1.

BALBINA MENDOZA vs PACIANO DIZON

FACTS:

In 1932 Cuevas married Florence Cocadiz. This marriage was definitively dissolved on
march 21,1944 by virtue of a decree divorce issued by the Court of First Instance in Batangas on
that date. There was no offspring.

In December 7, 1945 the President of the Philippines of Commonwealth issued

Administrative Order No. 27 in which under certain conditions is available to the bonuses or
gratuities to officials and employees of the Government National who had been in active service
in December 8, 1941, have been or not called to return to their jobs after the liberation. Later - 12
March 1946 - the Auditor General Delegate, making use of course powers conferred on it by Art.
262 of the Administrative Code, solved the substance of the instance of Balbina Mendoza,
dictating the following judgment:

As the gratuity of the late Juan M. Cuevas under Administrative Order No. 27, dated
December 7,1945, corresponds to his salary for the months of January and February, 1942,
during which his marriage with Florencia Cocadiz in 1932 was not yet dissolved, the decree of
their divorce having been issued by the Court of First Instance of Batangas only on March 21,
1944, the said gratuity should be deemed to be a part of their conjugal estate. Only one-half
thereof may, therefore, be paid to his surviving mother, the herein claimant, who is hereby
designated as his next of kin, the other half being payable to his divorced wife as her share.

ISSUE: Whether such gratuity should be considered as goods belonging to the acquisitions of
the deceased and his wife divorced

RULING:

Bonuses or gratuities should be governed by Order No.27. Administrator had character

and strength under the emergency powers granted by the Legislature to the President of the
Philippines in the wake of war, according to the Constitution.

However, the said Order Management uses the word gratuity that has a meaning known,
categorical and conclusive on the law and jurisprudence. Provide for a rapid authority of gratuity
as an equivalent and not salary, wages or other remuneration. It means gift, award, present,
something that is given and received by lucrative title.

In this case the difference accentuate the two concepts when one considers that Congress,
in its Joint Resolution No. 5 adopted on July 28,1945, recommended the study of "ways and
means to pay the back salaries, gratuities, bonuses or other emoluments of the loyal and
deserving employees of the Commonwealth on merits of the above, amending appeal subject to
the opinion and states that the appellant has receive the total amount of the gratuity belongs to
the deceased John M. Cuevas, subject of course to any valid claim against the property of the
deceased under the laws on good of the dead.

2.REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP vs SENDINO (1994)

FACTS:

Lucina Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc.
for a 120 sq m lot in Sucat Paranaque for P307,800. She paid 1k as partial reservation fee and
completed the reservation fee for 4k on July 18, 1984. Sendino paid Realty Exchange Venture,
Inc. P16,000 as full down payment on the purchase price but she was advised by Realty
Exchange Venture, Inc. to change her co-maker in which she agreed, asking for another month of
extension.

Because of the alleged non-compliance with the submission of requirements, Realty

Exchange Venture, Inc. informed Sendino, through the VP for marketing, of the cancellation of
the contract.

Sendino filed an action for specific performance against Realty Exchange Venture, Inc.
with the Office of Appeals Adjudication and legal affairs of the HLURB asking for Realty
Exchange Venture, Inc. to be ordered to comply and continue the sale of the house and lot, pay
for damages and attorney’s fees. HLURB rendered it’s judgment in favor of Sendino.

ISSUE: W/N HLURB has quasi-judicial functions to render judgment over the case filed by the
petitioners.

RULING:

The Court ruled that HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case filed by the
petitioners with its adjudicative body, the Office of Appeals Adjudication and legal affairs, in
ordering petitioners to comply with their obligations arising from the Reservation agreement.
The quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is
defined in the agency’s enabling act.

3.CEBU UNITED ENTERPRISES vs GALLOFIN

FACTS:

This suit for mandatory injunction was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
United Enterprise to compel Jose Gallofin, as collector of Customs, Cebu Port, to release and
deliver to the plaintiff two imported shipments of 7,834 bales of over issue newspapers
purchased by the latter from the United States. As ancillary relief during the pendency of the
action, the plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which
was granted by the court after the plaintiff posted a bond in the amount of P60,000.00 in favor of
the defendant. Thereafter, the goods were released to the plaintiff, it appearing further that the
advance sales tax due on the same had been duly paid upon arrival of the merchandise at port.

The importation of the aforesaid shipments was made under and by virtue of an Import
Control Commission License No. 1225, issued by the defunct Import Control Commission.
Under the terms of the license, the plaintiff could import, on a no-dollar remittance basis, over
issue newspapers up to the amount or value of $118,000.00. The refusal of the defendant to
deliver the imported items is premised on his contention that while the five bills of lading
covering the two shipments of the over issue newspapers were all dated at Los Angeles, U.S.A.
December 17, 1953, or one day before the expiration of the import license in question, the
vessels M/S VENTURA and M/S BATAAN, carrying on board the said merchandise, actually
left the ports of embarkation, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, on January 12 and January 16,
1954 respectively. Hence, according to the defendant, the importation must be considered as
having been made without a valid import license, because under the regulations issued by the
Central Bank and the Monetary Board, "all shipments that left the port of origin after June 30,
1953, and are covered by ICC licenses, may be released by the Bureau of Customs without the
need of a Central Bank release certificate; provided they left the port of origin within the period
of validity of the licenses". No Central Bank certificate for the release of the goods having been
shown or presented to the defendant, the latter refused to make the delivery.

ISSUE: Whether or not the valid period of the license in question should be counted up to the
time when the vessels carrying the imported items left the ports of origin on January 12 and
January 16, 1954, or when the corresponding bills of lading were dated, or December 17, 1953

RULING:

No. The authority of the appellee to import was contained in the Import Control
Commission License No. 17225, validated on June 18, 1953, and under Resolution 70 of the
Commission (adopted March 27, 1952), the same had a six-month period of validity counted
from the said date June 18, 1953. This license states, among other conditions, that —
Commodities covered by this license must be shipped from the country of origin before the
expiry date of the license, and are subject to Sec. 13 of Republic Act. No. 650. Although
Republic Act No. 650, creating the Import Control Commission, expired on July 31, 1953, it is to
be conceded that its duly executed acts can have valid effects even beyond the life span of said
governmental agency. What is important to consider only is the legal connotation of the word
"shipped" as the term was used in the license. Defendant maintains that it is when the vessel
leaves the port of embarkation, while plaintiff holds that it is the dates of the bills of lading,
which are usually issued after the cargo is placed on board the vessel. The date of the shipment is
the date when the goods for dispatch are loaded on board the vessel, and not necessarily when
the ship puts to sea. Defendant's reliance upon Central Bank regulations that the shipment
licensed must have "left the port of origin within the period of validity of the "license" is not
maintainable in the present case, because

the regulations came onto effect only on July 1, 1953 already after issuance of the
appellee' license and cannot be read into the same.

RATIO: Duly executed acts can have valid effects even beyond the life span of said
governmental agency

CRISOSTOMO vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of Commerce

(PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of the Philippines on July 17,
1974. During his incumbency as president of the PCC, two administrative cases were filed
against petitioner, which were filed with the Office of the President, and were subsequently
referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. On October 22, 1976, petitioner
was preventively suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, as amended. In his place Dr.
Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge on November 10, 1976, and then as
Acting President on May 13, 1977. On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF
COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES,
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS
CURRICULAR OFFERINGS. Mateo continued as the head of the new University. On April 3,
1979, he was appointed Acting President and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term of six
(6)years. On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment acquitting
petitioner of the charges against him. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and under which the
accused has been suspended by this Court in an Order dated October 22, 1976, said accused was
ordered reinstated to the position of President of the Philippine College of Commerce, now
known as the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, from which he has been suspended. By
virtue of said reinstatement, he is entitled to receive the salaries and other benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been
filed against him. The bail bonds filed by the accused for his provisional liberty in these cases are
hereby cancelled and released. On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court a motion for execution of the judgment, particularly the part ordering his reinstatement to
the position of president of the PUP and the payment of his salaries and other benefits during the
period of suspension. The motion was granted and a partial writ of execution was issued by the
trial court on March 6, 1992. On March 26, 1992, however, President Corazon C. Aquino
appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as acting president of the PUP, following the expiration of the term
of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was one of the five
nominees considered by the President of the Philippines for the position. The sheriff stated that
he had executed the writ by installing petitioner as President of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did
not vacate the office as he wanted to consult with the President of the Philippines first. This led
to a contempt citation against Dr. Gellor. Petitioner assumed the office of president of the PUP.
On May 18, 1992, therefore, the People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, assailing the orders and the writs of execution issued by the trial court. It also asked
for a temporary restraining order. On June 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary
restraining order, enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from acting as president of the PUP
pursuant to the reinstatement orders of the trial court. On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division of
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision to set aside the orders and writ of reinstatement issued
by the trial court. The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner accruing after the conversion
of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of salaries and benefits was limited to those
accruing from the time of petitioner’s suspension until the conversion of the PCC to the PUP.
The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amounts due and payable to
petitioner. Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which converted the PCC
into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He contends that if the law had intended the PCC to lose
its existence, it would have specified that the PCC was being "abolished" rather than "converted"
and that if the PUP was intended to be a new institution, the law would have said it was being
"created." Petitioner claims that the PUP is merely a continuation of the existence of the PCC,
and, hence, he could be reinstated to his former position as president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of the PCC into PUP abolished the PCC

RULING:

No. In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be explained, reinstatement
is no longer possible because of the promulgation of P.D. No. 1437 by the President of the
Philippines on June 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former
Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,
in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the Philippine
School of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce. What took place was a change in
academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its
name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an
organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. But the
reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president of the PUP could not be ordered by the
trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been promulgated fixing the term of
office of presidents of state universities and colleges at six (6) years, renewable for another term
of six (6) years, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of
incumbents who were not reappointed.

RATIO: When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to

replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. What took place was a change in
academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its
name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and
organization.

5.VIOLA vs ALUNAN III

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III, 1-2 of the Revised
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Officers so far as they provide for the election of first, second and third vice presidents and for
auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters. Petitioner Cesar G. Viola
brought this action as barangay chairman of Bgy. 167, Zone 15, District II, Manila against then
Secretary of Interior and Local Government Rafael M. Alunan III, Alex L. David,
president/secretary general of the National Liga ng mga Barangay, and Leonardo L. Angat,
president of the City of Manila Liga ng mga Barangay, to restrain them from carrying out the
elections for the questioned positions on July 3, 1994. Petitioners contention is that the positions
in question are in excess of those provided in the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), 493
of which mentions as elective positions only those of president, vice president, and five members
of the board of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels. Petitioner argues that, in providing for the positions of first,
second and third vice presidents and auditor for each chapter, 1-2 of the Implementing Rules
expand the number of positions authorized in 493 of the Local Government Code in violation of
the principle that implementing rules and regulations cannot add or detract from the provisions of
the law they are designed to implement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the additional positions in question have been created without authority
of law

RULING:

No. Petitioners contention that the additional positions in question have been created
without authority of law is untenable. To begin with, the creation of these positions was actually
made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, which was adopted by the
First Barangay National Assembly on January 11, 1994. The post of executive vice president is
in reality that of the vice president in 493 of the LGC, so that the only additional positions
created for each chapter in the Constitution and By-laws are those of first, second and third vice
presidents and auditor. Contrary to petitioners contention, the creation of the additional positions
is authorized by the LGC which provides as follows: 493. Organization. The liga at the
municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect a
president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of directors. The board shall
appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may deem necessary for
the management of the chapter. A secretary-general shall be elected from among the members of
the national liga and shall be charged with the overall operation of the liga on the national level.
The board shall coordinate the activities of the chapters of the liga. This provision in fact
requires and not merely authorizes the board of directors to create such other positions as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter and belies petitioners claim that said
provision (493) limits the officers of a chapter to the president, vice president, five members of
the board of directors, secretary, and treasurer. That Congress can delegate the power to create
positions such as these has been settled by our decisions upholding the validity of reorganization
statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish or merge offices in the
executive department. The question is whether, in making a delegation of this power to the board
of directors of each chapter of the Liga ng Mga Barangay, Congress provided a sufficient
standard so that, in the phrase of Justice Cardozo, administrative discretion may be canalized
within proper banks that keep it from overflowing. We hold that 493 of the Local Government
Code, in directing the board of directors of the liga to create such other positions as may be
deemed necessary for the management of the chapters, embodies a fairly intelligible standard.
There is no undue delegation of power by Congress.

RATIO: Congress can delegate the power to create positions such as these has been settled by
decisions upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the
Philippines to create, abolish or merge offices in the executive department.