Gen Eng Wiki
Gen Eng Wiki
Gen Eng Wiki
org/wiki/Bosnian_genocide
Bosnian genocide
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article needs to be updated. Please update this article to reflect recent events or
newly available information. (July 2017)
Bosnian Genocide
Part of the Bosnian War
The term Bosnian genocide refers to either genocide at Srebrenica and Žepa[5] committed by
Bosnian Serb forces in 1995 or the wider ethnic cleansing campaign throughout areas
controlled by the Army of Republika Srpska[6] that took place during the 1992–1995 Bosnian
War.[7]
The events in Srebrenica in 1995 included the killing of more than 8,000 Bosniak ("Bosnian
Muslim") men and boys, as well as the mass expulsion of another 25,000–30,000 Bosniak
civilians, in and around the town of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina, committed by
units of the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) under the command of General Ratko
Mladić.[8][9]
The ethnic cleansing campaign that took place throughout areas controlled by the Bosnian
Serbs targeted Muslim Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. The ethnic cleansing campaign included
unlawful confinement, murder, rape, sexual assault, torture, beating, robbery, and inhumane
treatment of civilians; the targeting of political leaders, intellectuals, and professionals; the
unlawful deportation and transfer of civilians; the unlawful shelling of civilians; the unlawful
appropriation and plunder of real and personal property; the destruction of homes and
businesses; and the destruction of places of worship.[10]
In the 1990s, several authorities asserted that ethnic cleansing as carried out by elements of
the Bosnian Serb army was genocide.[11] These included a resolution by the United Nations
General Assembly and three convictions for genocide in German courts (the convictions were
based upon a wider interpretation of genocide than that used by international courts).[12] In
2005, the United States Congress passed a resolution declaring that "the Serbian policies of
aggression and ethnic cleansing meet the terms defining genocide".[13]
However, in line with a majority of legal scholars, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have ruled that, in
order for actions to be deemed genocide, there must be physical or biological destruction of a
protected group and a specific intent to commit such destruction. To date, only the Srebrenica
massacre has been found to be a genocide by the ICTY, a finding upheld by the ICJ.[14] On 24
March 2016, former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and the first president of the
Republika Srpska, was found guilty of genocide in Srebrenica, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity—10 of the 11 eleven charges in total—and sentenced to 40 years'
imprisonment.[15][16]
Contents
1 United Nations
2 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
o 2.1 Finding of genocide at Srebrenica
o 2.2 Finding of genocide at Žepa
o 2.3 Milošević trial
o 2.4 Bosnian Genocide Trial
o 2.5 Involvement of Serbia
3 United States House and Senate resolutions
4 International Court of Justice (ICJ): Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro
o 4.1 Criticism of the ICJ judgement
4.1.1 Missing SDC Records
5 European Court of Human Rights
6 European Parliament
7 Individuals prosecuted for genocide during the Bosnian War
8 Death toll
9 Controversy and denial
o 9.1 Denial
10 See also
11 Footnotes
12 References
o 12.1 Other sources
13 Further reading
14 External links
United Nations
External video
On 18 December 1992, the United Nations General Assembly resolution 47/121 in its
preamble deemed ethnic cleansing to be a form of genocide stating:
Gravely concerned about the deterioration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina owing to intensified aggressive acts by the Serbian and Montenegrin forces to
acquire more territories by force, characterized by a consistent pattern of gross and systematic
violations of human rights, a burgeoning refugee population resulting from mass expulsions
of defenceless civilians from their homes and the existence in Serbian and Montenegrin
controlled areas of concentration camps and detention centres, in pursuit of the abhorrent
policy of "ethnic cleansing", which is a form of genocide, ...
On 12 July 2007, in its judgement on the Jorgić v. Germany case, the European Court of
Human Rights noted that:
the ICTY, in its judgments in the cases of Prosecutor v. Krstić and Prosecutor v. Kupreškić,
expressly disagreed with the wide interpretation of the 'intent to destroy' as adopted by the UN
General Assembly and the German courts. Referring to the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege, the ICTY considered that genocide, as defined in public international law, comprised
only acts aimed at the physical or biological destruction of a protected group.
In 2001, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) judged that
the 1995 Srebrenica massacre was genocide.[21] In the unanimous ruling "Prosecutor v.
Krstić", the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), located in The Hague, reaffirmed that the Srebrenica massacre was
genocide,[22] the Presiding Judge Theodor Meron stating:
By seeking to eliminate a part of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb forces committed
genocide. They targeted for extinction the forty thousand Bosnian Muslims living in
Srebrenica, a group which was emblematic of the Bosnian Muslims in general. They stripped
all the male Muslim prisoners, military and civilian, elderly and young, of their personal
belongings and identification, and deliberately and methodically killed them solely on the
basis of their identity.[23]
In September 2006, former Bosnian Serb leader Momcilo Krajišnik was found guilty of
multiple instances of crimes against humanity, but while the ICTY judges found that there
was evidence that crimes committed in Bosnia constituted the criminal act of genocide (actus
reus), they did not establish that the accused possessed genocidal intent, or was part of a
criminal enterprise that had such an intent (mens rea).[24]
In 2007, the court found insufficient evidence to conclude on alleged genocidal intent.[25]
The Court is however not convinced, on the basis of the evidence before it, that it has been
conclusively established that the massive killings of members of the protected group were
committed with the specific intent (dolus specialis) on the part of the perpetrators to destroy,
in whole or in part, the group as such. The killings outlined above may amount to war crimes
and crimes against humanity, but the Court has no jurisdiction to determine whether this is so.
In the case of Tolimir, in the first degree verdict, the International Criminal Tribunal has
concluded that genocide was committed in the enclave of Žepa, outside of Srebrenica.[5]
However, that conviction was overturned by the appeals chamber, which narrowed the crime
of genocide only to Srebrenica.
Milošević trial
246. On the basis of the inference that may be drawn from this evidence, a Trial Chamber
could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there existed a joint criminal enterprise,
which included members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, whose aim and intention was to
destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim population, and that genocide was in fact committed in
Brčko, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Ključ and Bosanski Novi. The genocidal
intent of the Bosnian Serb leadership can be inferred from all the evidence, including the
evidence set out in paragraphs 238 -245. The scale and pattern of the attacks, their intensity,
the substantial number of Muslims killed in the seven municipalities, the detention of
Muslims, their brutal treatment in detention centres and elsewhere, and the targeting of
persons essential to the survival of the Muslims as a group are all factors that point to
genocide.[26]
On 26 February 2007, however, in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, the
United Nations International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that there was no evidence linking
Serbia under the rule of Milošević to genocide committed by Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian
War. However, the court did find that Milošević and others in Serbia did not do enough to
prevent acts of genocide from occurring in Srebrenica.[27]
Currently, former Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić are both on trial
on two counts of genocide and other war crimes committed in Srebrenica, Prijedor, Ključ, and
other municipalities of Bosnia. Karadžić and Mladić are charged, separately, with:
Count 1: Genocide.
Municipalities: Bratunac, Foča, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Vlasenica
and Zvornik. Initially dismissed by the Trial Chamber on 28 June 2012,[28] this count
was unanimously reinstated on 11 July 2013 by the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals
Chamber concluded, inter alia, that the Trial Chamber erred by finding that evidence
adduced by the Prosecution was incapable of proving certain types of genocidal acts as
well as relevant genocidal intent by Karadžić.[29]
Count 2: Genocide.
Municipality: Srebrenica.
Count 3: Persecutions on Political, Racial and Religious Grounds, a Crime Against Humanity.
They are also charged with murder, deportation, inhumane acts, spreading terror among
civilians, unlawful attacks on civilians, and taking of hostages.[30][31]
Involvement of Serbia
On 26 February 2007, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found Serbia to be innocent of
genocide as committed at Srebrenica in July 1995.[32]
On 28 February 2013, the ICTY Court of Appeals overturned a conviction for JNA (Yugoslav
National Army) Chief of Staff Momcilo Perisic for crimes committed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia and ordered Perisic's immediate release.[33] His acquittal means that,
to date, no official or army officer of Serbia-Montenegro (Yugoslavia) and no member of the
JNA or VJ high command has ever been convicted by the ICTY for war-crimes committed in
Bosnia.[34]
On 30 May 2013, the ICTY acquitted and ordered the immediate release of Jovica Stanisic
and Franko Simatovic, two close aides of Slobodan Milosevic. Stanisic was the Chief of the
Serbian State Security Service while Simatovic was in charge of the special operations arm of
the State Security Service.[35]
United States House and Senate resolutions
The month before the 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica Massacre, both houses of the United
States Congress passed similarly worded resolutions asserting that the policies of aggression
and ethnic cleansing as implemented by Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to
1995, including the Srebrenica Massacre, constituted genocide.
On 27 June 2005, during the 109th Congress, the United States House of Representatives
passed a resolution (H. Res. 199 sponsored by Congressman Christopher Smith with 39
cosponsors) commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide.[36] The
resolution, as amended, was passed with an overwhelming majority of 370 – YES votes, 1 –
NO vote, and 62 – ABSENT.[37] The resolution is a bipartisan measure commemorating 11
July 1995 – 2005, the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre.[38] The Senate version,
S.Res.134, was sponsored by Senator Gordon Smith with 8 cosponsors and was agreed to in
the Senate on 22 June 2005 without amendment and with unanimous consent.[39] The
summaries of the resolutions are identical, with the exception of the name of the house
passing the resolution, and the substitution of the word executed for murdered by the House in
the first clause:
A trial took place before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), following a 1993 suit by
Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and Montenegro alleging genocide. On 26 February
2007, the ICJ, in the Bosnian Genocide Case concurred with the ICTY's earlier finding that
the Srebrenica massacre constituted genocide:[42]
ICJ President Rosalyn Higgins noted that there was a lot of evidence to prove that crimes
against humanity and war crimes had been committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina such as
widespread killings, the siege of towns, mass rapes, torture, deportation to camps and
detention centres, but the ICJ did not have jurisdiction over them, because the case dealt
"exclusively with genocide in a limited legal sense and not in the broader sense sometimes
given to this term".[42][43][44] Moreover, the Court found "that Serbia has not committed
genocide" nor "conspired to" or "incited the commission of genocide". It did however, find
that Serbia had failed "to take all measures within its power to prevent genocide in
Srebrenica" and to comply fully with the ICTY by failing to transfer Ratko Mladić to the
custody of the ICTY in the Hague and that Serbia must in future transfer to the Hague all
ICTY-indicted individuals, who reside under Serbian jurisdiction.[45]
The Court's finding that Serbia was not directly involved in the Srebrenica genocide have
been strongly criticized. Prof. Yuval Shany, Hersch Lauterpacht Professor of Public
International Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem,[46] described the Court's conclusions
on the three questions before it as controversial:
First, as far as the jurisdictional part of the decision goes, the court has been severely
criticized for unjustifiably over-stretching the concept of res judicata to decisions on
jurisdiction rendered at an earlier stage of the same proceedings; for over-relying on legal
conclusions that were decided at earlier stages without serious consideration; and for narrowly
construing its powers of revision. Indeed, seven out of the fifteen judges on the bench
expressed varying degrees of unease with this particular outcome.
Second, as for the actual findings on the commission of genocide, some writers have
criticized the court for refusing to look at the 'bigger picture' of the events in Bosnia – a
picture that seems to suggest that the various atrocious crimes meted out by the Bosnian Serbs
were all part of the same 'master-plan' of creating an ethnically homogeneous Serbian state.
Others have questioned the court's readiness to rely on the absence of individual convictions
in genocide by the ICTY (except with relation to the massacre in Srebrenica), without
properly considering the difference between standards of liability under criminal law and state
responsibility or fully appreciating the limited probative value of reduced charges as the result
of plea bargains.
Third, with respect to the question of Serbian responsibility, the court's legal analysis of
attribution standards, the reluctance to find Serbia to be an accomplice to genocide, and the
decision to refrain from ordering reparations, have all been criticized as excessively
conservative. At the same time, the court's expansive reading of Article 1 of the Genocide
Convention as potentially imposing on all states a duty to prevent genocide, even if
committed outside their territory, has been noted for its remarkable boldness. Still, some
writers have criticized the court for not clarifying whether Article 1 can provide an
independent basis for exercising of universal jurisdiction against individual perpetrators of
genocide. So, arguably, the court construed broadly the duty to prevent genocide while
narrowly construing the duty to punish its perpetrators.
Antonio Cassese, the first president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, criticized the ICJ judgement on the ground that "The International Court has set
an unrealistically high standard of proof for finding Serbia complicit in genocide." He added:
The ICJ, which ... deals with controversies between states, was faced with Bosnia's claim that
Serbia was responsible for the Srebrenica massacre. Although the Court ruled that genocide
had taken place, it decided that Serbia was not responsible under international law.
According to the Court, the Bosnian Serb generals who were guilty of this genocide, the
various Mladić's and Krstić's, were neither acting as Serbia's agents nor receiving specific
instructions from Belgrade ... Why was it not enough to prove that the Bosnian Serb military
leadership was financed and paid by Serbia and that it was tightly connected to Serbia
political and military leadership? More importantly, the ICJ's decision that Serbia is
responsible for not having prevented a genocide in which it was not complicit makes little
sense. According to the Court, Serbia was aware of the very high risk of acts of genocide and
did nothing. But Serbia was not complicit, the Court argued, because "it has not been proven"
that the intention of committing the acts of genocide at Srebrenica "had been brought to
Belgrade's attention".
This is a puzzling statement at best. The massacre was prepared in detail and took place over
the course of six days (between 13 and 19 July). Is it plausible that the Serbian authorities
remained in the dark while the killing was in progress and reported in the press all over the
world?[47]
The Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, Judge Al-Khasawneh, criticized the
judgement as not reflecting the evidence with respect to Serbia's direct responsibility for
genocide at Srebrenica:
The 'effective control' test for attribution established in the Nicaragua case is not suitable to
questions of State responsibility for international crimes committed with a common purpose.
The 'overall control' test for attribution established in the Tadić case is more appropriate when
the commission of international crimes is the common objective of the controlling State and
the non-State actors. The Court's refusal to infer genocidal intent from a consistent pattern of
conduct in Bosnia and Herzegovina is inconsistent with the established jurisprudence of the
ICTY. The FRY's knowledge of the genocide set to unfold in Srebrenica is clearly
established. The Court should have treated the Scorpions as a de jure organ of the FRY. The
statement by the Serbian Council of Ministers in response to the massacre of Muslim men by
the Scorpions amounted to an admission of responsibility. The Court failed to appreciate the
definitional complexity of the crime of genocide and to assess the facts before it
accordingly.[48]
The International Criminal Tribunal never received a complete archive of the Supreme
Defense Council minutes from Serbia. According to the explanation given by Sir Geoffrey
Nice, former prosecutor in the trial of Slobodan Milošević:
First, it is important to note that Serbia did not hand over to the Prosecution (OTP) the
complete collection of SDC [Supreme Defense Council] records. For example, for the year
1995 the OTP received recordings for only about half of all the sessions held by SDC.
Further, some of the SDC records were not handed over in their full stenographically recorded
form but were produced as extended minutes. That means that they were shorter than steno-
notes but longer than the regular minutes. The dates of the missing meetings or the meetings
where this lesser form of record was provided, as I recall, were significant – namely dates
leading up to, surrounding and in the aftermath of the Srebrenica massacre. The full records of
those meetings need yet to be provided. At the same time, these documents, significant as
they are, do not constitute a single body of evidence that will explain once and for all what
happened and who was culpable. They do provide a much fuller context and provide some
very valuable testimonials of things that were said by Milošević and others. In their un-
redacted form they would point all who are interested (not just governments and lawyers) to
other documents that have never been provided and that might well be more candid than the
words of those at the SD Council meetings who knew they were being recorded by a
stenographer. Second, it should also be remembered that there are other protected document
collections and individual documents which were, and still are, protected by direct agreements
between Belgrade and the former OTP Prosecutor, i.e. they were not protected by the Trial
Chamber. These documents are difficult now to identify but if and when Bosnia-Herzegovina
decides to reopen the ICJ case it will be essential to require Serbia and/or the ICTY to
produce all those documents for the ICJ.[49]
The Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, Germany, in September 1997, handed down a
genocide conviction against Nikola Jorgić, a Bosnian Serb who was the leader of a
paramilitary group located in the Doboj region. He was sentenced to four terms of life
imprisonment for his involvement in genocidal actions that took place in regions of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, other than Srebrenica.[50]
In a judgement issued on 12 July 2007, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the
Jorgić v. Germany case (Application no. 74613/01), reviewed the German court's judgements
against Jorgić. In rejecting Jorgić's appeal, the ECHR affirmed that the German court's ruling
was consistent with an interpretation of the Genocide Convention foreseeable at the time
Jorgić committed the offence in 1992. However, the ECHR highlighted that the German
court's ruling, based upon German domestic law, had interpreted the crime of genocide more
broadly than and in a manner since rejected by international courts.[51] Under the wider
definition that the German judiciary upheld, the ethnic cleansing carried out by Jorgić was a
genocide because it was an intent to destroy the group as a social unit, and although the
majority of scholars took the view that German genocide law should interpret genocide as the
physical-biological destruction of the protected group, "a considerable number of scholars
were of the opinion that the notion of destruction of a group as such, in its literal meaning,
was wider than a physical-biological extermination and also encompassed the destruction of a
group as a social unit".[52][53]
The Martyrs' Memorial Cemetery Kovači for victims of the war in Stari Grad.
In the case of Prosecutor v. Krstić (2 August 2001), the ICTY ruled "customary international
law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological
destruction of all or part of the group. Hence, an enterprise attacking only the cultural or
sociological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these elements which give
to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the community would not fall under the
definition of genocide".[54] On 19 April 2004, this determination was upheld on appeal: "The
Genocide Convention, and customary international law in general, prohibit only the physical
or biological destruction of a human group. ... The Trial Chamber expressly acknowledged
this limitation, and eschewed any broader definition. ... " although like the lower court, the
appeal court also ruled that ethnic cleansing might with other evidence lead to an inference of
genocidal intent.[55] On 14 January 2000, the ICTY ruled in the Prosecutor v. Kupreškić and
Others case that the Lašva Valley ethnic cleansing campaign in order to expel the Bosnian
Muslim population from the region was persecution, not genocide per se.[56] The ECHR noted
the opinion of the International Court of Justice ruling in the Bosnian Genocide Case that
ethnic cleansing is not in and of itself genocide.[18]
In reference to legal writers, the ECHR also noted: "Amongst scholars, the majority have
taken the view that ethnic cleansing, in the way in which it was carried out by the Serb forces
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to expel Muslims and Croats from their homes, did not
constitute genocide. However, there are also a considerable number of scholars who have
suggested that these acts did amount to genocide".[57]
The ECHR having reviewed the case and the more recent international rulings on the issue the
ECHR ruled that "The Court finds that the [German] courts' interpretation of 'intent to destroy
a group' as not necessitating a physical destruction of the group, which has also been adopted
by a number of scholars ... , is therefore covered by the wording, read in its context, of the
crime of genocide in the [German] Criminal Code and does not appear unreasonable",[58] so
"In view of the foregoing, the [ECHR] concludes that, while many authorities had favoured a
narrow interpretation of the crime of genocide, there had already been several authorities at
the material time which had construed the offence of genocide in the same wider way as the
German courts. In these circumstances, the [ECHR] finds that [Jorgić], if need be with the
assistance of a lawyer, could reasonably have foreseen that he risked being charged with and
convicted of genocide for the acts he had committed in 1992.",[59] and for this reason the court
rejected Jorgić's assertion that there had been a breach of Article 7 (no punishment without
law) of the European Convention on Human Rights by Germany.[60]
European Parliament
On 15 January 2009, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on the European
Union's executive authorities to commemorate 11 July as a day of remembrance and
mourning of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide, explicitly recognized as such with reference to the
ICJ decision. The resolution also reiterated a number of findings including the number of
victims as "more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys" executed and "nearly 25,000 women,
children and elderly people were forcibly deported, making this event the biggest war crime to
take place in Europe since the end of the Second World War".[61] The resolution passed
overwhelmingly, on a vote of 556 to 9.
Radovan Karadžić, the president of Republika Srpska, was sentenced for genocide in
Srebrenica by the ICTY in 2016
Four have been found guilty of participating in genocides in Bosnia by German courts, one of
whom, Nikola Jorgić, lost an appeal against his conviction in the European Court of Human
Rights.
On 29 July 2008, the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found Milenko Trifunović,
Brano Džinić, Aleksandar Radovanović, Miloš Stupar, Branislav Medan and Petar Mitrović
guilty of genocide for their part in the Srebrenica massacre,[65][66] and on 16 October 2009 the
State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found Milorad Trbić, a former member of the Bosnian
Serb security forces, guilty of genocide for his participation in the genocide in the Srebrenica
massacre.[67]
Slobodan Milošević, the former President of Serbia and of Yugoslavia, was the most senior
political figure to stand trial at the ICTY. He was charged with having committed genocide,
either alone or in concert with other named members of a joint criminal enterprise. The
indictment accused him of planning, preparing and executing the destruction, in whole or in
part, of the Bosnian Muslim national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such, in territories
within Bosnia and Herzegovina including Bijeljina, Bosanski Novi, Brčko, Ključ, Kotor
Varos, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Srebrenica.[68] He died during his trial, on 11 March 2006,
and no verdict was returned.
The ICTY has issued a warrant for the arrest of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić on
several charges including genocide. Karadžić was arrested in Belgrade on 21 July 2008, and
was transferred into ICTY custody in the Hague nine days later on 30 July.[69] Ratko Mladić
was also arrested in Serbia on 26 May 2011 after a decade in hiding.[70]
Death toll
If a narrow definition of genocide is used, as favoured by the international courts, then during
the Srebrenica massacre, 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were murdered and the
remainder of the population (between 25,000 and 30,000 Bosniak women, children and
elderly people) was forced to leave the area. If a wider definition is used, then the number is
much larger. According to the ICTY Demographic Unit, an estimated 69.8% or 25,609 of the
civilians killed in the war were Bosniak (with 42,501 military deaths), with the Bosnian Serbs
suffering 7,480 civilian casualties (15,299 military deaths), the Bosnian Croats suffering
1,675 civilian casualties (7,183 military deaths), amounting to a total of 104,732 casualties,
spread between the Bosnian Croats (8.5%), Bosnian Serbs (21.7%), Bosniaks (65%), and
others (4.8%).[74]
In January 2013, the Sarajevo-based Research and Documentation Center (RDC) published its
final results on "the most comprehensive" research into Bosnia-Herzegovina's war casualties:
The Bosnian Book of the Dead – a database that reveals "a minimum of" 97,207 names of
Bosnia and Herzegovina's citizens killed and missing during the 1992–1995 war. The head of
the ICTY Demographic Unit, Ewa Tabeu, has called it "the largest existing database on
Bosnian war victims".[75][76] More than 240,000 pieces of data were collected, processed,
checked, compared and evaluated by an international team of experts to tabulate the names of
the victims. According to the RDC, 82 percent or 33,071 of the civilians killed in the war
were Bosniak, with a minimum of 97,207 casualties, military and civilian, for all sides
involved: Bosniaks (66.2%), Serbs (25.4%) and Croats (7.8%), as well as others
(0.5%).[76][77][78]
In a statement on 23 September 2008 to the United Nations, Dr. Haris Silajdžić, as head of the
Bosnia and Herzegovina delegation to the United Nations 63rd Session of the General
Assembly, said that "according to ICRC data, 200,000 people were killed, 12,000 of them
children, up to 50,000 women were raped, and 2.2 million were forced to flee their homes.
This was a veritable genocide and sociocide".[79] However, such estimations have been
criticized as highly inaccurate and analysts such as George Kenney have accused the Bosnian
government and the international community of sensationalism and of deliberately inflating
the number of fatalities to attract international support for the Muslims.[80]
While the majority of international opinion accepts the findings of the international courts,
there remains some disagreement about the extent of the genocide and to what degree Serbia
was involved (note: the involvement of the breakaway republic of Bosnian Serbs within
Bosnia known as Republika Srpska is not in doubt).
The Bosnian Muslim community asserts that the Srebrenica massacre was just one instance of
what was a broader genocide committed by Serbia.[81]
The International Court of Justice veered away from the factual and legal findings of the
ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Duško Tadić case. In the judgment delivered in July 1999, the
Appeals Chamber found that the Army of Republika Srpska was "under overall control" of
Belgrade and the Yugoslav Army, which meant that they had funded, equipped and assisted in
the coordination and the planning of military operations. Had the International Court of
Justice accepted this finding of the Tribunal, Serbia would have been found guilty of
complicity in the Srebrenica genocide. Instead it concluded that the Appeals Chamber in the
Tadic case "did not attempt to determine the responsibility of a state but individual criminal
responsibility". Paradoxical as it may be, the outcome of this legal suit filed back in March
1993 arrived too early for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Radovan Karadžić arrest came over a year
after the ICJ gave its judgement,[69] and Ratko Mladić, also accused of genocide, was arrested
in May 2011. Slobodan Milošević died during his trial and three trials of former Serb officials
have just started.[when?][82]
Territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia controlled
by Serb forces 1992–1995. The War Crimes Tribual accused Milošević and other Serb leaders
of "attempting to create a Greater Serbia, a Serbian state encompassing the Serb-populated
areas of Croatia and Bosnia, and achieved by forcibly removing non-Serbs from large
geographical areas through the commission of crimes."[83]
Although the ICTY prosecutors had access to them during the trials, some of the minutes of
wartime meetings of Yugoslavia's political and military leaders, were not made public as the
ICTY accepted the Serbian argument that to do so would damage Serbia's national security.
Although the ICJ could have subpoenaed the documents directly from Serbia, it did not do so
and relied instead on those made public during the ICTY trials. Two of the ICJ judges
criticised this decision in strongly worded dissents. Marlise Simons reporting on this in the
New York Times, states that "When the documents were handed over [to the ICTY], the
lawyers said, a team from Belgrade made it clear in letters to the tribunal and in meetings with
prosecutors and judges that it wanted the documents expurgated to keep them from harming
Serbia's case at the International Court of Justice. The Serbs made no secret of that even as
they argued their case for 'national security,' said one of the lawyers, adding, 'The senior
people here [at the ICTY] knew about this'.". Simons continues that Rosalyn Higgins the
president of the ICJ, declined to comment when asked why the full records had not been
subpoenaed, saying that "The ruling speaks for itself". Diane Orentlicher, a law professor at
American University in Washington, commented "Why didn't the court request the full
documents? The fact that they were blacked out clearly implies these passages would have
made a difference.", and William Schabas, a professor of international law at the University
of Ireland in Galway, suggested that as a civil rather than a criminal court, the ICJ was more
used to relying on materials put before it than aggressively pursuing evidence which might
lead to a diplomatic incident.[84]
Denial
Some commentators believe that the Srebrenica massacre was not genocide. They cite that
women and children were largely spared and that only military age men were targeted.[85][86]
This view is not supported by the findings of the ICJ or the ICTY.[87] According to Sonja
Biserko, president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and Edina
Bećirević, the faculty of criminology and security studies of the University of Sarajevo:
Denial of the Srebrenica genocide takes many forms [in Serbia]. The methods range from the
brutal to the deceitful. Denial is present most strongly in political discourse, in the media, in
the sphere of law, and in the educational system.[88]
Part of a series on
Genocide
Issues
Cultural genocide
Democide
Ethnic cleansing
Ethnic relations
Ethnocide
Genocide
Genocidal rape
Utilitarian genocide
Double genocide
o Holocaust uniqueness debate
o Rwandan genocide
Soviet genocide
Ethnic cleansing in the Soviet Union
Final Solution
Porajmos
Nazi crimes against ethnic Poles
Nazi crimes against Soviet POWs
Serbian genocide
Cold War
Contemporary genocide
Related topics
Genocides in history
Khmer Rouge Killing Fields
Hutu Power
Holodomor genocide question
Extermination camp
Effects of genocide on youth
List by death toll
Mass killings under Communist regimes
Anti-communist mass killings
Mass killings compilation
Category
v
t
e
See also
Srebrenica massacre
Bosniaks
Command responsibility
Genocides in history
Republika Srpska
Serbian war crimes in the Yugoslav Wars
Footnotes
1.
1. To date, only the massacre in Srebrenica[1] has been described as a crime of genocide
by the ICTY. Overall, 34,000 Bosniak civilians were killed during the war and 1.2
million forcibly removed[2] from a minimum of 64,036 Bosniak fatalities overall.[3]
References
1.
Mojzes, Paul (2011). Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth
Century. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 178. ISBN 978-1-4422-0663-2.
Peterson, Roger D. (2011). Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of
Emotion in Conflict. Cambridge University Press. p. 121. ISBN 978-1-139-50330-3.
Toal, Gerard (2011). Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal. Oxford
University Press. p. 136. ISBN 978-0-19-973036-0.
"Serbia: Mladic "Recruited" Infamous Scorpions". Institute for War and Peace
Reporting. [1]
IWPR, Genocide Conviction for Serb General Tolimir, 13 December 2012.
http://iwpr.net/report-news/genocide-conviction-serb-general-tolimir
A Witness to Genocide: The 1993 Pulitzer Prize-Winning Dispatches on the "Ethnic
Cleansing" of Bosnia, Roy Gutman
John Richard Thackrah (2008). The Routledge companion to military conflict since 1945,
Routledge Companions Series, Taylor & Francis, 2008, ISBN 0-415-36354-3, ISBN 978-0-
415-36354-9. pp. 81,82 "Bosnian genocide can mean either the genocide committed by the
Serb forces in Srebrenica in 1995 or the ethnic cleansing during the 1992–95 Bosnian War"
ICTY; "Address by ICTY President Theodor Meron, at Potocari Memorial Cemetery"
The Hague, 23 June 2004 ICTY.org
ICTY; "Krstic judgement" UNHCR.org Archived 18 October 2012 at the Wayback
Machine.
ICTY; "Karadzic indictment. Paragraph 19" ICTY.org
European Court of Human Rights – Jorgic v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. §
36,47,111. Retrieved 20 March 2011
European Court of Human Rights – Jorgic v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. §
47,107,108
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the massacre at Srebrenica in
July 1995
ECHR Jorgic v. Germany Judgment §47,112
"Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian Serb, Gets 40 Years Over Genocide and War Crimes".
The New York Times. Retrieved 24 March 2016.
"Karadzic sentenced to 40 years for genocide". CNN. Retrieved 2016-03-26.
"Everyday objects, tragic histories". TED Talks. March 2014. Retrieved August 27,
2014., Ziyah Gafić, 4:32
ECHR Jorgić v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. §45 citing Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro ("Case concerning the application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide") the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) found under the heading of "intent and 'ethnic cleansing'" § 190
A/RES/47/121 91st plenary meeting: The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 18
December 1992.
ECHR Jorgic v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. §112
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia found in Prosecutor v.
Radislav Krstic – Trial Chamber I – Judgment – IT-98-33 (2001) ICTY8 (2 August 2001) that
genocide had been committed. (see paragraph 560 for name of group in English on whom the
genocide was committed). It was upheld in Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic – Appeals Chamber
– Judgment – IT-98-33 (2004) ICTY 7 (19 April 2004)
ICTY "Prosecutor v. Krstic" Archived 26 March 2009 at the Wayback Machine.
ICTY; "Address by ICTY President Theodor Meron, at Potocari Memorial Cemetery"
The Hague, 23 June 2004 UN.org Archived 3 April 2009 at the Wayback Machine.
Staff. Momcilo Krajisnik convicted of crimes against humanity, acquitted of genocide
and complicity in genocide, A press release by the ICTY in The Hague, 27 September 2006
JP/MOW/1115e
http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=667&code=bhy&p1=3&p2=3&case=91&k=f4&p3=5
Milosevic trial, Trial Chamber's "Decision on Motion to Enter Judgment of Acquittal"
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/tdec/en/040616.pdf
Paul Mitchell (16 March 2007). "The significance of the World Court ruling on genocide
in Bosnia". World Socialist Web. Retrieved 9 February 2013.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY. "Karadzic Acquitted
of One Genocide Charge". ICTY. Retrieved 28 June 2012.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY. "Appeals Chamber
reverses Radovan Karadžić's acquittal for genocide in municipalities of Bosnia and
Herzegovina". ICTY. Retrieved 11 July 2013.
Prosecutor's Marked-up Indictment, ICTY Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT THE
PROSECUTOR v RADOVAN KARADZIC, 19 October 2009. Retrieved 7 June 2011
Prosecutor's Marked-up Indictment, ICTY Case No. IT-09-92-I THE PROSECUTOR v
RATKO MLADIC, 1 June 2011. Retrieved 7 June 2011
"Court clears Serbia of genocide". BBC News. 26 February 2007.
"The ICTY Judgement in the Prosecutor vs. Momcilo Perisic case" (PDF). ICTY.
Hoare, Dr. Marko Attila. "Why was Momcilo Perisic acquitted ?".
Simons, Marlise (30 May 2013). "UN Court Acquits 2 Serbs of War Crimes". New York
Times.
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the massacre at
Srebrenica in July 1995
Washington Post. "Votes Database: Bill: H RES 199" 27 June 2005
Markup Committee on International Relations House of Representatives (pdf) Archived
31 January 2008 at the Wayback Machine., 109th Congress, H. Res. 199 and H.R. 2601, 26
May 2005, Serial No. 109–87. p. 13
Smith, Gordon. "S.Res.134 - A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding
the massacre at Srebrenica in July 1995". Congress.gov. Retrieved 20 April 2017.
Christopher Smith H.Res. 199, Expressing the Sense of the House of Representatives
Regarding the Massacre at Srebrenica in July 1995. Retrieved 31 January 2008
CRS Summary: A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the massacre at
Srebrenica in July 1995
"Courte: Serbia failed to prevent genocide, UN court rules". The San Francisco
Chronicle. Associated Press. 26 February 2007.
"Sense Tribunal: Serbia found guilty of failure to prevent and punish genocide".
Archived from the original on 30 July 2009.
ICJ: Bosnian Genocide Case: Summary of the Judgment of 26 February 2007 [2]
ICJ press release 2007/8 26 February 2007
The International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists (Justice No. 45, Spring
2008. Pages 21–26) [PDF
FORMAT]http://www.infolink.co.il/intjewishlawyers/docenter/frames.asp?id=16867
A judicial massacre, The Guardian, 27 February 2007.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/feb/27/thejudicialmassacreofsrebr
Dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, Vice-President of the International Court of
Justice, "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 June 2011. Retrieved
24 May 2011.
KBSA 2000, Interview with Sir Geofrey Nice, "The Victims of Srebrenica, Living and
Dead, Deserve Truth" [scroll down the page for English version]
Federal High Court of Germany: Translation of Press Release into English Nr. 39 on 30
April 1999: Federal High Court makes basic ruling on genocide, Prevent Genocide
International
ECHR – Jorgić v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. § 18,98,99
ECHR Jorgić v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. § 36 but also §§ 18,47,99,103,108
See also "'Ethnic Cleansing' and Genocidal Intent: A Failure of Judicial Interpretation?",
Genocide Studies and Prevention 5, 1 (April 2010), Douglas Singleterry
ECHR Jorgić v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. § 42 citing Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-
98-33-T, judgment of 2 August 2001, §§ 580
ECHR Jorgić v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. § 43 citing the judgment of 19 April
2004 rendered by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, IT-98-33-A §§ 25,33
ECHR Jorgić v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. § 44 citing Prosecutor v. Kupreškić
and Others (IT-95-16-T, judgment of 14 January 2000), § 751
European Court of Human Rights Archived 9 May 2013 at the Wayback Machine. –
|%20%27ethnic%20|%20cleansing%27&sessionid=24809174&skin=hudoc-en Jorgić v.
Germany Judgment[dead link], 12 July 2007. § 47
ECHR Jorgić v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. § 105
ECHR Jorgić v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. § 113
ECHR Jorgić v. Germany Judgment, 12 July 2007. § 116
European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2009 on Srebrenica, P6_TA(2009)0028
European Parliament – 15 January 2009.
Mladić Trial Chamber Judgement 2017, p. 2266
Staff. War crimes case widens 'genocide', BBC, 19 April 2004
Staff, Life for Bosnian Serbs over genocide at Srebrenica, BBC, 10 June 2010
Aida Cerkez-Robinson (2008-07-30). "7 Bosnian Serbs guilty of genocide in Srebrenica".
USA Today. Archived from the original on 2016-02-17.
Staff. Bosnian Serbs jailed for genocide, BBC, 29 July 2008
Staff. Bosnian Serb jailed for genocide, BBC, 16 October 2009
Case No. IT-02-54-T: The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Slobodan Milosevic,
amended indictment, ICTY, 22 November 2002
Staff. Karadzic flown to Hague tribunal, BBC, 30 July 2008
Ratko Mladic arrested: Bosnia war crimes suspect held, BBC, 26 May 2011
"Radovan Karadzic sentenced to 40-year imprisonment for Srebrenica genocide, war
crimes". The Hindu. 24 March 2016.
"UN hails conviction of Mladic, the 'epitome of evil,' a momentous victory for justice".
UN News Centre. 22 November 2017. Retrieved 23 November 2017.
Owen Bowcott, Julian Borger (22 November 2017). "Ratko Mladić convicted of war
crimes and genocide at UN tribunal". The Guardian. Event occurs at 11:00. Retrieved 23
November 2017.
"THE 1992–95 WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: CENSUS-BASED MULTIPLE
SYSTEM ESTIMATION OF CASUALTIES' UNDERCOUNT" (pdf). ICTY. Retrieved 27
January 2013.
"Bosnia war dead figure announced". BBC News. 2007-06-21.
Research and Documentation Center: Rezultati istraživanja "Ljudski gubici '91–'95"
Archived 3 December 2010 at the Wayback Machine.
Lara J. Nettelfield (2010). Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cambridge
University Press. Retrieved 22 July 2013., pp. 96–98
"After years of toil, book names Bosnian war dead". Reuters. 2013-02-15.
Statement by Dr. Haris Silajdžić, Chairman of the Presidency Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Head of the Delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the 63rd Session of the General
Assembly on the occasion of the General Debate, Summary, 23 September 2008.
George Kenney (23 April 1995). "The Bosnian calculation". The New York Times.
Retrieved 7 October 2012.
van den Biesen."Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, General Concluding Observation". International Court of Justice. 24
April 2006, para. 1–12. ICJ-CIJ.org Archived 9 July 2006 at the Wayback Machine.
Sense Tribunal: ICTY – The missing link Archived 22 December 2008 at the Wayback
Machine.
Decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber; 18 April 2002; Reasons for the Decision on
Prosecution Interlocutory Appeal from Refusal to Order Joinder; Paragraph 8
Marlise Simons. Genocide Court Ruled for Serbia Without Seeing Full War Archive,
New York Times, 9 April 2007
The Politics of the Srebrenica Massacre, Z Net, 7 July 2007, by Edward S. Herman,
zmag.org Archived 1 July 2009 at the Portuguese Web Archive
"The real story behind Srebrenica", The Globe and Mail, 14 July 2005.
ICTY, Prosecutor vs Krstic, Trial Chamber Judgement, Case No. IT-98-33-T, paras 43–
46. UN.org Archived 1 April 2009 at the Wayback Machine.
Other sources
"Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić" (PDF). The Hague: International Criminal tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia. 22 November 2017.
Further reading
Ed Vulliamy, The War Is Dead, Long Live the War: Bosnia: The Reckoning, Bodley
Head (London, 19 April 2012) ISBN 978-1-84792-194-9. Focusses on the camps.
External links
America and the Bosnia Genocide by Mark Danner New York Review of Books,
Volume 44, Number 19, 4 December 1997
Yale University – Bosnia Genocide Studies Program
Aegis Trust (genocide prevention trust) An independent international organisation
dedicated to eliminating genocide
Srebrenica – a 'Safe haven' Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Srebrenica –
a 'Safe haven', an extensive Dutch government report on events in eastern Bosnia and
the fall of Srebrenica.
Bosnia victims appeal Karadzic's Genocide Acquittal from Balkan Insight
Leydesdorff, Selma. Surviving the Bosnian Genocide: The Women of Srebrenica
Speak. Trans. Kay Richardson. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.
Missing No Longer – International commission forges ahead to identify genocide
victims, Scientific American, 1 August 2006
Genocide-Bosnia at Peace Pledge Union Information website
A review of the movie Storm, by director Hans-Christian Schmid (Screen Comment)
[show]
v
t
e
Yugoslav Wars
[show]
v
t
e
v
t
e
Genocide topics
Categories:
Bosnian genocide
Anti-Muslim violence in Europe
Responsibility to protect
Serbian war crimes in the Bosnian War
1992 in Yugoslavia
1993 in Yugoslavia
1994 in Yugoslavia
1995 in Yugoslavia
1992 in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1993 in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1994 in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbian nationalism
Ethnic cleansing in Europe
Genocides
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Serbia relations
Serbian nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Navigation menu
Not logged in
Talk
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Article
Talk
Read
Edit
View history
Search
Main page
Contents
Featured content
Current events
Random article
Donate to Wikipedia
Wikipedia store
Interaction
Help
About Wikipedia
Community portal
Recent changes
Contact page
Tools
Print/export
Create a book
Download as PDF
Printable version
In other projects
Wikimedia Commons
Languages
العربية
Bosanski
Español
فارسی
Français
Bahasa Indonesia
Norsk
Português
Slovenščina
Srpskohrvatski / српскохрватски
Suomi
Türkçe
Edit links