Game Theory - Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia
Game Theory - Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia
Game Theory - Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia
Estimating Studies 49
the Underground (2): 91-109,
Economy from 2012 ISSN 1511-4554
the Tax Gap: The Case of Malaysia
Abstract: The Underground Economy (UE) in Malaysia is estimated using ratio technique
on tax and criminal annual time series enforcement data. For the period of 1980 to 2009,
UE rose between 9 and 27 per cent of GDP. UE grows in the opposite direction of GDP
during good and bad times, and has shrunk due to slower growth in the last decade. The
size of the direct tax gap is about 10 per cent of direct tax revenue, 15 per cent of federal
revenue or 33 per cent of federal deficit. There is a shift in the tax non-compliance mix in
the irregular economy and a rise infraud activities in the illegal economy. The change in tax
non-compliance mix is likely due to taxation reforms.The rise in fraud activities highlights
the urgency of more efficient and effective enforcement.
1. Introduction
A countrys economic performance as indicated by the Official Economy (OE) is known as
the GDP. It measures most lawful activities and excludes activities that evade rules due to
their hidden nature. The unmeasured activities create a gap between GDP and the potential
economy leading to the conceptualisation of a second economy, that has been submerged
in various terminologies, wide scope definitions, and vague concepts which are often
intermixed (Carter 1984; Schneider and Enste 2000; Hesam 2003). Among the various terms
used are Hidden Economy, Informal Economy, Shadow Economy and Underground Economy
(UE). The UE is often referred to as a subset of this second economy that is taken to mean
those activities which are concealed from government regulatory agencies such as tax
evasion.
There are positive and negative consequences of UE. The existence of the UE
contributes positively in terms of employment creation and societal welfare as it provides
survival lines for the unfortunate. According to McKinsey (2004) the benefits of the life line
and the redeployed profits in the mainstream economy are only in the short term. They are
greatly overweighed by the considerable long-term burden of socio-economic cost. The
negative impacts include inefficient goods and labour markets, distorted statistics, deprived
workers rights and guarantees, and diverted finances through tax evasion. These collectively
affect public finances and possibly lead to policy crises.
The UE is likely to be a permanent phenomenon both in the developing and developed
countries. In developing countries, smaller enterprises would initiate the informal sector to
support the larger ones, providing job opportunities and facilitating poverty eradication.
Faculty of Economics & Administration, University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Email: marlizamrmd@yahoo.com; marliza@hasil.gov.my
Official
economy
(OE or GDP)
Informal sector
UE - legitimate
and criminal economic Household
Federal sector
activities
revenue (taxes
and non taxes)
Second Economy
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the Potential Economy constituting the Official Economy,
Second Economy and Underground Economy (UE)
linked to the determinants of UE. These observable forms are the proxy indicators which are
reflected in non-compliant activities. Tax non-compliance is commonly used because
participants of UE would conceal their activities from the tax authority by not reporting the
income derived to avoid being caught. From a tax perspective, where trade in the official
economy is concerned, the trader gains money while the consumer gets the product. Trade
is then completed with taxes paid. Whereas, trading in the UE ends without any tax paid. To
curb UE, the government could intervene through effective and efficient law enforcement
(Bhattacharya,1999). According to Tanzi (1982), Tucker (1982) and Slemrod (2007), the legal
activities conducted underground to escape taxation appear to be the fastest growing
component of the SE, largely because of the relaxed tax enforcement system.
Schneider (2002) and Shneider and Enste (2000) indicate that there is a significant,
growing underground sector in most countries, which evolves over time and leads to a high
degree of fund laundering. The size of the UE could range from 4 to 60 per cent of a
countrys GDP, depending on the countrys economy and data coverage (activities measured
and time period), methods employed and assumptions made. Hence, estimates require careful
interpretation and comparisons remain somewhat crude. In general, the size is smaller for
developed countries and larger for undeveloped countries. In 2000, it varied from 10 to 16
per cent of GDP for OECD countries, 21 to 30 per cent for transition economies and 35 to 60
per cent for developing and undeveloped countries. For countries in Asia, it ranges from
11.3 per cent in Japan to 44.6 per cent in Thailand. It is smaller in countries where
involvement of the public sector is relatively smaller (Japan, United States and Switzerland)
and there exists a comparatively high tax morality (United States and Switzerland). Kesner-
Skreb (1997) concludes that UE is inherent in all countries with only its size differing.
In general, legal activities are about 3 to 4 times larger than the illegal activities, ranging
in size from 5 per cent of GDP during a brisk economy to 20 per cent during a slow economy.
Kadokura (2000) has shown that the UE in Japan consists of about 70 per cent legal activities
(tax evasion) and 30 per cent illegal activities. Vaknin (2000) indicates that illegal activities
constitute up to 20 per cent of the UE in the United States. Meanwhile, Schlosser (2003)
estimates illegal activities in the United States to account for about 10 per cent of its
economy. Despite the substantial size, the Revenue and Customs of the United Kingdom
(2007-08) estimates about 80 per cent of the legal activities evade relatively small amounts
of tax.
Burrow et al. (2004) reports that the UE has increased in relation to GDP. Based on a
survey of 21 OECD countries (including Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Spain and Sweden),
the UE has grown to at least 20 per cent from 1970 to 2000. In the United States, it has
doubled from 4 per cent of the GDP in 1970 to 9 per cent in 2000, while in the states of the
former Soviet Union, it grew between 1990 and 1998 from about 25 to 33 per cent. Esbenshade
(2001) states that the growth of the informal economy follows the new global economy
based on small units of production that lend themselves to informal relationships and
practices. Kelchev (2006) concludes that over the last 13 years, countries have noted that
the informal economy grew in tandem with the GDP.
For Malaysia, past studies show the estimated UE to range from 0.2 to 85 per cent
(Table 1). Although the estimates could be interpreted according to the scope of definition,
data coverage, methods employed and assumptions made, they do not show any structural
proportion or trend and lack statistical information for policy and strategic positioning.
Over the period 1960-2008, although Malaysia experienced impressive growth in tax
revenue of about 115-fold, various proxy indicators of UE are seen. Among others are
changes in tax mix revenue from indirect to direct tax (signifying more opportunities for tax
evasion), higher indirect tax burden reform to inhibit certain types of consumption and to
protect local products (creating incentives for smuggling), reducing tax-GDP ratio from 18
to 15 per cent (indicating an inelastic tax growth relative to GDP), rising federal deficit,
widening of savings-investment gap (implying income is not properly streamed or utilised),
citizens dismay and dissatisfaction over pro-fligacy(refusal of citizens to share income
through taxes), moderate unemployment rate coupled with rising commercial crime (creation
of informal jobs for desperate jobless), relative high growth of private and luxury
Assuming that income from the UE is taxable, in a tax system of progressive tax rates
the amount of tax loss would depend on the income level. For appropriate estimation of tax
loss, computation is based on three probable tax rates. UE in each level series is multiplied
by the following: effective tax rate (UE x 10%); average enforcement tax rate (UE x 22%); and
marginal progressive tax rate (UE x 27%).
The equations for estimating the size of UE are as follows:
1. Sample from the entire direct tax compliance (DTC) and indirect tax compliance (inDTC) of
the tax base:
i. DTC = [voluntary reported direct tax] + [voluntary paid direct tax]
= [Dtxrev ] + [Dtxp]
ii. inDTC= [voluntary reported indirect tax] + [voluntary paid indirect tax]
= [inDtxrev ]+ [inDtxp]
Transfer payments:
subsidies and utility benefits
POPULATION:
Countrys entire
INLAND
REVENUE
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
economy (TE) BOARD
Transparency, integrity, OE (Y) Not liable
fair judgment and (compliant economy or
administration i.e. GDP value) Tax paid Federal revenue
Participants
(individual and
institutions)
UE (Z)
Tax burden,
intense regulation,
(unobservable non-compliant
economy)
Tax paid + fine
or
Federal revenue
dissatisfaction,
unemployment,
1. Irregular economy (income
from legal activities but evades
Tax loss Federal deficit
2. Sample from the entire captured direct tax non compliance (DTNC) and indirect tax non
compliance (inDTNC):
i. DTNC = [Direct tax evasion due to under reporting] + [unpaid DT] + [Direct tax
evasion due to non filing]= [Dtxev] + [Dtxup] + [(inDtev + inDtxup) + (UEcrbribe +
UEcrdrugs + UEcrothers)]
ii. inDTNC = [inDirect tax evasion due to under reporting] + [unpaid inDT] = [inDtev] +
[inDtxup)
3. Tax non-compliant ratio (TNCR) for each activity is assumed to mirror in the UE ratio i.e.
A+B+C: R Z:Y as in Figures 2 and 3:
i. TNCR due to direct tax evasion = [Dtxev : Dtxrev] UEDtxev : OE
years, GDP real growth reduced to 4.70 per cent in 1989, -7.36 per cent in 1998 and 4.00 per
cent in 2004. Meanwhile, the GDP nominal was reduced to 5.23 per cent in 1989, 0.51 per
cent in 1998 and 6.55 per cent in 2004 (Figure 6).
Over the period 1990-2009, the UE increased about 3.82 to 5.46-fold, with the value
ranging from RM 426 billion to RM850 billion indicating growth from 10.20 per cent in the
1980s to its peak of 30.06 per cent in the late 1990s, gradually declining in the recent years
(Table 3). However, the gap between the lower and upper estimates is widening.
As summarised in Table 4, UE size relative to its growth ranged between 10.55 and 11.10
per cent (1980-84) of GDP, peaking in the range of 18.10 to 26.94 per cent (1995-99), and
gradually reducing in the range of 8.92 to15.40 per cent in the period 2005-09. Higher UE
growth that doubled and tripled during the recession years of 1989, 1998 and 2004 in the
opposite direction to GDP growth implies a complementary association. It supports the
contention that the potential economy consists of two economic components: the official
economy and the second economy. It suggests that during a recession phase, the UE as
the thriving economy rises to fill the economic gap making it relatively large in size. The UE
then reduces its role as the country recedes from the sluggish performance in the phase of
economic recovery. This positive role has also a socio-economic explanation in that people
would resort to underground activities as survival lines. This social shock absorberevent
allows the institution to reduce production costs by employing informal workers who are
desperate for jobs in bad times.
This phenomenon suggests that the UE could reduce some recession impacts and
supports the contention that it forms part of the solution to urban decay and unemployment.
It could also mean that a rise in GDP in good times may not reflect a true increase in
production, but actually constitute a shift in the production from UE to OE (unrecorded to
recorded form). Nevertheless, a substantial shift of UE to OE is important as this will
generate more tax revenue.
is about 4 times larger than the illegal economy in normal times, 6 times larger than the illegal
economy in good times, but only 1.5 times larger than the illegal economy in bad times. The
composition of the UE is comparable to the economists general estimates of the irregular
economy being about 3 to 4 times larger than the illegal economy.
A higher proportion of the illegal economy during the economic downturn is likely due
to the economic pressures that cause people to opt for UE as life line survival, contributing
to more unreported income for tax leading to an erosion of the tax base.
Although the proportion of direct tax non-compliance in the irregular economy is larger
(50% to 76%) than the indirect tax non-compliance (7% to 30%), it is seen to be gradually
displaced over the years. The proportion of the former has been reduced by 50 per cent
while the latter increased by 33 per cent. The shift of tax non-compliance mix is consistent
with the tax reform to a lower direct tax burden and to a higher indirect tax burden. A
higher direct tax burden prior to the 1990s reflects that hiding incomes to avoid taxation was
more profitable while the lower direct tax burden in the 1990s created lower incentives for
evasion as the profits of reporting ones true income was reduced. Hence, apart from
government policy to promote economic growth, reforms towards a lower direct tax burden
have a negative association with the UE.
Meanwhile, the higher indirect tax burden reform (additional taxes and higher tax rates)
coupled with other rigid regulations to encourage local production, discourage health hazard
consumption and reduce social problems, would have instead encouraged people to smuggle
goods.This suggests that a rigid policy, if not countered by efficient and effective law
enforcement, would lead to policy failure as well as revenue loss.This phenomenon is
consistent with the experience of other countries where the increase in tax rates and tariff on
imports of traded goods has been shown to induce smuggling activities (Morgensen et al.
1995; Farnazegan 2008).
The shift in tax non-compliance mix conforms to the economic theory of tax burden that
encourages people to evade income tax. Nevertheless, despite the shift, the UE continues
to rise in its absolute value, signifying that a further reduction of direct tax burden would
not likely reduce UE further. A further reduction in tax burden must be weighed against the
benefits of public goods and services financed by tax revenue. Intuitively, it is unwise to
further reduce the tax burden as taxes are an important fiscal and social policy instrument.
Schneider (2002) who did a study on Australia in the period 1988-89, pointed out that
the hidden economy did not decrease despite the reduction in all the marginal tax rates on
income and a general simplification of the tax system. The limitation is partly due to the
positive effects of the changes in the tax system as well as the larger negative effects of
other voluminous regulations or determinants.
5-year period Bribery (%) Drug trafficking (%) Other commercial crimes* (%) Total (%)
1995-99 4.04 42.86 53.10 100.00
2000-04 2.98 4.76 92.26 100.00
2005-09 1.60 8.82 89.58 100.00
Average 3 19 78
Table 7. Direct tax gap with unreported income constituting criminal activities
Table 8. Direct tax gap with unreported income constituting criminal activities and indirect tax non-
compliance
5-year period Tax evasion Unpaid tax (%) Tax evasion Total (%)
(under reported (non filing)
income)(%) (%)
1990-94 9.97 16.98 68.11 78.26 11.77 14.91 100.00
1995-99 12.05 19.68 58.50 72.61 15.35 21.82 100.00
2000-04 11.92 15.79 37.22 55.71 32.37 46.99 100.00
2005-09 17.94 21.78 25.69 42.24 39.82 52.35 100.00
liability whereas the burden of indirect tax is to consume official goods at a higher cost
compared to smuggled goods.
Tax non-compliance of the illegal economy shows that fraud/breach of trust/swindle/
cheating activities constitute the most (53.10% to 92.26%) (and is rising) followed by a
reduction in drug trafficking (4.76% to 2.86%) and bribery (1.60% to 4.04%) (Table 6).
The direct tax non-compliance or direct tax gap is presented in two scenarios. Assuming
that the income from indirect (income tax office) tax, non-compliance and criminal activities
is not reported direct to the tax authority (income tax office) to avoid being traced and
caught, it would constitute tax evasion of the non-filing group who are outside the captured
tax base. In the first scenario (Table 7), we considered only the incomes from criminal
activities as unreported income from the non-filing group; the components mix are 64 per
cent (unpaid tax), 32 per cent (under-reporting) and 4 per cent (non-filing). In the second
scenario (Table 8), we considered the incomes from both criminal and indirect tax non-
compliant activities as unreported income from the non-filing group; the components mix
are 62.21 per cent (unpaid tax), 12.97 per cent (under- reporting) and 24.83 per cent (non-
filing).
In both scenarios, although the unpaid tax forms the largest component of direct tax
gap, its declining trend is an indication of an improving tax collection system. Tax evasion
due to under-reporting of legal income in the existing tax base is almost consistent, reflecting
considerable monitoring. However, the rising tax evasion outside the existing tax base
(Figures10 and 11) highlight a positive trend of potential tax loss in the future.
The extent of tax loss is shown as percentage size relative to tax revenue, federal
revenue and federal deficit in the last two decades in three probable tax rates at 10.22 and 27
per cent. For the period 1990-1999, the direct tax loss is between 6.61 and 33.68 per cent of
direct tax revenue, 13.85 and 14.49 per cent of federal revenue, and 60.38 and 307.28 per
Table 9. Direct tax loss relative to federal account at plausible tax rates (1990-1999)
Table 10. Direct tax loss relative to federal account at plausible tax rates (2000-2009)
cent of federal deficit. Meanwhile, for the period 2000-2009, the direct tax loss is between
4.79 and 26.29 per cent of direct tax revenue, 2.53 and 13.85 per cent of federal revenue, and
6.18 and 33.88 per cent of federal deficit. For these two periods, the proportion of tax loss
relative to direct tax revenue is about the same, but the proportion range is relatively large
by federal revenue and larger by federal deficit. This is partly due to faster UE growth in the
earlier period but a faster growth of the federal expenditure in the later period.
5. Concluding Remarks
Measuring a hidden variable is often arbitrary. Yet without any guesstimates, judgment and
development of the area of the second economy is not possible. To reduce skeptical
views, this study has considered employing enforcement data that captures true events
over which the researcher had no control to reduce bias estimates. Therefore several
assumptions had to be made about the data coverage, and amplifying techniques applied in
order to rectify the under coverage and over counting income mix. Considering the proxy
indicators, findings should at best be acceptable as conservative and reasonable estimates
to provide some baseline data and guidance for appropriate formulation or adjustment of
government policies and strategic planning. The tax gap is a negative indicator of an effective
tax system and denotes the benchmark for potential tax revenue while substantial tax loss is
an indication of weak enforcement and dissatisfaction of the citizens.
Irregular economic conditions rather than the size of the illegal economy would explain
a larger component of the UE. The reducing growth of UE recently and its smaller size
relative to GDP is a good sign. However, although accounting for a smaller component of
the UE, the increasing size of the illegal economy does not augur well. Its opposite growth
relative to GDP implies that UE forms an economy in transition to stabilise the economic
downturn, supporting the existence of an economic gap in a country. Although direct tax
non-compliance constitutes a larger portion of the irregular economy, its share of indirect
tax non-compliance is reducing. The displacement is partly due to the lower direct tax
burden reform and higher indirect tax burden reform. Despite a large share of direct tax non-
compliance in the irregular economy, the lower direct tax burden is only adequate for shifting
the tax non-compliance mix and reducing the growth of the UE recently, but not in its
absolute value. Studying the UE by the direct tax gap method shows that unpaid tax
constitutes the most, followed by tax evasion due to income under-reporting and non-
filing. There is a trend towards reducing unpaid tax, a consistent tax evasion within the
existing tax base, and rising tax evasion outside the captured tax base. A tax loss of about
15 per cent federal revenue or about 33 per cent of the federal deficit is no doubt a sizeable
budgetary implications. The UE partly explains the more than 10 years of federal deficit
while the rising tax evasion denotes a continuation. Its long-run consequence would force
the government to adopt an austerity drive of either reducing the federal expenditure or
withdrawing subsidies, or increasing borrowings. Limiting public benefits and acquiring
more debt would lead to further erosion of the federal account and eventually drive away
public or investor trust and confidence.
The substantial UE that is not inconsistent to GDP size and the wider gap between the
lower and upper range estimates signify that enforcement is required. It is proposed that
tax, police and anti-corruption agencies gear up for more effective and efficient law
enforcement to curb non-compliance. A study on how to shift the UE to OE would be useful
so that income per capita could be computed based on a higher GDP value, inter alia
achieving the countrys vision of high income economy. According to Bicanic and Ott
(1997), research on the UE would lead not only to a more comprehensive awareness but also
to better efficacy of economic policy. Hence, a continuous assessment and review of the UE
as an enduring institution in the Malaysian society is essential.
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