124495-1998-Chavez v. Presidential Commission On Good

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998.]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ , petitioner, vs . PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO
(in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG) , respondents, GLORIA A.
JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA A.
JOPSON , petitioners-in-intervention.
SYLLABUS
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF

PUBLIC CONCERN AND ACCESS TO OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS; SUFFICIENT
BASIS TO UPHOLD PETITIONER'S LOCUS STANDI IN CASE AT BAR. — The instant petition
is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to o cial records,
documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the
satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's
legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen,
we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed. In any event, the question on the
standing of Petitioner Chavez is rendered moot by the intervention of the Jopsons, who are
among the legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth. The standing of the Jopsons is not
seriously contested by the solicitor general. Indeed, said petitioners-intervenors have a
legal interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since a distribution or disposition of
the Marcoses' ill-gotten properties may adversely affect the satisfaction of their claims.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ALL TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING
PUBLIC INTEREST; LIMITATIONS IN THE EXERCISE THEREOF, ENUMERATED. — The
"information" and the "transactions" referred to in Sec. 7 (Article III) and Sec. 28 (Article II)
of the Constitution have as yet no de ned scope and extent. There are no speci c laws
prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative
state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking
transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE THEREOF; TERM "PUBLIC INTEREST" AND "PUBLIC CONCERN,"
CONSTRUED. — In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. , the Court emphasized that the information
sought must be "matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law.
Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving
public interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." As
to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, elucidated: "In determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. 'Public concern'
like 'public interest' is a term that eludes exact de nition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the nal analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public " In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, the Court also held that o cial acts of public
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o cers done in pursuit of their o cial functions are public in character; hence, the records
pertaining to such o cial acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional
right of access to public records. DACcIH
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID ; RATIONALE. — Under Republic Act No. 6713, public o cials and
employees are mandated to "provide information on their policies and procedures in clear
and understandable language, [and] ensure openness of information, public consultations
and hearings whenever appropriate . . .," except when "otherwise provided by law or when
required by the public interest." In particular, the law mandates free public access, at
reasonable hours, to the annual performance reports of o ces and agencies of
government and government-owned or controlled corporations; and the statements of
assets, liabilities and nancial disclosures of all public o cials and employees. In general,
writings coming into the hands of public o cers in connection with their o cial functions
must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of
governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to
determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are
honestly, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public servants.
Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free ow of thought; but thoughts and
ideas must be well-informed so that the public would gain a better perspective of vital
issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of
the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. Certainly, it is by
ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well informed public
that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, CONSTRUED; RECOVERY OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH,
CONSIDERED A MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN AND IMBUED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST. —
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the
people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a
matter of public concern and imbued with public interest We may also add that "ill-gotten
wealth," by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned
Executive Orders, "ill-gotten wealth" refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired,
directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close
associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or
properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public o ce; or their use of
powers, in uences or relationships, "resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave
damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines." Clearly,
the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself.
To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon
reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of
positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another
declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it
may be used for national economic recovery. We believe the foregoing disquisition settles
the question of whether petitioner has a right to respondents' disclosure of any agreement
that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES DISCLOSURE ON ANY PROPOSED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN
THE PCGG AND OSTENSIBLE OWNERS AND HOLDERS OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH SUBJECT
TO RESTRICTIONS. — Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe
that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its o cers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose su cient public information on any proposed settlement they
have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to de nite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during
the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in
the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on
disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier — such as on matters involving
national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classi ed
information. HCISED
7.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PCCG; E.O. NO. 14, SECTION 5 THEREOF, AS AMENDED BY E.O.
NO. 14-A; CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE PCGG MAY EXERCISE THE POWER TO GRANT
CRIMINAL IMMUNITY, ENUMERATED. — In the present case, the power to grant criminal
immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO No. 14-A.
The said provision speci es that the PCGG may exercise such authority under these
conditions: (1) the person to whom criminal immunity is granted provides information or
testi es in an investigation conducted by the Commission; (2) the information or
testimony pertains to the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused
acquired or accumulated ill-gotten property; and (3) such information or testimony is
necessary to ascertain or prove guilt or civil liability of such individual. From the wording of
the law, it can be easily deduced that the person referred to is a witness in the proceeding,
not the principal respondent, defendant or accused.
8.ID.; ID., ID.; COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PCGG AND MARCOS IN CASE AT
BAR, NOT IN CONFORMITY THERETO; GRANT OF CRIMINAL IMMUNITY TO PRINCIPAL
DEFENDANTS IN THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH CASE, UNWARRANTED. — Going now to the
subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, a
cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal aws. First, the Agreements do not conform
to the above requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. We believe that criminal immunity
under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in
the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan. As stated
earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify
against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case. While the General
Agreement states that the Marcoses "shall provide the [government] assistance by way of
testimony or deposition on any information [they] may have that could shed light on the
cases being pursued by the [government] against other parties," the clause does not fully
comply with the law. Its inclusion in the Agreement may have been only an afterthought,
conceived in pro forma compliance with Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended. There is no
indication whatsoever that any of the Marcos heirs has indeed provided vital information
against any respondent or defendant as to the manner in which the latter may have
unlawfully acquired public property. HSaIDc
9.ID.; ID.; NO POWER TO GRANT TAX EXEMPTION EVEN UNDER THE COVER OF ITS
AUTHORITY TO COMPROMISE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH CASES; PCGG'S COMMITMENT TO
EXEMPT FROM TAX THE PROPERTIES TO BE RETAINED BY MARCOS HEIRS, CONSIDERED
A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. — Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the
PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the
Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax
exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative
bodies. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, speci cally provides: "No law granting
any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemption,
even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Even granting
that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties,
such law will de nitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of
Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute
class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform
and equitable."
10.ID.; ID.; GRANT OF TAX EXEMPTION TO MARCOSES DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE
POWER OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO COMPROMISE TAXES OR ABATE
TAX LIABILITY; REQUISITES FOR A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO COMPROMISE
TAXES OR TO ABATE TAX LIABILITY, ENUMERATED. — Neither can the stipulation be
construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal revenue to compromise
taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the
validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's nancial position
demonstrates a clear inability to pay. De nitely, neither requisite is present in the case of
the Marcoses, because under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of
the claims against their properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the
PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel
a tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or
excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify
the collection of the tax due. In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability is done even
before the determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal violations of the Tax
Code, for which legal actions have been led in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot
be compromised.
11.ID.; ID.; CANNOT GUARANTEE THE DISMISSAL OF ALL PENDING CRIMINAL CASES
AGAINST THE MARCOSES. — The government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all
cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts. This
is a direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction.
Well-settled is the doctrine that once a case has been led before a court of competent
jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and
control of the judge. In a criminal case, the manner in which the prosecution is handled,
including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may lie within the sound discretion
of the government prosecutor; but the court decides, based on the evidence proffered, in
what manner it will dispose of the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not
lost despite a resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to
dismiss the complaint. The prosecution's motion to withdraw or to dismiss is not the least
binding upon the court. On the contrary, decisional rules require the trial court to make its
own evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting such motion is equivalent to
effecting a disposition of the case itself. Thus, the PCGG, as the government prosecutor of
ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against
the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and
discretion. IEHScT
12.ID.; ID.; STIPULATION IN COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PCGG AND

MARCOSES WAIVING ALL GOVERNMENT CLAIMS AGAINST THE LATTER, CONSIDERED
CONTRARY TO LAW AND A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE. — The government also waives all claims and counterclaims, "whether past,
present, or future, matured or inchoate," against the Marcoses. Again, this all-
encompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future
fraud may not be waived. The stipulation in the Agreement does not specify the exact
scope of future claims against the Marcoses that the government thereby relinquishes.
Such vague and broad statement may well be interpreted to include all future illegal acts of
any of the Marcos heirs, practically giving them a license to perpetrate fraud against the
government without any liability at all. This is a palpable violation of the due process and
equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses
beyond the reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for public accountability. It
is a virtual warrant for public o cials to amass public funds illegally, since there is an open
option to compromise their liability in exchange for only a portion of their ill-gotten wealth.
13.ID.; ID.; COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PCGG AND MARCOSES IN CASE
AT BAR DO NOT PROVIDE FOR DEFINITE PERIOD FOR FULFILLMENT OF THE
PRESTATION. — The Agreements do not provide for a de nite or determinable period
within which the parties shall ful ll their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime
before the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets.
14.ID.; ID.; ID.; DO NOT STATE WITH SPECIFICITY THE STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING
WHICH ASSETS TO BE FORFEITED AND WHICH SHALL BE RETAINED BY THE MARCOSES.
— The Agreements do not state with speci city the standards for determining which
assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses.
While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25
percent of the $356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery expenses), such
sharing arrangement pertains only to the said deposits. No similar splitting scheme is
de ned with respect to the other properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements,
a statement of the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio. Public o cers entering into
an arrangement appearing to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, invite their indictment
for corruption under the said law.
15.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED INVALID; CASE AT BAR. — The absence of then President
Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the
compromise incomplete and unforceable. Nevertheless, as detailed above, even if such
approval were obtained the Agreements would still not be valid. From the foregoing
disquisition, it is crystal clear to the Court that the General and Supplemental Agreements,
both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are
violative of the Constitution and the laws aforementioned.
16.REMEDIAL LAW; COMPROMISE; PROHIBITED COMPROMISE, ENUMERATED. — In
general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the
following matters: the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal
separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of
courts, and (6) future legitime. And like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise must not be contrary to laws, morals, good customs, public policy or public
order. A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties, unless the
consent of a party is vitiated — such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
in uence — or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably
unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts.
17.ID.; ID.; EFFECT THEREOF IN CIVIL ACTION. — One of the consequences of a
compromise, and usually its primary object, is to avoid or to end a litigation. In fact, the law
urges courts to persuade the parties in a civil case to agree to a fair settlement. As an
incentive, a court may mitigate damages to be paid by a losing party who shows a sincere
desire to compromise.
18.ID.; ID.; RELATING TO CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM AN OFFENSE DOES NOT
AUTOMATICALLY EXTINGUISH CRIMINAL LIABILITY; POWER TO GRANT CRIMINAL
IMMUNITY MUST BE SPECIFICALLY CONFERRED. — Any compromise relating to the civil
liability arising from an offense does not automatically terminate the criminal proceeding
against or extinguish the criminal liability of the malefactor. While a compromise in civil
suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards
criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred.
CSDcTA
19.ID.; COURTS; SUPREME COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER ISSUE INVOLVING THE
PRECISE INTERPRETATION IN TERMS OF SCOPE OF THE TWIN CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS ON PUBLIC TRANSACTIONS — In Tañada and Legaspi, we upheld therein
petitioners' resort to a mandamus proceeding, seeking to enforce a public right as well as
to compel performance of a public duty mandated by no less than the fundamental law.
Further, Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly confers upon the Supreme
C o ur t original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto a n d habeas corpus. Respondents argue that petitioner should have properly
sought relief before the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Civil Case No. 0141, in which the
enforcement of the compromise Agreements is pending resolution. There may seem to be
some merit in such argument; if petitioner is merely seeking to enjoin the enforcement of
the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to the public the terms contained
in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the public disclosure of "all
negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related to or
relating to such negotiations and Agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs." In
other words, this petition is not con ned to the Agreements that have already been drawn,
but likewise to any ongoing or future undertaking towards settlement on the alleged
Marcos loot. Ineluctably, the core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms
of scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on "public transactions." This broad and
prospective relief sought by the instant petition brings it out of the realm of Civil Case No.
0141.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN , J : p
Petitioner asks this Court to de ne the nature and the extent of the people's
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Does this right include
access to the terms of government negotiations, prior to their consummation or
conclusion? May the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a compromise
agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth? More
speci cally, are the "General Agreement" and "Supplemental Agreement," both dated
December 28, 1993 and executed between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, valid and
binding?
The Case
These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit
and "[e]njoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into,
perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of
Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad — including the so-called
Marcos gold hoard"; and (2) to "[c]ompel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations
and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating
to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs." 1
The Facts
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government
o cial who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed
unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the
country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several
news reports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997.
These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos
assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported
execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos
heirs, on how to split or share these assets. Cdpr
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information 3 and the correlative

duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, 4
demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that
any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of
"paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy"
that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence,
the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and
effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement
with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because
there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any
disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding.
Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject
Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitled
Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos , and that the Republic opposed such move on
the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been rati ed by or even
submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General
Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings
therein, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The
Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the
Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses' attorney-in-fact.
Furthermore, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in his May 4, 1998 Memorandum 5 to
then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, categorically stated:
"This is to reiterate my previous position embodied in the Palace Press
Release of 6 April 1995 that I have not authorized you to approve the Compromise
Agreements of December 28, 1993 or any agreement at all with the Marcoses, and
would have disapproved them had they been submitted to me.
"The Full Powers of Attorney of March 1994 and July 4, 1994, did not
authorize you to approve said Agreements, which I reserve for myself as President
of the Republic of the Philippines."
The assailed principal Agreement 6 reads:

"GENERAL AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS :
This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and
between —
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), a governmental agency vested with authority
de ned under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, with o ces at the
Philcomcen Building, Pasig, Metro Manila, represented by its Chairman
referred to as the FIRST PARTY,
— and —
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda Romualdez Marcos
and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., all of legal age, and with address at c/o No.
154 Lopez Rizal St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, Imee Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr., and Irene Marcos
Araneta, hereinafter collectively referred to as the PRIVATE PARTY.
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the PRIVATE PARTY has been impelled by their sense of
nationalism and love of country and of the entire Filipino people, and their desire
to set up a foundation and nance impact projects like installation of power
plants in selected rural areas and initiation of other community projects for the
empowerment of the people;
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss
Federal Tribunal of December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle
to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but
even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a nal
judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY;
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is desirous of avoiding a long-drawn out
litigation which, as proven by the past 7 years, is consuming money, time and
effort, and is counter-productive and ties up assets which the FIRST PARTY could
otherwise utilize for its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other
urgent needs;
WHEREAS, His Excellency, President Fidel V. Ramos, has adopted a policy
of unity and reconciliation in order to bind the nation's wounds and start the
process of rebuilding this nation as it goes on to the twenty-first century;
WHEREAS, this Agreement settles all claims and counterclaims which the
parties may have against one another, whether past, present, or future, matured or
inchoate.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants set
forth herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.The parties will collate all assets presumed to be owned by, or held by other
parties for the bene t of, the PRIVATE PARTY for purposes of determining
the totality of the assets covered by the settlement. The subject assets
shall be classi ed by the nature thereof, namely: (a) real estate; (b) jewelry;
(c) paintings and other works of art; (d) securities; (e) funds on deposit; (f)
precious metals, if any, and (g) miscellaneous assets or assets which
could not appropriately fall under any of the preceding classi cation. The
list shall be based on the full disclosure of the PRIVATE PARTY to insure
its accuracy.
2.Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded
to the FIRST PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained by the
PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of and
exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines.
However, considering the unavailability of all pertinent and relevant
documents and information as to balances and ownership, the actual
speci cation of assets to be retained by the PRIVATE PARTY shall be
covered by supplemental agreements which shall form part of this
Agreement.
3.Foreign assets which the PRIVATE PARTY shall fully disclose but which are
held by trustees, nominees, agents or foundations are hereby waived over
by the PRIVATE-PARTY in favor of the FIRST PARTY. For this purpose, the
parties shall cooperate in taking the appropriate action judicial and/or
extrajudicial, to recover the same for the FIRST PARTY.
4.All disclosures of assets made by the PRIVATE PARTY shall not be used as
evidence by the FIRST PARTY in any criminal, civil, tax or administrative
case, but shall be valid and binding against said PARTY for use by the
FIRST PARTY in withdrawing any account and/or recovering any asset.
The PRIVATE PARTY withdraws any objection to the withdrawal by and/or
release to the FIRST PARTY by the Swiss banks and/or Swiss authorities
of the $356 million, its accrued interests, and/or any other account; over
which the PRIVATE PARTY waives any right, interest or participation in
favor of the FIRST PARTY. However, any withdrawal or release of any
account aforementioned by the FIRST PARTY shall be made in the
presence of any authorized representative of the PRIVATE PARTY.
5.The trustees, custodians, safekeepers, depositaries, agents, nominees,
administrators, lawyers, or any other party acting in similar capacity in
behalf of the PRIVATE PARTY are hereby informed through this General
Agreement to insure that it is fully implemented and this shall serve as
absolute authority from both parties for full disclosure to the FIRST PARTY
of said assets and for the FIRST PARTY to withdraw said account and/or
assets and any other assets which the FIRST PARTY on its own or through
the help of the PRIVATE PARTY/their trustees, etc., may discover.
6.Any asset which may be discovered in the future as belonging to the PRIVATE
PARTY or is being held by another for the bene t of the PRIVATE PARTY
and which is not included in the list per No. 1 for whatever reason shall
automatically belong to the FIRST PARTY, and the PRIVATE PARTY in
accordance with No. 4 above, waives any right thereto.
7.This Agreement shall be binding on, and inure to the bene t of, the parties and
their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns and shall
supersede any other prior agreement.
8.The PARTIES shall submit this and any other implementing Agreements to the
President of the Philippines for approval. In the same manner, the PRIVATE
PARTY shall provide the FIRST PARTY assistance by way of testimony or
deposition on any information it may have that could shed light on the
cases being pursued by the FIRST PARTY against other parties. The FIRST
PARTY shall desist from instituting new suits already subject of this
Agreement against the PRIVATE PARTY and cause the dismissal of all
other cases pending in the Sandiganbayan and in other courts.
9.In case of violation by the PRIVATE PARTY of any of the conditions herein
contained, the PARTIES shall be restored automatically to the status quo
ante the signing of this Agreement.
For purposes of this Agreement, the PRIVATE PARTY shall be represented
by Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., as their only Attorney-in-Fact.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this 28th
day of December, 1993, in Makati, Metro Manila.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT
By:
[Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO
Chairman
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, MA.
IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., &
IRENE MARCOS ARANETA
By:
[Sgd.] IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS
[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. 7

[Sgd.] IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA
Assisted by:
[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR.
Counsel & Attorney-in-Fact"
Petitioner also denounces this supplement to the above Agreement: 8

"SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and
between —
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), a governmental agency vested with authority
de ned under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, with o ces at the
Philcomcen Building, Pasig, Metro Manila, represented by its Chairman
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo, hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY,
— and —
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda Romualdez Marcos
and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., all of legal age, and with address at c/o No.
154 Lopez Rizal St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, Imee Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr., and Irene Marcos
Araneta, hereinafter collectively referred to as the PRIVATE PARTY.
WITNESSETH:
The parties in this case entered into a General Agreement dated Dec. 28,
1993;
The PRIVATE PARTY expressly reserve their right to pursue their interest
and/or sue over local assets located in the Philippines against parties
other than the FIRST PARTY.
The parties hereby agree that all expenses related to the recovery and/or
withdrawal of all assets including lawyers' fees, agents' fees, nominees'
service fees, bank charges, traveling expenses and all other expenses
related thereto shall be for the account of the PRIVATE PARTY.
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the
PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that
may be eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this 28th
day of December, 1993, in Makati, Metro Manila.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT
By:
[Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL G. GUNIGUNDO
Chairman
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, MA.
IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., &
IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA
By:
[Sgd.] IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS
[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. 9
[Sgd] IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA
Assisted by:
[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR.
Counsel & Attorney-in-Fact"
Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order

10 dated March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives
from "entering into, or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth."
Issues
The Oral Argument, held on March 16, 1998, focused on the following issues: Cdpr
"(a)Procedural:
(1)Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to le
the instant petition; and
(2)Whether or not this Court is the proper court before which this action
may be filed.
(b)Substantive:
(1)Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the
public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and
(2)Whether or not there exist any legal restraints against a compromise
agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses' ill-
gotten wealth." 1 1
After their oral presentations, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson,
led before the Court a Motion for Intervention, attaching thereto their Petition in
Intervention. They aver that they are "among the 10,000 claimants whose right to claim
from the Marcos Family and/or the Marcos Estate is recognized by the decision in In re
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, Maximo Hilao, et al., Class
Plaintiffs No. 92-15526, U .S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit US App. Lexis 14796,
June 16, 1994 and the Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court of December 10, 1997." As
such, they claim to have personal and direct interest in the subject matter of the instant
case, since a distribution or disposition of the Marcos properties may adversely affect
their legitimate claims. In a minute Resolution issued on August 24, 1998, the Court
granted their motion to intervene and required the respondents to comment thereon.
The September 25, 1998 Comment 12 of the solicitor general on said motion merely
reiterated his aforecited arguments against the main petition. 13
The Court's Ruling
The petition is imbued with merit.
First Procedural Issue:
Petitioner's Standing
Petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the
legal personality to le the instant petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth
"belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in truth and in fact, part of the public treasury,"
any compromise in relation to it would constitute a diminution of the public funds,
which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a full, if not substantial,
recovery of such assets.
Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses is an issue "of transcendental importance to the public." He asserts that
ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity
of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are
"of paramount public interest;" and if they "immeasurably affect the social, economic,
and moral well-being of the people."
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satis es the requirement of personal
interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, 1 4 such as in this
case. He invokes several decisions in 1 5 of this Court which have set aside the
procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest.
On the other hand, the solicitor general, on behalf of respondents, contends that
petitioner has no standing to institute the present action, because no expenditure of
public funds is involved and said petitioner has no actual interest in the alleged
agreement. Respondents further insist that the instant petition is premature, since there
is no showing that petitioner has requested PCGG to disclose any such negotiations
and agreements; or that, if he has, the Commission has refused to do so.
Indeed, the arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional
rule as regards his legal standing to institute the instant petition. Access to public
documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people
themselves. 1 6
In Tañada v. Tuvera , 17 the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public
right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is su cient that
petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. 18 In the
aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters
of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, 19 in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the O cial Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling
for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be
enforced "is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land."
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission , 2 0 while reiterating Tañada, further declared
that "when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satis ed by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen
and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right." 2 1
Further, in Albano v. Reyes , 2 2 we said that while expenditure of public funds may
not have been involved under the questioned contract for the development, the
management and the operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, "public
interest [was] de nitely involved considering the important role [of the subject
contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the
nancial consideration involved." We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure
provision in the Constitution would constitute su cient authority for upholding the
petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information
and access to o cial records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under
Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a
Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by
decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public
right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be
allowed.
In any event, the question on the standing of Petitioner Chavez is rendered moot
by the intervention of the Jopsons, who are among the legitimate claimants to the
Marcos wealth. The standing of the Jopsons is not seriously contested by the solicitor
general. Indeed, said petitioners-intervenors have a legal interest in the subject matter
of the instant case, since a distribution or disposition of the Marcoses' ill-gotten
properties may adversely affect the satisfaction of their claims.
Second Procedural Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioner asserts that because this petition is an original action for mandamus
and one that is not intended to delay any proceeding in the Sandiganbayan, its having
been led before this Court was proper. He invokes Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions
for prohibition and mandamus.
The solicitor general, on the other hand, argues that the petition has been
erroneously brought before this Court, since there is neither a justiciable controversy
nor a violation of petitioner's rights by the PCGG. He alleges that the assailed
agreements are already the very lis mota in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0141, which
has yet to dispose of the issue; thus, this petition is premature. Furthermore,
respondents themselves have opposed the Marcos heirs' motion, led in the graft
court, for the approval of the subject Agreements. Such opposition belies petitioner's
claim that the government, through respondents, has concluded a settlement with the
Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten assets.
I n Tañada and Legaspi, we upheld therein petitioners' resort to a mandamus
proceeding, seeking to enforce a public right as well as to compel performance of a
public duty mandated by no less than the fundamental law. 23 Further, Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution, expressly confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
Respondents argue that petitioner should have properly sought relief before the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Civil Case No. 0141, in which the enforcement of the
compromise Agreements is pending resolution. There may seem to be some merit in
such argument; if petitioner is merely seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the
compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to the public the terms contained
in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the public disclosure of "all
negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related to
or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos
heirs."
In other words, this petition is not con ned to the Agreements that have already
been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any
settlement on the alleged Marcos loot. Ineluctably, the core issue boils down to the
precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on "public
transactions." This broad and prospective relief sought by the instant petition brings it
out of the realm of Civil Case No. 0141.
First Substantive Issue:
Public Disclosure of Terms of Any Agreement, Perfected or Not
In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining to a
compromise settlement with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth,
petitioner invokes the following provisions of the Constitution:
"Sec. 7[Article III]. — The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to o cial records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to o cial acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
"Sec. 28[Article II]. — Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,

the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."
Respondents' opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions refer to

completed and operative o cial acts, not to those still being considered. As regards
the assailed Agreements entered into by the PCGG with the Marcoses, there is yet no
right of action that has accrued, because said Agreements have not been approved by
the President, and the Marcos heirs have failed to ful ll their express undertaking
therein. Thus, the Agreements have not become effective. Respondents add that they
are not aware of any ongoing negotiation for another compromise with the Marcoses
regarding their alleged ill-gotten assets.
The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of
the Constitution have as yet no de ned scope and extent. There are no speci c laws
prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the
correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the
recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (7)
trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other con dential
information.
Limitations to the Right:

(1)National Security Matters
At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there
is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. 24 But where there is
no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold
documents and other information, 25 provided that they are examined "in strict
confidence" and given "scrupulous protection."
Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the
sake of national interest. 26
(2)Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions
The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally a rmed that, aside from
national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets
(pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27 and other related laws) as well as
banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28 ) are also
exempted from compulsory disclosure. 29
(3)Criminal Matters
Also excluded are classi ed law enforcement matters, such as those relating to
the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, 30 which courts may
not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law
enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example,
police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads
on covert criminal activities. cdrep
(4)Other Confidential Information

The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public o cials and employees
from using or divulging "con dential or classi ed information o cially known to them
by reason of their office and not made available to the public." 32
Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic
correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house
of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. 33
Scope: Matters of Public Concern and
Transactions Involving Public Interest
In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., 34 the Court emphasized that the information sought
must be "matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly,
the state policy of full public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public
interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." As to
the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, 35 elucidated:
"In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern
there is no rigid test which can be applied. 'Public concern' like 'public interest' is a
term that eludes exact de nition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the nal analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to
or affects the public."
Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the "legitimate

concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility
are occupied only by persons who are eligibles." So was the need to give the general
public adequate noti cation of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and
conduct of citizens, as held in Tañada. Likewise did the "public nature of the loanable
funds of the GSIS and the public o ce held by the alleged borrowers (members of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa)" qualify the information sought in Valmonte as matters
of public interest and concern. In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 3 6 the Court also held
that o cial acts of public o cers done in pursuit of their o cial functions are public in
character; hence, the records pertaining to such o cial acts and decisions are within
the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records.
Under Republic Act No. 6713, public o cials and employees are mandated to
"provide information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable
language, [and] ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearings
whenever appropriate . . .," except when "otherwise provided by law or when required by
the public interest." In particular, the law mandates free public access, at reasonable
hours, to the annual performance reports of o ces and agencies of government and
government-owned or controlled corporations; and the statements of assets, liabilities
and financial disclosures of all public officials and employees. 3 7
In general, writings coming into the hands of public o cers in connection with
their o cial functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of
transparency of governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an
opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the
government are honestly, faithfully and competently performing their functions as
public servants. 3 8 Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free ow of
thought; 3 9 but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the public would gain
a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as
well as participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and
effective manner. Certainly, it is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of
ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the
changes desired by the people. 4 0
The Nature of the Marcoses'
Alleged Ill-Gotten Wealth
We now come to the immediate matter under consideration.
Upon the departure from the country of the Marcos family and their cronies in
February 1986, the new government headed by President Corazon C. Aquino was
speci cally mandated to "[r]ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and
supporters of the previous regime and [to] protect the interest of the people through
orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." 4 1 Thus, President Aquino's
very rst executive orders (which partook of the nature of legislative enactments) dealt
with the recovery of these alleged ill-gotten properties.
Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after
the Marcoses ed the country, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist
the President in the recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates both
here and abroad.
Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons and
entities who had knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were
warned and, under pain of penalties prescribed by law, prohibited from concealing,
transferring or dissipating them or from otherwise frustrating or obstructing the
recovery efforts of the government.
On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional
powers to the PCGG which, taking into account the overriding considerations of
national interest and national survival, required it to achieve expeditiously and
effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten wealth.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from
the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten
wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. 42 We may also
add that "ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the
aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-gotten wealth" refers to assets and properties
purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal
use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their
public o ce; or their use of powers, in uences or relationships, "resulting in their unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines." Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly
originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they
belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public
treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may
be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding consideration for the
expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national economic
recovery.
We believe the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner
has a right to respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at
concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth.
Access to Information on Negotiating Terms
But does the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to information
regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the nal agreement? This same
clari cation was sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners
during their deliberations, which we quote hereunder: 4 3
"MR. SUAREZ.
And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from
contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to
the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to
the contract itself?
"MR. OPLE.
The 'transactions' used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated
contract, Mr. Presiding. Officer.
"MR. SUAREZ.
This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation
of the transaction?
"MR. OPLE.
Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest."
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its o cers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose su cient public information on any proposed settlement
they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealt h. Such information, though, must pertain to de nite propositions of the
government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications 44 during the stage when common assertions are still in the process
of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to
observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed
earlier — such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations,
intelligence and other classified information.
Second Substantive Issue:
Legal Restraints on a Marcos-PCGG Compromise
Petitioner lastly contends that any compromise agreement between the
government and the Marcoses will be a virtual condonation of all the alleged wrongs
done by them, as well as an unwarranted permission to commit graft and corruption.
Respondents, for their part, assert that there is no legal restraint on entering into
a compromise with the Marcos heirs, provided the agreement does not violate any law.
cda
Prohibited Compromises
In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to
the following matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a
legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the
jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitime. 45 And like any other contract, the terms
and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy or public order. 46 A compromise is binding and has the force of law
between the parties, 47 unless the consent of a party is vitiated — such as by mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation or undue in uence — or when there is forgery, or if the
terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the
agreement may be invalidated by the courts. 48
Effect of Compromise
on Civil Actions
One of the consequences of a compromise, and usually its primary object, is to
avoid or to end a litigation. 49 In fact, the law urges courts to persuade the parties in a
civil case to agree to a fair settlement. 50 As an incentive, a court may mitigate
damages to be paid by a losing party who shows a sincere desire to compromise. 51
I n Republic & Campos Jr. v. Sandiganbayan , 52 which a rmed the grant by the
PCGG of civil and criminal immunity to Jose Y. Campos and family, the Court held that
in the absence of an express prohibition, the rule on compromises in civil actions under
the Civil Code is applicable to PCGG cases. Such principle is pursuant to the objectives
of EO No. 14, particularly the just and expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth, so that it
may be used to hasten economic recovery. The same principle was upheld in Benedicto
v. Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBC 53 and Republic v.
Benedicto, 54 which ruled in favor of the validity of the PCGG compromise agreement
with Roberto S. Benedicto.
Immunity from
Criminal Prosecution
However, any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from an offense
does not automatically terminate the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the
criminal liability of the malefactor. 55 While a compromise in civil suits is expressly
authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal liability. The
authority must be speci cally conferred. In the present case, the power to grant
criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by
EO No. 14-A, which provides:
"SEC. 5.The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized
to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides
information or testi es in any investigation conducted by such Commission to
establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused
has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question in any case
where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter's
guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to
protect the witness who repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when
required to do so by the latter or by the Commission."
The above provision speci es that the PCGG may exercise such authority under
these conditions: (1) the person to whom criminal immunity is granted provides
information or testi es in an investigation conducted by the Commission; (2) the
information or testimony pertains to the unlawful manner in which the respondent,
defendant or accused acquired or accumulated ill-gotten property; and (3) such
information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove guilt or civil liability of such
individual. From the wording of the law, it can be easily deduced that the person
referred to is a witness in the proceeding, not the principal respondent, defendant or
accused.
Thus, in the case of Jose Y. Campos, the grant of both civil and criminal immunity
to him and his family was "[i]n consideration of the full cooperation of Mr. Jose Y.
Campos [with] this Commission, his voluntary surrender of the properties and assets
[—] disclosed and declared by him to belong to deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos
[—] to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines[;] his full, complete and truthful
disclosures[;] and his commitment to pay a sum of money as determined by the
Philippine Government." 5 6 Moreover, the grant of criminal immunity to the Camposes
and the Benedictos was limited to acts and omissions prior to February 25, 1996. At
the time such immunity was granted, no criminal eases have yet been filed against them
before the competent courts.
Validity of the PCGG-Marcos
Compromise Agreements
Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the
PCGG and the Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal aws. First,
the Agreements do not conform to the above requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. We
believe that criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who
are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before
the Sandiganbayan. As stated earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses
who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-
gotten wealth case.
While the General Agreement states that the Marcoses "shall provide the
[government] assistance by way of testimony or deposition on any information [they]
may have that could shed light on the cases being pursued by the [government] against
other parties," 5 7 the clause does not fully comply with the law. Its inclusion in the
Agreement may have been only an afterthought, conceived in pro forma compliance
with Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended. There is no indication whatsoever that any of
the Marcos heirs has indeed provided vital information against any respondent or
defendant as to the manner in which the latter may have unlawfully acquired public
property.
Second, under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to
exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This
is a clear violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is
vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. 5 8 Section
28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, speci cally provides: "No law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under
the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from paying
taxes on their properties, such law will de nitely not pass the test of the equal
protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor
only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the
constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform and equitable." 59
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the
commissioner of internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be
exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against
the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's nancial position demonstrates a clear inalibity to
pay. 6 0 De nitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the Marcoses, because
under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims against
their properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of
tax exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax
liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or
excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not
justify the collection of the tax due. 6 1 In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability is
done even before the determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal violations
of the Tax Code, for which legal actions have been led in court or in which fraud is
involved, cannot be compromised. 6 2
Third, the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the
Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts. 63 This is a direct
encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well-
settled is the doctrine that once a case has been led before a court of competent
jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and
control of the judge. In a criminal case, the manner in which the prosecution is handled,
including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may lie within the sound
discretion of the government prosecutor; 64 but the court decides, based on the
evidence proffered, in what manner it will dispose of the case. Jurisdiction, once
acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the justice secretary,
to withdraw the information or to dismiss the complaint. 65 The prosecution's motion
to withdraw or to dismiss is not the least binding upon the court. On the contrary,
decisional rules require the trial court to make its own evaluation of the merits of the
case, because granting such motion is equivalent to effecting a disposition of the case
itself. 66
Thus, the PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot
guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the
courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion.
Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims, "whether past,
present, or future, matured or inchoate," against the Marcoses. 6 7 Again, this all-
encompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future
fraud may not be waived. 6 8 The stipulation in the Agreement does not specify the exact
scope of future claims against the Marcoses that the government thereby relinquishes.
Such vague and broad statement may well be interpreted to include all future illegal
acts of any of the Marcos heirs, practically giving them a license to perpetrate fraud
against the government without any liability at all. This is a palpable violation of the due
process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces
the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for
public accountability. It is a virtual warrant for public o cials to amass public funds
illegally, since there is an open option to compromise their liability in exchange for only
a portion of their ill-gotten wealth.
Fifth, the Agreements do not provide for a de nite or determinable period within
which the parties shall ful ll their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before
the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets.
Sixth, the Agreements do not state with speci city the standards for determining
which assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the
Marcoses. While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be
entitled to 25 per cent of the $356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery
expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only to the said deposits. No similar
splitting scheme is de ned with respect to the other properties. Neither is there,
anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing
ratio. Public o cers entering into an arrangement appearing to be manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, 69 invite their indictment of corruption under the said law.
Finally, the absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal
Agreement, and express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and
unenforceable. Nevertheless, as detailed above, even if such approval were obtained,
the Agreements would still not be valid. cdasia
From the foregoing disquisition, it is crystal clear to the Court that the General
and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG
entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution and the laws
aforementioned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental
Agreements dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into
are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution.
Respondent PCGG, its o cers and all government functionaries and o cials who are
or may be directly or indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of
any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the nal agreement, relating to such
alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Melo and Quisumbing, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VITUG , J .:
In concur in the results, pro hac vice, for it is paramount that matters of national
interest deserve a proper place in any forum. The procedural rules in the courts of law,
like the locus standi of petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, the propriety of the special legal
action of mandamus used as a vehicle to reach this Court on the issues involved and
considered by the Court, as well as kindred legal technicalities and nicety raised by
respondents to thwart the petition are no trickle matters, to be sure, but I do not see
them to be cogent reasons to deny to the Court its taking cognizance of the case.
It is a cardinal principle in constitutional adjudication that anyone who invokes it
has a personal and substantial interest on the dispute. 1 Jurisprudentially there is either
the lenient or the strict approach in the appreciation of legal standing. The liberal
approach recognizes legal standing to raise constitutional issues of nontraditional
plaintiffs, such as taxpayers and citizens, directly affecting them. 2 A developing trend
appears to be towards a narrow and exacting approach, requiring that a logical nexus
must be shown between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated in
order to ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power. 3
With respect to the right to information, it being a public right where the real
parties in interest are the people themselves in general 4 and where the only recognized
limitation is "public concern," it would seem that the framers of the Constitution have
favored the liberal approach. Rev. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a member of the
Constitutional Commission, observes: LLphil
The real problem, however, lies in determining what matters are of public
concern and what are not. Unwittingly perhaps, by this provision the Constitution
might have opened a Pandora's box. For certainly every act of a public o cer in
the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern.
Jurisprudence in fact has said that "public concern," like "public interest," eludes
exact de nition and embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public
may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply
because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. 5
Corollarily, there is need of preserving a certain degree of con dentiality in

matters involving national security and public relations, to cite a few, 6 and until a
balance is struck, the Court may be constrained on occasions to accept an eclectic
notion that frees itself from the shackles of the trenchant requisites of locus standi.
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has a limited life in
carrying out its tasks and time is running short. It is thus imperative that the Court must
hold even now, and remind PCGG, that it has indeed exceeded its bounds in entering
into the General and Supplemental Agreements. The agreements clearly suffer from
Constitutional and statutory in rmities, 7 to wit: (1) The agreements contravene the
statute in granting criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs; 8 (2) PCGG's commitment to
exempt from all forms of taxes the property to be retained the Marcos' heirs
controverts the Constitution; 9 and (3) the government's undertaking to cause the
dismissal of all cases led against the Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan
and other courts encroaches upon judicial powers. I also see, like my other colleagues,
too much vagueness on such items as the period within which the parties shall ful ll
their respective prestations and the lack of appropriate standards for determining the
assets to be forfeited by the government and those to be retained by the Marcoses.
In this respect, while there is legal possibility when the terms of a contract are
not totally invalidated and only those opposed to law, morals, good customs, public
order and public policy are rendered ine cacious, when, however, the assailed
provisions can be seen to be of essence, like here, the agreement in its entirety can be
adversely affected. True, the validity or invalidity of a contract is a matter that generally
may not be passed upon in a mandamus petition, for it is as if petitioner were seeking
declaratory relief or an advisory opinion from this Court over which it has no original
jurisdiction, 1 0 the immediacy and signi cance of the issues, nevertheless, has impelled
the Court rightly assume jurisdiction and to resolve the incidental, albeit major, issues
that evidently and continually vex the parties.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition. LLphil
Footnotes
1.Petition, p. 3; rollo, p. 4.
2.Annexed to the Petition were the following news articles:
1.Estrella Torres, "$2-B FM Hoard Found," Today , September 25, 1997, p. 1.
2."Gov't Working Out Secret Deal on Marcos Gold," The Manila Times, September 25,
1997, p. 1.
3.Estrella Torres, "FVR Man Has FM Money," Today , September 27, 1997, p. 1.
4.Donna Cueto and Cathy Cañares, "Swiss, RP Execs Plotted Gold Sale," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, September 28, 1997.
5.Jocelyn Montemayor, "Coded Swiss Accounts Traced to Palace Boys?" The Manila
Times, September 29, 1997.
3.§ 7, Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
4.§ 28, Art. II, ibid.
5.The solicitor general's Manifestation, dated August 11, 1998.
6.Rollo, pp. 213-216.
7.It appears that Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. did not sign the General Agreement.
8.Rollo, pp. 217-218.
9.It appears that Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr did not sign the Supplemental Agreement either.
10.Rollo, pp. 159-160.

11.Resolution dated March 16, 1998, pp. 1-2; ibid., pp. 147-148.
12.Rollo, pp. 396-403.
13.This case was deemed submitted for resolution on September 28, 1998, when the Court
received the solicitor general's Comment on the Motion and Petition for Intervention.
14.Citing Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 536, May 29, 1987.
15.Such as Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, May 14,
1991; Kapatiran ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan , 163
SCRA 371, June 30, 1988.
16.Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. A Commentary ,
1996 ed., p. 334.
17.136 SCRA 27, 36-37, April 24, 1985, per Escolin, J.

18.Quoting from Severino v. Governor General, 16 Phil 366, 378 (1910).
19."Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized, access to o cial records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
o cial acts, transactions, or decisions shall be afforded the citizens subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law."
20.Supra, per Cortes, J.
21.Also in Gonzales v. Chavez , 205 SCRA 816, 847, February 4, 1992. Cf. Oposa v. Factoran ,
224 SCRA 792, July 30, 1993.
22.175 SCRA 264, 273, July 11, 1989, per Paras, J.

23.See also Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., 170. SCRA 256, February 13, 1989.
24.IV RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 921-922, 931 (1986) [hereafter,
"RECORD"]; Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, 295, 297, May 23, 1995.
25.Almonte, ibid.
26.V RECORD 25.
27.RA No. 8293, approved on June 6, 1997.
28.RA No. 1405, as amended.

29.V RECORD 25. See also Vol. 1, p. 709.
30.66 Am Jur § 27, Records and Recording Laws.
31.RA No. 6713, enacted on February 20, 1989.
32.§ 7 (c), ibid.

33.Legaspi, supra.
34.Supra, p. 266.
35.Supra, p. 541. Also quoted in Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., supra.
36.203 SCRA 515, 522-23, November 13, 1991.

37.§§ 5(b) & 8, RA No. 6713.
38.66 Am Jur § 19, Records and Recording Laws, citing MacEwan v. Holm, 266 Or 27, 359
P2d 413, 85, ALR2d 1086.
39.See Legaspi, supra, p. 540.
40.16A Am Jur 2d 315-317, § 497.

41.§ 1 (d), Art. II of Proclamation No. 3 (known as the Provisional or Freedom Constitution),
promulgated on March 25, 1986.
42.Republic v. Provident International Resources Corp., 269 SCRA 316, 325, March 7, 1997;
Republic v. Palanca, 182 SCRA 911, 918, February 28, 1990; Republic v. Lobregat et al.,
376 SCRA 388, January 23, 1995.
43.V RECORD 25 (1986).
44.66 Am Jur 2d § 39.

45.Art. 2035, Civil Code; Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Benedict, et al., 226 SCRA 314, 327,
September 10, 1993.
46.Art. 2028 in rel. to Art. 1306, Civil Code; Republic v. Benedicto, ibid, citing First Philippine
Holdings Corp. v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 212, September 30, 1991; Heirs of Gabriel
Capili v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 110, 115, July 14, 1994.
47.Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 108947, September 29, 1997.
48.Art. 2038 in rel. to Art. 1330, Civil Code; Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 189, 199-
200, March 20, 1996; Unicane Workers Union, CLUP v. NLRC, 261 SCRA 573, September
9, 1996; Del Rosario v. Madayag, 247 SCRA 767, 770, August 28, 1995.
49.Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra ; Del Rosario v. Madayag, supra ; Osmeña v.
Commission on Audit, 238 SCRA 463, 471, November 29, 1994.
50.Art. 2029, Civil Code.
51.Art. 2031, ibid.
52.173 SCRA 72, 84, May 4, 1989.

53.207 SCRA 659, 667, March 31, 1992.
54.Supra, pp. 319 & 324.
55.Art. 2034, Civil Code.

56.Republic & Campos Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 83.
57.General Agreement, par. 8.
58.Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos , 261 SCRA 667, September 11,
1996.
59.§ 28 (1), Art. VI, Constitution, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals , 261
SCRA 236, August 29, 1996; Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 249 SCRA 628, October
30, 1995; Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan , 163
SCRA 371, 383, June 30, 1988, citing City of Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil. 912, 919-920
(1968).
60.§ 204 (1), National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by § 3, RA 7646.
61.§ 204 (2), NIRC.

62.Par. 2, ibid.
63.General Agreement, par. 8.
64.People v. Nazareno , 260 SCRA 256, August 1, 1996; People v. Porras, 255 SCRA 514,
March 29, 1996.
65.Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 113216, September 5, 1997, pp. 21-22.

66.Ibid., p. 23, citing Crespo v. Mogul , 151 SCRA 462, June 30, 1987; Marcelo v. Court of
Appeals, 235 SCRA 39, August 4, 1994; Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575,
October 13, 1994; and Roberts Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307, March 5, 1996.
67.Last "Whereas" clause of the General Agreement.
68.Art. 1171.
69.Specifically § 3 (g) of RA 3019.

VITUG, J.:
1.People v. Vera , 65 Phil. 56, 89; Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority , 224 SCRA 238,
244.
2.Defensor Santiago, Miriam, Constitutional Law, First Edition, 1994, p. 11.

3.Am Jur § 189, 591, S. v D., 410 US 641, 35 L Ed 2d 536, 93 S Ct 1146.
4.Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 540, Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27,
36, 37.
5.The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 edition, pp.
336-337.
6.Ibid.
7.Noteworthy is the absence of the President's Imprimatur on the agreement.
8.Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-A.
9.Section 28 (4), Article VI, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. No law
granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of Congress.
10.Sec. 17, Republic Act No. 296, Judiciary Act of 1948; Sec. 5, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines; Remontigue vs. Osmeña, Jr. , 129 Phil. 60, 61; Rural
Bank of Olongapo, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Land Registration, et al., 102 Phil. 794-
795.

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998.]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ , petitioner, vs . PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF

12.ID.; ID.; STIPULATION IN COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PCGG AND

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information 3 and the correlative

The assailed principal Agreement 6 reads:

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. 7

Counsel & Attorney-in-Fact"

Petitioner also denounces this supplement to the above Agreement: 8

[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC

[Sgd] IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA

Counsel & Attorney-in-Fact"

Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order

"Sec. 28[Article II]. — Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,

Respondents' opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions refer to

Limitations to the Right:

(4)Other Confidential Information

Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the "legitimate

Corollarily, there is need of preserving a certain degree of con dentiality in

10.Rollo, pp. 159-160.

17.136 SCRA 27, 36-37, April 24, 1985, per Escolin, J.

22.175 SCRA 264, 273, July 11, 1989, per Paras, J.

28.RA No. 1405, as amended.

32.§ 7 (c), ibid.

36.203 SCRA 515, 522-23, November 13, 1991.

40.16A Am Jur 2d 315-317, § 497.

44.66 Am Jur 2d § 39.

52.173 SCRA 72, 84, May 4, 1989.

55.Art. 2034, Civil Code.

61.§ 204 (2), NIRC.

65.Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 113216, September 5, 1997, pp. 21-22.

69.Specifically § 3 (g) of RA 3019.

2.Defensor Santiago, Miriam, Constitutional Law, First Edition, 1994, p. 11.

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