Aglipay v.

Ruiz Digest

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

Laurel, J.:

Facts:

1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.

2. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
in the fulfilment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, a member of
the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President. In spite of the protest of the
petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States
the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the
greater part remained unsold.

3. The further sale was sought to be prevented by the petitioner. He alleged that the provisions of
Section 23, Subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution were violated in the issuance and selling
of the commemorative postage stamps. It was provided therein that, No public money or
property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the
use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or
to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of stamps was in violation of the principle of separation
of church and state

NO.

1. Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate, is not inhibition of profound reverence for

religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. In so far as it instils into
the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

2. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of the Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and
develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and
their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,"
they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain
general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.
3. There has been no constitutional infraction in this case. Act No. 4052 granted the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Sec. of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue
postage stamps with new designs. Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a
poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question, still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the
unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in
setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition. The court
resolved to deny the petition for a writ of prohibition.
 [G.R. No. 106440; January 29, 1996]
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, et al. petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Court is asked to resolve whether or not the public
use requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-
square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a national
historical landmark.
Petitioners inherited a 492 sq.m. land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro
Manila. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the
founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. It was approved by
the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, while the Secretary of Justice, in his opinion on the
legality of the measure, said in part that the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late
Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been
declared as a national landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is
a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized x x x. it is believed that the
NHI may initiate the institution of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in
question in accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In May 1989, the Republic, through the OSG, instituted a complaint for expropriation before RTC
Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, it filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an
order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by
petitioners. The trial court ruled in favor of the Republic.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation
was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,
contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. Motion was dismissed.
Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the expropriation of the land in the case at bar is for public use.
HELD:
YES. Petitioners ask about the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix
Manalos) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit. This attempt to give some
religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the
principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the
power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of
the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members
of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains
to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the
expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and jurisprudence.
The petition is DENIED.
Calalang vs. Williams

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940

Petitioner: Maximo Calalang

Respondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.

Ponente: Laurel, J:

Facts:

Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a
petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July
17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30
Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,
1940.

The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused
to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only
of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issue:

1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents

pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute
an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the

constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:

1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies
at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental
aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is
a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty
because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preserving.

2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability
of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est
suprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
 and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of
all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.

THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.

G.R. No. 167324 July 17, 2007

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL
ORTHOPEDIC WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. REYES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
EMPLOYEES UNION, SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
ALLIANCE OF HEALTH WORKERS, INC., HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY,
COUNCIL FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT, NETWORK OPPOSED TO
PRIVATIZATION, COMMUNITY MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC.,
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF SANITARY ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO UNO,
GABRIELA, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN
NG MGA MARALITA, ELSA O. GUEVARRA, ARCADIO B. GONZALES, JOSE G.
GALANG, DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES, EDUARDO P. GALOPE,
REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACUATA, EDGARDO J. DAMICOG,
REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND REMEGIO S. MERCADO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M. DAYRIT, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Respondents.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision,1promulgated by the Court of Appeals on 26 November 2004, denying a
petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines
1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102,
"Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which was
issued by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on 24 May 1999.

Prior hereto, petitioners originally filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the
Supreme Court on 15 August 2001. However, the Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated
29 August 2001, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.

FACT:

HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)

In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA
Technical Working Group after a series of workshops and analyses with inputs from
several consultants, program managers and technical staff possessing the adequate
expertise and experience in the health sector. It provided for five general areas of
reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding for
priority public health programs; (3) promote the development of local health systems
and ensure its effective performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory
agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program
(NHIP).

However, some provisions of the Health Sector Reform Agenda are challenged on the
ground that they violate 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which
directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the peoples
right to health and well-being. However, these provisions are not self-executory.

Petitioners challenged:

First reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals,

particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring
of government hospitals.
Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by
the DOH, dated 5 January 2001, entitled "Guidelines and Procedure in the
Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to
Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial Flexibility to Start by January
2001;" and Administrative Order No. 172 of the DOH, entitled "Policies and
Guidelines on the Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals in
Government Health Facilities," dated 9 January 2001, for imposing an added
burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for medicine and medical
services.
They also alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had
resulted in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to
economically disadvantaged Filipinos.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102

On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No.
102, entitled "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,"
which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of
the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from
being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services
and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local
government units.

There are certain provisions for the streamlining of the DOH and the deployment of
DOH personnel to regional offices and hospitals.

Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government
Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution to the local
government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific health-related
functions and responsibilities.7
Petitioners contended that:

Executive Order No. 102, which effects the reorganization of the DOH, should
be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. They argued
that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having been issued in excess of the
Presidents authority.
Implementation of the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not in
accordance with law. The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) approved it. They also
maintained that the Office of the President should have issued an administrative
order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so.
The validity of Executive Order No. 102 will be the reason of losing their jobs,
and that some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel
a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH employees
had to relocate to far-flung areas.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which
proved fatal: 1) Petitioners failed to show capacity or authority to sign the certification of
non-forum shopping and the verification; 2) Petitioners failed to show any particularized
interest for bringing the suit, nor any direct or personal injury sustained or were in the
immediate danger of sustaining; 3) the Petition, brought before the Supreme Court on
15 August 1999, was filed out of time, or beyond 60 days from the time the
reorganization methods were implemented in 2000; and 4) certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus will not lie where the President, in issuing the assailed Executive Order, was
not acting as a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Court of Appeals also ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14
of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which
directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the peoples
right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the
Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional
rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation.

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
rendered on 26 November 2004, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 7
March 2005.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO102 is constitutional?

RULING:

YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to
the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They
claim that the HSRAs policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue
enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article
III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987
Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and
free medical services. This contention is unfounded. As a general rule, the provisions of
the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for
their enforcement. If they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some
provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non-self-executing.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that
Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article
XIV of the1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of
the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from
other constitutional provisions as non-self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a
cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights. Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken
from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 --
the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non-self-executing in the
aforecited case of Taada v. Angara. Moreover, the records are devoid of any
explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process
clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no
allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the
HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were
breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to
the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA. In the remaining provisions,
Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords
recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful
working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to assistance and special
protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as
non-self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements
of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the executive
and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but
rather, the electorates displeasure may be manifested in their votes

DISPOSITIVE:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS
the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004,
declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No costs.
 Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge Case Digest
Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191, March 21, 1978

Facts:
On February 23, 1978, petitioner Francisco Virtouso , Jr., who filed an application for the
writ of habeas corpus, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the
preliminary examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a
useless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, (1) failed to meet
the strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable
cause. (2) He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted the
procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly
excessive. (3) It was in the amount of P16,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set being
imputed to petitioner.

As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it on Wednesday,
March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no impropriety in the way the
preliminary examination was conducted. As to the excessive character of the bail, he
asserted that while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by
the Executive Judge in Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the amount to P8,000.00.

Issue:
Whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of
probable cause was constitutionally deficient?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court declared that the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of
the Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978.

The Court issued the following Resolution:

Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court
Resolved pursuant to section 191of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year
old minor, to order the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his parents
Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his Counsel, Atty. Guillermo B.
Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice to further
proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law. This
Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code.

Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a
sum that is excessive.

-kdb.cpc.rc
PEOPLE vs. RITTER
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Accused-appellant: Heinrich Stefan Ritter

FACTS

On or about October 10, 1986, accused Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario
Baluyot inside his hotel room in Olongapo City. Inside the hotel room, the accused told them to
take a bath. When Rosario came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by the
accused and to join him in bed. At that time, Jessie was already asleep but Rosario touched him
to call his attention. When he looked, he saw the accused placing his penis against the vagina of
Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate but it would not fit. The following morning the
accused left after paying the children. Rosario then told Jessie that the accused inserted
something in her vagina. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her
whether the object was already removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie
claimed that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain
in her vagina and when he asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed.

Seven months later, Rosario was brought to the hospital with bloodied skirt, unconscious
and foul smelling. After 6 days, Rosario got serious and was pronounced dead subsequent to her
operation with a portion of a sexual vibrator extracted from her vagina.

A case for Rape with Homicide was filed against Ritter. The Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo rendered a decision declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt citing the rationale
of Art 4 of the Revised Penal He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
The Supreme Court however, reversed the judgment of the lower court and acquitted Ritter.

ISSUE

Whether or not the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability

RULING

It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is
that a person while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. While the guilt of the accused
in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 559).
 Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house.
Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Nonetheless, she has
left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her
sudden and incredulous death as reflected in the records of the case. Though the SC is acquitting
the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, it emphasizes that it is not ruling that he is
innocent or blameless.

It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to
build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do
not exist. As earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was
left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have caused her death. The Court
cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not require proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts found in the
records of this case.

The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or
public policy (Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino
children, enticing them with money. The Court cannot overstress the responsibility for proper
behavior of all adults in the Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The
sexual exploitation committed by the appellant should not and cannot be condoned. Thus,
considering the circumstances of the case, the Court awarded damages to the heirs of Rosario
Baluyot in the amount of P30,000.00.

The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH

STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to
pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario
Baluyot.