PNB vs. Garcia

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 724 8/4/15, 5:45 PM
G.R. No. 182839. June 2, 2014.*

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. JOSE
GARCIA and CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA,
JR., BOBBY GARCIA and JIMMY GARCIA and HEIRS OF
ROGELIO GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA,
DANILO GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA,
HEHERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA
GARCIA and JANE GARCIA, respondents.
Civil Law; Husband and Wife; Property Relations; Conjugal

Partnership; Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, their property relations were
governed by the conjugal partnership of gains as provided under
Article 119 of the Civil Code. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code,
all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Registration of a property alone in
the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature.
Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not
destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when
the property was acquired. The registration of the property is
not conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband
or the wife. Although the property appears to be registered in the
name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal
property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during
marriage. It retains its conjugal nature. In order to rebut the
presumptive conjugal nature of the property, the petitioner must
present strong, clear and convincing evidence of exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses. The burden of proving that the
property belongs exclusively to the wife or to the husband rests
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upon the party asserting it.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
281
VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 281
Philippine National Bank vs. Garcia
Same; Succession; The rights to the succession are transmitted

from the moment of the death of the decedent.Upon the death of
Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved and terminated pursuant to Article 175(1)
of the Civil Code, and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as
provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that
[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent. Consequently, the conjugal partnership
was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership between the
surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on
the other.
Same; Co-Ownership; Each co-owner has the full ownership of

his part or share in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate,
assign or mortgage it except when personal rights are involved.
Each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share in the co-
ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it
except when personal rights are involved. Should a co-owner
alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or
mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership.
Same; Same; Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had
the right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the
disputed property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire
property without his childrens consent.Jose Sr. constituted the
mortgage over the entire subject property after the death of
Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had the right
to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the
disputed property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire

property without his childrens consent. As correctly emphasized by
the trial court, Jose Sr.s right in the subject property is limited
only to his share in the conjugal partnership as well as his
share as an heir on the other half of the estate wh ich is his
deceased spouses share. Accordingly, the mortgage contract is
void insofar as it extends to the undivided shares of his children
(Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because they did not give their
consent to the transaction.
282
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Soraya F. Adiong for Philippine National Bank.
Meris, Rigos, Meris and Associates Law Office for
respondents.
BRION,J.:
We resolve this petition for review on certiorari[1]
assailing the decision[2] dated September 26, 2007 and the
resolution[3] dated May 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71356.
These challenged CA rulings reversed and set aside the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23,
Roxas, Isabela, dismissing Civil Case No. Branch 23-500-96
for lack of cause of action.
The Factual Background
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are
briefly summarized below.
The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential
land with all its improvements (subject property) located in
Barrio Olango, Mallig, Isabela. The land is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44422 under the
name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) who acquired the
subject property during his marriage with Ligaya
Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987.
_______________
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Rollo, pp. 36-54.
[2] Id., at pp. 10-33; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam,
and concurred in by Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., and
Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.
[3] Id., at pp. 31-33.
283
VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 283

The marriage of Jose Sr. and Ligaya produced the

following children: Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, all
surnamed Garcia, who are the respondents in the present
case.
Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia
Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained a loan facility from the
petitioner, Philippine National Bank (petitioner bank),
initially for P150,000.00. The loan was secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over their property covered by TCT No.
177585. The spouses Garcia increased their loan to
P220,000.00 and eventually to P600,000.00. As security for
the increased loan, they offered their property covered by
TCT No. 75324 and the subject property covered by TCT
No. T-44422.
Jose Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by
offering the subject property as additional collateral
security for the latters increased loan. For this purpose,
Jose Sr. executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) dated
April 14, 1992 and October 6, 1993, respectively, expressly
authorizing the Spouses Garcia to apply for, borrow, or
secure any loan from the petitioner bank, and to convey
and transfer the subject property by way of mortgage. Jose
Sr. also executed an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage
in favor of the petitioner bank. The SPAs and the
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage are both inscribed on
TCT No. T-44422. All of these transactions, however, were
without the knowledge and consent of Jose Sr.s children.
On maturity of the loan on April 20, 1994, the spouses
Garcia failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank
despite repeated demands.
On January 12, 1996, the respondents filed before the

RTC a Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment of Real
Estate Mortgage, Damages with Preliminary Injunction
against the spouses Garcia and the petititioner bank. They
claimed that the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage was
null and void as to respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and
Jimmy as they were not parties to the contract.
284

The respondents alleged that the subject property was a

conjugal property of Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse,
Ligaya, as they acquired the subject property during their
marriage; that upon Ligayas death, Jose Sr., together with
his children Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, by law,
became owners pro indiviso of the subject property; that
the petitioner bank was at fault for not including Jose Sr.
as payee to the check representing the loan despite its
knowledge that Jose Sr. was a signatory to the real estate
mortgage; that the real estate mortgage executed by Jose
Sr. could not bind his children as they did not give their
consent or approval to the encumbrance; and that the real
estate mortgage was also void as to Jose Sr. since he never
benefitted from the loan.
In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr.
was indebted to them in the amount of P133,800.00. To
settle this indebtedness, Jose Sr. volunteered to give the
subject property as additional security for their (the
Garcias) loan to the petitioner bank.
The petitioner bank, on the other hand, claimed that the
mortgage was made in good faith and for value, and
maintained that the respondents complaint stated no
cause of action against it. It alleged that the real estate
mortgage over the properties was duly registered and
inscribed on their titles and was thus binding on the whole
world.
In the course of the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby
and Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31, 1996
authorizing Jose Sr. to act as their attorney-in-fact during
the pre-trial of the case.

The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action. The court held that the subject property was a
conjugal property since it was acquired by Jose Sr. during
his marriage with his now deceased wife. As a conjugal
property, it is presumed that upon the death of his spouse,
one-half of the prop-
285
VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 285

erty passed on to Jose Sr., while the other half went to Jose
and his children as co-owners and as forced heirs of his
deceased spouse. Without the consent of the children, the
trial court ruled that the conjugal property could only be
transferred or encumbered to the extent of Jose Sr.s share
in the conjugal partnership, plus his share as an heir in the
other half pertaining to the estate of his deceased spouse.
The RTC nevertheless declared that by virtue of the SPA
executed by Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy in this suit,
they are already estopped from questioning the mortgage
and from alleging lack of consent or knowledge in the
transaction. It held Jose Sr. liable as an accommodation
party and upheld the petitioner banks right to collect the
debt.
The respondents disagreed with the RTC ruling and
elevated the case to the CA via an ordinary appeal.
The Ruling of the CA
On September 26, 2007, the CA upheld the trial courts
finding that the subject property was conjugal, but
reversed and set aside its ruling in so far as it declared
valid and binding the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage
between the petitioner bank, on one hand, and the spouses
Garcia and Jose Sr., on the other hand, with respect to
respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy. Relying on
the Courts ruling in Nufable v. Nufable,[4] the CA ruled
that the encumbrance Jose Sr. made over the entire
conjugal property, without his childrens conformity, was
null and void because a mere part owner could not alienate
the shares of the other co-owners.
_______________
[4] 369 Phil. 135, 146; 309 SCRA 692, 700 (1999). The Supreme Court
ruled that: a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned
property when his share is mortgaged by another co-owner without the
formers knowledge and consent as in the case at bar. It has likewise been
ruled that the mortgage of the inherited property is not binding against
co-heirs who never benefited.
286

The CA also declared that the conjugal property could

only be liable to the extent of Jose Sr.s shares; Jose Sr.s
acts could not affect his childrens pro indiviso shares in
the subject property. It disagreed with the trial courts
estoppel theory and held that their execution of the SPA
should not be construed as acquiescence to the mortgage
transaction. Lastly, it ruled that Jose Sr. could not escape
liability from the mortgage since he voluntarily bound
himself as the Spouses Garcias accommodation mortgagor.
The Petition
The petitioner bank disputes the CAs finding that the
subject property was conjugal in nature. It argues that, as
can be gleaned from TCT No. T-44422, the subject property
was registered in the name of Jose Sr. alone, who was
described in the title as widower and not married.
The petitioner bank posits that as a mortgagee in good
faith, it had the right to rely on the mortgagors certificate
of title; in the absence of any indication that could arouse
suspicion, it had no obligation to undertake further
investigation and verify whether the property was conjugal
or was acquired during marriage or thereafter.
Since the subject property belonged to Jose Sr., insofar
as petitioner bank as mortgagee was concerned, Jose Sr.
had the right under Article 428 of the Civil Code to
mortgage it without the consent of his children.
Accordingly, the mortgage in its entirety should be declared
valid.
The Comment
The respondents state that the issues raised by
petitioner bank are essentially factual; hence, they are
beyond the competence of this Court in a petition for
review. They submit that in a certiorari petition under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
entertained because the Court is not a trier of facts.
287
VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 287

The Courts Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The petition before us raises both questions of fact and
of law. Whether petitioner bank is a mortgagee in good
faith and for value and whether the subject property was
conjugal, are factual issues that this Court cannot look into
as our examination would entail going into factual matters
and records of the case. In Rule 45 petitions, only questions
of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be
entertained.[5]
Although there are exceptions to the rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari,
the petitioner bank failed to show that this case falls under
any of the established exceptions. Too, since the CA
partially affirmed the findings of the trial court and absent
any indication that these courts committed a serious error
in its findings, this Court is bound by these courts findings.
[6]
Moreover, even if we were to review the factual issues
raised by the petitioner bank, we still find no reason to
depart from the CAs ruling.
The Subject Property is Conjugal
a. All property acquired during
marriage is presumed conjugal
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, their property relations were
governed by the conjugal partnership of gains as provided
under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Under Article 160 of

the Civil Code, all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to
_______________
[5] Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Banas, G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013,
699 SCRA 157, 166.
[6] Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168; 268 SCRA 703,
705 (1997).
288

the conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it

pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
In his testimony, Jose Sr. admitted that at the time he
acquired the land through sale, he was already married.
The material portion of his testimony is as follows:
Q: Upon the death of your wife did you and your wife ever own
a piece of land?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is that land situated?
A: In Centro, District 2, Mallig[,] Isabela.
Q: Is that land titled in your names?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: You and your wife acquired that piece of land?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: May we know from you[,] Mr. Witness, how did you acquire this
parcel of land presently embraced and covered by TCT No. T-44422?
A: I purchased that piece of land from the Baniqued Family during my
incumbency as Municipal Mayor, sir.
Q: What was your civil status at the time you purchased that
piece of land?
A: I was already married, sir. (Emphasis ours, TSN, July 24, 1997,
Jose Garcia Sr.)[7]
Because of the petitioner banks failure to rebut the
allegation that the subject property was acquired during

the formers marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of
the conjugal nature of the property, in line with Article 160
of the Civil
_______________
[7] Rollo, pp. 19-20.
289
VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 289

Code, applies to this property. Proof of the subject

propertys acquisition during the subsistence of marriage
suffices to render the statutory presumption operative.[8]
b. Registration of the subject

property in the name of one
spouse does not destroy the
presumption that the property
is conjugal
The petitioner bank claims that the CA failed to consider
that the subject property was registered in the name of
Jose Sr. alone. Likewise, it raises the argument that Jose
Sr.s change of status in the subject propertys title from
married to widower prior to the constitution of the real
estate mortgage showed that the property was no longer
conjugal.
We do not consider this argument persuasive.
Registration of a property alone in the name of one
spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is
material is the time when the property was
acquired.[9] The registration of the property is not
conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the
husband or the wife. Although the property appears to be
registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent
character of conjugal property if it was acquired for
valuable consideration during marriage.[10] It retains its
conjugal nature.
In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the
property, the petitioner must present strong, clear and

convincing evidence of exclusive ownership of one of the
_______________
[8] Go v. Yamane, 522 Phil. 653, 663; 489 SCRA 107, 117 (2006).
[9] Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 768,
779.
[10] Bucoy v. Paulino, 131 Phil. 790, 800; 23 SCRA 248, 262 (1968).
290

spouses.[11] The burden of proving that the property

belongs exclusively to the wife or to the husband rests upon
the party asserting it.
In the present case, aside from its allegation that the
subject property is no longer conjugal and its assertion that
it is a mortgagee in good faith, the petitioner bank offered
no evidence, convincing to this Court, that the subject
property exclusively belonged to Jose Sr. As stated earlier,
the petitioner bank failed to overcome the legal
presumption that the disputed property was conjugal.
Thus, the conclusion of both lower courts that the subject
property was conjugal property holds. Factual findings of
the CA affirming those of the trial court are binding on this
Court unless there is a clear showing that such findings are
tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
[12]
The conjugal partnership was converted
into an implied ordinary co-ownership
upon the death of Ligaya
Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the
conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and
terminated pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code,[13]
and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided
under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that [t]he
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted
into an implied ordinary co-ownership between the

surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the
deceased, on the
_______________
[11] Dewara v. Lamela, G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA
483, 490.
[12] Supra note 6.
[13] Art. 175.The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1)Upon the death of either spouse;
291
VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 291

other.[14] This resulting ordinary coownership among the

heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code which
reads:
Art.493.Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his

part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this provision, each co-owner has the full

ownership of his part or share in the co-ownership and
may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it except when
personal rights are involved. Should a co-owner alienate or
mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or
mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.[15] In Carvajal v.
Court of Appeals,[16] the Court said:
While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect
of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right
to sell or alienate a
_______________
[14] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Pascual, G.R. No. 163744, February
29, 2008, 547 SCRA 246, 259.
[15] Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004, 421
SCRA 310, 323-324.
[16] 197 Phil. 913, 917; 112 SCRA 237, 240 (1982).
292

concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in

common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his
right over the thing is represented by an abstract or Ideal
portion without any physical adjudication. An individual co-
owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite
portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual
partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that
the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate
share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners.
What a co-owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share,
which shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him
upon partition. [emphasis supplied]
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage

over the entire subject property after the death of Ligaya,
but before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had
the right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided
interest in the disputed property, he could not dispose of or
mortgage the entire property without his childrens
consent. As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose
Sr.s right in the subject property is limited only to his
share in the conjugal partnership as well as his
share as an heir on the other half of the estate which

is his deceased spouses share. Accordingly, the
mortgage contract is void insofar as it extends to the
undivided shares of his children (Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and
Jimmy) because they did not give their consent to the
transaction.[17]
Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage
constituted by Jose Sr. over the entire property without his
co-owners consent is not necessarily void in its entirety.
The right of the petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited
though only to the portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr.
in the event of a division and liquidation of the subject
property.
_______________
[17] Supra note 14.
293
VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 293

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby

AFFIRM the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71356. Costs against
petitioner Philippine National Bank.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-

Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by

acquisitive prescription the share of the co-heirs or co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
(Heirs of Juanita Padilla vs. Magdua, 630 SCRA 573
[2010])
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. (Tan vs. Andrade,
703 SCRA 198 [2013])

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 724 8/4/15, 5:45 PM

G.R. No. 182839. June 2, 2014.*

Civil Law; Husband and Wife; Property Relations; Conjugal

upon the party asserting it.

VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 281

Philippine National Bank vs. Garcia

Same; Succession; The rights to the succession are transmitted

Same; Co-Ownership; Each co-owner has the full ownership of

disputed property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 283

The marriage of Jose Sr. and Ligaya produced the

On January 12, 1996, the respondents filed before the

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The respondents alleged that the subject property was a

the pre-trial of the case.

VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 285

the shares of the other co-owners.

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The CA also declared that the conjugal property could

VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 287

The Courts Ruling

under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Under Article 160 of

288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it

Because of the petitioner banks failure to rebut the

allegation that the subject property was acquired during

VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 289

Code, applies to this property. Proof of the subject

b. Registration of the subject

property, the petitioner must present strong, clear and

290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

spouses.[11] The burden of proving that the property

into an implied ordinary co-ownership between the

VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 291

other.[14] This resulting ordinary coownership among the

Art.493.Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his

Under this provision, each co-owner has the full

292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in

In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage

share as an heir on the other half of the estate which

VOL. 724, JUNE 2, 2014 293

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby

Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-

Notes.Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by

703 SCRA 198 [2013])

Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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