FH MAINZ – MSC.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

Case Study:
DaimlerChrysler
Analysis of Post-Merger Integration and Strategic
Position of Daimler AG
February Amelia Curry

Matrikel-Nr.: 903738

Prepared for: Prof. Dr. Herbert Paul

Due Date: November 27, 2009

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3

II. Post-Merger Integration ................................................................................................... 4

III. Demerger ......................................................................................................................... 6

IV. Daimler AG Future Strategy ............................................................................................ 10

V. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 12

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 14

Appendix ................................................................................................................................... 15
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I. Introduction

Amounting to $36 billion deal (Stertz & Vlasic, 2000) the merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler in

November 1998 was considered the largest trans-Atlantic merger ever. The resulting corporation was

equally stunning; DaimlerChrysler was the world’s fifth largest automobile manufacturer with $130

billion business, 442,000 employees (Finkelstein, 2002) and share value which climbed to a high $108.62

a few months after its stock was first traded (Schneider, 2001). Jϋrgen Schrempp, the Daimler’s CEO,

called it a “wedding made in heaven” (Schneider, 2001). In other words, his vision of this new giant in

auto industry was a corporation that would take advantage of synergy effects from two complementary

merging companies.

However, the honeymoon phase was over after six months. On their closely-watched first

quarterly earnings, the numbers were a massive disappointment. Contradict the company’s previous

promise, its revenues rose ten percent in the second quarter to $38.5 billion but its profits were the

same $1.53 billion (Stertz & Vlasic, 2000). The potential synergy savings between the two companies did

not seem to take effect. As the consequence, DaimlerChrysler stock dropped $13 per share in two days,

decimating over $10 billion in value (Stertz & Vlasic, 2000).

The subsequent years did not look promising for the merged companies either. The internal

turbulence within the company and the disappointing integration profitability, most notably indicated by

the declining share price, led to demerger in 2007. This paper attempts to analyze the successes and

failures of post-merger integration and determines the significant factors that culminated to the

separation of these two automakers. Additionally, the elements of a future strategy for Mercedes, one of

Daimler AG automobile divisions, without Chrysler are identified by analyzing its strategic position in

2007.
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II. Post-Merger Integration

According to Lasserre (2003) the quality of post-acquisition processes, such as integration

framework, transition management and consolidation, is the most important source of success or failure

of cross-border M&As. In DaimlerChrysler case, in terms of linear integration framework, the problem

began with the vision of the new company. It was a broad strategic intent, and did not drive behavior or

new corporate culture which was particularly essential in cross-border integration. And this effect is

enhanced in the case of merger between two automakers because automobile is the source of pride and

emotionally-charged product of industrialized nations (Schneider, 2001).

As for the change architecture, DaimlerChrysler integration council, automotive and non-

automotive integration teams performed successfully. Lead by Schrempp, the sense of urgency and

meticulous plans were emphasized and realized early on. It evidenced in its ability to accomplish $1.6

billion of integration benefit, surpassing the forecasted amount by $200 million (Paul, 2008).

However, the architecture for new company presented a challenge. The corporate structure and

legal form of DaimlerChrysler were seen to be inclined toward the Daimler side. Furthermore, the abrupt

change of direction from preservation to absorption mode following the disappointing first six-month

earnings introduced another problem in the case of “merger of equals” as declared pre-merger. These

were perceived as domination of Daimler in the new company and created a lot of tension in Auburn

Hills, Michigan.

The excellent concord of the two co-chairmen, Robert Eaton and Jϋrgen Schrempp, played a role

in the success of the integration teams. Leadership was established early on, with Schrempp took a more

active role. However, in the ensuing phase of transition and consolidation, leadership vacuum existed in

Chrysler-side. With Eaton’s withdrawal, Thomas Stallkamp, president of Chrysler, was in charge as the

change agent at Auburn Hills. Following Stallkamp’s retirement, anxious of being seen as intrusive,
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Schrempp left the lack of leadership and direction clarity for too long. During 1998-2001 periods,

Chrysler was neither taken over nor granted equal status (Finkelstein, 2002). The anxiety and non-

existent sense of purpose on Chrysler-side were not addressed properly, resulting in the departure of

many key talents of the so-called ‘dream-team’ that had led Chrysler to its success in the 1990s

(Schneider, 2001).

The mismanagement in the transition phase also precipitated internal and external

communication problems. Schrempp’s confession to German’s Handesblatt which then translated and

published at the Financial Times regarding his true intention of the merger sent the company into a

major credibility setback. It intensified the uncertainties at Chrysler, ignited outrage in American media

and lead to a failure of gaining the goodwill of various stakeholders, particularly in the United States,

signified by Kirk Kerkorian $8 billion lawsuit (Schneider, 2001).

Cultural issues also were not resolved directly with a definitive plan. There were some problems

concerning national culture differences, notably language which presented a barrier in communication.

Surprisingly these did not seem to be the determinant factors in the failure of merger. The more

important issues were the differences in corporate governance and cultures.

Daimler-Benz represented the more traditional corporation with tall hierarchical structure in

contrast with Chrysler relatively flatter cross-functional structure which posed a problem in decision-

making. The differences in compensation package manifested a more serious consequence. The

combined salaries of the top 10 executives at Daimler-Benz amounted to $11 million, which was $5

million less than those of Chrysler’s top 5 managers whom also had the stock options they exercised in

the aftermath of the merger (Schneider, 2001). Chrysler could not reduce its salaries or bonuses in order

to retain its key talents. This issue created difficulties in balancing the compensation for executives in

Auburn Hills and those performing the same job in Stuttgart. Additionally, the codetermination concept

of corporate governance adopted at Daimler-side where employees and managers are treated equally
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and are given equal voting was non-existent in the United States (Carpiaux, 2002). These clashes seemed

to sharpen when the dominance of Daimler became apparent, which was perceived in the U.S. as an

attempt to impose its thinking on Chrysler (Gulbro, Shonesy, & Valcana, 2007).

Additionally, the nonautomotive business of the old Daimler also posed a challenge for Chrysler

side (Stertz & Vlasic, 2000). The lack of experience in these businesses and of business practice in

Germany made it difficult for Chrysler executives to grasp some of the decisions by the new company.

Schrempp’s bid to take over Nissan Motor Co. added the complications and created a rift between

Schrempp and Stallkamp which culminated in Stallkamp’s retirement as mentioned previously.

III. Demerger

There were two key concerns preceding the demerger of DaimlerChrysler in 2007. The first issue

was related to the insufficient synergy savings realized from the integration. The opposite brand images

of Chrysler and Daimler-Benz and their respective product development philosophies resulted in a

fundamental detachment in supply-procurement strategies and factory staffing requirements

(Finkelstein, 2002). Due to the differences in brand disposition, distribution and retail sales systems of

Daimler and Chrysler were mostly independent (Finkelstein, 2002). Dealers of Mercedes-Benz were

disinclined to include Chrysler portfolio in their retail sales and this prevented its market penetration in

Europe where Chrysler market share stalled at two percent (Finkelstein, 2002). This bias generated

further synergy losses; for instance the loss of potential income generated by vehicles such as the Dodge

Neon and the Jeep Grand Cherokee that were sidelined in favor of the less-cost-effective and troubled

Mercedes A-Class compact and M-Class SUV (Finkelstein, 2002).

A more serious issue however, was Chrysler’s increasing inefficiency. By spring 2001, its

production costs were too high; it introduced too few new products and lost its competitive advantage

against Toyota, Honda and Volkswagen (Schneider, 2001). Declining demand in the U.S. market and the
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associated overcapacity forced Chrysler to offer product incentives and rebates up to $4,000 per car,

deteriorating Chrysler’s profitability further (Schneider, 2001). Meanwhile, the Japanese car imports and

increased domestic competition threatened Chrysler’s market share, which was sunk from 16.2% in 1998

to 13.5% in 2001 (Finkelstein, 2002).

Chrysler continued losses nearly halved DaimlerChrysler net profit in 2000 (Carpiaux, 2002). By

spring 2001, DaimlerChrysler stock price stagnated around $50 per share, meaning that the company

was worth less than Daimler alone had been pre-merger; and this dire situation was made worse when

Standard & Poor banished its stock from their S&P 500 (Finkelstein, 2002). Unlike the Mercedes-Benz

and Smart Car divisions, which posted an operating profit of €830 million in Q3 2000 (Finkelstein, 2002),

Chrysler’s profitability did not improve despite the subsequent restructuring efforts. Daimler recognized

its declining stock price as a threat to its profitability and ultimately might expose Daimler to the

possibility of a hostile takeover. Below is the overview of DaimlerChrysler/Daimler stock performance

from 2000-2009:

Figure 1. Daimler AG Stock Performance (OnVista Group)

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Closing year-end 2006 with €46.80 per share (Paul, 2008), a re-assessment of the business

environment and a new strategic direction were of imminent importance for Daimler. Taking the

external and internal factors of Daimler in 2007 into consideration, the SWOT analysis can be described

as follows:

Strengths Weaknesses

 Brand strength  Declining stock price

 Engineering and R&D  Dented image and
Capabilities credibility
 Capital Resource  Chrysler’s turnaround
difficulties

Opportunities  Exploit engineering and R&D  Improve reputation and

capabilities to develop fuel- profitability by unloading
 Changing consumer’s buying
efficient cars Chrysler
habit: fuel-efficient, green
technology
 Reinforce brand strength and  Unloading Chrysler to focus
 Traditional core segment:
reputation by refocusing all resources to exploit fuel-
Germany and Western Europe
business on core segments efficient version for core
 Interested party to buy
segments
Chrysler’s share
Threats  Use capital resource to eliminate  Unload Chrysler to eliminate
acquisition risk risk from sluggish US
 Sluggish U.S. economy and
economy
increasing oil price
 Use Brand Strength and
 Increasing competition in SUV
Engineering capabilities to regain  Focus to regain market
and truck segments
market share share in core segment and
 Vulnerability to takeover by
minimize risk from increased
competitors
competition in SUV
 Loss of market share to Audi
and BMW
Table 1. SWOT Analysis
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One of Daimler’s strengths is the brand value of its Mercedes-Benz cars which are associated

with disciplined German engineering coupled with uncompromising quality consumers pay the premium

for. Its superior engineering and R&D capabilities are indicated by the R&D costs for passenger cars,

which pre-merger in 1997 amounted to 5.75% of its revenue (own calculation, based on (DaimlerBenz

AG, 1997)). Capital resources available from Mercedes-Benz, Smart Car and non-automotive divisions are

also identified as one of its strength with regard to its next strategic method. The weaknesses of Daimler

are summarized from the two key issues described in previous paragraphs.

Rising oil price in 2007 led to a changing buying habit by consumers; they demand smaller and

fuel-efficient cars. Increased environmental concerns also heightened the need for cars with green

technology. The sluggish U.S. economy in 2007, combined with its automobile industry’s high volatility,

compelled Daimler to reassess its priority in terms of growth. Positive economic growth in Germany and

Western Europe compared to negative growth in the U.S. presented an opportunity to re-focus on

Daimler’s traditional core segment (Daimler-AG, 2007); Europe represented 60.2% of Daimler’s total

automobile revenues in pre-merger 1997 (DaimlerBenz AG, 1997).

From the analysis summarized in Table 1, adding the bids by Magna and Cerberus to buy

Chrysler’s share as opportunity and loss of market share in traditional core segment to Audi and BMW as

a threat, there are two points stand out for Daimler: unload Chrysler and re-focus on its traditional core

segment. Market reacted positively, exhibited by the sharp increase of Daimler’s stock price following

the demerger announcement, which settled at $95.63 per share at New York Stock Exchange and €66.50

per share at Frankfurt DAX by year-end 2007 (Paul, 2008). This sharp increase in its share price is quite

impressive in comparison to its main competitor, BMW AG; the share price of the latter remained

relatively constant in2006-2007 period1.

1
See appendix for BMW Stock Performance
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IV. Daimler AG Future Strategy

The demerger returned Daimler (Daimler AG post-demerger) to its prior position. The analysis of

Daimler AG strategic options is focused on its luxury vehicles segment. Competitive advantage as one of

the bases of strategic choice in this segment is determined using VRIO model which is illustrated as

follows:

Valuable? Rare? Costly to Exploited by the Competitive

imitate? organization? Implication

Advanced Patents Yes Yes Yes Yes

Established Yes No Yes Partly

customer base

High reputation Yes No Yes Yes

Powerful brand Yes Yes Yes Yes

Advanced R&D skills Yes No No Yes

Efficient production Yes No No Yes

skills

Table 2. VRIO Model

The advanced patents, high reputation and powerful brand are identified as intangible resources

that give sustainable competitive advantage and therefore difficult and relatively costly for competitors

to imitate.

The subsequent analysis on strategic directions is based on the Ansoff matrix and three options

are identified: market penetration using existing products in current market, product development in
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existing market and market development using existing products. As mentioned previously, Daimler AG

unique resources and core competences enable the company to sustain and improve its competitive

advantage in quality which is one of the key determinants for increasing market share (Johnson &

Scholes, 1999). Daimler’s expertise in environmental-friendly automobiles also gives it an edge

compared to muscle, gas-guzzling cars.

Product development is driven by innovation, in which Daimler AG is also best-known for. Fit-

driven innovation based on changing consumer needs necessitates R&D efforts and creativity to develop

alternative drive systems such as hybrid drive, fuel-cell drive, and the so-called DIESOTTO engines

(Daimler-AG, 2007). Daimler AG’s innovation is also stretch-driven exhibited by its vehicles market

success in terms of quality, customer satisfaction, customer perception and product appeal which it

plans to utilize in order to continue growing in its traditional core segments and seize new market

opportunities particularly in emerging markets (Daimler-AG, 2007). Table 3 summarizes the strategic

directions of Daimler AG:

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Environment Capability Expectations

Market Penetration Gain Market share for Exploit superior Better returns at low
advantages resources & exploiting risk by
competences current strategies

Product development Adapt cars to changed Exploit R&D

demands due to
increasing gas prices
Better Returns at
medium risk by
exploiting current
Market development Concentrate more on Exploit current strengths or market
emerging not yet products knowledge
saturated markets in
e.g. in Asia

Table 3. Daimler AG Strategic Directions

To accomplish its strategic direction, Daimler AG opts for the internal growth and develops its

strategies around its own resource base and competences; this strategy is particularly suitable for its

luxury vehicles which are highly technical (Johnson & Scholes, 1999). Plus, by choosing to grow

organically, Daimler AG can spread the high development costs favorably and realistically and reduce

disturbance to its other activities.

V. Conclusion

Cross-border M&As are one of the poorly understood phenomena in business world (Schneider,

2001). The internal turbulences of two merged companies increase significantly in the case of a merger

between two automakers (Schneider, 2001) as exhibited by DaimlerChrysler. Corporate culture clash

between the two companies with different business management and production philosophies were not
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managed properly. The boom in highly volatile automobile industry in the U.S. led Daimler-Benz to

overestimate the potential of the merger which ultimately resulted in their separation in 2007. It

appeared to be the right decision for Daimler AG, as it managed to boost its credibility and profitability

reflected in its share price right after the demerger. Internal growth also seemed to be the most viable

option for Daimler AG in 2007. Further study is required to determine the growth and profitability of

Daimler AG by pursuing this strategy with more recent data, particularly in light of recent recession.
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Bibliography

Carpiaux, N. (2002). DaimlerChrysler: Wunderkind or Problem Child? Journal of Undergraduate Research

- University of Wisconsin-La Crosse Volume V .

Daimler-AG. (2007). Annual Report 2007. Stuttgart: Daimler AG.

DaimlerBenz AG. (1997). Annual Report 1997. Stuttgart: DaimlerBenz AG.

Finkelstein, S. (2002). The DaimlerChrysler Merger. Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth.

Gulbro, R. D., Shonesy, L. B., & Valcana, G. (2007). Should the DaimlerChrysler Merger be Rescinded. The

International Academy for Case Studies: 14(1) (pp. 39-41). Jacksonville: Allied Academies International

Conference.

Johnson, G., & Scholes, K. (1999). Exploring Corporate Strategy: Text and Cases. Prentice Hall Europe.

Lasserre, P. (2003). Global Strategic Management. Palgrave Macmillan.

OnVista Group. (n.d.). Onvista. Retrieved November 11, 2009, from DAX-Performance-Index:

http://aktien.onvista.de/snapshot.html?ID_OSI=82840

Paul, H. (2008). DaimlerChrysler: Lessons in Post-Merger Integration. Fachhochschule Mainz - University

of Applied Science.

Schneider, P. (2001, August 12). Scenes from a Marriage. The New York Times .

Stertz, B., & Vlasic, B. (2000). Taken for a Ride: How the DaimlerChrysler "Marriage of Equals" Crumbled.

Book Excerpt . William Morrow & Co.

Stonehouse, G., Campbell, D., Hamill, J., & Purdie, T. (2004). Global and Transnational Business: Strategy

and Management. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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Appendix

Figure 2. BMW AG Stock Performance (OnVista Group)