Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Second Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Second Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Second Division
DECISION
QUISUMBING , J : p
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking to reverse the Decision 1 dated October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 41756, which a rmed the Decision 2 dated March 2, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Makati City. The RTC had declared the last will
and testament of Margarita S. Mayores probated and designated respondent Lucia D.
Abena as the executor of her will. It also ordered the issuance of letters testamentary in
favor of respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the rst cousin of decedent Margarita S.
Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the decedent's lifelong companion since
1929. CTAIDE
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor
descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was
survived by her rst cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego
Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament 3 on February 2,
1987 where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located
at Singalong Manila, consisting of 209.8 square meters, and covered by Transfer
Certi cate of Title (TCT) No. 1343 to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and Florentino
M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of
her undivided share of a real property located at San Antonio Village, Makati, consisting
of 225 square meters, and covered by TCT No. 68920 to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena,
and Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. Margarita also left all
her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor
of her will. HacADE
On August 11, 1987, petitioner led a petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No.
M-1531.
On October 27, 1987, respondent led a petition for probate of the will of
Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1607
and consolidated with SP Proc. No. M-1531.
On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and
testament of Margarita probated and respondent as the executor of the will. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
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1) declaring the will as probated;
2) declaring Lucia Abena as the executor of the will who will serve as
such without a bond as stated in paragraph VI of the probated will;
So ordered. 4
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of
Appeals, in a decision dated October 13, 2000, a rmed in toto the RTC ruling. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision states:
WHEREFORE , foregoing premises considered, the appeal having no
merit in fact and in law, is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED and the appealed
Decision of the trial court AF F IR M E D IN TOTO , with cost to oppositors-
appellants.
SO ORDERED . 5
II.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING PETITIONER, HER SIBLINGS AND COUSIN AS THE LEGAL HEIRS
OF MARGARITA S. MAYORES AND IN NOT ISSUING LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION TO HER. 6
Brie y stated, the issues are (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not
declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law, (2)
whether said court erred in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured
through undue in uence and pressure, and (3) whether it erred in not declaring
petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita, and in not issuing letters of
administration to petitioner. cCaSHA
Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum 1 1 that the petition for
review raises questions of fact, not of law and as a rule, ndings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are nal and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme
Court. She also points out that although the Court of Appeals at the outset opined there
was no compelling reason to review the petition, the Court of Appeals proceeded to
tackle the assigned errors and rule that the will was validly executed, sustaining the
ndings of the trial court that the formalities required by law were duly complied with.
The Court of Appeals also concurred with the ndings of the trial court that the
testator, Margarita, was of sound mind when she executed the will.
After careful consideration of the parties' contentions, we rule in favor of
respondent.
We nd that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure questions of fact, which
may not be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure.
The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the will was signed by
the testator in the presence of the witnesses and of one another, whether or not the
signatures of the witnesses on the pages of the will were signed on the same day, and
whether or not undue in uence was exerted upon the testator which compelled her to
sign the will, are all questions of fact.
This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 1 2 of Rule 45 limits this Court's
review to questions of law only. THaDEA
Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When
supported by substantial evidence, the ndings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the
case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a nding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its ndings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; CcTHaD
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the ndings of fact are conclusions without citation of speci c
evidence on which they are based;
(10) When the ndings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
13 STcHEI
We find that this case does not involve any of the abovementioned exceptions.
Nonetheless, a review of the ndings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of
Appeals, reveal that petitioner's arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:
With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada,
et al.] that the testator [Margarita Mayores] was not mentally capable of making
a will at the time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The
oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation
and contradict the presumption that the testator was of sound mind (See Article
800 of the Civil Code). In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte,
who, in some occasions, attended to the testator months before her death,
testi ed that Margarita Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and he
even stated that the illness of the testator does not warrant hospitalization. . . .
Not one of the oppositor's witnesses has mentioned any instance that they
observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a
manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be
physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound
mind. [The] testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought. aHECST
Anent the contestants' submission that the will is fatally defective for the
reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3)
pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because
the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it
is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after
examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the
number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to
invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is
consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a su cient safeguard
from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have
been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument
consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine
of liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which
reads :
"In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and]
improper pressure and in uence, defects and imperfections in the
form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact
executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of Article 805."
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures
of the testator were a xed on different occasions based on their observation
that the signature on the rst page is allegedly different in size, texture and
appearance as compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After
examination of the signatures, the court does not share the same observation
as the oppositors. The picture (Exhibit "H-3") shows that the testator was
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a xing her signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and the
notary. There is no evidence to show that the rst signature was procured earlier
than February 2, 1987. cTEICD
Finally, the court nds that no pressure nor undue in uence was exerted
on the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the
testator was in a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while
executing the subject will (See Exhibit "H").
In ne, the court nds that the testator was mentally capable of making
the will at the time of its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is
the same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements
(See Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have been
substantially complied with in the subject notarial will. 1 4 (Emphasis supplied).
IcDCaT
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted
to them.
9. Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters,
the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason
of relationship by the whole blood.
10. Art. 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fth degree of
relationship in the collateral line. DcCASI
13. Ontimare, Jr. v. Elep, G.R. No. 159224, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 257, 265.
14. Rollo, pp. 38-40.
15. Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants; THcaDA