National Security Law Outline
National Security Law Outline
National Security Law Outline
AND
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
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Art I § 9: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
safety may require it.”
writ of habeas corpus: right to have a court review the legality of
your detention.
problem, not clear who can suspend the writ it is in Art I
which deals w/ powers of Congress BUT it is included in § 9
which is passive and farmed in the negative (ie. one interpretation
– the framers didn’t want this to be a Congressional decision).
another interpretation: allow the President to suspend the writ and
this part is simply focused on the conditions – not who could
suspend the writ.
Art IV § 4: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion;”
limits: President can only step in if the legislature cant be
convened.
Art II § 3: “[H]e may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both
Houses.”
this illustrates that even in emergency times the President may
have to resort to Congress – he cannot act on his own.
Art I § 10 cl. 3: “No state shall, without the Consent of Congress . . .
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as
will not admit of delay.”
illustrates that the Federal government wants control of war.
Art II § 1: presidents oath to uphold the constitution:
argue that the President is acting in defense of people – it seems
odd, but that is what Lincoln did during the Civil war.
limit: Congress takes the same oath.
Art I § 8: “The Congress shall have the Power To . . . provide for the
common defence and general Welfare of the United States.”
Congress lays down the law fro when to call militia – President
will presumably be the one to call them up.
NOTE: our constitution favors legislative action – which is not the optimal
scheme for dealing with emergencies. The severe constraints are no accident –
emergency power by the executive is the most frequently abused.
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President gives Congress info on the state of the Union – but is
limited from time to time – not necessarily whenever Congress
asks for it.
Art I § 1:
implied power to give information to legislature to allow
Congress to legislate appropriately – this would place limits on
what Congress could ask from the President.
Art II § 2:
in order to command troops during wartime, President would
presumably have to have some right to classifying secrets.
diplomacy: appointing ambassadors, signing treaties – requires
some secrecy.
Art I § 9:
“regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”
but, this deals w/ the flow of information to the public – not from
the President to Congress.
Examination of the text reveals the potential for the allocation of national security
powers actually reflected in our history. It also demonstrates the futility of trying to
divine the Framers’ intent from the text alone.
o Articles I and II have overlapping functions
o The text is not precise
o The text fails altogether to prescribe or allocate power over some important
areas of national security.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (US S.Ct. 1952): text 31
o Facts: President issued EO to seize the nations steel mills and keep production
going. The Secretary of Commerce did so and the President sent a message to
Congress reporting his action – Congress did nothing. The companies obeyed
the EO, but brought proceedings against the Secretary. The D.Ct. issued a
preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from acting under EO and
seizing the plants. The Secretary appeals here.
note: EO’s are either issued by statute (which have the force and effect of
statute) or are not (which is then based on inherent constitutional
authority to have the force and effect of law – if not based on
constitutional authority – then doesn’t have the force and effect of law).
o Issue: Whether the President was acting w/in his constitutional power when he
issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and
operate most of the Nation’s steel mills.
o Black: Majority:
there is no statutory authorization for President to seize the plant
seizure statutes don’t apply and the Taft-Hartley Act illustrates
that Congress concluded not to provide such authority b/c it
would interfere w/ collective bargaining.
Congress has not authorized seizure, President’s actions are lawmaking
and the President cannot make the laws.
Commander-in-Chief Cl:
this is not occurring in the theater of war (suggesting he may be
less stringent if this took place in theater of war)
in theater have evidentiary problem of collecting evidence to
work under normal criminal procedures that is not the case
here.
Vestiture/Take Care Cl:
rejects this as authority because laws are made by Congress and
there are no laws here – thus there is nothing to execute faithfully.
o Frankfurter: Concurring:
Commander-in-Chief Cl:
stresses that this is not a declared war – if it was, then maybe the
domestic authorities would be different.
Vestiture/Take Care Cl:
even if there is no express statute to execute, it is possible that by
consistent and long lasting executive practice that the President
has been allowed to exercise power in which Congress by notice
has acquiesced. = customary authority
the current situation, however, can be distinguished from past
instances of customary authority. (ie. Midwest Oil = unique,
WWI and WWII – had authority from Congress, others are all
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distinguishable). it’s a fairly demanding predicate and it is not
met here.
Emergency Powers:
there is a temporary emergency power which authorizes collapses
– acknowledges some form of emergency power under very
narrow conditions.
o Douglas: Concurring:
only Congress can authorize such seizure because only Congress can
authorize money to compensate for it.
o Jackson: Concurring:
Commander-in-Chief Cl:
this is a war the President has started on his own – how can the
President start a war and then use that war to invoke further
power?
not necessarily convinced that the Korean war is illegal, but
regardless, it is not enough to self-vest the President to seize the
plant.
makes a distinction b/w outside and inside world: “I should
indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain his
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force,
at least when turned against the outside world for the security of
our society. But, when it is turned inward, not because of
rebellion, but because of a lawful economic struggle between
industry and labor, it should have no such indulgence.”
Emergency Powers:
framers set up a procedure for dealing w/ emergencies and it
required going to Congress to ask for authorization – need to get
a law.
when there isn’t time to go to Congress – don’t worry about it,
Congress can see it coming and delegate authority before hand =
standby statutory authority (ie. Militia Act – delegated authority
for when invasion occurs).
Jackson is wholly reluctant to acknowledge emergency power for
fear of abuse.
o Burton: Concurring:
Commander-in-Chief Cl:
might be a war situation in which entire nation is mobilized
where the President might have the power (so not completely
rejecting it), but this is not such a situation.
Emergency Powers:
in a catastrophic situation there may be emergency power – but
this is not one – not an insurrection or an invasion (which the
constitution text talks about).
o Clark: Concurring:
Emergency Powers:
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there might be situations sufficiently grave where the Presdient
can act – but only if Congress hasn’t occupied the field – in his
opinion, the Taft-Hartley Act occupies the field.
o Vinson: Dissenting:
Vestiture /Take Care Cl:
argues that the President is executing legislative programs and he
reported to Congress:
o (1) wage and price stabilization
o (2) Defense Production Act
o Count da Justices:
3 Justices agree that there is CIC power to do this under some
circumstances – but this aint it.
5-6 Justices agree that there is emergency authority in other
circumstances there is inherent emergency powers.
5-6 Justices agree that there is other executive power (ie. vestiture and
take care cl) IF Congress has not occupied the field and you buy into FF
customary authority argument.
Youngstown leaves the question open as to what happens if a conflict arises between a
statute and a claim of independent authorization from the President – who prevails?
o Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice (US S.Ct. 1989): text
56
. . . Kennedy’s concurring opinion suggests a solution
Kennedy writes that there are 2 categories of separation of powers cases:
(1) formalist: the constitution already struck a balance b/w
branches and assigned the authorization to one branch. (ie
Black’s opinion in Steel Seizure)
where the constitution is silent – there the courts do have a role
and its left to the S.Ct. to balance the degree of intrusion of the
Executive against the need for a statute from Congress. (ie.
Morrison v. Olsen)
Kennedy believes that national security cases will generally use
category (2) b/c either: (a) the constitution is silent or (b) the authority is
assigned to both branches.
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o Barreme argued that the statute is controlling and the executive re-writing of it is
unlawful.
o 2 issues to examine:
(1) would the seizure have been lawful if there was no statute? ie. could
the President have authorized the seizure?
if Congress hasn’t occupied the field by specifying the means by
which to execute war, the President has CIC powers to execute it.
Justice Marshall thinks the President’s order is more logical than
the statute.
(2) How does the court find the action unlawful when the statute doesn’t
expressly prohibit seizing vessels coming from the port?
Marshall feels bad b/c Little is just following President’s order
and Little will be personally liable.
o In the Ct’s view, Congress has occupied the field – has specified the means and
precluded other modes of carrying this out. Marshall: doesn’t think the
President has unfettered authority (note: this is 2 years after his sole organ
speech)
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o Congress decides legal status of those in war and the President responds with
force as occasioned essentially differentiating b/w what the President can do
de facto to ward off attack and the legal consequences which flow from war.
o believes that there are a certain amount of legal consequences which alter legal
status of people flowing from war – and only Congress can make that
determination. (ie. confiscation of property and war crimes). The President can
fight as a de facto matter, but to impose legal consequences – need statutory
authority. (note: RH refers to these legal consequences as the “legal dominoes”
which fall once Congress has declared war).
Neagle suggests an inherent rescue authority in the President – are there any limits?
o If Congress had spoke: either (a) prohibiting it or (b) occupying the field.
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o subject matter limit: protection of government officials and function and maybe
government official property self-protective of government.
o clearly cannot violate other parts of the constitution
o perhaps its only reactive – an imminent threat which activates the President’s
power.
Little v. Barreme and Neagle read together represent two different approaches to
emergencies which Congress hasn’t anticipated and the constitution is silent:
o (1) liberal approach: strict rule of law – if Congress hasn’t laid down response,
there is no lawful response and if President goes forward – it his own ass.
if gauged emergency correctly, Congress will ratify it late.
BUT no precedent created for him to do it again.
o (2) 3 dissenters in Steel Seizure:
whatever response the President takes is lawful – necessity compelled it.
the problem with this view is that if it is declared lawful, it establishes
precedent and it easier for next Administration to do it.
Executive Privilege:
o Executive Privilege refers to a group of executive branch justifications for
resisting disclosure of information to the public or other branches.
o Justifications:
State Secret Privilege
The CL evidentiary privilege is chief when the Executive invokes
it.
the information is a state secret the disclosure of which would
jeopardize the nation’s security.
Law Enforcement Privilege
The CL, codified into FOIA, authorizes law enforcement
personnel to withhold from disclosure in court OPEN
investigation files.
exists to protect sources and to prevent new material from being
released.
Intra-Branch Communications:
to encourage candor and to encourage to operate on paper in
decision making process.
Confidentiality of Presidential Communications:
presidential privilege is rooted in constitutional separation of
powers principles and the Presidents unique constitutional role.
The President invokes the presidential communications privilege
to protect documents he wants to keep confidential, and they are
presumptively privileged, but the presumption can be overcome
by a specific showing of adequate need. = balancing test (in
category 2 of separation of powers).
Declaration Process:
o Upon request of the President, Congress will enact a joint resolution declaring
war.
joint resolution = approved bicamerally and presented to the President
concurrent resolution = bicameralism, but no presentment
simple resolution = only one house
o there are legal consequences of declaring war activates international law and
standby statutes.
Bas v. Tingy (US S.Ct. 1800): text 93
Seriatim
o this is technically a prize question – whether or not a certain prize statute
applies. Congress had begun to incrementally raise the hostility b/w the US and
France.
o Chase: France ≠ an open enemy of the US; but, people began to get pissed at
France so Congress could get away w/ elevated degree of hostility. There wasn’t
a declaration of war against France.
o are we at war by virtue of these incremental statutes?
yes, we are at war – but its not a perfect (declared) war which would
allow attendant legal consequences.
this is an imperfect war: authorized by statute, containing both area and
use limitations (ie couldn’t do anything on land, could only use the
navy). France & America were enemies & the degree of hostility
meant to be carried on was done so w/out declaring war thus, have
imperfect, public war.
o It is not unconstitutional to do this:
if the it is set out by statute, the limits are binding on the President – he is
authorized to fight the war that Congress authorized (note: this provides
rebuttal to the President claiming that Congress cant limit President b/c
he has plenary authority).
just b/c don’t use formal declaration – view the declaration as a decision.
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o if you declare war on a state, its over when you enter into a treaty – there is an
endpoint. But, against a group – there is no one to negotiate a terminus – it ends
when the President says it ends.
o see the September 18, 2001 Authorization of Force Against Terrorism (text 263):
it is troubling lose at the boundaries of who it is authorized against
considering the broad sweep of power.
but, limit: have to be tied to September 11.
Other means of authorization Congress has to authorize the use of armed forces:
o Appropriation
problem: not necessarily clear Congressional intent – if already in
hostilities, it is unlikely that Congress will pull $ from the troops.
problem: accountability – depending on how specific the appropriation
is, a person may not be able to tell who authorized the war.
note: for all the options of authorization – at some point, Congress has to
appropriate money – Congress might not pull out $, but it can set a time
limit for when the money will stop (but, then the enemy knows when it
will end).
o Silence / Acquiescence
can also have acquiescence by subsequent legislation – ie. Executive
goes to war w/ Korea and Congress votes to extend the peace time draft.
– its not directly supporting it, but it facilitates what the President has
done.
problem: frequency of instances – acquiescence only occurs if President
does this a lot and it is hard to generalize military instances.
problem: accountability
problem: arithmetic: it takes fewer people to continue going to war under
the acquiescence theory (congress says no and President vetoes it) – a
larger # (majority) is needed if President has to get congressional
approval first.
o Treaty Based Wars
if we have been attacked, we have a duty to use armed forces of our
allies.
Senate has already approved the treaty
under the Supremacy clause it is US law
counterargument: the treaty is subject to constitution; house must also
OK the war (so the treaty cannot dictate domestic process for war).
Also, where would the treaty power end?
counterargument: in declaration clause debate the framers rejected giving
the Senate the sole power to declare war this would be contrary to
history and the conscription of the constitution.
ii. Passing the Buck: Delegating National Security and Emergency Authority
Delegations of National Security Authority:
Lichter v. United States (US S.Ct. 1948): text 102
o PH / Facts: Several contractors challenged the constitutionality of the
Renegotiation Act. The Act authorized the gov’t to determine and recapture
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‘excessive profits’ by private contractors. It was part of a national policy
adopted in time of crisis in the conduct of total global warfare.
o Issue: Whether the Renegotiation Act was a law “necessary and proper” for
carrying into Execution the war powers of Congress and especially its power to
support armies. Moreover, whether the Act constitutes an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to administrative officials.
o Holding: “On the basis of (a) the nature of the particular constitutional powers
being employed, (b) the current administrative practices later incorporated into
the Act and (c) the adequacy of the statutory term ‘excessive profits’ as used in
this context, we hold that the authority granted was a lawful delegation of
administrative authority and not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.”
o Authority: (1) necessary and proper clause; (2) raise and support. almost
anything necessary to wage war successfully will be deemed necessary and
proper.
o Hypo: could the President have done the same thing Congress did here?
necessary and proper only in Article I – re: Congress’ power
Congress can pass in support of presidential powers, but president does
not have it alone.
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explicitly authorized – just that first, it must be explicitly authorized – and it
wasn’t here.]
Hypo: Can Congress delegate the war powers (ie. if national security requires?)
o Possible Sources:
Lichter:
constitutionally explicit about raise & support (by Congress) and
Lichter allowed it to be delegated.
Greene:
if has such a dramatic effect on individual rights, it must be a
clear statement.
S.Ct. never said any power is non-delegable
may be non-delegable b/c Congress must make the determination
of whether to go to war (constitutional convention)
note: any situation which is so time urgent, the President can
repel an attack.
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Dames shows that incidental to the Presidents power to recognize
foreign countries, accept ambassadors, etc. President has an
inherent authority plus acquiescence in emergencies.
Post-Lovett Hypo: Which category of analysis is used if a rider infringes on the inherent
power of the President? [note: use bablancing b/c implied and shared authority] ie: rider
says: can’t fund weapons for Nicaragua:
o (1) President can veto, chose not to sign b/c unconst’l – this is likely not his only
weapon b/c then Congress could override w/ 2/3.
o (2) violate the rider. then a court can review if there is standing some
Presidents say its unconstitutional when signed. consequences of violation of an
appropriations: money runs out after violating, cant raise $ b/c need an
appropriation – may be able to finagle and transfer money.
o (3) run against Congress
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o (4) quid pro quo: arrange w/ a country who has the power – give that country the
money appropriated for foreign aid.
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domestic power and delegations of foreign affairs and war powers – perhaps the
latter is not subject to check by the terms of the legislation)
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o Ange had been deployed – imminent threatened injury – he could get shot – he
doesn’t have to wait until that happens.
o it’s a result of an unlawful order coupled w/ disruption of life of being sent to the
Middle East.
o its enough to have standing.
iii. Ripeness
The ripeness doctrine allows the judiciary to avoid present adjudication of an issue by
determining that future events may affect its shape or even its existence. The doctrine
maintains that “federal courts do not render advisory opinions. For adjudication of
constitutional issues ‘concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions’
are requisite.”
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o however, b/c the court concludes first that this is non-justiciable – it leave Ange
w/out any remedy (cf. it still being on the docket in Dellums) now or in the
future.
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Commander-in-Chief: President comes close to saying that this alone
would give him the power to do this. – basically, the President controls
the war b/c he is the CIC.
in conjunction w/ “sole organ” in FA language: sets standard as if
he deems it necessary to maintain the security and defense of the
US.
Defensive War: defending ships in the Gulf of Tonkin and President
decides what the appropriate level of response is – authority = The Prize
Cases.
Historic Uses of Force: Meeker (legal advisor to the Dept. of State
during Vietnam) – says there are 125 historic uses of force in an effort to
establish a pattern of usage. Under Youngstown, a steady pattern of
usage and congressional acquiescence leads to an accumulation of
precedent for the use of force.
Take Care Clause – taking care of SEATO (see below)
Counter-Arguments:
Defensive War: proportionality requirement is not met – domino effect
(ie. defensive action isn’t just attacking the boats, but the defense of an
ally whose defeat would lead to the domino effect and imperil the US) is
tenuous.
Abraham Lincoln’s warning about the Mexico-American war –
allowing an invasion to repel an invasion allows the President to
make war at his pleasure.
Time Urgency: proposal – can repel immediately, but then have to ask
for subsequent authorization.
Usage: did Congress acquiesce with clear notice – they weren’t really
aware of what was happening. In order to have Congress acquiesce in
custom the 125 have to be consistent and many were attacks on pirates –
not really consistent w/ what was going on in Vietnam. Also, Meeker’s
historical numbers are fishy.
Commander-in-Chief: proves too much – if President could do this –
what happened to the declaration power of Congress?
o SEATO:
Presidents Arguments:
a treaty is the law of the US and I am charged w/ taking care of the laws
of the US.
if triggered, a signer must act to meet the common danger in accordance
w/ constitutional process – President would argue the above
constitutional provisions is the constitutional process.
Counter Arguments:
the treaty is a law, but that doesn’t mean that it can bypass the
declaration clause. the constitutional process is the approval of Congress
and that hasn’t occurred here.
the treaty just applies if you are attacked – it doesn’t mean you don’t
seek authorization from Congress.
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o Gulf of Tonkin Resolution:
Presidents Arguments:
The TGR gives broad discretion to the President to “prevent further
aggression” and its to prevent aggression against the people of South
Asia.
Congress might not have had all the info, but often in the Nat’l Security
area Congress has to act w/out all of the information. Moreover,
Congress could have rescinded it. The statute says what it says – the
speculation whether Congress was or wasn’t really informed doesn’t
matter.
Counter Arguments:
Problem: it is rather vague and ambiguous in wording and probably not
intended to give the President broad war making powers and have the
President take maximum advantage of it.
the Resolution was to allow the President to respond to an attack on the
ships; however, none of them probably had in mind giving the President
the power to conduct an 8 year war.
Congress didn’t really know what they were doing – kind of like a
contract procured by fraud.
Delegation or Clear Statement Argument: cant delegate it and if can
delegate it must delegate it clearly.
Residual Issues:
o Scope of Initial Authority
The President conducted the war outside of Vietnam – went into Laos
and Cambodia – what arguments are for doing so?
its part of deterring further aggression against South Vietnam and
as such it is authorized by the TGR. And even if TGR said only
in Vietnam – as a tactical matter (CIC) this is part of the war in
South Vietnam.
o note: there is likely a political restraint on the CIC power
ie – President perhaps wouldn’t just take it nuclear on his
own.
o Area & Use Limits
ie. Congress says you cant go into Cambodia (like did in amendment to
Defense Appropriations Act – page 277). Is such an appropriations rider
constitutional?
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argument against it: Congress is trying to share the CIC power –
under Chadha balancing test it is interfering w/ executive power
and it is a huge intrusion.
argument for it: Congress has done it before (ie. Prize Cases –
however, there Congress did it up front; here, Congress has given
the power and now is taking it back). Here, Congress just
received the correct information – which is why they are now
taking it back.
o Ending the War:
Can Congress decide midway through to end the war by rescinding their
authorization?
Arguments Against it:
It is within the Presidents CIC powers to w/draw the troops – the
President always has plenary power to take actions to protect the
safety of the troops.
Congress is unlikely to do it for obvious political reasons – it
would likely instead just say it would like the President to end the
war.
o Mansfield Amendment (see page 285): RH says its likely
unconstitutional. Moreover, its unlikely it could be
enforced it court – it gives the President the time table
discretion – it’s a PQ baby.
The President is the sole organ in FA (Curtiss-Wright so Im right
fucker) and the end date set by Congress encroaches on that.
The form and speed of the end is within the Presidents tactical
CIC powers.
Arguments For it:
If Congress gives authority – it can take it back. The framing
history supports this notion – it should be easier to get out of war
then to get in it.
As a practical matter, Congress appropriates the money, has to
consider it every two years.
Re: form and speed Congress is in on the beginning of the
war, it should be included in the end.
Note: In Holtzman v. Schlesinger (2nd Cir. 1973) the court directed a cut off
date of August 15th – the President could use forces until the 15th after which an
injunction would be issued – the injunction was never issued.
o September 18th Authorization for the Use of Force in light of Vietnam Case
Study:
§ 2(a) says all necessary and appropriate force – doesn’t say military
force – so its broader than others we’ve seen.
target: very broad – perpetrators, aided or harbored organizations/persons
in Sept. 11th. It doesn’t name a sovereign nation – virtually every other
authorization we’ve seen has targeted a sovereign state.
theater of war = home and abroad.
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time period: doesn’t specify when over and not really an entity capable
of ending it (ie. no sovereign state).
ponder: does it repeat the TGR mistake of being overbroad???
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Under § 4(a)(2), the President placed troops in an area equipped
for combat – but didn’t really place them into hostilities – thus,
b/c not under § 4(a)(1) – consultation and 60 day clock is not
triggered.
An argument may be made that the President did place the troops
into imminent hostilities. If imminent hostilities is a political
term, it might be up to Congress to say whether or not we are in
imminent hostilities and whether 60 day clock starts running.
This may be contrary to the intent of the WPR, however, which
wanted the trigger to be automatic.
If the 60 day clock did start running after August 10, did
Congress’ subsequent actions satisfy the WPR?
o the simple resolutions fail on two levels: (1) the language
is not strong enough and (2) Art I is not satisfied –
bicameralism and presentment.
o supplemental appropriations: doesn’t satisfy the “major
language requirement” of the WPR: specificity and cross
reference to the WPR. this appropriation doesn’t.
PROBLEM: the last statute in time controls – “A dead
Congress cant tie the hands of the current Congress.” if
it is clear that the 1990 Congress wanted to authorize war,
the fact that the 1973 Congress wanted it done in a certain
manner does not matter. HOWEVER, this
appropriation does not clearly authorize the war.
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troops w/out permission. Problem – this procedure has never been
followed.
Other Authority:
Police Action:
o if the UN approves it – its not war – its simply a police
action.
o the problem with this is that it confuses the definition of
war that international law applies and what the
constitution would apply. For constitutional purposes,
generally if it’s a large scale action it has to come back to
Congress for declaration, if it’s a smaller scale its
probably more like a police action (not requiring
congressional approval). But, this would only work if
Congress had signed off on a UN special agreement to
begin with.
o moreover, the UN Participations Act § 287d-1 (a)(1)
provides that not more than a total of one thousand US
troops may be detailed to the UN for police action.
Statutory Authorization:
o together, they don’t constitute what Chadha requires and
the language alone still doesn’t authorize it.
Custom:
o Bush seemed to largely rely on custom.
o Congressional acquiescence – its unlike prior use – this is
where Congress could see it coming and didn’t act to
prohibit it. Prior practice and failure to say no on this
occasion.
o counterargument: precedents aren’t comparable – relies
on 220 actions the bulk of which are small and have to do
with pirates. – not deployments of this size.
o what about Korea? one incident is not enough and
distinguish Korea b/c (1) can infer authorization from
mutual participation (draft extension) and (2) the Korean
war was unconstitutional (President didn’t have the CIC
power to do it).
o Gulf War II: 2003 (we discussed this before “Operation Iraqi Freedom”
commenced).
Did anything in the 1990 Gulf War I authorization serve as authorization
for this war?
Arguments against it:
o The purposes behind the two wars are different: in 1991 it
was to oust Iraq from Kuwait – now the intent of the
administration is to (a) fight terrorism; (b) disarmament
and regime change. the two purposes are very different
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o 687 it said use of force was authorized for the set of
resolutions described there – not all subsequent
resolutions.
Arguments for it:
o the language of Congress’ resolution 687 mentions UN
resolution 678 calling for a cease fire – it wasn’t done
then – so now still carrying it out.
o Iraqi’s violated the cease fire – so war has not ceased – it
is not over yet.
New Authority:
UN Resolution 1441:
o falls short ¶ 12: UN convenes upon request to consider
- haven’t yet authorized the use of force.
9/18 Authorization (2001 resolution):
o only would help if Iraq has aided or harbored perpetrators
of 9-11 – and haven’t yet made this connection yet.
2002 Congressional Resolution:
o § 3 (a)(1): authorized to use Armed Forces to defend the
national security of US against a continuing threat posed
by Iraq intended to authorize preventative self-defense.
– have to make sure we are in continuing hostilities – its
not just them defending themselves against our attack.
o § 3 (a)(2): use Armed Forces to enforce all relevant UN
Security Council Resolutions against Iraq [note: very
different from 1991 authorization which limited it to
specific resolutions].
o In either aspect, is this unconstitutional delegation to the
Executive?
isn’t the minimum decision of Congress to decide
when a continuing threat reaches the point that it
justified the cost of using armed force?
one view: this is a conditional declaration -
Congress has authorized it and it’s the Presidents
tactical decision as CIC to determine when to
carry it out.
another view: the reason for the delegation
doctrine is to establish clear lines of
accountability, if delegate fact finding to the
President – how can congress really be held
accountable?
o this is really precedent for the preventative use of
force.
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Gulf of Sidra Incident
o (2) rescue operations
protective interventions
Iran hostage rescue mission
o (3) democracy interventions
to restore democratic regime or restore winner of foreign election.
this isn’t always the sole purpose for interventions in the name of
democracy – RH says that he hasn’t found any purely in that motive. For
example, the incident in Grenada was under the guise of ridding
Marxism – but US was truly concerned w/ it as a jet port for shipping
arms.
o (4) humanitarian ops
disaster relief
legally uncontroversial, but obscure statutory authority
peace operations
historically = peacekeeping
now, say peacemaking – suppress and make peace (ie. Kosovo
and Bosnia).
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killed leaving no choice for the means – this attack
seems to fit this criteria.
Responding to Acts of Imperfect War: Should the scope of the President’s power to
respond to general attack or invasion be different from the scope of his power to
respond to an act of imperfect war?
o In United States v. Smith (CCNY 1806), Judge Patterson held that the President
does not have the unilateral power to change peace into war. There is a
difference b/w changing the state of peace into a state of war and defensive
warfare. In the case of going to war, it is the exclusive province of congress to
change a state of peace into a state of war.
Anticipatory Self-Defense:
o What is it?:
hit first to ward off foreseeable, inevitable self-defense.
its preventative b/c the consequences could be so dramatic have to get
them first even if it is not foreseeable.
terrorism lends itself to this b/c there is no telling when it is coming or
how to stop it – so maybe the only response is to hit them first.
o Basis for it:
President has to get authority unless it is part of the authority to repel
sudden attacks
Presidential emergency authority against terrorists.
appropriations for preventing terrorism?
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argue that it is so hard to stop terrorists b/c cant forsee the attacks
that Congress could do little more than appropriate money.
counter-argument: Congress could authorize use of force against
terrorists and usual appropriations argument – it has to be a clear
statement.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA):
essentially just a finding – not necessarily authority
the language says “should” – doesn’t say that he has to
the statute essentially says don’t give $ to those who fund
terrorism.
o Standard for engaging in anticipatory self-defense:
the whole idea is that they can and will do it – is this impossible to
measure?
criminal standard – beyond a reasonable doubt:
might not be the right standard
intelligence is different from evidence – hearsay rule doesn’t
apply, no adverse testimony, decision has to be made off of raw
intelligence material – not like a criminal case.
if President can decide on his own standard, on something less than
evidence, what couldn’t he do?
some check of having to answer to the pubic via the media.
some international law check.
could limit President – ie see reporting requirement re: Kosovo
(page 411): reporting is probably ok, but a time table might
interfere w/ CIC powers. (but in Bas v. Tingy – Congress
imposed limits and created a limited war).
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DP Cl – what slides internationally – doesn’t necessarily slide
domestically DP: any PERSON entitled to DP.
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o Issue: Whether 2/3 Congressional confirmation is necessary for the President to
terminate a treaty.
o Holding: The President does not need Congressional confirmation to terminate
this treaty (the opinion passed where the factors present here are lacking).
Treaty termination is a political act, but political acts are not customarily taken
without political support. Even if formal advice and consent is not
constitutionally required as a prerequisite to termination, it might be sought.
Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan (DC Cir. 1988): text 218
o Procedural History: 1986, the ICJ held that US financial support of paramilitary
activities by the Contras against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua
violated both a treaty b/w the countries and customary international law. But,
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the US w/drew from the ICJ’s jurisdiction b/f the ct’s decision. Π seeks
injunctive and declaratory relief. The D.Ct. dismissed the complaint on political
question grounds. Π appeals here.
o Issue: Whether alleged violations of the UN Article 94 can be remedied by an
American court or whether they can only be redressed on an international level.
In short, do violations of international law have domestic legal consequences?
o Holding: Treaty obligations may be overridden by subsequent inconsistent
statute, therefore, cant say as a matter of domestic law that congressional
enactments violate prior treaties. [note: not saying whether US has upheld its
treaty as a matter of international law].
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them cannot be used for purposes of interpreting the treaty for domestic
law.
note: the US has a dualistic system – we could be in breach
internationally, but be ok domestically.
The fact that the President cant reinterpret the treaty not to apply does
not mean that the President cannot terminate the treaty. The President
has the power as Chief Executive under a number of circumstances to
exercise functions regarding treaties which have the effect of either
terminating or continuing their vitality. Prominent among these is the
Presidents authority to unilaterally terminate a treaty if:
(1) to determine whether a treaty has been terminated b/c of a
breach
(2) to determine whether a treaty is at an end due to changed
circumstances – circumstances on which the treaty was
predicated have changed.
o ie. complete regime change
if a treaty says if X happens the President can terminate the treaty
and X happens.
o (3) Can terrorists invoke the treaty to dismiss his indictment?
the terrorist can only invoke the treaty if it is self-executing its
another way of saying that the courts can enforce them w/out more if
someone w/ standing brings it to attention – a terrorist might have
standing.
if it is not self-executing, then Congress has to do a further act
implementing the treaty as US law, until then, private parties don’t have
any right to enforce it.
factors indicating whether a treaty is self-executing:
In Committee of US Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Regan, the
court held that “in determining whether a treaty is self-executing”
in the sense of its creating private enforcement rights, “courts
look to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by the
language of the instrument.”
RH added:
o if the treaty contemplates undertakings b/w just nations or
confers it upon private individuals as well.
o if the treaty has mandatory language.
o whether there are alternative mechanisms for enforcement
besides judicial enforcement (ie. NATO) seems to
confer individualized enforcement.
most treaties are viewed as non-self executing – including this one.
o (4) If the treaty does apply, what is the effect of the domestic statutes?
there is no express language in the statutes which says you can do
extraterritorial arrests.
there is arrest authority for reasonable grounds to believe a felony has
been committed; but, normally domestic statutes do not apply
extraterritorially. Could argue that b/c federal domestic law makes
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terrorism a felony, which is peculiarly international, it meant for the
statute to apply extraterritorially.
if it were the last in time, it would supercede – but it was enacted in 1928
(just last time it was codified was 2000) – so it wouldn’t be the last in
time.
however, assuming it is the last in time, we should still read the
statue not to violate existing international law (the Betsy
Charming Rule) so here, where the statute is ambiguous as to
whether it applies extraterritorially and to these activities, avoid
reading it to violate the UN Charter.
What if instead of statute, we had an Executive Agreement dealing w/
arrest:
While the case law suggests that congressional-executive
agreements and agreements made pursuant to treaty have the
same legal effect as constitutional treaties, it is unclear about the
effect of sole executive agreements on prior statutory or treaty
law. Is it “Curtiss-Wright so I’m right?”
o It may depend on what kind of executive agreement:
ie. Congressional executive agreement vs. sole
executive agreement v. treaty agreement.
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o (4) Can a court supercede customary international law, because its part of the
CL?
yes, courts change it all the time; But public international law is
controlling only “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision.”(Garcia-Mir quoting from
Paquette Habana). This suggests that if had any of those, could
supercede customary international law.
o (5) Could the President just order the director of the FBI to do this?
Curtiss-Wright – “sole organ” – President makes the decision to start
changing customary international law.
counter-argument: just b/c we can change customary international law –
that doesn’t mean the President can do it but, likely we want it to be
kept quiet so President would be more discrete.
o (6) Which executive acts are viewed as controlling?
The most controversial implication of the Paquette Habana dictum is
that a controlling executive act may override customary international
law. It likely has to be performed by the President himself or his
immediate alter ego cabinet level official. so, FBI director probably
wouldn’t be an executive act as controlling on his own.
o (7) If this is jus cogens, and it doesn’t have the stature of a constitutional
provision, how might it still enter into the analysis of deciding domestic legality
of this action?
4th A. search and seizure possibly
5th A. DP: b/c it says any PERSON – its substantive DP used in US
courts to go after abusive police behavior. Conduct which shocks the
conscience violates the 5th A. If it shocks the conscience because its just
cogens, it is an illustration that the rest of the world would be shocked
by it. use the jus cogens definitions to define the behavior which
shocks the conscience for substantive DP analysis.
problem w/ it: Scalia DP: has to be deeply rooted w/in the
states history / tradition – process is due which as always
been given (Bowers v. Hardwick style). What US society
thinks is due – not the international world. Jus cogens is the
view of 190 foreign countries most of which do not have
representative democracy – who cares what they think?
note: Nicaragua v. Regan illustrates the DC Cir. might
be more hospitable to using jus cogens than Scalia
would be.
Exercise: Intelligence Operation in Iraq (text 417): provide a legal opinion concerning the
legality under domestic law of proposed U.S. financial support for a coup in Iraq to
overthrow President Saddam Hussein.
o President: would argue that he has the authority for this as part of his FA power
rather than CIC in order to avoid any necessity of congressional approval under the
WPR. Would rely on Curtiss-Wright and the tradition of diplomatic actions done
under the rubric of FA, and, thus, at the discretion of the President.
o Congress: would argue that this is an exercise of war b/c using military force which
comes under the congressional Marque and Reprisal powers as well as the WPR.
Moreover, Congress has to appropriate money for it.
Secrecy Problems:
o President: Under Curtiss-Wright, he has the capacity and necessity to conduct things
secretly – including intelligence collection. Such secrecy may extend to keeping
these things from Congress.
o Congress: the State of the Union presumes Congress will get information when it
needs it and it is a necessary predicate for congress to legislate, and appropriate
money. Unlike the President, Congress does have the authority to keep secrets
(secret journal clause); thus, this would allow Congress to take secret information
from the President.
Custom:
o President: I’ve been doing this for a long time and you have known about it.
o Congress: (1) practice is varied and not necessarily adequate precedent (often cited
examples include “ceremonial occasions” in which special agents have spoke for the
President personally); (2) how could we have acquiesced in what we don’t know (in
the 1950’s there was almost no congressional oversight of the rash of such
intelligence).
Would the coup violate the Neutrality Act?
o there is a question as to whether it applies to government agents as well as private
persons case law splits on the issue.
o it has to be against a country w/ which we are at peace.
o moreover, the 1947 NSA was enacted subsequent to the Neutrality Act last in
time baby.
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EO 12,333 was in response to the CIA violating US laws (like in this case) –
however, it was enacted in 1981 and this is 1964. Basically, up until 1981,
the CIA has the authority to do anything.
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action – remember, it just says report to Congress, not that Congress has to
approve the action.
The Church Committee and a Proposed Charter: In 1975, the Senate created a
committee to study governmental operations, known as the Church Committee after its
chair. The committee was charged to determine “the extent, if any, to which illegal,
improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by the intelligence activities.” Eventually,
the committee proposed a new act to replace the NSA with more specific lines of
responsibility and limits of authority. The Charter/Act was never adopted, and the
Intelligence Oversight Act represents what the Senate Intelligence Committee was able to
salvage of its proposed charter.
If the President didn’t want Congress to know, what other authority did he have?
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o The President could attempt to avoid the AECA by using the Fifth Function of the
NSA – the sales were made as a covert action and thus do not fall under the AECA.
It would still fall under the Intelligence Oversight Act (which includes the Hughes-
Ryan Amendment), however, and thus the President is still required to report it to
Congress. If under the IOA, the President has to:
make a written finding:
the President didn’t make a finding initially, but after the second sale
in 1985, he made a finding. The “finding”, however, was oral and it
came after had already taken the action.
in 1986, the President made another finding, but he omitted any
reference to the arms-hostage situation.
division of labor for implementation:
the CIA is required to conduct such activities; however, in this
situation the NSC directed and conducted the operations vis a vis
Ollie North and Poindexter. While this is not very consistent w/ the
NSA, it is not necessarily a violation because the CIA is to conduct it
unless the President directs someone else to do it.
reporting requirement:
report in a timely fashion (limit it to gang of eight or not report at all
b/c the extraordinary circumstances excuse notice? statute is
ambig.)
what would be the extraordinary circumstances?
o is the risk that Congress will disapprove and thus jeopardize
the operation enough to establish extraordinary care?
this is probably the least solid ground for not
informing them. should have to report unless its on
the inherent executive power of the President.
o Congressional policy to disapprove this would be based on
theory that it would encourage taking of hostages and policy
was not to negotiate with terrorists.
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of the agencies) which would include agencies such as the NSC which
diverted funds to the Contras. [RH thinks it does include agencies such
as the NSC].
o (2) does “involved” encompass indirect support?
arguably, it does include indirect support. The legislation is a response
by Congress to perceived end runs around Congress by the
Administration. If it didn’t include indirect support the intent of the
legislation would be frustrated.
o (3) does the phrase “no funds available” apply only to the then-current DOD
appropriation or to all government funds?
part of a budget consists of contingency funds (for which there is no line
item appropriation) Congress didn’t want them to use contingency
funds for this action.
but, could they use private weapons manufacturers dealing directly w/
Iran?
by soliciting contributions from the US,
via photo ops w/ the President for example, and then making a
cash contribution to the Contras? The Miscellaneous Receipts
Act provides that the money has to go to the US treasury if there
is not a statute directing it elsewhere. The money only comes out
of the treasury if it has been appropriated. No statute authorizing
the money to go any where else here. The Anti-Deficiency Act
makes it a crime to authorize an expenditure without an
appropriation.
by inducing the contribution by quid pro
quo (giving them a tax break or assistance?): It would still fall
within the “indirect funds” language. Moreover, Congress
enacted the Pell Amendment (text 501) to prohibit quid pro quo.
It is hard to enforce a quid pro quo, however, because have to
allow the President certain FA latitude in communicating and
making foreign policy with the countries.
could Ollie North do this privately?
Under the Neutrality Act it would still fit fundraising to support
paramilitary support of Nicaragua.
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o Others argue that the Boland Amendments were unconstitutional because they
usurped the power of President Reagan to fashion a response to the multiple
violations of international law perpetrated by the Sandanistas. The counterargument
is that Boland is implementing international law by defining offenses. The
President must uphold the international law in absence of a controlling legislative
act – Boland Amendments are arguably a controlling legislative act.
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III. Fighting Terrorists and Other Transnational Criminals
a. Crisis Management: Detecting and Interdicting Terrorism and Transnational
Crime
i. Sleuthing at Home: The Fourth Amendment Framework (and its National Security
Exceptions?)
Terrorism:
o A federal statute provides international terrorism as activities that –
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any States, or that would
be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United
States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended –
i. to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
ii. to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or
iii. to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping;
and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or
transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are
accomplished, the persons they appear to intend to coerce or intimidate,
or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
o The USA PATRIOT ACT, passed in response to the September 11 attacks,
borrows the above definition of “international terrorism” to define as “domestic
terrorism” such acts that occur primarily within the jurisdiction of the United
States.
o Designation by the Secretary of State as a terrorist country has the following
implications:
you cannot be sold arms by the US or a country to which we have sent
them
civil liability statute waiving sovereign immunity for suit
Posse Comitatus: use of forces in certain terrorist instances
your assets may be blocked/frozen
immigration may be blocked
you may get booted from the US
prohibited from giving material support to an organization.
the DC Cir. has held that some organizations labeled as terrorists
have some DP right to be heard during such designation.
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give the President any authorization to conduct such surveillance absent a
warrant.
o Title III explicitly mentions national security searches and recognizes
constitutional authorities of the President in two scenarios:
foreign power threats
preserve, protect, defend
domestic security threats
mentions President taking such measures as are required to
prevent the overthrow of government. this is where this Δ falls
under – its not a foreign powers situation, but its not for a normal
crime either, it’s a symbolic act against the government.
o Did the President authorize warrantless searches pursuant to Title III correctly?
Title III recognizes that the President has the authority, but it doesn’t give
authority to conduct warrantless searches and it doesn’t regulate national
security issues.
counterargument: it does authorize and regulate national security issues
b/c last sentence in portion quoted on 317 says the contents of
communication intercepted by the President in the exercise of the
foregoing powers may be received if the interception was reasonable.
The court, however, concludes that Title III does not govern it.
o So, does the President have other constitutional authority to do this?
implied in the “Take Care” clause – Neagle – didn’t need specific statute
to protect S.Ct. justice from being attacked.
customary authority – the President has done this for decades
o Does this require a warrant and how is reasonableness determined?
gov’t: no warrant b/c national security presents special circumstances
which make this reasonable. the information they are seeking is hard
to explain to the court and they don’t want it leaked to the presss.
response:
there are certainly procedures to avoid the above concerns from
occurring.
re: the competency concern of the judges – courts already look at
a lot of these cases.
o Courts 3 part holding vis a vis RH:
(1) some sort of prior judicial approval is necessary (not after the fact
judicial approval)
(2) for intenal/domestic security surveillance where the subject has no
connection to foreign power
(3) but not necessarily by same standards as the Fourth Amendment
requires for ordinary crimes (codified in Title III) – ie. different
standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for
intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.
important because rejects the notion that the 4th Amendment
doesn’t apply, but says circumstances/standards might be relaxed
under those circumstances (and a fortiori probably more relaxed
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under foreign powers not addressed, but implied in the
holding).
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung (4th Cir. 1980): text 633
o Δ was convicted of espionage and the Δs seek reversal of their convictions
becaue of warrantless surveillance and searches. No court authorization was
ever sough or obtained for the installation of wire taps, for mail intercepts, etc.
The government relies on a “foreign intelligence” exception to the Fourth
Amendment. The FBI sought and received approval for the surveillance from
the AG.
o the court now recognizes a foreign intelligence exception, however, because
individual privacy interests are so important, the court provides a carefully
limited exception:
(1) the government is only relieved from seeking a warrant when the
object of the search is a foreign power, its agent or collaborators. Where
there is no foreign connection, the executive’s needs become less
compelling; and the surveillance more closely resembles the surveillance
of suspected criminals, which must be authorized by warrant.
(2) the executive should be excused from securing a warrant only when
the surveillance is conducted “primarily” for foreign intelligence
reasons. (ie. not for criminal prosecution).
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searches are still governed by the reasonableness requirement and can be
challenged in ex post criminal or civil proceedings.
o The court applies their standard and finds that the searches fall within the
foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Summary:
Electric Surveillance and Physical Searches in the US
o Ordinary Criminal Evidence:
in connection with ordinary criminal investigation = warrant upon
probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed = Title III.
o “Domestic Intelligence”
need prior judicial approval
prior approval doesn’t have to be a warrant, but its not up to the court to
decide what a domestic intelligence warrant should be based on.
o “Foreign Intelligence”
Truong and FISA?
courts said that the difference b/w foreign intelligence and domestic
intelligence are so significant that we can dispense w/ the prior judicial
approval – but it must be approved by at least the AG, must have foreign
intelligence reason to collect information, and must be foreign power
target. [note: these cases are pre-FISA]
In 1978, this was codified in FISA: wanted prior judicial approval, but
under relaxed circumstances.
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certification by the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, or AG, the certifying official deems the
information sought to be foreign intelligence information and that
the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence
information, together with a statement of the basis for
certification that the information sought it a type of foreign
intelligence information designated.
o Less intrusive forms of surveillance which don’t require a FISA warrant
pen registers, track and tracer devices, intercepts on email routers
all are regarded as somewhat less intrusive and they are also surveillance
of info you voluntarily put “out there.”
just get court order that you need warrant which does not involves US
person or involves foreign terrorism.
also can get certain kinds of business information upon mere relevance
to intelligence collection: credit records, some bank records subject to
search by gov’t upon nothing more than request (National Security
Letter) – don’t even have to go to court – just send the letter to the credit
bureau, libraries, etc.
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The FBI has scant statutory authority to carry out its mission. In addition to the powers
granted to the FBI by FISA, the FBI, lacking a statutory charter, conducts all of its
investigations under the authority of two sets of guidelines promulgated by the AG (one
domestic and one foreign), and President Reagan’s 1981 EO 12,333, that directs the
activities of all the agencies that make up the intelligence community.
Hypo: In connection with the Palestinian Coalition and National Patriots investigations,
informants have told FBI field officers of apparently unlinked plots by some
Palestinian-Americans who are members of PC and some US citizens who are members
of NP to bomb federal facilities throughout the United States. FBI officials are inclined
to rely on FISA or executive authority to engage in electronic surveillance and physical
searches of PC and NP headquarters and members homes. The concern is that the FBI
is at the intersection of the 4th and 1st Amendments. Both groups engage in some
protected activity; but, the tips suggest violent activity which the government has an
interest in protecting. (see pages 611 and 698 for further facts on the exercise)
o Investigations Analysis:
Generic Authority = CIA/FBI
Levels of Investigation:
“Checking Leads”
Preliminary Inquiry
Full Investigation.
What level is appropriate for NP? the FBI only have one tip, it might be enough under
the full investigation balancing test b/c of the type of concern. The bulk of their
activity, however, are protected under the 1st A.
What level is appropriate for PC? hard to say b/c the foreign guidelines apply, but if
domestic guidelines would allow it, surely the foreign ones would. PC also takes part in
non-terrorist humanitarian aid – so PC could be giving money just for that. The
government, however, would argue that because money is fungible, it doesn’t matter if
PC only intended to fund humanitarian efforts – it frees up money for the group to
support terrorism.
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government has a basis for classification: (1) legal authorization
for classifying aliens; (2) can rationally worry about flight risk
and loyalty.
Arab, Muslim & Immigrant:
begin to move from assumptions about propensity to identifying
characteristics of hijackers and those w/ whom they affiliated.
may not be profiling which is unconstitutional.
Political Advocacy:
this would appear to be unlawful, and protected 1st A. speech,
unless the advocacy itself is criminal.
could attempt to apply Korematsu, and argue that we are at war
w/ terrorism (undeclared defensive) and thus have Congressional
authorization. In Korematsu, however, at least in theory the
government could identify those who might be disloyal. Under
the present circumstances, identity is really gone.
o Pre-Textual Basis:
detainees are arrested for “spitting on the sidewalk” offenses = minor
crimes: credit card fraud, identify fraud, petty larceny, smuggling
cigarettes, etc. these give law enforcement probable cause to arrest the
detainees. They are called pre-textual because they were really arrested
b/c the government thought they were engaged in terrorism.
What’s wrong w/ these detentions?
selective prosecution – still prosecuted b/c of race, etc.
only people they are detaining are those they believe are involved
in terrorism (not everyone who spits on the sidewalk). Bail is
available for these minor crimes, yet they detain only these
certain people. [note: Bail Reform Act does allow for preventive
detention for (1) flight risk and (2) dangerousness to community.]
Why then, wasn’t the Bail Reform Act used to detain those charged?
in order to show they were dangerous might have to reveal
information and sources the government is protecting. And would
have to give them counsel – the government wants to keep the
detainees isolated.
note: flight risk is based on what the detainees were originally
charged with (so is dangerousness) – charge is so trivial, neither
really dangerousness nor flight risk would be high based on the
underlying offenses.
Speedy Trial Act: bail is pending trial, trial has to be set promptly.
If the objective here is preventively holding them, then it is not in
the governments best interest to proceed under the Bail Reform
Act b/c a speedy trial would still need to be provided.
o Other Alternatives:
Material Witness:
ill fit b/c it is not a security measure, it requires an open court
hearing, access to an attorney, and evidentiary demands on the
government. Further, the detention is in aid of securing
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testimony for trail, if there is no proceeding pending trial, the
federal statute might not even apply.
about 40 of the 1200 post-9-11 detainees were held as military
witnesses.
Immigration Detainees:
might be helpful in these circumstances b/c it is not a criminal
proceeding so the 6th A. wouldn’t apply.
drawback for the government is that there is a large body of law
regarding immigration detainees, including the Patriot Act. The
Patriot Act authorizes the INS to detain immigrants for up to 7
days b/f charging them. But, the Act also expressly authorizes
the writ of habeus corpus. The S.Ct. ruled that the DP Cl. places
a reasonable time limit on immigration detention. Therefore,
while the government may not be able to hold them indefinitely,
the Court may still give some deference under the national
security concerns.
Presidential Authorization: President’s CIC authority that the suspects
have information regarding terrorism and the President has been
authorized to detain them. = national security exception to the 4th
Amendment re: seizure:
Keith: Keith and its progeny suggest a warrant exception for
domestic searches – but need prior judicial approval. Perhaps by
implication, foreign intelligence might be ok w/ out prior judicial
approval. Is it such a stretch to come up with the argument for
seizure where the normal procedure is an arrest warrant?
o Seizure, even without a warrant, still must be reasonable.
Courts have found that holding someone indefinitely is
not reasonable.
o Keith ultimately says Congress can lower the standards,
but didn’t say anything about Congressional involvement
in foreign intelligence. Congress, however, clearly
thought they should be involved when they enacted FISA
Congress may determine the standards, and once they
do so – it occupies the field.
Suspend Writ of Habeus Corpus:
The President issued a Military Order on November 13, 2001
authorizing detention in § 3. The President has detained people
based on the same cases which he said support the order. § 7(b)
(2) of that order looks like an awful lot like a suspension of the
write of habeus corpus.
If the Military Order applies, has the President constitutionally
suspended the writ?
o Art. I § 9 cl 2: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeus
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.”
o argument: it is an Art. I power – so it really belongs to
Congress to suspend the writ.
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o counterargument: the President shouldn’t have to wait and
let the emergency run its course. So – both should be able
to suspend it. Article I is passive construction – the
constitution doesn’t say that the President cant have it –
so he can.
o Art I § 9 is entirely passive and seems to apply to both
branches of government. Congress, however, did address
suspending the writ in the Patriot Act. The Presidents
suspension of the writ, therefore, would seem unlawful
unless it operated under an entirely different field of law.
Thus, it should be construed narrowly to avoid a
constitutional question (INS v. St. Cyr n. 4 text 814). If
the Military Order suspends the writ – then it must do so
clearly. If the strict rule of construction were applied to
the Military Order, the S.Ct. would probably say that the
language doesn’t suspend the writ.
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here to do. Article 15 simply provides that those provisions don’t deprive
commissions of other jurisdiction – it’s a savings provision not an affirmative
grant of authority.
o this case implicates that there is a CL of war and the military commission has
authority under that to try offenses against the it. It may be that a
constitutionally authorized was is a predicate to using the CL of war and thus a
military commission [the Court doesn’t decide what would happen if there
wasn’t a constitutionally authorized war – b/c this is one].
if there is a CL of war, can Congress override it? Congress has
authorization to define the law of nations (Art. I § 8 cl 10) which
includes the law of war = subject matter jurisdiction. At the procedural
end, Congress may make rules and regulations of naval and military
(Art. I § 8 cl 14). If Congress hasn’t spoken, the President would seem
by default to have the authority to do this.
o The court found the President had the authority for the military commission and
the law of war is clearly violated. Thus, the 5th, 6th and 7th Amendments done
apply once w/in jurisdiction of a military commission.
THUS: all the cases together (Milligan, Quirin and Hamdi) stand for the proposition
that: the Open Court rule applies except in constitutionally authorized war and a
detainee is picked up on the battlefield OR if declared enemies (Congressional
declaration of war) and the President is acting with full powers under war.
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vaccinate first responders at the very least. Also coordinate medical
personnel from other states thru Public Health Service Act.
o When reached national health level, Governor declares state emergency and
issues a travel advisory (not immediately jump to quarantine or anything). Hard
advisory b/c these are tourist locations, saying no one can come in. Natural
local response was to flee – advisory had opposite effect.
Could he actually enforce the travel advisory? Means of implementation
will be local police or the national guard. The problem is that there are
no rules of engagement for local police and possibly not for the NG for
dealing w/ this shooting on innocent civilians to enforce travel ban.
NG has some experience for dealing w/ looters, but its an issue b/c the
people who will be enforcing it are generally local – the community
police firing on the community – and are worried about their own
families. The number of effective police declined – they took off too.
Suggests if this is a large scale, need military, need to federalize it and
bring in troops not indigenous to the area.
Problem w/ NG – many of the NG are also the first responders (police,
fireman) – which way to use them best.
Legal Authority: broad at state level, Governor’s concern here was
information – didn’t know what was the best thing to do – travel
advisory, quarantine, etc. Medical evidence was unclear.
o Governor has to tell the public what is going on – disseminate information.
Governor has to establish a chain of command, have someone responsible for
press relations, its not necessarily clear. Another problem: can you prohibit the
press from reporting certain things – take over media to control whats going to
the public – serious 1st A. issue. RH thinks probably cant do anything about
that – bank on panic from misinformation.
o Federal Role:
FBI is the lead federal agency (LFA) for investigating the bio-terrorist
incident. An agent in charge and everyone answers to him for
investigatory phase – going on at same time as response.
FEMA = lead federal agency for consequence management
who commands federalized national guard if so federalize them? not
clear how will interact w/ FBI and FEMA.
o Once antibiotics arrive, who gets them? Logically, it ought to be the first
responders to encourage them to continue to respond. but, innocuating them,
often means innocuating their families. Governor and staff? People already
been subjected the plague – if antibiotics will still work. Equity considerations
which are not hypothetical – population gets the notion that someone is being
favored – have potential for a riot. Serious disruption to stay at home orders.
Whenever you vaccinate one person – it makes them a carrier for a time – have
to vaccinate family. There are some who are not supposed to be vaccinated
(pregnant, etc) – which is a huge part of the US population – cant only vaccinate
only part of the family – so what do you do?
o 4 days after plague hit – estimated 1900 cases and 400 dead. May 22, Governor
forbid any travel in or out of Colorado. Can you prevent people from crossing
state lines? Public Health Service Act (757) – probably gives authority to
prevent interstate travel – but not intrastate travel.
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o Scenario ended w/ civil unrest breaking out everywhere. In 5 days, this just
went nuts.
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military at disposal of governor; continuing hostility
to a standing army.
o Declaration of Independence – list of military offenses
– concerned w/ military overrunning civil society.
Concern w/ presence of military order answerable to
the King and military officials and not the locals.
interfering w/ law enforcement carried on on a much
lower scale.
this is historically a big deal and it should be relied on.
government interest: government interests are twofold: (1) to
maintain order in times of domestic violence or rebellion = maintain
order; and (2) to improve the efficiency of civilian law enforcement
by giving it the benefit of military technologies, equipment,
information, and training personnel = effectiveness and efficiency.
how do you strike the balance? don’t have to b/c Congress already
struck a balance in the Posse Comitatus Act – Πs 4th A. claim
therefore must stand or fall on the proposition that the military
activity in connection w/ the occupation of Wounded Knee violated
the PC Act. [note: this isn’t a strict PC claim, the court uses PC as a
guideline for the balancing test, w/out the Act, the court still might
come out the same way under the balancing test.]. How does the PC
strike a balance?
PC isn’t absolute prohibition – its prohibition on coercive
nature of using military power not violated unless
“subjected the citizens to the exercise of military power
which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature,
either presently or prospectively.”
At Wounded Knee, Court found PC not violated: logistical
activity, conducting surveillance from the air, or giving advice
none of it is coercive and thus not proscribed by the PC.
Thus, ultimatey, 4th A. is not violated.
on other hand, if military involved in road blocks, it would
likely violate the PC, unless authorized by a separate statute,
and would then violate the 4th A.
o 4th A. views coercive activity more skeptically than other involvement.
Coercive activity doesn’t always violate it – if extreme need for it – then it
would be balanced out.
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o insurrections (773 n 5): 10 USC § 333
o use of military to enforce the laws when unlawful obstructions . . . § 332 – ie
KKK; use military to break strikes (Pullman strikes in 1950s); desegregation
aid;
what these all have in common – President cant just do it – if thinks there
is something blocking the law – has to “read them the Riot Act” these
are the Riot Acts, and has to call publicly on the groups to disperse as a
condition of calling up the Federal Troops.
o called out to assist the secret service in performance of its duties (774). not only
protect president, but candidates of president, etc.
o hypo: suppose the President has no statutory exception, does that leave him
bereft of using the military?
(1) constitutional authority recognized in PC, but says express authority
– so not clear that saying emergency power is enough b/c its not express.
(2) riot acts occupy the field? pretty strong argument that they do
o Bisonette – page 768: “We believe that the limits established by
Congress on the use of the military for civilian law enforcement
provide a reliable guidepost by which to evaluate the
reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment purposes of the seizure
and searches in question here. Congress has acted to establish
reasonable limits on the President’s use of military forces in
emergency situations, and in doing so has circumscribed
whatever, if any, inherent power the President may have had
absent such legislation.”
o Justice Jackson in Youngstown of course gov’t has emergency
authority, but that doesn’t follow its vested in president alone, if
Congress can anticipate the authority and provides it – that’s it.
o Neagle: it is an emergency case counterargument – Neagle
didn’t deal w/ the situation where Congress had put down a
statute.
(3) power to protect governmental installations, property etc. and can do
so if he concludes it is necessary – protect government facilities so that
the government can function. Neagle important for this proposition as
well.
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o try them in a military commission – advantage: we write the rules for the
comm’n they don’t come from const’n, statute, etc. so could say that secret
evidence could be used under certain circumstances, could make the trial
completely secret = an option under the current rules, although not the preferred
method.
Secret Trial:
Immigrant / Defendant Public / Media
- private interest - experience of public access?
- government interest - “logic” (positive effect) of public access
- risk of inaccuracy - strict scrutiny
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violated their 1st Amendment right of access to Haddad’s deportation
proceeding.
unless the respondent does not have an attorney, the person that are most
interested are aware of the proceeding b/c the attorney can communicate
w/ family, etc. and after the proceeding is over, the respondent and the
attorney can communicate w/ the media re: the protected information.
o Issue: Whether the First Amendment to the US constitution confers a public
right of access to deportation hearings.
o Holding: The Richmond Newspapers two-part “experience and logic” test is
applied to deportation proceedings. Under this test, the Court finds that there is
a First Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings because (1)
deportation proceedings have historically been open to the public and (2) public
access plays a significant role in the functioning of the deportation proceeding.
Under strict scrutiny, the government must show that denial of the First
Amendment right is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. While the government has illustrated a
compelling governmental interest, the Creppy directive fails to make specific
findings, is both under inclusive and over inclusive and as such is not narrowly
tailored [note: could be done on a case by case basis]. Thus, the Creppy
directive is unconstitutional.
o hypo: what is the right of a special interest respondent to have an open hearing?
RH suspects that on the same procedural DP ground as found having a
right to see the secret information, the respondent has a right to have an
open hearing – to ensure that the media checks the quality of justice – it’s
a particularized interest of the respondent of the case.
the individuals right isn’t the subject of this litigation – its from the
perspective of the medias right.
o Government claims that it has plenary control over immigration issues CT:
this isn’t a question of who comes and goes its whether this person is in a
particular “special interest” group – it’s a procedural question which the courts
can decide. don’t give the government deference on that point.
Zadyvdas v. Davis (supplement 44 and text 732): issue was whether the
post-removal statute authorized a detention indefinitely, or for a period
reasonably necessary to secure removal. While finding the government
didn’t have plenary authority to create immigration law, the Court noted
that it might be deferential in situations involving terrorism or national
security is this a basis for insisting on extreme deference to gov’t for
closing the procedures? CT: in that case, the Court was looking at a
case regarding the detention of a small segment of particularly dangerous
individuals – the group currently before the court is not a small segment,
but a broad, indiscriminate range of information, including information
likely to be entirely innocuous. Zadyvadas itself and the sexual predator
case it refers to both talk about a group of people identified by statute –
in this case the special interest group is determined the Executive & no
similarly no definable standard used to determine whether a case is of
“special interest” have been articulated.
o Can they close the hearings?
1st A. background: Richmond Newspapers test:
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(1) look to the experience of public access to the particular
governmental proceeding how much public access has been
historically permitted and for how long.
(2) logic: what positive contribution does public access make to
the functioning of the particular governmental process.
if determine have a right of access, is any limitation on that right
pass strict scrutiny: compelling governmental interest, narrowly
tailored.
o 6th Cir. concluded based on experience and logic that
there was a 1st A. right of access, then applied strict
scrutiny – govt hadn’t narrowly tailored it to compelling
governmental interest.
o cf. 3rd Cir. which says never get to strict scrutiny if don’t
get past logic prong – and in logic prong also have to
consider what negative contribution it makes to the
functioning of the particular governmental process.
o “experience” prong: they had been closed in a few cases, ie. abused children or
abused spouses, the proceedings had been closed. not an unbroken tradition
of open access to deportation proceedings. [cf. exclusion proceedings which are
closed]. 1964 statute created rebuttable presumption that the proceedings are
open.
3rd Cir: says maybe, but not long enough tradition. The criminal
proceeding tradition was centuries old – and this isn’t. note: default
mode for government hearings = open – 3rd cir. seems to ignore that.
o “logic” prong: it’s a check on bad faith of the government, bad conduct, more
importantly, it’s a check on mistakes and inaptitude – if performing in public,
you will prepare more carefully. it’s a substitute for other checks – there is no
jury at these proceedings and no right to counsel at governments expense. in
criminal court, it’s a therapeutic aspect to having open process – more
satisfactory to see it done then just to hear about it. right to participate in what
the government does to you.
do you consider the flip side, like the 3rd Cir., or does that only come in
when in strict scrutiny and deciding whether or not its narrowly tailored.
North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft (3rd Cir. 2002): appendix 61
o Facts / PH: reporters for the Π were repeatedly denied docket information and
access to deportation hearings in Newark’s Immigration Court. The Newspapers
filed a challenge to the Creppy Directive, asserting that its mandated policy of
closing every “special interest” case precluded the case by case treatment the
First Amendment requires. The D.Ct. found that under the Richmond
Newspapers two-part test, a First Amendment right to access existed. Further,
under strict scrutiny, it found that the directive failed because it lacked narrowly-
tailored means. The D.Ct. granted the Newspapers motion and temporarily
enjoined the Directive’s operation.
o Holding: The Richmond Newspapers analysis is proper in the administrative
context, but under that test, there is no First Amendment right to attend
deportation hearings. The deportation hearings do not pass the test because (1)
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the history of deportation proceedings do not present the type of unbroken,
uncontradicted history required and (2) with the logic prong properly
considering the extent to which the openness impairs the public good, the logic
prong test does not favor the media. Our judgment is confined to the extremely
narrow class of deportation cases that are determined by the Attorney General to
present significant national security concerns. In the absent of such a right, we
need not reach the subsequent question whether the Creppy Directive’s closures
would pass a strict scrutiny analysis.
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