202 hierarchy, 295
triads or octaves, 283 of nature, 47
Truesdell, 41 vigesimal, 216
truth-functional logic, 255 Vikrami, 312, 313
Vine DeLoria, 53
Uclides, 242, 257, 259, 260 visual impact, 328
ultra-violet catastrophe, 31 vital resources of the common man, 315
unacceptable biasedness, 201 vocabularly, 331
unbiased observation, 201 void, 176, 192
underdetermination voltage and current, 291
Quinean,, 72 von Glasersfeld, 77
understand the phenomena in chemistry, 204 Vosniadou, 167
understanding, 304 Vosniadou & Brewer, 167, 168
nature, 305
chemistry, 203 W.H. Freeman, 281
nature and knowledge, 304 Wallis, 225
the universe, 202 Walsh, 117
understanding warnings given by the body, 310
science concept, 165 water as a compound, 199
UNESCO, 111 Watson and Crick, 332
uniformity, 122 Watts and Gilbert, 289
unifying Western science, 63
principles, 202 western science, 63
unilinear trajectory, 212, 213 William Brewer, 167
unity of science, 305 witch-craft, 305
universal Wittgenstein, 97
concept of science, 62 Wolfgang Pauli, 282
science, 62 woman mathematician, 217
universalist, 52 Woolgar, 99101
perspective, 52 working knowledge, 202
perspective on science, 51 world view, 111, 177, 178, 196, 201
universality, 51, 62 Galilean, 177
Aristotelian, 176, 177
Galilean, 178
X-ray crystallographic patterns, 332

X-ray diffraction, 281
Yager, 115
Yang Guangxian, 236
Yash Pal Committee, 317
Yesudas Ramchandra, 237
Yoruba method of multiplication, 220
YuktiBhasa, 254, 260
Yuktibhasa, 226, 227
Zaire, 215
Zambia, 215
zero, 216
introduction, 214
Zij al-Arjabhar, 226
Ziman, 112
zoology, 286
Venkateswaran 389
References
Edwards, C.: 1979, The Historical Development of the Calculus, Springer-Verlag, New York.
Gurukkal, R.: 1992, The Kerala Temple and Early Medieval Agrarian System, Vallathol Vidyapeetham,
Sukapuram.
Hayashi, T. Kusuba, T. and Yano, M.: 1990, The Correction of the Madhava Series for the Circumference of a
Circle, Centaurus 33, 149174.
Jami, C.: 1988, Western Influence and Chinese Tradition in an Eighteenth Century Chinese Mathematical
Work, Historia Mathematica 15, 311331.
Joseph, G.: 2000, The Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Roots of Mathematics, 2nd edn, Princeton
University Press.
Marar, K. and Rajagopal, C.: 1944, On the Hindu Quadrature of the Circle, Journal of the Bombay Branch of
the Royal Asiatic Society 20, 6582.
Rajagopal, C. and Rangachari, M.: 1986, On Medieval Keralese Mathematics, Archive for History of Exact
Sciences 35, 9199.
Rajagopal, C. and T.V.V., A.: 1951, On the Hindu Proof of Gregorys Series, Scripta Mathematica 17, 6574.
Rajagopal, C. and Venkataraman, A.: 1949, The Sine and Cosine Power Series in Hindu Mathematics,
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal 15, 113.
R.V., T. and Aiyar, A. (eds): 1948, Yuktibhasa Part I, Mangalodayam Ltd., Trichur.
Sarma, K.: 1991, A History of Kerala School of Hindu Astronomy, Vishveshavaranand Institute, Hoshiarpur.
Sarma, K. and Hariharan, S.: 1991, Yuktibhasa of Jyesthadeva, Indian Journal of History of Science 26, 186
207.
Whish, C.: 1835, On the Hindu Quadrature and the Infinite Series of the Proportion of the Circumference to
the Diameter . . ., Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, Great Britain and Ireland 3(part III), 509
523.
Yan, L. and Shiran, D.: 1987, Chinese Mathematics: A Concise History, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
View publication stats

History and Philosophy in Science Teaching

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

History and Philosophy in Science Teaching

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

History and Philosophy in Science Teaching

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

See

History and philosophy in science teaching

Article in Interchange June 1989

Feng Shui and Science Education View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

1 Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science 3

2 Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science? 21

3 Teaching History and Philosophy of Science: Experience at IIT Kanpur 39

4 Multiculturalism in Science Education and the Question of Universalism. 51

5 Varieties of Constructivism and their (Ir-)Relevance to Science Education 71

6 Social Constructivism and the Science Wars 85

7 Re-examining the Image of Science in the School Science Curriculum 111

8 Linking Science Pedagogy with History and Philosophy of Science

9 Conceptual Change in the Learning of Science 167

10 How did Galileo Discover the Law of Free Fall? An Epistemological

11 Introducing History of Science in Science Education: A Perspective

12 Multicultural Mathematics, Anti-racist Mathematics: What can that be? 213

14 How should Euclidean Geometry be Taught? 243

15 The Axiomatic Method: Its Origin and Purpose 263

16 Approaches to the Periodic Table 281

17 Alternative Frameworks in Electricity 291

18 Common Mans Science 303

19 Attitude Towards Science: An Analysis 321

20 Emergence of Science Textbooks in TamilEncounter of Modern

The Science Literacy Crisis

and Grove (1989).

The Rapprochement between History, Philosophy, and Science Education

1. The Design Argument 4. Romantic Reaction

Figure 1: HPS-informed curriculum.

Philosophy and Technical Science Education

A common occurrence in science classrooms is a child asking: If no one has seen

Current Curriculum Proposals

The Inevitability of HPS in the Curriculum.

As if responding directly to Collins and Pinch, Einstein adds:

Naive Philosophy of Science

Closed Mind or Open Mind?

History of Science as Subversive

Contrary to a naive empiricist views, Newtons approach is characterised by Densmore:

Contextual Approach: Is Content Knowledge HPS-free?

The understanding of content knowledge cannot be HPS-free because even learning

Paradox of HPS in Science Teaching

A Role for History: The Bias of Science Textbooks

Science & Subjectivity

Should the History of Science be Rated X?

In view of the experimental confirmation of the most counter-intuitive features of

West, T.: 1991, In the Minds Eye, Prometheus Books, Buffalo.

1. Historical study as a means of understanding the nature of scientific mode of

Time: 1 hour OPEN NOTES 11.3.86

Multicultural Perspectives on Science

Multiple Culture-based Sciences?

Science from this perspective refers to descriptive knowledge of Nature developed

Multicultural Science in the Classroom

Nature is viewed as sacred

Humans are part of the web of life

Humans should live in harmony with nature

The entire world is viewed as being alive

Technology should be low impact

Figure 1: Native American views about nature (Simthsonian Institution, 1996b).

Defining the Standard Account