Holy War in China:

THE MUSLIM
REBELLION AND
STATE IN CHINESE
CENTRAL ASIA,
18641877

Hodong Kim,
Editor

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

holy war in china
This page intentionally left blank
Holy War in China
th e mu slim reb elli o n a nd s tate
i n c h in ese cen tra l a s i a , 18641877

Hodong Kim

stanford university press

stanford, california 2004
Stanford University Press
Stanford, California

2004 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford

Junior University. All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free,

archival-quality paper

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kim, Ho-dong, 1954

Holy war in China : the Muslim rebellion and state in
Chinese Central Asia, 18641877 / Hodong Kim.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8047-4884-5 (alk. paper)
1. Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu (China)History19th
century. 2. Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu (China)Ethnic
relationsHistory19th century. I. Title: Muslim
rebellion and state in Chinese Central Asia, 18641877.
II. Title.
DS793.S62 K595 2004
951'.6035dc22 2003019930

Typeset by Integrated Composition Systems

in 10/12.5 Sabon

Original Printing 2004

Last gure below indicates year of this printing:

13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04

Subsidy Assistance for the publication of this book was

provided by China Publication Subventions.
To my Parents
This page intentionally left blank
Contents

Acknowledgments xi
Introduction x

1. The Background 1
2. Xinjiang in Revolt 37
3. The Emergence of Yaqb Begs Regime 73
4. Muslim State and Its Ruling Structure 98
5. Formation of New International Relations 138
6. Collapse of the Muslim State 159

Conclusion 179
Appendix A: Treaty between Russia and Kashghar (1872) 187
Appendix B: Treaty between Britain and Kashghar (1874) 189
Appendix C: Table of Contents in TAs and THs 194
Glossary 197
List of Chinese Characters 201
Notes 211
Bibliography 263
Index 289
This page intentionally left blank
Illustrations

Maps
1. Muslim Revolts and Kuchean Expedition xx
2. Unication by Yaqb Beg and the Realm of the
Muslim State 72

Tables
4.1 Local Administrative Units under Yaqb Beg 103
4.2 Number of Troops Stationed in Eastern Turkestan
Cities 111

Figures
3.1 Portrait of Yaqb Beg 74
4.1 Guard of artillery sarbz and group of ofcers,
assembled in the courtyard of Yarkand governor 109
4.2 Yzbashi, panjhbashi, dahbashi, at attention 110
4.3 Soldiers from Kucha 115
This page intentionally left blank
Acknowledgments

The rst version of the present work was completed in 1986 when it
was submitted to Harvard University as a doctoral dissertation. At that
time, I thought that I would not hurry to publish it so that I could have more
time to ponder the subject and write a complete revision. For a deeper un-
derstanding of the history of modern Central Asia it seemed necessary for
me to expand my scope of interest. The focus of my interest shifted to the
topics related to the peculiarities of nomadic societies and states, and their
interactions with sedentary societies. So the revision of my dissertation
could not but be delayed much longer than I had imagined. Had it not been
for the encouragement of many scholars and colleagues, I am afraid that it
might never have been accomplished. With their warm support I nished
this much overdue task. Although this book cannot be said to be a complete
revision of my dissertation in terms of structure or basic arguments, its size
is considerably expanded, its organization is reshufed, and more details
and new researches have been added.
During these long years of preparation I have enjoyed the encouragement
and help of numerous scholars. First, I owe a debt of gratitude to my two
mentors, Min Tuki in Seoul and Joseph Fletcher Jr. at Harvard, who led me
to the pastures of Chinese and Central Asian history. I deeply mourn their
untimely deaths. The members of my doctoral committeeOmeljan Prit-
sak, Philip Kuhn, and Thomas Bareldgave me warm advice and thought-
ful criticism. In particular, this work would not have been completed were
it not for the help of Professor Bareld at Boston University who read the
revised version thoroughly and made numerous corrections.
I should like to thank the scholars who have shown great interest in my
work and provided me help and encouragement in various ways: Richard
Frye, Eden Naby, William Thackston, Sinasi Tekin, Beatrice Manz, Isenbike
Togan, Mark Elliot, Dru Gladney, Thomas Hllman, Saguchi Tru, Haneda
Akira, Mano Eiji, Hamada Masami, Hori Sunao, Umemura Hiroshi,
Sawada Minoru, Ji Dachun, Dian Weijiang, and Pan Zhiping. I would es-
pecially like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor James Millward for
reading the entire manuscript and giving me invaluable comments. My spe-
cial thanks are due as well to the Harvard-Yenching Institute, the Humboldt
Foundation, the Widener Library, and the Sakyejul Publishing Company. I
also wish to extend my gratitude to Muriel Bell, Carmen Borbn-Wu, and
Anne Friedman at Stanford University Press for their help.
xii acknowledgments

I should like to offer thanks to Koh Byungik, emeritus professor and for-
mer president of Seoul National University, for his warm and unagging
support. I remain grateful to my colleagues at the Department of Asian His-
tory, Seoul National University: Oh Keumsung, Yu Insun, Kim Yongdeok,
Lee Sungkyu, Park Hanje, and Kim Hyeongjong. I want to thank Kwon
Youngpil, Min Byunghoon, and the members of the Korean Association for
Central Asian Studies. I am grateful to Dr. Yi Eunjeong, Mr. Lee Yonggyu,
and Mr. Han Seunghyun for their assistance.
Without the moral support of my family certainly this book would not
have been published. I would like to thank my wife, Park Chanoak, and my
childrenEuihyun, Youngshin, and Sunghyunfor their love and perse-
verance. Finally, I wish to dedicate this book to my parents who have en-
dured the last fty years praying for me.
Introduction

Chinese Central Asia, the present Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Re-

gion, is divided into two unequal parts by the Tianshan range: Eastern Tur-
kestan, which is mostly desert except for a string of oases fed by the snow-
melt mountain waters, and Zungharia, which is a grassland steppe in the
plains and the mountain valleys. The whole territory is about three times
larger than France with a population of over seventeen million at present.1
Around the middle of the nineteenth century only between one and two mil-
lion people lived in this region. Several civilizations of Asia met here and left
long-lasting imprints upon the history of the area. From the time of antiq-
uity to our day, IndoIranian, Chinese, Islamic, and steppe cultures found
their way to this area. The fusion and the friction of these different factors
brought a variety of changes to the politics, social life, and culture of this
region. Because of such contacts, a large portion of the records on Chinese
Central Asia were written by its neighboring peoples. From the second half
of the past century scholars began to pay serious attention to its history
based on these records. There was also a remarkable increase of our knowl-
edge about this region through geographical explorations and archaeologi-
cal excavations.
Nevertheless, the historical research on Chinese Central Asia remains
inadequate compared to the study of other areas. Interest in the period after
the Mongol invasion is particularly lacking. We have only meager knowl-
edge of the Chaghatay khanate and its successor state, the Moghul khanate,
whose history in the region extends more than four centuries, although re-
cent efforts have begun to unveil the clouded history of the post-Mongol
period.2 This lack of study can be explained in part by the scarcity of source
material with which to pursue research. (One exception to this generaliza-
tion is the period of Qing rule where there have been a number of detailed
studies that take advantage of the abundance of Chinese sources.3) Another
reason for the general lack of interest in the history of the post-Mongol
period can be found in the assumption that Chinese Central Asia stopped
being a dynamic factor in Eurasian historical context from the late pre-
modern period. The gradually decreasing economic vitality of the Silk
Road and the Islamization of Central Asia reinforced this trend.4
One of most signicant but least explored periods in the regions history
is the late nineteenth century, which is the focus of this study. The period
xiv introduction

began with an enormous political upheaval that quickly engulfed all of Xin-
jiang in 1864. This revolt led to the expulsion of the Qing dynasty from Cen-
tral Asia and the establishment of an independent Muslim state led by
Yaqb Beg. Independence ended with Yaqb Begs death and the Chinese
reconquest of the region in 1877. This was a unique historical experience
for this region. For the rst time in their history, the people of the oases of
Eastern Turkestan were united in an independent state for which they
sought recognition and support from the outside world. In spite of the many
catastrophic results that came in the wake of the rebellion and the Qing re-
conquest, Eastern Turkestans decade of independence from China caused
the local people to reect anew on their self-identity. The period of auton-
omy in the nineteenth century then served as a source of inspiration for a
new generation of nationalistic leaders in the twentieth century. Another
legacy of this period was the awakening of historical consciousness among
the regions intellectuals that resulted in an unprecedented ood of writings
by local authors. This stood in stark contrast to the preceding centuries in
Chinese Central Asia during which only a few histories had been written by
local hands.
The Muslim rebellion and the creation of an independent state also had
a colossal impact on China. For the rst time since the establishment of the
Qing dynasty in 1644, a large territory had broken free of Chinas control.
This provoked intense debates over whether the empire should passively ac-
cept the loss of Xinjiang or make an all-out effort to reconquer the region
in spite of the huge nancial burden this would entail. There was historical
precedent for abandonment: Eastern Turkestan had slipped from Chinas
grip during both the Han and Tang dynasties, and the Ming dynasty had
never seriously attempted its conquest. The Qing, however, as a dynasty of
foreign origin, and which had previously devoted much of its frontier mili-
tary effort to incorporating vast areas of Mongolia, Tibet, and Manchuria,
was very concerned that such a loss might further undermine its authority
and encourage more popular unrest. The Qing had already been plagued by
a series of rebellions in China itself such as those by the Taiping, the Nian,
and Muslims in Shanxi-Gansu and in Yunnan, as well as territorial and
trade demands from the Western imperial powers. In the end China decided
on a policy of reconquest. With its success, the Qing ofcially incorporated
Xinjiang as a province of China and abolished the institutions of indirect
rule it had previously employed. Institutional reforms and the massive col-
onization of the region by Han Chinese immigrants reinforced this admin-
istrative change. In this way, the Qing attempted to incorporate Xinjiang as
an integral and indivisible part of China, a policy that has continued over
the past century under successive Chinese governments.
Because of its historical signicance, the Muslim rebellion in Eastern
 introduction xv

Turkestan has drawn the attention of a number of scholars. The British au-
thor, D. C. Boulger, produced the rst published history of this period in a
book written in 1878, barely a year after the end of the Muslim state.5 This
work is still the only book in English to treat the subject comprehensively,
covering the 1864 Muslim rebellion, the creation of the government by
Yaqb Beg, its foreign relations, and the collapse of the Muslim state.
Considering the limited number of sources available to the author at the
time, it remains quite an achievement. Despite its many contributions, the
book is now badly outdated and marred by numerous factual mistakes, in-
cluding stereotyped judgments that distort historical reality to a consider-
able degree.
More recently scholars in countries that have had continuing territorial
interests at stake in the region have contributed to our knowledge on this
topic. These include works by D. Tikhonov, A. Khodzhaev, and D. A. Isiev
in Russia,6 and those of Burhan Shahidi and Ji Dachun in China.7 They have
all made strenuous efforts to elucidate this poorly known history, particu-
larly by utilizing the many Muslim sources available in their countries.
However, they maintain quite irreconcilable positions on how we should in-
terpret the Muslim rebellion itself and the state established by Yaqb Beg.
The Russians present the uprising as a Uyghur national-liberation move-
ment against an unjustiable and oppressive Chinese rule. The Chinese
argue that it was a peasant uprising whose leadership was then snatched by
the reactionary feudal class represented by Yaqb Beg. These positions seem
to be rooted less in the analysis of the actual events than in the usefulness
of their political implications for each side during the SinoSoviet dispute.
What has been conspicuously lacking in all these studies, even those that
have used Muslim sources, is the perspective of the local Xinjiang people
who were the main actors in these events. The contemporary British and the
Russian commentators certainly provide us with useful insights from their
vantage points as outsiders, but their observations often betray a cultural
prejudice and a strong sense of their superiority, a blemish typically found
in the nineteenth-century Westerners writings on non-Western societies.
While the Chinese were not certainly outsiders in the same sense, in the
middle of the nineteenth century Xinjiang was not fully incorporated into
the Qing imperial system and its relationship to China was problematic. The
Muslims in the region of course recognized the political reality of Qing rule,
but culturally they identied themselves as a part of the larger Islamic world
and not as a part of greater China. Therefore it is not surprising that the
1864 Xinjiang rebellion took a quite different course than those initiated by
Han Chinese rebels in China, such as the Taiping and the Nian. Even re-
bellions launched in Shanxi and Gansu by ethnic Chinese Muslims (vari-
ously known in the literature as Tungans, Dungans, or Hui) took quite a dif-
xvi introduction

ferent form compared to those of the Muslim Uyghurs in Turkestan. For this
reason it is vital that the native Turkestani perspective be presented if we
hope to comprehend the reality of this historical event. And in this respect
we are fortunate to have at hand a few works produced by local historians
who were directly involved in the events they described. Because their works
were hard to nd and were written in less well-known languages, these
sources have been neglected for far too long. It is now time to give them the
keen attention they deserve and give weight to the message they hoped to
deliver.8
One reason for the emergence of so many new local voices was the ex-
citement generated by the rebellion. At least in its initial stage, they saw
themselves as engaged in a movement designed to revitalize a living Islamic
spirit that would return their land to the Dr al-Islm (Abode of Islam).
To make this a reality the indel rulers (the Qing) needed to be toppled from
power and replaced by Muslim rulers who would employ Islamic law. The
Chinese reconquest ended this dream, but not the forces behind it. Local
writers after the reconquest were less inclined to view the rebellion as a mis-
take than to see the era as a sort of exuberant period in which all the for-
merly divided Muslims had joined together for the victory of Islam. Failure
or not, the lasting glow of this endeavor sparked the composition of a se-
ries of historical treatises, most of which are at our disposal for study. Some
of these have actually been available for a long time because of the efforts
of a Russian scholar, N. N. Pantusov (18491909), who published them in
printed form at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The most important local historical source published is Trkh-i amniyya
by Mull Msa Sayrm (18361917).9 He is truly one of the best histori-
ans that Central Asia has ever produced and I feel no shame in depending
so heavily on his work for the details and the perspective of this study. His
work not only covers the entire period from the beginning of the rebellion
to the reconquest but also contains remarkably accurate information. The
author labored hard to collect so much of this information and he displayed
sound historical judgment in his use of it. Sayrm continued to revise his
work throughout his lifetime and the nal version crystallized into Trkh-
i kamd in 1908.10 A second important work is Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn
(Holy War in China) by Mull Bill (written in 187677), which also pro-
vides the title for this book.11 The author was a renowned poet in Ili and
the work itself is constructed as a long poem interspersed with prose. It con-
tains unique information of great value for the study of the Ili rebellion, es-
pecially about the internal situation of the Tungans and the Turkic Muslims
called Taranchi. In addition to these two, there are other historical works
available only in manuscript form. They are preserved in museums and li-
braries in Russia, China, England, France, Germany, Sweden, and a few
 introduction xvii

other countries. Although some institutions make it difcult for foreign re-
searchers to obtain access to them, most of these sources are accessible and
have been utilized by scholars.12
It was not only the local Muslim participants who recognized the sig-
nicance of that period. Several contemporary Westerners who combined
courage with curiosity personally dared to venture into this remote region
and left vivid descriptions of their visits. Especially important are the reports
of Robert B. Shaw who visited Kashgharia several times and personally met
Yaqb Beg13 and W. H. Johnson who risked his life crossing over the Pamirs
in 1865 and had an interview with Habb Allh, the leader of Khotan re-
volt.14 Of no little importance are the travelogues of those who visited this
region shortly after the collapse of the Muslim state in 1877. Particularly
vivid are the descriptions of E. Schuyler, who effectively transmits to us the
enormity of destruction that occurred in Zungharia,15 while M. F. Grenard
reveals the mood of the people after the reconquest in the Khotan area.16
Many ofcial documents written by the Chinese, British, Russians, and
Ottomans also add vital information to our store of knowledge. Chinese
sources are abundant, as usual, but most of them are useful only for the be-
ginning and the end of the period.17 The reason is self-evident: the Qing
ofcials had been completely wiped out during the rebellion and they re-
turned only after the successful conclusion of the reconquest. However, this
gap can be lled by two embassy reports, among others, one by a British
mission headed by T. D. Forsyth18 and the other by a Russian mission led
by A. N. Kuropatkin.19 They both contain extremely valuable information
about the government of Yaqb Beg. These include a number of details on
the socioeconomic conditions, the internal administration of the govern-
ment, and the army that would have been lost had it not been for their keen
and systematic observations. Their reports are indispensable companions
for anyone who hopes to study the Eastern Turkestan society in the later
half of the nineteenth century.
Important information can be culled from the diplomatic documents
drawn up by the ofcials of the British Foreign Ministry, especially those re-
counting their contacts with the government of Yaqb Beg, some of which
were never included in any published materials. These documents also con-
tain translations of Russian reports, the originals of which are still difcult
for us to gain access to. The Ottoman archives preserve rich materials not
only on the diplomatic relation with Kashgharia but on the internal condi-
tions of the Muslim government in its last years and its confrontation with
the Qing army. Many of these materials and personal reports of Ottoman
ofcers who had stayed in Kashgharia were put together by Mehmet tif in
his book.20
This work, Holy War in China, is a comprehensive survey of the history
xviii introduction

of Chinese Central Asia during the turbulent decade from 1864 to 1877. It
makes use of as many of the existing available published sources and man-
uscripts as possible. These original sources range over a wide variety of
languagesUyghur, Persian, Ottoman Turkish, Chinese, Russian, English,
French, and Germanand reect an amazing number of perspectives
and levels of understanding. By combining and analyzing these numerous
sources, as well a large number of secondary sources, I hope to provide a
sound overall description that can serve as the basis for further analytical
studies. While it is not my principal aim to make any denitive historical
judgments, at times this was impossible to avoid, so where I have a deni-
tive opinion, I state it. The structure of the book revolves around the fol-
lowing six questions: (1) What were the direct and indirect causes of the re-
bellion? (2) How did events unfold after the rebellions initial success? (3)
How could Yaqb Beg, a stranger from Khoqand, achieve success as a uni-
fying leader and founder of an independent state? (4) How did Yaqb Beg
run the government and what was the structure of his administration and
army? (5) How did the new state reach out to the international community
and how did various nations respond to his overtures? (6) Why did the state
fall apart so suddenly at Yaqb Begs death to allow China to reoccupy the
region almost without a ght?
The answers to these questions form the six chapters of this book. The
result may not be completely satisfactory because in some cases the sources
are inadequate while in other instances I lacked the necessary historical
tools. For this reason the accuracy of some details may still be doubtful and
many important aspects are left unattended. Yet, in spite of these short-
comings, I hope my endeavor calls more attention to the historical impor-
tance of this period and to the viewpoints so succinctly and ardently put for-
ward by local historians in Chinese Central Asia.
holy war in china
 ;;;;;
Ebinor
Jinghe
Mulei Barkul
Ili (11/10/1864) (10/19/1864)
I li Urumchi
N (7/26/1864)

Toqsun Pichan
Issyk Kul Hami
Turfan Lukchin (9/29/1864)

;;;;;
Muz Daban
Sayram Qarashahr Baghrash
Bay
Narin
ns
ntai Ush Turfan Kucha (6/4/1864) Kurla
an M ou
Ti a nsh (7/23/1864)
Aqsu
(7/27/1864) Lop Nor

;;;;;
Kashghar
(6/26/1864) Artush
t
Ming Yol Maralbash ser
Khan Ariq (Barchuq) n De
Tashmaliq a ka
Yangihissar l am
T ak

n
K ho ta
ir Yarkand (6/23/1864)
m
Pa
Tashqurghan
Sar
iq Q ol
Qaraqash Khotan
Keriya
Q a ra q a s h
1500m above sea level
Ke

Eastern Expedition of the Kuchean Army

riy

Western Expedition of the Kuchean Army

a

Yuru
ng Numbers in ( ) are the dates of revolts
Karakoram Pass q as h

untains
Kun l u n M o 0 100 200 300 km

map 1. Muslim Revolts and Kuchean Expedition

1 The Background

Tungan Revolt in Kucha

the beginning

It was in Kucha where the banner of the 1864 Muslim rebellion

against Qing rule was rst raised. At that time Kucha was a small city with
less than a thousand households within its walls, although in the past it had
been an important center on the Silk Road. During both the Han and Tang
dynasties it had served as the headquarters of the Western Region. The
reason for this was strategic. Located in the middle of the northern Tarim
Basin, the city served as a key eastwest link between China proper and the
other Central Asian cities through the Hesi corridor and Uyghuristan (Hami
and Turfan). To the north there was a route through the Tianshan moun-
tain region by way of precarious mountain passes and to the south it was
but a short distance across the Taklamakan Desert to Khotan.
The city of Kucha was greatly destroyed during the Qing conquest in the
middle of the eighteenth century when its population decreased drastically.
According to a Chinese record it was [formerly] a great city with thirty to
fty thousand Muslim households but had become so debilitated immedi-
ately after the conquest that only a thousand families remained in the city.1
A British mission that visited Kucha in 187374 attested to this fact, noting
that by their reckoning there were only about 800 households within the
city walls, perhaps another 1,200 in the suburbs, and 4,000 households
scattered among those villages that fell within the jurisdiction of Kucha.
Thus, at the time the rebellion began, the province of Kucha probably had
a population of no more than 6,000 households or 42,000 people.2
Although Kucha was still considered one of the Eight Cities of the
Southern Circuit (Nanlu bacheng) under the Qing rule, its urban popula-
tion was much lower than the other prominent cities of Eastern Turkestan
such as Khotan (6,000 households), Yarkand (5,000 households) or Kash-
ghar (5,000 households). One reason for the failure of the city to revive after
the Qing conquest was the alteration of the overall political situation in
Central Asia. Previously Chinas control of the oasis cities had been threat-
2 the background

ened by nomadic states based in the Zungharian plateau north of the Tian-
shan Mountains. When these states were active, Kucha served both as a base
of operation for Chinas attacks on the nomads and as a line of defense to
counter nomad attacks against them. After China destroyed the last of these
nomadic states in 1757 and took rm control of the steppe region, there was
no further need to maintain Kucha as a stronghold. The citys reduced im-
portance is borne out by a document, composed in 1804, stating that it was
administered by only a small staff of one imperial agent (banshi dachen)
supported by twenty petty ofcials and three hundred soldiers.3
Kucha was a seemingly unlikely place for a revolt to start. It was a rela-
tively isolated backwater town that had seen better days and had no history
of serious anti-Qing resistance. Yet it was here on June 4th the 1864 Mus-
lim rebellion started. The small number of Qing troops proved insufcient
to drive off the furious Muslims who began surging into the city. One rea-
son for the Qing vulnerability to attack was the structure of city itself. Like
the other oasis cities around the Tarim Basin, Kucha was encircled by a wall
made of sandy soil mixed with willow twigs about 1.71.8 km in cir-
cumference,4 but its internal structure was different. In Kashghar and
Yarkand, the Qing government had constructed separate forts outside the
walls, but near the Muslim town, to accommodate its colonial ofcials and
soldiers as well as merchants (mostly non-Turkic and non-Muslim peoples
that included a mix of Manchus, Mongols, and Han Chinese).5 In Kucha
they built the fort inside the city itself and then erected new walls designed
to separate the living quarters of the local Muslims from the non-Muslim
outsiders who served the Qing administration.6 Thus they were much more
vulnerable to attack and had no place to retreat.
Sayrm describes the events of that tumultuous night in this way:
As if it were a celestial calamity or a divine punishment, one night all of a sudden
some Tungans were perturbed and set re to the suburban bazaar (wayshang bazr)7
in the city of Kucha, killing indels and whomever they caught. At that moment, Al-
lhyr Khn Beg, son of the governor (kkim) of Yangihissar, leading some heart-
broken Muslims, joined with the Tungans. All the Tungans and Muslims allied to-
gether with one mind and set res to the buildings of the amban ofcial. Till dawn
they slaughtered many indels. As soon as it became the daybreak, the [Qing]
ofcials came out [of the fort] with troops to ght. But they could not stand and
were defeated. Tungans and Muslims were victorious while the Chinese (khitaylar)
were vanquished. It happened on the Saturday night, the rst day of Mukarram,
1281, in the Jawz season in the year of Snake.8

The Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang referred to Chinese-speaking Muslims

living in northwestern provinces by the names of Tungan or Dungan. In
Qing documents these same people were either called hanhui, that is, Chi-
nese Muslims, or simply transcribed as donggan.9 The non-Chinese Turkic-
 the background 3

speaking Muslims who constituted the overwhelming majority of the pop-

ulation in Eastern Turkestan simply called themselves musulmn (Muslim).
The common ethnic term of Uyghur that is now applied to many Turkic
people of this region was not used at the time and is, in fact, a twentieth-
century invention.10
The exact date of the revolt is somewhat in dispute, but it most proba-
bly began during the night of June 34, 1864.11 Sayrm names three per-
sons who led the Tungan rebels on that night: M Shr Akhnd, M Lng
Akhnd, and Shams al-Dn Khalfa, all living in Kucha.12 The rst two, with
the family name of Ma, were certainly Tungans, and the third was proba-
bly a Tungan too because it was not uncommon for them to have Arabic
names. Sayrms description makes it clear that the Kuchean revolt was
rst initiated and led by the Tungans living in that city. Only after they had
started the revolt by setting re to the suburban markets and killing in-
dels were they joined by the Turkic Muslims. These two groups of people,
now allied together, stormed into the government buildings and crushed a
detachment of the Qing army that came out of the fort to suppress them.
The cooperation of the Tungans and the Turks was also found in the me-
morial of Salingga, the imperial agent residing in Kucha, in which they were
called hanren and huimin respectively.13
Other Muslim accounts as well as Chinese sources give us a similar pic-
ture on the incident of that night. Hjj Ysuf, author of Jam al-tavrkh,
writes that the revolt was started by the initiative of the aforementioned
three Tungan leaders. He states that the Tungans, armed with axes, hoes,
and clubs, made a sudden assault and then burned ofcial buildings and
killed about one thousand Chinese and 150 Qalmaqs (i.e., Mongols).14 A
Qing document conrms this, recording that Chinese Muslims burnt the
city of Kucha and all the military and civil ofcials in Kucha, including
Wenyi and Salingga, were killed or wounded and all the ofcial buildings,
warehouses, and shops turned into ash.15 According to another Chinese
source, Ma Long, a native Kuchean Muslim, covertly conspired with out-
siders like Dian Manla and Su Manla, and they, leading a group of people,
revolted and burnt Kucha.16 Xinjiang tuzhi also writes that
in the fourth month of the summer a native Muslim in Kucha called Ma Long con-
spired to rise in revolt. There was a certain Yang Chun from Yumen, one of the in-
surgent Muslims, who had stealthily inltrated into Kucha and plotted a revolt with
Huang Hezhuo, Dian Manla and Su Manla.17 On the day of jihai [June 3] they burnt
the city of Kucha and on the day of renyin [June 6] the city fell. Salingga, imperial
agent [of Kucha], Wenyi, commandant (lingdui dachen) of Yangihissar, and Urenbu,
assistant (bangban dachen) of Yarkand were killed.18

All of our sources share two distinctive characteristics in describing the

Kucha revolt: they all stress that it was the Tungans who took the initiative
4 the background

and that they were aided by outside insurgents (waifei). As we will see,
these characteristics were also common to the revolts in other areas of Xin-
jiang such as Kashghar and Yangihissar where Tungan military command-
ers were reported to have secretly communicated and conspired with han-
huis. In Yarkand the revolt was alleged to have been started as a commo-
tion of hanhuis, while in Urumchi it was two Tungan leaders who initiated
the revolt. Indeed, with the exception of Khotan, it appears that it was the
Tungans who started the 1864 Muslim rebellion in each of the cities where
ghting broke out. The preeminence of the Tungans in the initial stage of
the revolt, however, immediately raises some difcult questions. First, why
was it not the Turkic Muslims who initiated the revolt? After all, they
formed the overwhelming majority of the indigenous population and would
seem to have been even more hostile to Qing rule than the Chinese Mus-
lims. Second, who were these so-called outside insurgents and what kind
of connection existed between them and the rebellious local Tungans?

rumor of massacre

It appears that the Tungans were thrown into panic by a rumor that
the Qing government was plotting to exterminate them. This at least was
the local native opinion about the cause of the Kucha revolt. Sayrm ex-
plains it as follows:
At that time English Christians overpowered the country of Chinese emperor and
conquered seventy-two large cities in the region called Brm. They even destroyed
some of them. At this juncture, a group of people called sngg Chanmz [i.e.,
Taipings]19 arose contending sovereignty on the one hand, and the Tungans caused
troubles on the other. In the end when the Great Khan (Ulgh Khn) heard the news
that Tungans, not being able to stay at Chingchf [i.e., Jinjibao], consulted with
each other and moved to the west in order to take the nearby areas, he sent the fol-
lowing edict to the chiefs of the provinces in this direction. Several Tungans deed
the submission, so we gave them advice and promise. However, because they were
worried and afraid of their crime and unruly behavior, they could not stay and went
to the west. If they go to that region, it is possible that the Tungans in that area will
become friendly with them and the common people will become disorderly. As soon
as you read this edict, exterminate the Tungans in city and, then, report the result to
me, the Great Khan! In this way, he sent the edict to the General of Ili. The Gen-
eral was also startled at this and, after consultations, said, Tungans are the people
of a large number, and their nature and behavior are different [from us]. If they got
a scent of [our weakness], we would become like evening and they would become
like morning. There is still a long distance for the Tungans to come from the inland
(ichkiri), so if we invite the Tungans living here and, giving them advice with friendly
words, conclude an agreement, then would they not be calmed down and devote
themselves to their own livelihood? . . . However, they did not become calm. Every
night they did not go to sleep, spending nights in holy tombs (mazr). They vowed
 the background 5

and vowed, and even those who had not performed an ablution once a month now
did it several times a day. Their sorrow and anxiety grew deeper day by day. The [Ili]
General, having found out such activities of these Tungans, became very anxious.
Then he ignored the agreement and, executing the emperor (khn)s edict, sent let-
ters to the ambans in every city: On such and such time of such and such day, mas-
sacre the Tungan people!20

He continues that the contents of this letter was revealed accidentally to

a Tungan scribe (siyh) working at a postal station (rtng).21 This man re-
ported it to his father named S Dlya who was an ofcer in Urumchi. S
Dlya then proceeded to spread this news to the Tungan chiefs in every city,
which ignited the revolt in Kucha.22 Sayrms assertion that the imperial
order of Tungan massacre was the immediate cause of the revolt is also cor-
roborated by a similar statement in Vafar-nma, composed by Mukammad
Al Khn Kashmr in 186768 just a few years after the revolt.23
Does their claim that the Muslim rebellion was touched off by the rumor
of a planned Tungan massacre have any grounding in reality? The edict of
Tongzhi Emperor himself, dated September 25, 1864, is noteworthy in its
assertion that the belief in such a rumor was widespread.
The present disturbance by Muslim insurgents in all parts of Xinjiang is agitated by
absurd stories fabricated by cunning people who ed from the interior region. It
seems to me that they were worried good Muslims (lianghui) might not trust their
words, so they, after having circulated a rumor that the Muslims would be massa-
cred, scared them and made them join.24

It may be impossible for us to nd out whether such a rumor was really

fabricated or had any factual basis. Although the emperor would have
hardly ordered such a massacre if he considered its inevitable and disastrous
consequences, it may be too rash for us to conclude that the rumor was as
completely fabricated by cunning people who ed from the interior re-
gion as the emperor thought. Even if the emperor had not considered such
a plan, local Qing ofcials, worried about the loyalty of their Tungan
troops, had previously considered ways they could be purged from positions
of power. One thing that both sides agreed on was that it was the rumor
of massacre itself, whatever its merit, that was a direct cause of the Mus-
lim revolt in Xinjiang.
Several sources allow us to conjecture how such a rumor came to be dis-
seminated, especially when we examine the cause of Muslim revolt at Lin-
tong in Shanxi which had started in June, 1862 and spread all over Shanxi
and Gansu provinces. In that spring the Taiping army began to pour into
the Shanxi area, and the Han Chinese organized militia units (tuanlian) at
the suggestion of government ofcials in order to repel the rebels. Then
these Han militias started to slaughter the Muslims who, they feared, might
6 the background

ally with the Taipings. In Guanzhong area a large number of Muslims were
massacred as shown by the expressions like jiaohui (extirpation of Mus-
lims), miehui (extermination of Muslims) or shalu jingjin (massacre
and cleansing). In Gansu the situation was not much different either.
Ofcials in Pingliang, having mobilized militias, searched and annihilated
insurgents in the city. In 1864 an ofcial in Suzhou secretly invited militia
leaders to conspire in the massacre of Muslims (tuhui), but the Muslims
discovered the plot and captured the city.25
Then, the question is how the news of these terrible incidents in Shanxi
and Gansu was transmitted to the Tungans in Xinjiang. Emperor Tongzhis
edict leads us to believe that it was the outside insurgents from the inte-
rior of China who disseminated the news and instigated their fellows in Xin-
jiang to rise. We have a few more reports that support this suspicion. As
mentioned earlier, a certain Yang Chun from Yumen plotted together with
local Tungans and caused the Kucha revolt. Another inland Tungan, named
Tuo Ming came to Urumchi and hid himself at the house of S Dlya, and
they became the leaders of the revolt there.26 We do not know whether their
arrival and activities were conducted as a part of a systematic anti-Qing
movement. The portrayal of Tuo Ming in a Qing document is less that of a
committed rebel than of a troublemaking tinker-peddler type common in
rural China.27 He practiced sorcery and fortune-telling and divination
while wandering around the Jinji[bao], Henan and Gansu areas, and got
acquainted with various Muslim leaders.28
There is no doubt that the outsiders propaganda was effective in creat-
ing an impending sense of crisis among the Tungans in Xinjiang, but what
is no less important is the social context that rendered them so susceptible
to that propaganda. After the revolt in Kucha and Urumchi, the other cities
rose against the Qing even without involvement of outsiders. In most areas
the revolts were not carefully premeditated by any leading group and the
leaders were chosen only after the revolt had succeeded. Why did they rise
against the Qing even without the involvement of the outsiders? Since it was
the Tungans who rst raised the banner of the revolt in many cities, let us
examine the direct cause that turned them against the Qing.
We do not know exactly how many Tungans were living in Xinjiang at
that time. According to Ch. Ch. Valikhanov who visited Kashgharia in
185859 and left detailed records on its social and economic conditions on
the eve of the rebellion, most of the Tungans there came from Shanxi,
Gansu, and Sichuan and they were running restaurants or engaged in the
transportation of tea by their own wagons.29 A considerable number of sol-
diers in the Green Battalions (luying) stationed in Xinjiang were also Tun-
gans from the Shanxi and Gansu areas. Based on Chinese sources, the total
number of soldiers in these units is estimated at about 4,0006,000,30 but
the actual number must have far exceeded this range. Estimated numbers
 the background 7

only in Nanlu (Southern Circuit, Kashgharia) reached almost 11,000.31

Many more Tungans, however, were living in the Ili and Urumchi areas
which were closer to China proper and had extensive cultivated areas.32
One source estimates that there were 60,000 Tungans around the Kulja re-
gion in the Ili valley alone.33 According to Sayrm, as quoted above, the Ili
General is reputed to have said that Tungans are the people of a large num-
ber, and it was certainly not an exaggeration.
Qing ofcials in Xinjiang were well aware of the existence of the large
number of Tungans and that some of them served as soldiers. They were nat-
urally worried about catastrophic repercussions of the revolts of Shanxi and
Gansu. It is not surprising that as a preventive measure they gave an order
to disarm the Tungan soldiers and to execute suspicious persons. Several
sources suggest that a larger scale of killings actually took place in Qa-
rashahr34 and in Kashghar.35 Thus the situation in Xinjiang immediately be-
fore the rebellion was most favorable to the outside instigators. The rumor
of a Tungan massacre was not only imported from the outside but also pro-
duced and conrmed in Xinjiang by actual incidents. Without any involve-
ment of organized rebel groups the rumor was rapidly disseminated by trav-
elers, merchants, and messengers over the entire region. Thus we can say
that the instantaneous and massive uprising of the Tungans was the result
of combined factors: the massacre in Shanxi and Gansu, the propaganda of
the Tungans from inland China, the excessive measures implemented by
local Qing ofcials that included actual massacres, and the rising awareness
of crisis among the Tungans in Xinjiang.
However, it was not the Tungans alone who rose up against the Qing
rule. As soon as the revolts broke out, almost simultaneously the Turkic
Muslims joined with them and the hegemony of the rebellion passed into
the hands of these Turks. With their participation virtually the entire Mus-
lim population in Xinjiang now stood against the Qing rule. The 1864 re-
bellion, started as a Tungan revolt, became the Muslim rebellion. But for
what reasons did the Turkic Muslims join a Tungan revolt so readily and
then so quickly come to dominate it? To answer this question, we have to
go back a century in time to discover how and why the Turkic population
had become so alienated from Qing rule.

The Limit of Qing Domination

conquest

The Qing annexation of Eastern Turkestan and Zungharia was an

important historical event in several respects. First of all, along with the in-
corporation of Mongolia and Tibet, it almost doubled the territory of
China. Unlike the Chinese expansions in the Han and the Tang times, the
8 the background

conquest of this region in the eighteenth century resulted in its permanent

incorporation into China and, ultimately opened the way to Sinicization.36
Furthermore, because the Qing military success came at the expense of the
destruction of the Zunghar, the so-called last nomadic empire,37 this
event shook the entire system of the international relation found there at
the center of which lay the Oyirat state from the middle of the seventeenth
century.38 The Qing conquest of this region was one of the high points in
the process of the SinoRussian expansion into Inner Asia that had started
a century or two earlier and was to be completed in the latter half of the
nineteenth century when the Inner Asian frontiers were nally closed. And
it was the event heralding the nal victory of sedentary states in the long
history of confrontations with nomadic peoples. It is not necessary for us to
explain the process of the Qing conquest of Xinjiang since there are already
detailed studies on this topic. A brief summary is sufcient here.
The death of the last effective Zunghar ruler, Galdan Tsering (r. 1727
45), instantly touched off thirteen years of succession struggles that nally
led to the destruction of the state. Initially Galdan Tserings second son suc-
ceeded to the throne, but he was killed by his eldest brother who then pro-
claimed himself ruler. However, he did not receive wide support from the
nobility, and power devolved to another imperial family member, Dawachi,
who secured the khanship in 1753. Fighting broke out soon between Da-
wachi and his former ally, Amursana, who, after being beaten by Dawachi,
ed to China to seek its assistance. In the spring of 1755 Emperor Qianlong
sent an expeditionary army of fty thousand and took Ili in June after en-
countering little resistance. However, at the completion of the expedition,
Amursana, who had expected to become the sole ruler of the Zunghars, was
dissatised with the decision of the Qing court to make him only one of four
khans. He revolted and although he gained the victory in the initial clash
with the Qing, he was later defeated (1757) and ed into Russian territory
where he died. When more than a decade of political turbulence ended with
the nal conquest of Zungharia by the Qing, the Zunghar population was
almost wiped out. According to a Chinese report, almost forty percent of
the population had died from smallpox, thirty percent were killed by the
Qing troops, and twenty percent had ed into the Qazaq and the Russian
territory.39
The Qing troops also encountered stiff resistance from the local oasis
population in the Tarim Basin led by a family of Naqshband Sus known
as Makhdmzdas, the descendants of a famous Central Asian Su,
Makhdm-i Aam (14611542), Great Master.40 Although he never set
foot in Eastern Turkestan, his second son Mukammad Iskq Wal (d. 1599)
came to this region and stayed several years, trying to draw important po-
litical gures to his order.41 His descendants and followers eventually suc-
 the background 9

ceeded in establishing their inuence upon the secular rulers of the region
and later became known as the Iskqs or the Qara Taghliqs (Black Moun-
taineers). Another line of Makhdmzdas descended from the eldest son
of Makhdm-i Aam, Mukammad Amn (also known as shn-i Kaln:
d. 1597/98), came to Eastern Turkestan a generation after the Iskaqs
had established themselves there. Under the leadership of Khwja Ysuf
(d. 1652/53) and Khwja Hidyat Allh (commonly known as Khwja
fq: d. 1693/94), son and grandson of Mukammad Amn respectively, this
branch of the family established a foothold in Yarkand and became known
as the fqs or the Aq Taghliqs (White Mountaineers).42 They were re-
ceived coldly by the Iskqs who perceived them as rivals. This was the be-
ginning of a long history of enmity, conspiracies, and assassinations be-
tween the two families.43
Around the middle of the seventeenth century when the political power
of the Moghul khans was declining and torn by internal power struggles in
the court, the two khwja families became entangled in partisan ghting.
These conicts resulted in the expulsion of Khwja fq who reportedly
sought help from the Zunghar ruler, Galdan Boshughtu Khan (d. 1696).
Such an incident induced a Zunghar invasion of Kashgharia (ca. 1680) and
the establishment of colonial rule with fq khwjas acting as the nominal
rulers of Kashgharia.44 After a while, however, they allied with family mem-
bers of the former Moghul khans and by taking advantage of the confusion
toward the end of Galdans reign, expelled the Zunghars from their land
and gained independence.45 However, as soon as Tsewang Rabtan (d. 1727)
secured power among the Zunghar nomads, he struck back and reimposed
colonial rule over Kashgharia. This time, fq khwjas were taken prison-
ers and held hostage in Ili while Iskq khwjas were made rulers of Kash-
gharian cities. Zunghar rule was not seriously challenged for about a half
century until Galdan Tserings death set off new disturbances in Zungharia.
The Iskq khwjas threw off the Zunghar yoke in western Kashgharia and
seemed to gain their independence.
When the Qing took Ili and eliminated Dawachi, they did not want to
leave Kashgharia outside their imperial control. Taking advantage of the
mutual conicts between the two khwja families, the court decided to re-
lease two fq khwja brothers, Burhn al-Dn and Khwja-i Jahn who
had been held hostage in Ili by the Zunghars, with a view to use them as
gureheads. The allied force of the fq khwjas and their followers, the
troops sent by Amursana, a small Qing detachment, and a number of local
leaders who saw a better prospect in siding with China, marched to Kash-
ghar and Yarkand. At the end of 1755 they soundly defeated the Iskq
khwjas and the Qing empire incorporated this region into its dominion.
However, the khwjas, especially Khwja-i Jahn, intended to be in-
10 the background

dependent rulers and found continuous Qing intervention irksome. The col-
lision between Qing and the khwjas became inevitable when a Manchu
general was killed in Kucha in 1757. The next year about ten thousand Qing
troops started the western march from Turfan. They encountered strong re-
sistance at rst in Yarkand and Kashghar, which the two khwja brothers
were holding, but after a substantial reinforcement, the Qing army under
the command of Jaohui took the two cities during the summer of 1759.
The khwja brothers ed to Badakhshan, where they were killed by Suln
Shh, the ruler of the region, and their heads were delivered to the Qing.46
Thus the conquest was completed and the newly acquired territory, the
north and the south of Tianshan mountains, began to be called Xinjiang,
that is New Dominion.
The situation in Eastern Turkestan after this Qing conquest was quite dif-
ferent from that in Zungharia, where due to the brutal military operations
of the Qing army nomadic populations were virtually exterminated. Ac-
cording to a Qing ofcial census, the population of Kashgharia, to the west
of Kucha, was counted 230,000. This probably reects only those who were
registered for taxation, so the actual number must have been much larger
than that. This assumption can be corroborated through a report
by Qing generals that the number of inhabitants of three cities in the ex-
treme westKashghar, Yarkand, and Khotan alonewere estimated at
240,000.47 If we add to this those who were living in Ush, Aqsu, and Kucha,
the total number would be about 370,000.48
The Qing army did not commit a systematic slaughter of the native
people in the Tarim Basin as they had done in Zungharia, even after they
had crushed the resistance of the khwja brothers. However, such a benev-
olent measure did not guarantee the security and tranquility in this region.
The slaughter and expulsion of the khwjas only intensied the resentment
against the indel rule among the local Muslim population, particularly
when it became known that Khwja Burhn al-Dns son, Sarimsaq, was
living in Khoqand khanate as a refugee.
The Qing attempted to gain local support by instituting a policy of indi-
rect rule in which most aspects of government would be in the hands of ap-
pointed local leaders known as begs. But the local population did not iden-
tify with these new ofcials whom they viewed as collaborators. Begs were
viewed with deep suspicion because they, imitating the lifestyle of the in-
dels, performed the koutou to their superiors and prostrated themselves
before the image of the emperor. Many of the third-ranking kkim begs
who came from Uyghuristan in the east (commonly called wang beg by the
Muslims) were particular targets of hatred because of their attempts to
amass personal fortunes. Lower-level functionaries, known as darughas, an-
gered many local people because they had no xed income and so frequently
resorted to illegal means to gain wealth. Members of ulam, the loosely or-
 the background 11

ganized Islamic clergy, had never wielded strong inuence on the people of
Eastern Turkestan, particularly when compared to the khwjas, and after
the Qing conquest their inuence declined even further. Thus there was no
group to bridge the gulf between the indigenous ofcialdom and the gov-
erned.49 This gulf was to be exploited both by the rulers of the Khoqand
khanate and by the fq khwjas, who had different goals but employed
the same means, including jihd or ghazt (holy war), to exploit the mili-
tary and ideological weaknesses of the Qing empire in Kashgharia.
With legitimate avenues of inuence and protest largely closed to them,
the peoples political expression could not but take the form of violence. The
Qing government seems to have been well aware of the problem and tried
to establish a system that would lessen the animosity of the local popula-
tion in Eastern Turkestan and strengthen its hold over this region. This sys-
tem was built on the principle of indirect rule based on rm military supe-
riority. To avoid provocation and unnecessary hostility in Eastern Tur-
kestan, the Qing let indigenous Muslims run the civil administration under
the close supervision of Qing ofcials dispatched from Peking. Thus in
Kashgharia it was the beg ofcials who took charge of the civil administra-
tion, while in Uyghuristan the job was left to those local notables who had
cooperated with the Qing during the conquest. The latter had been re-
warded with their own separate domains and the title of jasaq junwang. By
contrast, except for a small community of Muslims who were administered
by local begs, all of Zungharia was put under direct rule of the Ili General.
He was supported by a massive military force composed of soldiers drawn
from the Manchu and Mongol banners, as well as Chinese battalions sta-
tioned there to suppress promptly any Muslim opposition that might arise
in Eastern Turkestan. In spite of this carefully structured policy, the weak-
ness of the Qing domination rst became manifest in the 1820s and began
to crumble in the 1850s, laying the foundation for the success of the 1864
rebellion. Now let us examine the basic features and weakness of the Qing
rule in Eastern Turkestan.

dual layers of indirect rule

For the civil administration of the indigenous Muslim population the

Qing dynasty incorporated the stratum of local beg chiefs into its ofcial
system. Beg became the synonym of ofcial in Xinjiang, where formerly it
had been a general term designating the nobles. During the period of the
Moghul khanate (ca. 13471680) important ofcials, military as well as
civil, were recruited from the nomadic noble families, but, as the ruling
group of the khanate gradually adopted a sedentary way of life, these fam-
ilies were transformed into landed aristocrats. The process was almost com-
plete by the time of the Zunghar conquest.50 The Zunghars supported this
12 the background

class lest the ruling khwja family gain total domination, and they entrusted
the begs with the civil administration. Toward the middle of the eighteenth
century their political and economic power grew strong enough to compete
with that of the khwjas. For example, while the khwja brothers, Burhn
al-Dn and Khwja-i Jahn, opposed submission to the Qing, many of the
landed aristocrats allied themselves with the Chinese. To the Peking gov-
ernment the begs appeared to be not only an effective check against the
strong khwja power, but also a convenient tool for the indirect rule of a
newly conquered territory. Thus the traditional Chinese policy of divide
and rule was employed; the court put the begs against the khwjas while
the highest ranking begs in Kashgharia were recruited from Uyghuristan,
and it supported the Iskq against the fq khwjas to perpetuate the mu-
tual animosity between the two different khwja branches.
After the conquest, in order to incorporate indigenous landed aristocrats
into its ofcial system, the Qing conducted comprehensive inquiries and
found that there had been about fteen different ofcial titles such as kkim
(governor), ishikagha (deputy governor), or mrb (supervisor of irrigation)
distinguished by their functions. When the government picked new ofcials
from distinguished Muslim families (zhuxing huiren), that is, those who
had rendered meritorious service during the conquest,51 it gave them these
titles with beg appended indiscriminately, for example, kkim beg, ishik-
agha beg, and mrb beg. Moreover, the ranking system (pinji), which was
distinctively Chinese in character, was grafted onto it. The begs were given
the ranks from the third to the seventh, and entitled to cultivated land,
people to work on it (yanqi, or ynchi in Turkic), and stipends (yanglian) in
accordance with their ranks. For instance, a third-ranking beg received the
land of 200 batman52 and 100 ynchis while a seventh-ranking beg received
30 batman of land and 8 ynchis.
According to Saguchis detailed study on the beg ofcial system during
the Qing period there existed about thirty-ve different titles of beg, for ex-
ample: kkim beg who supervised the overall administration of districts of
varying sizes, ishikagha beg who were assistants of kkim beg; khaznachi
beg who took care of the treasury; mrb beg who were in charge of main-
taining the irrigation system and distributing water; qj beg who handled
judicial matters, and shang beg who supervised storehouses.53 However, it
appears that sometime later begs not only performed the functions ascribed
by their titles but also assumed the responsibility for general administration.
As a Yarkand tax-register54 shows, many small townships around the city
of Yarkand were administered by begs with the titles of mrb (supervisor
of irrigation), qara dvn (military comptroller), muktasib (accountant),
adr (chancellor), jab-i madar (town guard), and so on. There is no doubt
that they performed the general administrative works of the township.
 the background 13

Around 1830, the Qing government decided to transfer many beg ofcials
in cities to villages to tighten its control over those areas. As a result, the
begs who were transferred to villages began to take care of general affairs
despite the fact that they were still carrying specic functional titles.55
In Eastern Turkestan there were about 270 begs and in Zungharia about
20 (for the administration of the Taranchis).56 Although there was no xed
term of service for a beg, the posts were not hereditary. This was one of the
several measures that the government took to prevent unnecessary aggran-
dizement of the begs power. Another measure was the so-called rule of
avoidance, under which, in principle, the begs holding the ranks from the
third to the fth were to serve in cities or towns other than their hometown.
However, this rule was not strictly observed except for the third-ranking
begs. Many of the third-ranking kkims in Kashgharian cities came from
the ruling families in Hami and Turfan who had actively supported the Qing
conquest of Xinjiang. And to insure the loyalty of the high-ranking begs, the
court made the begs of the third and the fourth ranks visit Peking in turn to
have an audience with emperor.
In addition to those begs ofcially incorporated into the imperial ofcial-
dom, there was a semi-ofcial group called bashi (head). According to the
above-mentioned Yarkand register there were 84 mingbashis (miliarch) and
346 yzbashis (centurion)57 in the Yarkand area alone. The former were
posted in the suburban districts and large towns (dazhuang) while the lat-
ter were placed at small towns (xiaozhuang). They did not necessarily ad-
minister one thousand or one hundred households as the titles suggest. Their
chief responsibility was to assist the begs by collecting taxes from the people
under their jurisdiction.58 In addition to the aforementioned two bashi ti-
tles, we can nd in other materials kkbashi (supervisor of agriculture),59
elligbashi (head of fty) and onbashi (head of ten).60 The existence of vari-
ous bashis can be also found in a number of edicts (yarligh) issued during
the Moghul khanate,61 so it is apparent that this social stratum had existed
well before the Qing conquest. Under the Qing rule they were auxiliary
functionaries, without the same economic privileges that the beg ofcials
enjoyed. There was an incident illustrating their social position: just before
the 1864 rebellion several bashis in Kucha protested to ofcials (manab-
dr) about the excessive taxation, which ended in their imprisonment.62 In
addition to bashis there were other groups of functionaries who performed
auxiliary roles such as interpreters (tungchi, from Chinese tongshi), adju-
tants (darugha begi), stablers (mrkhr begi), couriers (chkchi), and
scribes (bichikchi).63
It is noteworthy that the Qing government adhered to the principle of in-
direct rule even in the religious sphere. There were religious leaders belong-
ing to the class of ulam (the learned) who, educated and trained in legal
14 the background

matters of religious law, performed judiciary and educational functions. In

Islamic countries it was a traditional practice for the secular rulers to en-
trust matters related to holy law to them. This had been the practice ear-
lier in Eastern Turkestan. For example, Abd al-Karm Khn (d. 1591/92)
had opened his tribunal court by seating the military chiefs (amr) on one
side and the religious leaders (qjs and mufts) on the other so that legal
matters could be administered depending on whether they were to be judged
by religious law (sharah) or secular law (tr).64
The members of the ulam had a hierarchy among themselves. Accord-
ing to the report of Valikhanov, in the later half of the 1850s, in Kashgharia
there were: one shaykh al-Islm who headed the ulam, two qj kaln
(chief judges), one qj askar (military judge), one ras (police), and sev-
eral qj qujts (high judges), alams (scholars), muft al-askars (military
prosecutors), and ordinary qjs and mufts. In addition, there were imms
(preachers), khalfas (deputies), khabs (reciters), and mulls (teachers).65
The Qing dynasty utilized these religious leaders to deal with the legal mat-
ters of the local people, but it did not incorporate all the existing ulam
members into the ofcialdom. The new beg system included only the qj
beg who administered litigation and punishment, and the muktasib beg who
taught Islamic scripture and kept an eye on public morals and education.
Through this method of indirect rule, as described above, the Qing dy-
nasty succeeded in winning some of the ruling elite in the conquered region
over to its side, but, because of that, the tax-paying commoners, called
alban-kash, came to have double layers of rulers, local Muslim begs and
their Manchu overlords. So while the discontentment of Muslim masses was
increasing more and more, the native ofcials were in no position to resolve
grievances and, naturally, could not take a leading role in social and politi-
cal upheavals. This left only one group of people in the Muslim society of
Eastern Turkestan who could speak for the people: Islamic mystics with the
honoric title of khwja. Compared to the insignicant respect that ordi-
nary members of the ulam received from the people of Eastern Turkestan
at that time, these people, especially those who belonged to saintly lineages,
had tremendous religious charisma.66
The most powerful of these lineages were the Makhdmzdas. As indi-
cated earlier, there were two competing branches of the Makhdmzdas,
the Iskqs and fqs. In terms of strength and inuence, the fqs were
much more powerful than the Iskqs. This was because the Iskqs had re-
mained in Eastern Turkestan and been tainted by their cooperation with the
Qing government. The exiled fqs in Khoqand, by contrast, claimed to
represent the aspiration of those Muslims seeking to throw off unjust
indel rule by means of a holy war. Their respective popularity can be
gauged by Valikhanovs report that there were only two hundred Iskq fol-
 the background 15

lowers in the Khoqand khanate compared with more than fty thousand
households of the fq followers eager to participate in the war against the
indels and to donate money to the fq khwjas. The fq also had
numerous followers among the nomadic Qirghiz and the Uzbeks.67 With
their popular political and nancial support, it was the fq who were to
prove the most consistent challengers to Qing rule in Eastern Turkestan.

military establishment

To secure its colonial rule in Xinjiang the Qing stationed a large

number of troops there. The primacy of military rule in Xinjiang is well at-
tested by the system of the so-called military bureau (junfu) headed by
the General of Ili (Yili jangjun). The Qing dynasty divided the whole of Xin-
jiang into three circuits (lu). Zungharia was renamed68 Tianshan Beilu
(Northern Circuit of Tianshan) and encompassed the area around Ili and
Tarbaghatai. The Qing called Kashgharia Tianshan Nanlu (Southern Cir-
cuit of Tianshan). It included the Four Western Cities of Khotan, Yar-
kand, Yangihissar, and Kashghar, and the Four Eastern Cities of Ush,
Aqsu, Kucha, and Qarashahr, which were together known as the Eight
Cities,69 equivalent to the Turkic terms such as Altishahr (Six Cities) and
Yttishahr (Seven Cities). There was a third division called Donglu (Eastern
Circuit) that included Turfan, Hami, Barkul, Qur Qarausu, and Urumchi.
The Qing court made the Ili General the supreme commander of all the
military and administrative affairs in Xinjiang. In large cities of Zungharia
as well as Eastern Turkestan were placed high military ofcials, such as
councilor (canzan dachen), imperial agent (banshi dachen), or commandant
(lingdui dachen). The entire Southern Circuit was under the jurisdiction of
councilor in Kashghar (sometimes in Yarkand) and was subject to the Gen-
eral of Ili.70 The Eastern Circuit was under the command of lieutenant-gen-
eral (dutong) in Urumchi who was also subordinate to the General of Ili in
military matters, but reported to the governor of Gansu province in civil
administration.71 In this respect the administrative status of the Eastern Cir-
cuit was somewhat different from the other two Circuits. Not only was it
geographically closer to inland China than the other territories, but it had
also voluntarily submitted to Qing rule before the rest of Xinjiang was in-
corporated into the empire. For these reasons the Qing simply extended the
traditional system of Chinese local administration (zhouxian, districts and
counties) to some areas, such as Urumchi and Barkul, while they allowed
their old political allies in Hami and Turfan to rule as Qing clients with the
title of jasaq junwang.72
These high military posts were almost always monopolized by the
Manchu and the Mongol bannermen. According to the study of Wen-djang
16 the background

Chu, of the 235 high ofcials who served in Xinjiang from 1760 through
1874 only ve of them might have been possible Chinese, while the rest
were clearly Manchus or Mongols.73 Another more extensive and detailed
study on the background of 619 high ofcials who served in Xinjiang be-
fore 1884 provides a similar result: 76.6 percent Manchus, 9.4 percent
Mongols, 2.2 percent Hans, and 11.8 percent unknown.74 This rule of ex-
cluding Han ofcials from Xinjiang was broken only in 1875 by the ap-
pointment of Zuo Zongtang to be the supreme commander of the Xinjiang
campaign and with the appointment of Liu Jintang to be the rst governor
of Xinjiang in 1884 when the regions status was changed to that of a Chi-
nese province.
Another peculiarity of Qing military organization in Xinjiang was its two
different systems for stafng military garrisons (fangbing). The rst em-
ployed residence troops (zhufang) who were permanently settled with
their families in the places where they served. The second employed rota-
tion troops (huanfang) who served xed terms of three to ve years and
then returned to their homes when replacements arrived. The Northern and
the Eastern Circuits were manned by resident garrison troops, while the
Southern Circuit depended entirely on rotation troops dispatched from
Shanxi, Gansu, or Urumchi. In Kashghar, Yarkand, and Yangihissar, there
were only about ve hundred Eight Banner soldiers dispatched from Ili.75
The total number of the troops stationed in Xinjiang sometimes uctu-
ated, but during the reign of Qianlong in the mid-eighteenth century they
numbered approximately 30,000. Of these more than half (16,300) were as-
signed to the Northern Circuit, another quarter (7,400) were allocated to
the Eastern Circuit, while somewhat fewer troops (5,0006,000) were as-
signed to the Southern Circuit.76 This left the Qing forces very unbalanced
geographically, with almost four-fths of its total force in the Northern and
the Eastern Circuits, particularly around Ili and Urumchi. Ethnic Manchus
(drawn from the Eight Banners) and the Han Chinese (drawn from the
Green Battalions) each constituted two-fths of the total number of troops,
while the remaining fth had their origins in such tribal groups as the
Solons, Sibos, Chahars, and lts (Zunghars). In addition to these forces
there were unknown, but not large, numbers of local Muslim troops under
Muslim ofcials in each city.
The reason for this unbalanced distribution of troops among the North-
ern, Eastern and Southern Circuits stemmed from several factors that Qing
took into consideration. First of all, the court attributed great strategic im-
portance to the area in the north of Tianshan because the region had his-
torically been the abode of powerful nomadic states, including the Zunghar
state. In addition, it was centrally located as a base of operations. From here
the Qing could check the advance of Russia into Central Asia in the west,
 the background 17

suppress rebellions by Kashgharian Muslims in the south, and watch over

potentially subversive Qalqa Mongols in the northeast. It was also attrac-
tive because it provided excellent pasture land to feed the large number of
horses needed to support the cavalry. Zungharia was also rich in undevel-
oped agricultural land that the Qing government used to establish various
agricultural colonies. These included huitun that were occupied by the Mus-
lims transported from Eastern Turkestan who were known as Taranchis,
bingtun and chitun established by resident Manchu and Mongol garrison
soldiers and their families, hutun populated by immigrant Han Chinese
peasants, and qiantun that were used to house exiles.77
While the north may have been geographically central in terms of impe-
rial geography, the placement of so many troops there created a strategic
weakness in dealing with Kashgharia. In case of a large rebellion or a for-
eign invasion, the small number of troops scattered across the region would
be grossly inadequate and would require substantial reinforcements from
Ili, Urumchi, or China proper. But such assistance would take several
months to arrive because of the distances involved, particularly since the
most trouble usually occurred in westernmost Kashgharia, which was at the
farthest end of the Qing imperium. The situation might easily get out of con-
trol before help could arrive from Ili. And it took at least six months after
the outbreak of an incident was reported to get a more massive reinforce-
ment army dispatched from Lanzhou to arrive in Kashghar.78
These defects became apparent in the early nineteenth century. The need
to repulse an invasion in 1826 led by Jahngr, an anti-Qing khwja based
in Khoqand, forced the court to dispatch almost 36,000 troops as rein-
forcements from China proper. When the invasion was repulsed, 10,000
soldiers were ordered to stay behind and reinforce the garrisons of the
Southern Circuit that had previously numbered only ve or six thousand.79
With each succeeding outbreak of trouble the number of Qing troops as-
signed to garrison duty in southern Xinjiang rose. After another invasion in
1830, Wei Yuan wrote that the six thousand troops stationed in the West-
ern Four Cities were doubled by dispatching three thousand cavalry from
Ili and four thousand Green Battalion troops from Shanxi and Gansu. New
units of one thousand each were also posted to Aqsu and Ush80 increasing
the total number of troops in Kashgharia (or the Southern Circuit) to
15,000, a gure that remained stable until the end of the 1850s according
to Valikhanovs observations.81 The Ministry of Households (hubu) re-
ported to the emperor in 1853 that the garrison soldiers in the Northern
and Southern Circuits are 40,000.82 So if we add those in the Eastern Cir-
cuit, the total number would have reached almost 50,000. Yet despite the
increased number of troops, the Qing government remained vulnerable to
Muslim revolts and invasions.
18 the background

The Qing court recognized that it needed more troops in Xinjiang but it
could not increase their numbers because of nancial limitations. A basic
principle of Qing administration held that the government should spend
in accordance with income (liangru weichu), but this was a principle that
was almost impossible to realize in practice. Only a few years after the con-
quest of Xinjiang, a memorial delivered to the Qianlong emperor in 1761
gave an accounting of its cost. Food provisions for the cavalry and the in-
fantry soldiers (numbering 17,000) who had been dispatched to Xinjiang to
pursue the conquest and staying there at that time were supplied by the pro-
duction of the agricultural colonies (tuntian) there. Salaries (yancaiyin) to
the ofcials and soldiers cost 333,400 liangs (taels) of silver, but only
58,000 liangs of this was covered by tax income in Xinjiang. This meant,
and the memorial conrms, that the remaining decit of 275,400 liangs of
silver had to be provided by subsidies (xiexiang) from inland provinces.83
The expenses only multiplied as the number of troops increased. The es-
timated annual expense of supporting 40,000 troops in Xinjiang was
1,400,0001,500,000 liangs,84 but the actual expense was apparently much
more than that amount. According to Wei Yuan, the annual subsidy to Xin-
jiang from inland provinces reached almost 1,800,000 liangs,85 and by the
1840s the gure amounted to over 4 million liangs.86 An additional expense
was rotating troops in and out of the Southern Circuit. Because they were
dispatched from Shanxi and Gansu, the government had to take the re-
sponsibility for the cost of their movement, as well as salaries, provisions,
equipment, special bonuses, and traveling expenses.87
After Jahngrs invasion in the 1820s, the Qing government attempted
to increase the local share of the regions administrative cost by raising more
revenue. Ofcials searched the region to put more privately cultivated lands
and previously hidden elds on the tax rolls. They also developed new agri-
cultural colonies by encouraging immigration of Han Chinese. But all these
efforts failed to produce the desired results.88 It became clear that the tax
revenue obtained from Xinjiangs Muslims would never be sufcient to sup-
port the military cost of garrisoning the region. The government would have
to depend permanently on subsidies drawn from the inland provinces to
cover the expenses of its occupation. However, because of the enormous
amount of military spending associated with putting down the Taiping re-
bellion in the 1850s, the annual subsidies for Xinjiang were soon drastically
reduced and sometimes even cut off entirely. This circumstance forced the
local administration to increase the tax burdens even more on the Muslims
in Xinjiang, which in turn inevitably aggravated the population and wors-
ened the regions socioeconomic condition. The khwjas and the rulers of
the neighboring khanate of Khoqand fully exploited this weakness of the
Qing.
 the background 19

Intervention of Khoqand Khanate

early contacts

The emergence of Khoqand as a strong political power in Central

Asia began in the 1740s, only a decade before the Qing conquest of Zung-
haria and Eastern Turkestan. Although the origin of this state goes back to
a legendary gure named Altun Bishik (Golden Cradle) belonging to the
Ming tribe of the Uzbeks around the middle of the sixteenth century, his de-
scendants had remained for two centuries merely as tribal chiefs in the Fer-
ghana valley with the title of b.89 In the 1740s their leader, Abd al-Karm
B, built a new fort at a place called Eski Qurghn (Old Fort) and renamed
it Khoqand, beginning the real history of the khanate.90
The internal situation leading to the strengthening of their political
power is not well known, but the rise of Khoqand in the 1740s apparently
owed much to overall political changes in Central Asia that weakened Kho-
qands rivals. The powerful Ashtarkhanid dynasty of Uzbeks fell victim to
Ndir Shh Afshar when he invaded Bukhara and Samarqand in 1740.
While Ndir Shhs empire eventually stretched from the borders of Otto-
man Turkey into Mughal India, and included both Khiva and Bukhara, it
collapsed upon his death in 1747.91 This opened a period in which there was
no hegemonic power in Central Asia. The Afghans in the south inherited
many of the eastern provinces of Ndir Shhs realm and, under the lead-
ership of Akmad Shh Durran, began to play a large role in Central Asian
politics. To the west there arose two new Uzbek khanates, Bukhara and
Khiva, that were similar in size and power to Khoqand. To the east and
north, Khoqand beneted from the weakening of the Zunghar khanate be-
cause it was at war with China. These events freed Khoqand from the out-
side pressure, providing its rulers a breathing space and time to strengthen
their power. The fact that Abd al-Karm B had the temerity to kill the en-
voys sent by the Zunghar ruler Galdan Tsering in 1745 demonstrated his
degree of self-condence.92
The conquest of Zungharia and Eastern Turkestan in 1757 brought the
Qing into direct contact with the Qazaqs and Qirghiz, as well as with Kho-
qand. The Qing commanding general, Jaohui, sent an envoy to the leaders
of the cities in Ferghana asking them to help the Qing arrest the eeing
khwja brothers. According to a Chinese source, Hjj B, the chief of the
Edigene tribe of the Qirghiz in Pamir, and Irdana (or, Erdeni: r. 175170),
the ruler of Khoqand, sent their emissaries to China with letters, stating that
we, two hundred and ten thousand population to the east of Bukhara, are
all subjects [of the emperor].93 Although the Qing perceived this as an ex-
pression of submission, later developments suggest that Irdana had quite a
different purpose in sending an envoy. Apparently he never intended to ac-
20 the background

knowledge his status as vassal to the Qing; but rather accepted the Qing
diplomatic terms only to secure the economic gains they brought, a strategy
pursued by most other Central Asian states that maintained similarly nom-
inal tributary relations with China.94
Most of Khoqands early relationships with the Qing in Kashgharia were
trade related. In November, 1760, for example, two Khoqand envoys came
to Kashghar and requested that their sale of cattle be exempted from taxa-
tion. The Qing government allowed the exemption, but restricted the privi-
lege to ofcial envoys and did not extend it to private merchants.95 The rst
serious dispute between the two states, and a harbinger of future conicts,
occurred in 1762 when Irdana took the city of Osh away from the control
of Hjj B by force. Because Osh was a city in the eastern Ferghana near
the Kashgharian border, the Qirghiz chief asked the Qing court to put pres-
sure on Irdana to return the city to him. This soon became a test of muscle
between Qing and Khoqand. Irdana adamantly refused the Qing demand,
in part because the ishikagha beg of Kashghar, Abd al-Rakm, had secretly
informed him that the Qing would take no military action against Khoqand.
With this knowledge Irdana was able to deal with the Qing court con-
dently. In a letter sent to the court, he called himself khan and demanded
that Kashghar mountain, that is, Terek Daban, be made the boundary be-
tween the two states.96
Khoqand was not the only Central Asian state causing trouble for China.
Akmad Shh Durran, the ruler of Afghanistan, was attempting to form an
alliance of the Muslim Central Asian khanates and the Qazaqs in order to
mount a military campaign against the Qing expansion into Central Asia.97
According to the report of Valikhanov, such Central Asian rulers as Irdana
of Khoqand and Tashkent, Fjl B of Khojent and Uratepe (Uratyube), and
a sultan of the Qazaqs, had earlier sent a letter to Akmad Shh to ask him
to deliver the Muslim world from the attack of non-believers. In the
spring of 1763 Afghan troops were deployed in the area between Khoqand
and Tashkent, and Akmad Shh dispatched letters to many leaders of Is-
lamic countries urging them to join in the holy war. According to Va-
likhanov this provoked at least one revolt in 1765 in a small town called
Ush within Kashgharia itself where the Muslims had risen with the expec-
tation of receiving support from the wider Muslim world.98
This plan for a coordinated attack against Qing territory also appears in
Russian records. According to their reports, Irdana had sent a letter to the
Qazaq sultan, Ablai, notifying him that Akmad Shhs emissary had arrived
in Khoqand with a message indicating that Akmad Shh had agreed to aid
Khoqand in case of a Qing attack. A merchant from Khojent who visited
Orenburg in January 1764 informed the Russians that Akmad Shh had
concentrated one hundred thousand troops [sic!] to the north of Qandahar
 the background 21

in case of war against the Qing.99 The Qing court received a similar report
about such military movements in Central Asia, but the Chinese appeared
to believe that the Afghans were going to attack Bukhara.100 The Chinese
belief that they were unlikely to be the true targets of Akmad Shh was
solidly grounded. It is true that he had been pursuing an expansionist pol-
icy,101 but he had many territorial disputes with Bukhara and few with
China. Moving an army to the borders of Bukhara under the guise of a war
against the indels would have fallen well within the bounds of treach-
ery common to Central Asian politics at the time. Still one cannot dismiss
the possibility of Afghan military aggression against the Qing. Akmad Shh
had invaded India 1761 and defeated non-Muslim forces there.102 And in
1765 Afghan and Bukharan forces raided Badakhshan to take revenge on
Suln Shh for killing the eeing khwja brothers.
Although the united front of Muslim countries came to naught be-
cause of the internal situation in Afghanistan and dissension among Central
Asian states, the attitude of Khoqand manifested during that course was
enough to show that she would not be satised with vassal status to the
Qing. Irdanas attitude during the Osh incident certainly indicates his con-
solidation of power in Ferghana. In this regard, it is worthwhile noting that
Irdana was the rst Khoqand ruler to assume the title of khan. Previous
rulers of Khoqand had been simply called b. In the Muslim literature on
the Khoqand khanate, Irdanas assumption of the title of khan, even though
it may have been temporary, is not mentioned, and lim (r. 17991809)
has been generally regarded as the rst Khoqand ruler who assumed that
title.103 However, his letter of 1763 sent to the Qing, as mentioned earlier,
leaves no doubt to the fact that he was the rst khan of Khoqand. His as-
sumption of this title may have been merely for a diplomatic ostentation of
his power and not for the internal politics, but it still can be interpreted as
an expression of his sense of self-condence.
During the reign of Irdanas son, Narbuta (r. 177098/99), not only did
the Khoqand territory expand to Namangan, Andijan, and Quramma, but
the economy of the country also ourished. He struck black copper coins
(fuls-i siyh) and agricultural production increased considerably.104 Al-
though his relationship with the Qing did not worsen, the Qing courts de-
mand that Khoqand should hand over Sarimsaq, the son of Burhn al-Dn
Khwja, who was living in Ferghana, remained a diplomatic stumbling
block to improved relations throughout his reign.
The Qing st became aware of the existence of Sarimsaq in 1761, but it
was only in 1784 the court realized that he had now become an adult who
was engaged in such subversive political actions as sending secret letters to
Muslim leaders in Kashgharia and collecting money from the local popula-
tion.105 Naturally the Qing court was apprehensive of the future danger
22 the background

Sarimsaq posed, so it requested Narbutas help in extraditing him to China.

However, it would have been extremely dangerous politically and unac-
ceptable religiously for Narbuta to hand Sarimsaq over to the Chinese. He
was both a khwja with holy lineage and a greatly revered gure among the
Muslims in Kashgharia. The Qing rst tried to gain Narbutas cooperation
by sending him gifts, but when these failed to change his mind they threat-
ened to ban the entry of Khoqand merchants into Kashgharia. As this threat
failed they tried a different tactic in 1797. If Narbuta would agree to keep
Sarimsaq under surveillance and prevent him from attempting an invasion
or inciting revolts in Kashgharia, then the Chinese would grant him an
ofcial title that came with a regular stipend.106 Narbuta agreed to this plan.
Qing concerns about subversive khwjas were not the only issue strain-
ing Khoqands relations with China. Because of a dispute between China
and Russia, the old border market in Kiakhta had remained closed from
1785 until 1792. During this period Khoqand played the role of a protable
middleman, transporting Chinese goods to Ferghana and then to Russia. As
this contraband trade ourished, so did the conicts of interest between
Qing and Khoqand. Toward the end of Narbutas reign the Qing retaliated
by imposing various restrictions on Khoqandian traders, including the
prohibiting of marriages between Khoqandian merchants and Khashghar-
ian women.107
During the reigns of the next two succeeding rulers, lim Khn (r. 1799
1809) and Umar Khan (r. 18091822), the Khoqand khanate witnessed the
most prosperous period in its history. Its territory was at least doubled,
stretching from Uratepe in the southwest and to Tashkent and Turkestan in
the northwest.108 From this newly acquired territory Khoqand could con-
trol the ow of international trade between Russia and Central Asia and this
brought much economic wealth to the khanate. Trade relations with Kash-
gharia also ourished under the guise of ofcial tributary visits to Kash-
ghar and Peking, as well as through ordinary trade conducted by private
merchants. The volume of trade increased signicantly during Umars
reign, as is evidenced, for example, by the complaint of a Chinese ofcial
that one embassy caravan alone carried eighty-eight cart-loads of Chinese
goods, including tea, porcelain, and cloth.109
With the strengthening of the khanates political power and the expan-
sion of the trade with Kashgharia, the conicts of interest between the two
countries began to surface more sharply in the reign of lim Khn. One
Khoqandian source, Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya, demonstrates that lim
Khn was well aware of the weakness of the Qing rule in Eastern Turkestan
and the reasons the emperor of China was sending him presents.
Chiefs (valiyn) of the Seven Cities (haft kishvar) of Kashghar110 who had been
loyal and submissive to Chinese emperors from the time of their ancestors, turned
 the background 23

their heads, neither considering nor observing that they were subject [to the em-
peror], away from him and did not put their courteous hand over the chest. Even a
tiny bit of our intrepid commands was not disaproved and the suzerainty over the
Andijanis [i.e., Khoqandians] in the Seven Cities (haft shahr) was entrusted to our
hands. Besides, the chiefs of every region are sending trustworthy representatives to
us as emissaries and enquiring after our well-being with gifts and tributes (psh-kash
va trtq).111

However, we cannot accept at face value all the claims asserted here. It
is unlikely that the Qing would have ever acknowledged a complete renun-
ciation of its suzerainty over the Khoqandians in Kashgharia or authorized
local Muslim chiefs sending tribute to Khoqands ruler. However, contem-
porary Qing sources do prove that these claims were not entirely ground-
less. For example, when lim Khn requested that the Qing grant full tax
exemption on those commodities taken to Kashgharia by Khoqandian mer-
chants, his demand was not rejected outright. Instead he obtained a half ex-
emption for such goods. Perhaps more signicant, his demand for this com-
mercial privilege was presented not by his own envoy, but by the governor
of Kashghar who argued the case on his behalf. He also sent a letter to the
chief of Khoqandian merchants (known as the huda-i da112) and asked him
to send tribute. He even once sent a letter to the Qing court in which he
called the Qing emperor his friend (dust), a severe breach of protocol when
dealing with the ruler of All under Heaven. This came to light because
court ofcials had a habit of cleaning up such letters to make them conform
to Chinese standards by employing less than verbatim translations. When
the emperor discovered the discrepancies between the original letters and
the Manchu translations prepared by Qing ofcials, he was furious at the
arrogant phrases that lim Khns had dared use to address him.113 The
letter was therefore rejected on the grounds that it did not observe the eti-
quette of submission by outer barbarians.114
As the Khoqand-Kashgharian trade expanded, many Khoqandian mer-
chants came to reside in the cities of Kashgharia. In 1813 lim Khns suc-
cessor, Umar Khn, therefore requested that the Qing government permit
him to station an ofcial political agent with the title of qj beg to super-
vise and tax the Khoqandian merchants. This ofcial would replace the
semi-ofcial huda-i da he had already posted in Kashgharia.115 This pro-
posal was rejected, but in 1817 he repeated it, and again the Qing denied it.
In 1820 Umar made the request again, but this time he altered the ofcial
title from qj beg to the perhaps more innocuous sounding aqsaqal (white
beard, meaning elder). Although the Qing ofcials still refused to accept
his petition, they later found out that Umar had just gone ahead and ig-
nored them by secretly appointing his aqsaqal without their permission.116
This conict of interestthe Khoqand rulers desire to increase the kha-
nates share in the ourishing trade versus Chinas unwillingness to grant
24 the background

any ignominious concessions to her vassal statecame to open conict

with the invasion of Kashgharia by Jahngr.

holy war of the khw1jas

The Khwja leader, Jahngr, the son of Sarimsaq and grandson of

Burhn al-Dn, had long been under the surveillance of Umar Khan who
received a stipend from the Qing for that reason.117 This was because the
fq khwjas in Khoqand had never given up their claim to Kashgharia
nor renounced their intention to wage holy war against China. Rather
than seeing their inuence decline after more than a half century of Qing
colonial rule, the khwjas importance had instead risen as the political and
economic conditions worsened in Kashgharia. Many people there viewed
themselves as victims forced to live under the unjust and unjustiable rule
of indels, and they were prepared to respond actively to the call of the
khwjas. The nomadic Qirghiz were also willing to participate in the khw-
jas cause, although many suspected that they were more interested in booty
than politics.
In 1820 Jahngr proposed that he and Umar Khan should ally to launch
a holy war against Kashghar, but his proposal was not accepted. So he
escaped from the Khans surveillance that summer and ed to the Qirghiz
who inhabited the northern environs of Kashghar. There he obtained the
support of the Chong Baghish and Sayaq tribes of the Qirghiz who provided
him with three hundred Qirghiz troops. Assisted by the Qirghiz chief Suran-
chi, Jahngr attacked the border of Kashghar but was soundly beaten by
the Qing troops and lost most of his men. He retreated back to Khoqand
accompanied only by a few dozen survivors.118 This aborted invasion, how-
ever, was only a prelude to a larger one.
Jahngrs second invasion plan began, like the rst, when he was again
able to escape surveillance in 1822. Mukammad Al (r. 182242; also called
Madal) had just succeeded his father to the throne of Khoqand, but he still
maintained his fathers policy of keeping Jahngr under house arrest. In the
summer of that year there was an earthquake of an unprecedented scale in
Ferghana that created confusion everywhere. Jahngr used this confusion
to escape into the Alai mountains,119 where he hid himself among the
Qirghiz for two years. In 1825 he was able to mount another invasion of
Kashghar with the aid of a couple of hundred Qirghiz troops, but this too
ended in failure. To end the threat of these incursions, the Qing government
decided to dispatch a small detachment of troops to destroy Jahngr and
the Qirghizs base in Narin. Instead the Qirghiz annihilated the Qing sol-
diers and their victory instantly boosted Jahngrs prestige. He quickly sent
messengers to Khoqand to inform Mukammad Al of his intention to in-
 the background 25

vade Kashgharia once more.120 At the same time, he sent secret emissaries
into Kashgharia where they were instructed to contact local fq support-
ers and collect money for the war.121
By the summer of 1826, Jahngr had succeeded in gathering together a
considerable number of Qirghiz, Kashgharian, and Khoqandian followers.
Many of the Khoqandian ofcials in this force were led by sa Ddkhwh
and his brother Msa who had joined him.122 Jahngr then appeared in Ar-
tush in July where he started his holy war by paying a visit to the holy
shrine of Satuq Boghra Khan.123 On receiving this news, the Qing army was
sent to besiege the shrine, at which point most of the Qirghiz who had ac-
companied him began to disperse. However, fortune again smiled upon
Jahngr when this Qing force was defeated. The Muslims in the immediate
environs then gathered to join his camp along with a large number of
Qirghiz belonging to the Chong Baghish tribe. With this group, Jahngr
marched on Kashghar where he rst took the Muslim town and then laid
siege to the Manchu fort. At this time local Muslims from Yangihissar,
Yarkand, and Khotan joined him and attacked Qing outposts and Chinese
merchants. The invasion had now sparked a full-scale rebellion.124
Mukammad Al had closely watched Jahngrs progress from behind
the scenes and now realized that the consequences of his success had become
too serious to be left unattended. One reason for this, sources explain, was
the new Khoqand ruler had taken very harsh measures against many reli-
gious leaders in Khoqand and his relationship with Jahngr was not very
cordial either,125 so that his victories were worrisome. Of even greater con-
sequence, however, was the threat to the status of Khoqands Kashgharian
trade that was so vital to the economy of the khanate. Win or lose, Mukam-
mad Al was worried that Jahngrs rising prominence might eclipse his
own and he decided to take action. Although Mukammad Al publicly ad-
vocated the necessity of the holy war, Khoqandian sources frankly reveal
that the main, perhaps primary, motivation for his decision was economic.
Citing the words of the khan himself, the Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya enumer-
ated his reasons for taking part in the campaign himself. First it was ex-
tremely reckless that a khwja of no experience, but only with some dis-
orderly crowd, could aspire to become a ruler. Second, there was a great
danger that the enormous treasures amassed by indels might fall into the
hands of other people (than himself!). And nally, as a good Muslim ruler
he was obligated to engage in holy war against an indel power.126
Mukammad Al was given an excellent opportunity to intervene when,
according to the Muntakhab al-tavrkh, Jahngr realized the difculty of
taking the Manchu fortress (gulbgh-i qurghn) and so sent an emissary to
Khoqand asking for support. The Khoqand ruler then decided to go so that
he could take possession of treasures (khazna ymb) stored in Chinese
26 the background

ofces.127 Mukammad Al came to Kashghar with about ten thousand

troops, and Jahngr met him riding on his horse, an intentional gesture de-
signed to show his status as an equal of the Khoqand ruler. His troops re-
placed those under Jahngr and began to assault the fort. This attempt,
however, ended in disaster leaving numerous casualties, which gave him no
choice but to return to Khoqand. After the retreat of the Khoqandian army,
Jahngr succeeded in occupying the fort on August 27. The Qing army had
exhausted its food supply and could no longer hold out against the besieg-
ing Muslims. Yangihissar, Yarkand, and Khotan also fell and Jahngr ap-
pointed governors for them, but Aqsu repulsed his assault.128 A Qing ex-
peditionary relief army of over twenty thousand troops, led by General
Cangling, nally reached Maralbashi in March of 1827. They delivered a
crushing defeat to Jahngrs army at Yangabad and then pushed on to
Kashghar, which was reconquered by the end of March. After this defeat
Jahngr attempted to ee through the mountains in the west, but Qing
troops soon caught him and he was sent to Peking as a prisoner. There he
was executed by being sliced into pieces.129
The Qing government now realized how fragile its control of Kashgharia
was, so Nayanceng, the governor-general of Zhili, was dispatched to Kash-
ghar as imperial commissioner to diagnose the problem and to repair the
colonial system. He set up an extensive reform program for the adminis-
tration in Kashgharia. Because he thought that the Khoqand khanate and
the khwjas sheltered there were the source of Chinas problems, he stopped
all the trade between Khoqand and Kashghar, especially the export of tea
and rhubarb. By this means he hoped to compel Khoqand to hand over the
fq khwjas living in Ferghana and to force the Khoqand rulers to ob-
serve the norms of etiquette on whose basis Qing tried to build her relation
with other countries and peoples,130 that is, the suzerain-vassal relation-
ship. To put additional economic pressure on Khoqand, he expelled the
Andijanis, that is, the Khoqandians, who had been permitted to stay for
up to ten years. He sent an envoy to Bukhara to encourage the Bukharan
merchants to come to trade and also invited those Qirghiz who had aided
Jahngr to sell their livestock.131
Nayanceng had to redress the internal corruption too. He forbade the
practice of selling and buying the beg titles and various unjust ofcial ex-
tortions from the local people. Another question to solve was how to
strengthen the military defense against external invasions and internal re-
volts. After the Jahngr invasion the number of Qing garrison troops in
Kashgharia increased considerably, so it was necessary to provide them with
food and salary. What he did was to conscate the land belonging to the fol-
lowers of Jahngr on the one hand and reclaim uncultivated land by way
of irrigation on the other, and then to establish a military colony there.132
 the background 27

This was put into practice from 1828 and resulted in a signicant increase
of the revenue income. However, it did not take long until the Qing realized
the economic embargo against Khoqand could not be a fundamental solu-
tion to the problem of Kashgharia.

the 1832 agreement

The Qing decision to coerce Khoqand using a trade embargo pro-

duced negative results because Khoqands rulers now fully realized how
fearful the Qing government was and what important leverage the khwjas
provided for putting pressure on China. Thus, although pressed by eco-
nomic hardships generated by the embargo, Mukammad Al decided to
support Ysuf Khwja, the elder brother of the now executed Jahngr. Ac-
cording to Muntakhab al-tavrkh, Ysuf, who had been living in Shahris-
abz, came to Khoqand and visited Haqq Qul Mngbsh, the majordomo
at that time. Being encouraged to launch a holy war on Kashghar, Haqq
Quli and other Khoqandian chiefs obtained permission from the khan to
that effect. However, unlike the 1826 invasion, it was not the khwjas but
the Khoqand khan who took the initiative and who intended to be the para-
mount leader of the expedition.133
A large number of Khoqand troops commanded by the khanates highest
military leaders, including Haqq Quli, Mukammad Sharf Qushbegi, and
Lashkar Qushbegi, participated in the Kashghar campaign along with a
number of Kashgharian migrs.134 They easily occupied the Muslim town
of Kashghar at the end of September 1830 and laid siege to the Manchu fort
where Qing ofcials and troops were stationed along with Iskq followers
who were taking refuge there. While ten thousand Khoqandian troops were
assaulting the walls of the fort and ransacking the environs, Ysuf went
down to Yarkand with several thousand people only to fail to take the
city.135 In the meantime about forty thousand Qing troops arrived at the
scene and Mukammad Al, worried about a new aggressive move from
Bukhara, recalled Haqq Qul and Khoqandian army. Ysuf Khwja could
not stay behind and so he returned to Khoqand at the end of December.136
The invasion of Ysuf demonstrated to the Qing court that their eco-
nomic embargo was ineffective as a means to stop the Khoqands interven-
tions in Kashgharia. Khoqand had proved its ability to wreak havoc on
Chinas western region whenever it wanted to do so. In desperation one
Qing ofcial claimed,
If the ofcials in Kashgharia are, so to speak, shepherds, the Muslims are sheep,
Khoqand is a wolf and the Qirghiz, surrounding us, are like dogs. In the sixth [1826]
and the tenth [1830] years [of Daoguang] Khoqand invaded the frontier again, and
the dogs, following the wolf, also devoured our sheep. Therefore, [even] the bark-
ing of the dogs is hard to trust.137
28 the background

The Qing had no sure remedy for dealing with this small but troublesome
khanate in Central Asia. Launching a military expedition against Khoqand
was not feasible because Kashgharias problems alone had already stretched
Chinas nancial and military resources to their limits.
In 1832 the Qing government recognized its weakness and nally agreed
to submit to Khoqand demands, including many important economic priv-
ileges, in return for peace. Based on the ofcial document sent by Khoqand
to Cangling, the General of Ili (Jngtng Jngjng Ambn), the demands of
Khoqand consisted of the following four points:
(1) to pardon and accept the native Kashgharians (Kashqarning yrliki) who,
having been accused of their anti-Qing and pro-Khoqand activities, were in exile in
various parts of the Khoqand khanate;
(2) to return the land, houses, and tea that the Qing conscated from the
Muslims;
(3) to hand over the right to Khoqand to collect the custom duties that com-
moners and caravan merchants who accompany diplomatic embassy pay when they
cross the border and enter Kashgharia; and
(4) to give exemption of custom duties for the commodities that Khoqandians
bring into Kashgharia.138

Khoqand requested that the Qing send them a letter with a seal through
an envoy if the court accepted these requests. Having been informed about
this, the emperor Daoguang issued an edict on April 13, 1832 to do all as
requested.139 Valikhanov also conrms that the two countries negotiated
about the following three points:
(1) the dues on the goods brought by foreigners into the Six Cities, or Al-
tishahr (Ush Turfan, Kashghar, Yangihissar, Aqsu, Yarkand, and Khotan) should be
appropriated by Khoqand;
(2) for the collection of these dues, Khoqand should have agents, called aqsa-
qals, in those cities who would be also the representatives of Khoqand rulers; and
(3) all the foreigners coming to the Six Cities should be subject to the Kho-
qandian agents in administrative and police matters.140

However, according to a Qing record, the Kashmiri and Badakhshi mer-

chants were excluded from those on whom Khoqand was entitled to levy
the custom duties, so probably Khoqand was allowed to collect the duties
only from Khoqandian merchants. The same record also shows that the of-
cial title of Khoqandian representative residing in Kashgharia was huda-i
da.141 However, the title of aqsaqal continued to be used because it was
more widely known in Central Asia. The status of aqsaqal stipulated in this
agreement was not much different from the consul of our day. In addition
to these privileges, the Qing government appears to have continued to pay
an annual subsidy to the khanate. According to a Russian report in 1849,
 the background 29

this amounted to 1,000 (or 250 according to others) yambus,142 a fact con-
rmed in a document sent by Mukammad Al Khn to the Ottoman sultan
in 1837.143
This agreement was unprecedented because the Qing had conceded to
Khoqand consular jurisdiction and the tariff autonomy over the for-
eigners in her own territory. That is why J. Fletcher calls it Chinas rst
unequal treaty settlement.144 The 1832 concession of Qing therefore rep-
resents an important event in the history of the relations between the Qing
Empire and the Khoqand Khanate. It not only reveals that the Qing lacked
rm control over Kashgharia, but also that it was willing to cede its eco-
nomic monopoly over the region, at least in terms of international trade. This
concession was the culmination of the Khoqand Khanates ceaseless efforts
to extract more trade benets from China that had rst begun around 1800.
As a result, after the 1832 agreement, the Khoqandians came to dominate
the Kashgharian economy and formed a sort of shadow government that
wielded great inuence within the region. Khoqands chief aqsaqal resided
in Kashghar where he had his own para-governmental functionaries such as
a zaktchi (tax collector), a khaznachi (treasurer), mrzbashi (chief secre-
tary), as well as his own soldiers. He also appointed junior aqsaqals who
served in other cities. Initially Khoqand appointed merchants to the post of
aqsaqal but later lled it with military men.145 Khoqand also exploited the
Qings weakness by extending its domination over the Qirghiz nomads liv-
ing along the border regions and encroaching on the Qing frontier lands
around the Narin river, Khotan, and Tashqurghan.146 Valikhanov goes so
far as to claim that as much as one-fourth of Kashgharias total population,
or around 145,000 people (including all the foreigners and chalghurts
[i.e., children of mixed blood born between Khoqand men and Kashghar
women]), came under Khoqands rule.147 As a result Kashgharia became
an awkward bone being gnawed apart in the struggle between the Qing and
Khoqand for dominance in the region.

On the Eve of the Rebellion

continuing invasions

After the 1832 agreement the Khoqand khanate reduced its demands
on the Qing government for more privileges. Of course, it continued to send
envoys to China attempting to expand its rights to collect the custom duties
from Badakhshi and Kashmiri merchants in Kashgharia apparently because
they were considered foreigners, but who were excluded in the earlier
agreement. Khoqand also continued to pressure the Qing for the right to oc-
cupy the Sariqol region in the Pamirs through which important trade routes
30 the background

passed, although this demand was rejected.148 Nonetheless, Khoqand did

not push these demands very far because it did not wish to jeopardize its ex-
isiting relationship with the Qing in any fundamental way. It had no reason
to do so because the Qing and Khoqand now had a shared interest in a sta-
ble Kashgharia that was best preserved by maintaining a balance of power
between them.
This stability, however, did not last long and the political situation began
to deteriorate in both countries beginning in the 1840s. Chinas military de-
feat in the Opium War (184041) and droughts, oods, and famines around
the Yangtze and the Yellow rivers in the 1840s seriously undermined the
foundation of the empire. These were followed by large-scale rebellions,
such as the Taiping (185064) and the Nian (185168). The Muslim rebel-
lion in Shanxi and Gansu, which broke out in 1862, seriously undermined
the Qing governments power to control Xinjiang. In particular it inter-
rupted normal communications and prevented the delivery of regular sub-
sidies from the inner provinces. Even more important, it produced a sense
of crisis among the Tungans residing in Xinjiang.
Xinjiangs political turmoil had repercussions in the Khoqand khanate.
Mukammad Al, who had lost his popularity by the persecution of leading
gures in the khanate and his too frequent military expeditions, added his
notoriety when he married his stepmother against Islamic law. This act of-
fended many religious leaders and allowed Nar Allh, the amir of Bukhara,
to use it against the Khoqand khan by issuing a statement (rivyat) in which
he condemned Mukammad Al as an indel. Furious at the accusation,
Mukammad Al drove his army to Jizzaq but was forced to retreat by the
counterattack of the Bukharan army. The Bukharan amir was then able to
crush Khoqands troops at Khojent and entered the capital of the khanate
in 1842. After this defeat, Mukammad Al ed to Marghilan but was taken
prisoner and then executed.149
The Bukharan amir soon departed from Khojent and left only a small
military detachment behind to protect the khanate. Upon discovering this,
a Qirghiz chief from Namanghan named Ysuf invited Shr Al from Talas,
a surviving member of the Khoqand royal family, to march with him and
attack the city. After successfully defeating the Bukharan troops there in
1842, he enthroned Shr Al but kept the real power in his hands with the
title of mingbashi. The internal situation remained unstable because the new
amir had to cope with both a renewed Bukharan attack and a rebellion by
the Qipchaqs. Shr Al managed to retain his hold on the throne for three
years (184245), but at his death his successor Murd was killed only eleven
days after he was made khan. At that time, a Qipchaq party led by Musul-
mn Quli enthroned a new khan, Khudyr (r. 184558, 186263, 1866
75), who was to gain and lose power repeatedly over the next thirty years.150
The cause of this incessant political turmoil in the Khoqand khanate has
 the background 31

yet to be studied. P. P. Ivanov attributes it to a shortage of cultivated land

that caused a sharp conict between the settled and the nomadic peoples.151
But it is as equally likely that political factors, such as the invasion by Bukh-
ara and the weakness of royal power itself, might have contributed to the
confusion. Whatever the cause, the turmoil weakened Khoqands control
over Kashgharians. This was well illustrated by the invasion of Kashgharia
around the end of August 1847 by the so-called Seven Khwjas (haft
khwjagn) who had crossed the Chinese border with a number of Kash-
gharian emigrants and Qirghiz followers.152 Although some argue that they
were unleashed or actively backed by the khanate,153 there seems to be no
evidence to support this assumption. On the contrary, Valikhanov writes as
follows.
Turmoil of Khoqand was reected in Kashghar too: aqsaqals were constantly re-
placed, and one of them named [Abd al-Ghafr] was summoned to Khoqand and
executed. Bands of barbarous Qirghiz invaded the borders where Chinese posts were
located, and Khoqandian aqsaqals, saying that they would stop the Qirghiz incur-
sion, received bribes [from the Qing government]. The khwjas, taking advantage
of the confusion, collected a small band composed mostly of Kashgharian migrs
and barbarous Qirghiz and approached to Kashghar in the autumn of 1847.154

The Muslim town of Kashghar fell into their hands less than a month
after they began the invasion and the Manchu forts in Kashghar and Yangi-
hissar were then besieged. However, upon the arrival of a Qing relief force
in the beginning of November, the invaders ed back to Khoqand. Through-
out the 1850s, invasions of Kashgharia by khwjas from Khoqand became
a regular feature of the regions politics. These invasions included those led
by Dvn Quli and Wl Khn in 1852, by Husayn shn Khwja in 1855,
followed by another invasion of Wal Khn in 1857.155 Compared with the
invasions mounted by Ysuf Khwja in 1830 at the instigation of the Kho-
qand khanate, this new series of invasions lacked formal state support.
H. Bellew who visited Kashgharia in the early 1870s and made inquiries
about the reason of the Seven Khwjas incursion wrote that they had taken
advantage of the anarchy on all sides, and the internal strife distracting
parties in Khokand, banded together and collecting a small force invaded
Kshghar.156 The Qing court investigation of the invasion of Husayn shn
Khwja and Wal Khn in 1855 also concluded that they were not spon-
sored by the Khoqand khanate.157 Indeed Wal Khn was not welcome in
the khanate and ed from Khoqand with seven Kashgharian emigrants.158
That Khoqand did not support their invasion can be seen by Khudyr
Khns attempt to execute Wal Khn on the grounds that he had massacred
innocent Muslims, and he ordered a watch on other khwjas so that they
could not freely cross the borders.159
Nonetheless, Khoqand did not consider the khwjas invasions of Kash-
32 the background

gharia extremely harmful to her interests. That the Qing had already lost
control over Kashgharia could be seen in the case of Nr Mukammad Khn,
who represented Khoqand as an aqsaqal in Kashgharia at the time. When
the Seven Khwjas had invaded, it was he who had commanded the army
ghting against the Qing. But after the khwjas were expelled, he remained
in ofce there and China was unable to eject him.160 For this reason Kho-
qand was not worried that these invasions would cause the Qing to sever
relations and thereby inict economic losses on Khoqand. On the contrary,
if the khwjas could succeed in taking some cities and collect treasure in
Kashgharia, Khoqand hoped to benet from their gains. However, when
the power of the khwjas became strengthened and the revolt developed
into a popular rebellion, and when the khwjas excluded her intervention,
then [Khoqand] endeavored to plant discord and to instigate secession, thus
to cause confusion within the army.161 It appears then that Khoqand was
content to let the khwjas cause trouble as long as they remained weak
enough to be controlled, so that the khanate took direct action only in ex-
treme cases.
The invasions of the khwjas time and again ended in failure, and it was
the Muslims in Kashgharia who received the most devastating blows in re-
taliation for these repeated incursions. Since there was an insufcient armed
force there, the Qing mobilized a number of exiles (qianfan, or chmpn in
Turkic transcription) marked with a scar on the left cheek,162 for the sup-
pression of revolts, but their atrocities antagonized many local people.163
People were not permitted to assemble in the streets or to visit the shrine of
Khwja fq.164 The government even banned performing plays or singing
songs.165 The khwjas themselves were also callous about the security of lo-
cal Muslims and allowed them to be plundered and killed. One of the most
notorious cases took place during the invasion of Wal Khn in 1857 when
he shocked the Western world by killing the German explorer Adolf Schlag-
intweit for no apparent reason.166 Incredible stories are also recorded in
Muslim sources, in particular that he killed so many innocent Muslims that
four minarets were formed by the piles of human skulls,167 or that to test
the sharpness of a sword he once cut off the head of the artisan who brought
him the sword as a gift.168 These stories illustrate the unscrupulous nature
of many of the khwjas actions, which they justied in the name of holy
war. This arbitrary behavior by the khwjas, as well as the selsh attitude
of the Khoqandians, greatly disillusioned the local Kashgharian Muslims.

omens

The most serious problem that the Qing ofcials in Xinjiang faced
just before the 1864 Muslim rebellion was a shortage of nancial resources.
They had previously depended heavily on receiving of large subsidies from
 the background 33

other provinces in China, but the events in the 1840s and 1850s, which had
driven the Qing dynasty into crisis, greatly reduced the ability of the central
government to send such aid. In regard to this Sayrm wrote as follows.
The Chinese emperor (Khqn-i Chn) could no longer hear the news from the cities
which were used to be called Gb, [i.e., Muslim region].169 So perhaps he sent edicts
saying I will not send provisions (kawlan vafa)170 to ofcials and soldiers work-
ing in the region of Gb. I have taken care of my ofcials and soldiers by sending
kawlan from the treasury in this way for years. I have spent much state funds but
nothing came from Gb to the treasury. Abandon Gb and come back! However,
chiefs of the Chinese here like Jngjng [Ili General] and Khn Ambn [imperial
agent in Kashghar] and chiefs of Muslims like provincial governors beginning with
Mrz Akmad Wang Beg, consulted each other and memorialized to the emperor
(lgh Khn): Even though kawlan would not come from treasury to the cities
here, we will do our effort to dig veins of gold, silver, copper and zinc, and thus take
care of the imperial army. . . . As soon as the edict [approving their request] came
down, ofcials in every city collected people and drove them to all the mountains
and plains wherever the veins of ore might be discovered. They let mountain slopes
be dug up like rat-holes but could not nd any vein. . . . Moreover, they introduced
several new taxes (bj) under the name of salt-money (tz pul) and extorted
money from the people. Every month they imposed money on the head of people
and called it chqa-bsh. In a word, taxes (albn-yasq v jblgha) imposed on
people became much more.171

In Trkh-i kamd (1908) Sayrm inserted a number of other stories not

included in earlier versions of his Trkh-i amniyya (1903). One such story
is an incident in Aqsu caused by the arbitrary collection of this salt-
money,172 a description that supports one recorded in a Qing source down
to minor details. As described in this Qing source, beginning during the
third month of 1860 the imperial agent of Aqsu, Jinxing, had collected two
tngs per month in guise of salt-taxes from every person for the period of
three or four months along with similar taxes on Khoqandians.173 As a re-
sult, the Khoqandian aqsaqal protested to the General of Ili. After becom-
ing aware of this practice, the emperor ordered an investigation of the mat-
ter, saying it would be a great violation of law if one, under the pretext of
the lack of military provisions, suddenly changes regulations and privately
collects money and then diverts it to public expense.174 As a result, sev-
enty-two Chinese and local ofcials were discharged from the ofce.175
The incident plainly revealed how grave the nancial conditions in Xin-
jiang had become on the eve of the 1864 Muslim rebellion. Because tax re-
ceipts were insufcient, government ofcials also began to sell ofces pub-
licly to secure more money. They posted promulgations (kngsh kha)176
in market streets and announced that whoever donated silver to the army
would get an ofcial post.177 Thus the post of Yarkand governor was sold
to Rustam Beg of Khotan for 2,000 yambus, and Sd Beg from Kucha
34 the background

bought the Kucha governorship for 1,500 yambus.178 It is hardly surprising

that those who bought such posts at once commenced to recoup his out-
lay and squeezed the people by severe punishment, nes, and exactions of
sorts.179 So the local Muslims were furious not only at the Qing ofcials
but also with the local high-ranking begs and their assistants. In the con-
temporary Muslim literature there is clear evidence of an explosion of the
fury against these Muslim ofcials who were accused of acting like dogs
with human faces.180
Conditions of the local Muslim population were getting worse because
of the malpractices like enforced corve, sales of ofces, and the introduc-
tion of new taxes. A French researcher, F. Grenard, who visited Khotan after
the fall of Yaqb Beg heard grim stories about the period immediately pre-
ceding the 1864 rebellion. One of his informants complained that people
had led miserable lives under the heavy tax burden imposed by Qing of-
cials and their Muslim begs. Pushed into a corner, they attempted to obtain
tax exemptions by bribing the interpreters who worked for ofcials or
sought the protection of Khoqandian aqsaqals. As a last resort some of them
just ran away. As a result, the begs demanded that the local mingbashis (who
were responsible for the collection of such taxes at village level) cover any
decit caused by peoples ight or tax evasion.181 A Muslim writer in
Khotan reports as follows.
Upon the heads of people several different kinds of taxes (alvn) were imposed.
One who borrowed ten tng from a Chinese was deprived of his land and livestock
and household furniture, but this was not the end of his suffering. Everyday and in
every place, they took away fty or one hundred people on the pretext of some sort
of crime and, at night, tied up their arms and legs and threw them into river. They
also cut the heels of some people, who pissed blood for several days and nally
died.182

Under these circumstances the periodic outbursts of rioting in Kash-

gharia is not at all surprising. One such riot occurred in Kucha in 1857
when Chen Tai and Li Shi (servants of the imperial agent of Kucha, Ur-
cingga) and their interpreter Ysuf (Yusupi) connived with each other to de-
mand excessive corve from the local people. Led by Mukammad Al
(Maimaitieli), the inhabitants of three villages including Qonas refused and
started rioting.183 Wishing to avoid a reprimand from the court for this in-
cident, Urcingga (Wuerchinga) executed thirty people without reporting his
actions to the General of Ili after interrogating the participants in the riot.184
A slightly different version of the same story is also recorded in Sayrms
work. According to him, Mukammad Al Shaykh, Mull Msa mm and
other community leaders who represented those Kuchean Muslims who
could no longer bear the excessive tax burden (alban-yasaq) petitioned to
ofcials (manabdr) for relief. However, since these ofcials only wanted
 the background 35

to quiet the discontent, they did not report the matter to the amban. When
the local people continued to be restive, these ofcials reported to the
amban that the people denied to obey the great khan (lgh Khns) order
and rose in revolt. The amban responded to this by executing more than
ten Muslim leaders including Mukammad Al Shaykh and Ibrhm Arbb
Beg. He also cut off the heels of some people and threw almost forty people,
several of them carrying the titles of kkbashi and yzbashi, into a prison
cell (dingza) with their necks shackled by chains (gull-i janzr).185
By comparing Sayrms account with the Chinese sources, it appears
that the amban in question was Urcingga, the imperial agent of Kucha. Sim-
ilarly the titles borne by the local leaders involved in this incident suggest
their social status. A kkbashi was an auxiliary functionary who adminis-
tered agriculture and irrigation while a yzbashi was the person responsi-
ble for collecting village taxes. As was noted earlier, the Qing administra-
tion held such people responsible when villagers did not pay the full amount
of their taxes and required them to make up any deciency. That was why
they had taken on the perilous task of petitioning to the ofcials for the re-
duction of tax burden.
The Qing documents record frequent riots and revolts by the local people
including one led by a blacksmith named Iwaj in Kashghar, another in
Khan Ariq led by Shh Mumn (both in 1845), and another in Artush by
Abd ar-Rakm.186 According to Hjj Ysufs report, just on the eve of the
Kucha rebellion in 1864, there had already been attempts at revolt by Ibr-
hm Tura, Yolbars Tura, \diq Beg, Qsim Beg, Rza Beg, Bahdur Beg, and
others.187 Epidemics, which broke out continuously in the middle of the
nineteenth century worsened the situation. According to one source, numer-
ous lives were lost to epidemics, including cholera outbreaks in Kashghar
during 1845, 1847, and 1849; endemic smallpox in Kashghar, Yarkand, and
Khotan between 18511856; and measles in Yarkand in 185556.188
These omens appeared to point to an imminent catastrophe for which the
Qing troops were hopelessly unprepared. The soldiers stationed in Xinjiang
had not received their salary and provision (yansay kawlan) for a long
time and were now on the verge of mass protest.189 The lack of nances had
disastrous effects on the Qing military effectiveness that included slacken-
ing discipline, low morale, and deciencies in the number of Qing garrison
troops. The following testimony by one Sibo eyewitness of the 1864 rebel-
lion in Ili proves how ineffective the Qing troops were at that time.
The Manchus, having lived quietly in cities for a hundred years, lost all their mili-
tancy and were physically weakened so much that they could not even pull the bows;
the arrows shot by them did not go far and did not penetrate the thickly quilted
clothes of the Taranchis. The effeminate Manchu ofcials neglected teaching soldiers
how to use the bows. They dressed fashionably and led a debauched life. In the bat-
36 the background

tle with the Taranchis and the Tungans their bulky clothes hampered their move-
ment. . . . On top of these, the soldiers were starving since there was no food in
Huiyuan Cheng. The horses of the Manchus were also emaciated from hunger be-
cause they could not get fodder. They could not gallop in deep snow. The Taranchis
and the Tungans caught the Manchus stuck in snow and killed them.190

This Sibo further blames the Manchu ofcials for the defeat as follows:
The ofcials did not care for the soldiers, and the soldiers also held them in con-
tempt. When the rebellion broke out, they did not attempt to lead the army and sup-
press the rebels bravely. Instead, at the sight of the rebels, they ran away. They wor-
ried about preserving their lives in that circumstance, and they did not realize the
fact that all in all they would be annihilated and that their wives and daughters
would fall in the hands of the rebels. How pitiful all these are!191

In short, on the eve of the 1864 Kucha revolt, the situation in Xinjiang,
and especially in Kashgharia, was extremely unstable and volatile because
of the repeated invasions by the khwjas and the maladministration of the
Qing government. The local Muslims had been placed under unbearable
conditions and their frequent but futile attempts at rebellion had only made
their lives more miserable than before. Neither the Qing government nor the
Khoqand khanate had the capacity to control the situation. The following
description by Sayrm aptly depicts the plight of the Muslims at that time.
Powerless people were driven here and there because of ever increasing taxes, so
things came to such a point that fathers could not meet their sons and sons could
not see their fathers. At last their patience wore out, and they ran to the doorstep of
the Creator and shed tears in drops, nay rather like a owing river.192

So when the Turkic Muslims in Kucha heard the news that the Tungans,
provoked by the rumor of imminent massacre, had risen in revolt, they res-
olutely marched with them to ght against the emperor of China. It was as
if the Tungans were the little fuse that had exploded the larger powder keg
of Turkic Muslim discontent. And as soon as the news of the revolt spread,
Muslims in every city throughout Xinjiang followed in their footsteps and
set in motion the great rebellion.
2 Xinjiang in Revolt

Spread of Rebellion

kucha

The Muslim rebellion in Kucha broke out on the night of June 34,
1864 and gained rapid success with the capture of the Manchu fort and the
extermination of Qing ofcials. When this news began to spread, people in
the surrounding villages began to swarm into the city, crying for holy war
and partaking in looting and seeking revenge. In the midst of this anarchy
a struggle for power ensued,1 because the Tungans were inferior in numbers
although it was they who had taken the initiative in the revolt at rst. Nei-
ther the Tungan akhnds nor Allh Yr Beg who had led the Kuchean Mus-
lims into revolt possessed leadership strong enough to stabilize the situa-
tion. According to one Muslim report, the city was soon partitioned among
the Tungans, the Kuchean Muslims, the Khoqandians, and the Kashgharis2
and it was imperative for them to look for someone who could calm this
chaotic situation. Since they realized that anarchic internal strife could not
be benecial to any party, they began to search for a person with strong
leadership and charisma.
At rst, they went to Akmad Wang Beg, former governor of Kashghar
and Yarkand, who was at that time retired in Kucha. The genealogy of his
family went back to Aba Bakr, a famous chief of Dughlat tribe, who had
ruled an independent kingdom in Kashgharia during 14791514. And Aba
Bakrs ancestor Khuddd was one of the most powerful ministers in the
Moghul khanate who put six khans on the throne.3 However, Akmads
great grandfather Mrz Hd4 had collaborated with the Qing court dur-
ing the conquest of Xinjiang, and his father Iskq rendered a signicant ser-
vice in capturing the rebel khwja Jahngr. In this sense, although Akmad
Wang Beg belonged to one of the most distinguished families in Xinjiang,
his familys reputation was greatly tainted by its active cooperation with the
indel rulers. Then why had the Muslims who pledged themselves to the
cause of holy war wanted Akmad Wang Beg to be their new leader? Was it
38 xinjiang in revolt

not contradictory to their cause? To answer these questions we need to look

into his activities and reputation more carefully.
First, let us examine the reason why he was discharged from the gover-
norship of Yarkand. In 1852 he accused two Qing ambans of Yarkand of
wrongdoings, but these two high ofcials counteracted this accusation by
indicting him for the crime of corruption. They contended that he, under
the pretext of his visit to Peking and offering of the tributes to the emperor,
had requisitioned from the villagers under his jurisdiction one thousand
yambus and two thousand lambskins. This case resulted in his dismissal
from ofce when the ofcial investigation of the charges went against him.
The investigation concluded that he had made a false charge against the
Qing ambans because he feared the discovery of the fact that his bodyguards
and akhnds had requisitioned the items in question and he would be pun-
ished if this were disclosed.5
Later, he was appointed as the governor of Kashghar, a post from which
he was also dismissed. Then, in 1860 he was dispatched to Yarkand to con-
duct the search for those who had helped Wal Khn and to conscate their
properties. However, at this time, he was once more indicted by Qing
ofcials. They insisted on his dismissal from the task on a charge that he
took so many retainers with him to make a display of his power that the
local Muslims were frightened and took ight.6 Then again Qing ofcials,
including the councilor of Yarkand, asked permission from the court to ar-
rest and investigate Akmad Wang Beg because he had a secret communi-
cation with outside barbarians.7 In spite of this request the court took
into consideration the meritorious services of Akmads ancestors and did
not take any drastic measure to punish him.
The above-mentioned incidents demonstrate the serious conicts brew-
ing between him and the local Qing ofcials. In this sense, the assertion by
the Qing ofcials that he lost the hearts of the Muslims8 seems to have
been a sort of malicious slander aimed at eliminating him. It would be
difcult for us to accept that assertion bona de and to regard him as a
typical high-ranking beg ofcial of a feudal-lord type arousing aversion
and deep hatred from the local Muslims.9 As a matter of fact, Sayrm
did not spare his praise of Akmad. He depicted Akmad as a devout Muslim
who had never dispensed with the daily prayer (namz) and never touched
any of the prohibited things such as alcohol or opium. He used to attend his
ofce wearing clothes appropriate for pious Muslims except for two days,
the rst and the fteenth, in a month when he dressed himself with the Qing
ofcial uniform. And when he handled legal matters, he always asked the
legal opinion (fatva) from the ulam and put his utmost effort into con-
forming to Islamic law. He also practiced asceticism after being initiated
into Su paths like the Qadiriyya or the Naqshbandiyya. He made large do-
 xinjiang in revolt 39

nations on behalf of resting places (langar), retreats (rib), colleges (ma-

drassa), and mosques (masjid). Thus Sayrm appraised him highly among
the descendants of Khuddd by writing that there had been no one like
him: he was noble and impartial, and he was friend of the ulam and
rearer of the people.10
Considering these remarks by Sayrm, we can understand the reason he
incurred such a strong animosity from the Qing ofcials. Probably it was
because of his attitude toward Islamic law and the local Muslims. There is
no doubt that the Kuchean Muslims were very well aware of this and, there-
fore, as soon as the revolt accomplished the initial success, they hurried to
him and asked him to be their leader. According to a Muslim source, they
urged him to accept their proposal with the following words.
From the time of your ancestors [your family] has administered the country as great
khan (lg khn). You know very well the principle of government and the ad-
ministration of justice. If you become like a father and rule over us, big and little
peoples, we will obey your orders with all our soul and spirit. We recognize you as
our leader in all matters of statecraft and wish you to sit on the throne of khan.11

However, Akmads reply to this entreaty was quite unexpected: he rst

of all pointed out that the Muslims could not match the Chinese in terms of
number and then reminded them of the fact that his family had received
good graces from Chinese emperors and worked as high ofcials. And he
told them as follows:
Under any circumstances I will not betray my lord who has given me salt (tz). It
is mandatory and essential for everybody to keep the obligation of salt (tz
kaqq). I will not ruin myself by following your words and becoming your chief.
Whoever you choose, it is up to you. But my age has already reached seventy and
since I have been blessed with enough glory and power, there remains no more wish
or craving to me.12

As Hamada Masami vividly describes in his article, of the two sharply ir-
reconcilable choicesthe obligation of salt to ones master who provided
provisions and nourishment on the one hand, and the duty of holy war
(jihd) that every sincere Muslim is supposed to full on the otherAkmad
selected the rst.13 Thereupon the crowd, being frustrated and feeling be-
trayed, cried out Do you still have any lingering hope to your Chinese?,
and dragging him out killed him. Although he refused to become the leader
of the Muslim revolt in Kucha and was thus slaughtered, according to
Sayrm the ulam at that time still considered Akmad Wang Beg a noble
martyr (shahd-i il) because of this high reputation.14
Then, the Muslims went to Rshidn Khwja to ask him to be their
leader. We can nd no material showing his activities prior to the rebellion,
except that he had lived a tranquil life as an ascetic (darvsh) and as a cus-
40 xinjiang in revolt

todian of the shrine of his ancestor Arshad al-Dn (d. 136465). Obviously
he had no experience in real politics whatsoever. Then, why did Muslim
leaders visit him and ask for his leadership? Although Akmad and Rshidn
had completely different backgrounds, they shared one common character-
istic. Both of them belonged to prestigious families and wielded strong
charisma among the local Muslims. They took Rshidn Khwja out of his
praying house regardless of his wish and proclaimed him as khan. They
told him that You [i.e., your family] have been our leader from former
times. Now you should be our leader and ascend to the throne and rule over
us as our chief. Having said this, they put him on a white carpet following
the ceremony in the days of former khans. At the same time they made
Tukhta Ishikagha Beg his minister (vizr). And they executed eight beg
ofcials beginning with Kucha governor Qurbn Beg and plundered their
properties.15
From this time Rshidn began to be called Khn Khwja which was
transcribed as Huang Hezhuo in Chinese documents. This title means
that he was khan and khwja at the same time, in other words priest-
king, which shows one of the characteristics of the Kuchean regime, the
unity of church and state. His name, Rshidn, inscribed on the coins minted
by his order also vindicates this point. Rshidn actually denotes the rst
four right-guided Caliphs who are called in Arabic khulfa al-rshidn.
However, we should note that Rshidn was probably not his original
name.16 It is rather more likely that his original name was Rashd al-Dn
(which was pronounced Rashdn in Kashgharian dialects) but changed into
Rshidn to have a more charismatic aura.17 On the coins that were made
by his order was inscribed Sayyid Ghz Rshidn Khn,18 that is, Rshi-
dn, the king (khn), the Prophets descendant (sayyid) and holy warrior
(ghz); and on the edicts was afxed his name with a long title of Zubda-
i Rasl Allh Ab al-Muaffar v al-Manr Sayyid Rshidn Khn Ghz
Khwjam (The Essence of the Allhs Apostle, the Victorious and Trium-
phant Leader, Sayyid Rshidn Khn Ghz Khwjam).19
Some Muslim writers argued that Rshidn was a key gure of the re-
bellion from the rst, leading, organizing and encouraging other people to
participate in the holy war. We can nd such claims, for example, in Rashd
al-Dn nma by Qr Najm al-Dn, Risla-i maktb by Mukammad \lik
Yrkand, and Tadhkirat an-najt by Dd Akhnd of Kurla.20 However,
their works tend to glorify and exaggerate the role and the virtue of Rshi-
dn because they were written in dedication to him and some of them were
read by him personally. The last work even completely omits mention of the
participation of the Tungans. Therefore, it is hard for us to accept their de-
scriptions of Rshidns role at face value. In fact Rshidn Khwja did not
play any signicant role in the Kucha revolt in its initial stage. Not only
 xinjiang in revolt 41

Sayrms work but also Chinese sources amply prove this point. Only after
the Muslim leaders had wiped out the Qing ofcials and troops from the
city, did they ask Akmad Wang Beg to become their new leader. But when
they failed to obtain his assent, they recognized Rshidn as the second best
and enthroned him as khan whether he liked it or not. A Muslim work writ-
ten in 186768 entitled Vafar-nma also states that he was enthroned after
Kuchean people and the Tungans assembled and rose in revolt.21

urumchi

After Kucha, it was Urumchi, the capital city of the Eastern Circuit,
that next caught the re of revolt. Before the Qing conquest this area had
been inhabited by the nomadic Zunghars, who were almost exterminated
by the conquerors. The Qing government, as soon as it had occupied this
place, built a fortress below the Hongshanzui (Red Mountain Peak) and, a
little later, another one about three kilometers away from there. The former
was called Jiu Cheng (Old City, also called Dihua) where ve thousand
Chinese army troops were stationed under the control of a marshal (tidu),
and the latter was called Gongning Cheng where three thousand Manchu
and two thousand Chinese soldiers, accompanied by their families, were re-
siding. Besides these, several thousand civilian households from Gansu and
criminals exiled from inland China were dispersed around the neighboring
areas such as Changji, Manas, Gumadi, Jimsa, and others.22 What we
should not forget is the fact that those non-Manchu Chinese soldiers and
peasants were mostly Tungans. So there were a large number of Tungan sol-
diers and peasants in the vicinity of Urumchi while only a few Turkic Mus-
lims were found,23 and it is not surprising that the revolt here was also ini-
tiated by the Tungans.
The Urumchi revolt began on June 26, 1864, only about three weeks
after the Kucha revolt, and its two most prominent leaders, Tuo Ming (alias
Tuo Delin) and Suo Huanzhang, were Tungans. A Qing source describes
Tuo in the following way.
In the rst year of Tongzhi when Shanxi Muslims rose in revolt, there was a chief of
the adherents named Tuo Ming, ahong [i.e. akhnd]. He was in dire poverty and
had no regular job, but, since he knew a little bit of Chinese writing, he practiced
sorcery and fortune-telling, wandering around the Jinji[bao], Henan and Gansu
areas, and got acquainted with various Muslim leaders. Taking advantage of the re-
bellion [in Shanxi], he went out of the Pass by way of Xining and arrived in Urum-
chi. Living in the house of Suo Huanzhang, lieutenant-colonel (canjiang), he deluded
many Muslims by practicing divination. More and more people began to follow
him.24

And as for Suo Huanzhang the same source continues,

42 xinjiang in revolt

Huanzhang was the son of Suo Wen, former marshal (tidu) of Ganzhou.25 While he
was brewing rebellion in his mind for a long time, he met Tuo Ming. Then he ele-
vated him to instructor (zhangjiao) and, making him teach the scripture, attended
him as his teacher.26

Tuo Ming was a Tungan from Gansu province and known to Muslims
by various names of Dd Khalfa, Lawrnj (laorenjia), or Lawtai (lao-
taiye). The preceding quotation clearly shows the negative perception of the
Qing court, which regarded him as a ringleader of the revolt. However, a
contemporary Russian source depicts him as a religious leader deeply re-
spected by the Tungans.27 Suo Huanzhang was not, of course, a man of re-
ligion but a military ofcer. Nonetheless, as his connection with Tuo Ming
suggests, he seems to have maintained close contacts with religious leaders
in the Xinjiang and Gansu areas and wielded wide inuence among the Tun-
gans. This is not surprising in view of the fact that his father, Suo Wen, had
been the leader of a religious sect in Salar and maintained contacts with Tun-
gan religious leaders in various regions through his emissaries.28
From about 1863 these two Tungan leaders plotted together and began
to conceal arms in a mosque. This fact tells us that the situation in Urumchi
had deteriorated before the 1864 rebellion. There were several reasons for
the worsening situation. First, Pingzui, the commander (dutong) in Urum-
chi, attempted to levy excessive taxes and demands for provisions on the
pretext of strengthening defenses, which caused outrage among the people.
Second, the hostility between the local Tungan Muslims and the Chinese
peasants and soldiers who had immigrated from Shanxi and Henan became
acute and it often developed into gang ghts, especially in Mulei area. In the
midst of this, it was reported that Chinese residents had organized a militia
group (tuanlian) and were going to attack the Tungans, and a certain Ma
Quan, a low-level ofcial in the district of Dihua, rallied Tungans in order
to respond to it. As a result, in May of 1864, a erce clash broke out in Qitai
and Ma Quan ed to the Nanshan Mountain with his followers.29
Though ominous signs continued to appear from the spring of 1864, the
actual storm of revolt did not surface until June 15 when the news of the re-
volt of Kucha reached Urumchi. Qing ofcials there immediately dispatched
a relief army to Kucha, about 2,100 strong but mostly made of Tungans.
They proceeded up to Ushaq Tal where they were soundly defeated by Iskq
Khwja who had been sent to Qarashahr by Rshidn Khwja and was
marching to the east with his Kuchean army. The remnants of the defeated
army came back to Urumchi.30 On June 23 the Tungans within the city gath-
ered at a mosque at the Southern Gate (Nanguan) and plotted to rise in re-
volt. This conspiracy was detected and reported to Qing ofcials, but Suo
Huanzhang succeeded in falsifying the report and covering up the truth.31
On June 26 they were joined by those Tungan soldiers who had ed from
 xinjiang in revolt 43

Ushaq Tal and assaulted the Old City of Urumchi. They could easily take it
because there remained only a few soldiers inside. Yebcongge, ex-lieutenant-
colonel of Urumchi, took refuge in the house of Suo Huanzhang, apparently
without any suspicion about him, but he was killed treacherously by Suo.
Pingzui, the commander, stayed shut up in the Manchu fort and waited for
the arrival of a backup force.32
We have previously introduced Sayrms argument that the 1864 Mus-
lim rebellion was touched off when Suo Huanzhang, who became aware of
the emperors edict to the Ili General commanding the massacre of the Tun-
gans, sent letters to Tungan leaders in several areas. In the case of Urumchi
his argument is corroborated by a Russian merchant, I. Somov, who visited
several years after the rebellion (1872) and asked about its cause. Accord-
ing to his report, they replied that it was the rumor that Chinese emperor
issued an order to massacre the Tungans.33 If it is true, as asserted in the
Qing sources, that both Tuo and Suo had previously been conspiring to re-
volt for one or two years, then they had probably been actively engaged in
spreading the rumor of massacre after the outbreak of rebellion in the Shan-
Gan area and preparing some measure of self-defense like storing arms. And
when they heard the news of Kucha, they instantly took action.
As soon as the Tungans had taken the control of the Old City, they en-
throned Tuo Ming as Qingzhen wang (King of Islam) and proclaimed the
creation of Qingzhen guo (Kingdom of Islam).34 Suo became commander
(yanshay from Chinese yuanshuai).35 They called in Ma Quan, who had ed
to Nanshan, and the reinforced Muslim force laid siege to the Manchu fort.
They divided the remaining troops into two units and dispatched them to
take other cities where a large number of Tungans were living. These cities
included Manas, also called Suilai, which fell between July 17 (the Muslim
town) and September 16 (the Manchu fort), and Qur Qarausu which fell on
September 29.36 At the same time, because they had had difculties taking
the Manchu fort in Urumchi, they sent an envoy to the Kuchean khwjas
seeking their assistance. In a rare case of cooperation between different rebel
groups, the commander of the eastern expeditionary army of Kucha, Iskq
Khwja, sent 5,000 troops to aid the Tungans and the allied army took the
fort on October 3.37 Pingzui exploded gunpowder and killed himself and his
family. After the fall of the Urumchi fort to the allied Muslim force of Urum-
chi and Kucha, Changji and Qutubi fell one after the other on the 6th and
the 20th of October. Jimsa and Gucheng also fell between the end of Feb-
ruary and the beginning of March 1865.38 In this way the Urumchi regime
succeeded in taking all of the Eastern Circuit except for Hami, Turfan, and
Barkul.
Although we do not have enough source material to reconstruct exactly
what happened after that in Urumchi, some sources suggest that a serious
44 xinjiang in revolt

power struggle erupted within the leading group of Urumchi. According to

one Chinese source, Tuo Ming sent Suo Huanzhang to Turfan, which meant
his exclusion from the center of power and reects the deteriorating rela-
tions between these two leaders.39 In the meantime, Tuo made Ma Sheng,
Ma Guan, Ma Tai, and Ma Zhong generals (yuanshuai) of the regions
that came under his control. Moreover, he even appointed the generals of
Gansu and Shanxi, though he had no domination over these areas: Ma Si
to Suzhou, Ma Duosan to Xining, Ma Yanlong to Hezhou, and Ma Hua-
long to Ningxia.40 However, when Ma Sheng soon began to assert hege-
mony in Urumchi, Tuo let Ma Guan, the commander of Suilai, kill him and
his party.41 According to Somov, there was one called Ma Fupo, with the
title of dayanshay (marshal), who virtually controlled the whole power so
that Dd (Tuo Ming) could not make any important decision without his
consent.42 It is not clear whether this Ma Fupo and Ma Guan was one and
the same person.

yarkand

Among the cities to the south of Tianshan it was Yarkand that imme-
diately followed Kucha in revolt. Yarkand was one of the eight cities in the
Southern Circuit and in terms of size of the Qing garrison troops it ranked
next only to Kashghar. The Muslim town was enclosed by mud walls with
ve gates whose circumference reached almost 5 km with a height of about
10 m.43 After the conquest the Qing built a fortress about 400500 m
to the west of the Muslim town that accommodated their ofcials and
troops.44
The rst report from the Qing side on the Yarkand revolt was a memo-
rial by Ili General who informed the court that On the 23rd day of the 6th
month (July 26), around the hour of chou (between 13 oclock in the
morning), Chinese Muslims in Yarkand caused a disturbance and burned
the gates. It is not still clear whether the councilor and soldiers were in-
jured.45 However, this became the last report by Qing ofcials from this
city because the communication with Yarkand, located the farthest west,
was completely severed. Later it became known that the rebel army killed
the councilor of Yarkand along with thirteen Qing and local Muslim of-
cials.46 Although the report of Ili General was brief, it is sufcient to demon-
strate the fact that the Tungans initiated the revolt in Yarkand too.
The British and the Russian embassies that visited this area almost ten
years after the incident conrm the Qing report. According to their reports,
the Yarkand rebellion was caused by the attempt of the Yarkand amban to
disarm or kill the Tungan soldiers under his command because he was wor-
ried about the repercussions of the Shanxi and Gansu Muslim rebellion to
their loyalty. However, his plan was disclosed and enraged Tungan soldiers
 xinjiang in revolt 45

under the command of M Dlya attacked the Chinese fort around two
oclock in the morning of July 26. They slaughtered two thousand Qing sol-
diers and their families, but when they faced stiff resistance they withdrew.
Next morning when the gates of the Muslim city opened they entered the
city and cried for the holy war. At rst Muslim leaders hesitated about what
to do, but gamblers, rufans, drunkards, and those who were in debt to Chi-
nese began to participate in raiding and killing. Thus, on that day alone it
was reported almost seven thousand Chinese were massacred.47
In addition to these reports, extant Muslim sources provide us with more
information. According to Vafar-nma by Mukammad Kashmr, before the
outbreak of the rebellion the amount of taxes imposed on Muslim peasants
kept on increasing by manipulative Qing ofcials, their interpreters, and
Muslim begs. For that reason the peasants could not but forsake their na-
tive place (vaan) and, being separated from their families, ee to other
places. After the Kucha revolt, the rumor of the order for a Tungan mas-
sacre reached Yarkand, and when the Tungans became aware of this order
they armed themselves and gathered at a mosque. Thereupon, the Qing
ofcials called in Muslim begs and akhunds to dispel their suspicions and
concluded a peace agreement (ulk). However, within several days the Tun-
gans became restless again and began to attack the indels, and, at this
news, the Yarkand people at once rose in revolt.48 According to an anony-
mous work entitled Ghazt-i Muslimn, this incident took place in July
1864 and resulted in the murder of many Chinese merchants (maymaych)
and usurers (giraw-kash) because they were owed enormous debts by the
people of Yarkand, amounting to 25,000 yambus for the previous three
years.49 The Tungans occupied the Muslim town and subsequently assailed
the Manchu fort but managed to occupy it for only three days before with-
drawing after being counterattacked by Qing forces. At that moment, Tun-
gan leaders felt a strong necessity to nd a new leader who could better ap-
peal to the Turkic Muslims. After they came back to the Muslim town, they
consulted and installed Ghulm Husayn, a religious man from a noble fam-
ily in Kabul, as pdishh (king).50 Then they continued to ght with the
Qing army for another two months until invading Muslim troops from
Kucha arrived around the end of September and forced them to drop the
siege in order to deal with this new threat.
The writer of Vafar-nma was very critical of the behavior of those who
took command of the revolt. He deplored the situation in this way:
The Chinese disappeared and Islam became open wide,
But in cities and countryside the [same] old practices remained.
All the people were in great joy and said,
Now, there will be no more sorrow for us.
[But] the ame of tyranny did not abate,
46 xinjiang in revolt

And from any grief people were not relieved.51

Unlike in Kucha, the Tungans continued to hold their hegemony in the

Muslim town of Yarkand after the revolt.52 They manipulated their puppet
ruler, Ghulm Husayn, to provide the darughas and begs with bills (tik)
so they could be dispatched to the countryside to collect taxes and conscript
the people necessary to besiege the Manchu fort that was still in the hands
of the Qing.53 A number of old beg ofcials who had served the Qing gov-
ernment were incorporated into the new ruling circle, and this disenchanted
many Muslims.
The reason the Tungans could retain their hegemony over the Turkic
Muslims stemmed primarily from the peculiar composition of population
in Yarkand. First of all, the number of Tungans was much larger than that
in Kucha. According to Valikhanov, a unit of the Green Battalion number-
ing almost 2,200 was stationed in Yarkand.54 Based on a Qing survey, the
British embassy of 1873 reported that the number of soldiers was 5,000 and
that the number of households in Yarkand was 10,000 (5,000 in the Mus-
lim town and 5,000 around its suburbs including the Manchu fort).55 At
that time most of the soldiers stationed in Kashgharia were the Tungans dis-
patched from the Shanxi and Gansu areas. Very few Turkic Muslims, except
for a few ofcials and their families, lived in the Manchu fort. Therefore, we
can assume that there were quite a large number of Tungans in Yarkand.
Moreover, Yarkand was an important center of trade with the Pamir region
and beyond, like India and Afghanistan, so a large number of foreign mer-
chants resided there. We have statistics, although a little bit later in Yaqb
Begs time, showing that the merchants from Andijan, Badakhshan, Kash-
mir, including a small number of Indians and Kabulis, reached almost 2,000
households.56 If we take these facts into consideration, we can understand
how the Tungans could maintain their supremacy after the revolt and why
they chose a religious person from the other country as their nominal leader.

kashghar

Kashghar was the headquarters of the Qing colonial administration

in Kashgharia, or the Southern Circuit, but the size of the city itself was
smaller than Yarkand. The circumference of the Muslim town measured
only 1.5 km and the population in and around the city was about 5,000
households.57 The Manchu fort was situated approximately 8 km to the
southeast of the town. Valikhanov reports that the number of Qing troops
in Kashghar was 5,500 in total.58
The revolt in the Kashghar area rst broke out at Yangihissar, about 60
km to the south of the city, where there were 2,000 households.59 Here, only
three days after the revolt in Yarkand, around the hour of shen (between
 xinjiang in revolt 47

35 oclock in the afternoon) on the 26th day of the sixth month (July 29),
Lan Fachun who was the commanding ofcer of a garrison in Yangihissar
secretly communicated with Chinese Muslims, and all of them caused a dis-
turbance simultaneously with the opening of market.60 On the next day,
Wang Dechun who was sub-lieutenant (bazong) in Kashghar [also] secretly
communicated with Chinese Muslims and made a tumultuous riot.61 Al-
though there is no documentary evidence, the two persons named above
were, in all probability, commanders of the Tungan garrison units. Chinese
sources are silent about why these Tungan ofcers came to take the initia-
tive in the revolt of Yangihissar, but we have other testimonies that give us
the answer.
First, a Muslim historian Hjj Ysuf asserts that the rebellion in Kash-
ghar was provoked by the governor of the city, Qutluq Beg, who had sent
a secret order to suburban villages to kill Tungans which, he claims, was ac-
tually carried out.62 Another source even writes that only 100 out of 4,600
Tungans in Kashghar survived the massacre.63 It is not easy for us to judge
how reliable this claim is. However, the Russian scholar, D. I. Tikhonov, as-
serts that this is a piece of evidence wiping away any doubt whether there
was actually a Tungan massacre.64 In relation to this we have an interesting
report by British R. B. Shaw who visited Kashghar in 186869. He trans-
mits the statement of the former Kashghar governors son named Ala
Akhnd who was serving Yaqb Beg as makrambashi (chief attendant).
The Toongnee soldiers in the Chinese service at Aksoo and Kooch having mu-
tinied, in conjunction with their countrymen further East, the Chinese at Kshghar
were on the alert to disconcert the plans of those Toongnees who formed part of
their own garrison. They were all invited to a feast and massacred, and so the
Kshghar Ambn was delivered from that danger.65

It is true that the aforementioned materials show a discrepancy about

who gave an order to kill Tungans, whether it was Qutluq Beg or Manchu
ofcials, but they all agree about the fact that there was such an order and
that the order was actually carried out. Undoubtedly, this massacre was the
immediate cause of the revolts in Kashghar and Yangihissar.
It is uncertain, however, what happened right after the revolt initiated by
the Tungans at the end of July. They seem to have failed to take either the
Manchu fort where Qing garrison troops were holding fast or the Muslim
town where Qutluq Beg and other Muslim begs continued to resist. The fact
that they could not take the city shows the weakness of the Tungan military
power in Kashghar. We cannot ascertain what the reason was for such
weakness, but it may have been the result of the decimation of the Tungan
population by the massacre or their failure to get support from the Turkic
Muslims in the town.
48 xinjiang in revolt

One Muslim author writes that Qutluq Beg, faced with the Tungan as-
sault, had asked for help from the Qirghiz living in Tashmaliq, especially
from \iddq Beg who was the chieftain of the tribe called Turaygir-
Qipchaq.66 However, when \iddq Beg came, Qutluq Beg became worried
that \iddq might betray him and take the town for himself. So he not only
closed the gate rmly but also gave a secret order to arrest him. Respond-
ing to this move, \iddq laid siege to the town and sent his followers to levy
supplies from the surrounding villages, which caused instant opposition by
the people.67 Both the Tungans and the Qirghiz failed to take either the
Manchu fort or the Muslim town, and their attempt to take control of small
villages in the vicinity caused erce resistance from the Turkic Muslim pop-
ulation there. The statement in a Qing source that Jin Xiangyin, a Muslim
leader in Kashghar, collected a band of followers and, with a Muslim rebel
\iddq of Qirghiz, rose in revolt68 suggests that the coalition of these two
groups was formed when they were confronted by the difcult situation. To
break this deadlock \iddq Beg and Tungans decided to invite an fq
khwja from Khoqand, whose inuence they could utilize to seize Kashghar.
According to H. Bellews report, when the subsidy coming from inland
China was stopped, Qutluq Beg, by the order of the Qing amban, attempted
to levy a new tax of 2 percent on every commercial transaction in the town.
Enraged people sent a petition to lim Quli, a strongman in Khoqand, and
asked him to redress the problem, but lim Quli, tied up with internal mat-
ters, could not adequately respond to their request. And then, a little later,
the Muslim rebellion broke out in Kashghar and several leaders belonging
to the fq faction asked for assistance from \iddq Beg, who, responding
to this, came to the Muslim town. However, driven out by Qutluq Beg and
the citizens, \iddq allied with the Tungans who had been expelled from the
Manchu fort and began to lay siege to the Muslim town. He attacked for
three months but failed to take it. Then he sent his messenger to lim Quli
and asked him to dispatch a khwja.69 Hjj Ysuf also concurs with Bel-
lews report but with one important difference. After the revolt twenty-four
Khoqandian merchants, in consultation with begs and akhnds, sent a let-
ter under joint signature and asked for a dispatch of Khoqandian troops to
drive away Siddq Beg and to take Kashghar. In the meantime, \iddq Beg
himself sent two messengers, Jin Laosan and Ma Tuzi, to Khoqand to ask
for Buzurg Khwja.70
We cannot say for certain which of the two sources is correct. Hjj
Ysufs claim that Khoqandian merchants informed Khoqand of the revolt
in Kashghar and urged the khanate to take advantage of the situation is
quite plausible in terms of the relationship between Khoqand and Kash-
gharia. However, most other sources agree in that lim Quli dispatched
Buzurg at the request of \iddq Beg,71 and it is not difcult for us to guess
 xinjiang in revolt 49

why \iddq tried to invite an fq khwja to come. He hoped to utilize the

khwjas religious inuence so that he could rally the support of Muslims
around the surrounding villages and take into possession the Chinese as well
as the Muslim towns of Kashghar. Whatever the truth was, lim Quli in
Khoqand accepted the proposal and decided to send Buzurg Khwja. He
also ordered one Khoqandian general to accompany the khwja, and he was
none other than Yaqb Beg.

khotan

The Khotan revolt is a peculiar case because it was not initiated by

the Tungans as it was in other areas of Xinjiang. Khotan, in a wider sense,
consisted of the city of Khotan, which was called Ilchi, and ve other adja-
cent towns: Qaraqash, Yurungqash, Chira, Keriya, and Niya. Altogether
they were called the Six Cities of Khotan (Altishahr-i Khotan).72 Prior to
the Muslim rebellion Ilchi was encircled with low walls,73 inside and around
the vicinity of which about 6,000 households were scattered along the
banks of the Khotan river. The Qing had built a fort inside the city wall
where 2,000 (or 1,400) troops were stationed. The majority of the popula-
tion was of course indigenous Turkic Muslims, but due to the citys geo-
graphical location in the south a considerable number of merchants from
Khoqand, Tibet, Kashmir, Punjab, and Kabul resided in Khotan region.74
Although there is no material showing the number of the Tungans, we may
assume that it was relatively small compared to other cities because Khotan
was located in the most distant part of southwest Xinjiang.
As for the cause and the progress of the revolt in Khotan we have only
meager Muslim materials and Western reports. We do not even know the
exact date of its outbreak. We can barely assume the approximate date by
indirect methods. According to a local historian, about a month after the
Khotan revolt the battle of Piyalma with the Kuchean army took place.75
From other sources we know that the battle was in April 1865, which indi-
cates that the Khotan revolt was in March. However, we have other evi-
dence that contradicts this date. After the success of the revolt Habb Allh
sent his son Ibrhm \udr to Khoqand, and Ibrhm, having nished his
mission, arrived in Kashghar with several other Khoqandians in February
1865 on his way back to Khotan.76 This suggests that the Khotan revolt
probably happened in 1864. And our guess is corroborated by the assertion
of a native historian Mukammad Alam. Although he wrote that the out-
break of the revolt in Khotan was on Rab I 22, 1280 (September 6,
1863),77 if we consider the fact that the dates in his work were frequently
given as one year earlier, it is highly possible that it is the mistake of Rab
I 22, 1281, that is, August 25, 1864.
50 xinjiang in revolt

In this respect, the testimony of a British explorer, W. H. Johnson, was

not much help either. He visited Khotan and was told the following story
by Habb Allh himself, the leader of a new Muslim regime. In 1861 Habb
Allh and his second son went for a pilgrimage to Mecca by way of India
and in the rst half of 1863 they came back to Khotan via Persia and Turk-
istan. Later, scarcely had one month passed after his appointment as chief
judge before the revolt broke out.78 This report is extremely valuable be-
cause it was based on the statement of Habb Allh himself even though we
can nd no answer to why he took action against the Qing government, not
to mention the date of the revolt.
Information about the cause of the revolt is supplied by M. F. Grenard
who visited Khotan after the Qing reconquest of this region. According to
the accounts of his informant, soon after the news of what had happened in
Kucha reached Khotan, Qing ofcials regarded Habb Allh who had just
returned from the pilgrimage as a potential rebel leader and ordered him to
be arrested. Fearful of being caught, he ed to the place where his eldest son
was living. Up to this time he had had no intention of rebelling against the
Qing, but soon another incident broke out that changed his mind. A certain
Fayd Majdd, who originally came from Badakhshan, cherished an evil
design to take advantage of the confusion and, having collected people
from Qarghaliq, marched toward Khotan. So Habb Allh and his son
joined them and succeeded in entering the city. The citizens of Khotan,
however, were reluctant to accept a foreigner as their leader and drove out
Fayd Majdd. Consequently Habb Allh and his son were able to take
power.79 Another informant of Grenards stated that the revolt broke out
when Qing ofcials, at the news of the Kucha revolt, became scared and cut
off the bridge that connected the town and fort.80
Compared to this Western report, the work of Mukammad Alam, which
was written in Khotan around 1311/189481 transmits much more detailed
information. Sayrm who is usually very helpful to us in reconstructing the
1864 rebellion treats the event in Khotan only briey. To know what really
happened there we cannot but rely on Mukammad Alams work. He rst
describes the profound discontent of the Khotanese against the Qing rule
before the outbreak of the revolt. Many Khotanese forfeited their proper-
ties and their heels were cut because of the debt to Chinese merchants, and
sometimes they were thrown into a river and drowned. Preposterous taxes
were imposed on the commodities of merchants and on their transactions.
In the midst of these extreme grievances, one day several drunken local
Muslims insulted a Qing ofcials horse boy and bragged to him that soon
they would rise in revolt and certainly take revenge. On being informed of
this incident, the Qing authority executed all of them.
People were greatly alarmed and fearful, so they went to a village called
t Jya. They visited Habb Allh, a religious man famous at that time for
 xinjiang in revolt 51

his poor but honest life. They complained about the tyrannical rule (ulm-
sitam) and urged him to lead a holy war (ghazt) saying if we live, we shall
be holy warriors (ghz); if we die, we shall be martyrs (shahd). He asked
them ten days for deliberation and then, having performed ablution, prayed
to holy spirits. One day he saw in his dream the prophet Mukammad giv-
ing him happy tidings (bishrat), so he decided to take an action.82 In this
way, Mukammad Alam explains the Khotan revolt largely from the inter-
nal context of Khotan. However, we should not forget another perspective,
as suggested by Sayrm, that the revolt was caused as a consequence of the
rebellion in Kucha.83
Habb Allh immediately sent his eldest son Abd al-Rakmn to Qara-
qash to collect his disciples while he himself, leading 400 people, besieged
the Manchu fort (gulbgh) and set re to a Buddhist temple. A number of
Khotanese began to gather at his camp, armed with clubs and spears. Soon
the merchants originally from Marghinan, Badakhshan, Kashmir, and Ka-
bul joined under the direction of their aqsaqals; the Tungans also came, led
by their imms. At this juncture about 20,000 fresh Muslims came and en-
gaged in the assault on the fort. They were those from Qaraqash conducted
by Abd al-Rakmn. On the fourth day nally they succeeded in demol-
ishing the wall with the help of artillery (zambarak). The Qing amban in-
side the fort, out of despair, set re to the explosives and took his own life.
In this way the Manchu fort fell to the hands of the Muslims. The number
of Chinese who either committed suicide or were killed reached almost
3,700.84
Mukammad Alam, describing the beginning of the revolt in this way, as-
serted that it was not Habb Allh but his son Abd al-Rakmn who had ac-
tually organized people and conducted the revolt. He called the former His
Holiness Hjj (Hajrat-i Hjjm) while the latter king (pdishh). Ac-
cording to him, Habb Allh began to be called king only after his son Abd
al-Rakmn was killed at the battle against the Kuchean troops at Piyalma,
which took place a month after the Khotan revolt.85 This fact is not re-
corded in any other material, but his assertion seems to be reliable if we con-
sider his generally accurate and detailed description about the events in
Khotan, especially about its initial stage.
The Khotanese thus succeeded in eliminating the Qing power but they
had to face serious internal dissension. Immediately after they took the
Manchu fort, a certain Fid Fayj Akmad shn, leading about three hun-
dred adherents, arrived at the city to participate in the holy war. The title
of shn suggests that he was probably a Su master. He utilized his reli-
gious charisma and, relying on the support of a large number of foreigners
(musr), began to challenge the hegemony of Habb Allh and Abd al-
Rakmn. However, he was expelled by the Khotanese who opposed the rule
of foreigners.86
52 xinjiang in revolt

After this incident Habb Allh and his son undertook organizing an
army with a view to strengthening their base of power. First, infantry troops
(sarbz) of 800 were formed and put under the command of Mukammad
Al Khn Kbul. They were supplied with ries (miltiq) and trained to han-
dle them. A cavalry unit of 1,000 was also organized, headed by Sharbat-
dr from Khoqand and Ibn Yamn Aqsaqal from Marghinan who taught
them how to ride and to shoot. Messengers were dispatched to villages to
levy soldiers. In the Manchu fort Buddhist temples were transformed into
mosques and new buildings were constructed.87
In spite of all these efforts, internal opposition confronting Habb Allh
and his son was not quickly subdued. As soon as a new army was organ-
ized, they were attacked by 500 Yarkand soldiers led by a son of Abd al-
Rakmn, chief of the Yarkand regime, but they were victorious in the bat-
tle at Qaraqash. There was another threatening incident. When a religious
gure named Zakariya shn at the town of Zava assumed the title of
pdishh for himself, several important military ofcers including Ibn Ya-
mn and Sharbatdr began to be inclined to follow him. His attempt, how-
ever, ended in failure. During this turmoil the military force under Habb
Allh was steadily strengthened and the infantry and the cavalry numbered
two thousand and three thousand respectively. They were also equipped
with six cannons. After having overcome these challenges, the Muslim gov-
ernment of Khotan seemed to have gained some peace, but it was to be
short-lived because they had to face another more formidable enemy from
Kucha.

ili

When the emperor Qianlong vanquished the Zunghars and occupied

the Ili valley in the middle of the eighteenth century, he chose this place as
the center of Qing rule over Xinjiang. He removed a large number of
Manchu and Mongol soldiers from areas like Heilongjiang, Shengjing,
Jehol, and Zhangjiakou and stationed them around Ili. They were so-called
resident Eight Banners who came with their families and settled there per-
manently. Among them Solons and Sibos belonged to the Manchus, and
Chahars, Daghurs, and Oirats were Mongols.88 In the meantime, not a few
Muslim immigrants were living in this area. There were two groups of them.
One group was the Taranchis, Turkic Muslims, who had been removed from
the Tarim Basin and forced to cultivate the soil as early as from the end of
the seventeenth century by the Zunghars. The other group was the Tungans
from the Shanxi and Gansu provinces who consisted of merchants, peas-
ants, and soldiers. The Taranchis numbered fty to sixty thousand and the
Tugans about sixty thousand.
 xinjiang in revolt 53

The Ili revolt shows a similar pattern to those in the other oases in the
sense that it was caused by the repercussion of the Shanxi-Gansu Muslim
rebellion on the Tungans in Xinjiang as well as by the aggravation of so-
cioeconomic conditions of the Muslims. Already around the end of 1862
the news of the Muslim rebellion in western China was transmitted to the
Tungans in Xinjiang and a rumor was spreading that the Qing government
was planning to massacre them. Mull Bll, an eyewitness of the Ili revolt,
wrote in his work Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn:
At that time [Emperor] Tngzh, the Cursed, was a ruler.
The paganism is worse than the tyranny.
This tyrant sent a letter.
...................
As soon as the letter reached the General [of Ili],
An enormous stir was created,
Because its content was as follows:
Tungans rebelled against us.
However many Tungans live in the city of Ili,
Kill them all and exterminate!89

At that time the Taranchis called the General of Ili Cangcing, who was
notorious for his cruel exploitation, by the nickname of Long Pocket.
They invented this nickname because his family name had the same pro-
nunciation of chang, which is the Chinese word meaning long, and it shows
how he amassed wealth by illegal means of exploitation and bribery.90 In
this respect, it is not surprising at all that the Muslims put up ags with a
slogan of peoples rise against ofcials oppression (guanbi minfan).91
The prelude to the rebellion had started on March 17, 1863 when about
two hundred Tungans living in a town called Sandaohezi attacked a Chinese
garrison at Tarchi. They plundered the armory and killed the soldiers sta-
tioned there. Mull Bll asserted that this incident was triggered by the
rumor of a Tungan massacre,92 but a Qing report alleged that it was insti-
gated by cunning Muslims who had inltrated from the inland to Ili.93 This
rst revolt was easily put down because of the small number of Muslims in-
volved and they were all killed. In the later half of August, the Tungans
began to attack the fort at Qur Qarausu, and the General of Ili dispatched
troops to suppress the revolt.94 The Qing troops, numerically much larger
than the Tungans, did not attack them immediately. Instead, they began to
negotiate, asking the insurgents to disarm within three days as the terms of
capitulation. At this juncture, a large number of Tungans came from Manas
and attacked the Qing army, which was completely destroyed. The news of
the defeat of the Qing army ignited the full-edged rebellion in Ili.95
The Qing government discharged Cangcing as responsible for the inci-
dent and appointed Mingsioi as new General of Ili. He also seems to have
54 xinjiang in revolt

attempted to appease the Tungans by negotiation at rst. Accompanied by

a councilor and a commandant, he visited the Tungan quarters in Ili (Hui-
yuan Cheng, or Kr Shahr in Turkic),96 but they failed to come to an agree-
ment. The Tungans were determined to stand against the Chinese and
sought an alliance with the Taranchis. Several Tungan leaders in Kulja
(Ningyuan Cheng) led by shr Khnj Akhn97 visited Abd Rasul98 who
was acting-governor and one of the highest-ranking Taranchi ofcials at
that time. Abd Rasul consulted with Nir al-Dn, qj kaln (chief judge)
and the leader of ulam, who gave him a fatva (legal opinion) in approval
of the holy war.99 Tungans in Ili and Kulja rose during the night of No-
vember 10, and they instantly occupied Kulja. Then they attacked the north-
ern gate of Ili, but with the counterattack of the Qing troops they ed to
Kulja. In Kulja the Taranchis and the Tungans massacred the Chinese resi-
dents and easily took control of the city.100
From the preceding discussion we can conrm the fact that in Ili, as in
other areas, the Tungans were very active from the rst. They seemed to
make an alliance with the Taranchis because a considerable number of
Taranchis were living in Ili and its vicinity. The reason the role of Taranchis
stands out especially in the work of Mull Bll is probably because he him-
self was a Taranchi and naturally more inclined to emphasize the activities
of his fellow people. However, as will be explained later, the Tungans, until
they were defeated by the Taranchis and departed to Urumchi, maintained
their own rulers and had been a powerful group in the course of the rebel-
lion. According to Mull Bll, Abd Rasul sent letters to Muslim leaders in
the Ili region urging them to rise against the Qing. Stimulated by him, Mull
Shams al-Dn Khalfa and Akmad Khn Khwja led a group of Muslims and
attacked Yamatu, located where the rivers Kunges and Qash meet. And
other Muslims living in the villages to the south of the Ili river succeeded in
assaulting and taking the towns of Khojgir and Zorghan Sumun.101
For the Muslims who occupied Kulja the next target was Bayandai
(Huining Cheng). Mull Bll names the twenty-four Muslim leaders who
swore their loyalty to Abd Rasul and joined the rebellion. From the titles
of these people we can conrm the fact that their leaders basically consisted
of two groups: one was religious leaders with titles like qj, mull, muft,
khalfa, or akhn, and the other was beg ofcials with titles like khaznachi
beg, shng beg, and so on.102 In the siege of Bayandai we see the participa-
tion of other groups of people: merchants (jam-yi ahl-yi tujjrlar) with the
title of shngy,103 and Tungans led by their own religious leaders like Shj
Akhn, Khnj Akhn, and Ykr shr Jsn.104
Before the outbreak of the revolt, Cangcing, the Ili General, had dis-
missed and imprisoned Muaam105 and appointed Abd Rasul as acting
kkim beg. The reason was that several beg ofcials accused Muaam of
 xinjiang in revolt 55

extorting money from Muslims and illegally forcing them to cultivate his
private farm.106 After the revolt the Qing ofcials released him so he could
collect Sibo soldiers and suppress the Muslims. Upon his release from Ili,
Muaam went to Kulja and entered into an alliance with Akmad Khn
Khwja. When he realized that the Qing could be no longer be relied on, he
resolved to take leadership for himself, and to this end he assassinated
Akmad Khaznachi Beg who was the right hand of Abd Rasul.107 The all-
out war between the two sides was avoided by negotiation. Rebel leaders
assembled and decided to enthrone Muaam khan. Abd Rasul was made
amr (general), Nir al-Dn qj kaln, Mull Shukt Akhn qj aghar
(assisting judge), and Mull Rz Akhn muft (prosecutor).108 In this way
the Taranchis formed an independent government under the leadership of
Muaam and their military force reached almost thirty thousand. How-
ever, their future was not so bright because of their difculties taking the
fortresses of Bayandai and Ili, as well as serious conicts among them for
hegemony.
Since they could not easily reduce Bayandai, they sent messengers to
Urumchi and Kucha to ask for army support, but in vain. While the siege
extended over a long period, people began to feel skeptical about Mua-
ams leadership while Abd Rasul popularity grew. Being apprehensive, he
killed Abd Rasul in the beginning of January 1865, that is, a month before
the occupation of Bayandai. He also imprisoned his party, beginning with
Nir al-Dn, whom he later killed too. On February 8, 1865 the Muslims
nally succeeded in taking the fortress of Bayandai, and almost twenty
thousand people inside the town were slaughtered.109
With one party going down, another arose, this time led by a certain
Makmd, nicknamed fuchi (gunner), who claimed to be a descendant of a
ghth, one of the highest saintly titles in Islam. After the fall of Bayandai,
the Muslims concentrated their attacks on Ili and Suiding. Fuchi Makmd
allied himself with Akmad Khn Khwja and came to achieve high popu-
larity for his bravery at the siege of those two towns as well as for his skill
of making a sort of wooden dynamite (chub fu). He became the leader of
the factions that opposed Muaam. He nally succeeded in killing Mua-
am, but then he himself was murdered about a month later.110 After this,
Mull Shkat Akhn was selected as a new suln, and Ala Khn, who was
known by various names such as Obul Ala or Abil Oghul, was made his
amr. 111 The siege of Ili was protracted, and the people inside were in mis-
erable condition because of the lack of food. They ate dogs, cats, and bow-
strings, and nally even human esh. On March 8, 1866 the Muslims
stormed into the fort, which had lost all power to resist. The Ili General
Mingsioi killed himself by explosion but his predecessor Cangcing became
a prisoner, and was dragged around the street. According to some reports,
56 xinjiang in revolt

almost 12,000 Manchus and Han Chinese were massacred and only 2,000
were left alive.112 After the fall of Ili, a few other forts among the Nine
Forts of Ili went over to Muslim hands.
In this way, the Muslims gained control over the entire area of Ili, but in-
ternal conicts did not easily calm down. Following the occupation of Ili in
the spring of 1866, a conict ared up between the two Taranchi leaders.
Shkat Akhn deprived Ala Khn of his post, but the people favored Ala
Khn, who pushed Shkat Akhn off to become sultan himself.113 However,
Ala Khn, by killing Tukhta Akhn whom he appointed as commander,
provided his opponents with a pretext to unite against him. The former sul-
tan Mull Shkat Akhn and Akmad Khn Khwja rose against him, but
since they could not overcome him they took refuge among the Tungans in
Suiding. At rst, the Tungans had cooperated with the Taranchis until the
Qing rule was overthrown. Once this common aim was achieved ghting
between these two groups for the control of the Ili valley was inevitable.
The ight of Akmad Khn and Mull Shkat touched off an eruption of
severe hostilities and ghting between the two groups. Ykr, also known
as Ma I, who was the leader of the Tungans, attempted to take advantage
of this opportunity to subjugate the Taranchis. A battle was fought near
Kulja in April 1867 in which Ykr and Akmad Khn Khwja were killed
and the Tungans were defeated. Most of them took ight to Urumchi and
only three to four thousand Tungans stayed around the forts like Suiding,
Guangren, and Zhande. Later the Tungans attempted a counterattack with
aid from Urumchi, but, though they initially held an advantage, they were
nally defeated and submitted to the Taranchis.114 In this way by 1866 the
Taranchis succeeded in eliminating the Qing as well as the Tungan opposi-
tion and took control of the entire Ili valley. The Taranchi regime based in
Kulja continued to rule this region until Russia wiped it out in 1871.
In the meantime, in Tarbaghatai to the northeast of Ili there was also a
Muslim revolt but an independent government did not form. It was started
by a certain Su Yude on January 27, 1865 who, having collected Tungans,
made an alliance with the Qazaqs and began to attack the fort. According
to a report, one thousand and several hundred Muslims, several thousands
of Qazaqs, and several hundreds of Andijanis participated in the revolt.115
One Muslim source reports that the revolt broke out because Qing ofcials
plan to kill Tungans was revealed.116 In the fort there were only a small
number of soldiers, but about a thousand Chinese mine workers in the sur-
rounding areas came and helped the defense, so the siege was protracted. In
the beginning of June, led by a certain lamaist monk, almost two thousand
Mongol soldiers arrived to assist the defense. With this additional army the
situation turned in favor of the Qing side, but councilor Ulongge continued
to be passive and could not utilize the opportunity. Around the end of April
 xinjiang in revolt 57

1866, the fort nally fell to the Muslims.117 Nevertheless, they could not
stay there long because they felt threatened by the Mongols in the environs.
So they left for Urumchi between June and July, and then this place came to
be controlled by the Mongols.118
Other cities in eastern Xinjiang also revolted. Led by Mam Khn
Khwja, Turfan rebelled on August 17, 1864.119 Hami revolted on Septem-
ber 29th. However, because these incidents were not independent, but
rather related to the approach of a Kuchean Muslim army, it is better to ex-
plain them in the context of the Kuchean expedition.

Kuchean Expeditions

eastern expedition

Immediately after Rshidn Khwja was enthroned in Kucha, he or-

ganized two separate expeditionary armies, one for the west and the other
for the east.120 He appointed his cousin Burhn al-Dn (also known as
Khab Khwja) as the commander of the western march and sent him off
to conquer Aqsu, Kashghar, Yarkand, and Khotan. On the eastern march he
appointed Iskq Khwja, the brother of Burhn al-Dn, to be the com-
mander and sent him in the direction of Bugur and Kurla. The number of
soldiers in each army was less than 200 at rst,121 but soon increased by
those who joined on the road. According to a Chinese record, one party of
1,200 Turkic Muslims and 300 Tungans went to the east and another party
made up of 1,000 Turkic Muslims and 100 Tungans went to the west.122
The eastern expedition marched to Bugur, which lies 100 km to the east
of Kucha, and then to Kurla, a further 170 km from there. Both cities fell
immediately without any resistance on the 11th and the 13th of June.123
Many Muslims there joined the Kuchean army which swelled almost to
2,000. At Kurla, with a view to take Qarashahr, the army detoured to the
south of Lake Baghrash by using a narrow path instead of the main road.
When they reached Ushaq Tal, they unexpectedly encountered a body of
Qing troops camping there. About 2,000 Kuchean troops attacked and de-
livered a crushing defeat to the Qing army. After this severe ghting they
proceeded toward Qarashahr until they encountered another army at Chu-
ghur, and here again the Kuchean army led by Iskq was victorious.124
When they arrived in Qarashahr between late July and early August, the
Kuchean army discovered that the city had been attacked by the Qarashahr
Tungans on June 14. The Kuchean army took the city after a week of
assault.125
After a rest in Qarashahr and being joined by the Mongols nomadizing
around the area, the Kuchean army resumed the eastern expedition in Sep-
58 xinjiang in revolt

tember.126 After taking the fort of Toqsun, they went to Turfan and laid siege
to the city. Turfan had already revolted at the news of the Kuchean armys
approach and now joined in attacking the city. At that moment, a request
for assistance came from the Urumchi Tungans who had had a hard time
taking the Manchu fort of Urumchi. It has already been explained how the
Tungans took the fort with Kuchean assistance and how the Kuchean army
under Iskqs command raided the cities around Urumchi. After the fall of
the Manchu fort in Urumchi, the Kuchean army of 5,000 did not immedi-
ately return but kept pillaging towns like Jimsa, Gucheng, Xintan, Fukang,
Jibuku, Qarabasun, Manas, and Jinghe where they slaughtered a lot of Chi-
nese. Two months later they came back to Turfan.127 In the meantime, Iskq
Khwja sent another 2,000 troops to Mulei128 located to the north of the
Boghdo Ula Mountains. This army crossed the mountains by way of Chik-
tim, and then attacked Mulei and another town called Dongcheng (Dngjn
in Sayrms works) to its west. However, they failed to take it and, due to
the cold weather, had to come back to Turfan. Next spring, Iskq Khwja
again dispatched an army to Mulei and Dongcheng but this too ended in
failure.
The Kuchean Muslims were able to occupy Turfan around March of
1865, after almost seven or eight months of siege. According to Sayrm,
Iskq Khwja realized the difculty of taking the fort by military means and
employed a deceptive tactic: he promised the Chinese, who were so starved
and desperate that they resorted to eating human esh, that if they evacu-
ated the city he would guarantee their security and allow their peaceful re-
turn to China. The Chinese accepted his proposal, but as soon as they came
out they were mercilessly slaughtered by him.129 In early summer of 1865,
Iskq resumed his eastern march to Hami and Barkul.130 The Muslims in
these cities had already rebelled a year before (Hami on September 29 and
Barkul on October 19, 1864),131 but they had not been able to take the city
because of strong defense by a Hami prince, Bashr, and the Qing troops.
The situation, however, began to change with the arrival of Iskq in Hami
with a large number of soldiers. Facing defeat, Bashr sought a compromise
with Iskq and peacefully surrendered the Muslim town of Hami to him on
June 16.132 Iskq also succeeded in taking the Manchu fort on June 27. Then
he marched to Barkul and took its Muslim town.
While he was continuing severe battles with the Qing troops in the
Manchu fort of Barkul, a message came from Kucha that Iskq should re-
turn to ght a new enemy, Yaqb Beg, who had come to Kashghar with
Khwja Buzurg from Khoqand and who now controlled that city as well as
Yangihissar. When Iskq returned to Kucha, he left only a small number of
troops in Hami. Soon antagonisms developed among these troops, the
Hami Tungans and a group led by Bashr. In the summer of 1866, a Qing
 xinjiang in revolt 59

army came down from Barkul at the request of Bashr and took the city.133
Although Iskq was summoned nominally in response to a new threat from
Yaqb Beg, it was in fact provoked by Rshidns growing fear of the enor-
mous popularity of Iskq. The rift between Iskq and Rshidn was not just
their individual enmity. A serious conict was developing within the family
of the Kuchean khwjas, that is, Rshidns brothers vs. his cousins, and it
seems to have been caused by the contest for a greater share of power as the
territory under the Kuchean khwjas became larger. The collapse of soli-
darity within the Kuchean khwjas delivered a fatal blow to them when they
confronted Yaqb Beg.

western expedition

The western expeditionary army led by Burhn al-Dn progressed to

Qizil, Sayram, and Bai without any serious opposition. People of those
places joined their ranks and soon the number of soldiers swelled to 7,000
mostly peasants armed with clubs.134 Having secured the Muzart Pass (Muz
Daban), an important strategic point connecting Kashgharia and the Ili val-
ley, they marched to Qara Yolghun with a view to taking Aqsu. When they
reached Yaqa Ariq, a place about 80 km to the west of Kucha, they en-
countered a sudden storm and, while taking shelter to avoid the rain, they
fell asleep. At that moment they were caught by a surprise attack of the Aqsu
army led by Sad, the governor of Aqsu. Almost 2,800 were killed and
Burhn al-Dn ed to Kucha.135
Rshidn was furious at the failure of his cousin and sent another army
to Aqsu, this time under the command of his elder brother Jaml al-Dn
whom he considered well suited to the task. This army, at rst numbering
700800 but later swelling to 2,000, left Kucha and avoided the main route
that passed through Bai, Yaka Ariq, Qara Yolghun, and Jam. Instead, they
opted for a detour, going north toward Muzart Pass and then coming down
to Jam. They poured into Jam where Sad Begs troops were stationed and
defeated them. Aqsu fell quickly thereafter on July 17 (\afar 12).136 With
the fall of the city, the imperial agent Fujuri and other Qing ofcials killed
themselves and their families through explosions.137 The next target was
Ush Turfan, an important city about 100km to the west. Burhn al-Dn and
his son Hm al-Dn took 600 Kuchean soldiers with four cannons and went
to Ush Turfan. The Qing ofcials and soldiers there also exploded their own
gunpowder and killed themselves. The Kuchean army entered the town on
July 23.138
In Ush Turfan the Kuchean khwjas collected more troops for a march
to Kashghar. On October 12, Burhn al-Dn rst dispatched his son Hm
al-Dn with an army of 2,000 and he himself marched leading 1,500 sol-
60 xinjiang in revolt

diers. On his way Hm al-Dn captured Aqsu governor Sad Beg. After the
fall of Aqsu he ed Kashghar where his elder brother Qutluq Beg was work-
ing as governor, but at that moment he was going to Ili to ask for assistance
from Qing ofcials. Hm al-Dn did not kill him, but he thought to use him
to make secret contact with Qutluq Beg. His plan was to defeat the Qirghiz
chief, \iddq, by allying himself with the besieged begs inside the Muslim
town of Kashghar. The army left Ush Turfan on October 13 and soon ar-
rived at stn Artush, 40 km northeast of Kashghar. Having received this
news, \iddq dispatched a body of troops and soundly defeated the
Kucheans who were forced to remain in custody for some time under the
tight surveillance of the Qirghiz army. Only after accepting the condition
that they would never intervene in the matter of Kashghar, could they re-
turn to Ush Tufan at the end of December.139
At the beginning of 1865, Rshidn resolved to extend his domain west
of Ush Turfan and ordered a new western expedition. He dispatched an
army of 4,000 to Yarkand under the command of his brother, Nar al-Dn,
and, at the same time, gave an order to Burhn al-Dn and Hm al-Dn in
Ush Turfan to proceed to Yarkand with 1,500 troops. The two armies met
in Aqsu where they levied an additional 1,500 soldiers. With 7,000 troops
altogether they marched to Yarkand. At rst, they reached Maralbashi and
easily overpowered the garrison under the command of M Dlya. About
2,000 of them surrendered and non-Muslims were forced to convert to
Islam, who were hence called new Muslims (yangi musulmn or naw
musulmn).140 Then they proceeded to Yarkand.
As mentioned earlier, the Chinese fort of Yarkand was at that time in the
hands of the Qing army and the Muslim town was held by the Tungans who
set up Ghulm Husayn (according to Sayrm, Abd al-Rakmn) as a pup-
pet ruler. The combined Kuchean force from Ush Turfan and Kucha entered
the city of Yarkand without serious opposition, and they made an agreement
with the local Tungans to drive out Ghulm Husayn and to divide the city
between themselves while cooperating on the assault of the Manchu fort.141
At this juncture Yaqb Beg came to take Yarkand with his army. Since his
activities are described later in much detail, it is sufcient here to state that
he had to go back to Kashghar because of the strong resistance from the
Kucheans and the Tungans.
In April the Kuchean khwjas and the Tungans in Yarkand organized an-
other expeditionary army to Khotan. The Khotanese army under Abd al-
Rakmns command faced them at Piyalma, about 60 miles northwest of
the city. At the battle the Khotanese gained a victory, but lost their leader
Abd al-Rakmn. The enemy withdrew to Yarkand.142 In the end, the
Kucheans not only failed to conquer Khotan but also to take the Chinese
fort of Yarkand. They could not even subjugate the Tungans in the Muslim
town. So they stopped all operations and turned back to Kucha.143
 xinjiang in revolt 61

From the failure of the campaign against Kashghar led by Burhn al-Dn,
and Hm al-Dn, and another failure to conquer Yarkand with a large force
of 7,000, we can see the obvious limit of Kuchean regime in terms of its mil-
itary strength. Although a lot of people participated in the campaign, most
of them were peasants who had no military training at all and were armed
merely with clubs and sticks, or at best helplessly outworn swords and
spears left by the Qing army. Their zeal for the holy war was soaring, but
because they lacked the necessary military manpower and equipment, they
could not overpower the resistance in large cities like Kashghar or Yarkand.
The reason they were able to take cities like Aqsu and Turfan had more to
do with the defenders loss of ghting spirit rather than the military power
of the Kucheans. This military weakness was not only the problem of the
Kuchean regime and we can nd similar phenomena in other Muslim re-
gimes based in Yarkand, Khotan, Urumchi, and Ili. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that Yaqb Beg, although he appeared on the stage relatively late,
could easily subdue them and achieve unication because he had a group of
professional military people with him.

Holy War

religious leaders

It is necessary to distinguish two phases in the 1864 Muslim rebel-

lion. The rst phase was an instant response to the rumor of the Tungan
massacre and to other factors like the increasing tax burdens that have been
mentioned. The response was abrupt and almost hysterical. People with var-
ied social and ethnic backgrounds were led by those who had enough pas-
sion and courage to impress members of each group and direct their anger
against the Qing. However, when the existing political order nally col-
lapsed, they could no longer hold together the many different groups be-
cause they lacked both charisma and organization. The second phase of the
rebellion was the process of seeking a new leadership that could unify
conicting factions. New leaders were often called in as a compromise
among these groups. In some areas these leaders were able to consolidate
their power successfully while others failed. It is one of the most distinctive
characteristics of the 1864 Muslim rebellion in Xinjiang that these new
leaders, whether they had real power or not, were mostly recruited from the
religious class. Let us now examine who these religious leaders were and
what their source of inuence was.
Kuchean Muslims succeeded in wiping out the Qing forces but they were
faced with serious difculties caused by the ghting for hegemony among
various rebel groups, not to mention the continuing battles with the Qing
troops stationed in neighboring cities. The only way to overcome that situ-
62 xinjiang in revolt

ation was to unite under an authority to whom all of them could willingly
submit. As explained earlier, the one who they had rst called on was
Akmad Wang Beg. Having served as governor for a long time, he was
known to be thoroughly familiar with the basis of government and the op-
eration of the administration and, at the same time, he was respected as a
devout Muslim who upheld religious laws faithfully. Probably because of
this attitude he aroused the distrust and suspicion of Qing ofcials more
than once and was discharged from the ofce. His career shows that he was
widely respected by the Muslims not only as a high ofcial but also as a man
of religious sincerity, though he was not a man of religion by profession.
That was why the rebel leaders went to him and asked him to be their leader,
which, however, he rejected and chose to die.
The next person they visited was Rshidn Khwja. Who was he and on
what grounds could he become the leader of the rebel army? He was a de-
scendant of the famous Su saint of the late fourteenth century named Ar-
shad al-Dn, the son of Jall al-Dn (Jaml al-Dn in some sources). Jall al-
Dn and his son had settled at rst in a town called Katakthus those who
followed them were called the Katakslying somewhere near Lop.144 Ac-
cording to a legendary story, Jall al-Dn had preached his teachings there,
but the people of Katak refused to follow him. Their disobedience provoked
the fury of God and the entire city was completely covered by sand. Later
Jall al-Dn met Tughluq Temr (r. 134762), who promised to accept Islam
if he became khan. After the death of Jall al-Dn, his son Arshad al-Dn
went to see Tughluq Temr who had already become khan by that time.
After reminding the khan of the promise made to his father, Arshad al-Dn
nally succeeded in converting him along with 160,000 Moghul nomads in
1353/54.145 He later settled in Kucha where the khan gave him a lot of vaqf
(pious endowment) lands.
Although the inuence of the Kataks had weakened considerably since
the end of the sixteenth century because of the successful activities of rival
Naqshband Sus,146 Arshad al-Dn, together with Satuq Boghra Khan dur-
ing the Qarakhanid period, became one of the most revered saints among
the Muslims in Eastern Turkestan. He was called Allhs companion (Wal
Allh) and his mausoleum in Kucha was considered a sacred place of wor-
ship. As a descendant of that holy Su and as a guardian of his mausoleum
Rshidn Khwja had been living with prayer (d) and cultivation (alab)
and, not being mixed with people, treading the path of an ascetic (dar-
vsh).147 He commanded respect and submission from a large number of
Muslimsboth the Turks and the Tunganswho considered themselves his
disciples (murd).148
The report that there was a numerous and inuential colony of Khoja
priests in the suburb of Kucha149 suggests the economic strength of the
 xinjiang in revolt 63

Katak khwjas who inherited vaqf lands from their ancestors, but the pos-
session of such economic properties does not appear to have been the major
source of Rshdns inuence. And as the later development in Kucha
shows, he did not seem to have any special talent in leadership either. Ex-
cept for his saintly lineage and his life as a Su guarding Arshad al-Dns
holy tomb, Rshidn Khwja did not have any other source of inuence.
Therefore, we cannot but conclude that his political power as the leader of
the Kuchean regime stemmed from his religious authority.150 Many Mus-
lims believed that Su saints had the faculty of performing miracles (kar-
mat) through their spiritual communication with Allh, prophets, and
saints, and thus giving the holy blessings (barakat).151
Tuo Ming, the leader of Urumchi revolt, was also a man of religion. In
all probability he belonged to the Jahr branch of the Naqshbandiyya, as as-
serted by J. Fletcher.152 Contrary to Rshidn, he had directed the rebellion
from the beginning and was branded by the Qing authority as the ringleader
of the revolt who deluded people. However, Somov, a Russian merchant
who visited Manas in 1872, describes him as a religious man who devoted
the whole life to his own God and adds that he, called master (pr) by
the Tungans, was at rst just a mediocre Tungan from a poor and insigni-
cant family but, showing some outstanding qualities by the devout and up-
right way of life, he gained respect and allegiance of many people.153 He
was also reported to have been wandering around the Jinji, Henan and
Gansu areas, and got acquainted with various Muslim leaders.154 Here
Jinji is nothing but the stronghold of Jinjibao where the famous Jahr
leader Ma Hualong had his base. This fact strongly suggests the connections
between Tuo Ming and Ma Hualong. After Tuo Ming was enthroned as
King of Islam, his appointment of Ma as commander (yuanshuai) of the
Ningxia region also suggests a possibility that Tuo belonged to the Jahriyya.
The background of Suo Huanzhang, who played a leading role together
with Tuo Ming, also conrms our point. Although he was a military ofcer,
he was not unrelated to the movements of the Jahr sect in the Shanxi and
Gansu areas. His father Suo Wen, who had been made lieutenant colonel in
Ganzhou as a reward for his service rendered during the Jahngr rebel-
lion,155 was actually the leader of a religious sect in Salar and maintained
contacts with Tungan religious leaders in various regions through his em-
missaries.156 Moreover, as a Chinese source reveals, some of the future Tun-
gan rebel leaders were employed as ofcers under him. One such example
is Ma Chungliang, alias Ma Si, who led the revolt in Suzhou in 1862 and
later was appointed, though ctionally, by Tuo Ming as the commander of
that area.157 In this light, the later execution of Suo Wen by the Qing au-
thority as well as Tuo Mings visit to his son, Suo Huanzhang, do not seem
to have been coincidental at all. This evidence supports the assertion that
64 xinjiang in revolt

Tuo Ming was a Su who had been with the Jahr leader Ma Hualong in
China proper and had been invited to Xinjiang by Suo Huanzhang, one of
Ma Hualongs disciples.158
In Yarkand, the revolt was initiated and led by the Tungans who, once
having occupied the Muslim town, continued to control it and kept ghting
with the Qing force in the Manchu fort. However, since the absolute major-
ity of the inhabitants of the city and its environs were Turkic Muslims, the
Tungans could not but enthrone a nominal leader who could command the
Turkic Muslims respect. This was why Ghulm Husayn (later replaced by
his brother Abd al-Rakmn) became the leader of the Yarkand regime. We
do not know much about this person except for the fact he came from a no-
table family in Kabul. It is interesting to note that Mehmet Emin Bughra, in
his work written in the 1940s, added the epithet of Mujaddd to his name.159
J. Fletcher already noticed this remark and assumed that Ghulm Husayn
may have been a descendant of Akmad Sirhind (15641624) who was a fa-
mous Su in India and was widely known as Mujaddd-yi Alf-i Thn, that
is, the Reformer of the Second Millennium.160 Probably his descendants
formed a Su sect called Mujaddd in Kabul where they exerted a lot of
inuence. This family belonged to the Naqshbandiyya and its male mem-
bers were called by the respected title Hajrt-i \kib-i Shor Bazr. The lead-
ers of this family are known to have displayed powerful political inuence
up to the middle of the twentieth century around the Kabul area.161
It would not be an exaggeration for Muslim sources to describe Ghulm
Husayn and his brother as belonging to a noble family of Kabul. Thus we
can surmise that it was nothing more than their religious charisma stem-
ming from their saintly lineage that the Tungans in Yarkand hoped to uti-
lize. Nonetheless, they did not want their puppet leader to become a real
ruler, and probably that was why they chose a person from Kabul, not
among the native Su masters living in Yarkand, who apparently did not
have a strong basis of local support.
The case of Kashghar is a good example of what happened when the
Muslims did not have a religious leader. Here, as we explained, the revolt
broke out all of a sudden without any premeditated plan. The Muslims did
not have a denite leader and could not take either the Muslim town or the
Manchu fort. The Qirghiz, led by \iddq, later joined with the Tungans and
attempted to take the city, but their efforts were frustrated by the strong re-
sistance of the Qing forces and the Muslim beg ofcials.
It is noteworthy that, unlike what happened in other cities, the Muslims
in Kashghar, not only in the town but also around the neighboring villages,
did not ally with the Qirghiz and even violently resisted. Their opposition,
of course, stemmed from the deep animosity of the sedentary Muslims
against the nomadic Qirghiz, but the situation might have improved if the
 xinjiang in revolt 65

Qirghiz had set up a person with religious charisma who could command
the respect of the local Muslims.
Our point is again well illustrated by Abd al-Bq Kshqar who provides
us with a useful account of \iddiq Begs activities. According to him, when
\iddiq Beg was governor of Farrash he had a dispute with some Kashghar-
ian begs. The begs, based on the decision of a religious court, conscated
lands and canals that \iddiq had administered. He was furious and, having
rallied Qirghizs and Qipchaqs living around Oy Tagh, came down to Kash-
ghar and besieged the town. Although the siege extended for a long time and
the provisions were running out, the begs would not surrender. They sent
him a letter of chastisement (siysat-nma) in which they made it clear
that they could not accept his rule because he was neither a sayyid (descen-
dant of Mukammad) nor pdishhzda (descendant of a king).162 Even after
begs and akhnds inside the town expelled Qutluq Beg in alliance with Kho-
qandians, they dispatched envoys to the Khoqand khanate to ask assistance,
while still refusing to submit to \iddq.163 \iddq also sent an envoy to the
Khoqand khanate asking to send an fq khwja. There is no doubt that
he took such an action with the intention of appeasing the opposition of the
local Kashgharians by using a religious gure. This fact amply proves how
important the religious authority of a person with a saintly lineage was in
rallying the Muslims.
The case of Khotan also shows the signicance of religious leadership.
The examination of related Muslim sources on the Khotan revolt convinces
us of the fact that it was not Habb Allh but his son Abd al-Rakmn who
actually collected fellow Muslims and prepared for an action. In spite of
this, the reason Habb Allh, sometimes together with his son, was de-
scribed as the prime mover of the revolt is apparently his religious inuence.
And for the same reason he was enthroned in old age after the death of Abd
al-Rakmn at the battle of Piyalma. According to Sayrm, Habb Allh was
born into the family that had produced ulam for generations and he him-
self was also muft. He was so strict in adhering to a religiously austere life
that he never set his foot on soil without having done ablutions (ahrat)
and neither did he neglect the daily ve times of praying (namz) even on
his journey. It was reported that he was against those religious leaders who
regarded taking gifts and donations as a matter of course and criticized their
attitude as a violation of sharah. It was with just such religious vigor he
had performed the obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina and stayed
in the Holy Land for seven years. It is not difcult for us to imagine the ex-
tent of his religious inuence after he returned from the pilgrimage.164 There
is no doubt that his inuence on the inhabitants of Khotan stemmed from
his being a man of religion. The fact that, after the success of the revolt, the
serious challenges against his regime also came from the same religious
66 xinjiang in revolt

people with the title of shn shows the charismatic inuence held by reli-
gious gures in general.
Finally, the case of Ili shows the same characteristics. As explained ear-
lier, the two groups of Ili Muslims, that is, the Tungans and the Taranchis,
put up their own leaders. Those who had the title of akhn and who took
the leadership of the Tungans were apparently of the religious group. It is
curious that Abd Rasul who acted as a leader of the Taranchis was not a
man of religion but a secular ofcial with the title of acting governor. How-
ever, we should not forget that, before he took action, he had received from
the prominent religious scholar Nir al-Dn the fatva approving the holy
war. Muaam who snatched the leadership from Abd Rasul was also an
ofcial. His genealogy, however, shows an interesting fact. He was son of
Khalzda, who was son of Khsh Naar, who was son of Malikzda, who
was son of Aurangzib, who was son of Amn Khwja, who was son of Niyz
Khwja, who was son of \f Khwja. And one of the ancestors of this last
person was Khwja Mukammad Sharf who was a famous Su master in
Kashghar in the later half of the sixteenth century.
Mukammad Sharf was born in Sayram and studied thirty years at the
Madrassa of Ulugh Beg in Samarqand. But after he attained the illumina-
tion through the spirit of Satugh Boghra Khan and Akmad Yasav, he came
to Kashghar and became the custodian of Satugh Boghra Khans shrine.165
He was also known to be the author of the biography of Satuq Boghra
Khan.166 He and his disciples became very inuential in the court of the
Moghul khans like Abd al-Rashd (r. 1533/341559/60) and Abd al-Karm
(r. 1559/601590/91). However, the inuence declined from the reign of
Mukammad Khan (r. 1590/911608/09), who was a staunch ally of the
Iskqi khwjas,167 and some of his descendants moved to the east around
Turfan. One of them was Amn Khwja who had helped the Qing conquest
of Eastern Turkestan in the 1750s. A branch of this family moved from Tur-
fan to Ili where they kept the post of governor for generations. In this re-
spect, we can assume that Muaams assumption of power was partly
helped by the religious and the secular inuence of his family. Moreover, the
fact that Fuchi Makmd who replaced Muaam pretended to be a descen-
dant of a saint and that Mull Shkat who eliminated Makmd was also
akhn indicates the importance of religious authority in the Ili rebellion.

holy war with china

We have explained the background as well as the direct cause of the

1864 Muslim rebellion in Xinjiang, and we also examined its outbreak and
progress in several important cities. Then, how can we dene this massive
movement in a wider perspective? In a sense, it is the culmination of the
 xinjiang in revolt 67

holy war led by the khwjas and the riots of the local Muslims during the
preceding decades. There is no doubt that it was also a response to the over-
all crumbling of the Qing empire in the nineteenth century, and in that re-
spect it is comparable to the Taiping and other rebellions of that period.
However, no other region except Eastern Turkestan denied the legitimacy
of Qing dominion so persistently. And the ideology of the anti-Qing move-
ment led by the khwjas was that of a holy war based on an Islamic
worldview to which the Qing could not adequately respond.
Although the 1864 rebellion was undoubtedly based on the Islamic prin-
ciple of holy war, we should not overlook the difference between such a
principle and the preceding invasions and riots that shook the region. Many
of those incidents had taken place with the direct participation of the fq
khwjas or with their covert instigation and assistance. Their prime moti-
vation was to recapture the region, which they considered their hereditary
domain, and their pursuits were aided by the Khoqand Khanate that hoped
to maximize its own economic privileges in this region. While these inva-
sions succeeded in rallying support from the fq followers and some of
the local population, many other people in the region (including the Iskqs
and beg ofcials) adamantly opposed them, as did the Tungans. Moreover,
the stage of their action was basically limited to the western part of Kash-
gharia. From the 1850s on, their incursions became more frequent and were
accompanied by imprudent pillages and massacres that only made the con-
ditions in Kashgharia more chaotic. As a result, the local people became
gradually disillusioned with their cause.
The 1864 rebellion, by way of contrast, was not led or even instigated by
those khwjas. In most cities it was the Tungans who became frightened by
the rumor of the Tungan massacre and rst raised the banner of anti-Qing
rebellion. This is the reason the rebellion was not limited to Kashgharia but
extended to all parts of Xinjiang, including Zungharia and Uyghuristan.
However, the Turkic Muslims who formed the majority of the population
in Eastern Turkestan, and who were strongly represented north of the Tian-
shans, also participated in the rebellion en masse because they had been suf-
fering from worsening conditions since the 1850s. They soon took the hege-
mony away from the Tungans except for those few areas in which the Tun-
gans were densely settled. Setting aside the question of which group took
control of the situation, it is an irrefutable truth that most of the Muslim
population in Xinjiang, regardless of their ethnic or social background, par-
ticipated in the rebellion. This marked a sharp contrast to the preceding holy
wars of the khwjas, and it is one of the most distinctive features of the 1864
Muslim rebellion in Xinjiang.
However, a number of studies have shown a tendency to overemphasize
the role of a certain ethnic or social group. For example, scholars who con-
68 xinjiang in revolt

sider the 1864 rebellion a peasant uprising try to stress socioeconomic is-
sues as its most dominant feature,168 while those who focus on the ethnic
conict between the Uyghurs and the Chinese tend to dene the rebellion as
an Uyghur national-liberation movement.169 Although these theories cer-
tainly reect some truth, they do not represent the historical reality appro-
priately and their theoretical frames do not conform well to what the Mus-
lims at the time were striving for. Certainly one of the important underlying
causes of the rebellion was the aggravation of the socioeconomic conditions
of the local people, most of whom were peasants. Yet at the same time there
was also massive participation by urban populations, merchant leaders, and
local beg ofcials. Moreover, there is no indication that any of the newly
created polities pursued any signicant program reecting the class interests
of peasants.
It is difcult for us to accept the claim that it was a Uyghur national-
liberation movement either. First of all, there was no concept of Uyghur na-
tionality among the people in Xinjiang at that time and even no expression
to designate all the population there.170 They had only the terms like Kash-
gharliq (Kashgharis), Khotanliq (Khotanese), Kuchaliq (Kucheans) and so
on. When they needed a more general term, they simply used musulmn to
distinguish themselves from the non-Muslim population. In much contem-
porary Muslim literature we nd frequent mentions of Khitay as their
enemy. However, for them this term signied the Chinese as non-Muslim
people par excellence, not as an ethnic group. We should not forget the fact
that the Chinese Muslims in Xinjiang were never called Khitay even though
they spoke the Chinese language. Nor was the ghting between the Taran-
chis and the Tungans an ethnic conict, but rather it was a power struggle
in which each group wanted to dominate.
So how should we understand the 1864 rebellion? Instead of making a
judgment from our scholastic point of view, it is important, rst of all, for
us to ask how those Muslims who participated in that movement perceived
their actions and how they explained their endeavor. To these questions the
contemporary sources give us a strikingly unanimous answer: they were
Muslims ghting against the indel rule. This may appear to be too sim-
plistic. However, other than Muslim, what common denominator can we
nd among the Tungans, Taranchis, Qirghizs, Khoqandians, Kabulis, Kash-
miris, and the Turkic populations in Eastern Turkestan? These diverse
groups came together under the banner of Islam because they were Mus-
lims. Of course, I do not purport to say that the religion was the prime mo-
tive of the 1864 rebellion or that it was a religious war. Religious conict
was only one of the factors that provoked the rebellion. Once the rebellion
broke out, however, it was Islam that emerged as the most powerful unify-
ing ideology. The reason why Islam could take such a decisive role in mo-
 xinjiang in revolt 69

bilizing the local population can be found in the inherent weakness of the
Qing rule in Xinjiang.
Recent studies on the Qing empire tend to emphasize the persistence
of the Manchu identity deeply anchored in Inner Asian tradition.171 The
Qing imperial ideology was not built on the traditional concept of the
Sinocentric world order but on the principle of the coexistence of multi-
farious cultural regions, China proper being only one of those, under the
aegis of the Manchu emperor. We nd a similar approach criticizing the Sini-
cization theory in the studies of the Qitan Liao and the Mongol Yuan. When
the alien dynasties ruled over China with their limited human and cultural
resources, the process of Sinicization was in some degree inevitable. How-
ever, it does not necessarily mean that they aspired to build a Chinese dy-
nasty. The Manchus shared with the Qitans and the Mongols a similar im-
perial ideology that transcended the geographical and cultural limits of
China.
This ideology of the Qing empire was more or less successful in other
Inner Asian zones like Manchuria, Mongolia, or Tibet. The Qing court put
its effort into making the tribal and the religious leaders in those areas feel
that the emperor was not a Chinese emperor alien to their cultures. Several
political devices and symbolic gestures were employed for this purpose,
such as the prohibition of Han immigration to these frontier areas, marriage
ties with tribal chiefs, audiences with emperor, and hunting expeditions.172
To the Chinese the emperor was of course huangdi, bestowed with the Man-
date of Heaven and with all the Confucian virtues. To the Mongols and the
Manchus, however, he was khan or khaghan, inheriting the political cha-
risma of Chinggis Khan; and to the Tibetans chakravartin, the secular ruler
who turns the wheel of the Buddhist laws.173
Then, what was he in the eyes of the Muslims in Xinjiang? In Muslim lit-
erature he was also called by the title of Khqn-i Chn (Khaghan of China)
or lgh Khn (Great Khan).174 In Central Asia the title of khaghan or khan
could be assumed only by the Chinggisid, at least theoretically, and un-
doubtedly it aroused great reverence from the local people in Xinjiang.
However, after the Islamization of Eastern Turkestan, which was completed
by the end of the fteenth century with the fall of the Hami kingdom, there
emerged a competing source of charisma that gradually overwhelmed the
Chinggisid imperial ideology. It was the concept of the sovereignty based on
sharah, the Islamic law. According to a popular Islamic theory, the region
in which Muslims form the majority of the population and where the
sharah law is put into force is called Dr al-Islm (Abode of Islam). Those
regions ruled by a political power that neither respects Islamic principles nor
has any peace pact with Muslims is called Dr al-Harb (Abode of War).175
At its most expansive level, this theory denies the political legitimacy of the
70 xinjiang in revolt

Dr al-Harb and argues that such a territory should eventually be brought

under the authority of Islam, by holy war if necessary.
Before the Qing conquest of Xinjiang in 1750s this religious charisma
was wielded by Su leaders with saintly lineages and from the end of the
sixteenth century it was almost monopolized by the Makhdmzdas. The
solidication of their religious inuence was followed by the expansion of
their power in the secular realm. Before the conquest of the Zunghars in the
1680s an Iskq leader began to be called by the title of khwjam pdi-
shh,176 and Khwja fq who ruled over Kashgharian cities under the
Zunghar protection was also addressed by the title of khn khwja even
though he was not a Chinggisid. Thus the synthesis of the secular and the
religious charismas, which Martin Hartmann called Heiligenstaat,177
formed a new tradition in Eastern Turkestan. The emperor Qianlong suc-
ceeded in expelling the khwja family and incorporating the region into his
realm, but he could not take away their religious charisma because he had
no other source to replace it. The domination of the Qing emperors who
were non-Muslims not only contradicted Islamic principles but also was
doomed to face the challenge from the khwjas who retained their religious
charisma. The Qing imperial ideology, designed to subsume all different cul-
tural regions, could not be fullled in Xinjiang.
The Qing policy of utilizing Muslim beg ofcials did not help much in
resolving this problem. On the contrary, a few examples show that the beg
ofcials themselves keenly felt the ideological contradictions between their
loyalty to Islam and to the emperor. In 1776, Sulayman who was junwang
of Turfan spent 7,000 liangs and built a madrassa, and he also erected a
stone monument with bilingual inscriptions. In Chinese text he expressed
deep gratitude to the grace of the emperor calling himself old subject of the
Great Qing emperor. However, in the Turki text he paid tribute only to
Allh and Islam without any mention of the emperor.178 We see a similar
case when Iskandar Beg, Kashghar governor, in 180102 sponsored the re-
pair of the mausoleum of Alp Ata, a legendary Su saint in Turfan. The text
of the tablet written in Turki on the front arch of the building shows only
his praise for Allh and Alp Ata with no mention of the Qing emperor at
all.179 These two examples suggest that even the highest beg ofcials felt the
schism of loyalty between Islam and the Qing emperor. The only justi-
cation, though partial, that the Qing rule could be accepted by the local
Muslims was that the emperor provided them peace and welfare, which they
called the rule of justice (adlat). However, whenever this justice was not
realized by the tyranny of ofcials or the increase of the tax burden, the non-
Muslim rule could not be tolerated.
This was what happened in 1864, and, when the Muslims rose against
the Qing, they denied the imperial rule not merely because it was unjust but
 xinjiang in revolt 71

also because such injustice was caused by indel rule. Since the 1864 re-
bellion in Xinjiang was the movement of the Muslims under the non-Mus-
lim domination, its ideal could be best postulated by holy war (ghazt). In
almost every page of this historical drama we can read their fervor to expel
the indels and to establish the kingdom of Islam. Rshidn called himself
holy warrior (ghz),180 Tuo Ming styled himself King of Islam, people in
Khotan urged Habb Allh to lead holy warriors, and the book recording
the Ili rebellion was entitled Holy War in China. Holy war was not only their
ideal, but it was also their best strategy to mobilize the Muslim masses re-
gardless of origin and class. In this movement most of the Muslims in Xin-
jiang participated from highly educated intellectuals like Sayrm and Mull
Bll down to those who belonged to the lowest social stratum who regu-
larly violated Islamic law like gamblers, drunkards, and opium-smokers.
Only a minority found their loyalty to the Qing emperor more important.
However, because all of the non-Muslim population in Xinjiang were re-
garded as indels and enemies to be exterminated, putting the rebellion into
a religious framework resulted in incredible cruelties whenever the towns
held by the Qing force were taken. The massive slaughter committed by the
Muslim rebels was one of the tragic aspects of their holy war. And yet in
spite of this fervor of holy war, the Muslims failed to create a unied force
to realize their dream, because the holy war was after all the ideology best
used against the indels. Once these common enemies disappeared, ghting
among fellow Muslims started and here the concept of a religious war could
no longer serve as a unifying ideology.
 Irtysh Al
ta
i M
ou
nt
ai
ns Uliasutai
Zaisan
N Khobdo

;;;;;
Balkash
Tarbaghatai

Mongolia
TA
RA
Syr

Il i NC
HI
Da

RE Qur Qarausu
GIM

;;;;;
rya

Ili E Gucheng Barkul

Urumchi
(10/11/1870) Dalbanchin
Hami
Issyk Kul Turfan
Muz Daban (11/1870)
Tashkent s
a n Mountain Kucha Karashahr
N ar i n T ians h
(6/5/1867)
Andijan Ush Turfan
Osh Aqsu Jiayuguan
Khoqand Terek Daban

;;;;;
rt Lop Nor
Kashghar es e
nD
(9/1/1865) a ka
Maralbash l am
T ak
Yagihissar (4/11/1865)
a Pamir
ry
Amu Da Yarkand
na n (5/1865)
S ar

S ig h
iqo

Wakhan Khotan (1/2/1867)

l

t Realm of Yaqub Beg

n ju
Ka () Dates of Yaqub Begs conquests
untains 1500m above sea level
K un l u n M o
r
mi
sh L ad
Ka ak h 0 100 200 300 km

map 2. Unication by Yaqb Beg and the Realm of the Muslim State
3 The Emergence of Yaqb Begs Regime

Yaqb Beg

myth and reality

It was at the beginning of 1865, a half year after the outbreak of the
Muslim rebellion, when Yaqb Beg came to Kashghar from Khoqand. Al-
though the Kuchean regime headed by Rshidn Khwja had gained control
over the large area from Maralbashi in the west to Turfan in the east, it
failed to unify the several different Muslim powers that controlled Kash-
ghar, Yarkand, and Khotan. Moreover, in Kashghar, the Manchu fort was
still defended by Qing forces and the Muslim begs occupying the Muslim
town continued to offer stubborn resistance. To the north of the Tianshan
Mountains there were also independent Muslim powers now freed from
Qing rule. It is really surprising then that Yaqb Beg, who initially set foot
in Kashgharia with only few dozen followers, could have achieved the
unication of the entire area south of the Tianshan within a year and a half,
and even took control of Urumchi by 1870.
The emergence of Yaqb Beg aroused a great deal of interest not only
among the Muslims in Central Asia but also among the Western powers. He
was known by the epithet Ataliq Ghz which reects his popular image as
a ghz or holy warrior striving for Islam while ataliq (whose literal
meaning is fatherly) give this title a meaning something like the great
holy warrior. This name t very well to his image which was nurtured by
the Muslims of the time who regarded him a hero ghting against the idol-
aters in China. The Muslims in Xinjiang had suffered from alien domina-
tion since the fall of the Moghul khanate in the 1680s. It was therefore nat-
ural that they felt proud of what they accomplished in the 1860s by ending
indel rule and creating the basis for the emergence of a Muslim state. In
their eyes Yaqb Beg was a hero who brought their holy war to its com-
pletion by creating an independent and regionally unied Islamic kingdom.
It is not surprising then that Yaqb Beg was depicted as a heroic holy war-
rior in so many of the literary works that described the great events of this
74 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y a q ub b e g s r e g i m e

figure 3.1. Portrait of Yaqb Beg. Source: Zapiski

Vostochnogo otdeleniia Russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshch-
estva, no. 11 (1899), on the page facing p. 87.

period because these works themselves were products of a heightened sense

of historical self-consciousness in the region.
Myth-making was not limited to the Muslims. Westerners also made a
contribution to it by attributing his seemingly sudden rise and success to his
spectacular good luck as embodied in his other title of badaulat, signifying
the one with fortune (or blessing). It is no wonder that he was often called
in the Western literature the Fortunate One or the Soldier of Fortune. Be-
cause of widespread interest in the region (perhaps the result of the many
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 75

successful books on the Anglo-Russian Great Game rivalry in Central

and Inner Asia at the time), the dissemination of this popular image to the
wider world was quite rapid. D. C. Boulgers biography of Yaqb Beg, The
Life of Yakoob Beg; Athalik Ghazi, and Badaulet; Ameer of Kashgar pub-
lished in 1878 right after the collapse of Yaqb Begs state also contributed
to disseminating his popular image. Even a novel full of fantasy and histor-
ical nonsense was written in French and was translated into Russian.1
Although it is true that he became a very popular, almost legendary,
gure in his day, his life before he became the ruler of Kashgharia is not well
documented. The available sources reveal very little about his early career,
but it is at least possible to revise some of the misleading and stereotyped
images of Yaqb Beg that tend to paint him either as a awless Muslim hero
or as a low born villain who was little better than a bandit. For example,
his reputation among the Central Asian Muslims at that time as a holy war-
rior was partly based on the mistaken information about his heroic ght-
ing against the Russians at Aq Masjid in which he took no part. Moreover,
after he came to Kashgharia, he fought and slaughtered many more of his
own co-religionists than he did indels. Nor did he refrain from violating
religious principles when it was to his political advantage. To conquer
Khotan, he swore a false oath of friendship on the Qurn with its ruler,
Habb Allh, who he then imprisoned and murdered. After the Khotanese
people discovered his trick and ercely resisted against him, he had no scru-
ples about giving an order for their massacre. He refused to involve himself
in conicts that were not in his own political interests and did nothing to
obstruct Russian attacks on the Central Asian khanates or to prevent the
Qing from reconquering the Urumchi area where the Tungans were living.
On the other hand, in a culture where lineage purity and personal honor
were of great importance, his enemies spread rumors that Yaqb Beg had a
disreputable past and had risen to prominence only by his clever manipula-
tion of personal connections. In his time, there was a widespread rumor that
he had been a bacha (dancing boy) in his youth but, owing to his handsome
appearance, he received good graces of high ofcials and began to climb up
the ladder of success.2 Mrz Akmad who had known him for a long time
in Khoqand also repeated the same claim in his memoir.3 As E. Schuyler de-
scribes in detail, a bacha was a beardless youth who performed singing and
dancing at teahouses or parties and received pecuniary remuneration. They
were also reputed to be willing to provide sexual services to their patrons.
At that time having one or two bachas was regarded as a symbol of wealth
and status. It was not infrequent that some of the bachas, with the assis-
tance of their patrons, became wealthy men or government ofcials.4 The
salacious rumor that a powerful ruler like Yaqb Beg had been once a bacha
appealed to many people, including a German scholar Albert von Le Coq
76 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y a q ub b e g s r e g i m e

who was well known for his archaeological excavations in Kucha and Tur-
fan at the beginning of the last century.
Although as a youth he had been obliged by poverty to struggle for existence as a
public dancer and comedian, he succeeded by bravery, energy, and cunning, after the
conquest of the country, in disposing of the Khoja and his adherents, and became
the sole ruler of Eastern Turkestan.5

Even those accounts that favored Yaqb Beg, such as D. C. Boulgers,

tend to stress his luck over all other considerations. Boulger wrote that The
Badaulet, or the fortunate one, as he was called, was essentially indebted
to good fortune in many crises of his career,6 and O. Lattimore called him
Inner Asian adventurer.7
However, we should be aware of the problems that these sorts of view-
points have. They tend to turn the rise of Yaqb Beg into an interesting
episode of a single individuals success and suppress its historical signi-
cance and context. Yet his coming to Kashgharia was not the sudden act of
an ambitious adventurer nor can his success be attributed merely to his for-
tune or bravery. As discussed in Chapter 1, the historical signicance of his
rise and achievement cannot be understood without considering the changes
in the power relations around Xinjiang from the southward expansion of
Russia and the weakening of the Qing rule. In addition, it is important to
focus on the background and the aim of Yaqb Begs expedition to Kash-
gharia, how the destruction of the Khoqand khanate changed his position
there, and how the weakness of the rebel groups in Xinjiang created an op-
portunity for him to succeed in ways he could not have originally imagined.
Now, bearing in mind these factors, let us trace Yaqb Begs career in Kho-
qand and his activities in the Tarim Basin after he came to Kashghar at the
beginning of 1865.

earlier careers

The extant records about the birth of Mukammad Yaqb, widely

known as Yaqb Beg, are so contradictory that it is difcult to discern reli-
able information from them. According to Mrz Akmad, who knew Yaqb
Beg well before he came to Kashghar and who later became one of his most
important ofcials, Yaqb was born to his fathers second wife after he had
been exiled to Kapa by the order of lim Khan (r. 17991809). Soon after
the death of lim Khans successor, Umar Khan (r. 18091822), the family
moved back to Piskent (or Pskent), which lay 50km south of Tashkent.8 If
this statement is correct, we can say that Yaqb Beg was born before 1822.
Some other sources tend to put his birth much later partly because of
Yaqbs younger-looking face. For example, Sayrm stated that Yaqb Beg
became the governor of Aq Masjid around 1265 A.H. at the age of 22,
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 77

which makes the year of his birth 182728.9 A. N. Kuropatkin who led a
Russian embassy to Kashgharia in 187677 also stated that in 1876 he had
the appearance of a man of about 50 years of age. However, Kuropatkin
added that Those persons who were then about him said that his age was
from 58 to 64, notwithstanding that grey hairs had only just begun to make
their appearance.10
In this sense, the report of a British embassy is more specic on this point.
According to it, Yaqb Begs forefathers lived in the mountainous district
of Karategin, but later moved to Dehbid, near Samarqand. His father Pur
Mukammad, also known as Mukammad Laf, was born there. Pur Mu-
kammad moved from there to Khojent where he nished his education and,
then, worked as a qj at rst in Kuramma, but later in Piskent. He took
the sister of Shaykh Nim al-Dn, who also worked as qj in the same
town, as his second wife and from her got his son Yaqb Beg in 1235/
1820.11 Therefore, on the question of his birth, the observation of the
British embassy members who personally met him and probably inquired
about his age shows the middle value and seems to be more reliable than
other sources.
There are some uncertainties about his ethnic background too. His bi-
ographer D. C. Boulger argues that he belongs to the Tajik race and that he
was a descendant of Amr Temr based on the British report.12 However,
this claim is self-contradictory because, if he is a Tajik, he cannot be Temrs
offspringunless he claimed this relationship through his maternal side
because Temr was apparently a Turk belonging to the Barlas tribe. More-
over, there is no other report that proves he is descended from Amr Temr.
This claim could be something made up to glorify his genealogy after he be-
came a heroic gure in the same way that Temr had been ascribed to be
the descendant of Chinggis Khan.
H. Bellew, one of the members of the British embassy, records his impres-
sion of Yaqb Beg after he had an audience with him in 187374 as follows.
The face has the general outlines of the Tatar physiognomy, with its asperities soft-
ened and rounded by Uzbak blood, and presents a broad full countenance without
wrinkle or a seam, and with less of commanding weight than of sensual passion in
its expression.13

So Bellew suggests that his physiognomy does not show the Tajik feature
but rather the mixture of Mongol and Turkic elements. In the ofcial report
of the British embassy he was also called Emir Muhammad Yakb Khan
Uzbak of Kshghar.14 These reports, however, should not necessarily be
interpreted that Yaqb Beg was ethnically Uzbek. We should not forget the
fact that the concept of ethnicity was not yet crystallized among the people
of Central Asia at that time. People were simply called Uzbek or Tajik based
on their linguistic as well as tribal afliations.
78 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e

R. B. Shaw who met Yaqb Beg in 1869 remarked that the language that
Yaqb Beg used during the interviews was easy Persian,15 which suggests
that he might be a Tajik. Especially because many Tajiks were found in
Karategin where his ancestors had lived. However, it is quite probable that
he knew the Turkic language perfectly well too. We have examples of his
edicts written in Persian as well as in Turkic.16 Without knowing Turkic it
would have been impossible for him to keep intimate relations with Qip-
chaq and Uzbek leaders in the Khoqand khanate. In this sense, it is inter-
esting to note that Mrz Akmad, in his memoir, called Yaqb Beg a
Sart.17 This was the term employed to designate sedentary peoples in
Central Asian towns and villages, including both Tajiks and Uzbeks, with-
out any distinctive tribal afliation.18
Yaqb Begs father, Mukammad Laf, died soon after he had moved to
Piskent and so the boy was then reared by his uncle. When Yaqb reached
adolescence, he began to frequent tea-houses. Because he had a good-look-
ing face and a talent in singing, he used to be called Yaqb Bacha, but it
is doubtful that he ever took up dancing as a profession as Kuropatkin as-
serted.19 While some bachas do dance and engage in other activities, any
handsome beardless youth could be referred to in this way (particularly if
he hangs around publicly with older men who are not his relatives), al-
though it sometimes has a disreputable connotation. So he could have been
a bacha, but not necessarily a dancing boy. Whatever the truth was, he
seems to have led a somewhat lax lifestyle, which made his uncle worry
about his future. He was sent to Tashkent to learn weaving, but, being bored
with the training, Yaqb ed back to Piskent. After this incident, by the rec-
ommendation of a high ofcial, he obtained a minor ofcial job under a mil-
itary general named Mingbashi Ghad B, and then served under the gov-
ernor of Khojent, Mukammad Karm Kshka.20
In 1842 Nar Allh, the amir of Bukhara, invaded Khoqand and killed
Mukammad Al Khan, alias Madal Khan. We have mentioned how a
Qirghiz chief Ysuf brought in Shr Al from Talas and recovered the city
of Khoqand from the Bukharans. After Shr Als enthronement many
Qirghizs and the Qipchaqs began to be involved in Khoqandian politics,
which lasted to the end of the khanate. Tribal chiefs manipulated khans at
will, and according to the shifts of power among the tribes, khans were de-
throned or killed overnight. Shr Al was merely a nominal ruler since all
the power was held by the Qirghiz and the Qipchaq parties. Soon Shr Al
Khan was killed by Murd Khan, son of lim Khan, and he too was killed
by the Qipchaqs led by Musulmn Quli after eleven days in power. They en-
throned Khudyr, son of Shr Al, in 1845.21
It was during this period that Yaqb Beg began to climb the ladder of
success. When Khudyr was enthroned in Khoqand by the manipulation
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 79

of Musulmn Quli, Sarimsaq, another son of Shr Al, in Tashkent refused

to accept his authority. Musulmn Quli, using a trick, invited Sarimsaq to
Khoqand and killed him. Musulmn Quli, who now easily secured Tash-
kent, appointed Azz Bacha as the governor of Tashkent and Nr Mukam-
mad, another Qipchaq leader, as the governor of Kereuchi (or, Kilauchi).
Mukammad Karm Kshka was also lured to Khoqand and killed by Musul-
mn Quli, then some of those who had been under Kshka transferred to
Azz Bacha. It was at this juncture that Yaqb Beg took the service under
Azz Bacha in the cavalry (jigit). According to the memoir of Mrz Akmad,
it was also around this time Nr Mukammad married Yaqbs sister.22 A
few years later Azz was expelled from the governors post of Tashkent and
Nr Mukammad replaced him in 1847.23 Owing to the support of this
inuential brother-in-law Yaqb Beg was appointed beg of Chinaz. Later
he was transferred to Aulie Ata and then, when he was about 30 (1849),
promoted to beg of Aq Masjid (Qizil Orda in present day) lying on the lower
Syr Darya.24
The begship of Aq Masjid was one of the most protable and coveted
posts in the khanate because of the valuable custom duties extracted from
the caravans passing through there on route to Orenburg or Bukhara. The
nomads in the vicinity also paid a tax on their livestock. Yaqb Beg appears
to have taken full advantage of the situation by amassing a fortune. There
was a widespread rumor that he even sold the shing rights of a lake to Rus-
sians in exchange for a rich bribe.25 This act exceeded the traditional bounds
of cupidity and Nr Mukammad recalled him to demand an explanation.
Yaqb Begs defense against the charge of bribery consisted largely of lav-
ishing gifts on his superior and he was allowed to keep his post in spite of
the scandal. Yaqb Beg was still beg of Aq Masjid in March of 1852 when
he and his soldiers were soundly defeated by a much smaller number of Rus-
sian troops at Aq Gerik, not far from Fort Aral. Shortly after this event he
was recalled to Tashkent.26 He arrived in April with a large number of valu-
able presents for Nr Mukammad.27 Therefore, the claim that he was still
commanding Aq Masjid when it was attacked by a Russian army in 1853
is completely groundless. During this attack, led by General Petrovskii, the
garrisons small number of troops put up a heroic resistance against a su-
perior Russian force armed with much strong repower before being over-
whelmed. The belief that it was Yaqb Beg who led the defense, although
incorrect, was nonetheless fairly widespread at that time.28
At this time the internal dissension among the Qipchaq leaders deepened.
Musulmn Quli, who held the title of mingbashi, was now opposed by a
party formed around Yaqb Begs brother-in-law Nr Mukammad. A clash
between Musulmn Quli and Nr Mukammad led to the ight of the for-
mer in 1852, and Utambai, one of Nr Mukammads allies, became ming-
80 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e

bashi in September of that year.29 Yaqb Beg had been recalled to Tashkent
only months before this incident occurred and subsequently served Nr
Mukammad as a military ofcer with the title of baturbashi30 or pnad
until even more serious political turmoil erupted.
Taking advantage of the lack of unity among the Qipchaqs, Khudyr
Khan successfully rallied support of the sedentary population and mounted
a coup against the nomadic Qipchaqs to end their intervention in the
khanates politics. Nr Mukammad was taken to Khoqand where he was
soon executed,31 and Musulmn Quli who sought refuge in the mountains
was also imprisoned and killed. Numerous Qipchaqs in the cities and the
villages of the khanate were massacred. This event, which took place dur-
ing late 1852 and the rst half of 1853, marked the end of the seven-year
domination of the Qipchaqs over Khoqandian politics, at least temporarily.
Nalivkin claims that Yaqb Beg was one of the conspirators allied with
Khudyr in arresting Nr Mukammad.32 We cannot verify the authentic-
ity of his remark since no other primary source, to my knowledge, has this
story. However, the betrayal of his brother-in-law and political patron
would not have been impossible in Khoqandian politics.
From the time of the Qipchaq massacre and the coup by Khudyr
(185253) until the arrival of \iddq Begs envoy from Kashghar at the end
of 1864, the course of Yaqb Begs political life is clouded by uncertainty.
The Khoqand khanate was so engulfed in civil war that quick shifts of
power made everyones position precarious and ephemeral. It is not sur-
prising, then, that various sources are full of contradictory remarks about
Yaqb Begs career, making it extremely difcult to reconstruct what hap-
pened to him during those ten years. By far the most accurate description is
found in Trkh-i ighr by Abd Allh, which is superior to the work of
Mrz Akmad because it has more consistent reports on the political events
in the Khoqand khanate and was written in 1874, twenty years earlier than
Mrz Akmads 1895 account.
Abd Allh did not mention what Yaqb Beg did during the years be-
tween 185358 when Khudyr reigned. H. Bellew reports that he was
made mr of Kilauchi,33 a fact that is not found in Abd Allhs work on
which Bellews description is largely based. Mrz Akmad says that Yaqb
Beg was appointed rst to supervisor of the embassy house and then was
made beg of Khojent.34 We cannot be certain that either of these statements
is true because it appears that Mrz Akmad confuses the events he reported
with those that were known to have taken place later in 186263 when
Yaqb Beg was appointed beg of Khojent by lim Quli.
In 1858 lim Quli, rallying the support of the Qipchaqs, put Mall
Khan on the throne and forced Khudyr to ee to Bukhara. According to
Abd Allh, it was during the reign of Mall Khan (185862) that Yaqb
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 81

Beg was appointed to shaghawul, probably the same supervisor of em-

bassy house mentioned by Mrz Akmad, and was then made beg of
Quramma. In 1862 Mall Khan was assassinated and lim Quli enthroned
Shh Murd in his stead. When the news of the assassination reached
Khudyr, he marched on Tashkent with the aid of the Bukharans. Qanat
Shh, who was the governor of Tashkent at that time, went over to Khu-
dyr along with Yaqb Beg who thereby kept his post at Quramma. This
defection proved premature because lim Quli soon succeeded in regain-
ing his lost territory. Upon the approach of lim Qulis army to the
Tashkent area, Yaqb Beg changed sides again, rejoining lim Quli, who
appointed him beg of Khojent.35
Khudyr counterattacked by marching through Khojent, taking the cap-
ital of the khanate again. Yaqb Beg, whose new post put him in Khudyrs
direct line of attack, was forced to surrender to him in Khojent36 and from
there he was sent to Bukhara under guard. However, Khudyr was unable
to hold Khoqand for long because he was hard pressed by lim Quli. To
relieve this pressure, Khudyr requested assistance from the amr of Bu-
khara, who once more organized an expedition in which Yaqb Beg some-
how participated. Though the amr temporarily succeeded in entering the
capital of the Khoqand khanate, he realized that he could not remain there
and returned to Bukhara. In the midst of this confusion Yaqb Beg man-
aged to escape to lim Quli along with many other able generals such as
Mrz Akmad and Abd Allh who had served Khudyr. With the situation
now completely out of his control, Khudyr nally retreated to Bukhara,
and in July of 1863 Suln Sad was enthroned as khan of Khoqand by
lim Quli. Quramma was again entrusted to Yaqb Beg.37
Some sources explain the cause of Yaqb Begs exile to Bukhara in dif-
ferent ways. According to Mrz Akmad, Yaqb Beg ed to Bukhara be-
cause his conspiracy with Rustam Beg against Khudyr was prematurely
leaked.38 He also adds that three years later Yaqb Beg visited him in
Tashkent and that after three more years of unemployment Yaqb Beg got
the job of pnad through his good ofces to Khudyr.39 However, Mrz
Akmads statement is hard to trust, for he not only skips the four-year reign
of Mall Khan but also gets his chronology confused.40 Sayrm also makes
a few errors about Yaqb Begs stays in Bukhara. First he claims that Yaqb
Beg ed to Bukhara to avoid prison after the bribery scandal erupted when
he was the beg of Aq Masjid. He then states that Yaqb Beg returned to
Khoqand when Mall Khan was ruling, and became the beg of Khojent. He
fell victim to slander by jealous ofcials who got Mall Khan to order
Yaqbs execution, so he was again forced to ee to Bukhara for safety.41
These remarks by Sayrm cannot be sustained. First of all, we know that
Yaqb Beg was recalled to Tashkent from Aq Masjid by Nr Mukammad.
82 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e

So, the story of his ight to Bukhara from Aq Masjid cannot be true. Be-
sides, there is no evidence that Mall Khan ordered Yaqb Beg to be exe-
cuted. Such a story is found neither in Abd Allhs writing nor in Mrz
Akmads memoir. At any rate, it is impossible to make a denite judgment
on every detail of Yaqb Begs political career during the years of 185363
because there are too few sources to compare and countercheck.
In spite of this uncertainty about the details, a close examination of his
career leaves no doubt that the two most widespread myths about Yaqb
Beg have no factual basis. The rst myth was that Yaqb Beg heroically de-
fended Aq Masjid against the Russian attack in 1853. As we have already
observed, there is no doubt that Yaqb Beg was not present at Aq Masjid
on July 24, 1853 when it was captured after four days attack by Russian
troops under the command of General Petrovskii. Nor was Yaqb Beg there
earlier on August 1, 1852 when Colonel Blaramberg attacked the fort. His
only skirmish with Russians was on March 16, 1852 at Aq Gerik. There,
one thousand Khoqand soldiers under Yaqb Begs command were unable
to stand against one hundred Russian soldiers equipped with superior re-
arms. After this defeat Yaqb Beg was immediately dismissed from the beg-
ship of Aq Masjid and ordered to return to Tashkent.42
The second myth was, as Boulger once wrote, that Alim Kuli recognized
in the Kooshbege [i.e., Yaqb Beg] a possible rival and successor. Any ex-
cuse therefore to keep Yakoob Beg in the background, or indeed to get rid
of him altogether, would be very welcome to Alim Kuli.43 Kuropatkin re-
marked in the same vein that This energetic and popular personage and a
very formidable rival greatly alarmed Alim Kool, and he had already deter-
mined in getting rid of him.44 But, the fact was that Yaqb Beg had never
been powerful nor popular enough to threaten lim Quli. Considering that
the highest post that Yaqb Beg ever reached was beg of Khojent, and that
his status was always precarious and depended on the outcome of the strug-
gle between lim Quli and Khudyr, we cannot but be skeptical about the
assumption that he was a rival to lim Quli, an ambitious and powerful
king-maker who was backed by a large number of Qipchaqs.
If Yaqb Beg did not initially come to Kashgharia expecting to establish
an independent Islamic government as a heroic holy warrior or to realize
his ambitions as an adventurer, how should we understand his mission to
Kashgharia? What we should not forget is that such missions to Kashgharia
from Khoqand had been quite common during the previous fty years be-
cause this region had been always important to the economic prosperity of
the Khoqand khanate. The series of invasions of Kashgharia by the Makh-
dmzda khwjas had always been organized in such a way that the Kho-
qand rulers could keep a close eye on them by placing their own condants
among the top leadership positions to ensure that the khwjas would not
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 83

act against the interests of the khanate. During the invasion of Jahngr
Khwja in 1826 sa Ddkhwh (former Andijan governor) was in his suite
and in 1830 Ysuf Khwja was watched over by Haqq Quli Mingbashi and
Lashkar Qushbegi, the khans brother-in-law.45
The 1865 expedition was probably organized along similar lines, and it
would not have been to lim Qulis interests, or to those of the khanate,
to appoint a man he did not trust as a leader of such an important mission.
Mrz Akmad notes that lim Quli decided to send Buzurg to Kashgharia
rather than Ktt Khn Tura who was shrewder and had a better claim to
leadership, because Buzurg was known to be a weakling who could be more
easily controlled.46 In fact, one source reveals that lim Quli even made
Buzurg take a vow swearing that he would let no one other than Yaqb Beg
direct him in deciding important political matters.47 This act demonstrates
that lim Quli was determined to maintain control over his mission to
Kashgharia, and that Yaqb Beg was his chosen agent for this task. If he
had really considered Yaqb Beg a rival, lim Quli would have never ap-
pointed him as commander. Bellews observation on this point is quite ac-
curate: lim Quli appointed Yaqb Beg to accompany Buzurg by way of
securing his own interests and maintaining the Khokand inuence in the
Kshghar States.48
Pressed hard by the Russians from the north, lim Quli could not afford
to send a large body of soldiers to Kashghar. Only a small group left
Tashkent which, traveling via Khoqand, reached the frontier city of Osh,49
where its number was increased to a couple of hundred. At the beginning of
January 1865, they reached Ming Yol, the last halting place before reaching
Kashghar, and there Yaqb Beg began a brilliant new career at the age of
forty-ve.

First Steps

occupation of kashghar

At the time the small Khoqandian expedition entered the city of

Kashghar, the Muslim town was in the hands of \iddq Beg, the Qirghiz
chief who had taken it shortly before their arrival. He had invited Buzurg
with the expectation that the khwjas presence might contribute to his ear-
lier efforts to occupy the city. Although the Qirghiz had failed to take the
city by direct attack, the siege exhausted the citys provisions and forced the
defenders of Kashghar to submit. One eyewitness relates the wretched con-
dition in the town on the eve of surrender.
First they ate their horses, then the dogs and cats, then their leather boots and straps,
the saddles of their horses, and the strings of their bows. At last they would collect
84 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e

together in parties of ve or six, who would go prowling about with ravenous eyes
till they saw someone alone, some unfortunate comrade who still retained the esh
on his bones. They would drag him aside and kill him, afterwards dividing the esh
between them, and each carrying off his piece hidden under his robe.50

The Qirghiz who entered the city repaid their stubbornness with the same
cruelty, pillaging and slaughtering the inhabitants. Qutluq Beg, Kashghar
governor, escaped after having paid them 100 yambus as a ransom and then
went on pilgrimage to Mecca.51 Now that he was the master of the Muslim
town, \iddq Beg was not happy about having to let Yaqb Begs party into
the city. Nevertheless, he had little choice in the matter since Buzurg was
very popular among the Kashgharians. His fears were borne out when the
inhabitants of Kashghar began to vent their rage against the Qirghiz as soon
as Buzurg was settled in the urda, the residence of governor.
The Qirghiz were forced to leave the city and \iddq Beg retreated to
Yangihissar which his brother was holding. From there he gathered a large
number of Qirghiz and proceeded to march to the shrine of Hajrt-i Pdi-
shh by way of Qizil Tepe. Yaqb Beg mobilized his own forces and de-
ployed them against the Qirghiz at the shrine of Sayyid Jall al-Dn Bagh-
dd.52 During the ensuing battle \iddq was defeated and retreated to Tash-
maliq, where he reorganized his force and prepared to give another battle.
Leading a force of four thousand, Yaqb Beg, accompanied by Buzurg, met
the Qirghiz there and once again defeated them, forcing \iddq to ee to the
west for refuge in the mountains. Having overcome his rst major trial of
strength, Yaqb Beg returned to Kashghar through Yangihissar where he left
Azz Beg to lay siege to the fort because it was still held by the Qing troops.53
In February, Ibrhm \udr,54 son of Habb Allh and sent by his father
as an envoy to lim Quli, returned with Nr Mukammad Parvnachi,55
Hamdm Pnad, and Mr Baba Hudchi56 whom lim Quli sent as a re-
turn embassy to Khotan. When they came to Kashghar, Yaqb Beg offered
them an escort for safety because Yarkand was in the hands of the Kuchean
khwjas who were ghting with the Tungans there. In fact, under the guise
of escorting the embassy he hoped to exploit the situation.57 He reached
Yarkand with about two hundred soldiers at the end of February. Accord-
ing to Abd Allh, his party was led into the city and stayed there for three
days. There ensued clashes between them and the Kucheans who had come
earlier in Yarkand. They were predominant at rst and even succeeded in
capturing Burhn al-Dn, but because of their numerical inferiority they re-
treated.58 On this battle R. B. Shaw left us the following description.
They fought from morning prayer time till afternoon prayers (it was Friday), and
Yakoob got the worst of it. At rst, his onslaught shook the Koochrees, but, his
horses getting tired in the wet soil, he took refuge in the city. Here he was enclosed,
but with difculty escaped away to Kshghar . . . 59
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 85

In the midst of this confusion Ibrhm \udr also ed to Khotan while the
rest of the Khoqand embassy was driven back to Kashghar.
After this aborted attempt to take Yarkand, Yaqb Beg concentrated his
effort on occupying Yangihissar. After forty days of siege the fort was nally
taken on April 11.60 Yaqb Beg then named Azz Beg as the governor of
Yangihissar,61 and sent Mr Baba (who had come from Khoqand as an
envoy) to lim Quli with presents to inform him of the fall of the fort and
the progress of the situation in general. According to Sayrm, the presents
consisted of nine Chinese cannons, nine charming Chinese virgins, nine
young Chinese boys, several packs of aromatic tea, nine times nine Chinese
yambus, nine times nine Qalmuq and Qazaq horses, and nine times nine
porcelains.62 The dispatch of the embassy shows that Yaqb Beg was not
an independent adventurer but a Khoqand ofcial responsible for his ac-
tions to the khanate. Mr Baba met with lim Quli, who was busy de-
fending Tashkent against the Russians, but he had no chance to deliver the
presents because lim Quli was killed in action soon thereafter.63
After Yangihissar fell, the Qirghiz chief \iddq Beg appeared again at
Tashmaliq and took the fort of Farrash. According to Abd Allh, he had
gathered about a thousand people, mostly Qirghiz but also including many
Khoqandians eeing from Khudyr, including Kichik Khn Tura. Yaqb
Beg brought up his army and met them at Farrash. This time they reached
a conciliation without ghting, and \iddq Beg took service under Yaqb
Beg as the magistrate of Farrash as well as the commander of Qirghiz sol-
diers.64 When Yaqb Beg returned to Kashghar, he faced a challenge from
the begs there. Led by Muqarrab Shh, these people collected troops to op-
pose Yaqb Beg, but in several battles that took place around Khan Ariq
and Qizil Buy they proved to be no match for the Khoqandians. Muqarrab
Shh ed to Yarkand where he allied himself with Jaml al-Dn Khwja
from Aqsu, who was preparing a major attack on Kashghar.65
Even without a chance to breathe, Yaqb Beg had to face his most
difcult test. He fought a pitched battle at the place called Khan Ariq near
Kashghar with the Kuchean army. This battle became a decisive event in the
process of unication. As explained earlier, Rshidn Khwja, intending to
create an Islamic state that embraced the entire Tarim basin, dispatched two
separate expeditionary armies. Compared to the eastern expedition, which
achieved a great success in taking such important cities as Qarashahr and
Turfan, the western expedition did not produce any signicant outcome. It
could not take any one of the cities like Kashghar, Yarkand, or Khotan.
Therefore, the arrival of Yaqb Beg and his sudden success in taking con-
trol of Yangihissar and the Muslim town of Kashghar, and even the danger
of his taking Yarkand, posed a real threat to the Kucheans.
After the rst expedition against Yarkand led by Burhn al-Dn and his
86 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e

son ended in failure, Rshidn Khwja decided to send another expedi-

tionary army, much larger than the rst. This time he entrusted its command
to his elder brother Jaml al-Dn, who also held the ofce of Aqsu gover-
nor. The troops from Kucha led by Alam Akhnd and \diq Khwja, and
those from Ush Turfan led by Burhn al-Dn and Hm al-Dn had come to
Aqsu where they joined with Jaml al-Dn. According to Sayrm, these
troops, numbering 26,000, then marched to Yarkand, which easily fell
under their control. Collecting more people from Yarkand and its vicinity,
they then proceeded to Kashghar by way of small roads to bypass Yangi-
hissar and thereby assault Kashghar by surprise. This army consisted of
troops drawn from all the major cities west of Kucha (i.e., Kucha, Shahyar,
Aqsu, Ush Turfan, and Yarkand) and also included Tungans who handled
the cannons. According to one report, the number of soldiers reached the
enormous size of 72,000.66
Yaqb Beg, by contrast, could muster only a small number of troops. The
center was entrusted to Buzurg with 200 Badakhshi soldiers and the right
wing was held by Yaqb Beg himself together with 1,000 Qirghiz and
Qipchaqs, while the left wing was commanded by Abd Allh Pnad and
Ghz Pnad with 200 men between themaltogether a force of less than
2,000.67 The Badakhshi were those whom Jahndr Shh, the ruler of
Badakhshan, had sent in order to take advantage of the confusion in west-
ern Kashgharia. Yaqb Beg had incorporated them into his army.68 Com-
paring the size of the two armies, Sayrm likened Yaqb Begs army to the
Pleiades in the heaven but the Kuchean army to the entire stars in the
seven spheres.69 At Khan Ariq the two sides met in a erce battle. Although
Yaqb Beg received severe wounds, he survived and emerged as a victor.
The large Kuchean army was completely routed and ed back to Aqsu. This
battle proved to be the most important of Yaqb Begs career in Eastern
Turkestan, for it ultimately led to the fall of the Kuchean regime and opened
the way for his conquest of the region.70
Considering that the number of the Kuchean troops was at least ten times
more than those of Yaqb Beg, it may appear hard to understand the out-
come of the battle. However, while the defeat was partly the result of the
overcondence by the Kucheans who were depending on their numerical
strength, at the same time, we should take note of the different composition
of each army. Yaqb Begs army, at least at its core, consisted of erce
nomadsQipchaqs and Qirghizand Badakhshi mountaineers who were
full of combat experience, and the Khoqand ofcials whom we may well
consider professional soldiers. On the other hand, the Kuchean army was a
mixture of the people from several cities who had received hardly any mil-
itary training and whose commanders were in most cases religious gures.
Sayrm deplored the Kuchean armys poor state in this way, Nothing will
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 87

be done by the hands of such disorderly troops. Two hundred brave men are
better than those of one hundred thousand.71
Although equipped with the instruments and armaments of war that had
been prepared for two years by the tax and the blood of the Muslims in
Aqsu, Yarkand, Ush Turfan, Kucha, and Shahyar, they could not ght even
two hours and scattered like dust.72 Although accounts vary, this battle most
likely took place between June and August of 1865.73 After the battle Yaqb
Beg marched back to Kashghar with the Tungans he had taken prisoner. At
the news of the Khan Ariqs defeat, Sayyid Alam Akhnd, who had been
left in Yarkand by Jaml al-Dn, ed to Aqsu.74 Yaqb Beg quickly dis-
patched Mr Baba, who had just returned from his mission to Khoqand, to
Yarkand and, with the aid of Niyz Beg, the leader of the Yarkand begs, suc-
ceeded in taking control of the Muslim town.75 Yaqb Beg thus took two
games with one arrow, and two big cities by one attack.76
After having returned from Khan Ariq, Yaqb Beg concentrated all his
efforts on taking the Manchu fort of Kashghar. The Qing troops there had
been under siege for almost a year, rst by the Qirghiz and then by the army
of Yaqb Beg. Provisions had already long run out in the fort, and both
famine and disease were prevalent. Having lost all hope of resistance, He
Buyun (H Dlya), commander of Chinese garrison troops, entered into
secret correspondence with Yaqb Beg, obtaining a guarantee of safety for
his family and the soldiers under his command in exchange for their ac-
ceptance of Islam. On the rst day of September Kuiying, the Kashghar
amban, and other Qing ofcials all killed themselves by blowing up the
urda. The fort was then easily taken, and several days of sacking and plun-
dering followed during which most of the Chinese were killed.77

a turning point

In less than eight months after coming to Kashghar, Yaqb Beg had
established a rm footing by occupying two complete cities, Kashghar and
Yangihissar, and the Muslim town of Yarkand. However, because the Man-
chu fort of Yarkand was still in the hands of the Qing army and other Mus-
lim forces were holding Khotan and Kucha, his position was far from se-
cure. Moreover, lim Qulis death, news of which Mr Baba had brought
back with him after his aborted mission to Khoqand, made Yaqb Beg re-
alize that he could not go back to Khoqand because Khudyr (whom he
had previously deserted) had taken power there. In fact, he had no reason
to do so because he was beginning to see that his future lay in Kashgharia
where he might expect to become a ruler in his own right. Accordingly,
Yaqb Beg found the existence of Buzurg more and more irksome, partic-
ularly as his own popularity had soared after the heroic battle of Khan Ariq
while Buzurg was considered politically incompetent.
88 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e

At this very juncture Yaqb Beg met with a signicant turning point. Ten
days after Yaqb Beg and Buzurg occupied the Kashghar fort, news came
from Ming Yol that a large body of Khoqandian soldiers was approaching.
They were the remnants of lim Qulis army, mostly Qipchaqs and
Qirghizs who had decided to take refuge in Kashghar. After the death of
lim Quli and the fall of Tashkent, Suln Sad Khan had run to Bukhara
to ask for help, but he was arrested in Jizzaq by the Bukharans. Those
Qipchaqs and Qirghizs who had been engaged in the defense of Tashkent
came back to the Ferghana valley. There they enthroned Khud Quli Beg,
later known as Belbaghchi (girdle-seller) Khan because he had been once
engaged in selling girdles; and entered Khoqand. Taking advantage of lim
Qulis death, Khudyr also marched to Khoqand. Those who belonged to
lim Qulis party then ed to Osh, but, when Khudyr followed at their
heels, they moved farther to the east and arrived at Ming Yol. Their num-
bers reached almost seven thousand,78 including many former high ofcials
of the Khoqand khanate: Khud Quli Khan, Beg Mukammad Mingbashi,
Mrz Akmad, Mukammad Naar Qushbegi, Mukammad Ynus Jn Dd-
khwh, Jmadr Ddkhwh, Umar Qul Ddkhwh, and so on. There were
also several Makhdmzdas, such as Ktt Khn Tura, Wal Khn Tura,
Hkim Khn Tura, and Isrl Khn Tura.79 Alarmed by the report, Yaqb
Beg sent the shaykh al-Islm of Kashghar, shn Makmd Khn, to Ming
Yol in order to discover their intention and to persuade them to submit.
After some hesitation, they agreed to submit to Yaqb Beg and entered
Kashghar, welcomed with a feast and robes of honor.
This event was a turning point for Yaqb Beg in several respects. In terms
of power, even though he succeeded in taking Kashghar and Yangihissar, he
had had only a comparatively small number of loyal followers. The Qirghiz
detachment under \iddq could not be relied upon, and the soldiers taken
from the Kashgharis and the Yangihissaris were not well disciplined and had
doubtful loyalties. Nor was it certain whether the Tungan troops under H
Dlya would support Yaqb Beg in a crisis even though he was now mar-
ried to Hs daughter. Therefore, the incorporation of the seven thousand
battle-seasoned troops from his own country was a signicant reinforce-
ment. In addition to this military aspect, Yaqb Begs acceptance of them
was politically an outward expression that he was no longer subject to the
khanate under Khudyr for those Khoqandian refugees he embraced were
all anti-Khudyrs. At the same time, this act of Yaqb Beg signied the ab-
rogation of his commitment to Buzurg, and opened the way for him to be a
real ruler.
Before he could become a real ruler, however, he was confronted with
two more minor challenges: rst, from Wal Khn, and then, from Buzurg.
Wal Khn is the one who had invaded Kashghar in 1857 when it was still
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 89

under the Qing rule and slaughtered so many innocent people. Hardly had
a few days passed since the arrival of the Khoqandians, when the followers
of Wal Khn began crying Time! Time! The time of Wal Khn! in the
streets of Kashghar.80 Yaqb Beg easily suppressed them and arrested Wal
Khn, sending him to Yangihissar under guard. After this incident Yaqb
Beg marched with Buzurg to Yarkand where the Tungans had freshly re-
volted. He laid siege to the city, and as soon as he took it, Beg Mukammad,
along with his Qipchaq followers, allied himself with Buzurg and retired to
Kashghar in November. Yaqb Beg left Kichik Khn in Yarkand and pur-
sued Buzurg. Yaqb Beg attacked the Kashghar fort for almost two months,
nally resulting in the expulsion of Beg Mukammad (who was later killed
by Khudyr Khan in Marghinan) and the arrest of Buzurg whom Yaqb
Beg sent to Yangihissar. Buzurg was initially replaced by another khwja,
Ktt Khn, who quickly died and Yaqb Beg nally assumed the rulership
himself in the early spring of 1866.81

Conquest of Kashgharia

seizure of khotan

Yaqb Beg had barely suppressed the internal opposition when

Yarkand slipped away from his hands again. At the defeat of the Kuchean
army at Khan Ariq, Rshidn sent Iskq to Yarkand, who had returned from
Hami to Kucha a year before. Iskq left Kucha with three thousand soldiers
around the end of December 1865.82 After ten days stay in Aqsu he
marched to Yarkand, but when he entered the city, the Tungans took Kichik
Khn to the fort, whom Yaqb Beg had left in Yarkand, and refused to sub-
mit to Iskq. Iskq occupied only the Muslim town while the Tungans were
holding the fort.
At this news Yaqb Beg did not proceed directly to Yarkand, but rather
to Maralbashi, with a view to cutting the communication line between Aqsu
and Yarkand. In the middle of July, after a week of siege, he occupied the
fort of Maralbashi which the Tungans, already having submitted to Rshi-
dn, were defending.83 He appointed Hkim Khn, son of Ktt Khn, as
governor of Maralbashi and then headed toward Yarkand for the third, and
last, time.
Both parts of the city were held by his enemies: Iskq and the Tungans.
The Tungans and the Kucheans allied and attempted a surprise attack on
Yaqb Begs army at night. It turned into a disaster because Niyz Beg had
warned Yaqb Beg of the plot. Yet, Yaqb Beg still could not enter the city.
When a relief army sent by Rshidn from Aqsu and Ush Turfan was unable
to pass through Maralbashi, Yaqb Begs strategy proved correct and he
90 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e

was able to come to an agreement with the besieged in Yarkand. Iskq and
his Kuchean army were allowed to go back to Kucha while the Tungans
were incorporated into Yaqb Begs army. He appointed Mukammad
Ynus Jn governor of Yarkand.84 The capture of Yarkand seems to have oc-
curred in early September 1866.85
Yaqb Begs next task was the conquest of Khotan, which he carried out
with great notoriety. Khotan maintained more than ten thousand infantry
and cavalry troops, including an artillery force, and stood rmly unied be-
hind Habb Allh.86 Yaqb Beg decided to take Khotan not by battle but by
trickery. He dispatched his right hand man, Abd Allh, to inform Habb
Allh of his intention to pay a visit to the shrine of Imm Jafar \diq. On
December 16, 1866 (the eighth of Barat, 1283), Yaqb Beg proceeded to
Yarkand with his troops87 and from there to Piyalma. Habb Allh dis-
patched one of his sons there,88 supported by a Khotanese army, to nd out
Yaqb Begs real intentions. It is said that Yaqb Beg swore an oath over
the Qurn and, calling Habb Allh my father (atam, dadam), invited
him to meet in a place called Zava for a feast. Habb Allh visited Yaqb
Beg without suspicion, but he was bound tightly and sent to Yarkand where
he was executed.89 Yaqb Beg then sent a letter to Khotan stamped with
Habb Allhs seal90 stating that both leaders would enter the city next
morning. Leading gures of Khotan, assuming all was well, came out to
welcome them and were arrested immediately by Yaqb Beg. Having en-
tered the city, he secured the treasury rst. When the Khotanese realized
what had happened, they armed themselves with clubs and began to attack
Yaqb Begs soldiers. Fighting continued several days in and out of the city.
At least several thousand Khotanese were killed.91 According to one source,
when the soldiers hands became blistered because of so much killing,
Yaqb Beg was reputed to have ordered butchers to continue the slaugh-
ter.92 This incident took place in JanuaryFebruary of 1867.93
These events generated a strong sense of betrayal and animosity in Kho-
tan against Yaqb Beg, who had no scruples about swearing falsely, play-
ing dirty tricks, or slaughtering his enemies. Even after the end of his rule
the Khotanese retained their bitterness toward him and his actions. The fol-
lowing lines of a poem disclose the depth of their contempt for this foreign
ruler from Andijan.
From Peking the Chinese came, like the stars in the heaven.
The Andijanis rose and ed, like the pigs in the forest.
They came in vain and left in vain, the Andijanis!
They went away scared and languidly, the Andijanis!
Everyday they took a virgin, and
They went hunting for beauties.
They played with dancing boys (bacha),
which the holy law has forbidden.94
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 91

Yaqb Begs occupation of the city by trickery and the slaughter of

Habb Allh along with his sons95 would have easily revived the sense of
martyrdom which had been deeply rooted among the people of Khotan, as
it was called the City of Martyrs (Shahdn-i Khotan).96 Yaqb Begs ap-
pointment of Niyz Beg, a Yarkandi, to the governorship of Khotan seems
to have stemmed from his consideration of the general feeling of the
Khotanese against the Andijanis.

collapse of the kuchean regime

With the conquest of Khotan, Yaqb Beg gained control of the entire
area to the west of Maralbashi and he turned his attention to Kucha, the
only remaining power in Kashgharia. Many signs of the internal weakness
had appeared within the Kucha regime long before Yaqb Beg launched his
expedition against it. Sayrm records revolts in Ush Turfan and Lukchin.
For example, in Ush Turfan a number of former begs became more and
more irritated with the stern rule, based on the Islamic law, of Mukammad
al-Dn, his father Burhn al-Dn, and his brother Hm al-Dn. These begs,
including Tukhta Hkim Beg, his brother Aq Beg, B Mukammad Beg,
Qurbn Ghaznach Beg, and Isml Bjgr Beg, gathered at a place called
Mazr-i Trk in the village of Gn Chiqan outside Ush Turfan and en-
throned a certain Mrz Jn Hajrat. However, the revolt ended in failure,
leaving more than two hundred people dead and putting more to ight.
Those who were captured were executed, and it was reported that their
corpses lled seven wells in the city.97
Sayrm pointed out as another cause of the revolt the widespread inu-
ence of several Su paths. At that time, in Ush Turfan, Su paths that had
eccentric teachings such as the Kubrwiyya, the Iskqiyya, Nimatiyya,
Rabdiyya, and Davniyya were active.98 Some followers of these orders
were calling their master Allh Khwjam and, arguing that Allhs char-
acteristic is also Khwjams characteristic, expounded a claim that directly
denied the unity of Allh. Moreover, men and women had meetings at se-
cret places and performed rituals that contradicted religious laws, such as
listening to music (sam), dancing (raqs), and falling into ecstasy. These or-
ders had many followers all over Kashgharia, especially among the immi-
grants (kchmn)99 and the foreigners (bgna). In this way, fanatic devo-
tion to Allh Khwjam, religious rituals contradictory to sharah, and the
exclusive secrecy of these groups posed a serious political threat to the
Kuchean khwja rulers.100
However, internal dissension among the Kuchean khwjas themselves
was much more devastating than anything else. This dissension had devel-
oped between Rshidns brothers and their cousins. As mentioned earlier,
Rshidn recalled Iskq from Hami in 1865, with the pretext of the grow-
92 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e

ing danger of Yaqb Beg. But Iskq was not allowed to lead the expedition
against Yaqb Beg. Instead, Jaml al-Dn, who had already replaced Burhn
al-Dn as the commander of the western march in the summer of 1864, be-
came the commander of the second Kuchean expedition to Yarkand. Iskqs
army, which numbered almost 16,000, was mostly appropriated by Jaml
al-Dn. When he marched later to Yarkand after Jaml al-Dns defeat at
Khan Ariq, he could collect only 3,000 troops in Kucha. His failure to hold
Yarkand was also severely criticized by Rshidn and Jaml al-Dn, and he
even had to hand over a part of his army to Jaml al-Dn. Jaml al-Dn also
clashed with Hm al-Dn of Ush Turfan. The cause of this dispute was the
jurisdiction of Aq Yar which lies halfway between Aqsu and Ush Turfan. It
ended nally with the arrest of Hm al-Dn, who was thrown into prison in
Kucha. This took place two months after the revolt of the Ush Turfan
begs.101
The deepening of the cleavage among the khwjas made it easy for
Yaqb Beg to subjugate the Kuchean regime. After he heard the news of
Hm al-Dns imprisonment, he uttered the exclamation Praise to Allh!
Now, Aqsu and Kucha shall fall in my hand even without ghting.102 Some
of the survivors from the revolt in Ush Turfan volunteered to be guides for
Yaqb Beg, and several high ofcials in Aqsu and Kucha also thought it best
for their interests to ally themselves with him. Of these Abd al-Rakmn
Ddkhwh and Abd Allh Dvnbegi in Aqsu, and Tukhta Ishikagha in
Kucha, all of whom were at the rank of vizr, sent secret letters to Yaqb
Beg, promising their support if he ever marched against Kucha.103
Being encouraged by this dissension within the ruling group of Kucha,
Yaqb Beg resolved to take advantage of the opportunity. He left Kashghar
on May 8, 1867 with his troops and marched to Aqsu, through Maralbashi.
Upon reaching the Aqsu Darya he easily defeated the Aqsu army under the
command of Yakya, Jaml al-Dns son. He entered Aqsu in the same month
without much resistance. Jaml al-Dn was taken prisoner and later sent to
Yarkand where he was executed.104 A detachment went to Ush Turfan to ob-
tain submission from Burhn al-Dn and his sons. They surrendered with-
out ghting and came to Aqsu to pay homage to Yaqb Beg. Yaqb Beg
marched farther to the east until he met and easily defeated some Kuchean
troops at Yaqa Ariq. At the news of this defeat, Rshidn called Hm al-Dn
away from Qarashahr, where he had been dispatched to suppress a revolt,
and sent him with four thousand soldiers to Yaqa Ariq to oppose Yaqb
Beg. Instead of ghting, however, Hm al-Dn defected to Yaqb Beg and
Kucha fell into his hands on June 5, 1867, barely a month after he departed
from Kashghar.105 Rshidn Khwja seems to have been killed when Kucha
was taken, and the other khwjas who attempted resistance were also killed
by Yaqb Beg. Burhn al-Dn and his sons, Hm al-Dn and Makmd al-Dn,
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 93

were sent to Kashghar and retired to a secluded life at the khnaqh (prayer
house) of Mukammad Khwja Hajrat.106 Yaqb Beg appointed Iskq as
the governor of Kucha to whose jurisdiction the towns of Shahyar, Bugur,
and Kurla belonged.107
Thus the Kuchean khwjas regime ended exactly three years after its cre-
ation (1864 June1867 June). It is worthwhile to listen to the judgment of
Sayrm on this regime.
In this way, [Kuchean] khwjas reigned for three full years, i.e., 37 months. Their
eastern border reached to Barkul, the northern border to Qalmuqistan [i.e., Zun-
gharia], the western border to Yarkand and Maralbashi, and the southern border
to Lop and Cherchen. Countless numbers of Chinese (Bechn) indels were de-
stroyed. . . . Although they took control of the power and authority in this manner,
they had never thought to show mercy on any of their brethren, to give abundant
gifts to prayers, intellectuals or artisans so that they could transcend worldy mat-
ters, to provide charities by building bridges over the river or establishing wells and
resting places in the midst of wilderness, to construct mosques and schools and offer
them as endowments, or even to build a couple of lodgings for their own use, . . .
They did not even bother to know or perform the norms and rules appropriate to
monarchs and did not care to learn the details of [necessary] knowledge and prac-
tice. Whatever work they undertook, they did it as they pleased and as they
wanted. . . . There was no peace to the poor and the common people.108

Having completed the unication of Kashgharia, Yaqb Beg returned to

Kashghar on October 21 and put his energy into rehabilitating the war-
stricken country. He also began establishing diplomatic contacts with neigh-
boring countries.

Annexation of Urumchi

first expedition

During the three years between the conquest of Kashgharia (1867)

and the beginning of the rst Urumchi expedition (1870) Kashgharias
southern and western borders remained tranquil. While the Khoqand kha-
nate under Khudyrs rule was not friendly toward the new government in
Kashghar, it took no hostile actions against it either. The mountain nomads
in the Pamirs along the southwestern and the southern borders of the coun-
try were subjugated by an army sent by Yaqb Beg, but their chiefs kept
their hereditary posts in exchange for tributary payments to him. The north-
ern border was less secure because the Russians refused to acknowledge the
legitimacy of Yaqb Begs government and pushed the limits of their fron-
tier to Narin, where they constructed a fort. Yaqb Beg, probably remem-
bering the fate of the Khoqand khanate, became extremely alarmed and dis-
patched his troops near Narin to construct a line of outposts and to watch
94 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e

for further movement by the Russians. After this initial tension, however,
the northern border maintained a kind of status quo.
The problem was at the eastern border. After Yaqb Beg conquered
Kucha and Qarashahr, the limits of his eastern boundary reached Gmsh,
halfway between Qarashahr and Turfan. Turfan was held by the Urumchi
Tungans led by S Dlya. When Dd (Tuo Ming) sent S to Turfan, a re-
organization of the leading members seems to have taken place. A Chinese
source wrote that Dd appointed Ma Sheng, Ma Guan, Ma Tai, and Ma
Zhong to be commanders (yuanshuay) and that he made Ma Si (Suzhou),
Ma Duosan (Xining), Ma Yanlong (Hezhou), and Ma Hualong (Ningxia)
commanders in their own territories.109 Although he had no control over
these areas, this indicates that he sought an alliance with the Tungan rebels
in Shanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia, and tried to expand his inuence to other
areas. So there was a danger that the two powers in Xinjiang, Urumchi and
Kashghar, would collide against each other sooner or later.
Besides the potential outbreak of war between those two, the area
around Turfan and Qarashahr was highly insecure and volatile because of
two other factors. The rst was the danger posed by the Mongol-speaking
Khoshot and Torghut tribes who had taken to raiding their neighbors. The
second was the existence of Chinese guerrilla forces who were ghting
against the Muslims. After the Qing force was expelled from Eastern Tur-
kestan and Zungharia, the nomadic tribes of the Torghuts and the Khoshots
became independent. They raided Ili, Turfan, and Qarashahr which were in
a state of confusion because of the rebellion. When Iskq Khwja marched
through Turfan and Qarashahr in 186465, he had to ght them. These
tribes were not submissive to the Ili sultanate either and played a provoca-
tive role in the relationship between Russia and the sultanate. Even though
by 1867 Yaqb Beg had conquered Qarashahr and Ushaq Tal, these no-
madic tribes remained a disruptive factor. In the meantime, guerrilla groups,
which Chinese sources called duanlian (militia), were another independent
political power in this border area formed by a considerable number of Chi-
nese who had ed from the Muslims. The largest of these groups was based
in Nanshan,110 almost ve thousand strong and led by Xu Xuegong. His ir-
regular forces often raided the garrisons and villages under the administra-
tion of the Urumchi government.111 There were also several other mountain
guerillas organized on similar bases.
The rst incident on the eastern border was caused by a certain Muaf-
far, Mukammad Al (Madal) Khans son, at the end of 1868. When his fa-
ther had died in 1842 in Khoqand, he had ed to Kashmir and from there
had come to Yarkand after the 1864 rebellion. In the midst of the ghting
after the rebellion he went to the Urumchi area to establish his own power
base. After collecting a number of Tungans, Mongols, and foreigners (mus-
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 95

rn), he raided Yaqb Begs eastern domains Kurla and Qarashahr in

1868. Iskq Khwja who was the governor of Kucha under Yaqb Beg
counterattacked Muaffar and easily regained Kurla. Muaffar was killed
in the battle and there was no further repercussion.112 But this was only a
prologue to larger and fuller border warfare with the Urumchi Tungans.
In the beginning of 1870 a large number of Tungans (twenty thousand
according to Sayrm) appeared in the Kurla area and the town instantly fell
into their hands.113 Yaqb Beg responded by ordering Hkim Khn, the
governor of Aqsu, to go to Kucha and aid Iskq, while he himself left for
Aqsu. The Tungans advanced toward Kucha, where they confronted the
troops of Iskq Khwja and Hkim Khn at a village called Qara Yighach.
The Tungans defeated them and entered Kucha without resistance while
Iskq and Hkim Khn ed to Aqsu. After having plundered Kucha for
more than a week, the Tungans retired to Turfan in order to avoid a full-
scale war with Yaqb Begs main army. On their way to Turfan, the Tun-
gans also took the opportunity to plunder Kurla and Bugur.
Yaqb Beg left Kashghar on March 11 and arrived in Aqsu within a week
or two with twenty thousand troops. Yaqb Beg stayed there ten days, puni-
shing those ofcials who had failed to defend the frontier against the Tun-
gans. He then marched to Kucha where he dismissed Iskq Khwja from his
post as governor of Kucha. After passing through Kurla and Ushaq Tal, he
reached Toqsun which the Tungans were defending, but he took the town
without much trouble. Yaqb Begs ultimate aim was to take Turfan, which
served as one of the main bases of the Tungans, but before he reached the
city, the two sides fought two battles at Yamish and Yar. His army won these
battles and was soon able to lay siege to Turfan which was too heavily
defended to be taken by storm. The siege continued more than a half year
and during this period Lukchin, located to the east of Turfan, fell into the
hands of Yaqb Beg. Finally, in November of 1870, the Tungans of Turfan
were terried by the power of the cannons employed by Yaqb Beg and
opened the gates to surrender.114 He appointed Hkim Khn Tura as the
governor.115
After the fall of Turfan, the showdown between Yaqb Beg and Dd
Khalfa became inevitable. With sixteen thousand infantry and cavalry
Yaqub Beg marched through Dabanchin and arrived at a place called
Daqiyanus116 about ten miles outside of Urumchi, where Dd Khalfas
Tungan army attempted to mount a surprise night attack. However, that
night the weather was bitterly cold and heavy snow was falling, which
caused them to lose their way and reach Yaqb Begs campsite only at day-
break. In the ensuing battle the Tungans were routed and ed. Yaqb Beg
pursued them and surrounded the city of Urumchi. Realizing the futility of
further resistance, Dd surrendered. Thus in late November 1870, Urum-
96 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e

chi fell to Yaqb Beg. He brought S Dlya from Turfan and made him
dayanshay (commander-in-general) of the Urumchi region.117 He also ap-
pointed yanshays (commanders) for the cities around Urumchi, such as
Qutubi, Gumadi, and Manas, which were subject to the dayanshay of
Urumchi.
Yaqb Beg spent the winter of 1870 in Urumchi where Xu Xuegong vis-
ited and presented him with gifts. Xu had visited him when Yaqb was stay-
ing in Turfan and provided him some troops and provisions. His younger
brother also participated with fteen hundred Han Chinese in the assault of
Urumchi.118 According to Sayrm, after three months of staying in Urum-
chi, Yaqb Beg returned to Turfan with his army, and after two more
months there he arrived in Qarashahr at the beginning of the next spring
(around the end of hamal, corresponding to March 21April 20). He im-
prisoned Khatun Khan who was the leader of Torghut Mongols nomadiz-
ing around Qara Modun in the vicinity of Qarashahr and put them under
the control of Hajj Mrz, the governor of Kurla.119 In this way, between
the winter of 1870 and the spring of 1871, Yaqb Beg succeeded in regain-
ing peace on the eastern borders by subjugating the Tungans in Urumchi and
the Mongols around Kurla.

second expedition

Yaqb Beg left Qarashahr after a three-month stay, sometime in

MayJune of 1871. Even before he reached Aqsu on June 8,120 news arrived
of an armed attack on Urumchi by Xu Xuegong and his murder of S
Dlya.121 Yaqb Beg ordered Nr Mukammad from Kucha, Hkim Khn
from Turfan, and Hjj Mrz from Kurla to march on Urumchi and help
subjugate Xu. However, when they arrived in Urumchi, the Tungans already
raised up Tlib Akhnd, son of S Dlya, to the rank of dayanshay,122 so
Yaqb Beg ratied his status. The army under Hkim Khns command, as-
sisted by the Tungans, pursued Xu to Nanshan but because he ed to the di-
rection of the Great Nanshan they could not catch him.
When they returned from this unsuccessful chase in the month of qaws
(November 22December 21), the situation in Urumchi changed again: the
Tungans had betrayed them by making Dd Khalfa their leader and ar-
resting Tlib Akhnd. They closed the gates and denied entrance to Yaqb
Begs army. Intense battles ensued between the two sides. Yaqb Begs army,
reinforced by the troops from Aqsu, stormed the city and Dd ed to
Manas. There Dd allied with Xu Xuegong and collected a large number
of Tungans. They came back and laid the siege to Urumchi. According to
Sayrm, there were 20,000 people attacking Urumchi, 16,000 Tungans
and 4,000 Chinese militia.123 The Tungans gained control of the entire
surrounding area except for the city of Urumchi, and throughout the win-
 t h e e m e r g e n c e o f y aq ub b e g s r e g i m e 97

ter and spring of 18711872 Yaqb Begs army defended the fort with
difculty.124
Yaqb Beg, who had returned to Kashghar that winter, set about organ-
izing another expedition to Urumchi to raise the siege. He made his eldest
son, Beg Quli Beg, amr-i lashkar and sent him with seven thousand troops
to Urumchi in the spring of 1872. Beg Quli found that the Tungans were de-
fending the fort of Dabanchin under the leadership of Ma Jingui and Xu
Xuegong who had come down from Urumchi to assist the defense. After
forty days of severe ghting Beg Quli nally took the fort on June 8. Ma
Jingui was killed in the battle.125 He then went to Urumchi where the Tun-
gans were faced with an attack by two armies, that is, the army of Hkim
Khn inside the city and that of Beg Quli outside. On June 11, after taking
many casualties the Tungans surrendered and Xu, who was helping them,
ed to Shashanzi.126
After two months of resting in Urumchi, Beg Quli proceeded to Gumadi
and Manas. Both these cities fell into his hands, and Dd died soon after
in Manas.127 Beg Quli made Gnj Akhnd, a man of Salar origin, the head
of the Urumchi Tungans and then returned to Kashghar in the month of sari-
n (June 22July 21) of 1873.128 Yaqb Beg honored Beg Qulis feat by
making him amr al-umar, that is, the commander-in-chief. With the suc-
cessful completion of the second Urumchi expedition Yaqb Beg added a
considerable tract of land to his dominion, which now extended from Pamir
in the west to Turfan and Lukchin in the east and from Sarikol and Khotan
in the south to Urumchi and Manas to the north.
4 Muslim State and Its Ruling Structure

Administration

No serious attempt has been made yet to analyze the basic structure
of Yaqb Begs government. The reason it has not received attention, de-
spite the obvious importance of the topic, may be the lack of materials on
which one can rely for an appropriate analysis. However, if we cautiously
put together scattered information, it is possible to reconstruct basic prin-
ciples upon which the governmental structure was erected. Our analysis is
centered around a few important questions: what was the basis of Yaqb
Begs political power?; how did he create the ruling structure to perpetuate
his power?; what were the strengths and the weaknesses of his government?
The answers to these questions will not only bring out several unexplored
aspects about the decade of his rule, but also will expand our perspective in
understanding the underlying causes of the destruction of his state. We will
be able to see clearly that the Qing reconquest of Xinjiang was not the out-
come of a simple military confrontation.

core of power

There was hardly anything that we could call the central government
in the state of Yaqb Beg. This was not because centralized political power
was absent but because its structure basically consisted of only a handful of
functionaries who were tightly controlled by Yaqb Beg. He did not insti-
tute a well-dened administrative apparatus, directed by high ofcials, but
decided most of the countrys important matters by himself.1 Therefore, in
order to understand the characteristics of the central power, we need to un-
derstand Yaqb Beg himself.
Based on contemporary Muslim writings, Yaqb Beg did not seem to call
himself khan. For example, Sayrm asserts that he never called himself
pdishh, suln, or khn. His seal was about the size of a melon seed, and
on it was inscribed simply Mukammad Yaqb.2 This assertion was con-
rmed by R. B. Shaw who visited and met Yaqb Beg personally. He tells
us that he received a passport, dated October 22nd of 1874, upon which
 muslim state and its ruling structure 99

Yaqb Begs seal was afxed in exactly the same form and manner that
Sayrm describes.3 Later, Yaqb Beg added the title of Badaulat Ghz to
the seal.4 However, in British and Ottoman diplomatic documents there are
instances in which he was designated as Yaqub Khn. For example, edicts
in the name of the Ottoman sultan issued in 1875 call him Respectable
Ruler of Kashghar Country, Yaqb Khn5 and Amr of Kashghar, His Ex-
cellency Yaqb Khn.6 In a British report he was also called His High-
ness Atalik Ghazee Yakoob Khan, Ruler of Yarkund.7 The reason that
Britain and Ottoman Turkey addressed him in this way seems to have
stemmed from their diplomatic consideration for the ruler of the country
with which they maintained friendly relations, even though Yaqb Beg did
not call himself khan. By contrast, because the Russians were keen not to
fully recognize the legitimacy of his government, they addressed him only
by the title of the honourable ruler of Djety-Shahr.8
Muslim sources inform us that Yaqb Beg commonly used a number of
different titles, including badaulat, ataliq ghz, qushbegi, and amr, among
others. As explained earlier, badaulat meant the fortunate (or blessed)
one and was used as a rather euphemistic appellation. Ataliq ghz, an-
other very popular title that literally meant fatherly holy warrior was
translated in contemporary European accounts as Champion Father or
Tutor of the Champions. In fact, however, it is more likely that Yaqb
Beg used this title because ataliq was one of the highest ranks in the Bukha-
ran khanate and it had been granted to him by Bukhara in 1868 in recog-
nition of his conquest of Eastern Turkestan. He then embellished it with the
honoric ghz to create a new title meaning the holy warrior of the ataliq
(rank). Qushbegi was one of the highest military titles in the Khoqand
khanate and Yaqb Beg probably received it from lim Quli when he was
dispatched to Kashghar with Buzurg. The title of amr was bestowed on him
by the Ottoman sultan Abdlazz in 1873.9 It was never as popular as ataliq
ghz, but in diplomatic documents he was often addressed by this title. In
many cases some of his several titles were used in combination, such as
Badaulat Ataliq Ghz, Amr of Kashghar or Ataliq Ghz Yaqb Beg.
The reason Yaqb Beg did not assume the title of khan can be found in
a peculiar concept on the political tradition in Central Asia where, except
for the descendants of Chinggis Khan or renowned Muslim saints, nobody
could use that title. Beside this consideration, his adoption of these titles was
relevant to his attitude of stressing hard facts of reality rather than outward
embellishments. As a matter of fact, several Europeans who had met Yaqb
Beg transmitted their strong impression about his candid, serious, and grave
manner. H. W. Bellew, who visited Kashghar in 1873 as a member of the
British embassy, described him as follows.
Atalik Ghazi has a very remarkable face, and one not easily described. It presents no
single feature with undue prominence, and seen in a crowd would pass unnoticed as
100 muslim state and its ruling structure

rather a common sort of face; yet it has peculiar characters and wears an expression
which somehow conveys the impression that it is more assumed than natural. . . .
The forehead is full and high, and without trace of a frown or wrinkle is displayed
to full advantage under a well set turban, the pure white folds of which rest high on
the shaven scalp . . . The mouth is large, but not coarse; and the lips are thick and
eshy, but at the same time rmly set. Its expression is one of severity, though now
and again in conversation the upper lip is curled for a moment with a very pleasing
smile, instantly, however, to resume its apparently studied expression of gravity.10

The building Yaqb Beg used as his headquarters and residence was
called urda. This word came from orda or ordu, which originally meant the
tent of nomadic rulers and was used in Central Asia as a general term for
the residence of rulers. Yaqb Begs urda was constructed on the former site
of the Manchu ambans residence that had earlier burned down. It was com-
prised of four successive rooms: his private space in the rear, an audience
hall, a room that contained kitchen, store, and the waiting space for his
pages, and nally a room where his royal guards were seated along the wall
forming a long row of solemn looking gures, seated with downcast eyes,
motionless and silent.11 At Yaqb Begs urda were found only a small
number of ofcials who performed personal service for him.
The British report listed several ofces for this purpose: znbardr (sad-
dle holder), dastrkhwnchi (banquet master), yasawul (aide-de-camp),
mrkhr (stabler), makram (attendant), khaznach (treasurer), aftbach
(cup-bearer), bekawulbashi (steward), and so on.12 These were the ofces
placed in order to full Yaqb Begs personal needs and had hardly any-
thing to do with the discussion and the decision of important state matters.
In the same report we can nd almost twenty principal ofcers of the
state, but some of them such as ataliq and qushbegi were not actually used
as ofcial titles in Kashghar. People were called by those titles simply be-
cause they had once carried them in Khoqand. And other ofcial titles con-
cerning civil, military and nancial affairs were also very much confused
and jumbled so that it is difcult to discover any consistent system to them.
However, the most signicant ofce in the court was that of the mrz-
bashi, literally meaning chief secretary, and included the subordinate
mrzs under his direction. Scholars have largely overlooked the signicance
of this ofce because it was considered just a secretarial post that involved
mere paperwork.13 It is true that in the Khoqand khanate the post was a
minor one, and that it had only a slightly higher importance in Bukhara.14
However, the following description by Sayrm shows that mrzbashi
under Yaqb Begs rule performed a much more important role.
His Highness Ataliq GhzLight be upon his grave!conducted all the affairs of
the country for himself. He did not publicly appoint a couple of learned or upright
persons to the post of vizr. However, instead of vizr, he decided and carried out all
 muslim state and its ruling structure 101

the affairs of state, such as tying and untying of matters or appointment and dis-
missal of ofcials, according to the excellent opinions of upright mrzs, wise mun-
shs15 and persons with wide experience who were wishing only the best for the well-
being of the country and the people. The entire income and expenditure of the state,
the number of commanders and soldiers, the counting of horses and armaments, the
revenue of the treasury and the workshops,16 all these were entrusted to mrzbashis.
The mrzbashis kept all the state affairs in order and reported [to Ataliq Ghz].
They assumed the role of supplicant as well as envoy, and through their judgment
the agreements could be dissolved. Mrzbashis authority was strong and powerful
only after Yaqb Begs: the respect and dignity which mrzbashis received had no
limit. Nevertheless, even they were not free from the anger [of Yaqb Beg].17

A Russian report, although not mentioning the ofce of mrzbashi

specically, corroborates Sayrms description: All the arrangements for
the administration of the country and all his correspondence, Yakoob Bek
carries on through his chancellerie, which is composed of four Mirzas. These
Mirzas serve Yakoob Bek both as secretaries and as clerks.18
As far as we can gather from various sources, the rst mrzbashi ap-
pointed by Yaqb Beg was Mrz Yaqb who had come to Kashghar with
Yaqb Beg and Buzurg. He kept the post for three years and, at his death,
was succeeded by Mrz Bart and Mull sa Mrz. Mull sa was soon
discharged because of his incompetence and replaced by Mah al-Dn
Makhdm b. Hjj Alam Akhnd. He was also known as Mrz Farsakh
because it was he who put the landmarks in stone along the main road, cal-
culating the distance by farsakh.19 He was said to have known seven dif-
ferent languages and six different calligraphies and was assisted by several
mrzs.20 Finally he was replaced by Mull Zayn al-bidn Makhdm from
Marghinan.21 However, these names do not represent the full list of mrz-
bashis under Yaqb Beg, nor do we know their terms of service.
The functions of mrzbashi, as Sayrm suggests, were diverse and ex-
tensive. He not only gave advice to Yaqb Beg in important matters of state
but also supervised such nancial matters as governmental income and ex-
penses. It was his duty to check and inspect the numbers of ofcials as well
as the state properties. For example, when residents and merchants in
Kucha and Kurla who had lost their possessions because of a Tungan attack
in 1870 appealed for help, Mull Zayn al-bidn Makhdm was dis-
patched to examine and recompense their losses.22 The person who assumed
the ofce of mrzbashi sometimes performed diplomatic missions. R. B.
Shaw, when he visited Kashgharia in 186869, was welcomed and escorted
by a mrzbashi to Kashghar.23 A. N. Kuropatkin recollects that a mrz
named Makhsum (probably the above-mentioned Mah al-Dn Makhdm)
was sent to Tashkent in 1872 as an envoy and that he had the greatest inu-
ence in affairs.24 The last mrzbashi, Mull Zayn al-bidn Makhdm,
102 muslim state and its ruling structure

was sent by Beg Quli to the Chinese army in Aqsu to open a negotiation
where he met a Chinese general called Zngtng Drn.25
It is not difcult to think of the reason Yaqb Beg gave such an impor-
tant role to his mrzbashis. Many religious and military notables had far
better claim to the rulership than Yaqb Beg, and he naturally feared that
these people might gain great inuence in political affairs. What Yaqb Beg
needed was the people who could efciently execute his orders with pro-
fessional skill, yet not threaten his own political status. None of the mrz-
bashis under Yaqb Beg possessed a high military or religious background,
but instead, they had good knowledge about the composition of political
documents, revenue accounting, and other practical matters. It was just be-
cause they had no such conspicuous backgrounds that their political power
depended solely on their loyalty to Yaqb Beg. That is why Sayrm wrote
that the respect and dignity which mrzbashis received had no limit. Nev-
ertheless, even they were not yet free from the anger [of Yaqb Beg]. He
could dismiss them easily whenever he wanted to do so. Although the ofce
of mrzbashi was apparently borrowed from Khoqand, its unique status
and the role in Kashgharia was a natural consequence of Yaqb Begs pol-
icy for centralization.

local administration

First of all, it is necessary for us to dene the boundaries of the state

under Yaqb Begs rule. According to the British report that was based on
an extensive survey over his realm in 1873, his dominion reached to the
southwest as far as Shahidullah bordering Ladakh, and to the direction of
Sariqol it extended to Aqtash and Sarhadd which adjoins the Pamir and the
Wakhan valley.26 To the west Terek Davan formed the frontier with the
neighboring Khoqand, which was by that time already under Russian rule,
and to the north it reached as far as Turghat Daban, located several miles
north of the Chaqmaq guard post, where it bordered Russia.27 In the Yul-
duz steppe to the north of Tianshan nomadic Torghut Mongols recognized
Yaqb Begs suzerainty but they were virtually independent. To the east lay
Chiktim where the last guard post was established formed frontiers with
Hami, and to the northeast his rule extended as far as Manas to the north
of Urumchi.28 Finally, to the south and the southeast, Qarangghu Tagh,
Cherchen, and Lop were within his dominion. In this respect, Sayrms ob-
servation was relatively accurate:
The frontiers of the country reached one hundred days journey from Gumadi in the
east to Sariqol in the west, and eighty days journey from Muzdaban to the north
and Qarangghu Tagh to the south. Over thirty-four large and small cities which had
governors (kkim) and belonged to Urumchi and Yttishahr,29 he was a rm ruler
 muslim state and its ruling structure 103

table 4.1
Local Administrative Units under Yaqb Beg

Kuropatkin a (10) Forsyth b (10) Bellew c (7) Sayrm d (8) Qing period
(8 cities in Nanlu)

Kashghar Kashghar Kashghar Kashghar Kashghar

(Yangihissar (Yangihissar)
and Maralbashi)
Yangihissar Yangihissar Yangihissar
Yarkand Yarkand Yarkand Yarkand Yarkand
Khotan Khotan Khotan (Cherchen) Khotan Khotan
Ush Turfan Ush Turfan Aqsu (Ush Turfan) Ush Turfan Ush Turfan
Aqsu Aqsu Aqsu Aqsu (Bai)
Bai Bai Sayram
Kucha Kucha Kucha Kucha Kucha
Kurla Kurla Kurla (Lop Qarashahr
and Qarashahr)
Qarashahr
Turfan Turfan Turfan Turfan
a Kashgaria, p. 40.
b Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 32.
c Kashmir and Kashghar, p. 4.
d TH/Enver, pp. 57576; TA/Pantusov, pp. 27677.

and independent sovereign for fourteen years.30 In this respect, the territory under
Yaqb Begs rule virtually covered the entire Xinjiang except for Hami to the east
and Ili to the north.

What kind of local administration did he establish to administer this

large realm? Except for a few small areas, sources show that the whole
country was divided into a number of vilyats (provinces) for which Yaqb
Beg appointed governors called kkim (or ddkhwh).
As we see from Table 4.1, available sources give different numbers of the
provinces (in parentheses). It is not clear whether this confusion about the
number of provincial units springs from the lack of accuracy of the sources,
or from the ambiguity of the provincial system itself. We can nd contra-
dictions even in the same source. For example, Sayrm writes that after
Yaqb Beg conquered the western part of the Tarim Basin he appointed
Niyz Hkim Beg to Khotan, Mukammad Ynus Jn Shaghwul to
Yarkand, lsh B to Kashghar, mil Khn Tura to Yangihissar, and Hkim
Khn Tura to Maralbashi. And he made them governors and [the territory
under their jurisdiction] their independent ef.31 And after the occupation
of Aqsu, he made Hkim Khn Tura the governor of Aqsu, and bestowed
all the attached areas like Bai and Sayram to him as his ef.32 However, as
the table shows, Sayrm considers Yangihissar administratively as being at-
tached to Kashghar while he made Bai and Sayram independent from Aqsu.
104 muslim state and its ruling structure

We cannot exclude the possibility that the number of provinces may have
been changed because Yaqb Begs occupation of Eastern Turkestan was
achieved not at one time but gradually, and the characteristics of the local
administration may have been changed from temporary to a more perma-
nent one as time passed. In the meantime, the British and the Russian em-
bassies visited Kashgharia at different times, one in 187374 and the other
in 187677, which can be the reason for their differences. Nonetheless, we
should note the fact that even T. D. Forsyth and H. Bellew who belonged to
the same British embassy did not agree with each other.
Considering the fact that one of the distinctive features in central as well
as local administration in the khanates of Khoqand and Bukhara was the
lack of system and stability and the fact that the mode of Yaqb Begs ex-
ercise of power showed a considerable degree of despotic and arbitrary na-
ture, we can acknowledge the high degree of uidity in the units of local ad-
ministration, easily being changed according to Yaqb Begs whim. Never-
theless, the territorial boundaries of these provinces were relatively well
dened, at least along the main road. For example, R. B. Shaw describes
how a younger brother of a Yarkand governor became powerless once he
passed beyond his own district; He could hardly get anything for himself
even, so I sent him half a sheep, &c.33
Whatever the actual number was, it seems that there were about seven to
ten large units of local administration called vilyat. This number, exclud-
ing Turfan, shows some resemblance to the Eight Cities of the Southern Cir-
cuit (nanlu bacheng) as Table 4.1 shows. Although it is not clear whether
the thirty-four large and small cities which had governors (kkim) in
Sayrms work reect the situation under Yaqb Begs rule, this number
corresponds almost exactly to the 35 kkim beg established in the Southern
Circuit during the Qing period.34 In fact, we can nd in the writings of
Sayrm and others kkims were appointed to places like Maralbashi, Toq-
sun, Qaraqash, Artush, Guma, and Sariqol, which did not constitute inde-
pendent provinces.35 These facts suggest the possibility that Yaqb took
over the existing Qing local system without much change. These provinces
covered the area from Kashghar to Turfan and formed the most essential
part of Yaqb Begs state, where the majority of their population was the
Turkic Muslim.
Besides this core area, there were other regions that were not incorpo-
rated into this provincial system. As explained earlier, after Yaqb Beg con-
quered Urumchi around the end of 1870, he appointed S Dlya (Suo
Huanzhang) as dayanshay and other leaders as yanshay to Qutubi, Manas,
Gumadi, and so on. After the murder of S, his son succeeded to the post,
but, when Beg Quli nished the second expedition in 1871, Yaqb made
Gnj Akhnd, a Salar living in Kashghar, dayanshay and dispatched him
 muslim state and its ruling structure 105

to Urumchi. The Salars were ethnically Turks and they were living in the
present eastern Qinghai province. Some of them were associated with the
Jahr sect of Ma Mingxin and from the later half of the eighteenth century
they came to the cities in Kashgharia as merchants.36 The reason he sent
Gnj Akhnd may have been Yaqb Begs consideration that through
Gnj Akhnd he could more easily control the Tungans in Urumchi, many
of whom belonged to the same Jahr sect. In this way, he seems to have ac-
knowledged the peculiarity of the Urumchi area, and the mode of local ad-
ministration was different from that in the Tarim Basin. In the meantime,
the Qirghiz, the Qazaqs, and the Mongols living around the mountain re-
gions of the Tianshan and the Pamir were not directly subject to governors
appointed by Yaqb Beg but to their own tribal chiefs. Therefore, the rule
was rather indirect. Sayrm claims that chiefs in Shighnan, Kanjut and
Wakhan also acknowledged the suzerainty of Yaqb Beg,37 but such rela-
tions do not seem to have been of a permanent character.38
Governors exercised full responsibility and authority over the province,
at least nominally. According to Sayrm, for example, when Yaqb Beg
made Niyz Beg the governor of Khotan, he gave that province as his
soyurghal and entrusted him with the power to administer all the affairs and
the right to appoint and dismiss the ofcials. Ynus Jn Shaghwul, gover-
nor of Yarkand, was also entrusted with the full power of administration.39
However, we can nd several cases showing that it was Yaqb Beg, not the
governors, who directly appointed provincial ofcials in the elds of nan-
cial, military, as well as civil administration. This implies the fact that the
actual power of governors was rather limited. The principal duties of a gov-
ernor were to facilitate the collection of taxes, to care for the well-being and
the security of his province, and to ensure the borders safety. For these pur-
poses he had the aid of several ofcials, including a lieutenant governor
called ishikagha and a number of yasawuls and makrams in his provincial
court.
As we have quoted above, when Sayrm mentions Yaqb Begs ap-
pointment of provincial governors, he uses the expression of soyurghal. For
example, after he conquered Kashghar and Yangihissar, he designated gov-
ernor and [his] soyurghal to each area.40 He also appointed Niyz Hkim
Beg to Khotan, Mukammad Ynus Jn Shaghwul to Yarknd, and . . . , he
made them governors and [the territory under their jurisdiction] indepen-
dent ef (kkim v soyurghal bil-istiqll).41 Especially when he appointed
Niyz Beg to Khotan, he writes as follows.
He appointed Niyz Ishikagha Beg, a Yarkandi, to the governor of Khotan and xed
it as his independent (mustaqill) soyurghal. He also let him have the power to take
care of the matters of country as he pleased and to have the great authority to select
and dismiss ofcials.42
106 muslim state and its ruling structure

We should remember that the two most fundamental features of the

soyurghal were (1) tax exemption and administrative immunities, and (2) a
perpetual and hereditary right by its owners.43 In Central Asia these two fea-
tures had been observed beginning with the early Ashtrakhanids, and then
the practice of soyurghal began to change gradually so that the rst of the
two features mentioned above disappeared from the eighteenth century, re-
taining only the hereditary right. At the same time, the size of soyurghal land
decreased; vilyat was no more given as soyurghal, but qishlaq (originally
winter camp, but used as a term for village) was usually bestowed. Later,
the practice of soyurghal changed further that when its original owner died,
his descendants could retain the right only with the reconrmation from the
ruler.44
In view of the original meaning and its transformation of the term
soyurghal I cannot agree with the opinion based simply on the terminology
found in Muslim sources that Yaqb Beg adopted the system of soyurghal.45
Governors under Yaqb Beg enjoyed neither the right of exemption nor that
of heredity. As will be discussed later in detail, taxes levied by the governors
were all sent to Kashghar except for a small amount left for provincial use,
and we can hardly nd any case of the ofce of the governorship being in-
herited. The term soyurghal used in Sayrms work seems nothing more
than an expression for a favor or grace bestowed by the ruler. We nd such
a usage even in the chronicle of Shh Makmd Churs, written in the later
half of the seventeenth century: the examples found in his work show that
this term was used when a khan entrusted the authority to rule over a cer-
tain province to his family members or tribal chiefs. And even when he be-
stowed a banner (tugh) to somebody, it is written that a banner was given
as soyurghal.46
Therefore, the expression like independent soyurghal should be un-
derstood not in its literal meaning but in the context of the reality under
Yaqb Begs rule. And as I pointed out above, Sayrms assertion that a
governor received unconditional power to handle important affairs and to
appoint or dismiss high ofcials cannot be accepted as true. When Yaqb
Beg sent somebody as a governor to a certain province, he frequently named
not only a deputy governor (ishikagha) but also other high-ranking ofcials.
He held the power in his hands to appoint and discharge commander-in-
chief (amr-i lashkar), treasurer (sarkr, or zaktch), and even religious
ofces. Of course, the low-ranking local ofcials may have been appointed
under the direction of governors. In general, however, the local administra-
tion with a governor at its head was not part of an integrated vertical hier-
archical system because all the ofcials of whatever level were directly and
individually responsible to Yaqb Beg alone.
One interesting fact found in the background of the local governors is
 muslim state and its ruling structure 107

that most of them were Khoqandians not indigenous Kashgharians. Al-

though it is impossible to make a complete list of the governors because of
the lack of information, all the data available to us conrms that fact. The
following is the list of governors in each province (the persons in italics were
Kashgharians, and the persons with an asterisk are those whose background
is unclear).
Kashghar: Aldsh (or Alsh)
Yangihissar: Azz Beg, mil Khn, Ab al-Qsim, Mull Nim al-Dn
Yarkand: Mr Baba, Qsh Qipchaq Parvnachi, Mukammad Ynus Jn
Khotan: Mr Baba, Niyz Beg
Ush Turfan: Mukammad Baba, Iskq Jn
Aqsu: *Mrz Najm al-Dn, Hkim Khn, *Mull Jiyn Mrzbashi, Abd
al-Rakmn
Bai, Sayram: Akmad Beg, Mukammad Amn
Kucha: Iskq Khwja, Nr Mukammad, mil Khn
Kurla: Hjj Mrz, Niyz Mukammad
Turfan: Hkim Khn47
This list contains twenty-four names in total, but only four were Kash-
gharian. Even though we do not count two persons with asterisks, eighteen
people in the list are non-Kashgharians, mostly from Khoqand. Moreover,
of the four Kashgharian governors Azz Beg was executed shortly after he
had been appointed governor of Yangihissar, and Iskq Khwja was dis-
missed from his ofce after his unsuccessful defense against the Tungan
raids in 1869. Only Abd al-Rakmn in Aqsu and Niyz Beg in Khotan
could keep their ofces to the end of Yaqb Begs reign. The result un-
doubtedly shows that the Kashgharians formed a minority among the gov-
ernors, and that there is no data supporting A. D. Isievs argument that more
than 80 percent of the ofcials under Yaqb Begs rule were recruited from
the Kashgharians.48 Shinmen Yasushis detailed study on this topic also con-
rms our conclusion. According to him, administrators in the center were
mostly from Western Turkestan, while the governors and their assistants in
the local government show the mixed composition of the Khoqandians and
the natives. Important posts in the army were also dominated by non-
Kashgharians, and only the judges (qj) were mostly recruited from the
natives.49
A province was divided further into smaller units of townships (kent).
Each unit, a conglomeration of small villages, had a magistrate (beg) as its
administrative head who resided in the center of the town. It was not un-
common that bigger towns were called vilyat and the magistrates were
108 muslim state and its ruling structure

called kkim, probably due to the old custom during the Qing rule or to the
exibility of the nomenclature.50 In cases where villages were farmed out to
military garrisons, those villages seem to have been controlled by the com-
manders of such garrisons.51 Mrb was appointed to supervise the irri-
gation of several villages and put under the supervision of a beg. He took
charge of the distribution of water, the repair of canals, and so on.
The judiciary side was staffed by ofcials known as qj, muft, and ras
in towns and cities. Qj performed the investigation when cases were
brought and made his judgments based on the Islamic law. After the judg-
ments were made, the governor enforced them except for the death sentence
which needed the conrmation of Yaqb Beg. Muft issued fatvas (legal
opinions) in answer to the questions submitted to him either by qjs or pri-
vate individuals. Ras was a member of the religious police, regularly pa-
trolling streets and shops with the assistance of a few muktasibs. Ras usu-
ally carried a whip called dira, a leather thong xed to a wooden handle as
a symbol of the discipline.52 Yaqb Beg appointed a qj kaln (senior jus-
tice) and a qj ras (police chief ) in the capitals of each province and qj
askar (military judge) for the bigger units of the army.53

Army

organization and management

Initially when Yaqb Beg was sent to Kashghar accompanied by

Buzurg, he commanded only a small number of followers. This was not too
much of a problem, for most of the fq followers and a number of native
Kashgharians looked upon Yaqb Beg as an ally in their battles against the
Qirghiz under \iddq Beg who had terrorized the city. They were, however,
neither loyal nor well trained, hence Yaqb Begs position in Kashgharia
had not been secure until the arrival of reinforcements in the form of a large
number of Khoqandian troops who were eeing from Khudyr. It was
these troops that rst gave Yaqb Beg a sound base of support in Kash-
gharia and provided him with the raw material to fashion a true profes-
sional army.
The reorganization of the army appears to have taken place in the begin-
ning of 1866 just after Yaqb Beg had crushed Buzurgs opposition and was
preparing for the nal expedition to Yarkand. As Sayrm reports, he drew
up the registration of the soldiers whom he had put together and divided
them into four divisions of cavalry (yigit) and one division of infantry
(sarbz), each with 3,000 soldiers (see Figure 4.1), bringing the total force
of the army to around 15,000. Yaqb Beg commanded one cavalry division
himself and appointed four generals called amr-i lashkar (or, lashkarbashi),
to command the others.54 Other military ranks were also xed: below amr-i
 muslim state and its ruling structure 109

figure 4.1. Guard of artillery sarbz and group of ofcers,

assembled in the courtyard of Yarkand governor. Source: T. D.
Forsyth, Report of a Mission to Yarkund in 1873 (Calcutta:
Foreign Department Press, 1875), photo no. 34.

lashkar came pnadbashi (head of ve hundred), or in short pnad (eight

pnads were assigned to each division), and then yzbashi (head of one
hundred; ve yzbashis under one pnad), followed by panjhbashi (head
of fty) and dahbashi (head of ten) (see Figure 4.2). With this reorganized
army he successfully accomplished the Yarkand expedition (1866) and, the
next year with the same formation, he conquered Aqsu and Kucha (1867).55
As his territory expanded, Yaqb Beg felt the need to deploy garrison
troops in important cities for security. Each garrison was headed by a com-
mander with the title of amr-i lashkar or pnad depending on the size of
the units. For example, after he conquered Yarkand, he made a certain
Kepek Qrbashi the garrison commander of the city, and in the same way,
he placed Khlmn Pnad in Khotan, Hamdam Pnad in Aqsu, Mukam-
mad Baba Toqsaba in Kucha, Haydar Quli Pnad in Turfan, and Trd Quli
Ddkhwh in Urumchi.56 He also placed small garrisons at the guard-posts
(qarawul) along the borders of his dominion. Those guard-posts took the
form of small forts (qurghan or qurghanch). Although various sources dis-
agree on the exact number of Yaqb Begs regular force that received salary
and provision from the state, its approximate size seems to have been
around between 35,000 and 40,000. Based on Dstn-i Mukammad Yqb
and the report by A. N. Kuropatkin, we can make Table 4.2.
The total number of the two sources cited above does not show much
difference, both around 40,000, though there are other sources which give
larger numbers.57 However, one can easily notice the discrepancy of the
numbers in each city. Compared to Dstn, Kuropatkins report shows the
110 muslim state and its ruling structure

figure 4.2. Yzbashi, panjhbashi, dahbashi, at

attention. Source: T. D. Forsyth, Report of a Mission
to Yarkund in 1873 (Calcutta: Foreign Department Press,
1875), photo no. 67.

heavy concentration of the troops, almost 20,000, in the eastern part of the
Tarim Basin (Turfan, Toqsun and Kurla). What we see here is not the nor-
mal deployment of the Kashgharian army: the difference in numbers was
probably caused by Yaqb Begs transfer of troops during the winter of
187576 from the western cities to the eastern border to prepare against the
Chinese invasion led by Zuo Zongtang. Then, which period does the num-
ber shown in Dstn reect? The manuscript of this work does not have the
date of compilation. However, it seems to indicate the condition after
187071 because we nd there the mention that Abd al-Rakmn was the
governor of Aqsu who was appointed to that post only after the Urumchi
expedition.
This regular army was divided into three categories according to their
combat functions: yigit, sarbz, and taifurchi. The yigit, which literally
means cavalry, was actually mounted infantry. They could make rapid
marches, an average thirty miles a day, but in action they dismount to re,
their horses being disposed of in rear.58 The sarbz had no horses but they
were better armed and drilled than the yigits. The ratio of cavalry and in-
fantry was about three to one. The taifurchi formed a division and was sta-
tioned in Kashghar. The word taifur came from the Chinese word of dapao,
and it was a large gun, six feet in length and manned by four men. They
were recruited mostly from the Chinese and the Tungans who could handle
this equipment. There were about 3,000 Tungan taifurchis under M D-
lya, of Gansu origin, stationed in the Muslim town of Kashghar, and an-
 muslim state and its ruling structure 111

table 4.2
Number of Troops Stationed in Eastern Tukestan Cities

Dstn-i Mukammad Yqb Kuropatkins report

Kashghar 7,700 4,6004,800

Yangihissar 1,500 4,000
Yarkand 6,000
Khotan 12,000 3,000
Maralbashi 400
Ush Turfan 1,500
Aqsu 6,000 1,200
Bai and Sayram 2,000 400
Kucha 3,000 1,500
Kurla 3,160
Dabanchin 900
Turfan 8,500 (+ 10,000 Tungans)
Toqsun 6,000
Other guard posts 1,500
Total 39,700 35,360 (+ 10,000 Tungans)

other division, about 1,500 Chinese taifurchis under H Dlya, was placed
in the fort.59
Besides these regular forces, Yaqb Beg also had an auxiliary army in
case of special needs, consisting of the Tungans in Urumchi and Turfan, and
tribal people from the Pamir, especially Qirghiz and Sariqolis. A traveler re-
marked that in an emergency Yaqb Beg could mobilize almost 20,000
among the neighboring Qirghiz.60 Several thousand of them participated in
the rst Urumchi expedition.61 However, it would not be useful to try to de-
termine the exact number because they must have changed from time to
time, and these auxiliary armies were neither a permanent nor essential part
of the Kashgharian military force.
Yaqb Beg took measures to strengthen and expand his army in order to
solidify his power basis, but the army itself could be a potential threat to
him. He devised measures to eliminate this threat. First of all, he took com-
plete control over the appointment and promotion of army ofcers. Kuro-
patkin wrote that Promotion to da-bashi and to piyand-bashi was in the
hands of the pansats. Promotion to yuz-bashi and to pansat rested with
Yakoob Bek, who, at his inspections, could promote a man from the ranks
direct to the grade of pansat, and in like manner degrade a pansat to the
ranks.62 This method was designed not only to check the unnecessary
growth of the commanders power but also to create military elites loyal
only to him. Moreover, Yaqb Beg tried to preserve his exclusive power by
lling the highest military ranks almost completely with non-Kashgharians,
especially with the Khoqandians. For example, all four amr-i lashkars
whom Yaqb Beg appointed in 1866 were non-Kashgharians: Abd Allh
112 muslim state and its ruling structure

(Marghilan), Mrz Akmad (Tashkent), Umar Qul (Qipchaq), and Jmadr

(Afghan). Except for Abd Allh who had come with Yaqb Beg, the other
three arrived later, in September of 1865, with a large anti-Khudyr
group.63 If we check the background of thirteen amr-i lashkars who served
Yaqb Beg and found in Sayrms work, all of them, except for one, were
non-Kashgharian. The case of pnad was similar.64 There is no doubt that
Yaqb Begs policy was to give the highest ofces of the army to Khoqan-
dians, and thereby exclude Kashgharians. Yaqb Beg, for his part, certainly
had sufcient grounds for such a policy. The Kashgharians had supported
practically all of his enemies. \iddq Beg, Muqarrab Shh Beg, Wal Khn,
and Buzurg had all relied on Kashgharian support in their armed attacks on
Yaqb Beg.
Another measure that Yaqb Beg took to preserve his power was the pol-
icy of checks and balances in dealing with those high-ranking non-Kash-
gharian military commanders. He knew the Khoqandian politics too well
to remain unsuspecting about the loyalty of his Khoqandian ofcers. In
order not to allow them to form a united opposition against him, he lled
the highest military posts with people of different backgrounds. The rst
four amr-i lashkars are good examples; one Qipchaq, two Sarts from dif-
ferent cities in the Khoqand khanate, and one Afghan. As a way of further
strengthening control over the army, he later appointed two of his sons, Beg
Quli and Haqq Quli, as amr-i lashkars. His eldest son was made the com-
mander-in-general after the second Urumchi expedition.
Yaqb Beg also tried to separate the army from the local government so
that provincial governors could not have complete control over regional
armies and, thus, the regional chiefs of military and civil branches would
not form a unied opposition against him. Administratively, garrison com-
manders were subject to the governors who assumed the military command
of the regional armies in case of a military expedition. However, the re-
gional armies were not completely dependent upon the treasury of the gov-
ernors but were supported by a separate nancial channel under the super-
vision and control of the central government. Nor had the governors the
power to dismiss the regional commanders. Thus the relationship between
governors and military commanders was not clearly dened and remained
ambiguous; only nominally were the latter subject to the former. This phe-
nomenon may be considered an indication of the immaturity of the gov-
ernmental structure. But it might have been maintained that way on pur-
pose to curb the power of the local governors and to prevent the emergence
of close alliances between the regional bureaucratic and military structures.
Yaqb Beg endeavored to eliminate tribal opposition in his army and to
reduce the centrifugal force. In this sense, his army was quite different from
 muslim state and its ruling structure 113

those in the Bukhara and the Khoqand khanates. The standing armies that
both Bukharan and Khoqandian rulers created and tried to maintain were
extremely limited in their military strength, whereas the tribal power in the
armies like the Qipchaqs and the Qirghizs was in general much stronger.
Yaqb Beg knew very well the disruptive inuence that the tribal armies
had produced on the politics of the two khanates. He tried to keep his armed
forces predominantly non-tribal. There were auxiliary troops (Qirghiz and
Sariqolis) who were collected in case of necessity, but they were marginal in
terms of overall military strength of Yaqb Begs army.
The reason the tribal features were not strong in the army of Yaqb Beg
is easy to explain. The geographical conditions of Eastern Turkestan did not
allow the nomadic economy to ourish in any signicant degree because
waterless deserts that could not support livestock generally surrounded its
oases. By contrast, the terrain in Western Turkestan had good pastures not
only around the distant mountain slopes and valleys but also in close prox-
imity to cities and towns. The nomads could thereby maintain tribal cohe-
siveness in the midst of their sedentary neighbors. These strong tribal ties
became partly the source of their power and allowed them to intervene in
the politics of the khanates.65 It is interesting to note that a number of tribal
names were identied among the town-dwellers in Western Turkestan even
in the nineteenth century.66 On the other hand, in Eastern Turkestan, the no-
madic tribes quickly lost their political and social ties once they came down
to oases from the mountains in the north. For example, a history of the
Moghul khanate written by Shh Makmd b. Fjil Churs in the late sev-
enteenth century shows that approaching the seventeenth century many of
the members of the ruling groups who had been identied with tribal names,
such as Dghlt, Churs, Arlt, Barls, gradually lost such identity and
began to carry the non-tribal title of beg. This tendency was accelerated by
the destruction of the Moghul khanate in the 1680s by the Zunghars, and,
in Tadhkira-i azzn written about a century later by Mukammad \diq
Kshghar, we can hardly nd any person identifying himself with tribal
name; rather, his name was now tagged with ofcial title or birth place.67
In this way, Yaqb Beg succeeded in building a powerful army over
which he had effective control. The organization of ve divisions number-
ing about 15,000 in 1866 was just the beginning of his ceaseless effort to
strengthen his military. He knew that these ve divisions were insufcient
to effectively ensure the internal and the external security of his dominion,
let alone meet the likely challenge of a Chinese invasion. He increased the
number to the level of 40,000. How could he manage this huge number of
troops? Let us now examine the method of recruitment, the provision and
salary, training, armament, and so forth.
114 muslim state and its ruling structure

military buildup

At rst, Yaqb Beg recruited into the army only those who were un-
employed or who could give no account of themselves while granting ex-
emptions to the peasants (zamndr) from the military obligation.68 How-
ever, not satised with the limits of manpower available, he seems to have
introduced later a compulsory system of military service, keeping the vol-
untary system as but an aid in lling up the ranks of his forces.69 Males be-
tween the ages of fteen and thirty-ve were subject to conscription, but the
quota of recruitment does not seem to have been xed, varying year by year
according to the situation. Once conscripted, recruits were assigned to var-
ious regional armies, not necessarily in their hometowns, for an indenite
period of service (Figure 4.3). In addition to these local people who were
forcibly conscripted, Yaqb Beg also attracted many foreigners to his army.
His fame was so high at that time in the Islamic world that many foreign-
ers came to Kashgharia in order to try their fortune or to full their desire
to ght in the holy war. The Khoqandians formed the majority of the for-
eign soldiers, but many Afghans and Indians were also found. Since they
were usually more skilled and experienced in battle than Kashgharians, once
they set foot in Kashgharia, Yaqb Beg tried every means to keep them
under his service. Many were even forced to marry local women despite the
fact they already had wives in their own countries.
Soldiers received their salaries both in cash and in kind. The exact
amounts, however, are hard to determine. Kuropatkin writes,
The payment and victualling of the army in Kashgaria were not regular or subject
to any xed rules. The amount of pay issued to the troops depended on whether they
were on the march, or were stationed in barracks in the several towns, or were at
the advanced posts, but chiey on the condition of Yakoob Beks cash deposits.70

Partly for this reason, even the scanty information available exposes wide
differences in the amounts of their salary. For example, in 186869 R. B.
Shaw heard from a certain yzbashi that his pay was 300 ills (about 10
yambu) a year, and that a private soldier received 30 ills (about 1 yambu)
a year. In case of war the rate of pay more than doubled.71 However, in
187677, under favorable circumstances a private soldier received only
315 tngs a month (about 0.030.16 yambu a year), a dahbashi 20 tngs
(about 0.21 yambu a year), a panjhbashi 25 tngs (about 1 yambu a year),
and a yzbashi 300 tngs (about 3.3 yambus a year).72 Even considering
various factors such as the possible inaccuracy of the gures, we are inclined
to believe that there was a signicant decrease in the amount of salary that
the soldiers received at the end of Yaqb Begs reign. In fact, the situation
may have even been worse because the Russian embassy heard complaints
from a soldier that he had received only two pieces of cloth and 25 tngs
 muslim state and its ruling structure 115

figure 4.3. Soldiers from Kucha. Source: T. D. Forsyth, Report of a

Mission to Yarkund in 1873 (Calcutta: Foreign Department Press, 1875),
photo no. 36.

during his entire ve-year period of service.73 That amount is the equivalent
to only a months pay for a daily laborer at that time.74 Salary in kind, or
more accurately provisions, consisted of (at least in principle) two pieces of
bread and a dish of rice (pilau) every day plus a xed amount of tea, our,
groats, and meat every month. Soldiers were also provided with cloth75 and
on the occasion of festivals, they would receive a bonus in cloth or in cash.76
Yaqb Beg employed three different ways of keeping his troops supplied
with provisions. The rst was to send the necessary amounts of grain di-
rectly to commanders of the regional armies and guard posts under the su-
pervision of nancial comptrollers known as sarkr. The second was to allot
xed tracts of state land on which hired laborers and/or the soldiers could
produce their own food supplies. The nal way was to farm out the tax rev-
enue of one or more villages and direct their receipts toward the support of
local army units.77
Yaqb Beg knew well that without renovating the army he would be un-
able to stand against the eventual Chinese strike. Although by the end of the
sixties he had almost 40,000 troops, he realized that for the total military
strength the sheer number was not sufcient if it was not backed up by ad-
equate training, organization, armaments, and morale. The Muslims who
had joined the ranks of the holy war in the 1864 rebellion may have had
soaring enthusiasm but they were not properly equipped and trained. That
116 muslim state and its ruling structure

was the reason the Kuchean army reaching almost 26,000 was soundly de-
feated at the battle of Khan Ariq by only 2,000 soldiers under Yaqb Beg.
The arms of the Kuchean army, probably the most powerful in Eastern
Turkestan at that time, were mostly taken from the Qing garrisons and
those arms were hopelessly dilapidated. Although they used sword (qilich),
arrows (oq), and spear (nyz), sometimes even cannons (top or zambarak),
ries (miltiq), and gunpowder (dura), most of the peasant soldiers were sim-
ply armed with clubs or sticks (kltk, chomaq, tayaq).78
Therefore, Yaqb Beg was keenly aware of the necessity for reinforcing
his armaments. By 1870 he seems to have obtained a considerable number
of ries. R. B. Shaw who visited Kashgharia in 186869 saw Russian-
made ries. According to his report, there were about 1,000 such ries and
some of them were taken as booty and others were given by envoys from
Russia. He also heard that they had begun to make imitations.79 However,
it is hard to believe that the Russians, with whom Yaqb Beg had gone to
the verge of battle on the border of the Narin river in 1868, would have pro-
vided him a large number of ries. Even though it is true that there were
1,000 ries, most of these were probably of old style except for a few newer
weapons. Our assumption is conrmed by the following remarks by
A. N. Kuropatkin.
Yakoob Bek stood in special need of rearms and cannon. Such of the former as he
had were principally int muskets, got partly from the independent States around,
and partly manufactured in the local workshops. Beside int muskets, Yakoob Bek
contrived in the year 1868 to procure a small supply of sporting guns, with one and
two barrels. Yakoob Beks artillery was in a very bad condition.80

Yaqb Beg could not possibly have equipped his large number of troops
by depending on the small ow of generally obsolete weapons that were
traded into Eastern Turkestan. Therefore he attempted to open a number of
direct channels through which he could purchase modern weapons in quan-
tity. Initially he turned to his neighbor Afghanistan, but, as he was not
satised with the outcome of the trade,81 he began to look further aeld for
help. After opening relations with the Ottoman Empire and England,
Yaqb Beg put considerable money and effort into negotiating arms pur-
chases from those countries. It is not easy to nd out the substance of direct
and indirect forms of military aid from Britain, which did not want to make
such aid public for fear of diplomatic conicts with Russia. Nonetheless, it
seems to be true that there was actually some military aid from Britain as
was strongly suspected by Russians who visited Kashgharia. For example,
when R. B. Shaw (186869) and T. D. Forsyth (1870, 187273) visited this
country, they gave Yaqb Beg as a gift several hundred breech-loading ries
of the Snider type, muzzle-loading ries of the Eneld type, and revolvers.
According to Reintal, a Russian ofcer who visited Kashgharia in 1875, a
 muslim state and its ruling structure 117

considerable number of percussion ries were delivered by Britain to Yaqb

Beg, who built a factory for manufacturing ries with British help and trans-
formed 4,000 muzzle-loading ries to breech-loaders. He added that the
Kashgharians were capable of producing 16 ries per week and there were
many English workmen in Kashgharia. Although this report does not
truthfully reect the situation, and was acknowledged to be somewhat ex-
aggerated even by the Russians themselves,82 we cannot deny the fact that
Britains support helped Yaqb Begs military buildup. However, such sup-
port generally took the form of donations through diplomatic channels or
from sales by private merchants rather than ofcial support on the govern-
mental level.83
Compared to British assistance, it is noteworthy that the support from
Ottoman Turkey was not only larger in scale but also proceeded openly and
ofcially. Since the detailed contents of this support will be examined later
when we deal with the question of the diplomatic relations with the Ot-
tomans, sufce it to say here that Yaqb Beg received 1,200 ries (200 of a
new type and 1,000 of an old type) 6 cannons in 1873, and 2,000 ries of
Eneld type and 6 cannons for mountain terrain in 1875 with a large
amount of ammunition and accessories. These were given gratis as a reward
because Yaqb Beg accepted the vassal status of the Ottoman sultan. In ad-
dition, he also made his special envoy Sayyid Yaqb Khn purchase con-
siderable amounts of armaments in Istanbul and Egypt. According to the
report of Kuropatkin, Sayyid Yaqb Khn was instructed to buy 12,000
ries in Istanbul but succeeded in bringing only half of that number to
Kashghar and the rest were left because he could not fully meet the
expense.84
Besides strengthening military armaments Yaqb Beg also put a lot of ef-
fort into introducing a new organization and training system so as to build
a modern army. And he hoped to achieve this aim again through the aid of
the Ottomans, and that was the reason he requested the dispatch of a num-
ber of Ottoman military ofcers. He was trying to reform the Kashgharian
army based on the model of the Ottoman new military system (nizm-i cedd
asker). Although we have almost no information about how he trained his
soldiers in the early years, during the 1870s it seems to have been quite
strict. According to the testimony of the Russian embassy in 1876, soldiers
had to get up ve oclock in the morning and gather in front of their camps,
except for Friday when they attended collective prayer at the mosques. They
were trained for ten hours a day and the method of training was a mixture
of Afghan, Hindu, and Russian styles, with some modications introduced
by Yaqb Beg himself. Kuropatkin wrote that With regard to the infantry,
the new training inculcated the manual exercise, especial skill in preserving
an unbroken front, and in marching. The cavalry were taught changes of
front, to ride past at the walk and at the trot, column of threes and sixes
118 muslim state and its ruling structure

and dismounted exercise.85 And most of the soldiers, though not all, ap-
pear to have put on uniforms.86
In this way, Yaqb Begs army seemed to be well ordered and trained at
least from its outward appearance, but, looking into it more closely, it turns
out to have been a mixture of extremely diverse elements. Based on the ob-
servation of T. E. Gordon, it contained not only native Kashgharians and a
number of Khoqandians but also Kashmiris, Hindus, Afghans, Kunjuts,
Wakhis, Badakhshis, Chinese, Tungans, Mongols, Qirghizs, and so on.87 Of
these various groups in the army, the native Kashgharians were deemed the
most lacking in the skills and spirit needed for ghting, while the Chinese
and Tungan troops had been recruited mostly from prisoners of war. Those
groups considered good in battle, such as the Kashmiris, Hindus and
Afghans, were divided into small groups and stationed at different places.88
Therefore, the group that Yaqb Beg most heavily relied on was the Andi-
janis, those approximately ten thousand Khoqandians whose fate was most
closely tied to his own. Because of the great mixture of different ethnic
groups even communication within the camps was not easy, which made it
difcult to adopt one unied method of training.
In view of these problems, we can understand why Yaqb Beg hoped to
reorganize the army and to introduce a more systematic way of training. It
is curious, however, that he did not put his utmost effort in pursuing the
military reform based on the Ottoman new army. This fact is conrmed by
the reports of the Ottoman ofcers who served him and later returned to
Istanbul. For example, Al Kzim, a military engineer with the title of
yzbashi, who had been dispatched to Kashghar in 1874, left the following
report.
His Highness Yaqb Khn assigned this humble servant to the service of His Emi-
nence Mull Ynus, governor of Yarkand. So, in Yarkand which became my post, I
worked as an austere military instructor for the purpose of organizing those who
had no knowledge whatsoever about the military organization into one artillery bat-
talion and teaching them close-order drills and other skills necessary for artillery-
men, so that they could learn the military organization perfectly. This humble ser-
vant wished to give additional teachings based on the skills of military engineering
which I had learned at the military school of Your Majesty, the Shadow of God, but
His Highness Yaqb Khn told me that it would be unnecessary. Therefore, fol-
lowing his command that I should train the above-mentioned one battalion and
another regiment of 3,000 with the skills of individual (nefer), company (blk) and
battalion (tabur) close-drills, I taught them based on the principle of military
organization.89

Yaqb Beg seemed to have a somewhat reserved attitude toward the Ot-
toman ofcers. According to another source, the ofcers who came in 1875,
including Isml Haqq Efendi, were also assigned to Yarkand and allowed
 muslim state and its ruling structure 119

to give only two-hour training sessions a day, and they were forbidden to
go alone out of the military camp.90
Why did Yaqb Beg not fully utilize the Ottoman ofcers and try to put
restrictions to their activities? Mehmet tif, the author of K{gar trh gives
us two interesting explanations. The rst was Yaqb Begs concern that his
special envoy to Istanbul, Sayyid Yaqb Khn, might become a future threat
to him because of his revered status of sayyid, descendant of the Prophet.
Therefore, Mehmet tif speculated, Yaqb Beg did not want any of the Ot-
toman ofcers who had maintained close relations with Sayyid Yaqb Khn
to have strong inuence on military matters. His second explanation was
more practical: although Yaqb Beg wanted to reform his army badly, he
was worried that these reforms would provoke internal opposition.91 An in-
teresting episode recorded in K{gar trh supports this explanation. Once
when Yaqb Beg was inspecting the troops being trained by Isml Haqq
Efendi, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the sufciency of their training.
To his criticism Isml responded as follows.
The Ottoman sultan commanded us to come here so that we could serve you and do
our utmost to educate and reform the army. We are determined to endeavor for Islam
with our soul and body, but until this day we have been secluded in the house and
could not do anything. If we could not discharge our duty to strengthen Islam, we
would rather return to our country.92

At this protest Yaqb Beg was reported to have said with tears in his eyes:
I also wish to reform the army as the sultan had done, but it is not time yet
to execute it. How much time and effort were spent for the sultan to dis-
card Yenieri and to build a new army?93
This description seems to be fairly reliable because it was based on the
personal accounts of Isml, and it suggests that Yaqb Beg was worried
about the strong opposition from the Khoqandians, his principle support-
ers and main prop of military power, who could regard the all-out military
reform as threatening their position. Our assumption becomes more con-
vincing if we consider the fact that, although he relied on a small group of
Khoqandian soldiers, he took extreme caution about their possible revolt
and so he had to guard his power by extensive intelligence activities.
Nonetheless, he seems to have decided to adopt a more active policy for
the reform in his later years. He transferred Ottoman ofcers like Isml
Haqq Efendi to his capital Kashghar to train the army. He personally par-
ticipated in the training and showed such an enthusiasm that he said that
If I make a mistake during the training, rebuke me just like others! He
also ordered his army to wear trousers, coat and cap similar to those used
in the Ottoman Empire. Later Isml Haqq Efendi and Zamn Efendi were
sent to Aqsu where they trained the troops under the direction of his son
120 muslim state and its ruling structure

Haqq Quli.94 Yaqb Beg introduced the Ottoman system of military or-
ganization into his infantry and cavalry. Though details are not available to
us, each division seems to have been reorganized into several battalions
(tabur) each of which in turn was divided into eight companies (blk) in
the case of the infantry, or eight squadrons (takm) in the cavalry. Accord-
ing to Kuropatkins observation, one infantry company consisted of thirty
columns and one cavalry company fteen to sixteen columns. Thus, Yaqb
Beg changed the principle of military division from the traditional system
of ten (dah)fty (panjh)one hundred (yz)ve hundred (pnad) to a
new one that he borrowed from the current Ottoman system. However, this
new system of division was applied only to a part of the Kashgharian army,
and the cavalry continued to maintain the traditional decimal system.95 We
should remember that the Khoqandians formed the majority of the cavalry
and it was they who made Yaqb Beg grasp the power. This fact suggests
that he applied the new system basically to the infantry, which was recruited
from the native population; he could not reform the cavalry because of a
possible reaction from the Khoqandians.
In this way, Yaqb Beg secured an army whose number reached almost
forty thousand and took various measures to strengthen his military power,
but such a large number of troops could not be maintained without over-
burdening the Kashgharian economy. In addition to the expenses that were
necessary just for the upkeep of the army, the costly expeditions such as
those he launched against the Urumchi Tungans exhausted a lot of gov-
ernmental treasury.96 Yet Yaqb Beg could neither reduce the number of
his troops nor the amount of money spent in arms purchase because he had
to be prepared for a future Chinese invasion. The result could be no other
means than the increase of tax collection and the reduction of soldiers
salary, which in turn increased the economic burdens of people and lowered
the morale of the soldiers. Another point that we should not forget to men-
tion in relation to the weakness of his army is the heterogeneity of its com-
position. Many of the foreign mercenaries were detained against their will,
as evidenced by the bitter complaint of one such soldier: Our only chance
is in some commotion arising, then we should be able to get away.97 Also
many Kashgharians were deeply dissatised with the domination of the
army by the Khoqandians. Some of them even grumbled that they were
better off under the Chinese.98

Society and Religion

socioeconomic conditions

Several decades of political turbulence had a serious impact on the

societies of Eastern Turkestan and Zungharia. Many people died in battles
 muslim state and its ruling structure 121

while some others ed; the irrigation canals were left unattended for a long
time; and trade, internal as well as external, shrank sharply. Yet the degree
of the impact was not uniform over all the areas of Xinjiang. Generally
speaking, Zungharia and the eastern extreme of Eastern Turkestan (Hami,
Turfan, and Qarashahr) were hit harder than Kashgaria. The Ili valley prob-
ably fared the worst of all in terms of damage. Many cities and towns turned
into complete ruins because of the ghting between the Qing troops and the
Muslims, and then, between the Taranchis and the Tungans, which lasted
altogether seven years. For instance, E. Schuyler who visited this area in
1873 describes the city of Ili (Huiyuan Cheng) as follows:
For the whole distance, about ten miles, the road lay through a country which had
formerly been well cultivated, but is now a desolated waste. At last we approached
the edge of the town, when heaps of ruins presented themselves on every side, and
sometimes a whole wall or a rooess house could be seen. Soon the ruins extended
on both sides of us as far as we could see, and in front of us up to the very walls of
the fortress. . . . Inside of the fortress walls, which were too strong to be destroyed,
a similar scene met our view; but here the destruction had been much more com-
plete. The two broad straight avenues were still plainly visible, as they were too wide
to be encumbered with ruins; but the other streets were all blocked up by the fallen
houses, and their course could scarcely be traced.99

On his way to the city of Ili, Schuyler also witnessed a series of other
towns in desolation, such as Yarkent, which became almost indistinguish-
able, Chimpantsi, where not a single house was left standing, Khorgos,
which presented nothing but mere mounds, and Alimtu, another ruined
town.100
Many people were killed too. One Tungan aqsaqal of Suiding told him
that That morning [when Ili fell] there were in it 75,000 people with the
army; that evening not a soul was left alive.101 This may be an overstate-
ment but undoubtedly reects what actually happened in the city, for the
statistics show a drastic reduction of the Ili population. The total popula-
tion before the rebellion was counted approximately 350,000.102 The 1876
census done by the Russians shows that the number went down to 131,910
(82,142 settled and 49,768 nomadic population).103 Even in 1910, more
than three decades later, the population of the Ili region had not fully re-
covered to its former level.104 From this we can easily imagine the magni-
tude of the destruction in this region.
Urumchi fared no better than Ili. Many Chinese and Manchus were killed
when Urumchi and neighboring areas fell into the hands of the Tungans.
Later, during the two years of war (187072) with Yaqb Beg, numerous
Tungans also died. Sayrm reports that 15,000 Tungans were killed in
Urumchi and 2,000 in Manas when these cities were taken by Beg Quli. Al-
though his estimation that almost 200,000 Tungans perished during this
war seems to be much inated,105 it is not surprising at all that Zuo Zong-
122 muslim state and its ruling structure

tang found only 6,400 households in Urumchi where 23,800 households

had been registered before the rebellion.106 The German archaeologist Le
Coq could see the ruins caused by the war between Yaqb Beg and the Tun-
gans when he traveled from Turfan to Urumchi in the winter of 1904, al-
most thirty years after the war.107
The conditions in Qarashahr, Turfan, and Hami seem to have been as bad
as in Ili or Urumchi. The British mission in 187374 reports that the area
between Qarashahr and Ushaq Tal was as follows:
It is about six days journey in length, and was covered with a succession of Khitay
homesteads; but these were all destroyed by the Amr, and the whole way up to Ush
Aktal, a distance of fty miles, is now a mass of ruined farms and deserted home-
steads. . . . The population of the division [of Qarashahr] was formerly reckoned at
8,000 houses or 56,000 souls, but now, excepting the Musulman settlement of 300
houses on the river and the new fort built by the Amr, there is hardly anybody in
the country.108

Because of the destruction of the cultivation and the decreased popula-

tion, the Qing court, after the reconquest, allowed the area of Qarashahr to
be exempted from taxes in 1878.109 Turfan which had been one of the most
populous and ourishing of all the States of Kshghar also suffered
frightfully during the late revolution of the Tungani and succeeding con-
quest by the Amr, and now it is described as a long succession of ruined
farmsteads and barely tenanted settlements.110
On the other hand, the area to the west of Qarashahr, though not im-
mune from the destruction, was in a better condition than the above-men-
tioned areas. Although Western visitors could notice somewhat dilapidated
conditions in some parts of the cities or in the countryside,111 the Kashghar-
ian society in general showed enough resilience to recover from whatever
destruction had been done. Travelers who traversed this region evidenced
how the cultivation and the irrigation were well managed. For example,
Shaw did not encounter any ruin of the peasant economy: As far as the eye
could see, there stretched a highly cultivated plain to which orchards and
groves of trees surrounding the numerous scattered homesteads gave almost
the appearance of wood.112 The 1873 British mission received the same im-
pression. In Khan Ariq and Qizil Buy near Kashghar, one of its members
carried on a traverse survey wherever he went, which has thrown some
light on the intricate maze of rivers and canals which irrigate the villages
that are thickly scattered over the whole of the ground visited by him.113
They witnessed a similar well-cultivated and well-irrigated scene in the Ar-
tush and Yarkand areas.114
Zuo Zongtangs report which shows the tax collection in grain by the
Qing government in 1878, one year after the reconquest, supports our con-
clusion that Kashgharia was in a far better condition than the other areas
 muslim state and its ruling structure 123

of Xinjiang. The amount of grain levied in each city was recorded as follows
(unit is shi): Zhendi (6,940), Turfan (14,200), Kashghar (60,508), Yangi-
hissar (20,612), Yarkand (79,412), Khotan (36,879), Aqsu (14,230), Ush
Turfan (8,378), Kucha (12,849), and Qarashahr (exempted; 6,598 in 1879),
which made a total of 254,008 shi. Although he did not mention Ili and
Urumchi, this amount was, as he pointed out, almost 120,000130,000 shi
more than what had been levied prior to the rebellion.115 These numbers
clearly show that the great majority of the revenue came from the area to
the west of Qarashahr and suggests that the agricultural production in
Kashgharia did not decrease, or it may have even increased, compared to
that prior to the rebellion.
One can point out several reasons for such a conspicuous contrast in the
socioeconomic conditions between Zungharia and Kashgharia. First of all,
more Manchu troops and Chinese colonists were found in Zungharia dur-
ing the Qing rule, and naturally it took a longer time for the Muslims to
take hold of this area than Kashgharia. During the rebellion many Muslims
died, and the Manchus and the Chinese were almost exterminated. The two
years of protracted warfare between Yaqb Beg and the Urumchi Tungans
must have devastated the whole area from Turfan up to Manas and killed
many Tungans. In the Ili valley disastrous ghting lasted longer than in
Urumchi, and the destruction there was almost complete. Compared to
these, the revolts in Kashgharia entailed fewer casualties, partly because of
the smaller number of the Chinese and the Manchus and partly because of
the swift success of the movement. Also, though there was internal ghting
between regional Muslim groups, the effects were not so disastrous as in
Zungharia, and the conquest of Kashgharian cities by Yaqb Beg, once he
had consolidated his base in Kashghar and Yangihissar, was swift and usu-
ally not followed by massive killings. Khotan was probably the only excep-
tion where a large number of people were killed.116

efforts for recovery

Yaqb Beg had to strengthen the economic capability of Eastern

Turkestan in order to support at least 40,000 soldiers, but it was not an easy
task. Although the Qing court had stationed approximately the same num-
ber of troops, these had received large annual subsidies derived from other
provinces in China. To maintain the huge number of troops, Yaqb Beg had
to nd sufcient human and nancial resources. According to the two
Western reports drawn up after extensive research in the country during the
seventies, the level of the total population in the region went down com-
pared to that prior to the rebellion. The British report observed that the ac-
tual number of the population under Yaqb Beg in 1873 was less than
1,015,000 (145,000 households) which was the revenue reckoning of the
124 muslim state and its ruling structure

Chinese rulers before the rebellion, while the Russian mission concluded
that the population in 1825 which had reached 1,500,000 decreased to
1,200,000 in 1876.117 Some sources mention that he ordered a cadastral
survey for the Urumchi area.118 Though we do not know whether similar
surveys were done in Kashgharia, it is certain, as Sayrm tells, that he tried
to eliminate the oating population and to turn them into a working force.
Those who were obstinate and troublesome, villains, unbridled ones, thieves, gam-
blers, abusers, and pigeonersall those who were living by ridiculing others, fear-
ing the stern fury of Ataliq Ghz, sought the forgiveness from him and, then, set-
tled down to work. If any one was caught ghting and disputing or making a false
litigation, he was sent immediately to yzbashi, pnad, or jild (executioner), and
made a soldier.119

It was reported that Yaqb Beg brought twenty thousand Tungans from
Urumchi to Kashgharia when he was returning after the rst Urumchi ex-
pedition.120 Those Chinese who survived the rebellion were forced to adopt
Islam and employed as soldiers, artisans, or farmers. At the same time,
Yaqb Beg tried to keep as many foreigners as he could. These foreigners,
once they came into Yaqb Begs dominion and served under him, could
not return to their countries as freely as they had come. We do not know
how many of them were living in Eastern Turkestan during the period of
Yaqb Begs rule. According to Valikhanov, in the late 1850s before the re-
bellion broke out, the total number of foreigners in Altishahr, that is, the
western part of Eastern Turkestan, was about 145,000, or approximately
one-fourth of the entire native Kashgharian population.121 This number
may have been inated, but whatever the number of foreigners was before
the rebellion, it is likely to have increased after the emergence of Yaqb Beg.
Yaqb Beg paid special attention to the artisans who could provide him
with a variety of military equipment. He mobilized them, as well as un-
skilled laborers, and built workshops (ishkhna) in large cities like Kash-
ghar, Yarkand, and Khotan. These workshops, run by the state, were of an
unprecedented scale, where almost fty thousand artisans and workers were
employed.122 The craftsmen of precious metals made girdles, quivers, bri-
dles, cruppers, and saddle-girths in gold and silver; the ironsmiths produced
ries, swords, sabers, stirrups, cannons, and arrows; the tailors made em-
broidered garments and silken cloth; and many other artisans were put to-
gether like carpenters, nailers, and metal casters.123 They were organized
along the professions and placed under the masters (stbashi) who were
supervised in their turn by the headmasters (ishbashi).124 One should not re-
gard this system of workshop as a kind of forced labor camp because the
participation in the workshops was voluntary at least at its earlier stages.
The artisans received a daily wage or monthly salary and provisions for
 muslim state and its ruling structure 125

their work.125 For example, workers at the carpet workshops in Khotan run
by the state received 20 puls a day, whereas if one provided the government
with his products while working in his own house, he was supplied with
food gratis and paid 10 puls.126 Yaqb Begs goal of establishing large-scale
state workshops lay in organizing the laborers for systematic and effective
production.
There were also a large number of miners working on the ores of gold,
copper, and iron. In some cases they were self-employed, and in others they
had contracts with agents who sold the metals to the government or the
market. Extensive gold mines were found in the Khotan region where more
than seven thousand miners, mostly drawn from the poor, were working.
The government appropriated one-fth of the original yield of gold, and the
miners could sell the rest to licensed dealers under the supervision of gov-
ernment ofcials. The government further reserved the right to purchase the
remaining four-fths of the yield from the dealers at a rate slightly lower
than the market price. To stop illegal hoarding and contraband sales, of-
cials sometimes searched the bodies or the houses of the workers. In case of
violations, the punishment was initially lenient, but it appears to have
grown harsher toward the end of Yaqb Begs rule.127 Iron ores were found
in the Qizil Tagh,128 to the northwest of Yarkand, and copper mines in Aqsu,
Bai and Kucha. The government practiced no monopoly on this mining, but
did keep the smelting furnaces under supervision. The famous jade industry
of Khotan was not so active during this period because of the want of Chi-
nese jade cutters.
While Yaqb Beg succeeded considerably in remobilizing the people and
in organizing the labor force, the condition of internal economy was not
much improved. Before the time of Yaqb Beg, commercialization and the
money economy had been poorly developed, and barter had been a pre-
dominant mode of economic transactions in this region. The limited amount
of money in circulation and the rapid changes in the comparative value of
silver vs. copper money seriously hampered the development of the money
economy. To these problems the widespread existence and use of foreign
coins, like those of Bukhara and Khoqand, and of counterfeit coins, espe-
cially made by the Qirghiz, added to the confusion and distrust of the people
for the money. For these reasons daily economic activities remained on the
level of exchange.
There is no indication that the situation improved during the period of
Yaqb Beg. Giving a portion of their products to the government as tax and
retaining another for their subsistence, people could turn only a limited
amount of their products into the market. The bazaar was the place through
which one could get the best view of the commercial activities in Kashgharia
at that time.129 On every market day people from the surrounding villages
126 muslim state and its ruling structure

swarmed into the bazaar; they came with grain, fruits, cotton, poultry, or
home-woven cloth, and so on, and bartered those items with whatever they
needed for daily life, such as ready-made cloth, hats, boots, belts, and so
forth. Money was rarely involved in these transactions. Indigenous Kash-
gharian merchants had a small amount of capital and little political pro-
tection. Even if they made prots, they were afraid of acknowledging their
good fortune.130 Chinese merchants disappeared, but the role and the
wealth they had managed to keep were now transferred to the Khoqandians
or a few other merchants who enjoyed political protection.
One important event in the eld of the internal economy was the intro-
duction of new coins. Even though money was not a predominant medium
of economic transactions, its existence was known long before the time of
Yaqb Beg.131 After the expulsion of the Qing power from Eastern Turke-
stan, the old coins continued to be used, while new coins were introduced.
Rshidn Khwja established foundries in Aqsu and Kucha where pul was
stamped, bearing the name of the city, for example, jarb-i dr al-salnat-
i Kch (minted in the kingdom of Kucha), and the name of the ruler, that
is, Sayyid Ghz Rshidn Khn.132 But they went out of circulation with
the end of the Kuchean regime. It is reported that Habb Allh of Khotan
also minted aq tng bearing the phrase of shahda, l illh ill allh Mu-
kammad rasl allh (There is no god but Allh, and Mukammad is His
apostle) on one side and jarb-i Khotan-i laf (minted in the city of Kho-
tan) on the other.133 Unfortunately, no specimen has been known to survive.
Yaqb Beg also made new coins, about which Sayrm made an inter-
esting remark. According to his assertion, Yaqb Beg, before opening for-
mal relations with the Ottoman empire, minted gold coins (ill) in the name
of Mall Khan (r. 185862) of the Khoqand khanate, and copper coins (ms
pul) in imitation of old Qing coins.134 Another source conrms that Yaqb
Beg made gold coins in the name of Mall Bahdur Khn.135 Throughout
the history of the Islamic world, the coinage (sekke) and the sermon on the
Friday prayer (khuba) have been the two most important signs showing the
locus of sovereignty. From the fact that Yaqb Beg ordered sekke in the
name of Mall Khan we can learn one important fact. His act apparently
signied that while he was not claiming his own independent sovereignty,
he was acknowledging only the suzerainty of a Khoqand khan who no
longer existed. This allowed him to explicitly deny the authority of the cur-
rent Khoqand khan, Khudyr. In this sense, the minting of new coins was
tantamount to the proclamation of his virtual independence while avoiding
the criticism of being a usurper.
Yaqb Begs policy seeking the legitimate source of his rulership from
some other established political power did not change to the end of his
reign. Later, he sent his envoy to Istanbul asking Sultan Abdlazz to accept
his country as one of the sultans protectorates and to give a blessing to his
 muslim state and its ruling structure 127

rule of Eastern Turkestan. After the envoy returned to Kashghar with the
recognition of the sultan, he ordered in the rst week of December 1873,
the striking of two kinds of new coinaq tng and qizil illand pray-
ing the Friday sermon all in the name of the sultan.136 Although we should
not ignore the economic considerations behind his decision to make new
coins (for example, to inject new blood into the old monetary system so that
the economy of the country could gain some stability and vigor, or to pro-
vide intermediate monetary units larger than pul but smaller than yambu to
pay his soldiers), it is also important to take into consideration the political
motivation, that is, the outward expression of his political legitimacy.
According to various sources, there were several other kinds of coins in
use during Yaqb Begs rule. The smallest monetary unit was pul. This cop-
per coin had existed well before the Qing conquest and continued in use
after that. It was also called by the local people qara pul or khoichan, from
Chinese heiqian meaning the black cash, and in Chinese it was called dan-
gwu (worth ve). Two puls made one darchin or dolchan (both from Chi-
nese daqian, large cash), which was no other than dangshi (worth ten).
All these were made in copper. Fifty puls or twenty-ve darchins made one
tng in silver, equivalent to one liang. Before Yaqb Begs time, tng had
not been real money, but had existed only as an indicator of monetary value.
Two kinds of tng were circulated, one Kashgharian minted by Yaqb Beg
and the other Khoqandian, two of the former being taken as the same value
as one Khoqandian tng. Also a few kinds of ill in gold (Kashgharian,
Khoqandian, and Bukharan) existed. In addition to these minted coins,
there was a silver ingot called yambu (from Chinese yuanbao) of the shape
of a deep boat with projecting bow and stern.137 The largest one weighed
about 50 liangs or 50 sers, approximately 2 kg, and there were several other
smaller ones of the same shape.
During the years of the rebellion external trade was almost completely
cut off. Direct trade with China was nonexistant and only a small amount
of Chinese goods were brought into Kashgharia indirectly via Russian ter-
ritory where the chief emporium was in Vernoe (present Alma-Ata).138 Nat-
urally tea which had been the foremost import from China was in great
scarcity. In 1865 W. H. Johnson witnessed how the people of Khotan dug
up the sand-buried old towns and found the tea. He wrote that The only
one [of those towns] that is well known is that in which very large quanti-
ties of brick tea are found, and which commands a ready sale in the mar-
kets, now that all trade with China is stopped.139
The trade of Russia with Eastern Turkestan which was about to ourish
could not avoid a serious impact too. In his letter to General Kaufman in
1868, Yaqb Beg wrote: Now, after the destruction of the Chinese power,
during six years all has been destroyed that was good and that which com-
merce had created, so that nothing remains of it all. This was the reason why
128 muslim state and its ruling structure

your rich merchants were not allowed here, for they could nd nothing here
but ruins.140 Although his intention for writing this was to justify his pol-
icy not allowing Russian merchants to come to Kashgharia, it certainly
reects the reality. The ow of the Russian goods into Kashgharia through
Tokmak in the north or Osh in the west was stopped or greatly impeded
during the years of 186467. According to one report, during the period of
December 1868December 1869 (13 months) the total amount of the ex-
ports and the imports together between the two countries through the Tok-
makNarin route was 274,665 rubles, which suggests that the amount of
trade in the year of 1869 would have been at most 250,000 rubles. In 1870
the size of the trade did not show much change, recording 224,025 rubles.
But in 1871 the amount almost tripled to 604,710 rubles.141 The trade via
the Tokmak and Narin route took about 85 percent of the entire trade be-
tween Russia and Kashgharia, so the increase of the trade volume through
this route directly affected the total amount of the trade between the two
countries.142 Probably this rapid increase of the trade volume was one of the
reasons Russia pushed Yaqb Beg to conclude the commercial treaty of
1872. In the same year the trade went over a million rubles. However, it did
not further increase to the end of Yaqb Begs reign.143
The Kashgharian trade with India and Kashmir also shows a similar uc-
tuation to that with Russia; the total volume of IndianKashghar trade
reached the nadir during the years of 186466 and showed a sign of recov-
ery in 1867, recording 227,000 rupees (imports and exports together), but
next year the amount was doubled and then continued to grow slowly.
Owing to the treaty with the British government in 1874, the trade in 1874
recorded 1,315,000 rupees, but after that year the trade volume did not
show any substantial increase.144
The cause of such an insignicant change in external trade even after the
treaties should be attributed, rst of all, to the political uncertainty of the
Kashgharian state, its geographical barriers, and to the limited capacity of
Kashgharia as a market. But, at the same time, we should not forget another
factor, that is, Yaqb Begs cautious attitude toward the expansion of trade
with neighboring countries. By concluding commercial treaties with Russia
and England he intended to enhance his international political stance and
to neutralize the direct threat from Russia rather than to facilitate interna-
tional trade itself. The fact that even after the conclusion of the treaties
many foreign merchants were subjected to various sorts of arbitrary treat-
ments from the government of Kashgharia also supports this point. Yaqb
Beg may have thought that a drastic increase of the foreign trade, being fol-
lowed by the inux of foreign goods and merchants, would entail unex-
pected changes and jeopardize the security of his dominion.
In contrast to his lukewarm attitude toward the expansion of the exter-
 muslim state and its ruling structure 129

nal trade, Yaqb Beg put not a small effort to facilitate internal communi-
cation and to enforce security. He put milestones or tash (stones) along the
main roads to indicate the distance between important cities. As mentioned
earlier, Mah al-Dn Makhdm obtained the epithet of Mrz Farsakh by
his work of erecting such stone posts. Yaqb Beg also built numerous halt-
ing places (langar), small forts (qurghancha) along the road, and guard
posts (qarawul) on the borders to facilitate communication and to ensure
security. He himself often supervised and participated in such constructions,
being covered with dust and even had his leg hurt by the fall of a
stone.145 The mountain nomads, especially Qirghiz and Sariqolis, who in
the time of the Chinese rule often attacked and levied tolls from travelers
and merchants, were brought under control. A member of the British em-
bassy described the security of the passage as follows.
. . . if a man drop his whip in the middle of the plain, he will nd it there if he looks
for it a year afterwards. This is a favourite saying amongst the people of Eastern
Turkestan, which I have heard more than once employed to describe the sense of se-
curity enjoyed under the present rgime.146

However, we should not forget that the security enforced by the stern rule
of Yaqb Beg was rather close to security by terror,147 or to the policy of
blood and iron.148 And to understand the establishment of the internal
security we should also take into account the religious policy of Yaqb Beg.

revival of islamic spirit

One of the most distinctive changes in social and religious life in East-
ern Turkestan during his rule was the strong reaction against the moral lax-
ity, from the Islamic viewpoint, which had pervaded the region during the
rule of the indels. Under the Qing rule people used to drink wine freely and
publicly; almost no public entertainment was complete without dancing,
and women could walk the streets with unveiled faces. A nineteenth-century
observer considered the reason for such a lack of fanaticism among the
people of Eastern Turkestan to be their unique historical experience, that is,
the frequent contacts with the Chinese culture but less frequent interaction
with their western neighbors.149 His viewpoint seems to reect the general
opinion of the contemporary Muslims that the source of the degeneration
of the Islamic spirit was the Chinese rule.
As soon as the Muslims gained victory over the Qing, their leaders took
the measures of purging the indels and forcing people to observe strictly
the sharah regulations. In Ush Turfan a severe religious persecution against
some Su orders, especially the Kubrawiyya, took place, and in Khotan
Habb Allh enforced almost unprecedentedly rigorous observation of the
sharah. The leaders in Urumchi even named their newly created govern-
130 muslim state and its ruling structure

ment Qingzhen guo (Kingdom of Islam). Yaqb Beg, who eliminated all
these regional powers, was no exception. However, he had not been a re-
vered religious gure and killed many religious leaders, such as Habb Allh,
Rshidn, Jaml al-Dn, Wal Khn, Ktt Khn, and Kichik Khn. He also
expelled Buzurg with an excuse that Buzurg was making a pilgrimage to
Mecca.150
These acts certainly provoked fury and anger from many Kashgharians,
so Yaqb Beg put his utmost effort into refreshing his image as a holy war-
rior as well as protector of Islam. He could have assumed the title of khan
or suln, but he did not because he wanted to avoid giving the impression
of being a usurper. Instead, he preferred the titles like Ataliq Ghz or
Badaulat because of the religious aura these titles carried. His acknowledg-
ment of the Ottoman sultan as his suzerain was also motivated by a similar
desire and his effort was redeemed by the title of amr (or amr al-mminn)
bestowed by the sultan.
Yaqb Beg put not a small effort for the revival of Islamic spirit to
strengthen his legitimacy. He sent a Qurn reciter to Mecca in order to set
up a hostel (takiya-khna) in the name of Yttishahr.151 He also ordered the
building and repair of many mausoleums, mosques, and praying houses,
and to provide vaqf funds to religious institutions.152 He introduced public
baths (kammm) in Kashgharia where they had not existed up to that time.
In particular he rebuilt the arch (gumbad) of the shrine of Khwja fq in
Kashghar, and ordered builders to put a new praying house and a mosque
inside the mausoleum.153 He regularly paid visits to this shrine which was
one of the most celebrated holy places in Eastern Turkestan. He also ordered
repairs to the tombs of Bibi Miriym and Satuq Boghra Khan. It was re-
ported that the number of religious buildings that he constructed or repaired
reached almost sixty.154 Some people even utilized his religious attitude for
their own benet: two shaykhs from Badakhshan, one of them claiming
himself Makd of the Last Day, came to Kashgharia and tried to manip-
ulate Yaqb Beg. At rst, he seems to have been terried by the warnings
of these pretenders and complied with their directions, but later, after con-
sulting with ulam, ordered them to be put into a pit and be killed by
throwing stones.155
Yaqb Beg not only strictly observed the sharah rules himself but also
required his subjects to do the same. The following portrayal by Sayrm
vividly depicts his religious and grave attitude.
He was the man of medium height and stout build, with upright body like a barley
stick, a face of rosy complexion and soft beards. At rst, he was temperate and acted
with prudence and led his life obeying the regulations of sharah. His manners and
conduct were almost like those of revered saints or intelligent scholars. His cloth re-
sembled that of noble merchants, and his horses and outts were not better than
those of captain of fty (panjhbashi). When he sat down, he kneeled, like a cam-
 muslim state and its ruling structure 131

el, on a white prayer-carpet or on a mat with his head covered with turban. No one
ever saw him loosen his belt binding the loin or sit cross-legged. Neither did he sit
on a raised dais or a sofa table: most of the time he just sat in front of his tent, on a
mat or low ground. He never set his foot on the soil without performing ablution.156

Yaqb Beg himself took a transportable tent-mosque, pulled by twenty

horses, whenever he traveled. Daily prayers were strictly enforced, and for
that purpose he ordered all the muazzins of the court and the mosques in
towns as well as villages, to start to call for prayer and to end exactly at the
same time. It was reported that even each shop had to have one muazzin.
Nobody could walk around the streets or the bazaars without wearing a tur-
ban (dastr); if somebody was found wearing a fur cap (tumaq) or a skull
cap (doppa), it was instantly torn off and taken away.157 To enforce the ob-
servation of the rules, he placed a number of religious ofcials in cities and
towns as well as in the army.158 For example, the ofcials called qj ras,
aided by several muktasibs equipped with a whip called dira, regularly pa-
trolled the streets and the bazaar.
He examines the weights in the retail shops, and ogs such as have short weights;
or in serious cases sends the offenders before the mufti for judgment. His own pow-
ers do not exceed the summary iniction of 20 to 40 stripes of the dira, and these
are freely bestowed on women appearing unveiled in the streets, on gamblers, drunk-
ards, brawlers, and disorderly characters, and such as neglect the stated hours of
prayer, and others.159

Those who wanted to travel beyond their own districts were required to
have passports issued by the local authority. If anyone was found in other
districts without a proper passport, he was sent to a police station for in-
quiry.160 Fasts and public prayers were enforced while drinking wine, smok-
ing narcotics or tobacco, singing, dancing, and playing music were all pro-
hibited both in public and in private.161 The following remarks by Kuro-
patkin seem to depict aptly the social milieu of the time.
He has acted as though he would turn the country into one vast monastery, in which
the new monks must, whilst cultivating the soil with the sweat of their brow, give as
much as possiblenay, the greater part of their earningsinto the hands of the
Government, to devote to warlike impulse.162

Taxation

taxes

The government collected three kinds of regular tax: ushr (or

kharj), anb, and zakt. The usage of the two termsushr and kharj
was more or less interchangeable in modern Central Asia, both meaning the
tax on the grain production. Originally ushr had been the tithe taken from
132 muslim state and its ruling structure

the produce of the land owned by Muslims, whereas kharj was the levy on
the land of non-Muslims and, in most cases, it was heavier than ushr. How-
ever, the more people converted to Islam, the more the land paying ushr
came into being and the less the amount of revenue was collected. Actually
the rapid conversion of the people in Khurasan and Transoxiana in the rst
half of the eighth century owed much to their desire to throw away the bur-
den of kharj. As the revenue income reduced drastically because of the
massive conversion of the non-Muslim population to Islam, the Umayyad
government tried not to change their tax status accordingly. The inconsis-
tency of these terms in this period did not disappear even after most of the
population in Central Asia converted to Islam and kharj lost its ground for
existence in principle.163 Ushr was in theory one tenth of the whole pro-
duction of all cereal crops and it was usually paid in kind. The reality, how-
ever, was different as the British embassy witnessed: in practice much more
is exacted by the Collectors for their own benet, and whilst at Yangi Hissar
we saw Government orders upon certain settlements for the collection of
the ushr at the rate of three parts in ten.164
]anb was the tax on orchards, meadows, or the elds raising non-cereal
crops like cotton, but the term itself was originally a measure of length that
differed according to regions and periods. The Qing government had also
made a distinction in taxing the land for cereal crops and that for non-cereal
crops. For the former the measure was batman, the land where one could
sow the cereal of 5 shi (bushel) 3 dou (pint).165 One tenth of the products
from the privately owned lands, or half from the government-owned land,
had been taken. As for the land of non-cereal crops, it is not clear whether
the measure of anb had been used ofcially by the Qing government but
it was certainly used by Khoqand aqsaqals in Kashgharia when they col-
lected tax from the cotton-elds and the orchards owned by the Khoqan-
dians and the chalghurts, 10 tngs from the orchards and 5 tngs from
every anb of the suburban elds and meadows.166 This kind of tax was
called anbna in Khoqand, and when Yaqb Beg conquered Kashgharia,
he seems to have extended this practice to other land owned by the
Kashgharians.
According to Valikhanov, in the late 1850s 1 anb in Kashgharia was
0.375 desiatina, that is, 4,050 m2.167 But the Forsyth mission reports that
in the year of 1873 1 anb equaled 47 yards and that any space on two
sides by a line of that length is called a tanab of land168 which would be
1,849 m2. Shaw also notes that 1 anb was a square of land whose side
is 40 gaz in length, each gaz being about 3 feet 6 inches, which equals to
1,820 m2.169 It is not certain whether the difference between assertions of
Valikhanov on the one hand and of the Forsyth mission and Shaw on the
other was due to an actual change in the length of a anb or to a mistake
 muslim state and its ruling structure 133

of either of the two sides, or to the difference of the area from which they
drew the data. In the early seventies the anb tax varied from 1 or 2 to 8
or 10 tngs according to the nature and value of the crop.170 At the end
of his rule, one had to pay 20 tngs from one anb.171
Zakt (alms), one of the ve pillars of Islam, had been originally used ei-
ther for the common cause or for the needs of the poor. Later, however, it
came to mean the custom duty and was used not necessarily for the origi-
nal purpose of charity. In the late nineteenth-century Kashgharia zakt was
1/40 of all livestock and of merchandise entering the country. Yet prior to
the treaties with Russia in 1872 and with England in 1874, from the mer-
chandise of the non-Muslims 5 percent of the zakt tax at the ad valorem
rate had been taken, and every Hindu merchant had to pay an additional 2
tngs of poll tax (jizya) every month, as long as they stayed in the domin-
ion of Yaqb Beg. After the treaties, the poll tax on the Hindus was dropped
and the rate of 2.5 percent applied to all foreign merchants.
These three regular taxesushr, anb, and zaktwere the major
items of the governmental income. All these existed before the time of
Yaqb Beg. When the Zunghars conquered Kashgharia and made its in-
habitants their albatu, that is, those who had the obligation to pay alban
(duty), people had to send a certain amount of alban to Ili. According to
Muslim sources, it comprised three: jizya, bj (custom tax), and kharj.172
The Qing government, after the conquest of Kashgharia, basically preserved
the old system of the Zunghars, with some later modications.173 The Qing
court, being pressed hard by the Khoqand khanate from the late 1820s, gave
up the right, on behalf of the khanate, to collect the zakt tax from all the
foreign merchants in the western Kashgharian cities, with the exception of
the Kashmiris and Badakhshis, as a result of the 1832 agreement.
The rates of the regular taxes were observed only on paper, and people,
especially tenant farmers, had to hand over several times more than what
they were supposed to. During the Qing rule those who worked on state
land (khaniyya zamn) could have only half of the products but there is no
doubt that they lost more because of the exploitations by governmental
functionaries. Yaqb Begs period was not an exception either. The land
that had been in possession of the Qing government and of high beg-
ofcials came into the hands of Yaqb Beg, who sold it to private owners
or farmed out taxes to governmental ofcials or military units. Even some
hereditary owners and lease-holders had to renew their right by purchase.174
It is reported that if somebody worked on anothers land one-tenth of the
product went to the state as ushr and three-fourths of the rest to the
landowner.175 Therefore, what he obtained was 22.5 percent of the original
products, of course in principle.
Besides these regular taxes and their abusive practices, peasants also
134 muslim state and its ruling structure

faced several other irregular taxes like kafsen, saman-pul, tarka, and qon-
algha. A certain portion of the peasants products was taken on behalf of
begs and sarkrs to recompense their non-salary jobs and it was called kaf-
sen. Western Turkestan had the same custom.176 For example, a mrb also
received his share from aqsaqals who had to give him 2 percent of the whole
output of corn in their villages, of which a half was turned over to the gov-
ernment.177 Such a share was called mrbna in the Khoqand khanate.178
According to Kuropatkin, tax-collectors received two sacks of straw (gen-
erally wheat) from every batman of grain coming as kharj and it was called
saman-pul. The form of payment was later changed to cash.179 This is prob-
ably what the Forsyth mission described: With every 30 [sic., mistake of
3] charaks of grain the Hakim will claim one donkey-load of straw, or an
equivalent amounting to 1 tanga 36 pul.180 There existed the inheritance
tax, called tarka (inheritance), also pronounced as tarika, by which the
state took 2.5 percent from the property of the deceased. Sometimes the rate
was doubled.181 But this tax was often abused to divest the property from
those whose forefathers amassed fortunes during the Qing rule by serving
as beg ofcials and who were discontented with the rule of Yaqb Beg.
Ofcials went to their houses and estimated the property of inheritors as
much higher than its real value. So even though he sold all that he had in-
herited, he could not pay the tax which was in theory 1/40 of the prop-
erty.182 Besides, people frequently had to satisfy the demands, at least in
part, of foreign embassies, and sometimes even provide lodging for soldiers,
which was called qonalgha (quartering).183
This situation was aggravated by the fact that governmental ofcials, in-
cluding governors, did not have a xed salary. The revenue that was actu-
ally collected by these functionaries must have far exceeded the stipulated
amount of the taxes because they had to obtain their shares from the por-
tion of collected taxes that remained for local expenses. To satisfy, more
often to maximize, their shares, they usually increased the quota of revenue
at each village. The central government seems to have tacitly acknowledged
the practice as long as it received the necessary amounts.
Besides the revenue sent to the central government, the governors had to
pay a visit twice a year with a huge amount of presents (tartuq) to insure
their posts. It was called toqsan (ninety) because the tribute consisted of the
symbolic number of nine or nine times nine.184 The items of such presents
were a large number of horses, of bales of robes, of carpets, of silken webs,
of packages of tea, and of sugar, of plates containing gold and silver money
or bars or ingots.185 For example, Niyz Beg, the governor of Khotan, once
brought to Yaqb Beg to regain his favor seventy camel-loads of presents
(or tribute), together with two horse-loads of silver, and a Yarkand gover-
nor presented him 100 yambus of silver with thirty horses, mounted by as
 muslim state and its ruling structure 135

many slaves. The governor of Guma once gave him Nine trays of tillahs
(400 or 500 each tray), nine trays of yamboos, &c., &c.186
Of course this nancial burden was not on the governor but on the tax-
payers to whom he swiftly turned for recuperation. Sayrm deplored that
by this kind of extortion Niyz (Khotan), Abd al-Rakmn (Aqsu) and
Mukammad Amn (Bai and Sairam) brought an enormous ruin to the
country.187 Yaqb Beg, on his part, bestowed robes of value, girdles and
rearms. Generally they, especially the robes, were called sar-o-p (literally
head and feet).

collectors

For the collection of various forms of taxes in the provinces there

were ofcials like sarkr (nancial supervisor), zaktchi (collector of the
zakt tax), and mrz. Shaw denes sarkr as an ofcial (of great or small
degree) charged with the duty of collecting and re-distributing or account-
ing for the revenues in kind, of a large or small district or village under the
orders of its governor or head-man; also with all the works of making up
or repair of moveable Government property.188 He says in another place
that sarkr, which he translates as comptroller of the household, was an
ofcial in charge of all the royal stores.189 Although Kuropatkin wrote that
sarkrs were appointed by the governor and were responsible for furnish-
ing a certain xed amount of revenue, either in kind or in cash, to the treas-
ury,190 other sources show that Yaqb Beg himself appointed provincial
sarkrs. For example, Sayrm notes that Yaqb Beg gave Ala al-Dn Beg
as sarkr to Mukammad Baba Toqsaba191 who was the governor of Ush
Turfan. According to another source, when they collected taxes, they di-
vided the portion that was to go to the central government and the portion
that was to go to the governor. In principle, the governors share from his
own province consisted of only a part of the kharj tax (one donkey-load
of grain from every three chrks of kharj), and the rest was either sent to
the central government or disposed for the expense of the regional army.192
From this information we can draw a conclusion that in each province sev-
eral sarkrs existed as ofcials in charge of collecting, storing, and distrib-
uting taxes and that they were headed by one principal sarkr whom Yaqb
Beg often appointed. Similar ofces were found in Bukhara (dvn-i
sarkr)193 and in Khoqand (sarkr and sarkrbashi).194
Zaktchi (or, mil al-zakt) was an ofcial appointed by Yaqb Beg on
the provincial level for the collection of the zakt tax. Sayrm recollects
that Mrz Baba Beg, whom he served for seven years as mrz, was made
the zaktchi of Aqsu by Yaqb Beg and took charge of the collection of
zakt in the area from Ush Turfan to Kurla. Postal communications were
136 muslim state and its ruling structure

also under his control.195 Similar ofces probably existed in other provinces,
but we do not know how many there were, since, if we believe Sayrm,
Mrz Baba Beg alone controlled three different provinces (Ush Turfan,
Aqsu, and Kucha). Zaktchis assistants, like Sayrm, were called mrz.196
They recorded and kept the accounts of the revenue from the villages.
Yaqb Beg also used mrzs for collecting details about events and rumors
inside the provinces. Thus he kept himself acquainted with all that is said
or done, true or false, and is fully prepared for the discussion of local affairs
with the governors, when they annually appear before him.197 We have no
doubt that spies and informants were found at most levels of Kashgharian
society. Many visitors actually reported the prevailing mistrust and suspi-
cion in the society at that time.198
Each village, called yaz or makalla, was represented by elders selected
from the villagers who had various titles, such as dvnbegi (or simply
dvn), aqsaqal, or yzbashi. They were usually well-to-do and responsible
for the collection of taxes. A provincial governor had ve to six hundred
dvns if the size of his province was large, or seventy to eighty if it was
small. The government chose a rich person (bai) from each village every
year. It was not uncommon that one was made dvnbegi against his will.199
For example, it is reported that there were twenty dvnbegis at the Astin
Artush district which contained about twenty small scattered villages.200
The dvnbegi stood at the lowest echelon of the provincial government201
and was connected both to the administrative (kkim, beg, and mrb) and
to the nancial (sarkr, zaktchi, and mrz) ofcials. It was they who ac-
tually performed the work of tax-collection. Government ofcials assigned
them the amount of tax to be collected and, if they were unable to meet this
quota, they had to make up the decit with their own money.202 The term
dvnbegi was attested during the Qing period and Chinese sources tran-
scribed it as duguan-beg203 because dvn was pronounced in many Central
Asian dialects as duwan. However, the total quota of this ofce under the
Qing rule was only nine and its function was not the same as dvnbegi in
Yaqb Begs time. At that time a yzbashi had performed a similar role to
that of a dvnbegi. As mentioned earlier, a Yarkand register records 346
yzbashis in 407 small villages. They were also known as aqsaqal, but this
term was used more widely in Zungharia than in Kashgharia. The title of
aqsaqal was also given to the head of each nomadic unit among the Qirghiz,
whose function corresponded more or less to dvnbegi in sedentary areas.
Harm done by tax collectors through their oppressive extortion was not
limited to the native Kashgharians alone. Foreign merchants also suffered
from various hindrances and losses. When Kuropatkin visited Kashgharia
in 187677, he received complaints from the merchants of Western
Turkestan and reported that as many as forty trading agents from Tashkent
 muslim state and its ruling structure 137

and Khoqand were going to present him their collective complaints.204

Sayrm also remarked that when the foreign merchants arrived, their pack-
ages were opened for investigation and everything was conscated by the
government. The owner went back only with string and wrapping
cloth.205
All these regular and irregular taxes, and their abuses, caused a great suf-
fering to the people of Kashgharia and Zungharia. This kind of situation
was commonly found in a society where the government ofcials had no
xed, or sufcient, salaries and where institutionalized bribery in the form
of presents was the primary means to obtain better living conditions and
promotions. Most of the regular and the irregular taxes levied in Eastern
Turkestan during the reign of Yaqb Beg also existed in Western Turkestan
to varying degrees. Still, there can be no doubt that the economic condition
of the people under his rule, especially approaching the end of his reign, was
harsh. People gradually felt disenchanted and betrayed, and many were
even hoping for the reconquest by the Chinese. The following episode in
Trkh-i kamd illustrates well the social milieu at the end of Yaqb Begs
rule.
It is narrated that in the town of Fayzabad in Kashghar someone was sowing the
eld and shooing birds away. Another person came and asked, Hey, brother! What
are you sowing here? He replied, What am I sowing? I am sowing [the seeds of ]
the Chinese. [At this answer] the one who asked smiled, and, being cheered up,
went his way. Less than six months later the Chinese came and camped on that same
site.206

A conversation of a British doctor, H. Bellew, who visited Kashgharia in

1872 with a young Kashgharian, is another example showing the mood at
that time. That young man is recorded to have spoken about the Chinese:
I hate them. But they were not bad rulers. We had everything then. There
is nothing now.207
5 Formation of New International Relations

The AngloRussian Rivalry

Since Ivan the Terrible opened the door for the Russian expansion by
his conquest of the Kazan and the Astrakhan khanates in 1552 and 1556,
Russias southward expansion was incomparably slower than that of the
eastward one. It took only sixty years from the start of the military cam-
paign by Yermak (1579), a Cossack leader, to the arrival of a band of the
Cossacks at the Sea of Okhotsk (1639). The rate of the territorial increase
was unprecedented in history. Between the middle of the sixteenth and the
end of the seventeenth centuries, Russia acquired annually 35,000 square
kilometers on averageabout the size of modern Netherlandsfor one
hundred and fty consecutive years.1 Of course its largest gain came from
Siberia. On the other hand, her southward expansion was blocked for al-
most three centuries. The attempt by Peter the Great (r. 16891725) in 1717
to subjugate Khiva ended in complete disaster when the entire expedi-
tionary force was slaughtered by the Khivans. A decade later, in 1734, a part
of the Qazaqs expressed their submission to the Empress Anne (r. 173040),
but it was nothing but a bargain with their conscience to gain material
wealth from Russia. Only during the rst half of the nineteenth century did
Russia gain effective control over the Qazaq steppe and, nally in 1853 did
the Russian troops successfully take the town of Aq Masjid on the lower Syr
Darya, which marked the beginning of the full-scale and rapid expansion in
the direction of Central Asia.
At the bottom of the British Central Asian policy lay the question of the
security of their Indian colony. Ever since Emperor Pauls (r. 17961801)
proposal to Napoleon for the joint expedition to India, the specter of a Rus-
sian invasion of India haunted British politicians. But they did not feel much
endangered until the early nineteenth century when the Russians crossed the
vast tract of the Qazaq steppe and began to overwhelm the Central Asian
deserts and oases. From the late 1830s British Russophobia began to build
up as Russia actively supported Mukammad Shh (r. 183448) of Iran in
his attack on Herat in 1837. Even though the seven months of siege of Herat
 formation of new international relations 139

ended in failure, this incident made the British reappraise their policy, and
these new circumstances played a considerable part in the decision of the
British invasion of Afghanistan in 1839. Although Britains rst Afghan War
(183942) ended in a failure, she continued to be concerned about the Rus-
sian activities in the Central Asian eld. In the late 1840s and 1850s En-
gland went over the Indus line by incorporating Punjab, and penetrated
almost a thousand miles into the debatable land of former days. On the
other hand, with the conquest of Aq Masjid, Russia now formed the Syr
Darya line. Thus the intervening areas between the two powers shrunk to
a mere narrow strip of territory, a few hundred miles across, occupied ei-
ther by tribes torn by internecine war or nationalities in the last stage of de-
crepitude, and traversed by military routes in all directions.2
The Russian occupation of Tashkent in 1865 was enough to revive the
specter of the Russian threat to India. Even Henry M. Lawrence, who was
one of the staunchest advocates of a policy of masterly inactivity, felt the
pressure to take a more active policy against Russia toward the end of his
term as the viceroy of India. It was from Richard S. B. Mayo (viceroy, 1869
72) that Britain decided to surround the northern frontiers of India with a
cordon of friendly independent states.3 The British government of India
decided to include Afghanistan in their sphere of inuence4 and endeavored
to exclude the Russian inuence from Eastern Turkestan where a new Mus-
lim government had been created by Yaqb Beg.

relations with russia

Around the summer of 1867 when Yaqb Beg had conquered all of
Kashgharia, it was impossible for him to avoid being entangled in the ri-
valry between the two great powers in Central Asia. He tried at rst to stop
all the political as well as commercial contacts with Russia. He may have
realized that commercial penetration was often followed by military ex-
pansion. Russia could not tolerate Yaqb Begs policy because she had
gained important trade privileges (the right to establish a consulate and fac-
tories in Kulja and the right for the Russian merchants to visit Eastern
Turkestan and to trade) from the Qing government.5
The initial response of the Russians to the unfriendly attitude of Yaqb
Beg was the military threat toward his northwestern border. The earliest
rumor about the hostile movement of the Russian army already reached the
British in July 1865.6 But this rumor seems to have been caused by the Rus-
sian military activities in 1865, including the takeover of Tashkent in the
same month. Two years later, in the later half of 1867, Russia began to move
into the valley of Narin. At that time Yaqb Beg successfully nished the
conquest of Kucha and was staying in Aqsu on his way back to his capital.
At the news of the Russian movement he immediately returned to Kashghar
140 formation of new international relations

on October 1. Alarming information, apparently false, reached him that the

Russians had come down to stn Artush in the direct vicinity of Kashghar.
The Russians built the Narin fort in 1868, and Yaqb Beg, in response,
sealed the frontier and massed troops along it.7
Although this incident did not develop into an armed conict, the
strained relations between the two countries continued. In 1868 a caravan
led by a Russian merchant, Khludov, venturing into Kashghar was attacked
soon after crossing the border and obliged to return to Vernoe. Then he ob-
tained a letter from the governor of Semireche and succeeded in entering
Kashghar. E. Schuyler writes that the impression that he produced on Yaqb
Beg resulted in the dispatch of Mrz Mukammad Shd to Tashkent.8 It is
obvious that Yaqb Beg realized at this time that he could not longer ignore
the existence of his strong northern neighbor and that he had to nd some
way to ease the tension.
Bearing a letter from Yaqb Beg for General Kaufman, the Russian
governor-general of Turkestan, Shd Mrz arrived at Vernoe in August of
1868 in the company of the Russian merchant Khludov. There he was re-
ceived by General Kolpakovskii, who informed him that Kaufman had left
for St. Petersburg and then complained that the letter he had brought did
not observe proper diplomatic usages. Kolpakovskii sent Captain Reintal
to Kashghar with his own letter informing Yaqb Beg of Kaufmans absence
and demanding the return of some Russian captives and the Qirghiz who
had seized them during a recent raid.9 Yaqb Beg captured the Qirghiz re-
sponsible but he chose only to return the Russian captives. After this, Mrz
Shd was allowed to proceed to St. Petersburg, where he met Kaufman.
However, he was not permitted to have any direct communication with the
Foreign Ministry and returned to Kashghar in January 1869. Again in the
same year there was a widespread rumor in Kashghar that the Russians were
instigating Khudyr Khn of Khoqand to invade Kashgharia. In a secret
report, Henry Cayley, who was on special duty in Ladakh, reported news
of a possible alliance against Yaqb Beg by Khudyr Khn and Buzurg
Khwja (who had arrived back in Khoqand through Punjab and Ladakh)
and about the active Russian support for their cause as well.10
In the next spring (1870), due to disturbances along his eastern border,
Yaqb Beg decided to launch an expedition against the Tungans in Turfan
and Urumchi. Yaqb Begs rapid success in this operation of taking Turfan
and Urumchi in the same year was alarming to the Russians for their rela-
tions with him was far from friendly. They also had poor relations with the
Ili sultanate. A. V. Kaulbars left Vernoe on November 29, 1870 and visited
Ala Khn of the Ili sultanate to obtain his permission to establish Russian
representatives in Kulja and allow Russian merchants to trade freely in the
Ili region, but his mission ended in failure. The Russians were especially
 formation of new international relations 141

anxious about the possibility of a close alliance between the two Muslim
governments of Ala Khn and Yaqb Beg that might create serious prob-
lems among their own Muslim subjects in the border areas and might allow
the English to expand their inuence into Zungharia. On his way to Kulja
in the autumn of 1870, the Russian emissary Borodin actually met Yaqb
Begs own envoy who was also heading to Kulja. The Russian had a suspi-
cion that Yaqb Beg was attempting to make an alliance with Ala Khn for
a joint attack on the Semireche region.11
Even though the Foreign Ministry in St. Petersburg regarded Yaqb Begs
occupation of the Ili valley as improbable,12 the shadow of such a danger
was still strongly felt by Russian generals in Central Asia, especially in view
of the weakness of the Ili sultanate.13 The Russian army took a preemptive
measure by blocking the Muzart pass to cut the road from Kashgharia to
Kulja. The Russian government eventually reached the conclusion that the
hostile powers should be eliminated from Zungharia, and consulted the
Chinese government about the recovery of the area by an allied force of the
two countries. At rst, the War Ministry considered the possibility of tak-
ing Kulja and Urumchi at the same time, but when China did not answer
the Russian proposal, it was decided to start the expedition alone, limiting
it to the Ili valley.14
The operation started on June 24, 1871 and ended in ten days with the
occupation of Kulja on July 4. It is not clear whether this sweeping cam-
paign was directed against any direct threat from Yaqb Beg. As we made
clear, Yaqb Beg had nished his Urumchi expedition in November of 1870
and he limited his sphere of action to the vicinity of Urumchi. Beg Quli
launched the second Urumchi expedition around June of 1871 due to a fresh
disturbance. The Russian move seems to have begun approximately at the
same time with Beg Qulis advance. We do not know whether the Russian
troops were put in motion after Beg Qulis move had been known to the
Russians. Whatever the sequence was, it appears that the Russian move was
not a response to an active attempt to take Kulja on the part of Yaqb Beg,
but was rather, as Terentev termed it, a precautionary measure15 to a
possible complication of matters arising from Yaqb Begs annexation of
Urumchi. Whether this threat, which induced the Russians to take such a
precautionary measure, was real or not is a matter of dispute.
Up to that point, Russia did not acknowledge Yaqb Beg as the legiti-
mate ruler of a new government. The reason was basically twofold: Russias
relations with the Chinese government and the uncertainty about the
longevity of Yaqb Begs rule. Because Russia had obtained important com-
mercial privileges in Eastern Turkestan through treaties with China even be-
fore the rebellion, she was not in a position to ignore Chinas claim over this
region. Considering the existing diplomatic relations between the two coun-
142 formation of new international relations

tries, the Russians did not want to risk serious trouble with China by open-
ing relations with a regime that was regarded as illegitimate by the Chinese
government and might collapse within a few years.
General Kaufman pushed Yaqb Beg hard to respect the privileges that
Russia had obtained from China and to surrender the Qirghiz who had
raided the border area. But Yaqb Beg, for his part, would not submit to
these demands while his government remained unrecognized by Russia. Fi-
nally, becoming tired of the diplomatic game, Kaufman offered Khudyr
Khn the cooperation of Russia in case he launched a campaign to subjugate
Kashghar. Khudyr, however, did not want to risk upon one card his
peace and, perhaps, his throne, fearing that his troops might desert to
Yaqb Beg.16 Instead, he agreed to send his envoy, a certain Sarimsaq
Hudchi, to persuade Yaqb Beg to come to a peaceful understanding with
Russia. When this embassy failed to achieve its goal, Kaufman himself sent
another non-Russian envoy bearing a letter with stronger words. Yaqb Beg
responded to this approach by urging the general to send one of his Russian
subjects as an envoy. The reason is clear: Yacoob Beg, although he valued
the friendship of Russia, was reluctant to lower his dignity by appearing in
the character of supplicant, and at the same time considered the interven-
tion of the Khan of Kokan as an infringement on his independence.17
Yaqb Beg in this way compelled the Russians to take the rst step. Kauf-
man resolved to send such a mission, headed by a Colonel Kaulbars, who
was a member of his General Staff, to be accompanied by an engineer, a
topographer, and a merchant. The party left Kulja early in May 1872 with
the goals of concluding a commercial agreement with Yaqb Beg and col-
lecting information about the country and its relation with British India. The
agreement (for the text of the treaty, see Appendix A) was concluded on June
20 (June 8 in the Julian calendar), 1872, and consisted of ve basic points:
1. the right of free trade without prohibition,
2. the right of establishing caravansarais,
3. the right of placing caravanbashis (commercial agents),
4. a custom duty to be exacted at the rate of 2.5 percent ad valorem, and
5. the right to traverse the country for transit to other countries.

The content of this treaty was almost exactly the same as the one the Rus-
sians previously signed with Bukhara and Khoqand, with one major excep-
tion. The RussoKashghar agreement acknowledged the de facto legitimacy
of Yaqb Begs rule whereas the others left their rulers as clients under Rus-
sian control. In the text of the agreement, Yaqb Beg was addressed by the
title of the honourable ruler of the Djety-Shahr (pochtennyi vladetel
Dzhity-shara). In the translated text, still current among scholars, this title
is rendered as the honourable Chief of Djety-Shahr, which is seriously
 formation of new international relations 143

misleading.18 There was an enormous difference in political nuance between

chief and ruler. By calling him the ruler, the Russian government tacitly
recognized the sovereignty of Yaqb Beg over his dominion. This can be
seen in the answer that Westman, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia,
gave to the British when he was asked to clarify the position of his govern-
ment toward Yaqb Beg in view of the visit of Kaulbars: Yacoob Beg was
at this moment the dominant ruler in that country, and as such, the Imper-
ial Government had treated with him.19 In exchange for her recognition of
Yaqb Beg, Russia gained an important diplomatic framework through
which she could expand her inuence in Kashgharia, primarily economi-
cally but politically as well. At the same time, any nonobservance of the
agreement by Yaqb Beg would give Russia the pretext of going to war
with him.20 Thus, although with very different intentions in mind, the two
countries opened formal diplomatic relations in 1872.
Based on this agreement, a Russian merchant named Somov took a large
number of commodities and visited Kashghar, but the result was not satis-
factory. Captain Reintal was dispatched in 1874 to renegotiate with Yaqb
Beg for the improvement of the conditions of the commercial agreement.
When these discussions proved fruitless, the Russians determined to solve
the problem by military means around the end of that year by concentrat-
ing troops, ammunition, and provisions on the Narin River. The invasion,
however, never materialized because the Russians had to deal with a
popular revolt in the Khoqand khanate against their puppet ruler, Khudyr
Khan.21
The strained relations between Russia and Kashghar continued even after
Russia formally annexed the territory of the Khoqand khanate in 1876.
Now the borders of the Kashgharian state directly bordered with Russia to
the north and the west. In order to tame this new neighbor, General Kauf-
man dispatched an embassy headed by A. N. Kuropatkin to demand the
transfer of several frontier guard posts that Yaqb Beg had built. Unable
to refuse this adamant demand by Russia, Yaqb Beg verbally conceded
his willingness to give up the posts of Suyek, Ulughchat, and Maltabar
and promised to send his own emissary to General Kaufman for further
negotiations.22
In summary, after the initial period of hostility and tension between Rus-
sia and Kashghar, which almost verged on the outbreak of war, both par-
ties found a modus vivendi. Yaqb Beg agreed to a commercial treaty and
in return the Russian government recognized him as the de facto sovereign
of Kashgharia and Urumchi. In this way Russia became reconciled to Yaqb
Begs growing power and accepted the stability of his regime. On his part,
Yaqb Beg responded to Russian pressure with caution and tried not to of-
fend his powerful neighbor.
144 formation of new international relations

kashgharia and england

The opening of British relations with Kashghar owed much to the ef-
forts of private individuals like R. B. Shaw, G. W. Hayward, and W. H. John-
son.23 Especially the writings of R. B. Shaw, who visited Kashghar in
186869, made a great impact upon the later British policy for Eastern
Turkestan. He emphasized the enormous potential of the market there and
the danger of losing such a strategically important and commercially fertile
ground to Russia. His rosy picture of the wealth and security in Eastern
Turkestan under Yaqb Begs rule impressed R. S. B. Mayo who became the
new viceroy of India in early 1869.24 As mentioned earlier, he had set up a
new policy in which Afghanistan and Eastern Turkestan were envisioned as
independent states friendly to Britain. Yaqb Beg, stimulated by the visits
of Shaw and Hayward, sent Sayyid Akrr as an envoy to Mayo, requesting
a British ofcer to accompany him back to Kashghar. Mayo could not have
been more pleased, so he immediately dispatched the rst British ofcial en-
voys, consisting of T. D. Forsyth, G. Henderson, and A. O. Hume, later
joined by R. B. Shaw.25 When they arrived in Yarkand, however, they dis-
covered that Yaqb Beg had gone to the eastern frontier where he was en-
gaged in intense ghting with the Tungans. Because of Mayos stringent in-
structions that they should not stay in Kashgharia through the winter under
any circumstance, the British envoys could not remain long in Yarkand and
thus their mission ended in failure.
On returning to Kashghar from the battleeld, Yaqb Beg again sent
Sayyid Akrr to India at the end of 1871 with his letter to the viceroy of
India as well as to the Queen of England. The purpose of Sayyid Akrrs
visit was simply to inform the British government of Yaqb Begs success in
his latest campaign against the Urumchi Tungans, and to purchase muskets
from the Indian market.26 The increasing Russian inuence over Kashgharia
through the 1872 RussoKashghar commercial treaty and the untiring ef-
fort of Shaw in England in propagating the message of the opening of the
future market, a kind of Eldorado,27 provided a new stimulus for accel-
erating relations between England and Kashghar. In early 1873 the India
Ofce was bombarded with appeals and deputations from municipal
Chambers of Commerce and other bodies, all using Shaws arguments in
favor of a British commercial treaty with the Ataliq Ghazee.28 The new
viceroy, T. G. B. Northbrook, who had succeeded Mayo, also thought that
a friendly relationship with Kashghar would be desirable.
In October 1872, Yaqb Beg dispatched his special envoy named Sayyid
Yaqb Khn to the Ottoman sultan, and this envoy, on his way to Istanbul,
visited Calcutta in February 1873 and delivered Yaqb Begs letter ad-
dressed to the viceroy, dated October 5, 1872 (Shabn 1, 1289).29 In his
 formation of new international relations 145

meeting with the viceroy on March 8, the envoy clearly explained that the
primary object of his mission was to promote and cement a friendly al-
liance with the British Government in a manner so public as would convince
the world of the intimate union between the two Governments, and would
serve to deter any other Power from entertaining designs hostile to the peace
of his sovereign and dominions.30 There is no doubt that any other
Power here primarily denoted Russia. Sayyid Yaqb Khn, upon whom
Yaqb Beg had conferred full power, not only offered an invitation to an-
other British mission to Kashghar to conclude a commercial treaty but also
proposed the permanent residence of the representatives of both countries
in exchange. As a result, the British mission with three hundred and fty
members headed by T. D. Forsyth was dispatched to the capital of the
Kashghar state, joined by Sayyid Yaqb Khn on his way back from Istan-
bul. The party reached Kashghar in early December of 1873. On February
2, 1874, both parties signed the commercial treaty and later, on April 13th
of the same year, it was ratied and conrmed by the viceroy of India,
Northbrook (for the text of the treaty, see Appendix B).31
Though the contents of this treaty were basically the same as those of the
RussoKashghar treaty of 1872, there is one important difference. In the
latter, Russia and Kashghar agreed to appoint respective caravanbashis in
each others territory but they had no other status than that of commer-
cial agents. By contrast, the AngloKashghar treaty agreed to the ap-
pointment of representatives and commercial agents who were also entitled
to the formal diplomatic ranks and privileges accorded to ambassadors and
consuls respectively. Shaw was appointed Ofcer on Special Duty,
Kashghar and served in Kashghar until he returned to India in June 1875.32
It was Russian involvement in Kashgharia that had rst induced the
British to become more involved there themselves. They were always anx-
ious about the security of the Indias northern frontier and any possible Rus-
sian invasion from that quarter, but they were also keen to exploit an un-
known commercial market. Signing the 1874 commercial treaty with
Kashghar appeared to be the start of a new and closer relationship. But as
G. J. Alder correctly points out, although the 18734 Forsyth mission
marks the peak of British inuence in Kashghar, it was at the same time an
important landmark in the progressive British disillusionment with the com-
mercial capacity of the country.33 Explorations reported by the mission
proved that Russia could not possibly advance into India through the
Karakorum Mountains but would have to use the passes in the Pamirs or
the Hindu Kush farther west. While Britain could not feel at ease about the
possible Russian invasion through the westerly direction, Kashghar no
longer held the strategic importance it once had. Similarly the prospect for
future trade with Eastern Turkestan was not as promising as it had been por-
146 formation of new international relations

trayed. All in all, British interests in its relationship with Kashghar declined
from 1874 onward and became limited to preventing Yaqb Beg from being
incorporated into Russias sphere of inuence.
Yaqb Beg gained much more from his treaty with British India. He not
only gained the recognition of his rule from the British government but also
rendered his domain safer than before from the Russian threat. Russia could
not invade Kashgharia without considering the serious impact such a move
would have upon her relation with England. Moreover, as a result of his
friendly relation with England, Yaqb Beg secured a source for arms pur-
chases. Even though the British Indian government never acted as an ofcial
supplier of armaments to Yaqb Beg, it granted licenses to private rms to
supply arms to Kashghar. In 1875, as an act of courtesy, the Indian gov-
ernment paid for the carriage of two hundred cases of guns from Bombay
to Lahore, destined for Yarkand.34 However, Yaqb Beg did not limit the
range of his diplomatic efforts only to his direct neighbors. He also needed
the approval of his legitimacy from the wider Muslim world, which led to
his approach to the Ottoman Empire.

Diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire35

sayyid yaqub kh1n

Having taken Aq Masjid in 1853, a frontier town of the Khoqand

khanate on the bank of Syr Darya, Russia was about to launch a full-scale
operation against Tashkent in 1865. In the face of this threat Khoqand was
thrown into great confusion, and the neighboring state of Bukhara took
advantage of the opportunity to put Khudyr Khn, who had been in exile
there, on the throne. In order to respond to these threats lim Quli hurried
to send an envoy to Istanbul to ask for assistance in the name of Sayyid
Suln Khn whom he had made a nominal ruler. This envoy was none other
than Sayyid Yaqb Khn (18231899) who was to play an important role
in future relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Kashghar state.
According to Boulger, he was born in Tashkent as a son of Nr Mukammad
Khn who was married to Yaqb Begs sister. So he was Yaqb Begs
nephew.36
Sayyid Yaqb Khn carried the title of sayyid which was given only to
the descendants of the Prophet Mukammad and evoked the deep respect of
the Muslims. He was also called qj because he had received the necessary
education to qualify him to make decisions on legal matters. It is reported
that he wrote several works but unfortunately these works are not handed
down to us.37 He was also popularly known as Hjj Tura, and Sayrm calls
him shn Sayyid Qj Turam.38 The title of tura (from Turco-Mongol
 formation of new international relations 147

word tr or tr, ultimately going back to Torah), which had been given
to the Chinggisids alone, was applied to noble religious gures as evidenced
by the Makhdmzdas who carried it. Combining this information, we can
conclude that he was not only a very well educated intellectual in Central
Asia but also a revered religious gure with noble lineage.
Around the beginning of 1865 he arrived in Istanbul. However, even be-
fore he had an audience with the sultan, he received the news of the fall of
Tashkent and lim Qulis death. This rendered his original mission moot,
but at this very juncture the amazing news about the activities of Yaqb Beg
in Kashgharia began to reach Istanbul. On his own initiative, Sayyid Yaqb
Khn decided to make a new request to the sultan that he bestow an impe-
rial letter (nme-i hmyn) and a high Ottoman order (ni{n-i al-yi Os-
mn) upon both Yaqb Beg in Kashghar and Khudyr Khn in Khoqand.
In addition, he asked that the Ottomans send samples of percussion-type
ries, magazine-type ries, and Ottoman army military uniforms represent-
ing the ranks from private to general. On September 16, 1868, the Ottoman
government responded that it would send the requested ries and uniforms,
but neither the imperial letter nor Ottoman order because the political sit-
uation in Central Asia was too unstable.39 Probably the Porte (Ottoman
court) was not certain about the political future of those two rulers and, nat-
urally, worried about creating unnecessary diplomatic friction with Russia.
It is interesting to note that the diplomatic relations between the Ot-
tomans and Kashgharia started with Sayyid Yaqb Khns personal initia-
tive even though his duty as an ofcial envoy of Khoqand had ended with
the death of his master, lim Quli. Why did he volunteer for such a role?
The fact that he was Yaqb Begs relative, of course, cannot be discounted.
However, we should note that his own explanation for requesting samples
of ries and uniforms was to strengthen Islam through the improvement
of military equipment and organization there [i.e., Central Asia].40 In order
to cope with the Russian expansion, he felt the need for strengthening the
Central Asian states through the introduction of new armaments and the
reformation of the military system with the support of the Ottoman Empire.
His attitudes in this regard may have been inuenced by his three-year stay
in Istanbul where he came into contact with members of the Tanzimat re-
form movement and the ideology of the Young Ottomans who were lobby-
ing for a Pan-Islamic coalition.
In the spring of 1869, Yaqb Khn traveled to Kashghar and personally
urged Yaqb Beg to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan.
However, Yaqb Beg was not initially attracted to such a move and was pre-
pared to ignore his advice. But Yaqb Khn persisted by explaining, ac-
cording to Sayrm, why he had visited Istanbul and whom he had met
there.
148 formation of new international relations

After Tashkent had been taken by the Russians, the ulam and the sayyids, declar-
ing that Now this land has become karm [unlawful], refused to submit to Rus-
sia and decided to follow the precedents and laws (sunnat sharat) of the Prophet
Peace be upon Him! So, emulating the example of the Prophet, they chose to emi-
grate (hijrat). I also made up my mind to emigrate and paid a visit to the two holy
cities, after which I stayed some days in Rm [i.e., the Ottoman empire]. I happened
to have discussions with grandees and noble people there, who told me [as follows].
Although the Ferghana region was occupied by the Russians, some Muslims rose
up in the land of [the Chinese] Emperor and achieved the victory and opened Islam.
When His Majesty the Caliph heard this news, he issued an edict commanding
people to offer a prayer, at the end of ve-time prayers at every mosque, for the suc-
cess of the Muslims in the East who had opened Islam, and before others he himself
prayed for [the Muslims] in the East. . . . Ever since the Ottoman empire, that is,
Rm Caliphate and the protector of the Muslims, had been established, whenever
the Muslims on the earth raised their heads, the Caliph rejoiced and prayed for their
success. And if he heard about their defeats, he grieved and became sorrowful and
prayed for their well-being. Whatever news he heard about the uprisings of the Mus-
lims, he let them all be written on the document and be announced. . . . This land of
Moghulistan belonged to Your Highness, and it is necessary as well as obligatory for
you to inform the Caliph.41

Of course, this passage cannot be considered to transmit exactly what

Sayyid Yaqb Khn said, but it seems to reect his notions about the des-
perate situation the Central Asian Muslims faced with the Russian threat as
well as about the Pan-Islamic solidarity found in the Ottoman empire.
Compared to the idealistic Sayyid Yaqb Khn, however, Yaqb Beg was
a realistic politician and soldier who had experienced the extremely com-
plicated and unpredictable politics in Khoqand and achieved the unication
of Kashgharia, overcoming innumerable obstacles. He was not the kind of
person who would blindly devote himself to the idea of Islamic solidarity.
As a matter of fact, his record in this area was rather poor. He had refused
to assist the Muslims in Khoqand when they rose up against the Russian
rule in 1865. Instead he closed the border and strengthened the guard to
prevent refugees from entering Kashgharia because he was worried that this
might introduce confusion into his realm.42 British diplomats even sus-
pected that he might take the side of Russia if Britain and the Ottomans
fought a war in alliance against Russia.43 Probably Yaqb Beg knew of the
diplomatic contacts between Khoqand and the Ottomans during the nine-
teenth century. However, after he had unied Kashgharia, it was not the
Ottomans but Britain and Russia that he rst tried to contact, and it was
because he thought that these two countries were the most powerful neigh-
boring states that could exert enormous inuence on his dominion. Recog-
nition of these two powers was urgent and indispensable for him. There-
fore, it is not strange that he did not attempt to contact the Ottomans who
 formation of new international relations 149

were not only far from his country but also insignicant in terms of their
inuence on international diplomacy.
When such a realistic politician as Yaqb Beg decided to take a more
active role to contact the Ottomans, it was because he had an expectation
that he could gain tangible prots from the relationship. We can understand
his decision from two angles. First of all, it was an expectation that his sta-
tus as a ruler of the state he had just created might have recognition not only
from the international community but also in the eyes of the native Kash-
gharians. Eastern Turkestan had been under the rule of the Qing dynasty
during the preceding hundred years, and so there lingered a strong notion
that it was a part of Chinese territory even after the Muslim rebellion, the
expulsion of the Qing power, and the establishment of his regime. In the
meantime, Yaqb Beg did not possess a source of indisputable political au-
thority widely accepted in Central Asia and his power was built simply upon
sheer military force. Therefore, the recognition by the Ottoman sultan, the
nominal leader of global Islamic society at that time, would enhance his po-
litical status. He had employed the strategy of using foreign recognition to
strengthen his internal status already in 186869 when R. B. Shaw visited
his country. Even though Shaw repeatedly made it clear that he came as an
individual merchant not as an envoy, Yaqb Beg deliberately arranged
parading him around the country and assembling several thousands to line
the approach when he visited his urda. Shaw was convinced that Yaqb
Beg was exploiting him for the benet of subjects and neighbours as an En-
glish envoy.44
Another factor causing his change of attitude was the possibility for him
to gain material support in the form of military advisors and a supply of ar-
maments. To prepare for the future confrontation with the Qing he needed
to equip his army with modern weapons like ries and cannons. He had
made incessant efforts to secure these weapons but without many practical
results. It was difcult for him to expect large-scale imports from Britain be-
cause they could not openly deliver military equipment for fear of Russian
reaction, not to mention the Russians who did not relinquish their hostile
attitude toward his state. He had tried other sources like the Afghans or pri-
vate merchants in India, but the amount of imports was not satisfactory. In
this respect the Ottoman empire could be a good alternative source.
However, whatever Yaqb Begs attitude may have been, the relations
between the two countries would never have been realized if the Ottoman
government had not changed its traditional policy of non-involvement in
Central Asia. We know that the Central Asian khanates had repeatedly sent
missions to the Porte to ask for moral and material support to stem the Rus-
sian expansion: for example, Khiva in 1840 and 1847; Khoqand in 1865;
and Bukhara in 1867, 1868, and 1871. However, the Porte never accepted
150 formation of new international relations

these requests. The basic reasons for the Portes denial of the entreaties from
the Central Asian rulers were the fear of the Russian reaction, the swift suc-
cess of the Russian operation in the Central Asian eld, and the political in-
stability within the khanates.45 However, with the death of Fuad Pa{a in
1869 and of Ali Pa{a in 1871 who had both been the grand viziers for a long
time and prominent leaders of the Tanzimat reform, a different mood began
to set in. The foreign policy shifted toward the direction of opposing the in-
tervention of foreign powers, and the need for Islamic unity began to be
stressed. The Ottoman sultan Abdlazz (r. 186176), in his later years,
viewed favorably the idea of the sultan not only as the head of the Ottoman
empire but also as the leader of all the Muslims in other countries.46 The
Young Ottomans had been permitted to return from exile after the death of
Ali Pa{a and came to have close contacts with the members of the ruling
group and propagated the idea of Islamic unity, thus contributing to the for-
mation of public opinion toward that direction. This was the beginning of
the so-called Pan-Islamism which reached its climax later during the reign
of Abdlhamid (r. 18761909).47
The news of the Muslim uprising and the establishment of independent
Muslim governments in the northwestern part of China was received with
fervor by those who were aggrieved by the plight of the Muslims all over
the world. The Muslims in the Ottoman empire as well as in other countries
were amazed by the rapid and enormous success of Yaqb Beg. His name
and activities were often reported in journals and newspapers in Istanbul.
For example, it was reported that 16 million Muslims had risen against the
Chinese rule and as a result three leaders were opposed to each other but,
after Yaqb Beg came from Aq Masjid with 300 soldiers and subjugated
them all, he became the ruler of 20 million Muslims.48 Although the con-
tents of these reports were often distorted and exaggerated, they con-
tributed to furthering the idea of Islamic unity and the sentiments of Pan-
Islamism as Namk Kemal vividly testied in 1872: Twenty years ago, the
fact that there were Moslems in Kasgar was not known. Now, public opin-
ion tries to obtain union with them. This inclination resembles an over-
powering ood which will not be stopped by any obstacle in its way.49

development of relations

Following the order of Yaqb Beg, Sayyid Yaqb Khn left Kashghar
in October 1872, as an envoy to Istanbul. First, he went to India and met
the viceroy in Calcutta where he stayed until next spring. He had contacts
with high ofcials of the Indian government in order to promote friendly re-
lations with Britain. He met the foreign minister of India on February 27,
1873 and explained to him Yaqb Begs concrete proposals for the strength-
 formation of new international relations 151

ening of political and economic relations between the two countries. At this
meeting he claried that the aim of his visit to Istanbul was nothing but con-
veying a friendly letter and messages on the part of his sovereign and said
that he was going to ask the sultan to accept the country under Yaqb Begs
rule as his protectorate. And when he was asked what course he would
pursue if the Sultan refused to approve Kashghar and the British govern-
ment having a friendly relation, he answered that, knowing the helpless
condition of Turkey, he felt sure that the request would be refused and,
then, Kashghar would do its utmost to promote the diplomatic relations
with Britain without any further reference to the Ottomans.50
We can assume that his answer reects his frank opinion without any pre-
tension because he knew very well of the repeated refusal of the Ottomans
to provide aid to the Central Asian states faced with the Russian threat. On
his earlier visit Yaqb Khn himself had been denied the imperial letter and
the Ottoman order he had asked the sultan to confer on Khudyr Khn
and Yaqb Beg. Therefore, it is very possible that he did not expect to
achieve a successful result from his new mission. On the other hand, his an-
swer may have been a highly diplomatic tactic because the emphasis on the
passive attitude of the Ottomans could induce a more active engagement
from Britain. In other words, by pointing out the fact that the Ottoman Em-
pire was not in a position to open diplomatic relations with Kashghar, he
was reminding the ofcials in India of the importance of Britains role. So
he hoped to transmit the willingness of his country to promote the relation-
ship with Britain, without taking into consideration the opinion of the sul-
tan. In fact, when he had an interview with Northbrook on March 8, 1873
he emphasized that point. Yaqb Khn made it clear that, although he was
carrying a letter of friendship to the sultan, he himself had already explained
to Yaqb Beg the fact that Britain was geographically closer to Kashgharia
and, thus, in a better position than the Ottomans to provide necessary aid.
Yaqb Khn added that Yaqb Beg agreed with his opinion and that one
of the aims of his visit to Istanbul was to obtain from the sultan an ofcial
approval of Kashgharias relation with the British government.51
Sayyid Yaqb Khn appears to have arrived in Istanbul not later than the
end of May 1873. There are several documents in the Ottoman archives
concerning his rst ofcial mission. The rst one, dated on May 25, 1873
(Rab I 27, 1290) shows that Yaqb Khn who is the ruler (kkmdr)
of Islamic community of a large number of Muslims in the country of
Kashgharia dispatched Sayyid Yaqb Khn as his envoy in order to form
the the relation of subordination. It also tells us that the letter that the
Kashgharian envoy had brought was translated and presented to the sultan.
Sayyid Yaqb Khn was allowed to have an audience with the sultan
Abdlazz.52 Other documents witness the positive response, contrary to
152 formation of new international relations

Sayyid Yaqb Khns expectation, that the Ottoman government consented

to the request from Kashgharia. First of all, on June 16 it was decided that
the rst-class of the Ottoman order and a sword worth 20,000 kuru{ should
be given to Yaqb Beg, kkim of Kashghar, and that the second-class Ot-
toman order and the travel expense of 10,000 kuru{ should be given to the
envoy.53 On August 2 it was also decided to send an imperial letter as a reply
to Yaqb Begs letter.54 We see another document showing the decision to
dispatch ries, cannons and military instructors, together with two other
volunteers.55
Although these documents do not provide a detailed list of military aid,
a letter sent later by Yaqb Beg expressing his thanks to the sultan shows
that four instructors, 6 cannons, 1,000 old-type ries, and 200 new-type
ries were sent.56 Based on the report of H. Bellew who witnessed Sayyid
Yaqb Khn and the Ottoman military instructor in Kashghar, among
many Turks from Europe were included four military ofcers and one civil-
ian.57 From another source we can identify their names. The four ofcers
were Mehmet Ysuf, Ysuf Isml the Circassian, Isml Haqq Efendi,
Zamn Bey from Daghestan, and one civilian was Murd Efendi who re-
tired from the Inner Court.58
While Sayyid Yaqb Khn was staying in Istanbul in 1873, he seemed to
meet intellectuals advocating reforms. As a secret report of N. Ignatiev, Rus-
sian ambassador to the Porte in 186478, reveals, Sayyid Yaqb Khn had
a meeting with the representatives of several of the Asiatic States at the
house of Ahmed Vek Effendi.59 Ahmet Vek was not only a renowned
writer and scholar but also an important political gure who had served as
minister of education and as prime minister. The Young Ottomans like
Namk Kemal kept in contact with him.60 The envoy also met religious lead-
ers of Su orders in Istanbul. Especially, he seemed to have an intimate con-
tact with the head of the Uzbek tekke of the Naqshband branch.61
Sayyid Yaqb Khn and his company left Istanbul on August 14, 1873
(or just immediately after that date) and arrived in Bombay by way of Egypt.
From there they went to a frontier post called Shahidulla under the escort
provided by the Indian government, where they were joined by the British
embassy under the leadership of T. D. Forsyth.62 Sayyid Yaqb Khn nally
reached Kashghar around the end of November. We have several reports,
including those of the British embassy members, the letter sent to the sultan
by Yaqb Beg63 and another Ottoman source,64 which allow us to recon-
struct Yaqb Begs response to the formal recognition of his state by the Ot-
toman sultan.
According to the testimony of Bellew, several days after the arrival of the
British embassy (December 4), Yaqb Beg paid a visit to the mausoleum of
Khwja fq in the suburb of Kashghar, one of the holiest places in this re-
 formation of new international relations 153

gion at that time, and performed the ceremony of wearing the sword and
the Ottoman order sent by the sultan and ring a cannon salute one hun-
dred times. There was no pompous parade or ceremony celebrating the oc-
casion, but he simply received congratulations from the soldiers.65 Soon
after this he took the title of amr al-mminn (Commander of the Faith-
ful) and ordered the reading of the Friday prayer and the minting of coins
in the name of the sultan,66 which is tantamount to the ofcial proclama-
tion of his recognition of the Ottoman sultan as suzerain.
However, we should not forget that Yaqb Begs recognition of suzer-
ainty was rather nominal because the Ottomans were not in a position to
interfere with the affairs of Kashgharia. In spite of that, the reason the nom-
inal suzerainty was accepted was because it coincided with the interests of
the two countries. The sultan hoped to demonstrate his role as the leader of
the entire Islamic world by showing his willingness to protect the Central
Asian Muslims threatened by the military expansion of the Western indels,
especially the Russians. He might have thought that this new image would
enhance his status which had been seriously damaged by the weakening of
the empire. The recognition of the sultans suzerainty was also rewarding to
Yaqb Beg because it conrmed his status as the ruler of the country not
only by his subjects but also among the international community. Moreover,
he succeeded in obtaining what he had been pursuingmilitary equipment.
Diplomatic relations between the two countries further developed on
Sayyid Yaqb Khns second visit to Istanbul in 1875.67 The prime purpose
of his visit this time was to transmit Yaqb Begs sincere gratitude for the
sultans favor. The arrival of the envoy from Kashghar was reported on
April 23 of 1875 (Rab I 27, 1292), and the translation of Yaqb Begs let-
ter was presented to the sultan. The envoy had an audience with him on
May 7.68 In this letter Yaqb Beg, rst of all, claried that the bestowal of
the sultans edict and the various gifts was a great honor not only to him-
self but also to all the inhabitants of Kashgharia and reported how he per-
formed the ceremony to celebrate the occasion. And then he swore that he
would never forget the sultans favor to the end of his life and would per-
form whatever command he should order. Since the sultans favor bestowed
a new life, he continued, to all the Muslims in Central Asia, all of them
turned their soul and body to the sultan. And he expressed his wish that the
people in Central Asia could be incorporated into the domain of the Caliph
(dr al-khilfat) within a short period of time so that the union of Islam
(ittifk-i Islm) should be achieved. Finally, he added that he unfurled the
imperial ag (sancak) and ordered the Friday prayer to be read and the coins
to be struck in the name of the sultan.69 According to the author of K{gar
trh, Sayyid Yaqb Khn presented to the sultan a tablet sent by Yaqb
Beg, on which the following poem was inscribed in Persian.
154 formation of new international relations

Abdlazz Khan, with his scepter of upright judgement, has

taken
The imperial domain from all the rulers on the earth.
Its evidence is found in the country of Kashghar,
Since khuba and sekke was done in his name.70

In order to strengthen the relationship of the two countries the Ottoman

government decided to provide many more arms and presents. From several
documents we can draw up the following list: a standard inscribed with
Ftika (the rst chapter of Qurn), a dagger with a curved blade, 2,000
ries, 6 mountain cannons, a clock decorated with imperial insignia (tu^ra),
a ceremonial garment (kallat), and 500 printed copies of Qurn. In addi-
tion to these, travel expenses were given to Sayyid Yaqb Khn, and the
rst- and the second-class of the Mecd order were bestowed to two sons
of Yaqb Beg, Beg Quli and Haqq Quli.71 And an imperial edict dated
Rajab 15 (August 17) was handed over. Yaqb Beg had requested the des-
ignation of Beg Quli, his eldest son, as his heir-apparent, and the sultan, hav-
ing no reason to object, gave his conrmation on three conditions:
1. khuba and sekke should be continued in the name of the sultan,
2. the shape and the color of the Ottoman ag already bestowed on Yaqb
Beg should not be changed, and
3. Yaqb Beg should not make unnecessary conict with neighboring
countries.

The sultan also bestowed the second rank, in the Ottoman scale of
ofcialdom, upon Beg Quli and the third rank upon Haqq Quli, younger
brother of Beg Quli.72 There is no doubt that this edict reects the sultans
will to keep Kashgharia as his protectorate although he knew very well that
he could not rule it. The development of the relations made possible further
military assistance in the form of a three-pound steel cannon, 2,000 Eneld-
type ries, and a considerable amount of ammunition and additional equip-
ment in total weighing 55,800 pounds.73 It was also decided that three more
military ofcers should be dispatched. These were Al (a specialist in man-
ufacturing armaments), another Al (an artillery ofcer), and Kzim Efendi
(a military engineer). The whole expense for the transportation to Bombay,
more than 50,000 kuru{, came from the treasury of the Ottoman govern-
ment, and the equipment and ofcers were sent to India in October 1875.74
Thus, the second mission of Sayyid Yaqb Khn succeeded in making the
Ottoman government expand her military aid to Kashgharia.
It seems that Sayyid Yaqb Khn was ordered to pursue another object,
that is, the improvement of relations with Russia. While he was staying in
Istanbul, he paid a visit to Ignatiev, Russian ambassador to the Porte, who
also made a return visit to him.75 Ignatiev worked as an ambassador for
 formation of new international relations 155

thirteen years from 1864 to 1877 and, with the full support of the vizier
Makmd Nedm, exerted such powerful inuence on Ottoman politics that
he earned the title of Sultan Ignatiev.76 Having sent the military equipment
to Kashghar, Sayyid Yaqb Khn visited St. Petersburg to obtain the sup-
port, or at least neutrality, from the Russian government in case of a war
with China.77 The envoy had an audience with the emperor around Sep-
tember, who told him to meet and discuss the matter with General Kauf-
man. Sayyid Yaqb Khn returned to Kashghar via Tashkent.78

The Great Game?

The opening of diplomatic relations between Kashghar and England,

Russia and the Ottoman Empire broke with older historical traditions in the
region. Before the emergence of Yaqb Beg, the political contacts that East-
ern Turkestan had had with its neighbors were basically threefold: China in
the east, nomadic powers to the north, and Muslim states in the west. The
inuence from these three directions had been deeply imprinted on various
aspects of life in this region, and the political vicissitudes of Eastern
Turkestan had been closely associated with the changes of the power bal-
ance among these three neighbors. However, during the 1860s and 1870s a
new type of unprecedented international relationship began to emerge with
the appearance of England and Russia on the scene. This new situation was
the result of several important historical developments.
First of all, in the later half of the eighteenth century the last nomadic
state, the Zunghar khanate, was crushed by the Qing, thus one of the above
three factors disappeared once and for all. Of the two remaining factors,
China was predominant and unchallengeable during the period between the
1780s and the 1820s. The situation rapidly changed with the consolidation
of Khoqand power, which brought about the balance between China and
Khoqand. However, when both countries were almost completely paralyzed
by internal disruptions, a situation similar to these power vacuums was cre-
ated in Xinjiang. The rebellions and the creation of an independent Muslim
government stemmed in a sense from this new situation. When Yaqb Beg
nally unied the whole of Eastern Turkestan, the political map of the sur-
rounding regions was changing once more. While Khoqand power was rap-
idly receding into oblivion, a new power, Russia, began to draw its long
shadow over Eastern Turkestan. At the same time the British who had been
lurking behind the great Himalayas became more and more anxious about
the Russian advance.
Yaqb Beg was keenly aware of these new developments and tried to
take advantage of them. He had basically two diplomatic goals: (1) to form
an international balance of power around his dominion, and (2) to obtain
156 formation of new international relations

the acknowledgment of his legitimacy from the neighboring powers. He

knew that the most immediate threat was Russia, so he sought to neutral-
ize this threat by concluding a commercial treaty with Russia and enter into
diplomatic relations with England as well. While Yaqb Begs diplomatic
goal was well dened and adroitly executed, neither England nor Russia
ever developed consistent policies in dealing with Kashgharia. Their failure
to formulate clearly dened diplomatic goals was primarily caused by the
peculiarity of their ways of perceiving the political reality in Eastern Turke-
stan. Russia was unnecessarily anxious about the potential danger Yaqb
Begs state presented to their occupation of Western Turkestan, particularly
that Yaqb Beg might actively engage himself in supporting anti-Russian
movements by Muslims there. If they had read Yaqb Begs mind better,
they would have realized that he would not dare to risk such a thing because
what Yaqb Beg wanted was a status quo that preserved his regime and not
continuous holy war.
The British diplomatic goal was based largely on the unfounded belief
that all of Russias political and military advances in the region were aimed
at laying the groundwork for an invasion of India. Because of Russias ag-
gressive activities in the Central Asian eld, the British could no longer feel
comfortable behind the natural mountainous barriers of the Himalayas, the
Pamirs, and the Hindukush. The British were also misled by grossly exag-
gerated estimates of the economic potential of the markets in Eastern
Turkestan. For these reasons England decided in the early 1870s that she
had to expand her inuence on Eastern Turkestan at all costs to prevent the
Russians from taking this strategically and commercially important region.
However, as the relations with Kashghar became closer and more detailed
research was done, British diplomats came to realize that it was practically
impossible for the Russian army to move swiftly through the mountains
lying to the south of Eastern Turkestan. Around the middle of 1870s, both
countries began to see the reality. England lost her earlier fervor and Russia
acknowledged Yaqb Beg as a de facto ruler of the country. Nonetheless,
neither country was willing to completely revise its policy because of the
commitments that had already been made, even if these commitments had
been based on misconceptions. Their moves toward Kashgharia were timid
and continually vacillating.
The approach of the Ottoman Empire was not realistic either. Its deci-
sion to ally with Kashgharia was in accord with the public opinion in and
out of the empire that urged the formation of a common Muslim front
against the encroachments of the Western Powers, especially Russia. At the
same time, to have Kashghar as one of their protectorates was a comforting
balm to the hurt pride of the Ottoman rulers who had for so long been los-
ing pieces of the empire and international diplomatic inuence. Hence the
 formation of new international relations 157

Ottoman alliance with Kashgharia remained basically within the ideologi-

cal and emotional sphere. In case of war in Eastern Turkestan nobody
thought it plausible that the Ottomans would do any good in saving
Kashgharia from falling into the hands of either Russia or China. Yaqb
Beg probably knew that too. It was extremely improbable that Yaqb Beg
ever considered mounting any holy war against Russia in alliance with the
Ottoman Empire. Rather Yaqb Begs goal, which he adroitly exploited,
was to use the relationship to improve his domestic political legitimacy and
as a way to purchase more armaments.
When one talks about the AngloRussian rivalry in Central Asia, the
term Great Game, rst coined in the 1830s, has been often used and it
certainly reects a part of the truth.79 However, we should note that the
term easily conjures up the image of Central Asia as a chessboard and of the
separate political entities as pawns that were manipulated by England and
Russia. In other words, it is supposed that the pawn has no free will and
only the players can calculate the next move. Not only is this idea itself hard
to accept, but also the reality often betrays this image. There is a conspicu-
ous danger that the rhetoric may lead to the distortion of the reality. Our
analysis of the international relations surrounding Kashgharia shows how
Yaqb Beg shrewdly set one Western power against the other. Whether it
was the result of Yaqb Begs adroit foreign policy or of the miscalculation
of the situation by the British and the Russians, the fact is that Kashgharia
was not a pawn.
One of the biggest misconceptions that both England and Russia held
was the belief that it would be almost impossible for the Chinese ever to re-
conquer their lost territory, even if they were willing to do so. At the news
that the Qing armies had advanced into Zungharia and taken the city of
Manas in August 1876, diplomats in both countries agreed that their
chances of success were low because of the difculty they would have in de-
feating the Urumchi Tungans who, indirectly supported by Yakoob Beg,
would nally succeed in repulsing them.80 Even after the Qing succeeded
in reconquering all of Zungharia around the end of 1876, the British and
Russians still remained doubtful that the Chinese would be as successful
against the well organized forces of Kashgar as they had been against
unarmed Tungan masses.81
This strategic assessment was the fruit of Yaqb Begs policy of incul-
cating an image of stability of his country. It is undeniable that Russia and
England were condent in Kashgharias ability to fend off any Qing attacks
because they knew that Yaqb Beg had tried hard to strengthen his army
and that China was in great disarray at that time. Still neither country had
committed itself to Kasgharias military defense. Russia was worried
enough to send a mission headed by A. N. Kuropatkin to nd out more
158 formation of new international relations

about Yaqb Begs military strength and about the possibility of a Qing re-
conquest. But at the same time it also began to allow its merchants to sell
grain to the Qing army in Zungharia. England, on the other hand, never ex-
pected Kashghar to fall. Therefore the British government put itself up as a
mediator to facilitate a diplomatic agreement that would bring peace be-
tween China and Kashghar and put pressure upon the Qing government to
abandon its military expedition against Yaqb Beg.
In the event of a Qing success, however, neither Russia nor England was
prepared to risk a greater danger in order to turn the tide of the events. Rus-
sia avoided any direct involvement with the Qing military campaign once it
began and even supplied it with grain. While England acted as a mediator
to aid Kashghar in its dispute with China, she refused to take more radical
measures such as those she had taken against Chinese seaports earlier when
her own vital economic interests had been jeopardized. The reason for this
is simple and clear. The survival of the Kashghar state was not a vital inter-
est to them. The Russians preferred the Chinese takeover but they could live
with Yaqb Beg because they already had reached a commercial treaty with
him, though not quite satisfactory. Britain preferred the survival of his
regime in which they had more inuence than the Russians. Since the diplo-
macy of both countries in Eastern Turkestan had been built upon the fear
of each other, if the region were retaken by China there would be no harm
done to their respective positions because it would still be a buffer state be-
tween them, albeit under Chinese control. This nal calculation led both
countries to preserve their neutrality in the war, leaving the fate of the Mus-
lim state to the contest between China and Kashghar. In the end, the cold
reality of international politics was the limit of Yaqb Begs diplomacy in
spite of all his efforts and ingenuity.
6 Collapse of the Muslim State

Preparation for Reconquest

clearing the road

When Zuo Zongtang came to Shanxi in the middle of 1867, the Mus-
lim rebellion in Shanxi and Gansu showed little sign of subsiding. Except
for several big cities where the Qing troops were concentrated, the whole
countryside was in the hands of the Tungans, the remnants of the Taiping
and the Nian. Conicting approaches to the suppression of the rebellion
among the highest Qing commanders constantly hampered effective opera-
tions in the eld. Serious lack of provisions and nancial resources caused
many Qing troops to desert the ranks, and they raided both cities and the
countryside, often allied with the Tungans. But the efforts of the Qing gov-
ernment had not been a complete failure. Dorongga, a erce Manchu gen-
eral, partly beneted from the lack of unity among the Tungan leaders, and
gained considerable success in establishing a Qing foothold in Shanxi until
his death in May, 1864.1
The Tungan rebels in Shanxi and Gansu were as much in disarray as the
Qing troops were. Their army in Shanxi was known as the eighteen great
battalions (shiba daying) but it was not a centrally coordinated military or-
ganization. Because of the lack of research on the structure of the rebel
army, it is hard at present for us to say anything certain on this subject.
Nonetheless, it appears that each battalion originally sprang from a com-
munal religious group centering around a local mosque, known as jiaofang.
As many as a half of the eighteen battalion leaders held the religious titles
of akhn or mull, which were normally held by the communal leaders of
such groups.2
The Muslims in Shanxi and Gansu were divided into the so-called four
big menhuans (path) and three big jiaopais (sect). To the former belonged
Hufuye (Khuyya), Jiadilinye (Qdiriyya), Zheherenye (Jahriyya), and
Kuburenye (Kubrwiyya), and to the latter Gedimu (Qadm), Yiheiwani
(Ikhwn), and Xidaotang (Chinese school). The difference between men-
160 collapse of the muslim state

huan and jiaopi lies in that the one was established based on Islamic Su
path while the other was formed regardless of it. The jiaopais possessed their
own organizations based on mosques but did not maintain communications
with each other, which caused a lack of unity among the rebels. On the other
hand, the menhuans had a large number of followers scattered over wide
areas under their own leaders. However, it was difcult for them to have
close cooperation not only because of difcult communications but also be-
cause of the conicts between the followers of the New Teachings (xinjiao)
and the Old Teachings (jiujiao) and disputes among their numerous sub-
branches as well.3 Therefore, although there were four separate rebel cen-
ters in GansuMa Hualong in Jinjibao, Ma Zhanao in Hezhou, Ma Gui-
yuan in Xining, and Ma Wenlu in Suzhouthey failed to achieve unity.
Zuo Zongtang, who had demonstrated his talent as a military com-
mander in the suppression of the Taipings, arrived in Tongguan, Shanxi, in
July of 1867.4 After some preparations, Zuo developed a strategy for re-
covering the area. The foremost priority was to take the Tungan strongholds
around Jinjibao which were defended by Ma Hualong and his followers. In
order to achieve this goal, he deemed it necessary rst to clear away the
Shanxi Tungans occupying Dongzhiyuan in southeastern Gansu. He
nished this campaign in April of 1869, reportedly killing twenty to thirty
thousand Tungans. Because of the sharp reduction of the soldiers as a result
of this defeat, the Shanxi rebels had to reorganize the eighteen battalions
into four and retreat to Jinjibao.5 Bai Yanhu, or Bai Su whose Muslim name
was Mukammad Ayb, was one of their leaders.6
Now the road to Jinjibao was open to the Chinese. After making prepa-
rations during the summer, the Qing army started the operation in Septem-
ber. Three Qing army columns approached Jinjibao from different direc-
tions: one led by Liu Songshan from the east, another led by Wei Guangdao
from the west, and the last led by other generals from the south.7 This cam-
paign, however, was much harder than Zuo had expected. In order to reach
Jinjibao itself, the Qing army had to capture several hundred less fortied
points around it. In addition to the Shanxi Tungans who came to Jinjibao,
Ma Hualong also called for help from his followers and allies in Gansu. The
total number of Tungan battalions increased to fty.8 While the Tungans
strengthened their defensive position, Zuo Zongtang encountered a number
of serious internal troubles. Mutinies occurred in the best forces under his
command, and Liu Songshan was killed in a battle in February of 1870.
Zuos military leadership was even seriously questioned at the court.9
Internal dissensions and difculties were not limited only to the Qing
army. During the siege of Jinjibao serious conicts also broke out within the
Muslim camp. Against Ma Hualong who sought a peaceful conclusion by
way of surrender even at the risk of his own execution, a group led by Bai
 collapse of the muslim state 161

Yanhu and Mas own son insisted on the military showdown. The hard-lin-
ers even proposed to make a surprise attack on Peking.10 A Tungan eyewit-
ness recollects that once they thought to kill Ma Hualong.11 Therefore,
when Ma nally decided to surrender, a large number of Tungans had left
Jinjibao under the leadership of Bai and moved to Hezhou where Ma
Zhanao had his base. In this way, the Qing army could take Jinjibao after
almost a year and half of severe ghting, rather by Ma Hualongs voluntary
surrender than its military superiority. They executed Ma Hualong on Feb-
ruary 21, 1871.12
In March Zuo drove his army to Hezhou and mounted a campaign there
in September, but he received a crushing defeat at the battle of Taizisi tem-
ple in February 1872. In spite of his impressive victory, Ma Zhanao chose
to surrender, which Zuo himself suspected was a ruse to earn the time to
get assisting troops and was called by one scholar a mysterious and odd
drama.13 His decision may have been based on his judgment that his vic-
tory could not last long and also on his expectation that he might have a
good opportunity to take the hegemony of the Muslim community if he sur-
rendered to the Qing voluntarily.14 In fact, after his surrender Ma Zhanao
was not executed like Ma Hualong but was appointed to tongling, and his
troops formed a branch of the Qing army. Later, his descendants maintained
their hegemony over the Muslim community in Gansu for almost 80 years
until 1948.15 Zuo moved his headquarters to Lanzhou in August and con-
centrated his efforts on recovering Xining and Suzhou, which he took after
exhausting battles by the end of 1873. It was at this time that Bai Yanhu
earned his epithet Dahu, Big Tiger, for his bravery.
As we have described above, it took almost seven to eight years for Zuo
Zongtang to suppress the Muslim rebellion in Shanxi since he had arrived
there in 1867. The operation against Jinjibao alone took one and a half years
and with the high cost of General Liu Songshans death. At Taizishi temple
he experienced a shameful defeat and only with Ma Zhanaos surrender
could he take Hezhou. Also the occupation of Xining and Suzhou took more
than a year. It would not be far-fetched to say that his success in quelling
the rebellion in Shanxi and Gansu owed more to the dissension among the
Muslims than to the superior military power of Zuo Zongtangs army.

debate and decision

In the beginning of 1874, Zuo was prepared to launch a campaign to

recover Xinjiang and gave an order to Jin Shun and Zhang Yue to move their
troops west. However, an unexpected incident delayed their further march:
the Japanese invasion of Taiwan in the spring of 1874 exposed the weak-
ness of the Chinese naval power and alarmed the Qing court. Although the
162 collapse of the muslim state

failure to cope with the invasion was partly due to the ill-coordination
among the Chinese naval groups, the incident was enough to make the court
become desperately anxious to strengthen the coastal defense.16 In view
of the apparent weakness of the coastal area, the spending of a large amount
of revenue for the Xinjiang expedition produced a serious skepticism in the
court, for Zuo had already exhausted approximately thirty-two million
liangs during the campaign in Shanxi and Gansu (1866 September1874
February).17 This amount was almost six times larger than the cost of the
building of the strategically vital Fuzhou dockyard (about ve and a half
million liangs) that was completed during almost the same period (1866 De-
cember1874 August). And that was one of the most important naval bases
at that time which was founded by Zuo himself.18
Several ofcials in Peking raised sincere doubts about the advisability
of the Xinjiang campaign. The question of whether the Qing should or
could keep Xinjiang under its control was not new. It had been raised as
early as 1865 when Li Yunlin, Tarbaghatai councilor, wrote the following
memorial:
The breakdown of the situation in the northwest did not occur all of a sudden. The
causes which could not but lead to this collapse are (1) the lack of nance, (2) the
lack of soldiers, (3) the inadequacy of personnel management, and (4) the ignorance
about what is urgent and what is not. . . . At present, the strategy as for Xinjiang lies
in the judgment of whether we should take it or not. Our dynasty had not possessed
Xinjiang until the middle of the Qianlong reign. Now the strength of the country
has not been fully recovered and both the troops and the treasury are exhausted. If
we do not consider nourishing the army and giving a rest to people, but only trying
to continue a military campaign for the victory in the far-off land, it would not be
a wise strategy for the statecraft. . . . 19

Several of the highest ofcials, including Zuo Zongtang and Prince Chun,
were ercely opposed to this suggestion20 and the question was not raised
again until 1874.
The so-called great policy debate over the maritime defense (haifang)
vs. the frontier defense (saifang) in 187475 is important not only because
its outcome determined the fate of the Xinjiang campaign, but also because
it revealed the conicting perceptions of national security among the lead-
ing politicians in China at the end of the nineteenth century. The main ar-
gument for the maritime defense, advocated especially by Li Hongzhang,
was that the threats coming from the coastal area were more serious and ur-
gent than those from the Muslim state established in Xinjiang. While ask-
ing the court to secretly order the commanding general on the western
front only to guard the existing border vigilantly and use his soldiers for mil-
itary colonizing and farming, without taking a rashly aggressive stand, Li
proposed to reduce or disband the army in the west and to transfer the sav-
 collapse of the muslim state 163

ings to maritime defense.21 Zuo Zongtang responded in his famous memo-

rial of April 12, 1875, that the prime goal of the Western maritime nations
was trade prots, not the territory of China or its people. Xinjiang, on the
other hand, was essential to the security of Mongolia which, in its turn, was
essential to the security of Peking.22
This Domino Theory strongly appealed to the politicians in Peking be-
cause the history of the long struggle between nomadic states in the north
and Chinese empires in the south appeared to justify Zuos point. His view
was also supported by two inuential Manchu ofcials in the court, Wenx-
iang (Grand Secretary of the Military Council) and Prince Chun (father of
the newly enthroned Emperor Guangxu).23 The nal decision made later
that month approved the Xinjiang campaign and Zuo was appointed as Im-
perial Commissioner for Military Affairs in Xinjiang. The outcome of this
great debate is evidence of how persistent the traditional Chinese view was
with regard to the northern and the northwestern frontiers in spite of all the
bitter experiences caused by the incursion of the Western powers along the
coastal line from the time of the Opium War (1840). I. Hs remarks that
with the advent of the age of sea power and Chinas opening to the West
in the middle of the nineteenth century, such steppe-oriented strategical
thinking was decidedly obsolescent; yet in varying degrees it still prevailed
among the historically-minded Chinese scholars and ofcials.24 However,
we should not forget that the result of such obsolescent thinking was the
addition of the largest province to China.
Even after receiving court approval for the Xinjiang campaign in 1875,
Zuo Zongtang was faced with the difcult problem of nancing such a
costly undertaking. In the beginning of 1876 he pleaded with the court to
approve a foreign loan of ten million liangs, which he asked his friend Shen
Baozhen, the governor-general of Liangjiang region, to arrange. Quite un-
expectedly, Shen objected to the idea of a loan on the ground that interest
rates were too high. In March, however, the court decided to allow a half
of the sum (ve million liangs) to be raised by a foreign loan, while making
up the rest from the treasury of the Board of Revenue (two million liangs)
and from the subsidies of various provinces (three million liangs).25
Although Zuo secured the necessary campaign fund, obtaining provi-
sions was another matter. Jin Liang proposed in 1874 to produce grain on
the spot, but Zuo viewed this as impossible to put into practice because the
area to the west of Jiayuguan, all the way to Hami, Turfan, and Urumchi,
had been severely damaged by war and become desolate. Instead, Zuo
sought to purchase the grain from the Russians as well as the local mer-
chants and to transport some from China proper. In 1875 a Russian mer-
chant, I. O. Kamenskii, sold the Chinese ve million jin (about 670,000
pounds). Such sales of grain to Zuos army were extremely protable to
164 collapse of the muslim state

Russian merchants. Flour purchased in Kulja at 1015 kopeika per pud

(about 36 pounds) was sold at 8 rubles per pud in Gucheng, that is at 6080
times higher price. Anyhow, Zuos army bought from Kamenskii alone al-
most 10,000,000 jins of grain during 187677 at the price of 400,000
liangs of silver.26
One Russian scholar argues that the sale of the grain by the Russian mer-
chants from Siberia was done in spite of the formal prohibition of the
Russian government.27 However, a report in a Russian newspaper, the Tur-
kestan Gazette (1876), clearly demonstrates the involvement of the Russian
authorities.
The Russian traders of Kuldja are well pleased with the report that a Russian de-
tachment will be stationed at Sazanza (North-West of Shiho) for the procession of
the caravan of Kamensky who has undertaken to supply the Chinese troops at
Guchen with grain. . . . The detachment at Sazanza . . . will most likely put an end
to the pillaging [of Chinese marauders] and protect Kamenskys caravans against at-
tacks on the part of the Dungans between Sazanza and Guchen.28

After almost a year of preparation, Zuo Zongtang moved his headquar-

ters from Lanzhou to Suzhou in April, 1876. Already in the spring of 1875,
the troops under the command of Zhang Yue and Jin Shun left Jiayuguan
and secured Hami during the summer. Jins army had then crossed the
Boghdo Ula mountains and reached Barkul. The Qing army also took
Gucheng in the same year. Zuos strategy for the conquest of Xinjiang was
clear: rst take Zungharia and then Eastern Turkestan. Because he wanted
to avoid the direct military confrontation with Yaqb Begs army until he
was fully prepared for it, he decided to approach Urumchi from the north
(Barkul to Gucheng to Fukang to Manas to Urumchi) not from the south
(Hami to Pichan to Turfan to Dabanchin to Urumchi). In April he ordered
Liu Jintangs army to leave Suzhou and by the end of July Lius entire force
was assembled in Gucheng. Thus, the total of 82 battalions (each infantry
battalion had 500 soldiers, and each cavalry battalion 250), about 30,000
40,000 troops, were placed in Hami (Zhang Yue), Barkul (Jin Shun) and
Gucheng (Liu Jintang).29 Now the Qing expeditionary army was fully posed
to launch an attack.

A Swift Collapse

death of yaqub beg

Toward the end of 1873 Hkim Khn, the governor of Turfan, re-
ceived alarming news from a frontier post that several tens of thousands of
Tungans were approaching led by Dahu and Shuhu. These were none other
than those Tungans who were eeing from Shanxi and Gansu led by Bai
 collapse of the muslim state 165

Yanhu, known as Big Tiger, and Yu Xiaohu, or Little Tiger.30 These people,
after leaving Xining in May 1873 before the fall of the city to Zuo Zong-
tangs army, had poured into the Hami area in August. They temporarily
succeeded in taking the Muslim town of Hami in October, but, not being
able to stay there because of the pursuing Chinese army, they left toward
Turfan.31 According to Muslim sources, the number of Tungans coming
from Hami was in the range of thirteen to thirty-ve thousand.32 Whatever
the exact number was, it appears to have been large enough to alarm Hkim
Khn. According to Abd Allh, Hkim Khn reported the news to Beg Quli
who had not yet returned to Kashghar after the completion of the second
Urumchi expedition and was staying in Toqsun at that time. Beg Quli dis-
patched someone to Bai Yanhu to discover the Tungans intentions and their
two leaders came to Toqsun to express their desire to submit to Yaqb
Beg.33 They were allowed to settle around the areas of Urumchi, Gumadi,
Manas, Qutupi, and so forth.34 After having cleared up the matter, Beg Quli
returned to Kashghar in FebruaryMarch of 1874.35
In SeptemberOctober of 1875 the approach of the Chinese army was
reported to Yaqb Beg. Upon receiving this news, he entrusted the capital
to Beg Quli and personally marched to the eastern frontier. He spent the
winter in Aqsu, while dispatching some of his troops to an advanced posi-
tion on the border. When spring came, he left Aqsu and arrived in Kurla,
where he established his headquarters. In response to the advance of Liu Jin-
tangs army to Gucheng in July, he moved again to Toqsun closer to the
frontier, and ordered the construction of a fortress there. When he had left
Aqsu, he had taken 15,000 troops (12,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry) with
him. Now, with the situation becoming more serious, he ordered 10,000 ad-
ditional troops (7,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry) to come from Aqsu com-
manded by his son Haqq Quli. At the same time, he sent reinforcements
composed of several thousands to Urumchi under M Dlya and Am
Qul Pnad. Am Qul was given 300400 soldiers and sent to Gumadi to
assist its defense, while the rest of the force remained in Urumchi.36
To strengthen the defense of the eastern frontier Yaqb Beg also fully uti-
lized the Ottoman ofcers whom he had taken with him when he came to
the East. According to the memoir of Al Kzim, two Ysufs who had been
training troops in Ush Turfan, and Isml Haqq who was in Aqsu were or-
dered to go to the front and to command several units of Yaqb Begs
army.37 His statement concurs with the recollection of Mehmet Ysuf who
asserts that he and two other Ottoman ofcers accompanied Yaqb Beg to
Toqsun.38 Subsequently Yaqb Beg called in again Al Kzim who was in
Yarkand at that time. He recruited 300 soldiers from Yarkand, 300 from
Aqsu, and another 300 from Bai, altogether 900, and arrived in Kurla.
Yaqb Beg entrusted him with more troops who had been recruited from
166 collapse of the muslim state

Yangihissar and Kurla. So Al Kzim took the command of about 1,530 sol-
diers, backed up by four 3pound cannons of Krupp manufacture, and
stood against the Qing army.
By the end of July 1876 the armies under the command of Liu Jintang
and Jin Shun had moved to Fukang. In order to attack Urumchi, they rst
had to take Gumadi, but the problem was the provision of water needed to
traverse the twenty-mile stretch of the desert lying between Fukang and Gu-
madi. The distance between the two places is about 30 miles. The only
source of water was at Huangdian, located off the main road, which was
carefully guarded by the Tungans. The Tungan tactic was rst to exhaust the
Qing troops by thirst and then hit them hard when they approached Gu-
madi. Liu Jintang responded with a feint operation. Having some of his
troops proceed along the main road, he deluded the enemy at Huangdian
into thinking that all the Qing troops were marching to Gumadi. This
caused them to loosen their defense and he made a successful surprise at-
tack on Huangdian. He thus obtained the needed water and reached Gu-
madi on August 12. The fort was taken after ve days of assault with ve
to six thousand Muslims dead, including Am Qul.39
When Liu Jintang and Jin Shun entered the fort of Gumadi, they found
a letter sent by Ma Rende, the leader of the Urumchi Tungans, to a Tungan
commander at Gumadi requesting reinforcements. After reading the letter,
Liu and Jin realized that there could not be many troops there, so they set
out for Urumchi on August 18, the day after Gumadi fell. While Jins army
was passing through a place called Qidaowan they had a skirmish with a
group of enemy cavalry whom, at least according to Chinese assertions, they
easily defeated.40 According to Sayrm the place was called Jdabn and
those Muslims involved were Tungan soldiers led by M Dlya coming to
rescue Am Qul at Gumadi. They were winning at rst, but because Yaqb
Beg had ordered them not to engage in a battle, they had to retreat. Then
Yaqb Beg ordered M to go back to Kashghar.41
Bai Yanhu and Ma Rende who were defending Urumchi realized that
their garrison was not large enough to receive the brunt of the Chinese at-
tack and they ed south on August 13, even before the fall of Gumadi. So
Urumchi fell to the Qing almost without resistance on the 19th of August.
In the meantime, another Qing army column, commanded by Rongquan
and assisted by the militia troops of Xu Xuegong and Kong Cai, came down
to Manas from the north and took the northern town on August 18. Yu
Xiaohu ed to the south, but the Tungans in the southern town offered stiff
resistance. Jin Shun came down from Urumchi to give assistance to Xu Xue-
gong, and Rongquan also came from Tarbaghatai. Without any support
from Yaqb Beg, they succumbed after two and a half months of siege to
the combined Qing army of three columns (Rongquan, Liu Jintang, and Jin
 collapse of the muslim state 167

Shun) on November 6. Thus the whole Zungharian campaign, except for

the Ili valley, took only three months.42 Winter was drawing near, and be-
cause of the cold and the snow, Zuo Zongtang decided to let his army rest
until the next spring.
During the winter Yaqb Beg, having ordered the strengthening of the
defense of Dabanchin (which lay between Urumchi and Toqsun), moved his
headquarters from Toqsun to Kurla, to the west of Qarashahr. Haqq Quli
was then stationed at Toqsun, and Hkim Khn, with the assistance of Ma
Rende, took charge of Turfans defense. Kuropatkin who met Yaqb Beg at
Kurla in January of 1877 gives the following account of Yaqb Begs mili-
tary strength in those areas: 3,160 at Kurla, 900 at Dabanchin, 8,500 in Tur-
fan (with additional 10,000 Tungan levies), and 6,000 at Toqsun. Thus the
total was 18,560 (8,160 infantry and 10,400 cavalry) and 10,000 Tungan
soldiers.43 These numbers are more or less similar to Sayrms assertion as
mentioned before; Yaqb Beg took about 23,000 troops (apparently the
Tungans were not counted here) to the eastern frontier. It seems that the
total number of Yaqb Begs army in the east, including the Tungan sol-
diers, was around thirty thousand, which was not much less than the Chi-
nese army of 30,00040,000.
On April 14, 1877, Liu Jintang let nineteen battalions march from Urum-
chi to Dabanchin. During the ve days of siege and assault by the Qing
troops (April 1620) the Muslim garrison there seems to have offered only
passive resistance and nally they ed, leaving about two thousand dead in-
side the fort. A Muslim captive told the Chinese general that Andijanis
were looking forward to the assistance [from Yaqb Beg], but it did not
come. As the siege of the Qing army was tightened day by day, people de-
cided to break the siege and ee.44 After a few days rest, Liu marched
down to Toqsun on the 25th with fourteen battalions. When they arrived
there, they found that the fort had already been completely evacuated. An-
other Muslim captive explained that Haqq Quli and other Muslim leaders
at Toqsun, having heard the fall of Dabanchin, all left the fort in hurry.45
Approximately at the same time, Xu Zhanbiao and Zhang Yao who had
marched from Jimsa and Hami respectively combined their troops and took
Chiqtim, Pichan and Lukchin by assault. On April 26th they had a skirmish
with the Muslims at a place about three miles to the east of Turfan. But they
easily defeated them and entered Turfan on the same day. Ma Rende sur-
rendered, while Hkim Khn ed.46 With the occupation of Turfan and Toq-
sun the gates to Kashgharia were open wide to the Qing expeditionary army,
but before they were able to begin their nal move, Yaqb Beg suddenly
died at Kurla.
There have been several conicting hypotheses about the cause and the
date of his death. The Times reported on July 16, 1877 that Yaqb Beg died
168 collapse of the muslim state

after a short illness, and the Russian Turkestan Gazette also reported that
he died on May 1 after a fever of seven days duration.47 Many Muslims
strongly believed that he was poisoned, and this view is still adhered to by
several scholars. For example, according to Sayrms version, Yaqb Beg
became very furious at a certain Kaml al-Dn Mrz48 whom he ordered to
be ogged by his attendants, but, apparently his fury not being calmed
down, he himself began to beat the man. Becoming tired and short of
breath, he ordered his servants to bring cold tea. As soon as he drank the
tea brought by a certain attendant (makram), he fell down and his body be-
came hard, its color turning blue, and then beginning to crack. Sayrm sus-
pects that the attendant had been previously bribed by Niyz Beg of
Khotan.49 Other Muslim writers such as Mukammad Alam and ]lib
Akhnd give quite similar descriptions about the cause of his death, all
blaming Niyz Beg.50 However, this hypothesis cannot be sustained because
Niyz Beg, the prime suspect, himself denied it in a letter sent to a Chinese
general, Zhang Yao, in which he wrote that Yaqb Beg had killed himself.51
There was no reason for him to deny that he poisoned Yaqb Beg if he had
really done so because that would have guaranteed an ample reward from
the Chinese. The rumor that Haqq Quli or Hkim Khn might have been
involved in the poisoning also has no basis on facts.52
Another theory is that Yaqb Beg killed himself out of the frustration in
the face of the advancing Qing army. This theory, based on military infor-
mation, was rmly believed by the Chinese generals at that time.53 Nonethe-
less, the suicide theory is not convincing because, although the Qing army
took Zungharia and the gates of Kashgharia, that is, Turfan and Toqsun,
their success was, as will be explained soon, not the result of intensive bat-
tles. Yaqb Beg sent no backup troops to the Tungans, and, in a sense, he
had not yet been defeated by the Chinese. Moreover, he still controlled most
of Kashgharia. Why should he have killed himself even before he fought a
major battle?
The most plausible explanation seems to be that he died of a stroke, as
witnessed by an Ottoman ofcer, Zamn Khn Efendi. According to his tes-
timony, it was around 5 oclock in the afternoon of May 28, 1877, when
Yaqb Beg became so furious at the above-mentioned Kaml al-Dn that he
beat him to death. He then turned his anger upon Sabr Akhnd and began
to beat him. At that moment he received a blow [i.e., shock] which de-
prived him of his memory and speech.54 He remained in that condition for
several hours and nally died around 2 oclock in the morning of May 29.
The context of the situationthe extreme fury of Yaqb Beg, the violent
physical exertion, and the sudden attack that resulted in several hours of
paralysisseems to support the theory that he died of some sort of cerebral
hemorrhage.55 Other sources also support this theory of an accidental
death.56
 collapse of the muslim state 169

There are also conicting opinions on the date of his death: April 28th
(Sayrm), May 1st (Turkestan Gazette), May 29th (Kuropatkin), July
(Baranova), and so on.57 N. M. Przhevalskii, a famous Russian explorer
who visited Kurla just before Yaqb Beg died had an interview with him on
May 9th (April 28th on the Julian calendar) and left May 11th until which
Yaqb Beg undoubtedly was alive.58 The dates proposed by Sayrm and
the Turkestan Gazette are thus out of the question. The basis of Baranovas
assumption is Sayrms remark that Yaqb Beg died two months after the
fall of Turfan. However, there seems to be no reason for us to hold only to
Sayrms remark as an unmistakable truth and refute all other information
that is contradictory to his remark. The Chinese, who must have paid espe-
cially close attention to Yaqb Begs moves, asserted that he died around
May 22.59 Other contemporary Muslims who directly or indirectly wit-
nessed the death also concur with the Chinese that Yaqb Beg died around
the end of May.60

failed strategy

His sudden death delivered a devastating blow to the defense of the

Kashgharian state. Before he died, however, Yaqb Beg issued a strange
order to his troops not to open re against the enemy, which produced as
much damage as would his own death later. Why did he give such an order
which delivered catastrophic results to his state? One of the answers can be
his fear of Qing military power. At that time there was a rumor that the Qing
army coming to attack Urumchi were almost two hundred thousand, which
made Yaqb Beg extremely worried. Probably in order to nd out the truth,
when he was staying in Toqsun he dispatched a certain Inm Khwja shn
to spy on the number of Chinese army, who reported to him: Chinese are
numerous without limit, and one cannot see the beginning and the end of
their ags.61 Although we do not know how much credence Yaqb Beg
gave to this report, it may have been one of the reasons he chose to take the
diplomatic solution rather than the military.
However, his strategy to maintain his realm through diplomatic means
did not emerge only when he faced the army of Zuo Zongtang. Already in
January of 1871, he sent a letter through a Chinese prisoner to a high Qing
ofcial, Cenglu.62 Although the content of his letter is not known, the em-
bassy sent to Yaqb Beg by the Qing in 1871, as mentioned by a Greek trav-
eler, P. Potagos, was probably a response to this gesture.63 Even before the
Qing expeditionary army set foot in Xinjiang, Yaqb Beg wanted to send
his own envoy directly to Peking. He even made such a suggestion to
D. Forsyth in 187374, who advised him that such an act might offend the
pride of the Chinese government.
There was also a group of Chinese ofcials who regarded a negotiation
170 collapse of the muslim state

with Yaqb Beg as desirable. When Forsyth met Li Hongzhang in April,

1876, Li asked him if Yaqb Beg could send a letter to the court stating his
willingness to submit to China.64 Also, at the suggestion of Wade and with
the good ofces of Li Hongzhang, Prince Gong and the Ofce of Foreign
Affairs (zongli yamen) sent a letter to Zuo Zongtang asking him to consider
the possibility of receiving Yaqb Begs emissary at his headquarters in
Suzhou. Zuo replied to the letter:
I have now issued instructions bringing this subject to the knowledge of all my di-
visional commanders, directing them that, in the event of a petition being handed in
by the Andijani Yakoob, should the tenour of the document approach in some de-
gree what is reasonable and right, they will be at liberty to bring it to my knowledge,
forwarding the document itself and the emissary sent with it to Suh-chow, there to
await consideration and reply on my part.65

Finally, on May 8, 1877, Fraser telegraphed from Peking to London that

The question of an arrangement with the Ameer of Kashghar has been
mooted in the Chinese Grand Council. Prince Kung is said to have spoken
in favor of termination of hostilities upon a basis of uti possidetis, but
without treaty or formal negotiation.66
When Yaqb Beg faced the advance of the Qing army, he dispatched
Sayyid Yaqb Khn as his plenipotentiary to London67 for the negotiation
with a Chinese representative, Guo Songdao. At that time Sayyid Yaqb
Khn was in Istanbul on a diplomatic mission to congratulate Sultan Ab-
dlhamid on his ascension to the throne.68 According to a curious remark
in the report dated March 5, 1877 (\afar 19, 1294) by the Ottoman consul
in Bombay, who had assisted Sayyid Yaqb Khn in his travels then, ac-
cording to a rumor, he would rather stay there [i.e., Istanbul] and not come
back.69 It is not possible for us to verify this rumor, but his report sug-
gests that Sayyid Yaqb Khn may have viewed the future of Kashgharia
skeptically even at this early date. When Sayyid Yaqb Khn met the sultan
in the middle of April, he transmitted Yaqb Begs goodwill and oath to re-
main loyal to the new sultan and delivered his congratulations and presents.
We have no information about any of his diplomatic efforts to stop the in-
vasion of the Qing army.70 It was not until the beginning of June that Sayyid
Yaqb Khn arrived in London and began his talks with the Chinese with
the aid of the British.
The British government, which saw the survival of Yaqb Begs state in
Kashgharia as advantageous to her Central Asian diplomacy, was willing to
act as a mediator between the two parties. Yaqb Beg, in order to save his
state, was prepared to accept any position that China may assign him, any-
thing short of expropriation.71 In London Sayyid Yaqb Khn made it
clear in July 1877 that Yaqb Beg would acknowledge the suzerainty of
 collapse of the muslim state 171

China if he could keep complete control over the country that he was hold-
ing at that time. Guo showed a favorable response to this proposition,
though disagreeing in some minor points. He sent a letter to Li Hongzhang
suggesting that China should not lose a good opportunity to end the cam-
paign to Xinjiang by the good ofces of Britain.72
However, as the military situation in Eastern Turkestan turned more and
more favorable for the Qing side, the attitude of the Peking court hardened
accordingly. In contrast to his position in 1876, Prince Gong was now
adamantly against any negotiation, declaring that all the decisions were in
the hands of Zuo Zongtang. Even Li Hongzhang was of little help, and for
Yaqb Beg time was running out. At any rate, there is no reason for us to
doubt that in 187677 Yaqb Beg was aware of the British mediation in
Peking and London, and that he might have been even optimistic about the
outcome of the negotiation. He had reason enough to believe that Sayyid
Yaqb Khn would achieve some sort of understanding with China. There-
fore he probably thought that it would be wise to avoid a direct military
confrontation with Zuos army, or delay it at least until he found out the re-
sult of the negotiation in London.
Such a calculation seems to have been the very reason Yaqb Beg issued
a strict command to his generals and high ofcials not to open re against
the Qing troops. The existence of such an order is not found in Chinese
sources but widely noted in the Muslim sources.73 Especially Sayrm notes
that he gave such an order because he hoped to make peace with the em-
peror of China and to conclude a treaty in peace.74 He not only ordered
his troops not to re but also showed outright disapproval with those who
disobeyed, even when they opened re in order to protect their souls from
attacks by the Chinese troops.75 One source relates how he punished M D-
lya, who had been engaged in the battle with the Chinese at the place called
Qidaowan , by placing him for ten days under the sizzling summer heat.76
It is highly probable that Yaqb Beg was willing to sacrice all of Zung-
haria and even the eastern portion of his dominion in order to avoid a battle
with the Chinese, considering that such an attitude might help the diplo-
matic solution. If this was not the case, it is very difcult for us to under-
stand why Bai Yanhu and Ma Rende, with all their garrison troops, evacu-
ated Urumchi without offering any kind of resistance, and why Hkim
Khn ed Turfan even though he had almost twenty thousand troops and
an enormous quantity of provisions there.77 The Qing army literally walked
into Urumchi and Turfan, strategically the most important points on the
eastern frontier of the Kashgharian state. When we recall the fact that it
took almost a year and half of siege and numerous casualties for Zuos army
to take Jinjibao alone, not to mention their defeat at Hezhou and other ex-
hausting battles in Xining, we cannot simply attribute their quick success in
172 collapse of the muslim state

Xinjiang to any superior military power. As a matter of fact, most of the for-
eign diplomats at that time regarded the prospect of the Chinese victory
over Yaqb Begs army as quite remote. For example, as we mentioned ear-
lier, at the news of the fall of Manas, both British and Russian diplomats
were skeptical that the Qing army would defeat the Urumchi Tungans,78 and
even after the Qing reconquest of Zungharia, they still doubted the prospect
of Chinese victory over the well organized forces of Kashgar.79
From our own privileged vantage point, it is not hard to understand
Yaqb Begs strategy. However, for the Muslims who were being threatened
by the approach of the Chinese, Yaqb Begs order and behavior must have
appeared most puzzling. People at that time put forward their own specu-
lations about Yaqb Begs passive attitude toward the Chinese advance. For
example, Sayrm thought that Yaqb Beg wanted to conclude a peace
treaty with the Qing, while another Muslim writer speculated that Yaqb
Begs avoidance of war in Urumchi and Turfan stemmed from his tactical
consideration. In other words, he wanted to face the Chinese in an open eld
where his superior cavalry force could be utilized most effectively.80 There
was a widespread rumor at that time that Zuo Zongtang had sent a letter
to Yaqb Beg demanding the extradition of the two Tigers, that is, Bai
Yanhu and Yu Xiaohu, guaranteeing in exchange the recognition of Yaqb
Begs rule.81 This rumor, even though somewhat distorted, seems to have
had at least a factual basis. Chinese records show when Haydar Quli, the
commanding general of Dabanchin, was caught by the Qing troops, he
asked Liu Jintang to allow him to send a letter persuading Yaqb Beg to de-
liver Bai Yanhu and to submit to Qing. Haydar Quli remained at Lius camp
but sent his letter to Yaqb Beg through his own men. The records add that
there was no reply afterward.82
Whatever the truth was, there is one fact that no one can deny: Yaqb
Begs strategy was not fully comprehensible to many of his Muslim subjects
and devastated the morale of his army. Soldiers began to desert the ranks
and many Kashgharians who had been discontented with his internal pol-
icy welcomed the Chinese army. There were many occasions of defections
and of secret correspondence with the Qing army.83 An interesting episode
is recorded: on the day when Yaqb Beg died, he is reported to have blamed
Niyz Beg saying Did you become Khitays man too? Do you have corre-
spondence with Khitays?84 More and more Kashgharians went over to the
Qing side, and many Khoqandian soldiers, more loyal to Yaqb Beg, could
do nothing caught between the re of the enemy and the strict order of their
ruler. The ground on which Yaqb Beg was standing began to quickly
erode: it was as if one walks to [the edge of ] the cliff with his own feet.85
Yaqb Beg does not seem to have given up his hope for a diplomatic solu-
tion to the last minute, but this was a grave mistake. Even if he had not met
 collapse of the muslim state 173

such a sudden and premature death, his armys serious disarray would have
made their battle with the Qing quite difcult.

last days

Yaqb Begs death had a devastating effect upon the Muslim defense
against the Qing, not because of his death per se, but rather because of its
suddenness which brought about a series of internal disputes and a succes-
sion struggle. The absence of Beg Quli, the heir-apparent, at the scene pre-
cipitated the dissension among the Muslim leaders. After the fall of Toqsun
and Turfan, the Qing army was fully poised to attack the Muslim troops
and even the Muslims themselves were skeptical about the survival of their
state. The diplomatic negotiations in London were abruptly suspended on
July 16, 187786 and Sayyid Yaqb Khn at once returned to Istanbul.87
At the news of his fathers death, Haqq Quli hurried from Qarashahr to
Kurla, where he stayed for several days gaining over the troops by presents
of clothes and by disbursing their arrears of pay.88 However, he did not
proclaim himself ruler, probably regarding his brother in Kashghar as the
legitimate successor. He appointed Hkim Khn as commander-in-chief to
look after the defense and set out for Kashghar on June 7th with his fathers
body and a small number of soldiers. The next day the commanders and
governors present in Kurla decided to enthrone Hkim Khn as their ruler.89
As soon as he was proclaimed khan, Hkim Khn sent a group of soldiers
in pursuit of Haqq Quli and he himself followed their steps. His intention
was to secure his rulership by getting rid of Yaqb Begs two sons, and to
get hold of the treasury of the deceased ruler in Aqsu. He left behind only a
small number of troops for the defense of Kurla, about ve thousand Tun-
gans under the command of Bai Yanhu. When the advance guards prior to
him arrived in Aqsu, Haqq Quli had already left the city. Soon Haqq Quli
was killed around the end of June at the place called Qupruq, fty miles
from Kashghar, by the people sent by Beg Quli who had suspicions about
his brothers intention.90
The succession struggle quickly evolved into a civil war. A month after
the death of Yaqb Beg Eastern Turkestan was partitioned into three: (1)
Beg Quli in Kashghar who now obtained the allegiance from the governors
of Yangihissar and Yarkand, (2) Hkim Khn in Aqsu to the east of which
came under his rule, and (3) Niyz Beg in Khotan to which he ed after hav-
ing accompanied Haqq Quli as far as Aqsu. Although the participants of
these three groups did not necessarily show clear-cut distinctions from each
other, the background of the three leaders reveals interesting points. First of
all, Beg Quli apparently represented the Khoqandian group that had been
very inuential during the last few decades of the Qing rule and the fore-
174 collapse of the muslim state

most beneciaries under Yaqb Beg. Hkim Khn, who was Ktt Khns
son and one of the last surviving members of the fq khwjas, emerged
after the death of Yaqb Beg to claim his familys legacy of leadership that
still carried legitimacy and inuence in the region. He reportedly sent a let-
ter to Beg Quli, stating, The khanship was my fathers in the rst place.
Your father, Yaqb Khn, usurped it from his hand by force. Now that
Yaqb Khn is dead, the khanship belongs to me.91 Niyz Beg was a rep-
resentative of the indigenous Kashgharian begs who had accepted Yaqb
Begs rule for their survival but became progressively discontented with it.
During the last days of Yaqb Beg, some of them, when given the chance,
went over to the Chinese side. Therefore, their opposition to Beg Quli ap-
parently reects the growing dissatisfaction of the local Kashgharian begs
and the fq khwjas under the rule of Yaqb Beg.
The contest between Beg Quli and Hkim Khn rst took place in Au-
gust. The latter advancing from Aqsu camped at a place called Yaidu, while
the former stopped at Chul Quduq. These places are located between Mar-
albashi and Aqsu. They fought twice: Hkim Khn prevailed at rst, but
then suffered a defeat in the second battle. He ed north of Tianshan to the
Issiq Kul area, and from there to Marghilan in the Ferghana valley. It is said
that ve thousand people followed him, but the rest, more than ten thou-
sand troops, were incorporated into Beg Qulis army.92 The Ottoman
ofcers who had opposed Hkim Khn also allied with him. Beg Quli had
eliminated one opponent, but the fate of his state was still desperate. On the
one hand, several Kuchean begs rose against Beg Quli and seized Kucha,
while on the other, Niyz Beg became independent in Khotan. Beg Quli rst
resolved to deal with Niyz. He drove his troops toward Khotan in Octo-
ber, where he met Niyzs army at Zava. Beg Qulis soldiers easily overcame
the enemy and retook Khotan. Niyz ed to Niya and then to Kurla, where
he surrendered to the Qing army.93
While the Muslim leaders were busy ghting against each other, the Qing
troops completed their preparations for a nal offensive against Kash-
gharia. Liu Jintang, stationed at Toqsun at that time, divided his troops into
two columns for an assault on Qarashahr. One column (fourteen battalions)
was to follow the Ushaq Tal route along the southern shore of the Baghrash
lake in order to surprise Qarashahr from the rear, while the other led by Liu
himself was to proceed along the main road. The operation began in early
October. When this army approached the vicinity of Qarashahr, the Mus-
lims under Bai Yanhus command offered little resistance except for ood-
ing the area, apparently intending to denude the country of supplies and
thereby delay the Qing march. On October 7th Liu easily entered the city
which had been almost completely evacuated and was inundated with sev-
eral feet of water.94 On the 9th one of Lius generals took Kurla, which Bai
 collapse of the muslim state 175

had already abandoned. The city was completely vacant, without a trace of
man. Instantly a detachment of twenty-ve hundred troops was dispatched
to Bugur where they overcame an ineffective resistance by the Muslims.95
With the cities in the eastern Kashgharia falling one by one into the
enemys hands, the Muslim leaders at Beg Qulis camp in Khotan saw the
prospect of defeating the invading Chinese troops rapidly disappearing.
They suggested abandoning Kashghar and then crossing the border to seek
safety. People were sent to Kashghar in order to bring out their families, but
only Beg Qulis family arrived in Yarkand because the others were taken
hostage by H Dlya, a Tungan leader in Kashghar, who now rose against
Beg Quli. The Muslim leaders who were waiting in Yarkand ready to cross
the border were angry about the outcome and insisted on assaulting
Kashghar in order to rescue their families. Forced by this change of cir-
cumstance, Beg Quli marched on Kashghar, while dispatching some troops
to Kucha to take the city from Qdir Pnad and the Kuchean begs who had
dissociated themselves from his rule.96
Shortly before this, Bai Yanhu and his group had ed from Kurla and
come to Kucha which Qdir was holding. Although Qdir offered some re-
sistance, Bai easily defeated him and entered the city. However, he could not
stay there long because Liu Jintangs troops were drawing closer in pursuit.
The Qing army arrived in the vicinity of Kucha on October 17th. Over-
powering the resistance of the Tungans and the Turkic Muslims, they en-
tered the city next day. The cities and the towns lying to the west of Kucha
also fell one by one: Qizil on the 20th, Bai on the 21st, Aqsu on 23rd, and
Ush Turfan on the 28th of October. Bai Yanhu nally crossed the border and
ed to Narin in the Russian territory. About three to four thousand people
were reported to have accompanied him.97
Beg Quli who came up to Kashghar from Yarkand attacked the city and
besieged it for almost a month without any success. When he heard the news
that the Chinese army had advanced to Fayzabad, only thirty ve miles east
of Kashghar, he and his followers hurriedly ed to Ferghana by crossing the
Terek Daban. Two of the Ottoman ofcers were captured by the Qing
troops. According the recollection of Mehmet Ysuf, the Chinese govern-
ment was quite fair and just and after ve months of imprisonment he
nally obtained the permission to depart from the Chinese who took good
care of him.98 However, another prisoner of war, Al Kzim, left a record
full of painful experiences. He writes that, after the departure of Beg Quli,
he was taken prisoner by the Qing army with seven other commanding
ofcers and three thousand soldiers. His hands and feet shackled by iron
chains, he was taken to a Qing high ofcer. He was interrogated with ques-
tions like why did you help Yaqb Khn? and was brutally tortured for
thirty-three days. They stripped him naked and pushed skewers beneath his
176 collapse of the muslim state

nails. He recalls that he was taken to a Qing commander (zngtng) ve

times, his feet and neck shackled by iron chains and his nails driven through
with sharp skewers. While he was imprisoned, he witnessed some of Yaqb
Begs commanders taken out of the prison and, after being decapitated, their
heads were hung on gibbets. He was forced to walk around the markets in
the state of being chained, and taken to the place of execution where they
let him see the scene of brutal killings. After three months in prison in this
way, he and three other Ottoman ofcers were expelled from Kashgharia.99
As soon as Beg Quli had left, about four thousand Chinese troops under
the command of Yu Huen and Huang Wanpeng entered the capital on De-
cember 18th. With the fall of Kashghar the reconquest of Xinjiang was com-
plete except for the cleaning-up operations in isolated areas. Liu Jintang,
who arrived in Yarkand on the 21st of December, dispatched troops to
Khotan commanded by Dong Fuxiang while he himself went to Kashghar.
He ordered Huang Wanpeng and Yu Huen to pursue Bai Yanhu and Beg
Quli. Yu pursued Beg Quli as far as Ming Yol, where a stone monument was
erected later. It is inscribed there that he caught Yu Xiaohu (Little Tiger),
Ma Yuan (a Urumchi Tungan leader), Jin Xiangyin (a Kashgharian Tungan
leader), and his son.100 Huang, pursuing Bai Yanhu, also approached the
Russian border and then returned. The expedition was formally completed
with the capture of Khotan on the second day of January 1878.
Later, the refugees who had ed to Western Turkestan made futile at-
tempts to regain their lost dominion. For example, in October 1879, F. Hen-
vey, a British resident ofcial in Ladakh, reported that a group of refugees
in Tashkent rallied under the leadership of Hkim Khn and ventured an at-
tack on a frontier town of Ming Yol. Some people reportedly witnessed that
six carts loaded with dead bodies of Qing soldiers killed in this attack ar-
rived in Kashghar. He also transmits a rumor that Russia provided Beg Quli,
Yaqbs eldest son, seven thousand Cossack soldiers and expenses to take
back Kashgharia. According to his report, Beg Quli also sent a petition to
the sultan.101 His report is conrmed by the petition, preserved in the Ot-
toman archives, dated December 25, 1879 (Mukarram 10, 1297) and
signed by a certain Yaqb.102 It explains how the Qing army reconquered
the region without ghting because of the discord among the Muslims after
Yaqb Begs death, and then reveals the cruelty that the Qing government
committed on the Muslims. It also tries to show the abundance of natural
resources in Kashgharia and, emphasizing the fact that this region had been
a part of the Ottoman empire during the time of Yaqb Beg, asked the sul-
tan to help them to recover the independence from the Qing by peaceful
means. Although we do not have further information about how the sultan
responded to this petition, it is very unlikely that he would have taken any
action to accommodate it.
However, the refugees in Tashkent did not seem to abandon their hope
 collapse of the muslim state 177

completely, as is evidenced by Beg Qulis personal visit to Istanbul around

the end of 1880. He presented a long petition dated November 15, 1880, in
which he reminded the sultan of his fathers incessant efforts to promote the
unity of Islam and explained that, in spite of his appointment as the suc-
cessor, the Muslims did not acknowledge his authority and started a civil
war (mukrabat-i dhiliye) which resulted in the demise of his state. Ac-
cording to his claim, Russia, promising to give him troops, asked several
times to attack and retrieve Kashgharia from the Qing. At that time, Russia
showed a sharp conict of interest vis--vis the Qing in relation to the re-
turn of the Kulja region. However, Beg Quli knew that the Russians were
just trying to take advantage of him, so he refused their proposal and re-
turned to his fathers hometown, Piskent, to live in peace.103 Then, he heard
the news that the Qing dug out Yaqb Begs grave and burned his body and
committed tyranny against the Muslims. Leaders in Kashgharia sent him a
letter asking to collect people from Khoqand and Tashkent and to liberate
the region. Beg Quli decided to recover Kashgharia by attacking the Qing
force, armed with the ries that the sultan had sent earlier and in alliance
with Abd al-Rakmn Ddkhwh who was leading almost ten thousand
tents of Qirghiz living in the Alai mountains. Finally, he mentioned that for
this venture what he needed was spiritual assistance rather than material
because he was aware of the enormous distance between the Ottoman em-
pire and his country.104 The spiritual assistance here seems to mean the
sultans endorsement of Beg Qulis status as legitimate leader of the Kash-
gharians because he was in dispute with Hkim Khn over the leadership in
their attempt to recover the country. However, we do not know how the sul-
tan responded to Beg Qulis request. He stayed in Gksu Saray where he re-
ceived a hospitable reception and on November 23, 1881 went to Izmir,
whence he returned to Tashkent via India.105
All these attempts of the Muslims were being frustrated by internal hege-
monic conicts as well as by international indifference. The Qing empire re-
gained and consolidated its rule over the entire Xinjiang region after a lapse
of thirteen years, except for the Ili valley which was still in the hands of Rus-
sians.106 Zuo Zongtang who commanded the whole operation from Suzhou
was acclaimed as the most outstanding man in the empire. As a reward for
his feat some suggested that he should receive the title of prince (wang), but
because of the Empress Dowager Cixis opposition he was made only mar-
quis (hou).107 I. Hs writes, correctly, that rare is the historical event that
has won the acclaim of traditional Chinese chroniclers, nationalistic writers,
and Marxist scholars alike. The Ching recovery of Sinkiang from the Mos-
lem rebels in the 1870s ranks among the few occurrences that enjoy such an
unlikely unanimity. The success of this expedition has been largely credited
to Zuos extraordinary gift as organizer, manipulator, and politician.108
It is beyond any doubt that Zuo was an extremely gifted strategist and
178 collapse of the muslim state

soldier, as was proven by the suppression of the Taiping rebellion and the
Muslim rebellion in Shanxi and Gansu. However, can we attribute the out-
come of the Xinjiang expedition solely to the talent of Zuo and the superior
power of his army? As would be clear now, there was no major battle be-
tween the Qing and the Muslim troops. When the Qing force conquered
Zungharia, they met only a slight resistance at Gumadi. Not to mention that
Yaqb Beg did not actively support the Urumchi Tungans, hoping to make
a bargain with the Qing, he even ordered his troops not to engage in the bat-
tle. His attitude caused deep suspicion among many Muslims and aggra-
vated their discontent, which caused the sharp fall in the morale of his
troops and massive defections to the Chinese. When the Qing troops nally
moved down to Kashgharia, Yaqb Beg suddenly died in Kurla and the
whole Muslim camp became engulfed in internal ghting. It took only sev-
enty days for the Qing army to march from Kurla to Kashghar. If we re-
member that the average number of days for caravans to traverse that
distance normally took thirty-ve days at that time, we can get some idea
about how fast the Qing army moved and how little resistance it must have
encountered.
What these facts tell us is that the success of the Qing expedition owed
more to the disarray of the enemy than the strength of the Qing force. This
disarray was caused not only by Yaqb Begs critically miscalculated strat-
egy and his sudden death, but also by the longstanding internal discontent
so widespread among the Muslims. This popular discontent resulted from
the political domination by the Khoqandians and their abuses of power as
well as from the worsening of the economic condition in the country. Nev-
ertheless, even when these negative factors are considered, if Yaqb Beg had
responded more actively to the Qing advance by defending the cities and ha-
rassing the long Chinese supply line over the desert caravan routes, we can-
not completely rule out the possibility that the Qing expedition might have
ended as one of the most disastrous military undertakings in modern Chi-
nese history.
Conclusion

The latter half of the nineteenth century was the period when the
force of worldwide modern transformation began to be felt in Central Asia.
During that period, the Russian expansion reached its nal stage by cross-
ing the Syr Darya; the British empire threw off its masterly inactivity and
strove to respond to the Russian pressure in Central Asia; and China was
going through the painful process of adapting herself to the modern age.
The changes in the outer world had always been reected in Chinese Cen-
tral Asia throughout its history and this period was no exception. The 1864
Muslim rebellion was a dramatic response to these global changes occur-
ring around Chinese Central Asia.
On June 4, 1864 a revolt erupted in Kucha that produced a shock wave
that quickly spread the rebellion to almost every city in Xinjiang. By the end
of that year almost the entire area was freed from the control of the Qing
empire. However, specic anti-Qing rebel groups neither planned most of
these revolts nor were they the products of much close communication or
cooperation among the local rebels in different cities. This seemingly para-
doxical phenomenonthe rapid and sweeping success of the rebellion and
its lack of coordinationcan be understood when we look into the direct
causes of the rebellion.
As a result of the rebellions in China proper, especially those in Shanxi
and Gansu provinces, the Qing could no longer send the subsidies to Xin-
jiang that were indispensable for maintaining its military force in Xinjiang.
The inevitable result was an increase in the tax burden on the local people
whose discontent grew deeper. At the same time, the news of the Muslim re-
bellion in the western part of China was accompanied by frightful stories of
massacre. The Tungans, that is, Chinese-speaking Muslims in Xinjiang were
extremely perturbed by this news while the Qing ofcials began to worry
about the growing anti-Qing mood among them. Soon rumors were spread
all over the cities in Xinjiang that the emperor of China had ordered the
Tungans to be massacred. Although the rumor of an imperial decree appears
to have no basis in fact, several sources suggest that in some areas localized
massacres of Tungans did actually occur on a small scale. It is certainly true
180 conclusion

that suspicious Qing ofcials in Xinjiang took precautionary measures to

disarm Tungan soldiers, executing ringleaders accused of plotting revolt,
and in some cases even slaughtering a number of Tungans. This was the rea-
son it was the Tungans who took up the rst arms against the Qing.
The revolt then rapidly developed into full-scale rebellion when the Tur-
kic Muslims who formed the majority of the population in Eastern
Turkestan joined it. They had been under Qing domination since the 1750s,
ruled by indigenous local ofcials called begs who were closely supervised
by Qing ofcials. While this policy of indirect rule was designed to lessen
conicts with the local people, the dual administrative structure instead
merely resulted in an increased level of exploitation by both local and Qing
ofcials. Under these conditions, the Qing found it necessary to increase the
number of troops stationed in Xinjiang to prevent and suppress revolts by
the Muslim population. The enormous expense required to maintain this
ruling structure was a serious burden not only to the Qing but also to the
local population.
Popular discontent was expressed by frequent riots that were exploited
by the anti-Qing religious group of the fq khwjas, who had ruled the
country before the Qing conquest and then had taken refuge in the neigh-
boring state of Khoqand. The aspiration of these khwjas to regain
Kashgharia was in accord with the interests of the Khoqand khanate, which
was also looking for a means to put pressure on the Qing court to obtain
trade concessions from China. Pursuit of their common interests resulted in
the invasions of Kashgharia by Jahngr in 1826 and of Ysuf in 1830.
Faced with this crisis, and expecting that the Khoqand rulers would refrain
from further hostile actions if China conceded them important commercial
privileges, the Qing court granted Khoqand the right to levy a custom tax
from foreign merchants in Kashgharia and other benets in 1832. The
agreement seemed to promise the region stability, but this hope crumbled
when both countries were thrown into great turmoil: the rebellions of the
Taiping and the Nian in China, the intervention of the Qipchaqs and the
Qirghizs, and the drastic weakening of central power in Khoqand. China
could no longer bear the nancial burden for Xinjiang and Khoqand was in
no position to restrain the khwjas. As a result, from the end of the 1840s
we see a drastic increase in the number of incursions by the khwjas and
riots by local people. Social and economic conditions of the Muslim popu-
lation became more and more unbearable and ominous signs of discontent
began to appear everywhere.
It was at this juncture that the revolt of Kucha erupted and, as the news
of its success spread throughout Xinjiang, virtually every major city rose in
rebellion with it. After the expulsion of Qing power six different centers of
rebellion emerged: Kucha, Kashghar, Yarkand, Khotan, Urumchi, and Ili.
Because the rebellion broke out without any coordination among the rebel
 conclusion 181

groups involved, there was no agreement on which one should have su-
preme power. Serious ghting therefore erupted between rival rebel groups
representing each region as well as internal conicts within each region.
Ethnic differences between the Tungans and the Turks aggravated the situ-
ation. Yet in spite of all these internal conicts, we can nd one common
feature shared by them all: the emergence of religious gures as the formal
leaders of the rebellion. Although it was not the men of religion, except in
Urumchi and Khotan, who initially started the anti-Qing movement, the
diverse groups participating in the rebellion found it in their best interest
to make established religious gures the ofcial leaders of their regimes.
Some of these religious leaders then succeeded in transforming themselves
from nominal leaders to actual rulers, but others remained mere titular
gureheads.
This feature reects one of the most conspicuous dynamics of the 1864
Muslim rebellion in Xinjiang. People with various ethnic and social back-
grounds lled the rank and le even when their aspirations were not in ac-
cord with one another. They joined the rebellion for their own reasons: the
danger of massacre for the Tungans, the unbearable tax burdens for the
peasants, the unjust indel rule for religious people, the prospect of taking
leadership from beg ofcials and the opportunity to get spoils for hooligans.
However, what they all cried for together was the holy war against the
indel rulers. Although the 1864 rebellion is not a religious war and reli-
gion was not its prime motivation either, it was the religion of Islam that all
the diverse groups of people shared in common. Nothing but Islam could
bridge the conicts of the class interest, the ethnic animosities, and regional
rivalries. The consciousness of holy war therefore became the driving force
rallying almost all the Muslim population in Xinjiang. The persistence and
tenacity of Islamic ideals had always been the Achilles heel of Qing impe-
rial ideology in Chinese Central Asia and the 1864 rebellion demonstrated
how badly the Qing had failed in inculcating a non-Islamic model of polit-
ical legitimacy.
Thus, the religious gures with the charisma of saintly lineages emerged
because they could best represent the ideal of the holy war. Many of them
styled themselves holy warriors (ghz) and a rebel government established
in Urumchi was named Kingdom of Islam (Qingzhenguo). However, the
slogan of holy war which had been so powerful against the Qing rulers lost
its dynamic force once the indels disappeared. Fighting broke out between
and within the rebel groups and the situation turned more and more
chaotic. Although the Kuchean regime under the leadership of Rshidn
Khwja took the lead sending armies to subdue other areas, it failed to cre-
ate a unied power. This historical task was achieved by Yaqb Beg, a late-
comer on the scene.
Yaqb Beg, probably an Uzbek in origin, was born in 1820 in Piskent, a
182 conclusion

small town 50 km to the south of Tashkent. His early career in the Kho-
qand khanate is cloudy, but it is apparent that he was neither an adventur-
ous soldier of fortune nor a fanatic holy warrior as has been generally de-
picted. He had started as a minor ofcial and gradually raised his position
serving several different khans and powerful gures. Before he came to
Kashgharia, he was under lim Quli, a Qipchaq leader, who was busy
preparing for the defense of Tashkent against the Russians. When lim
Quli received a request from \iddq Beg, a Qirghiz rebel leader in Kashghar,
for the dispatch of an fq khwja, he decided to send Buzurg, accompa-
nied by Yaqb Beg, in order to protect the vested interests of the khanate
by manipulating the situation there. This was the pattern repeated in the
past, and, in that sense, Yaqb Beg was a mere tool of Khoqands tradi-
tional Kashgharian policy.
His obligation to the khanate, however, was suddenly annulled in the
middle of 1865 as a result of lim Qulis death and his incorporation of
the political refugees opposing a new ruler of the khanate, Khudyr, whom
he himself had opposed. He became free to act on his own. Almost seven
thousand Khoqandian refugees, many of them seasoned warriors and mili-
tary ofcers, provided him a rm military basis for the conquest of Eastern
Turkestan. Based on these troops, he organized one cavalry and four in-
fantry divisions whose total number reached fteen thousand. By June 1867
Yaqb Beg became the sole ruler of Kashgharia by eliminating rival pow-
ers in Yarkand, Khotan, and Kucha, and during 18701872 he succeeded
in unifying the entire Eastern Turkestan and Urumchi areas.
His task was then how to rule this vast territory as a foreigner who lacked
sufcient secular or religious charisma. What he needed rst of all was a
strong army loyal to him, and so he built a non-tribal standing army of more
than forty thousand in strength. To insure their loyalty he gave highest posts
to the Khoqandians who came from his own country and shared the same
destiny with him. Careful studies show that the majority of the command-
ers of division and the captains of ve hundred were recruited from the Kho-
qandians. At the same time, in order to check the danger of opposition from
army commanders, he took measures to prevent them from establishing an
independent military power. He also retained the right to appoint and dis-
miss army ofcers above the rank of captain of one hundred.
The monopoly of the Khoqandians was also found in the provincial gov-
ernment. The largest unit of local administration, vilyat, was under the
governor called kkim. The exact number of provinces varies according to
sources, but it appears to have uctuated between seven and ten, which
roughly corresponds to the Eight Cities of the Southern Circuit under the
Qing rule. The governor took control of civil, nancial, military, and judi-
cial branches of the provincial government, but only nominally. This was
 conclusion 183

because Yaqb Beg frequently exercised his personal power to appoint the
military ofcers stationed in important areas, and nancial ofcials were
also directly responsible to him. This division was a measure aimed at pre-
venting regional ofcials from consolidating too much power in their own
hands.
Although the ruling structure of the Muslim state under Yaqb Beg was
extremely centralized, it seems that there was no well-structured central
government. What we can nd is a group of people called mrzs under the
direction of mrzbashi (chief secretary). They took responsibility for the
revenue and expenditures of the government and provided advice at the re-
quest of Yaqb Beg. The power of mrzbashis was so great that one local
historian wrote that they were only next to Yaqb Beg. The background of
these mrzbashis shows that they were neither high ofcials nor religious
gures. They were mere professional scribes or accountants, and because
they did not have an independent source of inuence, they could not but en-
tirely rely upon the favor of Yaqb Beg.
However, the military buildup and the centralization of power were not
sufcient to secure his rule. What he was conspicuously lacking was legiti-
macy. He had started as a mere deputy of the Khoqand khanate and had no
source of charisma to justify his rule. He himself knew this problem very
well and it was why he never called himself khan. What he chose to do to
overcome this handicap was to promote Islam and to enforce the regime of
sharah. He himself showed the model by a frugal way of life as if he were
a dervish and he promoted the construction of religious facilities, especially
saintly mausoleums. The popular titles like Badaulat and Ataliq Ghz by
which he was addressed show his inclination to present himself as the image
of a holy warrior endowed with divine blessing.
One of the aims for him to open the diplomatic relation with foreign
countries was to give an aura of legitimacy to his rule in the eyes of the local
population. At the same time, he used diplomacy to enhance his political
status in the international community and to nd channels for acquiring
military armaments. At rst, Russia not only ignored the legitimacy of
Yaqb Begs rule but also was prepared to use military means to protect her
trade rights in Eastern Turkestan and to eliminate the danger posed by him.
His strenuous effort to neutralize the threat nally resulted in a commercial
agreement with the Russian government in 1872. He also approached En-
gland and succeeded in bringing her to signing a commercial treaty in 1874.
While trying to maintain the balance of power around his country in this
way, he entered into a diplomatic relationship with the Ottoman Empire.
His relation with the Ottomans, initiated and propelled by the effort of
Sayyid Yaqb Khn, bore especially fruitful results. In 1873 he acknowl-
edged the suzerainty of the sultan who reciprocated by bestowing on him
184 conclusion

the title of amr and massive military support through the dispatch of ar-
maments and military instructors.
However, the Muslim state under Yaqb Beg had critical weaknesses, in-
cluding the widespread discontent of the local population due to economic
hardship and the Khoqandian domination. This problem was an inevitable
result of his centralization and military buildup. Yaqb Begs army of forty
thousand was equivalent in size to the number of Qing troops that had pre-
viously been stationed in Xinjiang. But while the Qing court had drawn on
the resources from China as a whole to offset the huge costs of maintaining
these troops, Yaqb Beg could only rely on the tax income from the local
population of Xinjiang itself. He attempted to alleviate their discontent by
ideological indoctrination stressing the puritanical spirit of Islam and by an
iron rule that inculcated fear into various sectors of the society. The dis-
content, however, was not obliterated but simply suppressed, only to
reemerge at the moment of critical weakness.
More important, Yaqb Beg had no sure means by which to forestall
Chinas intention to reconquer Xinjiang. He had rst attempted employing
direct diplomatic means to persuade the Qing rulers to acknowledge the
status quo. When these negotiations with China failed, he urged Britain to
wield its inuence upon the Qing court. The British effort to advise the
futility of the reconquest seemed to be listened to seriously among some of
the high Qing ofcials like Li Hongzhang and Prince Gong. Probably this
news may have given Yaqb Beg hope that he might solve the problem by
diplomacy.
However, in the middle of 1876 the Qing army under the command of
Zuo Zongtang already began its move into Zungharia. Yaqb Beg, while
having concentrated more than twenty thousand troops in the areas of Toq-
sun and Kurla preparing for a possible showdown, ignored the request of
assistance from the Tungans in Zungharia and ordered his troops not to
open re against the Qing army. This strange order stemmed from his ex-
pectation for diplomatic settlement with China. He sent his envoy to Lon-
don for negotiations with the representative of China and was prepared to
accept even the term of submission to China only if he could keep the coun-
try. His decision was, however, a critical strategic mistake because the Qing
court, under the urgings of Zuo Zongtang and several other Manchu hard-
liners, was not willing to accept the diplomatic solution.
Yaqb Begs passive policy toward China, especially his order not to
open re, gave a devastating blow to the morale of his army. Many ofcials
and soldiers began to desert to the Chinese side. In the middle of the defec-
tion and the confusion he suddenly died around the end of May 1877 in
Kurla. This was instantly followed by a massive defection of the Muslim sol-
diers to the Chinese and by an intense succession struggle within the Mus-
 conclusion 185

lim camp, which made it impossible for them to ght the Chinese. They
never offered any substantial resistance to the Qing troops who conquered
the entire area of Eastern Turkestan in just two months. We may well say
that the collapse of the Muslim state was self-destruction rather than the re-
sult of armed clashes.
The political events in Chinese Central Asia during the period between
1864 and 1877 left enduring marks upon later historical developments in
this region. The rst, and the most conspicuous change, was its incorpora-
tion into the provincial system. As a result of the bitter experience during
the period of the rebellion, China now clearly realized that the old way of
domination of Xinjiang through Qing military ofcials and local Muslim
begs was no longer adequate. A long history of debates surrounding the
plausibility of the establishment of provinces in Xinjiang nally reached
its end.1
With the introduction of a new provincial system which was followed by
extensive immigration of Chinese, sinicization of Xinjiang really began to
take place. After the creation of the Peoples Republic of China this process
continued through the colonization by the Military Corps for Production
and Construction, which accelerated the massive inux of Han population.
At present, the Uyghurs maintain a precarious plurality in numbers over the
Han Chinese,2 but there is no doubt that soon the pendulum will be tilted
toward the Han.
It was not only the Chinese attitude that was changed. This turbulent era
left an indelible imprint upon the local Muslims as well. During about ten
years of Yaqb Begs rule, religious leaders, especially khwjas, who had
exercised enormous inuence in the past, were executed or lost their polit-
ical inuence. After the Qing entered again in 1877, they ceased to be a pre-
dominant social group to be reckoned with. Hkim Khns attempt was vir-
tually the last page of their long history of dominance over the Kashghar-
ian people. Instead, a group of new intellectuals began to emerge who were
deeply imbued with the ideas of Jadidism in Russian Turkestan and Turkey.
They were critical of religious obscurantism and began to urge the reform
of traditional Muslim society. Since then the guiding principle of the popu-
lar movements in Xinjiang was nationalism, and holy war no longer could
be the sole slogan.3
After the great upheaval in the later half of the nineteenth century Chi-
nese Central Asia could no longer stay as it had been. The changes that it
brought about in the spheres of the political and social structures, ethnic
composition, and foreign relations began to operate as powerful forces in
molding the modern history of this region in the twentieth century.
This page intentionally left blank
appendix A
Treaty Between Russia
and Kashghar (1872)1

The following conditions of free trade were proposed and agreed upon be-
tween General Aide-de-Camp von Kaufman and Yakoob Beg, ruler of Djety-Shahr.

article i
All Russian subjects, of whatsoever religion, shall have the right to proceed
for purposes of trade to Djety-Shahr, and to all the localities and towns subjected to
the ruler2 of Djety-Shahr, which they may desire to visit in the same way as the in-
habitants of Djety-Shahr have hitherto been, and shall be in the future, entitled to
prosecute trade throughout the entire extent of the Russian Empire. The honourable
ruler of Djety-Shahr undertakes to keep a vigilant guard over the complete safety of
Russian subjects, within the limits of his territorial possessions, and also over that
of their caravans, and in general over everything that may belong to them.

article ii
Russian merchants shall be entitled to have caravanserais, in which they
alone shall be able to store their merchandise, in all the towns of Djety-Shahr in
which they may desire to have them. The merchants of Djety-Shahr shall enjoy the
same privilege in the Russian villages.

article iii
Russian merchants shall, if they desire it, have the right to have commercial
agents (caravanbashis) in all the towns of Djety-Shahr, whose business it is to watch
over the regular courts of trade, and over the legal imposition of custom dues. The
merchants of Djety-Shahr shall enjoy the same privilege in the towns of Turkestan.

article iv
All merchandise transported from Russia to Djety-Shahr, or from that
province into Russia, shall be liable to a tax of 2 1/2 percent, ad valorem. In every
case this tax shall not exceed the rate of the tax taken from Mussulmans being sub-
ject to Djety-Shahr.
188 treaty between russia and kashghar (1872)

article v
Russian merchants and their caravans shall be at liberty, with all freedom and
security, to traverse the territories of Djety-Shahr in proceeding to countries coter-
minous with that province. Caravans from Djety-Shahr shall enjoy the same advan-
tages for passing through territories belonging to Russia.
These conditions were sent from Tashkent on the 9th of April, 1872.
General Von Kaufman I., Governor-General of Turkestan, signed the treaty and
attached his seal to it.
In proof of his assent to these conditions, Mahomed Yakoob, ruler of Djety-
Shahr, attached his seal to them at Yangy-Shahr, on the 8th of June, 1872.
This treaty was negotiated by Baron Kaulbars.
appendix B
Treaty Between England
and Kashghar (1874)1

Treaty between the British Government and His Highness the Ameer Ma-
homed Yakoob Khan, Ruler of the territory of Kashgar and Yarkund, his heirs and
successor, executed on the one part by Thomas Douglas Forsyth, C. B., in virtue of
full powers conferred on him in that behalf by His Excellency the Right Honourable
Thomas George Baring, Baron Northbrook, of Stratton, and a Baronet, Member of
the Privy Council of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ire-
land, Grand Master of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Viceroy and
Governor General of India in Council, and on the other part by Syud Mahomed
Khan Toorah, Member of the First Class of the Order of Medjedie, &c., in virtue of
full powers conferred on him by His Highness.
Whereas it is deemed desirable to conrm and strengthen the good understand-
ing which now subsists between the high contracting parties, and to promote com-
mercial intercourse between their respective subjects, the following Articles have
been agreed upon:

article i
The high contracting parties engage that the subjects of each shall be at lib-
erty to enter, reside in, trade with, and pass with their merchandise and property
into and through all parts of the dominions of the other, and shall enjoy in such do-
minions all the privileges and advantages with respect to commerce, protection, or
otherwise, which are or may be accorded to the subjects of such dominions, or to
the subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation.

article ii
Merchants of whatever nationality shall be at liberty to pass from the terri-
tories of the one contracting party to the territories of the other with their mer-
chandise and property at all times and by any route they please; no restriction shall
be placed by either contracting party upon such freedom of transit, unless for urgent
political reasons to be previously communicated to the other; and such restriction
shall be withdrawn as soon as the necessity for it is over.
190 treaty between britain and kashghar (1874)

article iii
European British subjects entering the dominions of his Highness the Ameer
for purposes of trade or otherwise must be provided with passports certifying to
their nationality. Unless provided with such passports they shall not be deemed en-
titled to the benet of this Treaty.

article iv
On goods imported into British India from territories of his Highness the
Ameer by any route over the Himalayan passes which lie to the south of his High-
nesss dominions, the British Government engages to levy no import duties. On
goods imported from India into the territories of his Highness the Ameer, no import
duty exceeding 21/2 percent. ad valorem shall be levied. Goods imported as above
into the dominions of the contracting parties may, subject only to such excise regu-
lations and duties and to such municipal or town regulations and duties, as may be
applicable to such classes of goods generally, be freely sold by wholesale or retail,
and transported from one place to another within British India, and within the do-
minions of his Highness the Ameer respectively.

article v
Merchandise imported from India into the territories of his Highness the
Ameer will not be opened for examination till arrival at the place of consignment.
If any disputes should arise as to the value of such goods the Customs ofcer or other
ofcer acting on the part of his Highness the Ameer shall be entitled to demand part
of the goods at the rate of one in 40, in lieu of the payment of duty. If the aforesaid
ofcer should object to levy the duty by taking a portion of the goods, or if the goods
should not admit of being so divided, then the point in dispute shall be referred to
two competent persons, one chosen by the aforesaid ofcer and the other by the im-
porter, and a valuation of the goods shall be made, and if the referees shall differ in
opinion, they shall appoint an arbitrator, whose decision shall be nal, and the duty
shall be levied according to the value thus established.

article vi
The British Government shall be at liberty to appoint a representative at
the Court of his Highness the Ameer, and to appoint commercial agents subordinate
to him in any towns or places considered suitable within his Highnesss territories.
His Highness the Ameer shall be at liberty to appoint a representative with the
Viceroy and Governor General of India, and to station commercial agents at any
places in British India considered suitable. Such representatives shall be entitled to
the rank and privileges accorded to ambassadors by the law of nations, and the
agents shall be entitled to the privileges of consuls of the most favoured nation.
 treaty between britain and kashghar (1874) 191

article vii
British subjects shall be at liberty to purchase, sell, or hire land or houses or
depts for merchandise in the dominions of his Highness the Ameer, and the houses,
depts, or other premises of British subjects shall not be forcibly entered or searched
without the consent of the occupier, unless with the cognisance of the British repre-
sentative or agent, and in presence of a person deputed by him.

article viii
The following arrangements are agreed to for the decision of civil suits and
criminal cases within the territories of his Highness the Ameer in which British sub-
jects are concerned:
(a.) Civil suits in which both plaintiff and defendant are British subjects,
and criminal cases in which both prosecutor and accused are British subjects or
in which the accused is a European British subject mentioned in the 3rd Article
of this Treaty, shall be tried by the British representative, or one of his agents,
in the presence of an agent appointed by his Highness the Ameer.
(b.) Civil suits in which one party is a subject of his Highness the Ameer
and the other party a British subject, shall be tried by the courts of his High-
ness in the presence of the British representative, or one of his agents, or of a
person appointed in that behalf by such representative or agent.
(c.) Criminal cases in which either prosecutor or accused is a subject of his
Highness the Ameer shall, except as above otherwise provided, be tried by the
courts of his Highness in presence of the British representatives, or of one of his
agents, or of a person deputed by the British representatives, or by one of his
agents.
(d.) Except as above otherwise provided, civil and criminal cases in which
one party is a British subject and the other the subject of a foreign power, shall,
if either of the parties is a Mahomedan, be tried in the courts of his Highness;
if neither party is a Mahomedan, the case may, with consent of the parties, be
tried by the British representative, or one of his agents: in the absence of such
consent, by the courts of his Highness;
(e.) In any case disposed of by the courts of his Highness the Ameer to
which a British subject is party, it shall be competent to the British representa-
tive, if he considers that justice has not been done, to represent the matter to
his Highness the Ameer, who may cause the case to be retried in some other
court, in the presence of the British representative, or of one of his agents,
or of a person appointed in that behalf by such representative or agent.

article ix
The rights and privileges enjoyed within the dominions of his Highness the
Ameer by British subjects under this Treaty shall extend to the subjects of all princes
and states in India in alliance with Her Majesty the Queen; and if, with respect to
any such prince or state, any other provisions relating to this Treaty, or to other
matters, should be considered desirable, they shall be negotiated through the British
Government.
192 treaty between britain and kashghar (1874)

article x
Every afdavit and other legal document led or deposited in any court es-
tablished in the respective dominions of the high contracting parties, or in the Court
of the Joint Commissioners in Ladakh, may be proved by an authenticated copy,
purporting either to be sealed with the seal of the court to which the original docu-
ment belongs, or in the event of such court having no seal, to be signed by the judge,
or by one of the judges of the said court.

article xi
When a British subject dies in the territory of his Highness the Ameer, his
movable and immovable property situate therein shall be vested in his heir, execu-
tor, administrator, or other representative in interest, or (in the absence of such rep-
resentative) in the representative of the British Government in the aforesaid terri-
tory. The person in whom such charge shall be so vested shall satisfy the claims out-
standing against the deceased, and shall hold the surplus (if any) for distribution
among those interested. The above provisions, mutatis mutandis, shall apply to the
subjects of his Highness the Ameer who may die in British India.

article xii
If a British subject residing in the territories of his Highness the Ameer be-
comes unable to pay his debts, or fails to pay any debt within a reasonable time after
being ordered to do so by any court of justice, the creditors of such insolvent shall
be paid out of his goods and effects; but the British representative shall not refuse
his good ofces, if needs be, to ascertain if the insolvent has not left in India dis-
posable property which might serve to satisfy the said creditors. The friendly stipu-
lations in the present Article shall be reciprocally observed with regard to his High-
nesss subjects who trade in India under the protection of the laws.
This Treaty having this day been executed in duplicate, and conrmed by his
Highness the Ameer, one copy shall, for the present, be left in the possession of his
Highness, and the other, after conrmation by the Viceroy and Governor General
of India, shall be delivered to His Highness within twelve months in exchange for
the copy now retained by his Highness.
Signed and sealed at Kashgar on the 2nd day of Februray, in the year of our Lord
1874, corresponding with the 15th day of Zilhijj, 1290 Hijri.

(Signed) T. Douglas Forsyth

Envoy and Plenipotentiary.

Whereas a Treaty for strengthening the good understanding that now exists be-
tween the British Government and the ruler of the territory of Kashgar and Yarkund,
and for promoting commercial intercourse between the two countries, was agreed
upon and concluded at Kashgar on the 2nd day of February, in the year of our Lord
1874, corresponding with the 15th day of Zilhijj, 1290 Hijree, by the respective
plenipotentiaries of the Government of India and his Highness the Ameer of Kash-
 treaty between britain and kashghar (1874) 193

gar and Yarkund duly accredited and empowered for that purpose: I, the Right Ho-
nourable Thomas George Baring, Baron Northbrook, of Stratton, &c., &c., Viceroy
and Governor General of India, do hereby ratify and conrm the Treaty aforesaid.
Given under my hand and seal at Government House in Calcutta, this 13th day
of April, in the year of our Lord 1874.

(Signed) Northbrook.
Seal
appendix C
Table of Contents in TAs and THs

This table shows the epitomized title and its starting page (or folio) of each
chapter in ve different manuscripts and editions of TA and TH which are available
to me. The ve copies listed below do not exactly match with each other, and it was
because Sayrm continuously revised his work throughout his life. It is important
for researchers to compare and nd the changes found in these copies.

Titles of Chapters th/ th/ ta/ ta/ ta/

Enver Jarring Pelliot Jarring Pantusov
Preface 27 1r 1v 7r 2
Introduction
1 History after Noah 41 3r 3v 9r 7
2 Chinggis Khan and his descendants 67 8v
3 Dughlat tribe and its amrs 98 15r 10r
4 Tughluq Temr Khan
and his descendants 117 19r 17r 21v
5 Holy war of Jahngr 148 26r 26r 30v 28
6 Muslim under the Chinese rule 158 28r 29v 34v 34

Part 1: Rshidn Khwja

1 Holy war of Rshidn Khwja 181 33v 38v 44r 44
2 Genealogy of Rshidn Khwja 187 35r 40v 46v 48
3 Failure of Aqsu campaign 190 35v 42r 47v 50
4 Success of Aqsu campaign 197 37v 44r 50r 54
5 Expedition to Ush Turfan 202 38v 46v 52v 57
6 Kashghar campaign 210 40v 49v 55v 62
7 Yarkand campaign 213 41r 51r 57r 65
8 Campaign to Kashghar and Yarkand 220 42v 53r 59r 69
9 Rule of Makmdn 230 44v 57r 63r 76
10 Iskq Khwja; Ili and Khotan 246 48r 63r 69v 86
11 Conquest of Qarashahr 254 50r 66r 73r 92
12 Conquest of Turfan 271 53v 71v 78v 100
13 Failure of campaign to Murkhu 282 56r 76v 83r 107
14 Submission of Hami and Return
of Iskq Khwja 288 57v 78v 85r 111
15 Iskq Khwjas western campaign
and its failure 299 60r 82v 89v 116
16 Dissension and demise of Kuchean
khwjas 307 62r 85v 93r 121

Part 2: Yaqb Beg

1 Arrival of Yaqb Beg and Buzurg 326 66v 91r 99r 131
2 Refugees from Khoqand 340 69v 96v 105r 141
 table of contents in tas and ths 195

3 Yaqb Begs rise to power 352 72v 101v 110r 149

4 Khotan campaign 360 74r 104v 113v 155
5 Habb Allhs virtue and his rule 377 78r 104v 113v 167
6 Conquest of Aqsu and Kucha 388 80r 115r 124v 174
7 Unication of Yttishahr 399 83r 119r 129v 182
8 The Ottoman empire 417
9 Battles with the Urumchi Tungans 431 86v 126r 135v 193
10 Conquest of Urumchi 447 90r 132v 141v 202
11 Hkim Khns campaign to Urumchi 459 93r 137v 146r 211
12 Second expedition to Turfan 476 96v 144r 150v 219
13 Merits and demerits of Yaqb
Begs rule 495 100r 151r 157r 231
14 Hkim Khns enthronement 526 104v 160v 165v 245
15 Rise and fall of Beg Quli 533 106v 163v 168v 251
16 Niyz Hkim Beg 546 109v 168v 173r 259
17 Notables during Yaqb Begs era 563 113r 175v lacking 270
18 Carreer of the author, Sayrm 587 116v 183v 183r 284
19 Reconquest of Chinese emperor 600 120v 187v 187r 291
20 Virtues of Chinese emperor 617 lacking
Conclusion
Description of Yttishahr,
and Conclusion 636 lacking 196r 195r 304
This page intentionally left blank
Glossary

fq followers of Khwja fq, Black Mountaineers

akhnd (akhn) title given to Muslim religious leaders
alam scholar
alban (alvan) tributary tax
Altishahr Six Cities, that is, Kashgharia
amban Qing high ofcial (Ma.)
amr al-mminn Commander of the Faithful
amr al-umar commander-in-chief
amr chief, commander
amr-i lashkar commander-in-chief
aqsaqal elder (white beard)
ataliq title of a high ranking ofcial (lit., fatherly)
bacha dancing boy
badaulat fortunate one
bashi low governmental funtionary (lit., head)
batman unit of measure for crop land
bai the well-to-do
beg local Muslim ofcial title
b (b)) title for tribal chief (etymologically same as beg)
caravanbashi commercial agent (lit., head of caravan)
ddkhwh governor (synonim of kkim)
dahbashi head of ten
darugha petty functionary
darvsh ascetic, dervish
dayanshay commander-in-chief (Ch. dayuanshuai)
dvn (dvnbegi) village headman
elligbashi head of fty
farsakh unit of measure for distance (4.55 miles)
fatva legal opinion based on the Islamic law
ghazt holy war
ghz holy warrior
kjj pilgrimage (to Mecca)
kjj one who performed kjj
kkim governor
huda-i da head of merchants (Ma.)
198 glossary

imm preacher, religious title

shn high religious title (lit., they)
ishikagha deputy governor
jigit (yigit) cavalry
jizy poll tax
khalfa caliph (lit., deputy)
khnaqh prayer house, retreat
kharj land tax
khaznachi treasurer
khitay China, Chinese
khuba Friday sermon
khwja high Muslim religious title
kuhnashahr old city
kuru{ Ottoman monetary unit
langar halting place
lashkarbashi commander-in-chief
madrassa Islamic college
Makhdmzda descendant of Makhdm-i Aam
masjid mosque
mazr holy tomb
mihtar court ofcial (keeper of the wardrobe)
miltiq rie
mingbashi miliarch
mr govenor (lord)
mrb supervisor of irrigation
mrz secretary (from amrzda)
mrzbashi chief secretary
muazzin the caller of prayer
muft religious prosecutor
mull teacher (from mawl)
murd disciple
musulmn Muslim
namz daily prayer
pdishh king, emperor
pdishhzda descendant of king
panjhbashi captain of fty
pnad (pnadbashi) captain of ve hundred
parvnachi court ofcial (keeper of the royal seal)
pr (pr) religious master
pul smallest monetary unit
qj judge
qj kaln chief judge
 glossary 199

qarawul frontier guard-post

qonalgha irregular levy (quartering)
qushbegi high ofcial title in Bukhara and Khoqand
sam listening to music
saman-pul irregular tax on grains
sarbz infantry
sarkr treasurer
sayyid high religious title
sekke coinage
shahd martyr
shngy elder of merchants (Ch. shangye)
sharah religious law of Islam
shaykh al-Islm head of ulam
shaykh lord; leader of Su order
soyurghal ef
Su Islamic mystics (f)
suln king, ruler
tng silver coin (equal to 50 puls)
taranchi (tariyachi) Eastern Turkestanis in Zungharia
(lit., cultivator)
top cannon
tungchi interpreter (Ch. tongshi)
anb tax on orchards; unit of measure
for non-crop land
ill gold coin
ulam Muslim scholars (the learned)
urda residence of governor or ruler (from orda
or ordu)
ushr land tax; tithe
vaqf endowment
vilyat province
vizr minister
wayshang suburban market (Ch. waishang)
ymb silver ingot (Ch. yuanbao)
yangishahr new city
yanshay commander (Ch. yuanshuai)
yasawul aide-de-camp
Yttishahr Seven Cities, that is, Kashgharia
Yenieri cavalry army in the Ottoman empire (Janissary)
yzbashi centurion
zakt alms tax, or tax on livestock or commodities
zaktchi collector of zakt
This page intentionally left blank
List of Chinese Characters

ahong
ahun
*Atuwai (Atuoai) R
Bai Su
Bai Yanhu
bangban dachen j
banshi dachen j
bazong `
Beilu _
bingtun L
bo B
cang
Cangcing (Changqing) `M
Cangling (Changling)
canjiang N
canzan dachen j
Cenglu (Chenglu) S
Changji N
changmaozi l
chantou hui Y^
Chen Tai
chitun X
chou
Cui Wei Z
Dahu j
dangshi Q
dangwu
dapao j
daqian j
dayuanshuai j
dazhuang j
Dian Manla
Dihua }
Dong Fuxiang
Dongcheng F
202 list of chinese characters

donggan Fz
Donglu F
Dongzhiyuan
dou
duguan [ (x)
duguan-beg xBJ
Dorongga (Duolonga) h
dutong
Edui k
Elute B|S
fangbing L
Fujuri (Fuzhuli) I]
Fukang d
Ganzhou {
Gedimu
Gongchen Cheng f
Gongning Cheng d
gongshi
guanbi minfan xG
Guangren Cheng s
Guanzhong
Gucheng j
Gumadi (Gumudi) ja
Gumu j
Guo Songdao Cv
haifang
hancheng ~
hanhui ~^
hanren ~H
He Buyun B
Heilongjiang s
heiqian
Hesi e
Hongmiao q
hongqian
Hongshanzui sL
hou J
huanfang
Huang Hezhuo M
Huang Wanpeng UP
huangdi
Huangdian
 list of chinese characters 203

hubu
Hufuye C
Huibu ^
huicheng ^
huimin ^
Huining Cheng f
huitun ^
Huiyuan Cheng f
Hunasi J
hutun
jasaq junwang Jp
Jehol e
Jiadilinye LC
jiaofang {
jiaohui ^
jiaopai
Jiayuguan n
Jibuku Nw
jihai w
Jimsa N
Jin Laosan T
Jin Liang }
Jin Shun
Jin Xiangyin L
jin
Jinghe e
Jinjibao n
Jinxing A?
jiucheng
jiujiao
junfu x
junxian p
Kong Cai ~
kouliang f
koutou nY
Kuburenye wC
Kuiying ^
Lan Fachun oK
laorenjia Ha
laotaiye
Li Hongzhang E
Li Shi Q
204 list of chinese characters

Li Yunlin
lianghui }^
liangru weichu qJX
liang
lingdui dachen j
Liu Jintang BA
Liu Songshan BQs
lu
luying
Ma Chungliang }
Ma Duosan T
Ma Guan x
Ma Guiyuan Q
Ma Hualong (s)
Ma Jingui Q
Ma Long
Ma Quan
Ma Rende Ho
Ma Sheng
Ma Si |
Ma Tai ()
Ma Tuzi rl
Ma Wenlu S
Ma Yanlong s
Ma Yuan
Ma Zhanao e
Ma Zhong
Maimaitieli R
Maizimuzate S
Manas
mancheng
Ma Zhenhe M
menhuan
miehui ^
Mingsioi (Mingxu)
Muhanmode Zhairifu puqwC
Mulei S
Muleihe Se
Nanguan n
Nanlu bacheng nK
Nanlu n
Nanshan ns
 list of chinese characters 205

Nayanceng (Nayancheng)
Ningyuan Cheng
Paxia L
Pichang z
Pingliang D
Pingzui (Pingrui)
pinji ~
Prince Chun J
Prince Gong
puerqian
qianfan
qiantun
Qidaowan CDW
Qieshi v
qingzhen guo Mu
qingzhen wang Mu
Qitai _x
Qur Qarausu wfQ
Qutubi I
renyin G
saifang
Salingga (Salinga) F
Sandaohezi TDel
shalu jingjin b
shangye
Shashanzi Fsl
Shen Baozhen H
Shengjing ?
shen
shiba daying QKj
shi
Su Manla
Su Yude o
Suiding Cheng kw
Suilai k
Suo Dalaoye j
Suo Huanzhang
Suo Wen
Suzhou {
taizhan O
Taleqi Cheng _
tianming R
206 list of chinese characters

Tianshan Beilu s_
Tianshan Nanlu sn
tidu
Tongguan
tongling
tongshi q
tuanlian m
tuhui O^
tuntian
Tuo Delin oZ
Tuo Ming
Ulongge (Wulonge) ZB
Urcingga (Wuerchinga) QM
Urenbu (Wurenbu) ZH
waifei ~
waixiang ~[
Wang Dechun oK
wang
Wei Guangdao Qv
Weigan z
Wenxiang
Wenyi
Wu Sangui dT
xiaozhuang p
Xichun Cheng K
Xidaotang D
xiexiang
xincheng s
Xining
xinjiao s
Xintan sy
Xu Xhuedi }
Xu Xuegong }\
Xu Zhanbiao }eC
yancai Q
yancaiyin Q
Yang Chun K
Yang Ziying l^
yanglian iG
yanqi P
Yebcongge (Yebuchonge) ~RB
Yiheiwani
 list of chinese characters 207

Yili jiangjun pNx

Yu Deyan o
Yu Huen E
Yu Xiaohu _p
yuanbao _
yuanshuai v
Yumen
Yusupi
Jaohi (Zhaohui) f
Zhande Cheng w
Zhang Yao i`
Zhang Yue iV
Zhangjiakou af
zhangjiao x
Zheherenye C
Zhili
zhufang n
Zhunbu
Zhungaer
zhongtang daren jH
zhuxing huiren m^H
zongli yamen `z
This page intentionally left blank
reference matter
This page intentionally left blank
Notes

introduction

1. Zhongguo tongji nianjian: 2000, comp. Guojia Tongji Ju (Peking: Guojia

Tongji Chubanshe, 2000), p. 96. As of 1999 the number of the population reached
17,179,000.
2. For example, see Liu Yingsheng, Xibei minzushi yu Chahetai hanguoshi yan-
jiu (Nanjing: Nanjing Daxue Chubanshe, 1994); Michal Biran, Qaidu and the Rise
of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997); Wei
Liangdao, Yeerjiang hanguoshigang (Haerbin: Heilongjiang Jiaoyu Chubanshe,
1994).
3. See Saguchi Trus trilogy: Jhachi-jky seiki Higashi Torukisutan shakaishi
kenky (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kbunkan, 1963); Shinky minzokushi kenky (Tokyo:
Yoshikawa Kbunkan, 1986); Shinky Musurimu kenky (Tokyo: Yoshikawa
Kbunkan, 1995). Hori Sunao also published a number of articles dealing with so-
cial and economic aspects of Xinjiang during the Qing period (see Bibliography). In
Russia we have two good studies: L. I. Duman, Agrarnaia politika Tsinskogo
provitelstva v Sintsiane v kontse XVIII veka (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii Nauk
SSSR, 1936); V. S. Kuznetsov, Ekonomicheskaia politika Tsinskogo pravitelstva v
Sintsiane v pervoi polovine XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 1973). Pan Zhiping pub-
lished Zhongya Haohanguo yu Qingdai Xinjiang (Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chu-
banshe, 1991) in which he used important archival documents preserved in Peking.
In English there is an excellent study published by James A. Millward, Beyond the
Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 17591864 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1998).
4. Nonetheless, there are a couple of good surveys showing the persistence of the
continental trade in the post-Mongol period. See Morris Rossabi, China and Inner
Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975); Saguchi
Tru, Roshia to Ajia sgen (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kbunkan, 1967). Several Japanese
scholars have strongly criticized the so-called Silk Road perspective and put more
emphasis on the importance of the relationship between the nomads in the north
and the sedentaries in the south, which they regard as the real dynamics of Inner
Asian history. See, for example, Mano Eiji, Ch Ajia no rekishi (Tokyo: Kdansha,
1977); Komatsu Hisao ed., Ch Yrasiashi (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shubbansha, 2000).
5. The Life of Yakoob Beg; Athalik Ghazi, and Badaulet; Ameer of Kashgar
(London: W. H. Allen, 1878).
6. D. Tikhonov, Vosstanie 1864 g. v Vostochnom Turkestane, Sovetskoe vos-
tokovedenie, no. 5 (1948); Uigurskie istoricheskie rukopisi kontsa XIX i nachala
XX v., Uchenye zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniia, no. 9 (1954); A. Khodzhaev,
212 notes to introduction

Tsinskaia imperiia, Dzhungariia i Vostochnyi Turkestan (Moscow: Izd-vo Fan

Uzbekskoi SSR, 1979); D. I. Isiev, Uigurskoe gosudarstvo Iettishar (Moscow: Izd-vo
Nauka, Glav. red. vostochnoi lit-ry, 1981).
7. Burhan Shahidi (Baoerhan), Lun Agubo zhengquan, Lishi yanjiu, 1958, no.
3; Zailun Agubo zhengquan, Lishi yanjiu, 1979, no. 8; Ji Dachun, Shilun yibal-
iusi nian Xinjiang nongmin qiyi, Minzu yanjiu, 1979, no. 2.
8. In this respect, we learn much from the works by Japanese scholar Hamada
Masami. Among others, see his Murr Birru no Seisenki ni tsuite, Ty gakuh,
vol. 55, no. 4 (1973); LHistoire de [otan de Mukammad Alam (13), Zinbun,
no. 15 (1979); no. 16 (1980); no. 18 (1982); Jky seiki Uiguru rekishi bunken
jsetsu, Th gakuho, no. 55 (1983).
9. The printed edition of this work is Taarikh-i emenie. Istoriia vladetelei Kash-
garii (Kazan: Tabkhane-i Medresse-i Ulum, 1905). For a brief introduction to
Sayrms work, see V. Bartold, Taarikh-i Emenie, Sochineniia, vol. 8 (Moscow:
Nauka, 1973), 21319; V. P. Iudin, Tarikh-i amniia, Materialy po istorii Kaza-
khskikh khanstv XVXVIII vekov (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1969), 47686; Enver
Baytur (Anwaer Bayituer), Maola Musha Shayiranmi he Yimideshi, Minzu yan-
jiu, 1984, no. 3: 2633.
10. According to Enver Baytur, a Qirghiz scholar in Xinjiang, there is an auto-
graphed copy of this work in Peking (Institute of Nationalities, Academy of Social
Sciences). I failed to get access to this manuscript and I had to rely on Envers trans-
lation in Modern Uyghur (Tarikhi hmidi, Peking: Milltlr Nshriyati, 1986). For-
tunately, however, there is a copy of this work in Gunnar Jarring Collection, Lund,
Sweden (Prov. no. 163). Although this copy lacks the nal pages, it enables us to
check most of Envers translation.
11. Voina musulman protiv Kitaitsev (Kazan: Universitetskaia tipograia,
188081), 2 vols. Cf. M. Hamrajev, Bilal Nazim: ein Klassker der uigurischer Lit-
eratur, Ungarische Jahrbcher, no. 42 (1970): 7799; M. Hamada, Murr Birru
no Seisenki ni tsuite.
12. For the manuscripts in Russia and their contents, consult L. V. Dmitrieva et
al., comp., Opisanie Tiurkskikh rukopisei Instituta Narodov Azii, vol. 1: Istoriia
(Moscow: Izd-vo Nauka, Glav. red. vostochnoi lit-ry, 1965); A. M. Muginov,
comp., Opisanie Uigurskikh rukopisei Instituta Narodov Azii (Moscow: Izd-vo vos-
tochnoi literatury, 1962); D. I. Tikhonov, Uigurskie istoricheskie rukopisi kontsa
XIX i nachala XX v., pp. 14674; V. P. Iudin, Nekotorye istochniki po istorii
vosstaniia v Sintsziane v 1864 godu, Trudy Instituta istorii, arkheologii i etnograi
im. Ch. Ch. Valikhanov Akademii Nauk Kazakskoi SSR, no. 15 (1962): 17196;
K. Usmanov, Uigurskie istochniki o vosstanii v Sintsziane 1864 goda, Voprosy is-
torii, no. 2 ( 1947): 8789. We do not know yet the full scope of the manuscript col-
lection in China, but see Yusuf Beg Mukhlisov, comp., Uigur klassik edibiyat qol
yazmiliri katalogi (Xinjiang, 1957). Cf. Iudins review of Mukhlisovs work in Trudy
Instituta istorii, arkheologii i etnograi im. Ch. Ch. Valikhanov Akademii Nauk
Kazakskoi SSR, no. 15 (1962): 197206. Many of the manuscripts available in the
West are well explained in Hamadas Jky seiki Uiguru rekishi bunken jsetsu,
Th gaku, no. 55 (1983): 353401. The extant sources, the locations, the date of
compilation, the authors or copyists, and other related information can be found in
the Bibliography in this book.
 notes to chapter 1 213

13. Visits to High Tartary, Yarkand, and Kashghar (London: J. Murray, 1871).
14. Report on His Journey to Ilchi, the Capital of Khotan, in Chinese Tartary,
Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, no. 37 (1867).
15. Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara and
Kuldja, 2 vols. (New York: Sampson Low, 1877).
16. J.-L. Dutreuil de Rhins. Mission scientique dans la haute Asie, 18901895
(Paris: E. Leroux, 189798).
17. Among others Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang huifei fanglue, Yi Xin
et al., comp., 320 chs. (Taipei; Chengwen Chupanshe repr., 1968).
18. T. D. Forsyth, Report of a Mission to Yarkund, 18731874 (Calcutta: For-
eign Department Press, 1875).
19. A. N. Kuropatkin, Kashgariia (St. Petersburg: Izd. imp. Russkago geogra-
cheskago obshchestva, 1879). Fortunately we have an English translation of this im-
portant work, Kashgaria: Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, W. E. Gowan, trans. (Cal-
cutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1882). The English translation omits the Appendix
on the routes and the trade items between Russia and Kashgharia in 1876, which is
found at the end of the original.
20. K{gar trh (Istanbul: Mihran Matbaas, 1300/188283). Modern Turkish
translation by Bsmail Aka et. al., Ka{gar Tarihi: Bis-i Hayret Ahvl-i Garibesi
(Krkkale: Eysi, 1998).

chapter 1

1. Xiyu congzhi (also called Xiyu jianwenlu), Chunyuan, comp. (Qiangshutang

edition in 1818; Taipei, Wenhai Chubanshe repr., 1966), 26r.
2. Forsyth, Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 44.
3. Huijiang tongzhi (1925 jiaoyinben; Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe repr., 1966),
q. 10, 3r3v. This number probably increased later as the political situation in
Kashgharia worsened. As will be related later, a Muslim writer (Hjj Ysuf ) wrote
that in the Kucha rebellion of 1864 more than a thousand garrison soldiers were
killed.
4. Huijiang tongzhi, q. 10, 2v; q. 7, 2r; q. 8, 3r. This was slightly larger than the
walls of Khotan (1.3 km) or Kahsghar (1.4 km) although the wall of Yarkand, the
former capital of Moghul Khanate, was exceptionally long (about 4.8 km).
5. Thus the Muslim town was variously called huicheng (Muslim city), jiucheng,
(Old city), or kuhnashahr (Old city in Turkic) while the Manchu fort was called
mancheng (Manchu city), xincheng (New city), or yangishahr (New city in Tur-
kic). According to a recent study by James A. Millward (Beyond the Pass, pp.
14952), from the 1840s a new term hancheng (Chinese city; or its equivalent in
Turkic, khitayshahri. See TH/Jarring, 38v [see Note 8 below]; TH/Enver, p. 203;
TA/Pantusov, p. 58) began to be used designating the Manchu fort because of inux
of a considerable number of Chinese merchants into the fort.
6. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 44.
7. Waishiang means suburban areas in Chinese.
8. A manuscript of Trkh-i kamd (hereafter abbreviated as TH) in the Gunnar
Jarring Collection, Lund, Sweden (TH/Jarring), 33v34r. TH is a revised version of
Sayrms Trkh-i amniyya (TA). In this book I used two different manuscripts
214 notes to chapter 1

(TA/Pelliot and TA/Jarring) and one printed edition (TA/Pantusov) of TA, one man-
uscript (TH/Jarring) and one modern Uyghur translation (TH/Enver) of TH. For
more detailed information on these manuscript and editions, see Appendix B and
the Bibliography. Jawz is one of the twelve seasons based on the solar calendar, and
it corresponds to the period from May 22 to June 21. Compare the quoted text with
TH/Enver, pp. 18283; TA/Pantusov, p. 45.
9. There are several hypotheses on the etymology of this term. See M. Hartmann,
Chinesische-Turkistan: Geschichte, Verwaltung, Geistesleben und Wirtschaft (Halle
a.S.: Gebauer-Schwetschke Druckerei und Verlag, 1908), pp. 104105; S. R. Dyer,
Soviet Dungan Nationalism: A Few Comments on Their Origin and Language,
Monumenta Serica, no. 33 (19771978): 34962.
10. The term Uyghur was introduced as a designation for nationality for the
rst time in the 1930s. In the Muslim materials of the nineteenth and the twentieth
centuries we can nd terms like Qirghiz and Qazaq. These were employed not
as an ethnic nomenclature but as names of tribal people whose nomadic way of life
was sharply distinguished from the sedentary Turkic Muslims. On the emergence of
national consciousness among the Uyghurs in the modern period, see Dru C. Glad-
ney, Ethonogenesis of the Uighur, Central Asian Survey 9, no. 1 (1990): 128.
11. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang huifei fanglue, comp. Yi Xin et al.
(Taipei: Chengwen Chubanshe repr., 1968), q. 68, 1r2r; Xinjiang tuzhi, comp. Yuan
Dahua (Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe repr., 1965), q. 116, 1r. These Chinese sources
should be given more credit because they are based on the contemporary military
reports written on the spot. Sayrm, relying on his memory, seems to have made a
mistake. The rst day of Mukarram, 1281 (June 6, 1864), is not Saturday as he as-
serts but Monday. The date given in the Chinese sources, June 4, is Saturday.
12. TH/Jarring, 28r. Also see TA/Pelliot, 29v; TA/Pantusov, p. 34; TA/Jarring,
34v; TH/Enver, p. 158. Some of the manuscripts have M Shr Akhnd M Lng
Shams al-Dn Khalfa. It is possible to regard M Lng Shams al-Dn Khalfa as
one person.
13. Hanren literally means Han people and huimin Muslim population,
but Saling, with these two terms, seems to have in mind the Chinese (Tungans) and
the (Turkic) Muslims. According to Qing terminology, the Tungans were called han-
hui or donggan and distinguished from the Turkic Muslims who were usually called
chantouhui (Muslim with turban). The term huimin was often used to designate
both groups.
14. The manuscript of this work, now at the Institut Narodov Azii in St. Peters-
burg, was not available to me. However, the rsum of its contents can be found in
D. Tikhonov, Vosstanie 1864 g. v Vostochnom Turkestane. Hjj Ysuf provides
more interesting details about the initial stage of the revolts. According to him, there
was a conspiracy by several Kuchean Muslims (Ibrhm Tura, Yolbars Tura, \diq
Beg, Qsim Beg, Rza Beg, Bahdur Tukhta, and so on), but somehow it was not re-
alized, and after this aborted attempt the three Tungan leaders started the action on
their own initiative. In the meantime, Chinese scholars believe that the Kucha revolt
broke out at rst by the laborers working near the Weigan river under the worst con-
dition. See Ji Dachun, Shilun yibaliusi nian Xinjiang nongmin qiyi, p. 39; Xinjiang
jianshi (Urumqi: Xinjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1980), vol. 2, p. 110. This argument
 notes to chapter 1 215

is based on a report of eld research done in Kucha in 1975 which has not been
published.
15. Daqing lichao shilu, Tongzhi-36yiyou (the date is in the order of the reign:
title, year, month, and day).
16. Kanding Xinjiangji, comp. Wei Guangdao et al. (Taipei: Shangwu Yin-
shuguan, 1963; Xinjiang Yanjiu Congshu, vol. 10, ed. Yuan Dongli), q. 1, 1r.
17. Manla is Chinese transcription of mull, a title for a Muslim religious leader.
18. Xinjiang tuzhi, q. 116, 1r. There can be no doubt that Ma Long in the Chi-
nese sources is M Lng Akhnd in the works of Sayrm and Hjj Ysuf. Huang
Hezhuo is the transcription of Khn Khwja, which was later the title of Rshidn
Khwja who became the ruler (khan) of the Kuchean regime. However, as will be
explained later, he was not the one who started the revolt at rst, so the assertion of
Xinjiang tuzhi is certainly misleading.
19. Chanmz is the transcription of changmaozi (Long Hairs), a pejorative ap-
pellation applied to the Taipings. But it is not clear what sngg means. It looks
like the transcription of Wu Sangui who had rebelled during Kangxis reign. Al-
though the rebellion of Wu Sangui had taken place much ealier, because of its no-
toriety his rebellion may have been called together with the Taiping rebellion.
20. TH/Jarring, 30r30v; TH/Enver, pp. 165167; TA/Pantusov, pp. 3940.
21. In Chinese, taizhan.
22. TH/Jarring, 30v.
23. Vafar-nma, 20r20v. This manuscript is in the India Ofce Library (Ms.
Turki 5).
24. Daqing lichao shilu, Tongzhi-38guisi.
25. On the Muslim massacre in Shanxi and Gansu, see the recent study by Wu
Wanshan, Qingdai xibei huimin qiyi yanjiu (Lanzhou: Lanzhou Daxue Chubanshe,
1991), pp. 13740.
26. Pinghuizhi, comp. Yang Yuxiu (Jiannan Wangshi, ed., 1889), q. 7, 1v2r.
27. Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militari-
zation and Social Structure, 17691864 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1970; 2nd ed., 1980), pp. vivii.
28. Pinghuizhi, q. 7, 1v2r.
29. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3 (Alma-Ata: Glavnaia red. Kazakhskoi Sovetskoi
entsiklopedii, 1985), pp. 15960.
30. Haneda Akira Ch Ajiashi kenky (Kyoto: Rinsen Shten, 1982), p. 76;
Saguchi Tru, Shinky minzokushi kenky, pp. 301306.
31. Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 161. According to his estimation
there were 5,500 in Kashghar; 2,200 in Yarkand; 1,400 in Khotan; 600 in Aqsu; 800
in Turfan; 300 in Barchuq; and 300 in Sayram. Besides these, there were soldiers sta-
tioned at front posts (qarawul) and postal stations (rtng) as well as merchants and
other individual Tungans. Adding all these together, he surmised the total number
of Khitays did not exceed 15,000.
32. Millward, Beyond the Pass, pp. 168175.
33. E. Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand,
Bukhara and Kuldja, vol. 2 (London: Sampson Low, 1877), pp. 174, 197.
34. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang Fanglue, q. 95, 23v24r.
216 notes to chapter 1

35. Shaw, Visits to High Tartary, pp. 4748.

36. Cf. J. Fletcher, Ching Inner Asia c. 1800, in The Cambridge History of
China, vol. 10, pt. 1, ed. J. K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978), pp. 3536.
37. Thomas J. Bareld, Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 26695; Miyawaki Junko. Saig no yu-
boku teikoku (Tokyo: Kdansha, 1995).
38. B. P. Gurevich, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentralnoi Azii v XVII
pervoi polovine XIX v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), p. 120.
39. Wei Yuan, Shengwuji, vol. 1 (Peking: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984 repr.), p. 156.
For a more detailed account of the Qing conquest of the Zunghars, see I. Ia. Zlatkin,
Istoriia Dzhungarskogo khanstva (16351758) (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), pp. 425ff;
M. Courant, LAsie centrale aux XVIIe et XVIIIe sicle: Empire kalmouk ou em-
pire mantchou? (Lyon: A. Rey imprimeur-editeur, 1912), pp. 97ff; P. Pelliot, Notes
critiques dhistoire Kalmouke (Texte) (Paris: Librairie dAmerique et dOrient,
1960), pp. 814; C. R. Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia (London: Wei-
denfeld and Nicholson, 1968), pp. 115ff.
40. Thus Makhdmzda means offsprings of the great master. His original
name was Akmad Khwjagi-yi Kasan.
41. On the activities of Khwja Iskq in Eastern Turkestan, see Sawada Mi-
norus Hj Ishaqqu no shky katt, Seinan Ajia kenky, no. 27 (1987).
42. At present scholars in Xinjiang call the descendants of Iskq Iskqiyya
and the descendants of Ysuf Ishqiyya. However, I have not yet found the term
Ishqiyya in contemporary Muslim sources. The term fqiyya is not attested
in the sources either, but here I adopted it to designate the followers of Khwja fq
and his descendants because it is widely accepted by Western scholars and easily
brings that group to mind.
43. There are a number of Muslim works on the history of the Makhdmzda
khwjas and the conicts between the two branches of this family. The best known
work among them is Tadhkira-i azzn (or, Tadhkira-i khwjagn) written by Mu-
kammad \diq Kshghar around 1768. For epitomized translations, see Martin
Hartmann, Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam: Das Ende der Caghataiden und die Herr-
schaft der Cho^as in Kasgarien, Der islamische Orient: Berichte und Forschungen,
pts. 610 (Berlin: W. Peiser, 1905); R. B. Shaw, The History of the Khjas of East-
ern-Turkistan, edited and supplemented by N. Elias, Journal of the Asiatic Society
of Bengal, no. 66, pt. 1, extra number (Calcutta, 1897). There are dozens of copies
of this famous work. The text on which Hartmann based his translation is Ms. Or.
Oct. 3292 (Staatsbibliotek zu Berlin, Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Orientalabteilung),
and the one that Shaw used for his translation is Or. 5378 (British Library). Cf. Hart-
mann, Die osttrkischen Handschriften der Sammlung Hartmann, Mitteilungen
des Seminars fr orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin, vol. 7, no. 2 (1904): 121; note
of N. Elias in Shaws The History of the Khjas, pp. iiii; H. Beveridge, The Kho-
jas of Eastern Turkistan, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, no. 71 (1902):
4546. For the scope of the existing copies of Tadhkira-i azzn, consult H. F. Hof-
man, Turkish Literature: A Bio-Bibliographical Survey, sec. 3, pt. 1, vol. 4 (Utrecht:
University of Utrecht, 1969), pp. 2530. On the conict between these two khwja
 notes to chapter 1 217

families see the following studies. Saguchi Tru, Higashi Torukisutan hken
shakaishi jsetsu: Hoja jidai no ichi ksatsu, Rekishigaku kenky, no. 134 (1948):
118; H. G. Schwarz, The Khwajas of Eastern Turkestan, Central Asiatic Journal
20, no. 4 (1976): 266296; Pan Zhiping, Hezhuo chongbai de xingshuai, Minzu
yanjiu, 1992, no. 2: 6167; Liu Zhengyin, Hezhuo jiazu xingqi qian Yisilanjiao zai
Xiyu de huodong ji qi zhengzhi beijing, Shijie zongjiao yanjiu, 1991, no. 4: 5764.
44. On the date of this event, see Khronika, critical text, translation, commen-
taries and study by O. F. Akimushkin (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), pp. 32324. This
work was written in Persian by Shh Makmd ibn Mrz Fjil Churs.
45. Tadhkira-i azzn (Bodleian: d. 20), 26r.
46. For the Qing conquest of Kashgharia and the fate of the khwjas, see Sagu-
chis Shakaishi kenky, chs. 1 and 2. Also cf. a good survey in L. I. Dumans Zavoe-
vanie Tsinskoi imperiei Dzhungarii i Vostochnogo Turkestana, in Manchzhurskoe
vladychestvo v Kitae (ed. S. L. Tikhvinskii, Moscow: Nauka, 1966), pp. 26488.
47. Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, pp. 197199.
48. Hori Sunao, Jhachi-nij seiki Uiguru joku jinko shiron, Shirin 60, no. 4
(1977): 123.
49. Fletcher, Ching Inner Asia c. 1800, p. 74.
50. See Shimada Jheis article, Hja jidai no beku tachi, Th gaku 3 (1952):
19. He called this change the transformation from the age of amr to the age of
beg. However, it seems to me that there was no fundamental difference between
the terms amr and beg, except that one is Persian and the other is Turkic. Both of
them were actually equivalent to a Monglian word noyan. See K. A. Pishchulina,
Iugo-vostochnyi Kazakhstan v seredine XIVnachale XVI vekov (Alma-Ata:
Nauka, 1977), pp. 15657. G. Clauson regards the title of beg as originating from
the Chinese word bo. See his An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century
Turkish (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 322.
51. Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, pp. 104105.
52. One batman is the cultivated land on which one could sow 5 shi and 3 dou
of grain. On the measurements used in Xinjiang, see Ji Dachuns Weiwuerzu du-
liangheng jiuzhi kaosuo, Xiyu yanjiu, 1991, no. 1.
53. Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, pp. 10924. The term shang is not from the Chi-
nese word meaning present but from cang, treasury. See Fletcher, The Biography
of Khwush Kipk Beg (d. 1781) in the Wai-fan Mng-ku Hui-pu wang-kung piao
chuan, Acta Orientalia 36, nos. 13 (1982): 171.
54. I would like to express my gratitude to the late professor Joseph Fletcher Jr.
who kindly lent me a copy of this important source preserved at the ki Bunko, the
Institute of Tyo Bunka Kenkysho in Tokyo University. The full title of this docu-
ment is Yeerqiang cheng zhuanglishu huihu zhengfu ge xiangce (A register of the
itemized taxes of the Muslim households and of the names and the distances of the
villages in Yarkand). For a more detailed study see Hori Sunao, Tky Daigaku
Tyo Bunka Kenkysho shj Yeerqiang cheng zhuanglishu huihu zhengfu ge xiang-
ce, Knan Daigaku Kiy (Bungakuhen), no. 51 (1983).
55. As Hori Sunaos study has shown, this change was the result of the reform
taken as a remedy after the invasion of Jahngr in the late 1820s. See his Shinch
no kaiky tji ni tsuite ni-san mondai, Shigaku zasshi 88, no. 3 (1979): 1519.
218 notes to chapter 1

56. The term taranchi came from the Mongol word tariyachi(n) meaning cul-
tivator and they were those who had been forcefully moved to the Ili valley for cul-
tivating land in the late seventeenth century by the Zunghars. See Saguchi, Shinky
minzokushi kenky, pp. 28184.
57. It is worth mentioning here about the confusion of the terms yzbashi and
yzbegi. According to Xiyu tuzhi (q. 29, 19r) there was only one yzbeg in Ili, but
later sources prove the existence of 6080 yzbegs in the same area. See Xinjiang
shilue, q. 5, 32v; W. Radloff, Proben der Volksliteratur der nordlichen trkischen
Stmme, vol. 1, pt. 6: Dialekt der Tarantschi (St. Petersburg, 1886), p. 27 (text) and
p. 35 (translation). It seems to me that yzbashi found in the Yarkand register cor-
responds to yzbeg in Ili. Valikhanov shows that the term yzbegi was also used in
Kashgharia. See Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 124.
58. See Horis Tky Daigaku Tyo Bunka Kenkysho shj.
59. TH/Jarring, 31r31v; TH/Enver, pp. 16970; TA/Pelliot, 35r35v.
60. Radloff, Proben der Volksliteratur, vol. 1, pt. 6, p. 27 (text), p. 35
(translation).
61. One such edict was published by G. Raquette, Eine kaschgarische Waqf-
Urkunde aus der Khodscha-Zeit Ost-Turkestans (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1930).
The copies of several edicts preserved in the Gunnar Jarring Collection also contain
mentions of these titles.
62. This incident will be explained in detail later in this book.
63. Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 172.
64. Akimushkin, Khronika, 49r (text).
65. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, pp. 17273, 181.
66. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 162.
67. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 184.
68. The Qing conquest of the Zunghars not only physically exterminated these
nomads but also intended to erase the memory of their existence by banning the use
of the word Zunghar (in Chinese Zhungaer). Instead, an old term Elute (i.e., lt)
was introduced. lt is a shortened form of gled and should be distinguished
from Oyirad or Oyirod. On these terms, see Okada Hidehiros Doruben Oiratto
no kigen, Shigaku zasshi 83, no. 6 (1974).
69. The names Zhunbu and Huibu were also used to designate Zungharia and
Kashgharia.
70. For detailed accounts of the administration in Xinjiang, see Zeng Wenwu,
Zhongguo jingying Xiyushi (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1936), pp. 26465;
Haneda Akira, Ch Ajiashi kenky (Kyoto: Rinsen Shoten, 1982), pp. 7375;
A. Khodzhaev, Zakhvat Tsinskim Kitaem Dzhungarii i Vostochnogo Turkestana.
Borba protiv zavoevatelei, in Kitai i sosedi v novoe i noveishee vremia (ed.
S. L. Tikhvinskii, Moscow: Izd-vo Nauka, 1982), pp. 17172; Lo Yunzhi, Qing
Gaozong tongzhi Xinjiang zhengce de tantao (Taipei: Liren Shuju, 1983), pp. 5164.
71. Haneda, Ch Ajiashi kenky, p. 74.
72. Zeng Wenwu, Zhongguo jingying Xiyushi, pp. 301302.
73. The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China 18621878: A Study of Gov-
ernment Minority Policy (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), pp. 17881.
74. Lin Enxian, Qingzhao zai Xinjiang de Han-Hui geli zhengce (Taipei: Shang-
 notes to chapter 1 219

wu Yinshuguan, 1988), p. 128. For the names and terms of ofcials in Xinjiang, see
Hu Zhenghua ed., Xinjiang zhiguanzhi: 17621949 (Urumchi: Xinjiang Weiwuer
Zizhiqu Renmin Zhengfu Bangongting, 1992).
75. Wei Yuan, Shengwuji, vol. 1, pp. 15960.
76. Lin Enxian, Qingzhao zai Xinjiang de Han-Hui geli zhengce, pp. 12931.
77. On these colonies consult L. I. Dumans study, Agrarnaia politika Tsinskogo
provitelstva v Sintsiane, pp. 12875. Also cf. V. S. Kuznetsov, Ekonomicheskaia
politika Tsinskogo pravitelstva v Sintsiane, pp. 2942. On the exiles in Xinjiang
see Joanna Waley-Cohens Exile in Mid-Qing China: Banishment to Xinjiang,
17581820 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Qi Qingshun, Qingdai Xin-
jiang qianfan yanjiu, Zhongguoshi yanjiu, 1988, no. 2.
78. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 176.
79. Daqing lichao shilu, Daoguang-122yisi.
80. Wei Yuan, Shengwuji, vol. 1, p. 195.
81. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 175. In another place (p. 161) he enumerated
the number of Chinese garrison (Kitaiskie garnizony) soldiers in the Southern Cir-
cuit (Nanlu): 5,500 in Kashghar; 2,200 in Yarkand; 1,400 in Khotan; 600 in Aqsu;
and 800 in Turfan (10,500 in total). However, Turfan did not belong to the South-
ern circuit, and he omitted Yangihissar, Ush, Kucha, and Qarashahr.
82. Daqing lichao shilu, Xianfeng-34guisi.
83. Qinding pingding Zhungaer fanglue, comp. Fuheng et al. (Yingyin Wen-
yuange Sikuquanshu, vols. 357359; reprint in Taipei: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1983
1986) (xubian), q. 15, 1r2r.
84. Daqing lichao shilu, Xianfeng-34guisi.
85. Shengwuji, vol. 1, p. 487.
86. Millward, Beyond the Pass, pp. 6061.
87. Daqing lichao shilu, Daoguang-122yisi.
88. Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, pp. 23360; Kuznetsov, Ekonomicheskaia poli-
tika Tsinskogo pravitelstva v Sintsiane, pp. 4288.
89. V. P. Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia Kokandskago Khanstva (Kazan, 1886),
pp. 46: French translation by A. Dozon, Histoire du Khanat de Khokand (Paris:
E. Ledoux, 1889), pp. 6164. B or b has the same etymology as beg; all mean
chief.
90. Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, p. 59.
91. Cf. L. Lockhart, Nadir Shah: A Critical Study Based Mainly upon Contem-
porary Sources (London: Luzac, 1938), pp. 187ff.
92. Pan Zhiping, Zhongya Haohanguo yu Qingdai Xinjiang (Zhongguo Shehui
Kexue Chubanshe, 1991), pp. 4142.
93. Daqing lichao shilu, Qianlong-24-9-gengshen; Qinding Pingding Zhungaer
fanglue (zhengbian), q. 78, 10v13v and q. 82, 5r6r.
94. The difference between the concepts of the tributary relation between
China and Central Asian states is well illustrated by J. Fletcher. See his China and
Central Asia. 13681884, in The Chinese World Order: Traditional Chinas For-
eign Relations, ed. J. K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1968), pp. 206224.
95. Zhungaer fanglue (xubian), q. 7, 13r15v.
220 notes to chapter 1

96. Op. cit., q. 19, 22r22v.

97. For the details about this aborted Muslim alliance, see Gurevich, Mezh-
dunarodnye otnosheniia, pp. 18798.
98. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 137. Cf. V. C. Kuznetsov, Imperiia Tsin i
musulmanskii mir, in Tsentralnaia Aziia i sosednie territorii v srednie veka (ed. V.
E. Larichev, Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1990), pp. 107108.
99. Gurevich, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, pp. 19496.
100. Pan Zhiping, Zhongya Haohanguo, pp. 5253.
101. V. Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1969), p. 49.
102. A. Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 208209.
103. For example, see Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia Kokandskago khanstva, p. 76;
V. A. Romodin, Some Sources on the History of the Farghnah and the Khqand
Khnate (16th to 19th cc.) in the Leningrad Mss. Collection, XXV International
Congress of Orientalists: Papers Presented by the USSR Delegation (Moscow,
1960), p. 18.
104. Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya, pp. 3435. This is a history of Khoqand written
by Mull Niyz b. Mull Ashr Mukammad Khqand, and its printed edition was
published by N. N. Pantusov (Taarikh shakhrokhi. Istoriia vladetelei Fergany,
Kazan: Tip. Imperatorskago Univ., 1885). He regards the title of this work as
Trkh-i shahrukh, but the correct title appears on p. 24 (Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya
nm nihda). For the descriptions on Eastern Turkestan in this work, see T. K. Bei-
sembiev, Tarikh-i Shakhrukhi o Vostochnom Turkestane, in Iz istorii Srednei Azii
i Vostochnogo Turkestana XVXIX vv., ed. B. A. Akhmedov (Tashkent: Izdatelstvo
Fan Uzbekskoi SSR, 1987); Tarikh-i Shakhrukh kak istoricheskii istochnik
(Alma-Ata: Izd-vo Nauka Kazakhskoi SSR, 1987).
105. Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, pp. 9798.
106. V. S. Kuznetsov, Tsinskaia imperiia na rubezhakh Tsentralnoi Azii (Novo-
sibirsk: Izd-vo Nauka, 1983), p. 60.
107. Ibid.
108. For the Khoqand expansion during this period, consult Istoriia Kirgizskoi
SSR, vol. 1 (Frunze: Kyrgyzstan, 1984), pp. 49099; A. Kh. Khasanov, Narodnye
dvizheniia v Kirgizii v period Kokandskogo khanstva (Moscow: Nauka, 1977),
pp. 2531.
109. Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, p. 350.
110. The Seven Cities is a synonym of Kashgharia. Words like haft kishvar
and haft shahr are Persian equivalents of the Turkic word yttishahr.
111. Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya, p. 75. Also see Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, p. 410.
112. This is a Manchu word meaning head of merchants. See Fletcher,
Ching Inner Asia, p. 89.
113. Na Wenyigong zouyi, comp. Nayanceng (1834; Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe
repr., 1968), ch. 19, 2r3r.
114. Pan Zhiping, Zhongya Haohanguo, pp. 8384.
115. Fletcher, Ching Inner Asia, p. 89.
116. Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, pp. 38992.
 notes to chapter 1 221

117. Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, p. 109.

118. Qinding pingding huijiang chiaojin niyi fanglue, comp. Chao Zhenyong
(1830; Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe repr., 1972), q. 1, 1r2r. Valikhanov confuses this,
known as the revolt of the Qirghiz Suranchi, with the later invasion of Jahngr.
See Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 141, and compare with Saguchis Shakaishi
kenky, pp. 411ff.
119. Muntakhab al-tavrkh, 340r340v; Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, p. 126.
The author of Muntakhab al-tavrkh is Hjj Mukammad Hkim valad-i Mam
Khn and I used the manuscript at the Academy of Social Science in St. Petersburg.
I would like to thank Beatrice Forbes Manz, at Tufts University, who kindly loaned
me her microlm copy of this manuscript.
120. Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 142.
121. Qinding pingding niyi fanglue, q. 3, 5r5v.
122. According to Report of a Mission to Yarkund (p. 182) Mukammad Al
Khn sent sa Ddkhwh as his commander, but in Muntakhab al-tavrkh (340r)
it is stated that sa Ddkhwh, escaping from Mukammad Al Khn, ed to Tash-
qurghan in the mountain areas of Alai where he stayed about a year and that there
he collected followers of Jahngr. A Chinese record called the brothers of sa and
Msa rebel subjects of Khoqand (Qinding pingding niyi fanglue, q. 12, 20v
23r). Tavrkh-i Shahrukhiyya (p. 114) states erroneously that Buzurg, not Jahngr,
invaded Kashghar.
123. Muntakhab al-tavrkh, 340v341r. In Qinding pingding niyi fanglue (q.
12, 20v23r) this shrine is called Payghambar Mazr (prophets shrine). Muntakhab
mistook it as the shrine of fq Khwja, and one of the Chinese sources also calls
it his ancestral khwjas tomb (Shengwuji, vol. 1, p. 183).
124. The events from Jahngrs arrival at Artush and the occupation of the
Muslim town are described in relative detail in Muntakhab al-tavrkh, 340v342v,
and its description is corroborated by Qing sources.
125. Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya, p. 113; Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, pp. 12226.
126. Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya, p. 114; Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, p. 127. Also
see TH/Jarring, 26r26v; TA/Pantusov, pp. 2830. Although the author of
Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya mistakenly writes that Buzurg, Jahngrs son, invaded in
1831, his narration of the event is correct in general. Sayrms description of the
Jahngr invasion (TH/Jarring, 26r26v; TA/Pantusov, pp. 2830) is almost a ver-
batim translation of Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya (pp. 11416) except for the change of
Buzurg into Jahngr. He made it clear (TA/Pantusov, p. 7) that Tavrkh-i
shahrukhiyya was one of his sources.
127. Muntakhab al-tavrkh, 342v.
128. Muntakhab al-tavrkh, 343v345r.
129. For the detailed description of the invasion and the Qing expedition, see
Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, pp. 40567; Zeng Wenwu, Zhongguo jingying Xiyushi,
pp. 302308.
130. Kuznetsov, Ekonomicheskaia politika, p. 126.
131. Pan Zhiping, Zhongya Haohanguo, pp. 101111.
132. On the internal reform see Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, pp. 185188,
239241.
222 notes to chapter 1

133. Muntakhab al-tavrkh, 416r.

134. Muntakhab al-tavrkh, 416r; Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya, pp. 11721. Va-
likhanov reports that forty thousand troops and ten artillery guns were mobilized
(Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 146). Qushbegi was one of the top military titles in
Khoqand mostly bestowed on highest commanders.
135. Mrz Shams Bukhr erroneously regards that Ysuf took Yarkand. See his
Nekotorye sobytiiakh v Bukhare, Khokande, i Kashgare (Kazan: Univ. tipograia,
1861), p. 39.
136. Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, pp. 14647; Pan Zhiping, Zhongya
Haohanguo, pp. 12122.
137. This remark of Pichang, who defended Yarkand during the invasion of
Ysuf, is quoted in Wei Yuans Shengwuji, vol. 1, pp. 19697.
138. The original of this document written in Turkic is now preserved at the First
Historical Archives of China (Zhongguo Diyi Lishi Danganguan) in Peking and its
facsimile is published in Pan Zhipings Zhongya Haohanguo, p. 141. Although in
the original text the last item of the four points (trt qismi ish) is not clearly shown,
the Chinese translation of the text made at that time includes the fourth point.
139. Daqing lichao shilu, Daoguang-123gengshen.
140. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 147, Also cf. a partial English translation by
John and Robert Michell, The Russians in Central Asia (London: E. Stanford, 1865),
p. 215. A British report drawn up by the Forsyth Mission in 1873 records the same
contents based on the testimony of Valikhanov, Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp.
185, 192.
141. Daqing lichao shilu, Daoguang-165guiwei.
142. I quote this passage from an anonymous British report entitled Eastern
Turkestan, 1874 (p. 4) in FO 65/902 which includes the translation of the article
Kokand as it is at present, Russian Imperial Geographical Society, no. 3 (1849):
195. This British report adds that According to the same authority (p. 196) after
the deportation of 70,000 families from Kashghar by Mahommed Ali Khan, of
Kokand, the Chinese, in addition to above subsidy, paid the latter 10,000 tillahs
(=R.128,000, or 16,000 l) per annum for the single city of Kashghar, which amount
was collected on the spot by resident Kokand Ak-sakal. This is, I think, sufcient to
show that the Kokand Government did more than merely tax its own subjects in
Kashghar.
143. Mehmet Saray, Rus i{gali devrinde Osmanl develeti ile Trkistan Hanlk-
larl arasndaki siyasi mnasebetler (17751875) (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaas,
1984), p. 46.
144. The Heyday of the Ching Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet, in
The Cambridge History of China, ed. J. K. Fairbank, vol. 10, pt. 1 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 375ff. He regards the agreement as being
made in 1831, but the nal sanction by Daoguang was made in 1832. In the mean-
time Chinese scholars do not accept Fletchers assertion that it was an unequal
treaty. See Pan Zhiping and Jiang Lili, 1832nian Qing yu Haohan yihekao,
Xibei shidi, 1989, no. 1.
145. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 185. On aqsaqal there is a brief account by
Chen Ching-lung, Aksakals in the Moslem Region of Eastern Turkistan, Ural-Al-
 notes to chapter 1 223

taische Jahrbcher, no. 47 (1975): 4146, but the historical role of aqsaqal needs a
fuller examination.
146. Khasanov, Narodnye dvizheniia v Kirgizii, pp. 1842.
147. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, pp. 148, 18586.
148. Daqing lichao shilu, Daoguang-165guiwei, 166jiyou.
149. Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, pp. 132143.
150. Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, pp. 145163; Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana,
vol. 2 (Tashkent: Izd-vo AN UzSSR, 1947), p. 171.
151. Ocherki po istorii Srednei Azii (Moscow: Izd-vo Vostochnyi Literatury,
1958), pp. 20910.
152. Cf. Kato, Shichinin no hja tachi no seisen, Shigaku zasshi 86, no. 1
(1977): 6072.
153. For example, see Kuznetsov, Tsinskaia imperiia, p. 103.
154. Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 148.
155. On these invasions see Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, pp. 51130; Pan Zhi-
ping, Zhongya Haohanguo, pp. 15663.
156. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 186. Similar descriptions are found in
Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, p. 168; Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, pp. 51415.
157. Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, pp. 51617.
158. Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 150.
159. Op. cit., p. 156.
160. Op. cit., p. 150.
161. Op. cit., p. 190.
162. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 186.
163. These exiles were employed for this purpose from the early nineteenth cen-
tury, and those who made contributions to the suppression got redemptions. For the
exile system in Xinjiang, see Waley-Cohens Exile in Mid-Qing China; N. J. Chous
Frontier Studies and Changing Frontier Administration in Late Ching China; The
Case of Sinkiang, 17591911 (Ph.D. dissertation: University of Washington,
1976), pp. 5280. Muslims hatred of these exiles is well reected in Radloff,
Proben, vol. 1, pt. 6, pp. 3133 (text) and pp. 4144 (translation).
164. Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 195. The Kashgharians used to
visit and gather at this mausoleum during the festival of Bart, the fteenth day of
Shabn.
165. Daqing lichao shilu, Xianfeng-118jiwei; 1111bingshen.
166. Boulger, The Life of Yakoob Beg, p. 214.
167. TH/Jarring, 28r; TH/Enver, p. 156; TH/Pantusov, p. 33 (6 towers).
168. This story is found both in Sayrm and Valikhanov, which proves that this
story was quite widespread among the people. See TH/Jarring, 28r; Valikhanov, So-
branie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 153.
169. Although it is not clear what this word stands for, it seems to be the tran-
scription of Huibu (Muslim region) rather than Gobi (the Desert).
170. Kawlan is the transcription of the Chinese word kouliang (provisions),
while vafa has the same meaning in Arabic.
171. TH/Jarring, 32r32v; TH/Enver, pp. 17375; TA/Pantusov, pp. 4142.
The indication that the Qing emperor considered abandoning Xinjiang because of
224 notes to chapter 1

nancial difculty can also be found in Ghazt-i mslimn, in Three Turki Manu-
scripts from Kashghar, ed. E. D. Ross (Lahore, 1908?), pp. 2223. Cf. Haneda
Akira, Ghazt-i Mslimin no yakuk: Yaqb-bg hanran no isshiry, Nairiku
Ajiashi ronsh, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1964), pp. 32627.
172. TH/Jarring, 31r; TH/Enver, pp. 170, 61723.
173. Daqing lichao shilu, Xianfeng-112xinyou.
174. Daqing lichao shilu, Xianfeng-113dingwei.
175. TH/Enver, pp. 61723. It is interesting to note that Sayrm highly praised
the Chinese emperors justice (adltlik) and sympathy for people (puqr-prwr-
lik) which he had displayed during the investigation of this incident. Cf. Hamada,
Shio no gimu to seisen no maede, pp. 13334.
176. Kngsh seems to be the transcription of gongshi (promulgation), and kha
is an Arabic word meaning letter, note, word, and so on.
177. TH/Jarring, 32v; TH/Enver, pp. 17576 (ksh kha); TA/Pantusov, p. 42
(ks).
178. TH/Jarring, 32v33r; TH/Enver, pp. 17677; TA/Pantusov, pp. 4142.
179. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 202.
180. Tadhkirat al-najt, 15v. This is a work by Dd of Kurla written in 1282/
186566 whose manuscript is found in the India Ofce Library, London (Ms.
Turki 4).
181. Grenard, Mission scientique dans la haute Asie, pp. 5253.
182. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh Habb Allh v Rshidn Khn v Yaqb Beg,
2r. This work, whose title was also known as Trkh-i Kshghar, was written by
Mukammad Alam on the 18th of Shabn, 1311/Dec. 17, 1894. The manuscript in
LInstitut de France (Ms. 33488) was translated and annotated by M. Hamada. See
his LHistoire de [otan de Mukammad Alam, Zinbun, no. 15 (1979); no. 16
(1980), and no. 18 (1982). Another manuscript is in St. Petersburg. On this manu-
script see D. I. Tikhonov, Uigurskie istoricheskie rukopisi, pp. 15055; G. M.
Ibragimova, Rukopis Mukhammada Aliama, Istoriograia i istochnikovedenie
istorii Azii, vol. 1 (1965): 5055.
183. In the Chinese source it is written Hunasi. This village is located to the
southwest of Kucha. See Han-Wei Xinjiang diming cidian (Urumchi, 1993), p. 260.
184. Daqing lichao shilu, Xianfeng-7yun 5yisi, 76qiwei.
185. TH/Jarring, 31r31v; TH/Enver, pp. 16970; TA/Jarring, 39v40r;
TA/Pelliot, 35r35v. There is a slight difference in the names of Muslim leaders. Ac-
cording to Valikhanovs explanation, tynza, that is, dingza, probably the tran-
scription of a Chinese word, was a kind of police station where a Qing ofcial called
pdishab and several local ofcials were working. See his Sobranie sochinenii, vol.
3, pp. 118 and 172. For the description on the punishment of cutting heelsactually
crushing anklessee Philip A. Kuhn, Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of
1768 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 1517.
186. Cf. Fletcher, The Heyday of the Ching Order, pp. 38595.
187. D. I. Tikhonov, Vosstanie 1864 g. v Vostochnom Turkestane, Sovetskoe
vostokovedenie, no. 5 (1948): 157.
188. A. E. Madzhi, Novyi istochnik po istorii Kokanda, Kashgara i Bukhary,
Izvestiia otdeleniia obshchestvennykh nauk Akademii Nauk Tadzhikskoi SSR, vol.
 notes to chapter 2 225

35, no. 1 (1958): 4041. Similar epidemics in Western Turkestan are recorded. See
Ibid., pp. 3839; E. Schuyler, vol. 1, pp. 14849; Mehmet tif, K{gar trh, p. 353.
K{gar trh was written in Istanbul right after the fall of Yaqb Begs regime. The
author gives us very detailed and fairly accurate reports on the events in Kashgharia
during these turbulent years. His work is invaluable to modern researchers because
it put together all the information available to the Ottomans at that time. His work
was recently translated into modern Turkish. See Ka{gar Tarihi: Bis-i Hayret
Ahvl-i Garibesi, tr. Bsmail Aka et. al. (Krkkale: Eysi, 1998).
189. These two words represent Chinese yancai and kouliang.
190. Vospominaniia Iliiskago Sibinitsa o Dungansko-Taranchinskom vozstanii
v 18641871 godakh v Iliiskom krae, Zapiski Vostochnogo otdeleniia Russkogo
Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva 18 (19071908), p. 249. This is the testimony of
a Sibo who lived in Ili at the time of the rebellion, written in Manchu and translated
by A. Diakov.
191. Op. cit., pp. 25051.
192. TH/Jarring, 33r; TH/Enver, pp. 177178; TA/Pantusov, p. 43.

chapter 2

1. V. P. Iudin, Nekotorye istochniki po istorii vosstaniia v Sintsiane v 1864

godu, Trudy Instituta istorii, arkheologii i etnograi im Ch. Ch. Valikhanov
Akademii Nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, no. 15 (1962): 180, 192; Isiev, Uigurskoe gosu-
darstvo Iettishar, p. 13 and a note on page 15.
2. This is the report of Hjj Ysuf ( Jam al-tavrkh, f. 60), quoted from Isievs
Nachalo natsionalno-osvoboditelnogo vosstaniia Uigurov vo vtoroi polivine XIX
v. (18641866 gg.), in Materialy po istorii i kulture Uigurskogo naroda (Alma-
Ata: Nauka, 1978), p. 64.
3. E. D. Ross, tr., A History of the Moghuls in Central Asia (1895; London: Cur-
zon Press, 1972 repr.), p. 58. Cf. a new translation by W. M. Thackston, Tarikh-i-
Rashidi. A History of the Khans of Moghulistan (Department of Near Eastern Lan-
guages and Civilization, Harvard University, 1996), p. 31.
4. His name is also known as Odui based on Edui in Chinese sources. Sayrm
named Akmad Wang Begs ancestors as follows: Mrz Akmad Wang Beg b. Mrz
Iskq Wang Beg b. Mrz Uthmn Beyse Beg b. Mrz Hd Beg. Tadhkira-i khw-
jagn also writes his name Mrz Hd (Staatsbibliothek, ms. Or. 3292, p. 3).
5. Daqing lichao shilu, Xianfeng-2-7-wuwu and guihai; 3-1-bingshen.
6. Daqing lichao shilu, Xianfeng-10-2-yimao; 10-6-xinwei.
7. Daqing lichao shilu, Xianfeng-10-9-yisi.
8. Daqing lichao shilu, Xianfeng-10-2-yimao; 10-6-xinwei.
9. Cf. Saguchi, Shakaishi kenky, p. 189.
10. TH/Jarring, 18r18v; TH/Jarring, pp. 11015.
11. TH/Jarring, 34r; TH/Enver, p. 183; TA/Pantusov, p. 45.
12. TH/Jarring, 34r; TH/Enver, pp. 18384; TA/Pantusov, pp. 4546.
13. En no gimu to seisen tono maede, Tyshi kenky, vol. 52, no. 2
(1993).
14. TH/Jarring, 18r18v; TH/Jarring, pp. 110115.
226 notes to chapter 2

15. TH/Jarring, 34r34v; TH/Enver, p. 184; TA/Pantusov, p. 46.

16. Muslim sources wrote his name in several different ways: Rshidn, Rsh al-
Dn, Rashd al-Dn, and so on. Considering the fact that all his brothers names end
with al-DnNar al-Dn, Jaml al-Dn, Fakhr al-Dn, and Jall al-Dnwe can as-
sume that his name also had the same component of al-Dn. The Turkic-speaking
people in Kashgharia at that time had a tendency of reducing certain phonetic ele-
ments: for instance, Jaml al-Dn to Jamldn, and Hm al-Dn to Hmdn. Cf.
TH/Jarring, 35v; TA/Pantusov, p. 46.
17. I do not think Rsh al-Dn was his original name. Rsh (a feather or a heap
of winnowed corn) does not make proper sense when it combined with al-Dn (of
religion). Cf. F. Steingass, A Comprehensive PersianEnglish Dictionary (London:
Ruoutledge, 1892), pp. 56364.
18. A. A. Bykov, Monety Rashaddina, Uigurskogo povstantsa, Strany i nar-
ody Vostoka, no. 15 (1973): 288302. The inscriptions on the coins found in Zhu
Zhuopeng and Zhu Shengweis Xinjiang hongqian (Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanshe,
1991, pp. 168170) should be read Sayyid Ghz Rshidn Khn instead of Sayyid
Rshidn Khn.
19. TH/Jarring, 37r; TH/Enver, p. 197; TA/Pantusov, p. 54.
20. The contents of the rst two works can be found in V. P. Iudins Nekoto-
rye istochniki, and the manuscript of the third is in India Ofce Library (Ms. Turki
4). Cf. Isiev, Uigurskoe gosudarstvo Iettishar, p. 13 and note 10 on p. 52.
21. Vafar-nma, 20v.
22. Xiyu congzhi, q. 3, 5r6r.
23. On the garrison farm in the Urumchi region during the Qing period, see
Wang Xilongs Qingdai Wulumuqi tundian shulun, Xinjiang Shehui Kexue, 1989,
no. 5: 1018.
24. Pinghuizhi, q. 7, 1v2r.
25. He received this title as a reward for his service rendered during the Jahngr
rebellion. See Ma Xiaoshi, Xibei huizu geming jianshi (Shanghai: Dongfang Shushe,
1951), p. 59.
26. Ibid.
27. G. G. Stratanovich, K voprosu o kharaktere administrativnogo ustroistva i
sotsialnoi otnoshenii v Dunganskom Soiuze gorodov (18631872 gg.), Izvestiia
Akademii Nauk Kirgizskoi SSR (SON), vol. 2, no. 2 (1960): 61.
28. A. N. Geins, O vosstanii musulmanskogo naseleniia ili Dunganei v zapad-
nom Kitae, Voennyi sbornik, 1866, no. 8: 192 (quoted from A. Khodzhaevs Tsin-
skaia imperiia, p. 109, note 8).
29. Pinghuizhi, q. 7, 2r2v.
30. Daqing lichao shilu, Tongzhi-36yiyou; 37dingsi; Pinghuizhi, q. 7, 2v
3r. About the battle of Ushaq Tal we can nd a detailed description in TH/Jarring
(50v51r), but the size of the Qing army is exaggerated as 18,000 or 24,000.
31. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 70, 1r1v; Kanding Xin-
jiangji, q. 1, 1r1v.
32. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 73, 10r10v; q. 81, 1r2v;
Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 2r. The latter source dates the beginning of the uprising on
July 15, but in the reports by eld ofcials was written as June 26.
 notes to chapter 2 227

33. G. G. Stratanovich, K voprosu o kharaktere, p. 62.

34. Qingzhen literally means pure and true, but it was used almost synony-
mously with Islam. On the concept of qingzhen as a mark of Muslim identity in
modern days, see Dru Gladneys Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the
Peoples Republic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 715.
35. For the eruption of the Urumchi rebellion, see Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan
Xinjiang fanglue, q. 70, 1r1v; q. 72, 21r23r; q. 73, 6r12v; Pinghuizhi, q. 7,
1v3v. Dd proclaimed the beginning of the new era as the year of 2893 of
qingzhen, but I have no knowledge about the meaning of this number.
36. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 86, 9v10r.
37. TH/Jarring, 55r; TH/Enver, p. 277; TA/Pantusov, pp. 100107; Qinding
Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 80, 19v; q. 81, 2r2v.
38. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang Fanglue, q. 75, 9v10r; q. 93,
12v13r; q. 98, 11r.
39. Khodzahev, Tsinskaia imperiia, pp. 2829.
40. Pinghuizhi, q. 7, 4r. Cf. Khodzhaev, Tsinskaia imperiia, pp. 2829.
41. Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 12r13v.
42. Stratanovich, K voprosu, p. 61.
43. Huijiang tongzhi, comp., Hening (Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe repr., 1966),
q. 8, 3r.
44. On this city under the rule of the Qing and Yaqb Beg, see Hori Sunaos
Kaiky toshi Yarukando, Knan Daigaku kiy (Bungakuhen), no. 63 (1987).
45. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 77, 18v.
46. Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 2r.
47. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 202203; Kuropatkin, Kashgaria,
p. 157.
48. Vafar-nma, 7v28v.
49. Ghazt-i Muslimn in E. D. Ross, ed., Three Turki Manuscripts (Lahore:
Mud-i-Am Press, 1908?), pp. 3940.
50. Vafar-nma, 7v28v.
51. Vafar-nma, 28v.
52. Vafar-nma, 29v. Sayrm (TH/Jarring, 41v; TH/Enver, p. 214) writes that
when the Kuchean army led by Nar al-Dn, elder brother of Rshidn, arrived in
Yarkand, the city was divided into three parts: the Muslim town was partitioned be-
tween Abd al-Rakmn and Tungan imms, while the Chinese fort was still held by
the Qing army. However, according to Ghazt-i Muslimn, Ghulm Husayn had
been the ruler when the Kuchean army appeared in Yarkand and only after they had
left was his elder brother Abd al-Rakmn enthroned as the new ruler (E. D. Ross
ed., Three Turki Manuscripts, p. 40). Comparing the two sources, we can nd that
Ghazt-i Muslimn contains far more detailed and accurate information than
Sayrms work. Therefore, we can conclude that right after the revolt Yarkand was
not divided into three parts as Sayrm asserts but partitioned into two parts, that
is, the Manchu fort guarded by the Qing army and the Muslim town taken by the
Tungans with a nominal ruler Ghulm Husayn.
53. Vafar-nma, 28v29v.
54. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 161.
228 notes to chapter 2

55. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 3536.

56. Ibid.
57. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 39 and a map facing p. 249.
58. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 161.
59. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 37.
60. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 77, 19r.
61. Ibid.
62. Jam al-tavrkh, quoted from Tikhonovs Uigurskie istoricheskie ruko-
pisi, p. 168.
63. Trkh-i nma-i Yaqb Khn (INA AN, B 772), 36r36v, quoted from
A. Khodzhaev, Tsinskaia imperiia, p. 30 and note 13 on page 110.
64. Uigurskie istoricheski rukopisi, p. 168.
65. Visits to High Tartary, pp. 4748.
66. According to Valikhanov, one of \iddqs ancestors, a certain Akim (proba-
bly from kkim), helped the Qing during its conquest of Xinjiang and that Akim was
appointed to the kkim of Tashmaliq for his contribution. He adds that \iddq was
the leader of the Turaygir tribe of the Qirghiz and helped the Qing government end
the rebellion of Wal Khn in 1857. For this service he received a hat decorated with
red gems and was well received by Qing ofcials. See Sobranie sochnenii, vol. 3, pp.
160, 188.
67. Tikhonov, Uigurskie istoricheskie rukopisi, pp. 16869. As he pointed
out, Hjj Ysufs statement that Qutluq Beg invited \iddq Beg in October of 1863
is wrong. He seems to have been confused because he wrote his work in 19078,
more than forty years after the incident.
68. Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 2v.
69. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 203204.
70. See Xinjiang jianshi, vol. 2, pp. 127128. This work also suggests, based on
a Muslim source, that the two Tungans, Jin Laosan and Ma Tuzi, were farmers at a
tundian in Fayzbd (Qieshi).
71. See TH/Jarring, 68r68v; TH/Enver, p. 333; Report of a Mission to Yar-
kund, p. 204; Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 159.
72. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 33.
73. Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, p. 122. Habb Allh built a new wall mea-
suring 25 feet high and 20 feet thick. See W. H. Johnson, Report on his Journey to
Ilchi, the Capital of Khotan, in Chinese Tartary, Journal of the Royal Geographic
Society, vol. 37 (1867): 14.
74. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 33; Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol.
3, pp. 12223.
75. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 19r20r.
76. Trkh-i ighar,, 28v29r.
77. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 4r.
78. Johnson, Journey to Ilchi, p. 4.
79. Mission scientique, vol. 3, p. 54.
80. Ibid.
81. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 2r8v.
82. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 2r2v.
83. TH/Jarring, 78v; TH/Enver, pp. 37980; TA/Pantusov, pp. 16869.
 notes to chapter 2 229

84. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 3r8v.

85. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 19r20r.
86. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 8v9r.
87. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 9r10r.
88. Lo Yunzhi, Qing Gaozong tongzhi Xinjiang zhengce de tantao, pp. 7274.
89. Mull Bll, Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn (printed edition by N. N. Pantusov,
Voina musulman protiv Kitaitsev), p. 11. On this work, see M. Hamrajev, Bilal
Nazim: ein Klassiker der uigurischen Literatur, Ungarische Jahrbcher, no. 42
(1970): 7799; Hamada Masami, Murr Birru no Seisenki ni tsuite, Ty
gakuh, 55, no. 4 (1973): 3159.
90. Vospominaiia Iliiskogo Sibintsa o Dungansko-Taranchinskom vozstanii v
18641877 godakh v Iliiskom krae, Zapiski Vostochnogo otdeleniia Russkogo
arkheologicheskogo obshchestva, no. 18 (19071908), introduction by A. Diakov,
p. 234.
91. Daqing lichao shilu, Tongzhi-41yimao.
92. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, p. 11.
93. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 44, 10v11v.
94. According to the recollection of a Sibo, 8,000 Sibos, Oirats and Han Chi-
nese, in addition to 3,000 exiled criminals, were dispatched at that time (Vospom-
inaniia Iliiskogo Sibintsa, p. 239). But in the memorial of Cangcing, the total num-
ber of troops was 5,200 including 3,000 Torghuts, 500 exiled criminals, and some
other government forces. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 76,
7v8r.
95. Vospominaniia Iliiskogo Sibintsa, pp. 23942; Schuyler, Turkistan, vol. 2,
p. 178; Grum-Grzhimailo, Opisanie puteshestviia v Zapadnyi Kitai (St. Petersburg,
1896), vol. 1, p. 7.
96. The Ili Generals headquaters were placed here. This was one of the so-called
Nine Forts of Ili and the other eight were Huining Cheng (Bayandai), Suiding
Cheng (Ukharliq), Guangren Cheng (Ukurborosuk), Zhande Cheng (Chaghan Usu),
Gongchen Cheng (Khorgos), Xichun Cheng (Khara Bulaq), Taleqi Cheng (Tarchi),
and Ningyuan Cheng (Kulja). The names in parentheses are the Turkic appellations.
97. The word khnj in the Taranchi dialect corresponds to kjj. See Ghazt dar
mulk-i Chn, vol. 2 (Pantusovs note), p. 42. Mull Bll uses the form of akhn (in
Chinese transcribed either as ahong or ahun) rather than akhnd, so I followed him
in the case of Ili.
98. Properly it should be Abd al-Rasl, but I followed the spelling of Mull
Bill.
99. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, pp. 1213.
100. Ibid. The fact that the Kulja revolt occurred on November 10, 1864 is
conrmed by a memorial of Cangcing and Mingsioi. Cf. Vospominaniia Iliiskogo
Sibintsa, 243 (October 12 in the Julian calendar). Mull Bll writes that it hap-
pened on 12 Jumda I, 1280 which corresponds to October 25, 1863, but this is ob-
viously wrong. His year 1280 must be a mistake for 1281.
101. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, pp. 1719. For the locations of Taranchi villages
to the south of the Ili river, see Saguchi Trus Taranchi jin no shakaiIri keikoku
no Uiguru buzokushi, 17601860, Shigaku zasshi 73, no. 11 (1964): 2533.
102. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, p. 21.
230 notes to chapter 2

103. Shngy is a transcription of the Chinese word shangye, meaning head of

merchants.
104. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, p. 22. According to Vospominaniia Iliiskogo Sib-
intsa (p. 246), Ykr Akhns Chinese name was Ma I.
105. Chinese sources write his name as Maizimuzate (i.e., Mamzda) which
probably reects the local pronunciation.
106. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan-Xinjiang Fanglue, q. 92, 4r4v.
107. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, pp. 2428.
108. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, pp. 2428, 34, 40. Bill, who had high respect for
Abd Rasul, called them the two shhs.
109. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang Fanglue (q. 106, 29v30r), Ghazt
dar mulk-i Chn (p. 73) and Vospominaniia (p. 251), all agree on the date of the
fall of Bayandai. However, there are slight differences in other details. For example,
Ghazt records that the Muslims entered the fortress after they had exploded its
walls, while Vospominaniia writes that they crossed the bridge at midnight when
the garrison soldiers were sleeping. Also cf. Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 4r.
110. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, pp. 8296. This fuchi is no other than an ad-
venturer from Andijan named Patcha Hodja in E. Schuylers Turkistan (vol. 2, p.
183), and Kaira-khodzha in Vospominaniia (note 2 on page 253). There ex-
isted a Bukharan group called puchin in the Ili valley under the Zunghar rule (see
Haneda, Ch Ajiashi kenky, pp. 26266).
111. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, pp. 82107. Obul and Abil seem to be variants of
Ab al-.
112. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, pp. 11836; Vospominaniia, pp. 26566.
113. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, pp. 99100 and 13637.
114. Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, pp. 15262; Schuyler, Turkistan, vol. 2, pp.
18283; Vospominaniia, pp. 26970.
115. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 107, 1r2r.
116. Qurbn Al Ayghz, Kitb-i trkh-i jarda-i jadda (Kazan, 1889), p. 66.
117. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 16, 18r, 20v21r; Xin-
jiang Tuzhi, q. 116, 5v.
118. Xinjiang jianshi, vol. 2, p. 114.
119. According to TA/Pantusov (p. 103), he was sayyid and one of the khw-
jas in Sayram. He was assisted by Qsim Jang, d Khalfa, Khwja Zd Khalfa,
and Hjj Bq Khalfa. Here the khwjas in Sayram seems to denote one of the
three major clans (urugh, qabla) in Sayram, that is, khwja, shh, and amr.
120. For a detailed account see Tikhonov, Vosstanie 1864 g. v Vostochnom
Turkestane, Sovetskoe vostokovedenie, no. 5 (1948): 15572, and a recent article
by Sugawara Jn, Kch Hj no seisen to Muslimu shoseiryoku, Nairiku Aji-
ashi kenky, no. 11 (1996): 1740.
121. TH/Jarring, 34v; TH/Enver, p. 185; TA/Pantusov, pp. 4647.
122. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 70, 4r5r.
123. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 69, 16r16v.
124. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 70, 14v15v and 20r,
mentions two battles around Ushaq Tal on July 5 and July 16 as the author of Tadh-
kirat al-najt (27r33v) does (he joined the eastern expedition). Sayrm says that
 notes to chapter 2 231

the total number of Qing troops defeated by Iskq was 42,000 (TA/Pantusov,
pp. 9394), but this is a highly exaggerated statement. There were about a hundred
soldiers in Qarashahr (Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 68, 3r) and
the total number of the assistance army sent from Urumchi and Turfan was only 600
(op cit., q. 69, 17r17v). An eyewitness gives much more moderate numbers. See
Tadhkirat al-najt, 28v and 31v.
125. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 68, 3r.
126. The date when they departed Qarashahr is recorded as the 18th of Rab
II, 1281 (September 20, 1864) in TA/Pantusov (p. 101). However, in TA/Pelliot
(72r) they encamped at Twilgh and prepared for an expedition on the 12th of
Rab II, 1281 (September 14, 1864). In TH the date was erased (TH/Jarring, 54r;
TH/Enver, p. 273).
127. TH/Jarring, 55r55v; TA/Enver, pp. 27779; TH/Pantusov, pp. 104106.
Sayrm seems to have exaggerated the number of indels killed in these areas.
128. Sayrm (TH/Jarring, 55v, 56v; TH/Enver, p. 278; TA/Pantusov, p. 105)
writes the name of the town as Mray or Mrkh. Mray apparently corresponds
to Mulei, but Mrkh seem to transcribe to Muleihe (Mulei River).
129. TH/Jarring, 56r; TH/Enver, pp. 28081; TA/Pantusov, pp. 106107. Say-
rm, at rst, wrote the duration of the siege as 5 months, but later he changed it to
6 months and nally to 78 months. The second campaign to Mulei was in the spring
of 1865 and the fall of Turfan occurred after that. Therefore, it seems that the siege
of Turfan began around August of 1864 and, after 78 months of ghting, ended in
March of 1865.
130. In all the manuscripts of TA (TA/Pantusov, p. 111), the date of their de-
parture to Hami is recorded as the 18th of Dh al-Hijja, 1282 (May 4, 1866). How-
ever, TH (TH/Jarring, 57v; TH/Enver, p. 288) changed it to the 18th of Mukarram,
1282 (June 13, 1865).
131. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 76, 19v20r and q. 86,
11r.
132. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 106, 4r; q. 114, 12v;
TH/Jarring, 57v58r; TH/Enver, pp. 28890; TA/Pantusov, pp. 11112.
133. Khodzhaev, Tsinkaia imperiia, pp. 4546; Zeng Wenwu, Zhonguo jingy-
ing xiyushi, p. 322.
134. TH/Jarring, 36r; TH/Enver, pp. 19092; TA/Pantusov, pp. 5051.
135. TH/Jarring, 36r36v; TH/Enver, pp. 19394; TA/Pantusov, pp. 5152;
Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 70, 10r.
136. TH/Jarring, 37r38r; TH/Enver, pp. 198202; TA/Pantusov, p. 56.
137. Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 1v; TH/Jarring, 38v; TH/Enver, p. 201.
138. TH/Jarring, 38v39r; TH/Enver, pp. 202204; TA/Pantusov, pp. 5758.
139. TH/Jarring, 40v41r; TH/Enver, pp. 21013; TA/Pantusov, pp. 6264.
Sayrm does not mention where the khwjas were imprisoned, but only in TH/
Jarring he writes that they were taken to Kashghar. If this is true, the Muslim town
of Kashghar may have been taken by \iddq before the Kuchean army came to Ar-
tush. Moreover, Sayrm notes that the Qirghiz, after concluding a truce with the
Kucheans, conducted the khwjas to Kashghar with friendship and respect. They
made an agreement (ulk v mudr) that the Qirghiz would not intervene in the
232 notes to chapter 2

matters of Ush Turfan and Aqsu while the Kucheans would not interfere with the
matters of Kashghar. This description gives us an impression that the two sides were
on equal terms. It is possible that Sayrm, who had intimate relations with the
Kuchean khwjas, tried to keep their honor by this kind of ambiguous statement.
140. TH/Jarring, 41r41v; TH/Enver, pp. 21314; TA/Pantusov, p. 65.
141. TH/Jarring, 41v42r; TH/Enver, pp. 21617; TA/Pantusov, pp. 6566.
142. TH/Jarring, 78v; TH/Enver, pp. 38081; TA/Pantusov, p. 169.
143. On the rst Kuchean expedition of Yarkand and its failure, see TH/Jarring,
41r42v; TH/Enver, pp. 21319; TA/Pantusov, pp. 6568. It is not clear when the
Kuchean army came back to Kucha. According to Sayrm the expedition had
started in 1865 and the siege of Yarkand continued about eight months. However,
the famous battle of Khan Ariq between Yaqb Beg and the second expeditionary
army from Kucha occurred at the end of July, so the return of the rst expeditionary
army should be at least earlier than that date.
144. On this group see Hamada Masami, Islamic Saints and Their Mau-
soleums, Acta Asiatica, no. 34 (1978): 7998.
145. Trkh-i rashd (tr. by E. D. Ross), pp. 1015.
146. On the process of the conicts between these two groups, see my Muslim
Saints in the 14th to the 16th Centuries of Eastern Turkestan, International Jour-
nal of Central Asian Studies, vol. 1 (1996): 285322.
147. TH/Jarring, 34r; TH/Enver, p. 184; TA/Pantusov, p. 46.
148. Ibid.
149. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 44.
150. Hamada Masami, De lautorit religieuse au pouvoir politique: la rvolte
de Kc et Khwja Rshidn, Naqshbandis: cheminements et situation actuelle
dun ordre mystique musulman, ed. M. Gaborieau, A. Popovic and T. Zarcone
(Istanbul-Paris: Isis, 1990), pp. 45589.
151. On various forms of miracles performed by saints, see R. Gramlich, Die
Wunder der Freunde Gottes (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1987).
152. Les <voies> (uruq) soues en Chine, in Les ordres mystiques dans lIs-
lam, ed. A. Popovic and G. Veinstein (Paris: Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences so-
ciales, 1986), p. 23.
153. Stratanovich, K voprosu o kharatere, p. 61.
154. Pinghuizhi, q. 7, 1v2r.
155. Ma Xiaoshi, Xibei huizu geming jianshi, p. 59.
156. A. N. Geins, O vosstanii musulmanskogo naseleniia ili Dunganei v za-
padnom Kitae, Voennyi sbornik, no. 8 (1866): 192 (quoted from A. Khodzhaevs
Tsinskaia imperiia, p. 109, note 8).
157. Pinghuizhi, q. 2, 19r19v.
158. See Fletcher, Les <voies> (uruq) soues en Chine.
159. Sharq Turkistn Trkh (Srinagar, Kashmir: Bruka Parlis Basmakhanesi,
1366/194647), p. 391.
160. Les <voies> (uruq) soues en Chine. On Akmad Sirhind see A. Ahmads
Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment (Oxford, 1964), pp. 18290
and Y. Friedmans Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (Montreal, 1971).
161. H. Einzmann, Religises Volksbrauchtum in Afghanistan: Islamische Heili-
 notes to chapter 2 233

genverehrung und Wallfartswesen im Raum Kabul (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner,

1977), p. 24. Thomas J. Bareld, in his private communication with me, pointed out
that they were active in the anti-Soviet war and are still very inuential.
162. Yqb Begdin ilgri Kshqarn alghan \iddq Begning Dstn tadhkirasi,
1v5v. This manuscript is found in the India Ofce Library (Ms. Turki 3), London.
This is a copy made by Mrz Jall al-Dn Akhn on the 13th of Jumda I, 1282
(October 4, 1865). Also cf. Hamada, Uiguru rekishi bunken, 36263.
163. According to ]lib Akhnd (Prov. 115, 3v5v), the person who led Kash-
gharian begs and expelled Qutluq Beg was a certain Naar Shng Beg. In this re-
spect, his statement agrees with Abd al-Bqs (Yqb Begdin ilgri, 9v). Naar
Shng Beg sent San Allh Shaykh as an envoy to \iddq Beg for negotiation, but
\iddq refused to accept his terms. So Naar sent an envoy to Alm Quli in Khoqand.
In response to this, lm Quli dispatched his emissary to Kashghar, whom Naar
did not trust because he thought that it might be \iddqs plot.
164. TH/Jarring, 78r78v; TH/Enver, pp. 37879; TA/Pantusov, pp. 15556.
165. See his biography entitled Khwja Mukammad Sharfning tadhkirasi (Gun-
nar Jarring Collection, Prov. 10), 3r9r. Several copies of this work exist (particu-
larly in Russia) three of which I have seen at the collection of Gunnar Jarring. A par-
tial translation is found in Materialy po istorii Kazakhskikh khanstv XVXVIII
vekov, pp. 23236. Also cf. Akimushkins Khronika, p. 265.
166. There is an important work called Tadhkira-i Satq Boghr Khn. This is
a collection of numerous short biographies of the so-called Uways saints including
Satugh Boghra Khan. It was translated and studied by Julian Baldick, Imaginary
Muslims: The Uwaysi Sus of Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1993).
In one of the manuscripts in Russia the name of Khwja Mukammad Sharf is writ-
ten as author, which led many scholars including myself to regard him an Uways
Su. However, recently Devin DeWeese raised a serious doubt about his real au-
thorship of this work. See his An Uvays Su in Timurid Mawarannahr (Papers
on Inner Asia, no. 22; Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University, 1993).
167. The competition between these two Su orders is most vividly described in
the two works of Shh Makmd ibn Mrz Fjil Churs. One was translated with
excellent annotations by Akimushkin (Khronika) and the other titled Ans al-libn
is in the Bodleian Library (Ms. Ind. Inst. Pers. 45). A part of the latter is printed also
in Akimushkins book, pp. 33144.
168. For example, see Xinjiang jianshi, vol. 2, pp. 91ff; Ji Dachun, Shilun.
169. See, for example, D. Isiev, Nachalo, pp. 5963 and 7172.
170 Cf. Fletcher, Ching Inner Asia, p. 69.
171. For the related secondary materials, see Evelyn S. Rawski, Re-envisioning
the Qing: The Signicance of the Qing Period in Chinese History, Journal of Asian
Studies, vol. 55, no. 4 (1990): 82950.
172. Robert Lee, The Manchurian Frontier in Ching History (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). Cf. C. R. Bawdens description of the Qing
policy toward Mongolia in The Modern History of Mongolia (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicholson, 1968, pp. 8186) tends to emphasize its negative side. This tendency
seems to be related to his reliance on the works of Mongol scholars.
173. Suzuki Chsei, Chinas Relation with Inner Asia: The Hsiung-nu, Tibet,
234 notes to chapter 3

in The Chinese World Order: Traditional Chinas Foreign Relations, ed. John K.
Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 180197.
174. Sayrm (TH/Jarring, 1r; TH/Enver, pp. 30, 204, 625) employs sometimes
a rather archaic form, Faghfr-i Chn (Chinese emperor). On the term faghfr, see
Paul Pelliots Facfur in Notes on Marco Polo (Paris: A. Maisonneuve, 195973),
pp. 652661
175. In order to circumvent the inevitable result of perpetual warfare, some ju-
rists, notably belonging to the Shafs, recognized a third status called Dr al-\ulk
(Abode of Truce). However, the jurists of the Hanaf school did not acknowledge
this third status. See M. Parvin and M. Sommer, Dar al-Islam: The Evolution of
Muslim Territoriality and Its Implication for Conict Resolution in the Middle
East, International Journal of Middle East Studies, no. 2 (1980): 4. For the ac-
counts of the above-mentioned three zones, see the articles of Dr al-Harb, Dr
al-Islm and Dr al-\ulk in Encyclopaedia of Islam (the 2nd ed., Leiden: Brill),
vol. 2, fascs. 24 and 25 (1961).
176. Shh Makmd Churs, Ans al-libn, 106r (see printed text in Akimush-
kin, Khronika, p. 342).
177. Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam: Das Ende der Caghataiden und die Herrschaft
der Cho^as in Kasgarien, Der islamische Orient: Berichte und Forschungen, pts.
610 (Berlin: W. Peiser, 1905).
178. Saguchi, Shinky minzokushi kenky, pp. 22528.
179. See my The Cult of Saints in Eastern Turkestan: The Case of Alp Ata in
Turfan, Proceedings of the 35th Permanent International Altaistic Conference
(Taipei, 1992), pp. 199226.
180. It is interesting to note that jihd, a more popular Arabic word for holy
war, was hardly ever used in the Muslim literature of the nineteenth century
Xinjiang.

chapter 3

1. I have seen only the Russian translation, Magomet-Iakub, Emir Kashgarskii

(St. Petersburg, 1903), tr. I. G.
2. Kuropatkin, Kashagria, pp. 15960.
3. Badaulet, pp. 9495.
4. Turkistan, vol. 1, pp. 13236.
5. Buried Treasures of Chinese Turkestan (1928; Oxford University Press, 1985
repr.), p. 24.
6. The Life of Yakoob Beg, pp. viiviii.
7. See his Pivot of Asia (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), p. 32.
8. Badaulet, p. 94. His memoir tends to overstate his role as an early patron
of Yaqb Beg, but it contains some details, not found in other sources, on Yaqb
Begs career in the Khoqand khanate.
9. TA/Pantusov, p. 131.
10. Kashgaria, p. 159. He also reported that Yaqb Begs father was Ismet-
Oola and that he married a woman in Piskent and got Yaqb Beg from her. How-
ever, there is no other evidence to support his assertion that Yaqb Begs parents
 notes to chapter 3 235

had divorced right after his birth and, because his mother remarried a butcher in
Piskent and he grew up in his house, he was sometimes called the son of a butcher.
11. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 9798.
12. The Life of Yakoob Beg, pp. 7778. His claim that Yaqb Beg is Amr
Temrs descendant seems to be based on the report in Mission to Yarkund (p. 97).
The part in this report was written by H. Bellew.
13. Kashmir and Kashghar (London: Trbner & Co., Ludgate Hill, 1875),
p. 300.
14. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 55.
15. Visits to High Tartary, pp. 373, 35758.
16. For example, see TH/Enver, pp. 50413; TA/Pantusov, pp. 23739.
17. Badaulet, p. 94.
18. The word sart which originally came from the Sanskrit sartha, meaning mer-
chant, retained its original meaning up to the eleventh century. The earliest occur-
rence of the term in Turkic texts goes back to the eighth century in the Manichean
texts from Turfan. Cf. Clauson, An Etymological Dictionary, p. 846. From the late
twelfth and the thirteenth centuries the word sartaul among the Mongols meant the
Muslims in general. See, P. Pelliot, Notes sur lhistoire de la Horde dOr (Paris:
Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1949), p. 34. Later it came to mean town dwellers. The ac-
tual usages in the nineteenth century are found in Shaws Visits to High Tartary, pp.
2526 and Schuylers Turkistan, vol. 1, pp. 104105.
19. Kashgaria, pp. 15960.
20. Badaulet, pp. 9495.
21. Nalivkin, Histoire du Khanat de Khokand, pp. 17499.
22. Badaulet, p. 95.
23. On this event see Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, pp. 16768; Istoriia Kirgizskoi
SSR, vol. 1 (Frunze, 1984), p. 559. The author of Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya (p. 182)
puts the date of Azzs death as 1266/184950. Cf. Bartold, Izvlechenie iz Tarkh-
i shhrukh, in Sochineniia, vol. 2, pt. 2 (1964), p. 351.
24. Badaulet, p. 95. Bellew writes incorrectly (Report of a Mission to Yar-
kund, p. 98) that Yaqb Beg was promoted from mahram to qushbegi when he was
made the governor of Aq Masjid. Aq Masjid was governed by a beg subject to
Tashkent kkim, not by qushbegi which was one of the highest military ranks in the
khanate. Also see Maksheevs correction in Kuropatkins Kashgariia, pp. 18384.
25. Badaulet, pp. 9596; TH/Jarring, 66v; TA/Pantusov, pp. 13132; FO
65/902, Eastern Turkistan, 1874, p. 2; a memoir by a certain Mull Mrz which
was translated by M. F. Gavrilov, Stranichka iz istorii Iakub-beka Badauleta
pravitelia Kashgarii, in V. V. Bartoldu. Turkestanskie druzia ucheniki i pochitateli
(Tashkent: Tipo-lit. No.2 Kazgiza, 1927), p. 126.
26. Maksheevs accounts quoted in Kashgaria, p. 183.
27. This was witnessed by a Russian merchant, S. Ia. Kliucharev, who stayed at
that time in Tashkent. See Appendix in Veliaminov-Zernovs Istoricheskiia izves-
tiia o Kokanskom khanstve ot Mukhammeda-Ali do Khudaiar-Khana, Trudy Vos-
tochnogo otdeleniia Russkogo Arkhelogogicheskogo Obshchestva, no. 2 (1856):
36364.
28. See Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 98; H. Rawlinson, England and Rus-
236 notes to chapter 3

sia in the East (London: J. Murray, 1875), p. 166; Boulger, The Life of Yakoob Beg,
pp. 7981; Schuyler, Turkistan, vol. 1, p. 64. All these sources repeat the same mis-
take. A. N. Kuropatkin who had argued the same story rectied the mistake by in-
serting Maksheevs report (cf. Kashgaria, p. 161, note 1). For a more detailed de-
scription about the fall of Aq Masjid, see A. I. Maksheev, Istoricheskii obzor
Turkestana i nastupatelnago dvizheniia v nego Russkikh (St. Petersburg, 1890), pp.
179 ff.
29. Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, pp. 16971; Veliaminov-Zernov, Istorich-
eskiia izvestiia, pp. 34752.
30. On this title, also called bahdurbashi in the khanate, see A. L. Troitskaia,
Zopovednikikurk Kokandskogo Khana Khudaiara, Sbornik Gosudarstven-
noi Publichnoi Biblioteki imeni M. E. Saltykova-Shchedrina 3 (Leningrad, 1955), p.
138, note 3.
31. Mrz Akmad (Badaulet, p. 96) clearly writes that Nr Mukammad was
killed six months after he had been taken to Khoqand. Report of a Mission to
Yarkund makes a strange mistake on page 197 by writing that lim Quli killed
Suliman Khoja and made Nr Mukammad, the brother-in-law of Ykb Beg,
Tashkent governor. But the original text of Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya (22r23r) reads
that lim Quli killed Shdmn Khwja Qushbegi, Tashkent governor, and made
Nr Mukammad Parvnachi who was his own father-in-law (pidr-i ars-i khd) a
new governor. Note that Report of a Mission to Yarkund has a correct translation
on page 99.
32. Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, p. 173.
33. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 98, 195.
34. Badaulet, p. 96.
35. Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya, 13r15r.
36. Nalivkin also writes this in his Kratkaia istoriia, p. 194.
37. Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya, 15r22r.
38. On this rebellion see Nalivkin, Kratkaia istoriia, pp. 18586.
39. Badaulet, p. 97.
40. Isiev follows the statements in Report of a Mission to Yarkund and
Badaulet. See his Uigurskoe gosudarstvo, pp. 5354, note 6.
41. TH/Jarring, 67r68r; TH/Enver, pp. 32831; TA/Pantusov, pp. 13335.
42. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, pp. 18287.
43. Boulger, The Life of Yakoob Beg, p. 86.
44. Kashgaria, p. 162.
45. Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, pp. 14247; cf. English translation
by John and Robert Michell, The Russians in Central Asia (London: E. Stanford,
1865), pp. 20212.
46. Badaulet, p. 98.
47. Xinjiang jianshi, vol. 2, p. 133, quotes this from the biography of Ynus Jn,
Yarkand governor, entitled History of Ferghana and Kashghar, written by Muhan-
mode Zhairifu.
48. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 198.
49. Bellew states that the number of people who left Tashkent was only 66
(Kashmir and Kashghar, p. 323; 68 in Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 204), and
 notes to chapter 3 237

according to an Ottoman source it was about. 4050 (Mehmet tif, K{gar trh,
pp. 344345).
50. Shaw, Visits to High Tartary, p. 48.
51. Shaw, Visits to High Tartary, pp. 4849.
52. Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya, 26r27r. ]lib Akhnd (Prov. 115, 11v) exag-
gerates the numbers of \iddqs army (30,000) and of Yaqb Begs (40,000).
Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya (27r) has a more reasonable number for \iddqs army
(3,000). TA/Pantusov (p. 138) writes that \iddq went to Farrash, his original base,
and gathered 6,0007,000 Qirghizs. Both shrines were located by the Qizil river
which ows between the two parts of Kashghar. See Report of a Mission to Yarkund,
p. 39.
53. Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya, 27r28v.
54. He received this title from lim Quli. The holder of this title in Bukhara su-
pervised the vaqf economy. See A. A. Semenov, Bukharskii traktat o chinakh i
zvaniiakh i ob obiazannostiakh nositelei ikh v srednevekovoi Bukhare, Sovetskoe
vostokovedenie, no. 5 (1948): 141.
55. This is not Yaqb Begs brother-in-law who was executed but lim Qulis
father-in-law, former Tashkent governor.
56. Trkh-i ighar, 28v29r and 31r. Sayrm writes (TA/Pantusov, p. 170;
TH/Enver, pp. 38182) that the embassy to Khudyr sent by Habb Allh was
headed by his son Abd al-Rakmn and the return embassy was headed by Mr Baba
Ddkhwh (in TH, Nr Mukammad Parvnachi) and Mrz Baba Beg Hir with
250 cavalry, and that when they reached Yarkand they encountered Yaqb Beg who
was ghting with Hm al-Dn Khwja. And he continues that Yaqb Beg, after hold-
ing most of the Khoqandian soldiers, sent Abd al-Rakmn to Khotan. Considering
that lim Quli died on May 21, 1865 (Maksheev, Istoricheskii obzor, p. 231), the
Khotan party must have reached Khoqand while he was alive. It is unthinkable that
they had an audience with Khudyr who was in Bukhara at that time. And his claim
that the Khotanese embassy was headed by Abd al-Rakmn is also misleading. I am
more inclined to believe the accounts of Trkh-i ighar whose author escorted the
return embassy to Yarkand. On the title of parvnachi and hudchi in the Khoqand
khanate, see A. L. Troitskaia, Katalog arkhiva Kokandskikh khanov (Moscow: Izd-
vo Nauka, Glav. red. vostochnoi lit-ry, 1968), pp. 557, 569.
57. Sayrm mentions a secret communication between Niyz Beg of Yarkand
and Yaqb Beg. See TH/Jarring, 69r; TH/Enver, pp. 38687; TA/Pantusov, pp.
13839.
58. Trkh-i ighar, 29r30v.
59. Visits to High Tartary, p. 53. Also see TH/Jarring, 41v; TH/Enver, pp.
21516; TA/Pantusov, p. 66.
60. Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 5r. The author of Trkh-i ighar, Abd Allh, ap-
parently gives a wrong date for the fall of Yangihissar as a Wednesday of the month
of shr in the year of ox (32r), which corresponds, according to the Ferghana
system of the twelve animal cycle as Abd Allh uses, to May 27June 25 of 1865.
Because lim Quli died on May 21, this is contradictory to his later remarks that
Mr Baba whom Yaqb Beg sent to Khoqand after the fall of Yangihissar met lim
Quli.
238 notes to chapter 3

61. On his origin there is a difference of opinion. Abd Allh regards him as a
Yangihissari (Trkh-i ighar, 32v) while Sayrm includes his name in the list of the
people who joined Yaqb Beg in Osh (TH/Jarring, 68v; TH/Enver, p. 334; TA/Pan-
tusov, p. 137).
62. TH/Jarring, 69v; TH/Enver, p. 339; TA/Pantusov, p. 140; Trkh-i ighar,
32v. The number nine had a symbolic meaning to the Central Asian Turks. Schuyler
notes (Turkistan, vol. 1, p. 143) that The wedding presents are usually given by
nines, which is looked upon as a sacred number, nine times nine being usually the
largest number that is given. The number nine is used with regard to other presents,
as those given to guests or in exchange of hospitality. Cf. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria,
p. 42. The Mongols also had a similar custom, as being testied by the term yisun
chaghan-u alban (the tribute of the nine whites), which comprised eight white horses
and one white camel. Cf. Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia, p. 59.
63. Trkh-i ighar, 28v33v. Kuropatkin, however, reports (Kashgaria, p. 165)
that Mr Baba did not see lim Quli.
64. Trkh-i ighar, 38r40v and ]lib Akhnd (Prov. 115), 13v17v. The ac-
counts of Trkh-i ighar is taken here, even though there is a signicant disagree-
ment between these two sources. ]lib Akhnd says that the terms of the concilia-
tion were to raise Kichik Khn Tura to pdishh and to make \iddq lashkarbashi.
The two armies, he continues, then marched against Kashghar led by Yaqb Beg,
\iddq Beg, Abd Allh, Ghz Beg and Azz Beg, who were opposed by an army sent
by Buzurg and commanded by Muqarrab Shh, Ghaffr Beg and Gnj Beg.
Buzurgs army is said to have lost the battle and Buzurg himself to have lost the ruler-
ship. It is interesting that ]lib Akhnd claims the early clash between Yaqb Beg
and Buzurg, and its relation with the later opposition of Muqarrab Shh. Sayrm
notes that Muqarrab Shh Beg, Ghz Pnad, Azz Jild and Mull Ibrhm tried
to persuade Buzurg to get rid of Yaqb Beg (TH/Jarring, 70r; TH/Enver, p. 341;
TA/Pantusov, pp. 14142). We cannot say what exactly happened. The signs of the
antagonism between Yaqb Beg and Buzurg may have appeared from this early
period.
65. Muqarrab Shh was from a place Mughal Tarim in the vicinity of Khan Ariq.
]lib Akhnd gives a detailed description of this incident (Prov. 115, 20v30r).
66. TH/Jarring, 43v; TH/Enver, p. 223; TA/Pantusov, p. 71. This number may
be a considerably inated one. Trkh-i ighar (42r) estimates the number to have
been about 40,000, and ]lib Akhnd (Prov. 115, 32v33r) 50,000.
67. Trkh-i ighar, 42v; TH/Jarring, 70r; TH/Enver, p. 342; TA/Pantusov, p.
142. ]lib Akhnd extremely exaggerates the numbers (total 30,000 in Prov. 115,
33v34r).
68. See Trkh-i ighar, 31v32r and 42r.
69. TH/Jarring, 44r; TH/Enver, p. 226; TA/Pantusov, p. 73.
70. For detailed accounts of the battle, see TH/Jarring, 43v44v; TH/Enver, pp.
22428; TA/Pantusov, pp. 6975; Trkh-i ighar, 41v44r; Report of a Mission to
Yarkund, pp. 208209; ]lib Akhnd (Prov. 115), 32r38v. Kuropatkin mistakes
this battle as having taken place before the capture of Yangihissar (Kashgharia, p.
164), and the same mistake appears in Isievs Uigurskoe gosudarstvo, pp. 2021.
Also consult Tikhonovs Vosstanie 1864 g., pp. 16869, which is largely based
on Sayrms work.
 notes to chapter 3 239

71. TH/Jarring, 44r; TH/Enver, p. 227; TA/Pantusov, p. 74.

72. Ibid.
73. Sayrm states in his Trkh-i kamd that Jaml al-Dns army left Yarkand
on the second of Jumda II, 1282 (October 23, 1865) and the battle took place on
the 22nd day of the same month (November 12) (see, TH/Jarring, 43v, 70v; TH/
Enver, pp. 224, 344; TA/Pantusov, p. 144). In TH/Enver (p. 344) the departure of
the Kuchean khwjas from Yarkand is dated on the third of Jumda I, 1283 (Sept.
13, 1866), which is apparently wrong. We know from Chinese sources that after the
battle of Khan Ariq Yaqb Beg took Kashghars Manchu fort on September 1, there-
fore, the date of the battle should be before that, and thus we cannot accept
Sayrms claim that it happened in November. We should also note that Mr Baba
Hudch (whomYaqb Beg had dispatched to Khoqand) returned after lim Quli
had died on May 21 and that his return was just after Yaqb Begs arrival at
Kashghar from Khan Ariq (Trkh-i ighar, 44r).
74. TH/Jarring, 44v; TH/Enver, pp. 22829; TA/Pantusov, p. 75.
75. Trkh-i ighar, 44v.
76. TH/Jarring, 71v; TH/Enver, p. 348; TA/Pantusov, p. 147.
77. Trkh-i ighr, 45r; Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 167. On the date of the oc-
cupation, see Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 6r;
78. Trkh-i ighar, 47v; TA/Pantusov, p. 145.
79. For a fuller list of names see Trkh-i ighar, 46r46v; TH/Jarring, 71r;
TA/Pantusov, p. 145.
80. See Akmad Quli Andijn, Janb-i Badaulatni kikyatlari (Houghton Li-
brary, Harvard University: uncatalogued), 5v. This was a common phrase used for
proclamation of a new ruler to the people in the streets. Cf. Tadhkira-i azzn (Bod-
leian: d. 20), 87v and 88v (dr dr-i Islm dr dr-i Hajrt-i Khwja-i Jahn).
81. Janb-i Badaulatni kikyatlari, 11r. Sayrm writes that Buzurg left the coun-
try 60 days after the end of the season of Capricorn, that is, between February and
March (TA/Pantusov, pp. 14748). Abd Allh gives the date of Buzurgs departure
as the end of Ramajn, 1281 (probably a mistake of 1282), that is, February of
1865 (1866). Shaws assertion that Buzurg left in 1868 (Visits to High Tartary, p.
55) is probably wrong. For more detailed accounts of the struggle between Yaqb
Beg and Buzurg, see Trkh-i ighar, 48v56r; Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp.
21013; TH/Jarring, 71v72r; TH/Enver, pp. 34851; TA/Pantusov, pp. 14749;
]lib Akhnd (Prov. 115), 46r55r; Kmil Khn shn, Risale-i-Iakubi; Vospomi-
naniia o Iakub-beke Kashgarskom Kamil-Khana-Ishana, Istorik-Marksist, no. 3
(1940): 131.
82. The second of Barat, 1282/ Dec. 21, 1865 in TH/Jarring (60r) and TH/Enver
(p. 299). The date in TA/Pantusov (p. 116) is wrong.
83. TH/Jarring 73r; TH/Enver, pp. 35455 (the second of Rab I, 1283/July 15,
1865).
84. According to Trkh-i ighar (58r), Yaqb Beg entrusted the city to Mr
Baba. Mukammad Ynus Jn Shaghawul wrote a history of Ferghana and Kashghar,
Hadqat al-kaqiq (Garden of Truths), or Hadiq al-anvr (Gardens of Lights).
Two defective manuscripts exist in Russia. See C. A. Storey, Persidskaia literatura;
Bibliogracheskii obzor, trans. by Iu. E. Bregel (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), vol. 2,
p. 1196.
240 notes to chapter 3

85. TH/Jarring, 74r; TH/Enver, p. 359 (25th day of Rab II, 1283/Sep. 6, 1866).
Cf. TA/Pantusov, p. 155.
86. W. H. Johnson, Report on His Journey to Ilchi, the Capital of Khotan, in
Chinese Tartary, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, no. 37 (1867): 9.
87. TH/Jarring , 73r; TH/Enver, p. 362; TA/Pantusov, p. 157.
88. According to Sayrm, Nimat Allh, but in Trkh-i ighar Ibrhm udr.
89. TH/Jarring, 81r; TH/Enver, p. 392; TA/Pantusov, p. 177.
90. According to Sayrm (TH/Enver, p. 373), on his seal was inscribed the
phrase of The Beloved of Allh to whom the intercession is directed (Huwa al-
Habb Allh dh turj shifathu).
91. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh (24r28r) does not mention Habb Allhs visit to
Zava. According to it, he and his son, Mam Khn, were arrested in Khotan and
taken to Yarkand where they were killed later. TA/Pantusov (p. 163) and Sharq
Turkistn Trkh by Mehmet Emin Bughra (p. 386) write that 40,000 people were
killed, but this may be an exaggerated number.
92. TH/Jarring, 76v; TH/Enver, p. 371; TA/Pantusov, pp. 16263.
93. TA/Pantusov, p. 166; Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 24r. As I pointed out,
Trkh-i ighar usually gives dates one year earlier and the capture of Khotan is not
an exception: Ramajn, 1282/JanuaryFebruary, 1866 (60r). It should be Rama-
jn, 1283. Cf. Hamada, LHistoire, pt. 3, p. 77. R. B. Shaw who usually gives
wrong dates correctly writes that Khotan fell in January, 1867. See his Visits to High
Tartary, p. 56. According to Sayrm, Yaqb Beg returned to Kashghar on Shawwl
18, 1283 (Feb. 23, 1867). Cf. TH/Jarring, 77v; TA/Pantusov, p. 166; Shawwl 28
(March 5) in TH/Enver, p. 376.
94. The poem of Mukammad Alam in his Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh (48r49v).
Cf. Mission scientique, vol. 3, 58 and Hamada, LHistoire, pt. 2, pp. 206207.
95. Habb Allh had three sons: Abd al-Rakmn, Ibrhm and Mam. The rst
son was killed in the battle of Piyalma, and the other two were killed by Yaqb Beg.
96. Like Khotan some other cities in Eastern Turkestan had epithets: Kash-
ghar, the City of Nobles (Azzn-i Kshghar); Aqsu, the City of Holy Warriors
(Ghzyn-i Aqs); Yarkand, the City of Elders (Prn-i Yrkand); Turfan, the City
of Foreigners (Gharbn-i Turfn), and so on. See Trkh-i jarda-i jadda (India
Ofce Library, Ms. Turki 2), 8r8v; Katanov, Volkskundliche Texte, pp. 122021.
97. TH/Jarring, 45v46v; TH/Enver, pp. 23439; TA/Pantusov, pp. 7882.
Mrz Jn came from Yarkand and was shn Mr Ghiyth al-Dns grandson (TA/
Pantusov, p. 67).
98. Kubrawiyya started from Najm al-Dn Kubra (d. 1221); Iskqiyya was the
group following Khwja Iskq (d. 1599); Nimatiyya was stemmed from Nimat
Allh Wal (d. 1430) from Mahan; Rabdiyya is believed to have originated from
Raba (d. 801) who had lived in Basra; and Davniyya came from Davn (d. 1502)
of Iran. On a brief explanation on these sects, see TH/Enver, pp. 74344.
99. Many of the inhabitants in Ush Turfan were called by this name because they
were immigrants from other cities of Eastern Turkestan, especially (Kuhna) Turfan,
which caused the change of name of the city from Ush to Ush Turfan. They were
moved here after the suppression of the Ush Turfan rebellion and the following
massacre. On this appellation, see TH/Jarring, 39v40r; TH/Enver, p. 207; TA/
Pantusov, pp. 6061.
 notes to chapter 3 241

100. TH/Jarring, 47r47v; TH/Enver, pp. 24046; TA/Pantusov, pp. 8286.

101. TH/Jarring, 61v62v; TH/Enver, pp. 30510; TA/Pantusov, pp. 12023.
102. TH/Jarring, 62v; TH/Enver, p. 310; TA/Pantusov, p. 123.
103. TH/Jarring, 62v63r; TH/Enver, pp. 31011; TA/Pantusov, pp. 12324.
104. TH/Jarring, 80v81r; TH/Enver, pp. 39092; TA/Pantusov, pp. 175
76. On Jaml al-Dns execution, see TH/Jarring, 65v, 82r; TH/Enver, pp. 32223,
392.
105. On the conquest of Kucha, also cf. TH/Jarring, 80r83r; TH/Enver,
pp. 38899; TA/Pantusov, pp. 17482.
106. TH/Jarring, 65v66r; TH/Enver, pp. 31525; TA/Pantusov, pp. 12731.
Mukammad Khwja Hajrat was a famous religious man in Yaqb Begs time (see
TH/Jarring, 113v).
107. TH/Jarring, 82v; TA/Pantusov, pp. 12830 and 17880; Trkh-i ighar,
61v65r.
108. TH/Jarring, 65v66r; TH/Enver, pp. 32325.
109. Pinghuizhi, q. 7, 4r. On Ma Duosan (or, Ma Wenyi), see Ma Xiaoshi, Xibei
huizu geming jianshi, pp. 4752. On Ma Yanlong and Ma Si (or, Ma Chungliang,
Ma Wenlu) see Pinghuizhi, q. 3, 1r and 19r19v. There are several studies on Ma
Hualong and his Jahriyya branch. See, for example, Mian Weilins Ningxia Yisilan
jiaopai gaiyao (Yinchuan: Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 1981), pp. 58100.
110. This is not to be confused with the one in the Gansu-Qinghai border. It is
located around Manas and Urumchi in Zungharia. See Pinghuizhi, q. 7, 5v.
111. Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 13r. According to TH/Jarring (90r), almost
10,000 families of Han Chinese had ed to Nanshan mountain escaping Iskqs at-
tack and most of them came under the command of Xu Xuegong.
112. TH/Jarring, 42r42v, 85r85v; TH/Enver, pp. 218, 406409; TA/Pan-
tusov, pp. 6768, 18889.
113. Sayrm suggests (TH/Jarring, 86v; TH/Enver, p. 432; TA/Pantusov, p.
193; TA/Pelliot, 126v) that this happened in the spring of 1870, or the season of
thawr (between April 22May 21 of 1870). Kanding Xinjiangji (q. 1, 13r) writes
that a large number of Tungans attacked Qitai in March 1870, and that in April they
invaded the territory of the Andijanis up to the border of the fort at Yar and were
defeated by Yaqb Beg. In spite of the fact that these two sources indicate the date
of the border incident taking place in AprilMay, we cannot accept this date because
there is a piece of evidence that Yaqb Beg undoubtedly left Kashghar on March 11
for the counterattack. The date of March 11 is found in Yaqb Begs letter addressed
to the viceroy of British India, dated Rajab, 1258 A.H. Though Yaqb Beg writes
in one place Dh al-Hijja 8, 1287 (Enclosure 10), in all circumstances Dh al-Hijja
8, 1286/March 11, 1870 is correct as it appears in Enclosure 11. See FO 65/874, En-
closures 10 and 11.
114. TH/Jarring, 86v90v; TH/Enver, pp. 43149; TA/Pantusov, pp. 193204;
K{gar trh, pp. 37375. Sayrm writes that Yaqb Beg dispatched his army to
Urumchi on Rajab 4, 1287/September 30, 1870, after he had taken Turfan. This is
contradictory to his remarks that the Tungans had attacked Kurla in the season of
thawr and that the siege of Tufan by Yaqb Begs army lasted nine months. Here
the date of the fall of Turfan was taken from Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 13v. Schuyler
(Turkistan, vol. 2, p. 319) regards the fall of Turfan as July of 1870. At the same
242 notes to chapter 3

time, there is a discrepancy in TA, TH and Kanding Xinjiangji on the question of

who the Tungan commander in Turfan was. Sayrm writes that it was S Yanshay
(Suo Huanzhang) while in the latter (q. 1, 13r13v) is found Ma Zhong. Another
source (see Stratanovich, K voprosu, p. 63) conrms Sayrms opinion. Xinjiang
jianshi (vol. 2, p. 140) writes that the fall of Turfan was on the 9th day of the 10th
month (November 11) and the Tungan leaders were Ma Zhong and Ma Rende, but
it does not clarify the source.
115. However, according to Kanding Xinjiangji (q. 2, 13v), Yaqb Beg made
Ma Zhong kkim and let him administer the city.
116. The name of this place derived from the Roman emperor Decius (r. 249
251) who was related with the legend of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus (Akb al-
Kahf in Islamic literature). This legend was also quite popular in Eastern Turkestan,
and it is reported that there was a cave of the Seven Sleepers at a place called Tuyuq
near Daqiyanus. See Qurbn Als Trkh-i jarda-i jadda (India Ofce Library: Ms.
Turki 2), 17rff; A. v. Le Coq, Volkskundliches aus Ost-Turkistan (Berlin: D. Reimer,
1916), p. 3. Also cf. printed edition of Qurbn Als work, Kitb-i jarda-i jadda
(Kazan, 1884), pp. 18ff. On the legend of the Akb al-Kahf see a long treatise in
TH/Enver, pp. 661ff; R. Paret, Ashb al-Kahf in Encyclopaedia of Islam (the sec-
ond edition, vol. 1, fasc. 11, 1958).
117. Sources disagree about who was made the leader of the Urumchi Tungans:
Ma Zhong in Kanding Xinjiangji (q. 1, 13v); Dd Khalfa in ]lib Akhnd (Prov.
116, 28v30v); S Dly in TH (Jarring, 91v; Enver, p. 454); and in Stratanovich
(K voprosu, p. 63).
118. According to Sayrm, Xu Xuegongs brothers name is Mshye (TH/
Jarring, 90v; TH/Enver, p. 448; TA/Pelliot, p. 133r). However, Kangding Xinjiangji
(q. 1, 14r) writes his name as Xu Xuedi, which is probably correct.
119. Qar Mdn in TH/Jarring (92r) and TA/Pantusov (p. 207), but Qara
Murun in TH/Enver (p. 456) which is incorrect. On the map of Aurel Stein (Serial
no. 23) in his Innermost Asia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928) we can nd Qara
Mudu.
120. This date is conrmed by Yaqb Begs letter found in FO 65/874, Enclo-
sures 10 and 11.
121. TH/Jarring, 92r92v; TH/Enver, p. 460; TA/Pantusov, p. 211; Stratano-
vich, K voprosu, p. 63. However, Kanding Xinjiangji (q. 1, 13v) writes that it
was Ma Zhong who was killed and that the incident happened in the 4th month of
1871.
122. TH/Jarring, 93r; TH/Enver, p. 461; TA/Pantusov, pp. 212, 216. But ac-
cording to Xinjiang jianshi (vol. 2, p. 176), it was Ma Rende, the son of Ma Zhong.
123. TH/Jarring, 93v; TH/Enver, pp. 46263; TA/Pantusov, p. 213. According
to Kanding Xinjiangji (q. 1, 14r), Yaqb Begs army took Urumchi and expelled
Dd Khalfa in the 10th month of 1871 (Nov. 13Dec. 11), and in the rst month
(Feb. 9March 8) of the next year Xu Xuegong began to attack the city. This record
agrees with Sayrms statement.
124. Cf. Stratanovich, K voprosu, pp. 6364. It was during this time that the
Russian merchant I. Somov visited Manas (JanuaryMay 1872) with a huge cara-
van. He left us a vivid description of the situation in Manas on the eve of its con-
 notes to chapter 4 243

quest by Beg Quli. A Chinese source also mentions Somovs caravan (Pinghuizhi, q.
7, 5v6r).
125. TH/Jarring, 93v94r; TH/Enver, pp. 46668; TA/Pantusov, pp. 21314.
Kanding Xinjiangji (q. 1, 14r) wrongly states that Paxia (i.e., pdishh, that is,
Yaqb Beg) led the second expeditionary army for himself. Xinjiang jianshi (vol. 2,
pp. 17778) seems to repeat this mistake.
126. Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 14r14v; TH/Jarring, 94r94v; TH/Enver, pp.
46768; TA/Pantusov, p. 214.
127. Sayrm writes that the Tungan leader called Lawrnj (i.e., Dd) in Manas
killed himself when the city fell to Beg Quli (TA/Pantusov, p. 215). Pinghuizhi (q. 7,
5r5v) erroneously reports that both Dd and Ma Guan died during the rst Urum-
chi expedition led by Yaqb Beg himself in 187071.
128. TH/Jarring, 96v; TH/Enver, p. 477; TA/Pantusov, p. 220.

chapter 4

1. TH/Jarring, 103r; TH/Enver, 516; TA/Pantusov, p. 240.

2. TH/Jarring, 100v; TH/Enver, pp. 49697.
3. R. B. Shaw, A Grammar of the Language of Eastern Turkestan, Royal Asi-
atic Society of Bengal, no. 3 (1877): 32223, 349.
4. TH/Jarring, 100v; TH/Enver, p. 497.
5. K{gar iqlmin hkim-i shib al-itibr Yaqb Hn. See Nme-i Hmyn,
no. 13 (cf. K{gar trh, pp. 38889).
6. K{gar amr {ahmetl Yaqb Hn. See Yldz tasnif, 33112797391.
7. FO 65/879, Enclosures no. 3 and no. 4.
8. See Appendix A.
9. On the assumption of amr title, see Bellews Kashmir and Kashghar, p. 304;
T. E. Gordon, The Roof of the World (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1876),
p. 87.
10. Kashmir and Kashghar, pp. 299300.
11. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 40.
12. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 99.
13. For example, see Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 99; Kashgaria, pp.
4748. Boulger did not even mention this post. Tikhonovs Nekotorye voprosy is
the same case.
14. A. Kuhn puts it as the twelfth rank in the military hierarchy, and the ninth
in the court. See his The Province of Ferghana, formerly Khanate of Kokand, tr. from
German by F. Henvey (Simla, 1876), pp. 2728. Also see Troitskaia, Katalog, p. 554.
15. Like mrz, this was the ofcial who conducted scribal works.
16. TH/Jarring (115v) has a long lacuna from this point. However, it is found
in TH/Enver, pp. 576ff; TA/Pantusov, pp. 277ff.
17. TH/Enver, pp. 57576; TA/Pantusov, p. 277.
18. Kashgaria, p. 47; Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 99.
19. It was also called tash or sang, both meaning stone. There is no doubt that
these terms were originated from the custom of putting stones to indicate the dis-
tance. It is interesting to note that another term, yighachi (wood), was used for the
244 notes to chapter 4

same purpose. One tash theoretically corresponds to 12,000 camel paces, but in
Kashgharia it was approximately 4.5 miles. Also cf. Grenard, Spcimens de la lit-
trature moderne du Turkestan chinois, Journal asiatique, 9e sr., tom. 13 (1899),
33944; Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 241, 436.
20. Sayrm lists the names of seven mrzs, which contradicts Kuropatkins as-
sertion that Yaqb Begs chancellery consisted of four mrzs.
21. TH/Jarring, 88v; TH/Enver, pp. 440, 576; TA/Pantusov, pp. 27778.
22. TH/Jarring, 88v; TH/Enver, p. 440.
23. Visits to High Tartary, p. 247.
24. Kashgaria, p. 47.
25. TH/Enver, p. 577; TA/Pantusov, p. 278. Zngtng Drn seems to be a tran-
scription of zhongtang daren, a respected appellation for commander-in-chief.
This does not necessarily mean that he met with Zuo Zongtang who did not set foot
in Xinjiang at that time.
26. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 22632, 42233.
27. Op. cit., pp. 21415, 251, 431.
28. Op. cit., pp. 45354.
29. Its literal meaning is Seven Cities, but it was used almost synonymously
with Altishahr (Six Cities), that is, Kashgharia.
30. TH/Jarring, 100v; TH/Enver, p. 496.
31. TH/Jarring, 80v; TH/Enver, p. 388; TA/Pantusov, p. 174.
32. TH/Jarring, 81v; TH/Enver, p. 393; TA/Pantusov, 17778.
33. Visits to High Tartary, p. 245, 378.
34. On the number of kkim beg, see Saguchis Shakaishi kenky, pp. 12627.
35. TH/Enver, pp. 435, 467, 540; Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 219, 224,
254; Shaw, Visits to High Tartary, p. 246.
36. Saguchis Sinky minzokushi kenky, pp. 293300.
37. TH/Enver, p. 414.
38. Report of a Mission to Yarkund (p. 55) writes that up to Sariqol was Yaqb
Begs territory and, beyond that, the Wakhan valley belonged to the Afghan territory.
39. TH/Jarring, 74r, 77r; TH/Enver, pp. 359, 374.
40. TH/Jarring, 72v; TH/Enver, p. 352; TA/Pantusov, p. 150.
41. TH/Jarring, 80v; TH/Enver, p. 388: TA/Pantusov, p. 174.
42. TH/Jarring, 77r; TH/Enver, p. 374; TA/Pantusov, p. 165.
43. V. Minorsky and I. P. Petrushevskii concur in these points. See Tadhkirat al-
Mulk: A Manual of \afavid Administration (London: Printed for the Trustees of
the E. J. W. Gibb memorial, 1943; repr. in 1980), p. 27; K istorii instituta soiur-
gala, Sovetskoe vostokovedenie, no. 6 (1949): 23334, 245.
44. A detailed analysis of the soyurghal practice in Central Asia is found in Ab-
duraimovs Ocherki agrarnykh otnoshenii v Bukharskom khanstve v XVIpervoi
polovine XIX veka (Tashkent: Izd-vo Fan Uzbekskoi SSR, 196670), vol. 2, pp.
100112. Also cf. his discussion of tankhwh in the same book, pp. 11224.
45. This opinion was rst raised by D. Tikhonov (see Nekotorye voprosy, p.
113) and later was accepted by some other scholars. See Isievs Uigurskoe gosu-
darstvo, p. 27; Xinjiang jianshi, vol. 2, p. 170.
46. On the usage of soyurghal in Shh Makmd Churs, see Khronika, 52v, 53r,
55v, 56v, 61v, 64v, 69r, 70v, 71r, 75r, 77r, 79r, 79v, 80r, and 84v.
 notes to chapter 4 245

47. These data were drawn from various sources such as TH; TA; Tadhkira-i
Hjj Pdishh; Trkh-i ighar; ]lib Akhnds work; Dstn-i Mukammad
Yaqb Beg; Report of a Mission to Yarkund; N. F. Petrovskiis Kratkaia svedeniia
o litsakh, imevshikh otnosheniia ko vremeni Kashgarskago vladetelia Bek-Kuli
Beka (Published by N. Ostroumov. Protokoly zasedanii i soobshcheniia chlenov
Turkestanskago kruzhka liubitelei arkheologi, no. 21 [1917]: 89101), and so on.
48. Uigurskoe gosudarstvo, p. 27. He does not provide any evidence, either.
49. Yakbu Begu seiken no seikaku ni kansuru ichi ksatsu, Shigaku Zasshi
96, no. 4 (1987): 142.
50. For example, Sayrm shows a sample of a document in which Guma was
called vilyat. See TA/Pantusov, p. 247. Also cf. Shaw, Visits to High Tartary, p. 246;
Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 219, 440.
51. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, pp. 4142.
52. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 6, 104; Bellew, Kashmir and Kashghar,
pp. 28182.
53. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 46; TA/Pantusov, pp. 155, 166, 178.
54. TA/Pantusov, p. 150.
55. Op. cit., p. 175.
56. Op. cit., pp. 155, 166, 178, 181, 202, 217.
57. For example, see Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 34r (52,000); TA/Pantusov, p.
185 (more than 50,000); Gavrilov, Stranichka, 131 (60,000); Sharq Turkistn
Trkh, pp. 401402 (80,000).
58. Gordon, The Roof of the World, p. 92.
59. Dstn-i Mukammad Yqb, 1v2r, 3r; Report of a Mission to Yarkund,
pp. 1314; Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, pp. 22530.
60. Report of the Mirzas Exploration, Proceedings of the Royal Geographi-
cal Society 15, no. 3 (1871): 194.
61. ]lib Akhnd (Prov. 116), 9r.
62. Kashgaria, p. 200.
63. Their names are found in the list of Trkh-i ighar, 46r. And for the back-
ground of Mrz Akmad, see his Badaulet, pp. 9094. On Umar Quli, see
TA/Pantusov, pp. 145, 175, 282; Petrovskii, Kratkiia svedeniia, p. 96. Jmadr,
or Nubbi Buksh in Gordons The Roof of the World (pp. 9092), was an Afghan,
born in Punjab, and served for a long time in the Sikh army and, later, in the Kho-
qand army. See Kuropatin, Kashgaria, pp. 175, 22122; TA/Pantusov, pp. 145, 147,
282; Petrovskii, Kratkiia svedeniia, p. 92; Shaw, Visits to High Tartary, p. 347.
64. TH/Enver, 58485; TA/Pantusov, pp. 28284. Also see Shinmens article,
Yakbu Begu seiken no seikaku ni kansuru ichi ksatsu.
65. Ivanov, Ocherki po istorii Srednei Azii, p. 190.
66. See Khanykov, Opisanie Bukharskago khanstva (St. Petersburg: 1843) pp.
53ff; S. S. Gubaeva, Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia Fergany v kontse XIX-nachale XX
v (Tashkent: Izd-vo Fan Uzbekskoi SSR, 1983).
67. Hartmann, Ein Heiligenstaat, pp. 34760.
68. TH/Jarring, 101r; TH/Enver, p. 499; TA/Pantusov, p. 233; Gordon, The
Roof of the World, p. 76.
69. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 197.
70. Op. cit., p. 208.
246 notes to chapter 4

71. Visits to High Tartary, p. 255.

72. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 208. According to Shaw (Visits to High Tartary,
p. 228), in 186869 one gold ill (Khoqand-made) was worth between 3235 and
a large silver yambu equal to 1,100 tngs. If Kuropatkin is correct, one yambu had
the value of the same 1,100 tngs in 187677. However, there seems to have been
a slight depreciation of silver value after the end of the Urumchi expeditions.
73. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 213.
74. Op. cit., p. 66.
75. Op. cit., pp. 208209.
76. Dstn-i Mukammad Yqb, 2v.
77. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, pp. 20910; Dstn-i Mukammad Yqb, 2v.
78. We can cull many cases of mentioning these arms in Sayrms work. If I just
list the mention of cannons, see TH/Enver, pp. 185, 198, 203, 214, 236, 238, 256,
258, 261, 263, 265, 272, 281, 283, and so forth.
79. Visits to High Tartary, p. 267.
80. Kashgaria, p. 191.
81. FO 65/874, no. 50 (St. Petersburg, March 26, 1872; from Loftus to
Granville).
82. See Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, pp. 19194. Also cf. an account in the Russian
newspaper Golos, June 9, 1874, which was translated and included in FO 65/902,
from Loftus to the Earl of Derby. Sayrm also mentions a workshop (ishkhna), but
only rudimentary arms and cloths were made there (TH/Jarring, 83r; TH/Enver, p.
400; TA/Pantusov, p. 183).
83. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, pp. 205206.
84. Op. cit., p. 205.
85. Op. cit., p. 214
86. Bellew remarks that the uniform was made of a yellow leather coat and a
conical leather cap attached with fur around it (Kashmir and Kashghar, p. 289).
Kuropatkin who visited there a few yeas after Bellew mentions about the leather cap
of the same shape and reddish kaftan (Kashgaria, p. 201).
87. Gordon, The Roof of the World, pp. 9495.
88. Ibid.
89. Yldz tasnif, no. 3314817391.
90. K{gar trh, p. 390.
91. K{gar trh, pp. 39093.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. K{gar trh, p. 405.
95. K{gar trh, p. 196.
96. TH/Jarring, 96r; TH/Enver, p. 473; TA/Pantusov, p. 218.
97. Visits to High Tartary, p. 272.
98. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 212.
99. Turkistan, vol. 2, p. 162.
100. Op. cit., p. 158.
101. Op. cit., p. 164.
102. Op. cit., p. 197.
 notes to chapter 4 247

103. Pantusov, Svedenie o Kuldzhinskom raione, p. 9. According to the report

of H. Landsdell who traveled the Ili region in 1882, the Tungan population in 1862
in this area was about 60,000, but after the Qing reconquest the number shrank to
3,000 (2,100 males and 900 females). See his Russian Central Asia including Kuldja,
Bokhara, Khiva and Merv, vol. 1 (London: Searle and Livington, 1885), pp.
208209.
104. Xinjiang tuzhi, q. 43.
105. TH/Jarring, 94v, 96r; TH/Enver, pp. 46768, 474; TA/Pantusov, pp. 214,
215, 218. According to I. Somov, the residents in Manas were no more than 6,000,
and the male population in Urumchi, Turfan, Sanju, Gumadi, and Qutupi was about
40,000 (the female population being much more than the male, at least two or three
times). See Stratanovich, K voprosu, p. 61.
106. Zeng Wenwu, Zhongguo jingying Xiyu shi, p. 353.
107. Buried Treasures of Chinese Turkestan (1928; Hong Kong, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985 repr.), p. 49.
108. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 45.
109. Xinjiang tuzhi, q. 97, p. 26r.
110. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 50.
111. For example, see Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 35.
112. Visits to High Tartary, p. 248.
113. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 253.
114. Op. cit., pp. 254, 464.
115. See Xinjiang tuzhi, q. 97, 25v26r.
116. Mehmet Emin Bughra (Sharq Turkistn Trkh, p. 386) states that forty
thousand (probably an exaggerated gure) were killed in Khotan. Tadhkira-i Hjj
Pdishh (27r) writes that three thousand died in Qaraqash alone.
117. See Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 6263; Kashgaria, pp. 34, 126.
118. ]lib Akhnd (Prov. 117), 21v23r; TH/Enver, p. 470; TA/Pantusov, pp.
21516.
119. TH/Jarring, 101r; TH/Enver, p. 499; TA/Pantusov, p. 233.
120. This is what Sayyid Akrr, an envoy to British India in 187172, told
British ofcials. See FO 65/874.
121. Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, pp. 161162.
122. TH/Jarring, 84r; TH/Enver, pp. 400401; TA/Pantusov, p. 183; TA/
Jarring, p. 131v; TA/Pelliot, 121v122r. Tikhonov mistranslates the text as The in-
fantry and the cavalry soldiers, more than fty thousand, were obliged to work in
workshops. See his Nekotorye voprosy vnutrennei politiki Iakub-Beka, Uchenye
zapiski Instituta Vostokovedenie, no. 14 (1958): 136. However, the text reads: The
number of the infantry and the cavalry soldiers exceeded fty thousand. And [sic]
artisans and craftsmen who were obliged to work in workshops were near to fty
thousand.
123. TH/Jarring, 84r; TH/Enver, pp. 400401; TA/Pantusov, p. 183.
124. Ibid; Report of a Mission to Yarkund (p. 478) calls master aqsaqal and men-
tions the existence of some 200 recognized carpet-weaving masters in Khotan.
125. TH/Jarring, 84r; TH/Enver, pp. 400401.
126. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 478.
248 notes to chapter 4

127. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 476. Cf. the testimony of Vasilii Nikitin
quoted in Tikhonovs Nekotorye voprosy, pp. 13334. Compare the practice dur-
ing the Qing rule in Akmad Shh Naqshbands Narrative of the Travels of Khwa-
jah Ahmud Shah Nukshbundee Syud, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain
and Ireland 25, no. 4 (1856): 350.
128. Bellew, Kashmir and Kashghar, pp. 28990.
129. On the characteristics of commercial transactions in Kashgharian markets,
see Sanada Yasushis Oasisu bazaru no seidai kenky, Ch Daigaku Daigakuin
kenky nenb, no. 6 (1977): 20720.
130. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 482.
131. One of the best studies on the nancial, especially monetary, system in Xin-
jiang during the Qing period was done by Kuznetsov. See his Ekonomicheskaia poli-
tika, pp. 14662; cf. Wang Zhaowu, Jindai Xinjiang huobi shulue, Minzu yanjiu,
1992, no. 3.
132. Bykov, Monety Rashaddina, pp. 28896. Also see Du Jianyi and Gu
Peiyu, Xinjiang Hongqian daquan tushuo (Peking: Zhonghua Shuju, 1996), pp.
400407, where 28 puls were listed.
133. TH/Jarring, 79r; TH/Enver, p. 383; TA/Pantusov, pp. 17071.
134. TH/Enver, p. 401. It is curious that TH/Jarring (83r) and TA/Pantusov (p.
183) writes as if Yaqb Beg minted copper coins in the name of Daoguang Emperor
(r. 182150) of China (Khqn-i Chn Dawng Khnning nmid mth pl qoy-
durdi). Cf. TA/Jarring, 130r; TA/Pelliot, 120v.
135. Gavrilov, Stranichka, p. 132.
136. Istanbul Arkeologi Mzesi has at least three such coins, two qizil ills and
one aq tng (nos. 2064, 2065, and 2066) minted in 1290/187374 and 1291/
187475, bearing Suln Abdlazz with the date on the obverse side, and jarb-i
dr al-salnat-i Kshghar (no. 2064), jarb-i makrsa-i Kshghar (no. 2065), or
jarb-i laf-i Kshghar (no. 2066) on the reverse. Also see Report of a Mission to
Yarkund, p. 494; cf. the photos of nos. 2065 and 2066 in A. R. Bekins Yakup
Begin Do^u Trkistan e^emenligi altna almas, in Do^u Dilleri 2, no. 1 (1971),
p. 117.
137. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 494.
138. FO 65/874, Strictly condential; Memorandum of an Interview with the
Envoy of Yarkand, p. 4 (Dec. 25, 1871).
139. Journey to Ilchi, p. 5 and the note in page 13. Also see Journal de St. Pe-
terburg, March, 1872 (a copy included in FO 65/874, no. 50), and Kuropatkins
Kashgaria, p. 71.
140. Quoted from E. Schuyler, Turkistan, vol. 2, p. 318.
141. Schuyler, Turkistan, vol. 1, p. 217.
142. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 88.
143. Cf. Kashgaria, pp. 6869, 7677.
144. See G. J. Alder, British Indias Northern Frontier 186595: A Study in Im-
perial Policy (London: Published for the Royal Commonwealth Society by Long-
mans, 1963), pp. 318319 (all the numbers are reduced to half for the reason he ex-
plains).
145. Shaw, Visits to High Tartary, pp. 226, 312.
 notes to chapter 4 249

146. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 269.

147. Bellew, Kashmir and Kashghar, p. 302.
148. Boulger, The Life of Yakoob Beg, p. 120.
149. Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 157.
150. TH/Enver, p. 516; TA/Pantusov, pp. 24041.
151. TH/Jarring, 101v; TH/Enver, p. 502.
152. For example, see Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 17.
153. TH/Jarring, 101v; TH/Enver, pp. 502503; TA/Pantusov, p. 235.
154. Bellew, Kashmir and Kashghar, pp. 308309, 324, 34445; Stein, Ruins of
Khotan, p. 143.
155. This episode is recorded only in TA/Enver, pp. 409412.
156. TH/Jarring, 100v; TH/Enver, p. 497; TA/Pantusov, p. 232.
157. TH/Jarring, 100v101r; TH/Enver, pp. 49799.
158. TA/Pantusov, p. 234.
159. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 104.
160. Ibid. For a specimen of the passport, see Shaw, A Grammar of the Lan-
guage of Eastern Turkistan, Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, no. 3 (1877): 32223,
349.
161. TH/Jarring, 101r; TH/Enver, p. 499; TA/Pantusov, p. 233. However, ac-
cording to Bellews observation, there was a military band, and at some special oc-
casions music was played within individuals houses. See his Kashmir and Kashghar,
p. 286.
162. Kashgaria, p. 39.
163. Kuropatkin (Kashgaria, p. 43) says kharj while Sayrm (TA/Pantusov, p.
242) and the British embassy (Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 103) have ushr.
For the same confusion in Western Turkestan see Schuyler, Turkistan, vol. 1, pp. 298
99, 303. It seems that there was a tendency in Western Turkestan to use ushr for the
collection of one tenth from the land produce while kharj for the collection of more
than one tenth, such as one fth or sometimes even higher. Cf. A. A. Semenov,
Ocherk pozemelno-podatnogo i nologovogo ustroistva v Bukharskogo khanstva,
Trudy Sredne-Aziatskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta 2, no. 1 (1929): 22.
164. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 103. This kind of exaction was not
unique only to Kashgharia at that time, but had been a widespread practice for a
long period of time in Western Turkestan too. For example, see Troitskaia (Katalog,
p. 567) for the case in Khoqand during the reign of Khudyr, and Istoriia Uzbek-
skoi SSR (Tashkent: Izd-vo AN Uzbekskoi SSR, 195657), vol. 1, pp. 35556 for
the case during the Timurids.
165. Right after the Qing conquest 1 batman was the same as 4 shi and 5 dou,
but from 1761 it changed to 5 shi 3 dou. One batman equals in weight 640 jin, that
is, 382.08kg. See Ji Dachun, Weiwuerzu duliangheng jiuzhi kaosuo, pp. 6061.
For a survey on the units of measurement in Xinjiang, see Hori Sunao, Jhachi-nij
seiki Uiguru zoku no doryk ni tsuite, Otemae Joshi Daigaku ronsh, no. 12
(1978): 5767.
166. Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 186.
167. Ibid.
168. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 103.
250 notes to chapter 4

169. A Sketch of the Turki Language, p. 136. On the eve of the Russian con-
quest of Western Turkestan, one anb was about 2,7002,800 m2 in Samarqand
and Tashkent while it was about 4,100 m2 in Khiva. See Abduraimov, Ocherki
agrarnykh otnoshenii, vol. 1, p. 215, note 94. Also cf. Budagov, Sravnitelnyi slavar,
vol. 1, p. 741; Troitskaia, Arkhiv Kokandskikh khanov XIX veka; Predvaritelnyi
obzor, Trudy Gosudarstvennoi Publichnoi Biblioteki imeni M. E. Saltykova-
Shchedrina, no. 2 (5) (1957): 187.
170. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 103.
171. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 43.
172. A Muslim source relates that the Zunghars levied 100,000 tngs from
100,000 people in the cities of Moghulistan as the annual jizya. See Tadhkira-i
azzn (Bodleian: d. 20), 37r38v and 96v; Hartmann, Ein Heiligenstaat, pp. 17,
3233, 59. But according to a report of a Chinese general who conquered
Kashgharia, from Kashghar alone the amount of 67,000 tngs (in cash as well as
in kind) were taken at the time of Galdan Tsering. See Zhungaerh fanglue (zheng-
pian), q. 75, pp. 30v31r.
173. On this subject see Shimadas Shindai kaiky no jintozei, Shigaku zasshi
61, no. 11 (1952): 2540; Haneda, Ch Ajiashi kenky, pp. 11721.
174. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 103.
175. Ibid.
176. Schuyler, Turkistan, vol. 1, p. 304.
177. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 77.
178. Troitskaia, Katalog, p. 553. Also cf. Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR, vol. 1, p. 356.
179. Kashgaria (p. 43) has a wrong translation. See the Russian original (p. 33).
The word saman means straw. See Clauson, An Etymological Dictionary, p. 829.
180. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 504505.
181. Kashgaria, p. 43. But his transcription, tari-kara, is wrong. Sayrm writes
this as trk (TH/Jarring, 103v; TH/Enver, p. 520). As for the similar custom in
Khoqand, see Troitskaia, Katalog, p. 564.
182. The text of TA/Pantusov (pp. 24243) is misleading. See TH/Jarring,
103v104r; TH/Enver, pp. 51920; TA/Jarring, 164r; TA/Pelliot, 159r.
183. Sayrm and Hjj Ysuf have mentioned this. See Tikhonov, Nekotorye
voprosy, p. 130. Also see Xinjiang jianshi, vol. 2, p. 171. On the etymology and
other examples of the same custom, see Radloff, Versuch, vol. 2, pp. 53839; Bar-
told, Otchet o kamandirovke v Turkestan, in Sochinenie, vol. 8, p. 203.
184. TH/Enver, p. 415.
185. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 42.
186. Shaw, Visits to High Tartary, pp. 307, 276, 320.
187. TH/Jarring, 103v; TH/Enver, p. 518; TA/Pantusov, p. 241.
188. A Sketch of the Turki Language, p. 122.
189. Visits to High Tartary, p. 265.
190. He adds that one principal Sirkar and several Mirzas were attached to
the governor. See Kashgaria, p. 44.
191. TH/Jarring, 82v; TH/Enver, p. 397; TA/Pantusov, p. 181.
192. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, pp. 504, 509.
193. A.A. Semenov, Bukharskii traktat, p. 149, note 72; M.A. Abduraimov,
 notes to chapter 5 251

Ocherki agrarnykh otnoshenii, vol. 1 (Tashkent: Izd-vo Fan Uzbekskoi SSR, 1966),
p. 83.
194. Troitskaia, Katalog, p. 562.
195. TH/Enver, p. 579; TA/Pantusov, pp. 27980, 194.
196. TH/Enver, pp. 579, 589; TA/Pantusov, p. 285. Sayrm worked eleven
years (18671877) as mrz. Also cf. Materialy po istorii Kazakhskikh khanstv
XVXVIII vekov, ed. S. K. Ibragimov et al. (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1969), pp. 47880.
197. Gordon, The Roof of the World, p. 98.
198. Shaw, Visits to High Tartary, pp. 217, 259; Report of a Mission to Yarkund,
p. 103; Boulger, The Life of Yakoob Beg, pp. 14849. Also see, TH/Jarring, 84r;
TH/Enver, pp. 403404; TA/Pantusov, p. 185.
199. TH/Enver, pp. 51819; TA/Pantusov, p. 242; TA/Jarring, 163v.
200. Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 509. Also cf. Hayward, Journey from
Leh to Yarkand, p. 133.
201. In the Khoqand and the Bukharan khanates the dvnbegi was one of the
highest ofcials in the court, in charge of collecting revenue. Troitskaia, Katalog, p.
542; Abduraimov, Ocherki agrarnykh otnoshenii, vol. 1, pp. 7274.
202. TH/Enver, pp. 51819; TA/Pantusov, p. 242.
203. This was also written in different characters with the same pronunciation.
Cf. Saguchi, Shakashi kenky, pp. 11617.
204. Kashgaria, p. 64; also see the note on page 63.
205. TH/Enver, p. 517; TA/Pantusov, p. 241.
206. TH/Enver, pp. 52223; TA/Pantusov, p. 248.
207. Kashmir and Kashghar, pp. 35455. About Bellews own observation, see
pp. 38283.

chapter 5

1. R. Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: Scribner, 1974), p. 83.
2. H. C. Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East (London: J. Murray, 1875),
pp. 14142.
3. Op. cit., p. 331.
4. As for the settlement between Russia and England on the questions of the
Afghan boundaries and for the different attitudes toward the responsibility of the
British government, see Schuyler, Turkistan, vol. 2, pp. 26669.
5. E. Hertslet, ed., Treaties, &c., Between Great Britain and China; and Between
China and Foreign Powers (London: Harrison, 1896), vol. 1, pp. 44954, 46172.
6. FO 65/868, nos. 19 and 27 (from Lumley to Russell).
7. Trkh-i ighar, 65v66r; TA/Pantusov, p. 182; Schuyler, Turkistan, vol. 2, p.
317. Also cf. M. A. Terentev, Russia and England in Central Asia (Calcutta: Foreign
Dept. Press, 1876), vol. 1, 263; Alder, British Indias Northern Frontier, p. 35.
8. Turkistan, vol. 2, p. 317. Also see Boulger, The Life of Yakoob Beg, pp.
18284. He later died in Guma during Yaqb Begs reign. See Petrovskii, Kratkiia
svedeniia, p. 95.
9. See N. Aristov, Nashi otnosheniia k Dunganam, Kashgaru i Kuldzhe,
Ezhegodnik: Materialy dlia statistiki Turkestanskago kraia, no. 2 (1873), p. 181.
252 notes to chapter 5

10. FO 65/871, no. 16, Oct. 25, 1869 (from Cayley to Thornton).
11. B. P. Gurevich, Istoriia Iliiskogo voprosa i ee Kitaiskie falsikatory,
Dokumenty oprovergaiut protiv falsikatsii istorii Russko-Kitaiskikh otnoshenii
(Moscow: Mysl, 1982), p. 434.
12. Op. cit., pp. 43435.
13. Terentev, Russia and England, vol. 1, pp. 27273.
14. Gurevich, Istoriia Iliiskogo voprosa, pp. 43638.
15. Terentev, Russia and England, vol. 1, p. 272.
16. Op. cit., pp. 26677.
17. Op. cit., p. 281.
18. See Boulgers The Life of Yakoob Beg, pp. 32021; his text is reproduced in
Alders British Indias Northern Frontier, p. 323.
19. FO 65/874, no. 288, Oct. 16, 1872 (from Loftus to Granville).
20. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 62.
21. Boulger, The Life of Yakoob Beg, pp. 199211.
22. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, pp. 1217.
23. The British relation with Kashghar is well analyzed by G. J. Alder in his
British Indias Northern Frontier, pp. 1599.
24. Op, cit., pp. 3940.
25. On their visit see G. Henderson and A. O. Hume, Lahore to Yarkand (Lon-
don: L. Reeve, 1873).
26. FO 65/874 contains detailed reports on his arrival and the interview with the
viceroy.
27. Shaw, Visits to High Tartary, p. 68.
28. Alder, British Indias Northern Frontier, pp. 4849.
29. English translation of the letter is in FO 65/877, enclosure no. 3.
30. FO 65/877, enclosure 5.
31. The text of the treaty is also found in Boulgers The Life of Yakoob Beg, pp.
32229 and in Alders British Indias Northern Frontier, pp. 32428.
32. On the background of Shaws return see Alder, British Indias Northern
Frontier, pp. 5253. The Russians appointed Reintal as the rst commercial agent.
See Terentev, Russia and England, vol. 1, p. 291.
33. Alder, British Indias Northern Frontier, p. 55. For example, see how wildly
the population was estimated by various authorities in R. Michells Eastern
Turkestan and Dzungaria and the Rebellion of the Tungans and Taranchis, 1862 to
1866, n.p., n.d., pp. 57.
34. Alder, British Indias Northern Frontier, p. 54.
35. This section is based on my article, 1870nyondae Kashgharia-Osman
jeguk gan oegyo gyoseop eui jeonmal gua teugjing, Jungang Asia Yeongu, no. 1
(Seoul, 1996), in which I expanded and revised the earlier version on the Kashghar-
Ottoman relations in my dissertation. On this topic we have now a very detailed
study by Rana von Mende-Altayl, Die Beziehungen des osmanischen Reiches zu
Kashghar und seinem Herrscher Yaqub Beg, 18731877 (Bloomington, Indiana:
Papers on Inner Asia No. 31, 1999). Especially we can nd in this work the German
translation of several important Ottoman documents related to our topic.
36. Boulger, The Life of Yakoob Beg, pp. 169170. However, there are some
 notes to chapter 5 253

conicting reports about his birth and parents. See Mende-Altayl, Die Beziehungen,
p. 29.
37. T. D. Forsyth, Autobiography and Reminiscences of Sir Douglas Forsyth (ed.
by his daughter; London: R. Bentley and Son, 1887), pp. 60ff.
38. TH/Jarring, 86r; TH/Enver, p. 418.
39. Brde Hriciye, no. 13785. This document is in Osmal devleti ile Kafkasya,
Trkistan ve Krm Hanlklar arasndaki mnasebetlere dir ar{iv belgeleri
(16871908) (Ankara: Ba{bakanlk Develet Ar{ivleri Genel Mdrlg, 1992). Also
cf. Saray, Rus i{gali devrinde, pp. 7071.
40. See Saray, Rus i{gali devrinde, p. 70.
41. TH/Enver, pp. 418419. In TH/Jarring (86r) this part is omitted.
42. FO 65/957, June 6, 1876, (from Loftus to Derby).
43. Alder, British Indias Northern Frontier, p. 63.
44. Shaw, Visits to High Tartary, p. 327.
45. For more details, see Saray, Rus i{gali deverinde, pp. 2898.
46. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (1961; 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1968; 1979 repr.), pp. 12324.
47. The activities of Jaml al-Dn Afghn, who stayed in Istanbul in 186971,
do not seem to have given much inuence on the formation of the Pan-Islamic mood
during this period. Afghns Pan-Islamic appeal came somewhat later, probably
from circa 1877, when he wrote in one of his letters that he would send mission-
aries of sharp tongue to Kashghar and Yarkand to call the believers of those lands
to the unity of the people of the faith. See N. R. Keddies Sayyid Jaml ad-Dn al-
Afghn. A Political Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p.
137. Keddie thinks (pp. 12933) the letter was composed around 187778.
48. Mehmet Atif, K{gar trh, p. 366.
49. Quoted from ?. Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Prince-
ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 60, note 110.
50. FO 65/877, Enclosure no. 4.
51. FO 65/877, Enclosure no. 5.
52. Brde Dahiliye, No. 46454.
53. Brde Dahiliye, No. 15524. According to Brde Dahiliye, No. 46685, in July
a new decision was made to the effect that the rst-class of the Mecd order, instead
of the rst-class Ottoman order, should be given to Sayyid Yaqb Khn.
54. Brde Dahiliye, No. 15546. Cf. Kenan Bey asar (transcription in Ka{gar
trh, pp. 37172); Mende-Altayl, Die Beziehungen, pp. 4142.
55. Brde Dahiliye, No. 46753.
56. Brde Dahiliye, No. 49054.
57. Kashmir and Kashghar, p. 188.
58. K{gar trh, p. 363. On the career of Zamn Bey, see Kuropatkin, Kash-
garia, pp. 1011. However, Al Kzim, one of the military instructors who returned
from Kashghar after the fall of Yaqb Begs regime, recollects that 2,000 ries, 6
cannons, and some other military equipment were sent (Yldz tasnif, 33148173
91). On the other hand Mehmet Ysuf, one of the four above-mentioned ofcers,
recalls that 3,000 ries and 30 cannons together with three instructors (Mehmet
Ysuf himself, Ysuf Isml, and Isml Haqq Efendi for drilling cavalry, infantry,
254 notes to chapter 5

and artillery respectively) were dispatched. See FO 17/826 (Translation of state-

ment made by Mukammad Yusaf, Effendi, late in the service of the Amr of Ksh-
ghar). The difference in the numbers of armaments found in various sources can
be attributed to the blurring of memories after the lapse of a long time and also to
the additional purchase of arms in Egypt where Sayyid Yaqb Khn stopped on his
way back to Kashghar. Therefore, the list found in Yaqb Begs letter1,200 ries
of old and new types, 6 cannons, and 4 instructors (with one additional civilian)
should be accepted to be most authentic.
59. Ignatievs report dated June 14, 1873, Constantinople. Quoted from FO
65/903, St. Petersburg, June 14, 1873 (from Loftus to Derby).
60. Bslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Trkiye Diyanet Vakf, 1989), pp. 143
57; Mardin, The Genesis, pp. 67, 249.
61. FO 65/903; Sarary, Rus i{gali devrinde, p. 86.
62. T. E. Gordon, The Roof of the World, pp. 2930; Bellew, Kashmir and
Kashghar, pp. 18788.
63. Brde Dahiliye, No. 49054.
64. K{gar trh, p. 384.
65. Bellew, Kashmir and Kashghar, p. 304.
66. According to T. E. Gordon, another eyewitness, this order was issued at the
Qurbn festival on January 28, 1874 (The Roof of the World, p. 87). Sayrms as-
sertion (TH/Enver, p. 420) that he received from the sultan the title of mrkhr is
not found in any other source.
67. Between 1873 and 1875 there was no remarkable event to note. But Sayyid
Yaqb Khns letter, informing what Yaqb Beg did after he had received the
presents from the sultan, was delivered to the Ottoman consul in Bombay, and the
consul reported it to the sultan with the translation of that letter (Brde Dahiliye, No.
15817). One more episode to mention is that Yaqb Begs sister, Ay Bibi, visited Is-
tanbul on her way back from the pilgrimage to Mecca and received a cordial recep-
tion (K{gar trh, p. 386).
68. Brde Dahiliye, No. 49016 and No. 49054.
69. Brde Dahiliye, No. 49054. Cf. Kenan Bey asar (K{gar trihi, pp. 37374);
Mende-Altayl, Die Beziehungen, pp. 5051.
70. K{gar trh, pp. 38687.
71. Brde Dahiliye, No. 49145, No. 49220 and No. 49338.
72. Saray, Rus i{gali devrinde, p. 105. Cf. The text of this is found in Brde
Dahiliye, No. 49426. Cf. Kenan Bey asari, pp. 912 (K{gar trihi, pp. 37879);
Mende-Altayl, Die Beziehungen, pp. 5253.
73. In K{gar trh (p. 387) we can nd a complete list of these additional items.
74. Op. cit., pp. 38790.
75. Op. cit., p. 387.
76. S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 156.
77. F.O. 65/930, no. 323, St. Petersburg, Oct. 27, 1875 (from Loftus to Derby).
78. F.O.65/929, no. 292, St. Petersburg, Sep. 27, 1875 (from Doria to Derby).
Cf. K{gar trh, pp. 38889.
79. Many of the nineteenth century writers, including H. Rawlinson and M. A.
Terentev, were the advocates of the Great Game theory, and this approach is very
 notes to chapter 5 255

popular even today. Among others, see L. E. Fretchling, AngloRussian Rivalry in

Eastern Turkistan, 18631881, Royal Central Asian Journal, no. 26, pt. 3 (1939);
V. G. Kiernan, Kashghar and the Politics of Central Asia, 18681878, The Cam-
bridge Historical Journal, vol. 11, no. 3 (1955); O. E. Clubb, China and Russia: The
Great Game(New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); E. Ingram, The Be-
ginning of the Great Game in Asia 18281834 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979);
P. B. Henze, The Great Game in Kashgaria: British and Russian Missions to Yakub
Beg, Central Asian Survey, vol. 8, no. 2 (1989); P. Hopkirk, The Great Game: The
Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (1990; New York: Kodansha America, 1994
repr.); K. E. Meyer and S. B. Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and
the Race for Empire in Central Asia (Washington: A Cornelia and Michael Bessie
Book, 1999).
80. FO 65/957, no. 444 (secret), St. Petersburg, Sep. 26, 1876 (from Loftus to
Derby).
81. FO 65/989, quoting the Turkestan Gazette, no. 1, Jan. 5/17, 1877.

chapter 6

1. On the operations and the failure of the Qing government to suppress the
Shanxi-Gansu Muslim rebellion before the arrival of Zuo Zongtang, see Wen-djang
Chu, Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China, pp. 2388.
2. Shan-Gan jieyulu in Huimin qiyi, comp. Bai Shouyi, vol. 4 (Shanghai: Sheng-
zhou Guoguangshe, 1952), p. 311; Feng Zenglie and Feng Junping, Yisilanjiao zai
Tongzhi nianjian Shanxi huimin fanqing qiyi zhong suoqide zuoyong, in Yisilan-
jiao zai Zhongguo (Ningxia: Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 1982), pp. 205207. On
the Muslim rebellion in Shanxi and Gansu, the traditional view by scholars like Lin
Gan and Ma Changshou who regarded it as a peasant revolution has been criticized
recently by those who understand it from the viewpoint of national struggle. How-
ever, even one such critic, Wu Wanshan, emphasizes the important role of religious
leaders. See his Qingzhao Tongzhi nianjian huimin qiyi xingzhi de zaijiantao,
Xibei Minzu Xueyuan xuebao (Zhesheban), 1985, no. 1: 6269; Lin Ji, Qingdai
Shan-Gan huimin qiyi yanjiu gaishu, Minzu yanjiu, 1988, no. 5.
3. For this topic, see Ma Tong, Zhongguo Yisilanjiao jiaopai menhuan zhidu
shilue (Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 1983) and his Zhongguo Yisilanjiao jiaopai
menhuan suyuan (Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 1987).
4. The most important source for the study of Zuo Zongtang is the collection
of his memorials, letters and literary works, entitled Zuo Wenxianggong quanji
(repr. Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe, 1964). Based on this, not a few biographies were
written. Among others, see Zuo Wenxianggong nianpu, compiled by Lo Zhengjun
(reprinted as Zuo Zongtang nianpu, Changsha, 1982, with additional notes) and
W. L. Bales, Tso Tsungtang. Soldier and Statesman of Old China (Shanghai: Kelly
and Walsh, 1937). Especially on Zuos northwestern campaign, see Lu Fengges
Zuo Wenxianggong Zhengxi shilue (1947; repr. Taipei, 1972); Qin Hancais Zuo
Wenxianggong cai Xibei (1945; reprinted in Shanghai, 1946); L. B. Fields, Tso
Tsung-tang and the Muslims. (Kingston, Ontario: Limestone Press, 1978). For more
recent studies, see Yang Dongliang, Zuo Zongtang pingchuan (Changsha: Hunan
256 notes to chapter 5

Renmin Chubanshe, 1985); Dong Caishi, Zuo Zongtang pingchuan (Peking: Zhong-
guo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1984).
5. Wen-djang Chu, The Moslem Rebellion, p. 132; Yang Dongliang, Zuo Zong-
tang pingchuan, pp. 15556.
6. O. V. Poiarkov, Poslednii epizod Dunganskago vozstaniia (Vernoe, 1901),
p. 11. According to Trkh-i jarda-i jadda (pp. 6465 of the Kazan edition), his
other name was Nr al-Dn. On the historical evaluation of his role, see Chang
Dezhong, Bai Yanhu de yingxiong xingxiang burong waiqu (Huizu Wenxue lun-
cong, Ningxia Renmin Chubanshe, 1990) no. 1, pp. 26471. According to Ma Xiao-
shi (Xibei Huizu geming jianshi, p. 41), the leaders of these four big battalions
were Bai Yanhu, Cui Wei, Yu Deyan, and Ma Zhenhe.
7. Yiang Dongliang, Zuo Zongtang pingchuan, p. 157. See also the map in Bales,
Tso Tsungtang, p. 240.
8. Ma Xiaoshi, Xibei Huizu geming jianshi, pp. 3841.
9. K. C. Liu and R. J. Smith, The Military Challenge: The North-west and the
Coast, in Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1980), vol. 2, pt. 2, ed. by J. K. Fairbank and K. C. Liu, pp. 23031.
10. See Feng and Feng, Yisilanjiao, p. 220.
11. Poiarkov, Poslednii epizod, p. 22.
12. There was a claim that Ma was not executed by the order of Zuo Zongtang
but by a Qing army ofcer named Yang Ziying who had defected in disguise to the
Muslims during the siege of Jinjibao. But there seems to be no evidence to support
such a claim. See Guan Lianji, Guanyu Ma Hualong zhi si de lishi zhenxiang,
Minzu yanjiu, 1984, no. 5: 7476.
13. Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (zougao), q. 41, 9r; Ma Xiaoshi, Xibei Huizu
geming jianshi, pp. 4447; Bales, Tso Tsungtang, pp. 27678.
14. Ma Zhanao supposedly said that To surrender after the victory would bring
more prot than to surrender after the defeat. His remark, if it is true, appears to
support our assumption. See Ma Xiaoshi, Xibei Huizu geming jianshi, p. 47.
15. Ma Tong, Yisilanjiao Jiaopai menhuan zhidu shilue, p. 234.
16. I. Hs, The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense vs.
Frontier Defense, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, no. 25 (196465): 213.
17. Chu, The Moslem Rebellion, pp. 11314.
18. J. L. Rawlinson, Chinas Struggle for Naval Development, 18391895
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 56.
19. Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 137, 18r20v.
20. See Khodzhaev, Tsinskaia imperiia, pp. 4647.
21. Hs, The Great Policy Debate, p. 217.
22. Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (zougao), q. 46, 32r41r.
23. Khodzhaev, Tsinskaia imperiia, p. 71.
24. Hs, The Great Policy Debate, p. 227.
25. Chu, The Moslem Rebellion, pp. 12122.
26. Khodzhaev, Tsinskaia imperiia, p. 80.
27. Ibid.
28. FO 65/957, no. 240, St. Petersburg, May 30, 1876 (from Loftus to Derby).
The parentheses and the brackets are in the text, and the date of the Turkestan
Gazette is not given.
 notes to chapter 5 257

29. It is not easy to calculate the total number of the Qing troops advancing to
the north of Tianshan. According to Yang Dongliangs study (Zuo Zongtang ping-
chuan, p. 242), the total number was about thirty to forty thousand. Khodzhaev
points out that Zuos army consisted of 141 battalions (about 75,000 soldiers), but
it probably included the rear troops. See also Zeng Wenwu, Zhongguo jingying
Xiyushi, p. 334; Bales, Tso Tsungtang, pp. 35051.
30. Very often they are mentioned together in Zuo Zongtangs memorials. For
example, see Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (zougao), q. 49, 25r26r. According to
Trkh-i jarda-i jadda (the Kazan edition, p. 64), Yu Xiaohus Muslim name was
Al Qanbar (or, Al Qambar).
31. Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 1, 16r16v. For the Tungan raid of Hami, cf. A. von
Le Coq, Osttrkische Gedichte und Erzhlungen, Keleti Szemle, no. 18 (1918
19): 83, 89.
32. See Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 34v; TA/Pantusov, p. 220; Trkh-i ighr,
102v.
33. Trkh-i ighr 102v104r.
34. Zuo Zongtang wrote that Bai Yanhu took erce Tungans of Shanxi and
Gansu, and they settled separately in Hongmiao, Gumu, and Manas. See Kanding
Xinjiangji, q. 2, 8v. It seems that the base of Bais group was at Hongmiaozi and that
of Yus in Manas. Cf. Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (zougao), q. 49, 35r; Pinghuizhi,
q. 7, 13r; Poiarkov, Poslednii epizod, p. 35.
35. Forsyth, Report of a Mission to Yarkund, p. 19.
36. TH/Enver, pp. 482484; TH/Jarring, 97v98r; TA/Pantusov, pp. 22224.
One Chinese source (Kanding Xinjiangji, q. 2, 14r) writes that Yaqb Beg sent
Atuoai (*Atuwai), an enemy commander, with several thousand cavalry for assis-
tance, while another source (Zuo Wenxianggong quanji, zougao, q. 49, 3r and 5r)
points out that 358 Andijani soldiers commanded by one pnad and one
yzbashi were all killed when the fort was taken.
37. Yldz tasnif, 3314817391.
38. Later he was taken as a prisoner by the Qing army and, after being released,
he went to Peshawar where he wrote a short recollection at the request of British
ofcials. His memoir is found in FO 17/826, No. 1621.
39. Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (zougao), q. 49,1r3r; Qinding Pingding
Shangan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 300, 6v10v; Pinghuizhi, q. 7, 13r14r; Kanding Xin-
jiangji, q. 2, 13r14v; TH/Jarring, 98r; TH/Enver, pp. 48384; TA/Pantusov, p. 224.
Also note an interesting episode in K{gar trh, pp. 40911.
40. Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (zougao), q. 49, 3v4r.
41. TH/Jarring, 98r; TH/Enver, pp. 48384; TA/Pantusov, p. 224. According to
K{gar trh (pp. 41112), at rst the cavalry under the command of Mukammad
Sad and the artillery under M Dlya fought with the Qing army. Initially they
overpowered the enemy but, soon being exhausted, had to retreat. It does not men-
tion Yaqb Begs order of retreat.
42. Yang Dongliang, Zuo Zongtang pingchuan, p. 215.
43. Kashgaria, pp. 24142.
44. Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (zougao), q. 50, 34v.
45. Op. cit., 36r36v.
46. Op. cit., 17r19v.
258 notes to chapter 5

47. Boulger, The Life of Yakoob Beg, pp. 25052.

48. According to Sayrm (TA/Pantusov, p. 278), he was a Bukharan and served
as a mrz under Mah al-Dn Makhdm.
49. TH/Jarring, 99v; TH/Batyur, pp. 49091; TA/Pantusov, p. 228.
50. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 38r; Tlib Akhnd (Prov. 117), 92r93r. Several
Soviet scholars like Khodzhaev and Baranova accept this theory. See Tsinskaia im-
periia, p. 99; Svedeniia Uigurskoi, p. 93.
51. Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (shudu), q. 19, 30r31v.
52. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 249.
53. Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (zougao), q. 50, 71r71v.
54. See the Russian text in Kuropatkins Kashgariia, p. 211, which reads V eto
vremia s nim sdelalsia udar, lishiushii ego pamiati i iazyka. However, its English
translation (Kashgaria, pp. 24849)In the struggle with him [i.e., Sabr Akhnd]
he received a blow which deprived him of his sensesis somewhat ambiguous and
could be misunderstood, as if Yaqb Beg was hit by Sabr Akhnd and died. As a
matter of fact, the assertion by Takakuwa and Ji Dachun, claiming that he was
beaten to death, was misguided by this vague translation. See Yakub Beg no shiin
ni tsuite, Shigaku zasshi 30, no. 4 (1919): 10711, and Guanyu Agubo zhi si,
Xinjiang Daxue xuebao (shekeban), 1970, no. 2: 14951. Also note the same mis-
take in Xinjiang jianshi (vol. 2, p. 190).
55. Hamada, LHistoire, pt. 3, pp. 8384.
56. Cf. Baranova, Svedeniia Uigurskoi, p. 93, note 76.
57. See TH/Jarring, 99v; TH/Enver, p. 490; TA/Pantusov, p. 228; Boulger, The
Life of Yakoob Beg, pp. 25052; Kuropatkin, Kashgariia, p. 249; Baranova, Sve-
deniia Uigurskoi, p. 92, note 74.
58. Ot Kuldzhi za Tian-Shan i na Lob-Nor (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo geogr. lit-
ry, 1947), pp. 9293; an English translation by E. D. Morgan, From Kulja, Across
the Tian Shan to Lob-Nor (London: S. Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1879),
pp. 12729.
59. See Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (zougao), q. 50, 71r71v.
60. For example, see Mehmet Ysuf (in FO 17/826) and Zamn Khn (in Kash-
garia, p. 250).
61. TH/Jarring, 98r98v; TH/Enver, p. 485; TA/Pantusov, p. 225.
62. See Khodzhaev, Tsinskaia imperiia, p. 54.
63. P. Potagos, Dix annes de voyages dans lAsie Centrale et lAfrique quato-
riale, vol. 1 (Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1885), tr. from Greek by A. Meyer, J. Blan-
card and L. Labadie, and ed. by E. Burnouf, pp. 9192 (cited from J. Fletcher,
China and Central Asia, p. 223 and note 121 on pp. 36778).
64. FO 17/825, April 9, 1876 (from Forsyth to Wade).
65. FO 17/825, no. 219, Dec. 10, 1876 (from Fraser to Derby).
66. Ibid.
67. He was also known as shn Khn whom Mrz Akmad erroneously con-
sidered to have been sent to the Chinese emperor. Khodzhaev repeats this error
(Tsinskaia imperiia, p. 68 and note 2 on p. 116).
68. Brde Dahiliye, No. 60621.
69. Brde Hriciye, No. 16526.
 notes to chapter 5 259

70. Brde Dahiliye, No. 60710 and No. 60716.

71. This is what Sayyid Yaqb Khn secretly told to D. Forsyth. Quoted from
I. Hs, British Mediation of Chinas War with Yaqub Beg, 1877, Central Asiatic
Journal 9, no. 2 (1964), p. 145.
72. Hs, British Mediation, pp. 14647.
73. See TA/Pantusov, p. 225; Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 35r; ]lib Akhnd
(Prov. 117), 78v; Qurbn Als Trkh-i kamsa-i sharq, p. 119 (quoted from
Khodzhaev, Tsinskaia imperiia, p. 91).
74. TH/Jarring, 98r; TH/Enver, p. 485; TA/Pantusov, p. 225.
75. Ibid.
76. ]lib Akhnd (Prov. 117), 79v.
77. Sayrm writes that there were thirty thousand troops and provisions that
could feed these troops for ten years in Toqsun and Turfan (TH/Jarring, 99r;
TH/Enver, p. 488; thirty years in TA/Pantusov, p. 227).
78. FO 65/95, no. 444 (secret), St. Petersburg, Sep. 26, 1876 (from Loftus to
Derby).
79. FO 65/989, quoting the Turkestan Gazette, no. 1, Jan. 5/17, 1877.
80. Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh, 37r. Also cf. Baranova, Svedeniia, p. 91.
81. For example, see Tlib Akhnd (Prov. 117), 71r73r and Tadhkira-i Hjj
Pdishh, 35r36v.
82. Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (zougao), q. 50, 35r36v and 71r; Pinghuizhi,
q. 7, 19v22r; Qinding Pingding Shan-Gan Xinjiang fanglue, q. 303, 17v18r.
83. See TH/Jarring, 97v; TH/Enver, p. 485; TA/Pantusov, pp. 22526.
84. Grenard Spcimen, p. 31.
85. TA/Pantusov, p. 226.
86. On this topic see Immanuel Hs, British Mediation of Chinas War with
Yakub Beg.
87. K{gar trh, p. 406. Later he went to India and died in Delhi in 1317/1899
(Mende-Altayl, Die Beziehungen, p. 29).
88. The statement of Mehmet Ysuf, an Ottoman ofcer, is in FO 17/825. On
the political development in Kashgharia after Yaqb Begs death, two other Ot-
toman ofcers reports are useful. One is by Zamn Khn found in Kuropatkins
Kashgaria (pp. 249ff ) and the other by Al Kzim in Yldz tasnif (3314817391).
The facsimile and the transcription of the latter are found in A. R. Bekin, Sultan
Abdlhamide sunulan Do^u Trkistan ile ilgili bir rapor, Do^u Dilleri, vol. 3, no.
4 (1983): 3966. Also Mehmet tif, in his K{gar trh, gives quite detailed ac-
counts which are useful if we read them carefully.
89. Sayrm erroneously regards Hkim Khn as having been chosen khan while
Haqq Quli was in Kurla (TH/Jarring, 105r; TH/Enver, p. 527; TA/Pantusov, p.
246). Mehmet tifs assertion that Haqq Quli went to Kashghar with an intention
to kill his brother, is also doubtful (K{gar trh, pp. 43132). Why would he at-
tempt such a thing with only a small number of soldiers, or why, in the rst place,
would he go himself?
90. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 251. Also cf. Mehmet tif, K{gar trh, pp.
43336; TA/Pantusov, pp. 24648.
91. Mehmet tif, K{gar trh, pp. 43637.
260 notes to conclusion

92. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, p. 251; Mehmet tif, K{gar trh, pp. 43740.
93. TH/Jarring, 111r; TH/Enver, pp. 55354; TA/Pantusov, pp. 25254.
94. Zuo Zongtang nianbu, p. 334; Zuo Wenxianggong quanji (zougao), q. 51,
28r.
95. Dong Caishi, Zuo Zongtang pingchuan, p. 167.
96. TH/Jarring, 107r108v; TH/Enver, pp. 53742; TA/Pantusov, pp. 25457.
97. Poiarkov, Poslednii epizod, p. 6.
98. See FO 17/826, no. 1621. Passing through Sariqol and Wakhan and cross-
ing the Pamir, he arrived in Badakhshan, and then he went to Peshawar via Kabul.
99. See his report in Yldz tasnif, 3314817391. They rst went to Ladakh
and, thence, with the help of the British reached Bombay. There they could take the
ship heading to their country.
100. On the Ming Yol monument, see Liu Yongneng, Agubo zuihou fumieh de
lishi jianzheng, Xinjiang Daxue xuebao (Shekeban), 1979, no. 3: 5159.
101. FO 17/826, no. 127.
102. Yldz tasnif, 331638 (pp. 14851). Kemal H. Karpat regards this Yaqb
as representative of the Kashghar regime stationed in Istanbul. See his article,
Yakub Beys Relations with the Ottoman Sultans: A Reinterpretation, Cahiers du
Monde russe et sovietique, vol. 32, no. 1 (1991): 26. The petition was delivered by
a Kashgharian infantry commander named Mehmet Khn who came to Istanbul.
It is highly possible that this Mehmet Khn was the same person to whom Henvey
referred, erroneously as Ahmed.
103. The Russian proposal is also conrmed not only by the aforementioned re-
port of Henvey but also by a Qing document. General Kaufman is reported to have
told Beg Quli as follows: since the Qing and Russia are opposed against each other
because of the Ili question, this is a good opportunity for you to recover your coun-
try. If you send a declaration to the Kashgharians urging them to expel the Chinese,
many cities will transmit your declaration amongst themselves and [your aim] shall
be achieved. See Shae qinhuashi, vol. 3 (Peking: Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan
Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, 1981), p. 263.
104. Yldz tasnif, 14382. Cf. Mende-Altayl, Die Beziehungen, pp. 6365.
105. K{gar trh, pp. 45758.
106. For the negotiation and the return of Ili, consult I. Hs, The Ili Crisis (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1965).
107. Bales, Tso Tsungtang, p. 376.
108. The Late Ching Reconquest of Sinkiang: A Reappraisal of Tso Tsung-
tangs Role, Central Asiatic Journal 12, no. 1 (1968): 50.

conclusion

1. Cf. Enoki Kazuo, Shinky no kensh (15), Kindai Chgoku, no. 15

(1984): 15890; no. 16 (1884): 3669; no. 17 (1985): 7590; no. 18 (1986): 4459;
no. 19 (1987): 4882; Kazutada Kataoka, Shinch Shinky tji kenky (Tokyo: Yu-
zankaku, 1991): pp. 61199.
2. According to the most recent statistics in Xinjiang nianjian 1999 (Urumchi:
Xinjiang Nianjianshe, 1999, pp. 1122), the Uyghurs are 8,139,458 and the Han
Chinese are 6,741,116.
 notes to appendix b 261

3. On the nationalist movement prior to the Communist takeover, see An-

drew D. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History
of Republican Sinkiang 19111949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986); Wang Ke, Higashi Torukisutan Kywakuni kenky: Chukoku to Isuramu
minzoku mondai (Tokyo: Toky Daikagu Shupankai, 1995); Hamada Masami, La
trasmission du mouvement nationaliste au Turkestan oriental (Xinjiang), Central
Asian Survey 9, no.1 (1990): 2948.

appendix a

1. I reproduced this text, with modications, from Boulgers The Life of Yakoob
Beg, pp. 320321. The Russian original text can be found in Kuropatkins Kash-
gariia, pp. 4950 (cf. English translation in Kashgaria, pp. 6162).
2. Chief in Boulgers text. As I mentioned earlier, the Russian word vladetel
should be translated as ruler. For the original Russian text, see Kuropatkins
Kashgariia, pp. 4950. The translator of his book renders this word correctly
(Kashgharia, pp. 6162).

appendix b

1. I reproduced this text from a document in the Public Record Ofce (ZHC
1/3920), entitled Kashgar Treaty. Copy of the Treaty of Commerce lately concluded
with the Amir of Kashgar. Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be printed, 15
June 1874. Also cf. Boulger, The Life of Yakoob Beg, pp. 32229; Alder, British
Indias Northern Frontier, pp. 32428.
This page intentionally left blank
Bibliography

manuscripts and documents

Since this study heavily relies on Muslim sources most of which are still in manu-
script form, it seems necessary to list them in this separate section to show the
amount of existing Islamic literature on the topic. Each Muslim source is supplied
with the title, its author, the date of writing, the location(s) of the manuscript(s), the
printed edition if any, the name of the copyist and the date of copying if known, fo-
lios, and other bibliographical information. The items to which I do not have access
are indicated with an asterisk. Diplomatic documents stored in archives in Turkey
and England are also listed here.

muslim sources
Amr Al* (Sublime Leader). Ashr Akhnd b. Isml b. Mukammad; Institut Nar-
odov Azii Akademii Nauk in Russia (hereafter INA AN): C 759, C 580; 1280/
186364; maybe an autograph: cf. Muginov, nos. 19 and 20, and Dmitrieva, nos.
134 and 135.
Ans al-libn (Companion of the Seekers). Shh Makmd ibn Mrz Fjil Churs;
Bodleian Library (Oxford): Ms. Ind. Inst. Pers. 45; ms. of Turk translation, Rafq
al-libn, INA AN: B 771; cf. Akimushkin, Khronika, pp. 33144.
sirlr sadasi (Voice of the Era). Alma-Ata, 1963.
Badaulat-nma* (Book of the Fortunate). Mukammad Umar Marghinn (the au-
thor of Jang-nma); INA AN: C 587; 1308/1890; an autograph by the request of
N. F. Petrovskii; 61f; cf. Muginov, no. 25; Dmitrieva, no. 141.
Buzkhan Tram biln Yqb Begni vaqasi* (Events on Buzkhan Tram and Yqb
Beg). Anonymous; LInstitut de France: Ms. 33987; 6f; cf. Hamada, Uiguru
rekishi bunken.
Dstn-i Mukammad Yqb Beg (Story of Mukammad Yaqb Beg). Mrz B; India
Ofce Library: Ms. Turki 6; 1294/187778; Jumda I, 1311/Nov. 10Dec. 9 of
1898; 20f.
Ghazt-i muslimn (Holy War of Muslims). Anonymous; in E. D. Ross, Three Turki
Manuscripts from Kashghar; cf. Hanedas Japanese translation, Wari Han and
Ghazt-i-Mslimin.
Ghazt al-muslimn* (Holy War of Muslims). Mukammad \lik Yrkand; INA AN:
B 3980; probably 1281/186465; copied in 1912, Kashghar; cf. Dmitrieva, no.
136.
Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn (Holy War in China). Mull Bill; 1293/187677; Pan-
tusovs printed text Voina musulman protiv Kitaitsev; cf. Hamada, Murr
Birru.
264 bibliography

Ghuljaning vaqatlarining byni* (Story of the Events in Kulja). Qsim Beg; INA
AN: B 4018; copied at the end of the nineteenth century; 01+15+001f; cf. Dmi-
trieva, no. 139, and Tikhonovs Uigurskie, pp. 17374.
Jall al-Dn Katakning tadhkirasi (Biography of Jall al-Dn Katak). Anonymous;
G. Jarring Collection: uncatalogued; 40f; cf. Muginov, nos. 134140.
Jam al-tavrkh* (Collection of Histories) (or, Trkh-i Yaqb Badaulat (History
of Yaqb Badaulat]). Hjj Ysuf b. Mull Ashr b. Qurbn \f b. \afar By;
INA AN: D 124; \afar By; Jumda I, 1325Mukarram, 1326/June 1907
March 1908; 352f; cf. Muginov, no. 157, Dmitrieva, no. 145; and Tikhonov,
Uigurskie, pp. 16672.
Janb-i Badaulatni kikyatlari (Stories of His Highness Badaulat). Akmad Quli
Andijn; The Houghton Library, Harvard University: uncatalogued; 1322/
190405 in Kashghar; 56p.
Jang-nma* (Book of War). Mukammad Umar Marghinn (nom de plume: Umd);
INA AN: B 292; 1305/1888; 5v46r; cf. Muginov, no. 335, and Dmitrieva,
no. 138.
K{gar trh (History of Kashghar). Mehmet tif. Istanbul: Mihran Matbaas,
1300/188283. Modern Turkish translation by Bsmail Aka et al., Ka{gar Tarihi:
Bis-i Hayret Ahvl-i Garibesi. Krkkale: Eysi, 1998.
Khronika (Chronicle). Shh Makmd ibn Fjil Churs; critical text, translation,
commentaries and study by O. F. Akimushkin, Moscow: Nauka, 1976; Sydiy
Khandanliq trikhig dair materiyallar (modern Uyghur translation) Qshqr:
Qshqr Uyghur Nshriyti, 1988.
Kitb-i trkh-i jarda-i jadda. See Trkh-i jarda-i jadda.
Muntakhab al-tavrkh (Selection from histories). Hjj Mukammad Hkim valad-
i Mam Khn; INA AN: D 90.
Osmal devleti ile Kafkasya, Trkistan ve Krm Hanlklar arasndaki mnasebetlere
dir ar{iv belgeleri (16871908) (Archival documents on the relations between
the Ottoman state and Caucasus, Turkestan, and Crimean khanates). Ankara:
T.C. Ba{bakanlk, Devlet Ar{ivleri Genel Mdrl^u, Osmanl Ar{ivi Daire
Ba{kanl^, 1992.
Qnn nma-i askir* (Canon book of the army). Anonymous; INA AN: B 1022;
probably 187980; 45f; cf. Muginov, no. 273.
Risla-i khqn ichid Tunganlari qilghan ishi* (Treatise on the activities of Tun-
gans in the realm of Emperor). Anonymous; INA AN: C 579; at the end of the
nineteenth century; cf. Muginov, no. 213; Dmitrieva, no. 142; Tikhonov, Uigur-
skie, pp. 15557.
Shajrat al-anb-i Sayyid Mukammad Hkim Khn Khwjam* (Genealogical tree of
Sayyid Mukammad Hkim Khn Khwjam). Anonymous, but may be Qr Umar
Mukammad; INA AN: B 292; 1v5r; copied in 1305/1888; cf. Muginov, no. 343.
Sharq Turkistn Trkh [History of Eastern Turkestan]. Mehmet Emin Bughra. Sri-
nagar, Kashmir: Bruka Parlis Basmakhanesi, 1366/194647. A new printed edi-
tion was published in Ankara: Fatma Bugra, 1987.
Shir dar nat-i Hajrat-i Khn Khwjam Pdishh* (Verses in eulogy of His High-
ness Khn Khwjam Pdishh). A collection of four different works: (1) Rashd
al-Dn nma by Qr Najm al-Dn (2r37v); (2) a work by Ghiyth (38r47r);
 bibliography 265

(3) Risla-i maktb by Mukammad \lik Yrkand (48r87v); (4) an anonymous

work of no title (88r97r); INA AN: C 584; written shortly before the fall of
Kuchean regime; cf. Iudin, Nekotorye istochniki.
Tadhkira-i Hjj Pdishh Habb Allh v Rshidn Khn v Yaqb Beg [Biography
of Hjj Pdishh Habb Allh, Rshidn Khn and Yaqb Beg] (also known as
Trkh-i Kshghar). Mukammad Alam; the 18th of Shabn, 1311/Dec. 17,
1894. The two extant manuscripts are (1) LInstitut de France: ms. 33488; for
translation in French by Hamada, cf. his LHistoire de [otan de Mukammad
Alam in 3 parts; and (2)* INA AN: B 2332; 61f; cf. Muginov, no. 40a; Dmi-
trieva, no. 143; Tikhonov, Uigurskie, pp. 15055; and Ibragimovas article
Rukopis Mukhammeda Aliama.
Tadhkira-i azzn [Biography of nobles] (or, Tadhkira-i khwjagn [Biography of
khwjas]. Mukammad \diq Kshghar; written ca. 1768; for available copies,
see Hofman, Turkish Literature, section 3, pt. 1, vol. 4, pp. 2530; there are two
epitomized translations (see Hartmann and Shaw); a copy in the Bodleian Li-
brary, Oxford (Ind. Inst. Pers. d. 20), was also used in this book.
Tadhkira-i Satq Boghr Khn (Biography of Satq Boghr Khn). Khwja Mukam-
mad Sharf; Bibliothque Nationale, Paris: Suppl. Turc 1286; 375f; the same
work in Leningrad; cf. Muginov, nos. 81 and 82; for a summarized translation,
see Baldick.
Tadhkira-i irshd (Record of guidance). Anonymous; Bibliothque Nationale, Paris:
Suppl. Turc 1006 which was wrongly titled Kitb-i Tughluq Timur Khaning
qialari.
Tadhkira-i Khwja Mukammad Sharf (Biography of Khwja Mukammad Sharf ).
Anonymous; three copies in G. Jarring Collection: Prov. 10, Prov. 73, and one
uncatalogued; for other copies in Leningrad, cf. Muginov, nos. 105106. Also cf.
Hartmann, Die osttrkischen Handschriften, p. 7; and Ross, Three Turki Man-
uscripts, p. 4.
Tadhkirat al-najt (Record of salvation). Dd of Kurla; India Ofce Library: Ms.
Turki 4; 1282/186566; 73f.
(]lib Akhnds History of Yaqqb Beg). ]lib Akhnd b. Mull Nimat Mingbegi
of Khotan; Gunnar Jarring Collection: Provs. 115, 116, and 117; the rst day of
Jumda II, 1317/Oct. 6, 1899; no title in the text: authors name appears only in
Prov. 117, but it is apparent that the three mss. are written by the same hand and
that they form one coherent history of Yaqb Beg.
Trkh-i amniyya (History of Peace). Mull Msa Sayrm; 1321/1903. There is one
printed edition and several manuscripts. (1) Pantusovs printed edition (TA/Pan-
tusov): see Pantusov, (2) Bibliothque Nationale, Paris: Collection Pelliot B 1740
(TA/Pelliot); copied in 1325/190708; autograph(?); 208f, (3) Gunnar Jarring
Collection (TA/Jarring): uncatalogued; 210f, (4)* INA AN: C 335; 302f; cf. Mu-
ginov, no. 27 and Dmitrieva, no. 144, (5)* in PRC; 166f; autograph; cf. Mukhli-
sov, p. 45 (no. 69) and Iudins Review, p. 200, (6)* in PRC; copied in 1907 by
Hjj Ysuf of Tashmaliq (probably the author of Jam al-tavrkh of INA AN
D 124); 162f; discovered in Kashghar; cf. Mukhlisov, p. 46 (no. 70) and Iudins
Review, p. 200. Also consult Tikhonov, Uigurskie, pp. 15966; Iudin,
Tarikh-i amniia; Bartold, Taarikh-i Emenie; Baranova, Svedeniia. There
266 bibliography

is a modern Uyghur translation, Trikhi miniy (Urumchi: Shinjang Khlq

Nshriyti, 1988).
Trkh-i kamd (History of Hamd). Mull Msa Sayrm; this is a revision of the
preceding work. Two copies are known to exist. (1) Gunnar Jarring Collection,
Lund: Prov. no. 163 (TH/Jarring); probably written in 1326/190809 (see 124r);
copied not prior to 1345/1927 probably by Hjj Ghulm Mukammad Khn
Khwjam. (2)* PRC, Institute of Nationalities in Pekin; written in July 10, 1908;
copied on July 7, 1911 by author; 399 pp.; modern Uyghur translation by Enver
Baytur, Trkh-i hmd (TH/Enver; Peking: Milltlr Nshriyti, 1986).
Trkh-i jarda-i jadda (A new little history). Qurbn Al valad-i Khlid Hjj
Ayaghz; 1306/188687. (1) India Ofce Library: Ms. Turki 2; copied on May
14, 1893; 74f, (2)* INA AN: C 578; 78f; cf. Muginov, no. 28, and Dmitrieva,
no. 137, (3) a printed edition, Kitb-i trkh-i jarda-i jadda (Kazan, 1889),
71pp.; (4) Staatsbibliothek in Berlin: Ms. Orient. Oct. 1670.
Trkh-i nma-i Yaqb Khn* (History of Yaqb Khn). Makmd valad-i Mr
Akmad Shaykh Gharb; INA AN: B 772; 1316/1898; 78f; cf. Muginov, no. 41,
and Tikhonov, Uigurskie, pp. 15759.
Trkh-i rashd (History of Rashd). Mrz Mukammad Haydar (Dughlt); for
more information about the locations of the available mss., cf. Storeys Persid-
skaia, vol. 2, pp. 12021206; English translation, see Ross, Thackston.
Trkh-i ighar (Little history). Abd Allh Pnad; British Library: Or. 8156; in Per-
sian; the 15th of Mukarram, 1291/March 4, 1874; 107f; cf. the chapter on the
history of Eastern Turkestan by H. W. Bellew in Report of a Mission to Yarkund
in 1873.
Tavrkh-i kamsa-i sharq* (Histories of ve Eastern countries). Imm Qurbn Al
Hjj Hamd Oghli; Kazan, 1910.
Tavrkh-i shahrukhiyya (Histories of Shahrukh) (or, Trkh-i shahrukh). See Pan-
tusov.
Yqb Begdin ilgri Kshqarn alghan \iddq Begning dstn tadhkirasi [Story of
\iddq Beg who took Kashghar prior to Yaqb Beg]. Qj Abd al-Bq Ksh-
ghar; India Ofce Library: Ms. Turki 3; copied by Mrz Jall al-Dn Akhnd on
Jumda I 13, 1282/Oct.4, 1865; 28f.
Vafar-nma (Book of victory). Mukammad Al Khn Kashmr; India Ofce Li-
brary: Ms. Turki 5; 1284/186768; 95f.
Vafar-nma* (Book of victory). Mull Shaqr; in PRC, see Mukhlisov, pp. 1617;
cf. partial transcription in sirlr sadasi, pp. 31032; Aitbaev, <Zafar-name>
mulla Shakira.

ottoman documents
Ba{bakanlk ar{ivi in Istanbul has a number of Ottoman documents related to the
Kashgharian state. Many of these contain useful information on the activities of en-
voys from Kashgharia and the response of the Ottoman government to their re-
quests. The archival numbers are as follows.
(1) Yldz tasnif (ksm, evrak, zarf, and karton): 3312117391, 3312797391,
3314817391, 3316387391, 143821269.
 bibliography 267

(2) Brde tasnif:

Dahiliye; 15524, 15546, 46454, 46685, 46753, 47768, 47978, 49016,
49054, 49145, 49220, 49338, 49343, 49426, 49650, 50480, 60621, 60710,
60716.
Majlis-i Mahsus; 1992.
Hriciye; 15817, 15837, 16299, 16353, 16500, 16526.
Nme-i Hmyn; defter no. 13.

british documents

The Public Record Ofce in London keeps many diplomatic correspondences be-
tween the British Indian government, the British embassy in St. Petersburg, the
British embassy in Peking, and the Foreign Ministry in London. Most of them are
found in FO 65 (Russia) and FO 17 (China). Especially valuable are summarized
translations from the contemporary Russian journals and newspapers in FO 65. Be-
sides these, Parliamentary Papers: House of Common Report has several docu-
ments related to our topic.

additional sources and studies

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Tashkent: Tashkent: Izd-vo Fan Uzbekskoi SSR, 196670.
Ahmad, A. Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1964.
Akmad Shh Naqshaband. Route from Kashmir, vi Ladakh, to Yarkand. Trans-
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Great Britain and Ireland, no. 12 (1850): 34458.
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skogo vosstaniia 1864 g. (Vafar-nma by Mull Shaqran important source on
the history of the 1864 Kuchean rebellion). Iz istorii Srednei Azii i Vostochnogo
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Alder, G. J. British Indias Northern Frontier 186595: A Study in Imperial Policy.
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Baikova, N. B. Anglo-Kashgarskii torgovyi dogovor 1874 goda. (The Anglo
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Qiangshutang edition in 1818; Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe repr., 1966.
Yang, Dongliang F. Zuo Zongtang pingchuan v (Biographical Study
of Zuo Zongtang). Changsha: Hunan Renmin Chubanshe, 1985.
Yeerqiang cheng zhuanglishu huihu zhengfu ge xiangce ?^U
U(A register of the itemized taxes of the Muslim households and of the names
and the distances of the villages in Yarkand). Preserved at the ki Bunko, the In-
stitute of Tyo Bunka Kenkysho, Tokyo University.
Yan, Tsing. Yaqub Beg (18201877) and the Moslem Rebellion in Chinese
Turkestan. Central Asiatic Journal 6, no. 2 (1961): 13667.
Zeng, Wenwu ^. Zhongguo jingying Xiyushi gv(History of Chi-
nese rule of the Western regions). Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1936.
Zenker, J. Th., comp. Dictionnaire turc-arabe-persan. 2 vols. Leipzig: W. Engel-
mann, 186676; repr. Hildesheim and New York, 1979.
Zhongguo shaoshu minzu (National minorities in China). Peking:
Renmin Chubanshe, 1981.
Zhongguo tongji nianjian: 2000 p~ (China statistical yearbook 2000).
Compiled by Guojia Tongji Ju. Peking: Guojia Tongji Chubanshe, 2000.
Zhu, Zhuopeng P and Zhu Shengwei tQ. Xinjiang hongqian s
(Red cash in Xinjiang). Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanshe, 1991.
Zlatkin, I. Ia. Istoriia Dzhungarskogo khanstva (16351758) (History of the Zung-
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Zuo Wenxianggong nianpu ~ (The chronology of Zuo Zongtang).
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Index

1864 revolt, see Xinjiang revolt of 1864 artisans, Yaqb Begs mobilization of,
12425
Abd Allh (Trikh-i sighri), 80, 84, Ataliq Ghz, Yaqb Beg known as,
165 7374, 99
Abd Rasul, 5455, 66 tif, Mehmet (Ksgar trh), xvii, 119,
Afqs or Aq Taghliqs (White Moun- 153
taineers), 910, 1415, 24, 67, 130,
180, 216n42 bacha boy, Yaqb Beg rumored to have
Afghanistan, 2021, 46, 139 been, 7576, 78
Ahmad Shh, 1920 background and causes of 1864 revolt,
Ahmad Wang Beg, 3739, 62 136; nancial conditions, 3234; indi-
Ala Khan, 14041 rect rule in Xinjiang, 1011, 1115;
Al Kzim, 118, 16566, 25354n58 Khoqand khanate, intervention of, 19
Alim Khn, 2223 29 (see also Khoqand khanate); Kucha
lim Quli, 4849, 8083, 84, 85, 87, revolt, 17, 36 (see also Kucha revolt);
14647, 182 political turmoil and invasions after
Allh Khwjam, 91 1832 agreeemnt with Khoqand, 2932;
alms (zakt), 133 Qing army in Xinjiang, 1518, 3536;
Aq Taghliqs or Afqs (White Moun- Qing conquest of Xinjiang, 711; riots
taineers), 910, 1415, 24, 67, 130, and local revolts, 3436, 180
180, 216n42 badaulat, Yaqb Beg known as, 7374
army of Kucha rebels, see Kuchean bashis, 10, 13
expedition Beg Quli, 165, 17374, 17576, 177
army of Qing, see Qing army in Xinjiang beg system, 1014, 70, 217n50
army of Yaqb Begs Muslim state, 108 Bellew, H., 31, 48, 77, 99, 104, 137, 152
20, 18283; armaments and equipment, Bll, Mull (Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn),
updating, 11517; auxiliary army, 111; xvi, 53, 54
divisions of cavalry (yigit), infantry Black Mountaineers (Ishqs or Qara
(sarbz), and artillery (taifurchi), 108, Taghliqs), 910, 14, 66, 216n42
11011, 113; foreign military aid, 116 Boulger, D. C., xv, 75, 76, 77, 146
20, 149, 152, 165, 25354n58; foreign British relationship with Kashgaria dur-
soldiers in, 112, 114, 120; garrison ing Yaqb Begs rule, 14446; Anglo-
troops, 10910, 111; ofcers, 1089; Russian rivalry, 13839, 156, 157,
organization and management, 108 179; diplomatic goals of, 156, 157
13; pay and provisioning, 11415; pho- 58; mediation between Qing China
tographs of, 109, 110, 115; potential and Yaqb Beg, 17071; military aid,
threat posed by, 11112; regular army, 11617; trade, 128; treaty, 128, 144
10911; separation from local adminis- 46, 18993
tration, 112; socioeconomic recovery British writings on 1864 revolt, xv, xvii
required to support, 12324; strength- Bukhara, 19, 26, 3031, 78, 8182, 146
ening and buildup of, 11420; training, Burhn al-Dn, 57, 5960, 61, 84, 86, 92
11718; tribal elements, 11213 Buzurg Khwja, 4849, 83, 86, 8889,
artillery (taifurchi), 11011 130
290 index

causes of Xinjiang revolt of 1864, see lions, xiv, xvxvi, 56, 7, 30, 15961,
background and causes of 1864 revolt 179, 255n2
cavalry (yigit), 108, 11011 garrison troups, 10910, 111
China, see also entries at Qing: holy war Ghazt dar mulk-i Chn, Mull Bll, xvi,
against, 6671; impact of 1864 revolt 53, 54
on, xiv; initial conquest of Xinjiang Ghazt-i Muslimn, 45, 227n52
(see Qing conquest of Xinjiang); Kash- Ghulm Husayn, 4546, 64
garian trade during Yaqb Begs rule, glossary, 19799
127; maritime defenses, weakness of, government of Yaqb Begs Muslim
16061; modern period, transition to, state, 98137, 18284; army (see army
179; provincial system, incorporation of Yaqb Begs Muslim state); bound-
of Xinjiang into, 185; reconquest of aries of, 1023; central core of power,
Yaqb Begs Muslim state (see recon- 98102; dayanshays and yanshays, 104
quest of Yaqb Begs Muslim state) 5; hakm or governors of provinces,
Chinese Central Asia, See Xinjiang 1038, 13435, 136; international rela-
Chinese characters, table of, 2017 tions (see international relations with
Chinese writings on 1864 revolt, xv, Yaqb Begs Muslim state); judicial
xvii ofcials, 108; kent or townships, 107
clergy (ulam), 1011, 1314, 130 8; local administration, 1028, 112;
coining money, 12627 mrzbashi (chief secretary), 100102;
collectors of taxes in Yaqb Begs Mus- personal ofcers, 100; reconquest, rela-
lim state, 13537 tionship of government administration
to, 98; separation of army from local
Dr al-Islam (Abode of Islam) and Dr administration, 112; socioeconomic
al-Harb (Abode of War), 69 conditions (see socioeconomic condi-
darughas, 10, 13 tions in Yaqb Begs Muslim state);
Dd Khalfa, 9497 sovereignty issues (see sovereignty);
dayanshays, 1045 soyurghal system, 1056; taxation (see
death of Yaqb Beg, 16769, 173, 184 tax system in Yaqb Begs Muslim
denitions (glossary), 19799 state); titles used by Yaqb Beg, 98
diplomatic documents, xvii 99; urda, 100; Urumchi, local adminis-
dvns, 136 tration of, 1045; vilyats or provinces,
Domino theory of importance of Xin- 1038; village ofcials, 136; weak-
jiang, 163 nesses of, 184
Dungans, see Tungans governors of provinces or hakm, 1038,
13435, 136
Eastern Turkestan, xiii, 10, 12021 Great Britain, see entries at British
economy, see entries at socioeconomic The Great Game, 157, 25455n79
conditions Grenard, M. F., xvii, 34, 50
embassy reports, xvii Gumadi, 166, 178
England, see entries at British
ethnic background of Yaqb Beg, 7778 Habb Allh, xvii, 4952, 65, 75, 8990,
ethnic conict, 1864 revolt viewed as, xv, 130
68 Hkim Khn, 16465, 167, 17374, 176,
185
nancial conditions before 1864 revolt, hakm or governors of provinces, 1038,
3234 13435, 136
Forsyth, T. D., xvii, 104, 116, 144 Hm al-Dn, 57, 5960, 61, 86, 92
Hami, 57, 58
Galdan Tsering, 8, 19 Hanhui, see Tungans
Ganja Akhnd, 1045 Haqq Quli, 173
Gansu and Shanxi Chinese Muslim rebel- Herat, siege of, 13839
 index 291

Hezhou, 161 1864 revolt, 6871, 181; Xinjiang re-

holy war: China and Qing dynasty, oppo- volt of 1864 as Islamic movement, xvi
sition to, 6671; Islam as unifying ide-
ology of 1864 revolt, 6871, 181; Kho- Jadidism, 185
qand khanate khwjas, 2427; khw- Jahngr invasion, 1718, 2426, 37
jas, role of, 67; obligation of salt vs. Jall al-Dn, 62
obligation of, 39; religious leadership Jaml al-Dn, 86, 92, 130, 253n47
arising from initial 1864 revolt, 6166, Jami al-tavrkh, Hj Ysuf, 3, 47, 48
181; sovereignty, Islamic theory of, 69 Japanese invasion of Taiwan, 16162
70; Yaqb Beg known as holy warrior, jasaq junwang, 11, 15
7374 Jinjibao, siege of, 16061
Hui, see Tungans Johnson, W. H., xvii, 50, 127, 144
judicial ofcials of Yaqb Begs Muslim
Ili rebellion, xvi, 5257, 66, 121 state, 108
immigration of ethnic Chinese to Xin-
jiang, 185 Kaml al-Dn, 167
India, 46, 128, 139, 14446 Ksgar trh, Mehmet tif, xvii, 119,
indirect rule in Xinjiang, 1011, 1115, 153
70, 180, 185 Kashgar/Kashgaria: 1864 rebellion
infantry (sarbz), 108, 11011 spreading to, 4649, 6465; condi-
international relations with Yaqb Begs tions following rebellion, 121, 122
Muslim state, 13858, 183; Anglo- 23; government of (see government of
Russian rivalry, 13839, 156, 157, 179; Yaqb Begs Muslim state); Khoqand
Britain (see British relationship with invasions of, 1929; religious leader-
Kashgaria during Yaqb Begs rule); ship, 4649, 6465; Yaqb Begs con-
diplomatic goals of, 15558; external quest of Kashgaria, 8993; Yaqb
trade, 12728; The Great Game, Begs taking of Kashgar, 8387
157, 25455n79; Ottoman empire (see Kashmr, Muhammad (Zafar-nma), 45
Ottoman empires relationship with Kataki khwjas, 6263
Kashgaria during Yaqb Begs rule); kent or townships, 1078
Qing reconquest of Kashgaria, 15758, khan, failure of Yaqb Beg to use title of,
17071, 177, 260n103; Russia (see 9899
Russian relationship with Kashgaria Khitay, 68
during Yaqb Begs rule) Khoqand khanate, 18, 1929; agreement
Irdana (Erdeni), 1921 of 1832, 2729; army ofcers and sol-
Ishq Khwja, 5759, 8990, 9193, diers of Khoqand origins, 112, 114;
95 continuing invasions and political tur-
Ishqs or Qara Taghliqs (Black Moun- moil following 1832 agreement, 29
taineers), 910, 14, 66, 216n42 32; early relationship with Qing, 19
Islam, see also holy war: Ahmad Wang 24; hakm or governors of provinces
Begs refusal to lead after Kucha revolt, mostly of Khoqand origins, 107; holy
3739; Central Asia, effects of Islamiza- war of khwjas, 2427; Jahngr inva-
tion of, xiii; changes to local Muslim sion, 1718, 2426, 37; Khashgar re-
thought following Qing reconquest, bellion of 1864, response to, 4849,
185; Kuchean regimes collapse and 65; khwjas, 2122, 24, 26, 3132;
religious dissension, 91; Pan-Islamic Nayanceng reforms and trade embargo,
state, 14748, 253n47; religious lead- 2627; rise of, 19; Russian annexation
ership arising from initial 1864 revolt, of, 143, 146; sovereignty issues, 126,
6166, 181; revival in Yaqb Begs 182; Yaqb Begs early career in, 78
Muslim state, 12931; sharah, obser- 83; Yaqb Begs Muslim state, sover-
vance of, 12931; sovereignty, Islamic eignty issues regarding, 126, 15253,
theory of, 6970; unifying ideology of 182; Ysuf khwja, invasion of, 27, 32
292 index

Khotan: revolt of 1864, xvii, 4952, Naqshband Sus, 62, 64

60, 6566; Yaqb Beg and taking of, Nr Muhammad, 7980, 81
9091 Narbuta, 2122
Khdyr Khn, 30, 7881, 14647, 182 nationalist movement in Xinjiang, 185,
khwjas, 912, 1415, 17, 180, 185, see 261n3
also specic khwjas; holy war, role in, Nayanceng, 2627
67; Khoqand khanate, 2122, 24, 26, Nian rebellion, xiv, xv, 30
3132
Kucha revolt, 17, 3741, 17981; back- Opium War, 30
ground and causes of 1864 revolt, 1 Ottoman empires relationship with
7, 36; city of Kucha, 12; initial events Kashgaria under Yaqb Beg, 14655;
of, 24; leadership, search for, 3741; development of relations, 15055;
massacre rumor, 47, 45, 17980; reli- diplomatic goals of, 15657; formal
gious leadership, 6163; Turkic Mus- recognition of Kashgarian state and
lims joining with Tungans, 7 Ottoman suzerainity, 15253; initia-
Kuchean expedition, 5761; eastern expe- tion of relations, 14650; military aid,
dition, 5759; map, xx; western expe- 11720, 149, 152, 165, 25354n58;
dition, 5961 non-involvement policy of empire,
Kuchean khwjas failure to unify area change in, 14950; reasons for Yaqb
and rise of Yaqb Beg, 5859, 73, Begs initial failure to contact Ot-
9193 tomans, 14849; Russian-Ottoman
Kuropatkin, A. N., xvii, 101, 109, 131, relations, 15455; Sayyid Yaqb Khn,
167 14648, 1501155
Ottoman writings on 1864 revolt, xvii
labor force, Yaqb Begs organization
of, 12425 Pan-Islamic state, 14748, 253n47
Le Coq, Albert von, 7576, 122 Pantusov, N. N., xvi
local administration of Yaqb Begs Mus- peasant uprising, 1864 revolt viewed as,
lim state, 1028, 112 xv, 68
population estimates following Qing con-
Ma Hualong, 16061 quest of Xinjiang, 10
Ma Zhanao, 16061 population levels following 1864 revolt,
Makhdmzdas, 89, 1415, 69, 216n43 12122, 12324
maps, xx, 72 provinces or vilyats of Yaqb Begs
Mayo, Richard S. B., 139, 144 Muslim state, 1038
milestones or tash, 101, 129, 24344n19 provincial Chinese system, incorporation
military organizations, see army of Yaqb of Xinjiang into, 185
Begs Muslim state; Kuchean expedi- provincial governors or hakm, 1038,
tion; Qing army in Xinjiang 13435, 136
miners, Yaqb Begs organization of,
12425 qd, 108
Mrz Ahmad, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81 Qara Taghliqs or Ishqs (Black Moun-
mrzbashi (chief secretary), 100102 taineers), 910, 14, 66, 216n42
modern period, transition to, 179, 185 Qianlong (Emperor), 8, 52, 69
Muazzam, 5455, 66 Qing army in Xinjiang, 1518; inef-
muft, 108 fectiveness on eve of revolt, 3536;
Muhammad Alam, 5051 Tungan soldiers, 67
Muhammad Al (Madal), 2426, 27, 30, Qing conquest of Xinjiang, 711, 180;
78, 94 indirect rule system, 1011, 1115;
Muhammad Shh of Iran, 138 Kucha affected by, 12; population
Muhammad Sharf, 66 estimates following, 10
Musulmn Quli, 30, 7880 Qing dynasty, xiii, xiv, xv, 6671
Muzafar, 9495 Qing reconquest of Yaqb Begs Muslim
 index 293

state, see reconquest of Yaqb Begs [TA] and Trkh-i hamd [TH]), xvi,
Muslim state 19495, 213n8
Qipchaqs, 7880, 82, 86 Sayyid Yaqb Khn, 14648, 15155,
Qirghiz, 24, 48, 6465, 78, 8384, 86, 170
111 Schuyler, F., xvii, 75, 121, 140
Qutluq Beg, 4748, 60, 65, 84 seven Kkwjas invasions, 3132
Shanxi and Gansu Chinese Muslim rebel-
ras, 108 lions, xiv, xvxvi, 56, 7, 30, 15961,
Rshidn Khwja (Khan Khwja or Huang 179, 255n2
Hezhuo), 3941, 57, 59, 60, 6263, 73, sharah, Kashgarian Muslim states ob-
8586, 9192, 130, 226n1617 servance of, 12931
reconquest of Yaqb Begs Muslim state, Shaw, Robert B., xvii, 47, 78, 84, 98,
15978, 18485; approach of Qing 101, 116, 144
army and initial battles, Kashgarian Shr Al, 30, 78
response to, 16467; British atempt to Siddq Beg, 4849, 60, 65, 80, 83, 228n66
mediate, 17071; death of Yaqb Beg, Silk Road, decline of, xiii, 1, 211n4
16769, 173, 184; debate over attempt S Dlya (Suo Huanzhang), 4142, 43,
at, 16164; diplomatic strategy, failure 44, 63, 94, 104
of, 16973, 18485; nal offensive, socioeconomic conditions in Xinjiang and
17477; nancing and preparation, 1864 revolt, xv, 3234, 45, 68, 180
16364; governmental administration socioeconomic conditions in Yaqb
and, 98; internal discontent and, 178; Begs Muslim state, 11937; effect
international relations and, 15758, of decades of unrest, 11923; efforts
17071, 177, 260n103; Russian activi- at recovery, 11929; external trade,
ties and, 177, 260n103; Shanxi and 12728; foreign residents, 124; internal
Gansu rebellions, suppression of, 159 communications and security, 129;
61; succession struggle, 17374 internal money economy, 12527; Is-
religion, see Islam lamic revival, 12931; labor force, or-
revolt of 1864, see Xinjiang revolt of 1864 ganization of, 12425; population lev-
riots as background to and cause of 1864 els, 12122, 12324; Qing reconquest
revolt, 3436, 180 affected by, 178; taxation (see tax sys-
Russian expansion southward, 76, 79, tem in Yaqb Begs Muslim state)
82, 83, 93, 13839, 14647, 179 sovereignty: formal recognition of Kash-
Russian occupation of Tashkent, 139, garian state and Ottoman suzerainity,
14647 15253; Islamic theory of, 6970;
Russian relationship with Kashgaria dur- Khoqand khanate, 126, 182
ing Yaqb Begs rule, 13943; Anglo- soyurghal system, 1056
Russian rivalry, 13839, 156, 157, 179; Su saints, 6263
diplomatic goals of, 156, 15758; mili- suicide theory regarding Yaqb Beg, 168
tary aid, 11617; Ottoman-Russian Suo Huanzhang (S Dlya), 4142, 43,
relations, 15455; Qing reconquest, 44, 63, 94, 104
177, 260n103; trade, 12728; treaty,
128, 14243, 18788 taifurchi (artillery), 11011
Russian writings on 1864 revolt, xv, xvii Taiping rebellion, xiv, xv, 30
Taiwan, Japanese invasion of, 16162
Salars, 1045 tanb (tax on orchards, meadows, and
salt, obligation of, 39 non-cereal crops), 13233
salt-taxes, 33 Taranchis, xvi, 5254, 56, 66
sarbz (infantry), 108, 11011 Tarbaghatai, 5657
Sarimsaq, 2122, 24, 79 Trkh-i amniyya (TA) and Trkh-i
Sariqolis, 111 hamd (TH), Mull Msa Sayrmi,
sarkrs, 135 xvi, 19495, 213n8
Sayrmi, Mull Msa (Trkh-i amniyya Trikh-i sighri, Abd Allh, 80, 84, 165
294 index

tash or milestones, 101, 129, 24344n19 vilyats or provinces of Yaqb Begs

Tashkent, Russian occupation of, 139, Muslim state, 1038
14647 village ofcials, 136
tax burden problems and 1864 revolt,
3234, 45, 180 Wal Khn, 8889, 130
tax system in Yaqb Begs Muslim state, Western historical sources for 1864 re-
13137; collectors of taxes, 13537; volt, xv, xvii
governors gifts, 13435; irregular White Mountaineers (Afqs or Aq
taxes, 134; rates of tax, 133; tanh (tax Taghliqs), 910, 1415, 24, 67, 130,
on orchards, meadows, and non-cereal 180, 216n42
crops), 13233; ushr or kharj (tax on
grain production), 13132, 249n163; Xinjiang: division into circuits or lu by
village ofcials, 136; zakt (alms), 133 Qing, 15; historical background and
trade in Yaqb Begs Muslim state: exter- interest in region, xiiixiv; immigration
nal trade, 12728; internal money of ethnic Chinese to, 185; impact of
economy, 12527 1864 revolt on, xiv; incorporation into
tribal elements of army of Yaqb Begs provincial system, 185; maps, xx, 72;
Muslim state, 11213 nationalist movement, 185, 261n3;
Tungans, xv, xvi, 23, 17980; auxiliary post-revolt Muslim state (see govern-
army of Yaqb Beg, 111; ight to Tur- ment of Yaqb Begs Muslim state);
fan in face of Qing army of reconquest, Qing conquest of (see Qing conquest
16465; holy war and, 67; Ili, 5254, of Xinjiang)
56, 66; Kashgar, 4748; Kucha revolt, Xinjiang revolt of 1864, 3771, 179
17; numbers living in Xinjiang, 67; 81; background and causes (see back-
religious leadership, 6364; Shanxi ground and causes of 1864 revolt);
and Gansu Chinese Muslim rebellions, historical sources, xvxviii; holy war
xiv, xvxvi, 56, 7, 30, 15961, 179, (see holy war); Ili, 5257; Islamic
255n2; Urumchi, 4142, 6364, movement, viewed as, xvi; Kashgar,
9497; Yarkand, 4445, 46, 64 4649; Khotan, 4952; Kucha revolt
Tuo Ming, 4142, 44, 6364, 94 (see Kucha revolt); Kuchean expedi-
Turfan, 57, 58, 9496, 111, 16465 tion, 5761 (see also Kuchean expedi-
tion); local people, effect on, xiv, xv
ulam, 1011, 1314, 130 xvi, 7374; map, xx; post-revolt Mus-
Umar Khn, 22, 2324 lim state (see government of Yaqb
United Kingdom, see entries at British Begs Muslim state); religious leader-
urda, 100 ship arising from initial rebellion, 61
Urumchi: conditions following rebellion, 66; spread of rebellion from Kucha,
12122; local administration by Mus- 3757; Urumchi, 4144; Yarkand,
lim state, 1045; Qing reconquest, 166 4446
67; revolt of 1864, 4144, 6364; Xinjiang tuzhi, 3
Yaqb Beg, annexation by, 9397 Xu Xuegong, 96, 166
Ush Turfan, 5960, 91
ushr or kharj (tax on grain production), Yangihissar, 84, 85
13132, 249n163 yanshays, 1045
Uwaysi saints, 233n166 Yaqb Beg, xiv, xvii, xviii, 7397, 181
Uyghur as ethnic term, 3, 214n10 85; bacha boy, rumored to have been,
Uyghur national liberation movement, 7576, 78; birth and background, 76
1864 revolt portrayed as, xv, 68 78; death of, 16769, 173, 184; early
career of, 7883; government of (see
Valikhanov, Ch. Ch., 6, 14, 20, 28, 29, government of Yaqb Begs Muslim
31, 132 state); Kashgar occupied by, 8387;
Vek, Ahmet, 152 Kashgarian conquest, 8993; Khotan
 index 295

seized by, 9091; Kuchean khwjas, yigit (cavalry), 108, 11011

collapse of, 5859, 73, 9193; map Ysuf, Hj (Jami al-tavrkh), 3, 47,
of realm, 72; mythmaking about, 73 48
76, 82; nicknames for, 7375; physical Ysuf khwja, invasion of, 27, 32
description of, 99100; picture of, 74;
Qing reconquest, initial resistance to, Zafar-nma (Muhammad Kashmr), 45
16467; religious attitude of, 13031; zakt (alms), 133
rivals removed by, 8789; suicide the- zaktchi, 13536
ory, 168; titles used by, 9899; Urum- Zamn Khn Efendi, 167
chi annexed by, 9397; Yangihissar Zungharia, xiii, xvii, 10, 12021, 123
taken by, 84, 85; Yarkand taken by, Zunghars and Zunghar rulers, 8, 9,
8487, 8990 1112, 41, 52, 155
Yarkand: revolt of 1864 in, 4446, 60, Zuo Zongtang, 110, 12123, 159
64; Yaqb Beg and taking of, 8487, 65, 167, 169, 170, 17778, 184,
8990 25556n4