692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Tuanda

*
Adm. Case No. 3360. January 30, 1990.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, vs. ATTY.

FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

Lawyers; Suspension; Moral Turpitude; Criminal Law;

Bouncing Checks Law; Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious
criminal offense which affects public interest and public order; it is
a crime involving moral turpitude, hence, conviction of such crime
justifies petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law.—The
Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by
the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that “the offense [of] which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude.” We should add that violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously
affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, the
Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 in the following terms: “x x x x x x x x x The gravamen of the
offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing
a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. x x x The thrust of the law is to prohibit
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense
against public order. x x x x x x x x x The effects of the issuance of
a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of
the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong
to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The
harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.”
(Italics supplied)
Same; Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to an admission
to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.—We should add that the crimes
of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and
violation of her attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which

________________

* EN BANC.

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VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 693

People vs. Tuanda

she was bound to “obey the laws of the land.” Conviction of a

crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case,
violation B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the
profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects
the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In
Melendrez v. Decena, this Court stressed that: “the nature of the
office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.”

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Motion

to Lift Order of Suspension.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989,

respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar,
asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of
law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total
stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis,
with the condition that the respondent would turn over the
sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez
on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February
1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of
jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00,
issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for
the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February
1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check
dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00.
Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days
after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by
the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of
funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and
made no
694

694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Tuanda

effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against
respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one
for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b)
three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively
as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361.
In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision
dated 25 August 1987 which:

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all
three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of
P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the
amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 85-38359;

to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00,
in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all
three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093

affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in
addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice
of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows:

“For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to

sustain the conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED
subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a
member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended
from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until
further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of
this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required
by Section 29 of the1 same Rule.
SO ORDERED.”

______________

1 Court of Appeals’ Decision, p. 7; Rollo p. 14; italics supplied.

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VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 695

People vs. Tuanda

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal

with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent’s
Notice of Appeal and advised her “to address her Notice of
Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper
forum.” On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this
Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court
noted without action respondent’s Notice of Appeal and
declared that the Court of Appeals’ decision of 17 October
1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the
period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16
December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that
respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when
she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the
reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,
respondent states:

“that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a

not painful penalty aggravating the lower court’s penalty of fine
considering that accused-appellant’s action on the case during the
trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated
purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged
nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-
appellee.”

We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent

that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the
checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage
to complainant Ms. Mar-quez.

The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law

imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that “the offense [of]
which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude.” We
should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious
criminal offense which deleteriously affects public
2
interest
and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, the Court
explained the nature of the offense of

________________

2 146 SCRA 323 (1986).

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696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Tuanda

violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:

“x x x     x x x      x x x
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act
of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. x x x The thrust of
the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed
by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property but an offense against public order.
x x x     x x x     x x x The effects of the issuance of a worthless
check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to
the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.”3 (Italics
supplied)

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice

of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

“Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on

what grounds.—A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” (Italics supplied)
“Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a

_______________

3 146 SCRA at 338 and 340.

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VOL. 181, JANUARY 30, 1990 697

People vs. Tuanda

Court of First Instance.—The Court of Appeals or a Court of First

Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.” (Italics
supplied)

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was

convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney’s
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under
both of which she was bound to “obey the laws of the land.”
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not
(as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not)
relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however,
it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character
of a person
4
convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v.
Decena, this Court stressed that:
 “the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she
shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not
only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law;
its continued possession
5
is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law.”

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion

to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders
from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be
forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.

          Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz,

Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortés and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
     Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., In the
result.

Motion denied.

Note.—Failure of lawyer to live up to the high

standards of the law profession, his name in Roll of
Attorneys be stricken

________________

4 Administrative Case No. 2104, promulgated 24 August 1989.

5 Id., slip op., p. 16; italics supplied.

698

698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ponferrada vs. Relator

out. (Diaz vs. Gerong, 141 SCRA 46.)

——o0o——

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