Sales Estimation of Tallink Silja’s commercial traffic between

Finland, Sweden and Estonia

Jori-Joonas Hämäläinen

Bachelor’s Thesis
Degree Programme in
International Business
2014
 Abstract

17.12.2013

Degree Programme in International Business

Author Group
Jori-Joonas Hämäläinen GLOBBA
Title of report Number of
Sales Estimation of Tallink Silja’s commercial traffic between pages and
Finland, Sweden and Estonia appendices
57+3
Supervisors
Jaana Melamies, Jutta Heikkilä

This Bachelor’s thesis research was conducted for Tallink Silja Oy, a shipping company
in the Baltic Sea region. Tallink Silja is one of the largest shipping companies in the
region operating on six routes with 13 vessels. It has been a market leader, providing
its customers quality cruises and transporting cargo between Finland, Sweden, Estonia
and Latvia. The objectice of this research is to research passenger and cargo sales of
Tallink Silja’s operations between Finland, Sweden and Estonia.

Maritime traffic has a long history in the Baltic Sea region between Finland, Sweden
and Estonia. AS Tallink Grupp and Silja Line Ab used to be two saperate shipping
companies before 2006, when AS Tallink Grupp acquired Silja Line. The corporation
was then renamed Tallink Silja.

This reseach project started on 4 August 2013 and ended on the 17 December 2013.
The research material and figures were collected between August and September.
Research methods included qualitative semi-formal interviews held with three Tallink
Silja employees. These interviews took place between September and October. The
data collected was analyzed in October and November.

There are many factors that affect Tallink Silja’s sales. It was found out that 59 % of
Tallink Silja’s revenue comes from on board sales, making it the most important source
of income. It also became clear that the competition between shipping companies is
challenging and prices are kept low to promote sales. It is diffcult to maximize sales
and cut costs, but these are areas the company needs to work on constantly.

As a conclusion, Tallink Silja has been improving its sales in the past few years, but
future threats can make a strong company vulnerable. That is why it is a constant battle
to develop businesses and adapt to the ever changing world.

Keywords
maritime traffic, revenue structure, sales volumes, sales estimatimation, Cost-Volume-
Profit, sustainability
Table of Contents
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Background and the Thesis Objective ..................................................................... 1
1.2 Research Problem ....................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Research Question and Investigative Questions ..................................................... 4
1.4 Demarcation................................................................................................................. 4
1.5 Theoretical Framework .............................................................................................. 5
1.6 Benefits for Stakeholders ........................................................................................... 6
1.7 Reason for Doing This Research .............................................................................. 6
2 Introduction of Tallink Silja................................................................................................ 7
2.1 Organization Structure ............................................................................................... 7
2.2 History of Tallink ........................................................................................................ 9
2.3 History of Silja Line .................................................................................................. 10
2.4 Main Players ............................................................................................................... 12
2.5 Maritime Traffic between Finland, Sweden and Estonia ..................................... 12
3 Research Methodology ...................................................................................................... 15
3.1 Research Design and Data Analysis ....................................................................... 15
3.2 Interviews ................................................................................................................... 16
4 Traffic Revenues ................................................................................................................ 17
4.1 Analysis of Competitors ........................................................................................... 17
4.2 Sales Mix ..................................................................................................................... 19
4.3 Pricing ......................................................................................................................... 20
4.3.1 Pricing Decisions ........................................................................................... 21
4.3.2 Target costing ................................................................................................. 22
4.3.3 Pricing on the Finland – Estonia route ...................................................... 23
4.3.4 Pricing on the Finland – Sweden route ...................................................... 24
5 Sales on Routes ................................................................................................................... 25
5.1 Sales on Finland – Estonia route ............................................................................ 25
5.2 Sales on Finland - Sweden route ............................................................................. 29
5.3 Factors that affect Sales ............................................................................................ 31
5.4 Factors that have Changed Sales ............................................................................. 32
 5.4.1 Wärtsilä Marine’s Bankruptcy ...................................................................... 32
5.4.2 Safety Concerns ............................................................................................. 33
5.4.3 Changes in Tax Free Sales ............................................................................ 35
5.5 Reasons for why all Traffic is not profitable ......................................................... 36
5.6 Ways to Improve Sales ............................................................................................. 39
6 Future Challenges ............................................................................................................... 41
6.1 Sustainability .............................................................................................................. 41
6.1.1 Competitive Strategy ..................................................................................... 42
6.1.2 Environmental Management Accounting .................................................. 42
6.2 New Emissions Regulations in 2015 ...................................................................... 43
6.2.1 Criticism towards New Regulations ............................................................ 45
6.2.2 Effects on Traffic and Prices ....................................................................... 45
7 Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 47
7.1 Reliability and Validity .............................................................................................. 47
7.2 Key Findings .............................................................................................................. 47
7.3 Ideas for the Future of Tallink Silja ........................................................................ 50
References ................................................................................................................................ 53
Attachments ............................................................................................................................. 58
Attachment 1. Passenger amounts trend on Helsinki – Tallinn route. ............................ 58
Attachment 2. Passenger amounts trend Helsinki – Stockholm. ..................................... 59
Attachment 3. Passenger amounts trend Turku – Stockholm. ......................................... 60
1 Introduction

This chapter will first in 1.1 introduce the background and the objective of this re-
search, afterwards 1.2 will lighten up the research problem, 1.3 research question and
investigative questions, 1.4 demarcation, 1.5 theoretical framework, 1.6 benefits to the
stakeholders and 1.7 reason for doing this research and finally

1.1 Background and the Thesis Objective

This thesis concerns the sales estimation of Tallink Silja’s commercial traffic between Finland,
Sweden and Estonia. I will examine Tallink Silja’s passenger and cargo traffic, and analyze
the company’s sales statistics. This thesis will also describe the history of Tallink Silja’s
commercial traffic and analyze what factors have affected sales since the 1990’s. Tallink
Silja was established in 2006 when AS Tallink Grupp acquired Silja Line Oy Ab and
both companies were merged into one corporation. I will analyze each one of these
companies separately before 2006 and conclude with an examination of Tallink Silja
after the merger.

This research involves traffic between Finland – Sweden and Finland – Estonia.
Tallink Silja currently operates between both countries, but also has other operations
from Sweden to Estonia and Latvia. These routes will not be included in this thesis.

Ferry traffic involves transporting vehicles and passengers on a specific route with a
regular timetable. In this thesis I will analyze all kinds of passenger traffic e.g. leisure
passengers and one way travelers and roll on – roll off (roro) cargo traffic. Roro1 cargo
traffic includes semi, truck and trailer traffic. Most of roro cargo customers are logistics
companies that regularly have cargo units traveling from one country to another. These
companies have special contracts with Tallink Silja, and they might transport tens of
units per day on board Tallink Silja’s ships. This thesis will not include any kind of oth-
er cargo operations, such as sea rail, containers or tankers.

1Roro means loading ships from the bow or stern ports of the ship, meaning that these units have to be driven
or towed into the ship. (Dumell, 2008, 15)

1
The objective of this research is to help Tallink Silja to recognize its problems and pos-
sible threats in passenger and cargo traffic. After recognizing those problems I have
brought up in this research the company may start actions to either increase sales or
keep them in the same level as they are right now. The objective of this research is also
to raise awareness in maritime traffic and help Tallink Silja to make its operations more
efficient.

1.2 Research Problem

The topic of this thesis was selected after discussing the possibility of conducting re-
search for Tallink Silja Oy (Tallink Silja). This subject is of personal interest to me and
because I thought it would also be useful, I decided to conduct it for Tallink Silja Oy,
after they had given their approval. As an employee of the company, I found it easy to
gather information and to set up interviews with employees inside the company.

Tallink Silja is a market leader in passenger and cargo traffic in the Northern part of
the Baltic Sea. Its ferries connect Finland, Sweden, Estonia and Latvia. The problem is
that in the past ten years the volume of passengers has dropped despite Tallink Silja’s
efforts to promote their cruises and to gain more customers. This is a challenge for
many shipping companies because cheap airfare offered by airlines are taking custom-
ers away from cruises. For the price of a cruise from Finland to Sweden, one can fly
across to the other side of Europe. Fuel surcharges are also expected to rise in the near
future, making it an even bigger challenge to attract passengers in the future. There are
also difficulties with transporting cargo. Cargo operations mark only 11 % of Tallink
Silja’s revenue, and in many cases most of the cargo is transported only on several spe-
cific days of the week. Tallink Silja and its competitors are trying to attract international
logistics companies to become their clients, and to use their services as much as possi-
ble, but the competition is fierce. It is a challenge to produce a profit with cargo opera-
tions, while also dividing cargo transportation so that all departing ships would be fully
loaded.

2
As a result of these challenges, Tallink Silja has been promoting its leisure cruises and
targeting new groups of customers. The company is looking for new markets and new
customers through advertising. For example, instead of marketing cruises in just Fin-
nish, Swedish and Estonian markets, the company has seen tourists to these countries
as a potential new customer base in the future. These include e.g. Russians, Asians, and
people from other parts of Europe who travel to these Baltic countries. Lately the
company has been arranging new theme cruises that would attract the interest of cus-
tomers more than just “normal” cruises. Another challenge is to get cruise passengers
to spend more money on board the ships. This marks up 59 % of Tallink Silja’s reve-
nue. In order to attract passengers’ interest, the stores on board the ships must be able
to offer cheaper retail prices, and also more unique products compared to shops on
land.

To overcome the challenges posed by cargo operations, the company is trying to pro-
mote their concept of offering several routes and timetables, giving logistics companies
more options and greater flexibility to transport their goods. Since Tallink Silja offers
more routes and vessels, it has a decisive advantage over its competitors. There is a
possibility that logistics companies in Southern Europe and Eastern Europe will start
transporting goods through the Baltic States and Scandinavia. Therefore Tallink Silja’s
cargo promoters are travelling around Europe looking for possible new clients. So far
at least Ukraine and Croatia have expressed a lot of interest regarding Tallink Silja’s
businesses.

3
1.3 Research Question and Investigative Questions

This subchapter explains the main research question which will be analyzed in this re-
search and it will be followed by four investigative questions.

RQ: How to estimate and improve sales in passenger and cargo traffic?
This research questions will be answered in the latter part of this thesis

The research questions will be divided to the following investigative questions which
will help to answer the research question itself.

IQ1: What are the advantages and disadvantages against competitors?

IQ2: Why all traffic is not profitable and why keep operating?
IQ3: What is the future situation of the traffic and how to overcome possible threats?

1.4 Demarcation

This research is demarcated geographically in order to focus on specific routes. These

routes are selected, because they are economically important for the company and be-
cause of tough competition. This report will analyze past events that have had an effect
on sales regarding routes between Finland, Sweden and Estonia, and also analyze the
current situation of these routes. This includes the following routes: Helsinki – Tallinn,
Helsinki – Stockholm, and Turku – Stockholm (figure 1). Other historical and current
routes, except the Vaasa – Umeå route, will not be discussed in this research. Tallink
Silja also has operations from Sweden to Estonia and Latvia. These routes will not be
included in this thesis. Silja Line Oy Ab had other cruise and passenger traffic in differ-
ent areas of the world and these will also not be included in this thesis. Neither will
Tallink’s discontinued traffic between Finland – Germany and Finland – Russia or ho-
tel businesses be discussed.

4
Figure 1. Tallink Silja This is Where We Operate. (Tallink Silja. 2013d).

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework was formed gradually when it was decided that which
methods are being used to conduct this research. When I implemented the project
steps I decided to use a so called zipper model, applying the theory and the empirical
research at the same time. As my theoretical framework I have used several accounting
methods that companies use for their sales estimations. The methods used in this re-
search were the analysis of competitors, sales mix, pricing and sustainability.

Managerial accounting (Braun & Tietz 2013) provides a core theoretical base for this
thesis. Data provided by Tallink Silja such as cargo sales revenues and passenger vol-
umes are used together with the theoretical framework to bring up key findings of this
research. Also maritime traffic literature is used to understand reasons that are behind
decisions shipping companies have made in the past.

5
1.6 Benefits for Stakeholders

Tallink Silja will benefit from this thesis report, when planning their future plans in
cargo and passenger traffic. It is important to understand the company’s history when
making decisions about the future, in order to avoid the same mistakes made in the
past. Tallink Silja will be also able to use this report as a guideline for future decision-
making and this may give them a new perspective on how to think about their future
plans. I will benefit from this research by gaining more knowledge about maritime traf-
fic, and by learning how to conduct and write a research.

1.7 Reason for Doing This Research

The reason for writing this thesis about Tallink Silja’s sales estimation is to investigate
the factors that have affected sales and to determine possible threats to the future of
commercial traffic. I find this subject very interesting, due to the fact that I have per-
sonal interest in maritime traffic. Also as an employee of Tallink Silja, I find this sub-
ject to be a helpful way of gaining more knowledge about the company, and I may use
this research for future job tasks. This research analysis also fulfills the requirement of
containing an international business aspect, since this research looks into operations
between three different countries.

6
2 Introduction of Tallink Silja

Tallink Silja is the produce of a joint venture of two separate shipping companies that
merged in 2006. On the 12 June, 2006 an Estonian-based shipping company, AS
Tallink Grupp bought Silja Line Ab (Silja Line) and its six cruiseferry’s for EUR 470
million. The seller was Silja Line’s previous owner a Bermuda based company, Sea
Containers Ltd (Sea Container’s). Sea Container’s had acquired Silja Line from Oy
EffJohn Ab in 1999 (Dumell 2008, 139).

Tallink Silja has operates from Finland under the Silja Line brand to Stockholm and
under the Tallink brand to Tallinn. Tallink Silja operates roro and ropax vessels be-
tween Finland-Sweden-Estonia and Latvia and calls 8 ports. In 2013 it had in total 18
vessels of which 13 currently sail under Tallink Silja’s brand. Its headquarters are locat-
ed in Helsinki, Finland and it currently employs approximately 6700 people of which
1500 are located in Finland (Tallink Silja Oy. 2012c).

Tallink Silja has operations in six countries: Finland, Estonia, Sweden, Latvia, Russia
and Germany and its parent company AS Tallink Grupp is listed in the Tallinn stock
exchange. In 2012 Tallink Silja transported 9.26 million people and its revenue was
56.3 million EUR (Tallink Silja 2013b).

2.1 Organization Structure

Presented in Table 1 is the company structure of of Tallink Silja. The company struc-
ture has been divided so that under the parent company there are seven subsidiaries.
All of them concentrate on specific routes. Under these subsidiaries are suppliers of
goods, technical ship management, crewing, hotels, beauty services and harbor ser-
vices. There are also 18 ship-owning companies and 13 other companies that are brief-
ly mentioned. Those subsidiaries and companies that have a part in this research are
marked in blue. Later in Figure 2 is a brief timeline which points out the key events in
the history Tallink Silja.

7
 AS Tallink Grupp
Holding company, Estonia-Finland and Estonia-Sweden route operator, sales and
marketing in Estonia, general administration
Tallink Silja Oy
Finland-Sweden routes op- AS Tallink Duty Free 18 Ship-owning
erator Sales & Marketing in Supply of goods for ships Companies
Finland
Tallink Silja AB
OÜ Hansaliin
Sales & Marketing in Swe- 13 Other Companies
Onboard personnel crewing
den
OÜ HT Laevateenindus
AS Tallink Latvija
Technical ship management
Sales & Marketing in Latvia
and crewing
OOO Tallink-Ru AS HTG Invest
Sales & Marketing in Russia Stevedoring services
Silja Line GmbH HTG Stevedoring OY
Sales Agent in Germany Stevedoring services
AS Tallink Baltic
OÜ TLG Hotell
Finland-Germany route
Operator of hotels
operator
AS Tallink
OÜ Hera Salongid
Riga-Stockholm route oper-
Beauty services
ator
OÜ HT Hulgi Tolliladu
Public customs warehouse
OÜ HT Meelelahutus
Entertainment on ships
OÜ Tallink Travel Club
Travel services
Figure 2. Tallink Silja company structure (Adapted from Tallink Silja, 2013i).

8
2.2 History of Tallink

Tallink Grupp AS is an Estonian-based shipping company founded in 1989. It was

formed as Laevandusühisettevôte Tallink by Eesti Merelaevandus RAS (ESCO) (60 %)
and Palkkiyhtymä Oy, Helsinki (40 %). The joint venture had acquired M/S Scandina-
vian Sky from DFDS Seaways and started operating it on the Helsinki-Tallinn route as
M/S Tallink (Huopana 2013, 1).

In 1991, Estonia gained its independence from the Soviet Union and it soon became
an intriguing tourist destination. The amount of Finnish passengers traveling to Esto-
nia became 60 % of the total passenger amounts. Tallink also gained a second passen-
ger vessel M/S Georg Ots. In 1993 ESCO bought all shares of Tallink from
Pankkiyhtymä Oy and in 1994 it merged with Tallinn based company Inreko, which
had operated on the Helsinki - Tallinn route with M/S Corbiere, and two hydrofoils.
The name of the new corporation was changed to AS Hansatee Grupp
(Tallink Silja, 2013c; Huopana 2013, 1).

In the mid 1990’s Tallink sold its hydrofoils to the Estonian-based company Linda
Line, but had acquired several other vessels to operate on the Helsinki-Tallinn route.
The amount of Finnish passengers rose to 80 % in 1995. In 1997 Tallink started to also
operate between Estonia and Sweden on the Paldiski - Kapellskär route, but also ran
into financial difficulties. The company was nearly bankrupt and it was offered for sale
to Silja Line and Viking Line. Both companies refused, and Tallink received more loans
from banks to continue its operations. In 1999 AS Hansatee Grupp acquired all rights
to use the “Tallink” brand name. In January 2001 AS Hansatee Grupp had charted two
vessels from Estline, which operated on the Tallinn - Stockholm route. The two ves-
sels were taken over by Tallink brand, and now Tallink had expanded its operations to
Tallinn – Stockholm route (Dumell 2008, 141; Huopana 2013, 1; Estline 2013).

In 2002 AS Hansatee Grupp changed its name to AS Tallink Grupp (Tallink), and its
first newly built vessel, M/S Romantika started sailing on the Helsinki - Tallinn route.
That same year Tallink’s market share on that route rose to 32 %. In 2004 Romantika’s

9
sister ship, the newly built M/S Victoria I started sailing between Tallinn and Stock-
holm, and Tallink opened a short-lived route between Helsinki and St. Petersburg
(Huopana 2013, 1).

In March 2006 Tallink bought Superfast Ferries operations in the Baltic Sea region.
This sale included three high-speed ropax vessels that operated between Finland and
Germany. The usage of Superfast Ferries brand and the link to Germany were later
discontinued. The same year Tallink also opened a new Stockholm-Riga route. Later in
2006 Tallink also bought Silja Line Ab from Sea Containers Ltd, and a new company
Tallink Silja Oy was established in Finland (Huopana 2013, 1).

Between the years 2007-2009, Tallink Silja modernized its fleet by bringing four new
vessels into traffic. These include the new brand of Tallink Shuttle, which includes two
ships that operate between Helsinki and Tallinn, making it possible to travel between
these two capital cities in just under two hours. Tallink Silja also replaced the M/S Gal-
axy of the Helsinki-Tallinn route with the newly built M/S Baltic Princess and brought
another newly built vessel, the M/S Baltic Queen to the Tallinn - Stockholm route.
Between the years 2010-2013, Tallink Silja has shifted its ships between different
routes, making its operations more efficient, and in 2013 it bought a former Viking
Line boat, the M/S Isabella (renamed M/S Isabelle) to the Stockholm – Riga route to
better satisfy the route’s needs (Tallink Silja 2013j).

2.3 History of Silja Line

In 1918 two companies Suomen Höyrylaiva Osakeyhtiö (SHO) and Stockholm’s

Rederi AB Svea (Svea), signed a contract to start steam ship passenger traffic between
Turku and Stockholm. Later in 1928 Höyrylaiva Oy Bore (Bore) joined the party. In
1950’s the companies ordered three new ships so called “Olympic ships” to operate
between Finland and Sweden. To satisfy the growing demand the companies called
SHO, Bore and Svea (Yhteisliikevarustamot) founded Oy Siljavarustamo-Ab (Silja
Line) in 1957. The company acquired two vessels for their operations on the Turku -
Stockholm route. By the end of 1950’s, they decided to order two brand new cruise
ferries, which were delivered in 1961 and 1962 and assigned to the Turku- Aland-

10
Norrtälje route. Later in the 1960’s Silja Line acquired several new cruise ferries, and in
1972 it started to operate the Helsinki - Stockholm route with two newly built vessels
year-round. (Malmberg 2007, 6-7).

In 1974, the famous seal logo was first introduced and painted on the funnels of some
of their ships. In 1980, Bore left the joint venture, and in 1981, Svea was purchased by
a Swedish company, Johnsson Line. In the same year, Silja Line introduced two new
luxury cruise ferries the M/S Silvia Regina and M/S Finlandia on the Helsinki- Stock-
holm route and in 1985-1986 two new ships, M/S Svea and M/S Wellamo on the Tur-
ku- Stockholm line. In 1987, Johnsson Line and SHO, which had become Effoa earli-
er, bought Rederi Ab Sally from their rival company, Viking Line. This trade also in-
cluded Vaasanlaivat, a shipping company that had operations in the Bothnian Bay.
Rederi Ab Sally had financial difficulties; due to unsuccessful operations in other parts
of the world, and the debts became a burden for its new owner. In 1990 Johnsson Line
and Effoa merged, and the new company was called EffJohn Holding Oy. In 1990-
1991 M/S Silja Serenade and its sister ship, M/S Silja Symphony were built and set on
the Helsinki – Stockholm route, but both ships ended up costing almost twice as much
as expected. In 1995 the parent company changed its name to Silja Oy Ab, and in 1999
Sea Containers Ltd. bought 51 % of Silja Line’s shares, making the company foreign-
owned. Due to financial difficulties in 2006, Sea Containers Ltd. sold Silja Line to As
Tallink Grupp in order to avoid bankruptcy. On the 1st of November 2006, the com-
pany was re-named Tallink Silja Oy (Malmberg 2007, 8-9; Tallink Silja 2013c; Dumell
2007. Video).

11
Figure 3. Timeline of Tallink Silja’s history

2.4 Main Players

Between Finland, Sweden, and Estonia there are three shipping companies that are the
main players in the market. They are Tallink Silja, Viking Line, and Eckerö Line. There
are other shipping companies, but they are seen either as indirect or minor competitors
for Tallink Silja. Table 2 below clarifies the operators’ services between Finland, Swe-
den, and Estonia.

Table 2. Main Players

Operator Finland - Estonia Finland - Sweden
Tallink Silja Helsinki - Tallinn Turku - Stockholm
Helsinki - Stockholm
Viking Line Helsinki - Tallinn Turku - Stockholm
Helsinki - Stockholm
Eckerö Line Helsinki - Tallinn Eckerö - Grisslehamn

2.5 Maritime Traffic between Finland, Sweden and Estonia

It has been almost a century since the first scheduled traffic started between Finland
and Sweden. It was in 1918 when SHO and Svea started traffic with two ships SS
Oihonna and SS J L Runeberg. Both of these ships were built in the 19th century, they
were old, expensive, and slow, and that is one reason why commercial traffic never
really took off before the 1950’s (Malmberg 2007, 20-21).

12
Before the 1960’s, travelling abroad was expensive, and only few could afford it. It all
changed dramatically after 1954, when the passport freedom agreement was created
between Finland and Sweden. Yhteisliikennevarustamot started to think of a way to
supply the growing demand. When Silja Line was established in 1957 the traffic ex-
panded (Dumell 2008, 9,11).

In 1959 Viking Linjen (nowadays Viking Line) was established and started operating
with one old English canal ferry from Finland to Sweden. After this it was mainly Silja
Line and Viking Line competing against each other (Sjöström 2009, 14-15).

Through the 1960’s and 1970’s both Silja Line and Viking Line expanded their opera-
tions and ordered new ships every few years. They operated mainly from the ports of
Turku or Naantali to Stockholm or Norrtalje, providing transportation for cargo and
leisure cruises for passengers. Later the Helsinki – Stockholm route was also intro-
duced. In the 1980’s Viking Line was owned by Rederi AB Slite, Rederi AB Sally and
Ålandsfärjan AB. AB Sally ran into financial difficulties in 1987 and was sold to Silja
Line. At this time, Silja Line also gained access to the Nordic route from Vaasa to
Umeå, which Viking Line never took part in. AB Slite went bankrupt in 1993 and
Ålandsfärjan AB, which had changed its name to SF-Line AB, became the sole owner
of Viking Line. It changed its name officially to Viking Line Abp in 1995, which re-
mains its current name (Dumell 2008, 49,114-115; Dumell 2007. Video).

The financial crisis around the world in the early 1990’s halted the exceptionally long
growth period in maritime traffic, which had started in the 1960’s. Shipyard Wärtsilä
Meriteollisuus (eng. Wärtsilä Marine) went bankrupt, and the M/S Estonia disaster
decreased the interest in leisure cruises, and new EU regulations also stopped tax-free
sales on ships (Sjöström 2009, 197).

However a new growth opportunity between Finland and Estonia presented itself. In
1991 when Estonia gained its independence back, it opened up new opportunities to
start operating cruises from Helsinki to Tallinn. This was not possible before because
Estonia was part of the Soviet Union, and traveling to and from Estonia was practically

13
impossible. Estonian based company ESCO and several other investors that used the
brand name of “Tallink” started operating between Helsinki and Tallinn in the early
1990’s. Several other shipping companies tried their luck on the same route including
Viking Line and Silja Line, but Tallink had the biggest market share. In the 2000’s
Tallink ordered altogether five new cruise ferries to operate on the Helsinki - Tallinn
route, whereas its main rival Viking Line ordered only one new ship (Tallink Silja
2013c).

In 1993 Viking Line had ordered a new ship, M/S Europa, but due to the bankruptcy
of AB Slite, it was not able to cash the ship from the shipyard. Silja Line saw an oppor-
tunity and purchased it renaming it the M/S Silja Europa. Earlier in 1990 and 1991,
Silja Line launched two new ships on the Helsinki - Stockholm route, and was now the
market leader between Finland and Sweden (Malmberg 2007, 164).

In 1997 Viking Line managed to buy M/S Silja Scandinavia from Silja Line renaming it
M/S Gabriella, and gained a steady share of the commercial traffic again. The traffic
since then between Finland and Sweden has remained steady, but in 2008 and 2013
Tallink Silja modernized its fleet on the Turku Stockholm route. Viking Line also re-
placed one of its older cruise ferries with a newly-built cruise ferry, M/S Viking Grace
in 2013 (Sjöström, 2009, 187-188; Fakta om Fartyg 2013b; Fakta om Fartyg 2013c).

The Vaasa - Umeå route that Silja Line had gained in the late 1980’s was ceased in
2000, due in part to the fact that the EU had banned tax-free sales a year earlier. Ac-
cording to Lars Wendelin, former CEO of Silja Line, the end of tax-free sales de-
stroyed the whole foundation of the commercial traffic (Dumell 2008, 131).

14
3 Research Methodology

Research methods are divided into the following chapters. 3.1 Research Methods and
Data Analysis and 3.2 Interviews. The research problem itself has been discussed al-
ready in chapter 1.4 and the Research question and investigative questions have been
discussed in chapter 1.5

3.1 Research Design and Data Analysis

This thesis is a qualitative research report. When deciding whether to conduct a quali-
tative or a quantitative research report I decided that in order to address the most im-
portant factors, I decided to directly interview employees working for Tallink Silja. I
conducted semi-formal interviews with prepared questions and interviewed three em-
ployees of Tallink Silja. After the interviews, I also attended a seminar held by the Sales
Manager of Tallink Silja. In this seminar he explained the development of sales from
the past up to the present. The sales manager also provided some future forecasts in
order to support my research. In addition of completing the qualitative interviews I
also used quantitative methods for gathering data, such as passenger and cargo vol-
umes and sales revenues. I have also gathered reports about Tallink Silja’s current and
past financial situation and read literature about the history, and how maritime traffic
has developed. To compare the results I have also researched similar information
about Tallink Silja’s competitors.

The information received from the interviews was written on a document and key
findings were taken as part of this thesis. Data collected from Tallink Silja’s reports was
processed and most important information was taken to be part of this research. In-
formation regarding passenger volumes and cargo units amounts were taken from a
Shippax Market database which is a neutral source that gathers passenger amounts and
cargo units transported in the whole Europe. This data was conducted in the past cou-
ple of years and comparing the amounts to Tallink Silja’s competitors could be proper-
ly conducted.

15
3.2 Interviews

For this thesis I held three interviews with Tallink Silja employees. The interviews con-
sisted of interviewing two captains of different vessels, and an interview with a cargo
sales manager. I chose these people for my research because I found it important to
understand how employees both on-shore and on-board understand Tallink Silja’s
sales, and how they view their development (Table 3). In these interviews we discussed
about Tallink Silja’s current market situation, how to improve sales and make opera-
tions more efficient, customer supply and demand, and future challenges. After these
interviews I took part in a seminar, where I gained more information about sales and
discussed about these matters with Tallink Silja’s Director of Cargo Mr. Håkan
Fagerström.

Table 3. Interviewees
Interviewee Job Title Interview date
Vahur Söstra Captain 26 September 2013
Tarvi-Carlos Tuulik Captain 30 September 2013
Marina Hasselblatt Cargo Sales Manager 17 October 2013

My first interview took place on boards the M/S Star on 26 September 2013, where I
interviewed the ships master Mr. Vahur Söstra. This interview gave me a well-rounded
perspective of the differences between working on-board a ship compared to work on-
shore. My second interview took part on 30 September 2013, on-board the M/S Super-
star where I interviewed its master, Mr. Tarvi-Carlos Tuulik. This interview also pro-
vided me with more information about how employees on-board the ship view the
company’s operations, and how the commercial traffic is handled. My last interview
took place in Helsinki’s West Harbor on 17 October 2013. There I met with the Cargo
Sales Manager, Marina Hasselblatt. She gave me valuable information about the current
situation of Tallink Silja’s sales, and how they have changed recently. She also provided
me with useful data and material to be used in my thesis. The seminar I attended was
held on 29 October on-board the M/S Silja Europa.

16
4 Traffic Revenues

The following chapter determines how the passenger and cargo sales of Tallink Silja
are constituted. Chapter 4.1 explains the Analysis of Competitors, 4.2 Sales Mix and
4.3 Pricing.

4.1 Analysis of Competitors

Tallink Silja’s main competitors are the Åland-based companies Viking Line and
Eckerö Line. On the Helsinki – Tallinn route there is a small Estonian-based company
Linda Line, which operates two catamarans, carrying only passengers. Its market share
in the traffic is marginal, and its vessels are different than Tallink Silja’s, therefore it is
only a minor competitor for Tallink Silja. Finnlines transports cargo and passengers
mainly to the other European countries such as Poland and Germany, but also oper-
ates some vessels between Finland and Sweden.

Finnlines transports only cargo between Finland and Sweden, competing with Tallink
Silja in cargo operations. Finnlines operates several ships to other countries in Europe,
but not on the same routes as Tallink Silja. Therefore it is seen as an indirect competi-
tor (Finnlines 2013).

Viking Line operates seven ferries in the Baltic Sea area. Of its seven vessels only two,
M/S Mariella and M/S Gabriella operate on the Helsinki – Stockholm route compet-
ing directly with Tallink Silja’s ships, M/S Silja Symphony and M/S Silja Serenade.
Two ships M/S Viking Grace and M/S Amorella operate on the Turku – Stockholm
route competing with Tallink Silja’s vessels, M/S Baltic Princess and M/S Galaxy. On
the Helsinki – Tallinn route it operates one fast cruise ferry, M/S Viking XPRS (Viking
Line 2013a).

Eckerö Line is competing against Tallink Silja on the Helsinki – Tallinn route with one
vessel, M/S Finlandia. The company has also has two other vessels sailing between
Åland and Sweden, but it has only a marginal effect on Tallink Silja’s operation be-
tween Finland and Sweden. These ships sail under the Eckerö Linjen and Birka Line

17
brand. Below are shown the market share of Tallink and its competitors in passenger
traffic (figure 4) and the market share on Finland – Sweden route (figure 5) (Eckerö
Line 2013a).

100.00%

90.00%

80.00%

70.00%
59.00% Tallink
60.00%
Viking Line
50.00%
Eckerö Line
40.00%
Linda Line
30.00% 24.00%
20.00%
12%
10.00% 5%
0.00%

Figure 4. Market shares in passenger operations Finland - Estonia (Adapted from

Tallink Silja 2013h, 9).

100%

90%

80%

70%
Tallink Silja,
60% 55%
Viking Line,
Axis Title

50% 45%
40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Figure 5. Market shares in passenger operations Finland - Sweden (Adapted from

Shippax Market 2013, 194).

18
4.2 Sales Mix

In 2012 Tallink Silja’s total consolidated revenue amounted to EUR 943.9 million, of
which ticket sales were EUR 241.0 and sales of cargo transport EUR 102.8. EUR 517.5
million was the total from stores sales on board and on land, contributing over 50 % of
the total revenue.

According to Tallink Silja’s Cargo Sales Manager Marina Hasselblatt, on-board sales
play the biggest role in the revenue structure, making up 59 % of the total revenue. It is
important to attract passengers to spend money on-board the ships and sometimes it is
a big challenge. The second most important aspect is the ticket sales being 28 %, and
third is cargo with 11% and other 1 % (figure 6) (Hasselblatt, M. 17 Oct 2013).

8.01 %
11. 12 %

26. 28 %
54. 59 %

Restaurant and shop sales Ticket sales Cargo Other

Figure 6. Sales Mix Tallink Silja (Adapted Fagerström, H. 29 Oct 2013).

Tallink Silja has compiled statistics about how their annual revenue is determined as a
percentage on each route. In 2012 the Finland – Sweden and Finland – Estonia routes
presented in total 70.5 % and in 2011 72.6 % of the company’s annual revenue, making
these routes very important for the company. Below are listed all routes and their share
of the total revenue. The “other” category includes revenues of vessels that were pre-
viously on the Finland – Germany route and mainland shops (Table 4).

19
Table 4. Percentages of total revenue in geographical segments (Adapted from AS Tal-
link Grupp Yearbook 2012, 30).
Route 2012 2011
Finland - Sweden 38.2 % 40.8 %
Finland - Estonia 32.3 % 31.8 %
Estonia - Sweden 12.1 % 12.0 %
Sweden - Latvia 7.0 % 6.9 %
Other 10.4 % 8.5 %
Total 100 % 100 %

4.3 Pricing

Pricing in maritime traffic is based on the demand and supply. In peak season prices
are set higher due to increased demand. In peak season times many of the ships are
fully booked for weeks ahead, and the amount of cargo shipped is reduced in order to
create more space for passengers who will spend money on-board. Peak season times
in passenger traffic are normally considered times when Europeans have their vaca-
tions. Scandinavians normally take their summer vacations between June and August,
whereas other Europeans between July and September. Therefore the peak of the sea-
son is normally between June and September. Winter vacation is usually taken in Feb-
ruary, but these are only a few week peaks in a year and not really as significant as the
peak season. Also at times before Christmas, between November and early December
the amounts of passengers are normally higher than average, but only for a short peri-
od of time.

The price war between Viking Line and Silja Line is nothing new. It dates all the way
back to the 1960’s when both companies reduced their prices to gain more passengers.
The idea was to get more people on cruises and to spend more money on-board the
ships. When ticket prices were lowered, prices of alcohol and food were increased. On
longer routes the importance of on-board sales is more important than on short routes,
due to the higher operating costs. The share of on-board sales varies a lot. In some
traffic like the discontinued Bothnian Bay route, the amount was over 50 %. That’s

20
why ticket prices were kept lower than what was profitable since people spent so much
money on-board instead (Dumell 2007, 85-87,131-133).

4.3.1 Pricing Decisions

Tallink Silja’s ships sail everyday according to a set timetable. Sometimes ships are not
using full capacity, and some trips are not profitable. In some situations when the ships
are sailing despite not being at full capacity it is better to sell the tickets with what the
contribution margin is. These situations are the following:

- The ships would otherwise sail half empty

- Not change in fixed costs
- Not require variable marketing or administrative expenses
- Not affect regular sales.
(Adapted from Braun & Tietz 2013, 462.)

If the ticket sale price is high enough to cover the variable costs the company is pro-
vided with an additional operating profit and also possible profit from sales on-board.
Passengers may find these kinds of deals often on companies’ websites as “Get away”
deals or “Last Minute Deals” (Braun & Tietz 2013, 462-463).

Pricing decisions are made when the company has information in the some of these
basic questions:

- What is the reasonable markup?

- How much are customers willing to pay?
- Are we a price-taker or a price-setter for this product?
(Adapted from Braun & Tietz 2013, 465.)

21
Maritime traffic can be either a price-taker or price-setter business. In passenger traffic
the industry is more of a price-taker, because there is heavy competition, the service is
not unique and the pricing approach emphasizes target costing. In cargo transportation
maritime traffic is also a price-taker, but sometimes it can also be a price-setter. This is
especially true when there is more demand to transport goods, there is less competi-
tion, and the pricing approach emphasizes cost-plus pricing. However, these occasions
are quite rare and are likely to occur when the passenger traffic is in a peak season, re-
ducing the amount of cargo space in ships. That is when a company can set up a de-
sired profit by increasing the prices (Braun & Tietz 2013, 465).

4.3.2 Target costing

Since maritime traffic is a price-taker the company emphasizes a target costing ap-
proach to pricing. Table 5 below shows how it is been calculated.

Table 5. Target Cost (Braun & Tietz 2013, 466).

Revenue at market price
Less: Desired profit
= Target total cost

Since customers set the market price, often stockholders have to set to a low annual
return in the company’s assets. In order to stay in business and to target to better in-
come, companies need to use strategies to achieve it. This includes the following:

1. Cut fixed and variable costs

2. Increase sales volume
3. Add new products
4. Create and sell more of a unique service
(Braun & Tietz, 466.)

22
4.3.3 Pricing on the Finland – Estonia route

According to a July 2011 news article in Taloussanomat, the time of the cheapest cruis-
es from Helsinki to Tallinn would be over. This is due to rising fuel costs that pressure
shipping companies to start raising their prices. In July 2011 according to
Taloussanomat the cheapest cruises were EUR 10-20. However in November 2013
Viking Line advertised mini cruises from Helsinki to Tallinn starting as low as EUR 4
for its member card holders. However regular day cruises were advertised starting from
EUR 18, whereas Tallink Silja advertised 22 h cruises to Tallinn starting with EUR 35
(Talous Sanomat, 2011; Viking Line 2013b; Tallink Silja 2013a).

In November 2013 Eckerö Line’s advertises cheapest crossings to Tallinn starting

EUR 19 for S-card members. Regular prices are closer to EUR 30. Linda Line has
ceased operations for the winter and continues traffic again in the spring of 2014
(Eckerö Line 2013a; Linda Line 2013).

All of these three main players have their own member ship programs, and passengers
holding these cards are occasionally eligible for discounts and special deals. Tallink
Silja’s member ship program is called Club One, Viking Line’s is called the Viking
Club, and Eckerö Line is a part of the Finnish retailing cooperative organization S
Group (Eckerö Line 2013b; Viking Line 2013c; Tallink Silja 2013f).

Peak season is summertime on Helsinki –Tallinn route. That is when the demand is the
highest and shipping companies may set their prices higher up. Linda Line operates
two catamarans and has traffic only on the summer season. Other times of the year its
vessels are laid up. Especially winter time after New Year’s is low season, and compa-
nies are trying to attract customers with extremely low prices. Late fall (November-
December) is time for pre-Christmas parties and shipping companies are trying to at-
tract people to spend pre-Christmas parties on board their ships. However this is only
a short period of the year, and for the Christmas holidays the traffic quiets down.

In cargo operations Tallink Silja has price categories for departures, and depending on
the amount of demand. If the demand is high, so is the price, but if the demand is low,

23
the prices will be low also. Tallink Silja also makes contracts with logistics companies
according to how much they use Tallink Silja’s services.

4.3.4 Pricing on the Finland – Sweden route

Tallink Silja’s main competitor on the Finland-Sweden route is Viking Line. As of No-
vember 2013, on the Helsinki – Stockholm route, Tallink Silja offers cruises starting
from EUR 50 whereas Viking Line offers from EUR 40. There is an enormous change
in prices on weekdays compared to weekends. On Fridays and Saturdays Viking Line
offers cruises for EUR 112-240 whereas Tallink Silja EUR 99-286 (Viking Line 2013b;
Tallink Silja 2013a).

On the Turku – Stockholm route there are two departures daily for both Viking Line
and Tallink Silja. The morning departure has less demand so the prices are also cheap-
er. For Viking Line, the prices in morning departures start from EUR 80 and evening
departures from EUR 150.Whereas Tallink Silja’s prices for morning departures start
from EUR 35 and from EUR 52 in the evenings. Friday departures start at over EUR
100 for both companies. On Turku – Stockholm route there are more people coming
from the countryside and going for leisure cruises. Also the sea voyage is shorter than
between Helsinki and Stockholm, so for business travelers ships can be seen as a pos-
sibility among air planes. Day cruises from Turku to Åland and back have also been a
success especially among retired people. Retired people come in groups from the coun-
tryside and go on a day cruise to do tax free shopping. (Viking Line 2013b; Tallink
Silja 2013a).

Cargo pricing on the Finland – Sweden route is done according to the same strategy as
on the Finland – Estonia route. Tallink Silja has set price categories for different depar-
tures, but depending on the logistics company, the price varies according to the usage.
Tallink Silja’s advantage on the Turku – Stockholm route is its ropax2 vessel M/S Sea
Wind. It carries only cargo, which helps the company to have more space on passenger

2Ropax vessel is a roro ship, which has a car deck. Ropax vessels carry mainly cargo, but also limited amounts of
passengers (Dumell 2008, 15.)

24
ships for passengers’ cars. This is important because it allows for trailers and machines
that take a lot of space on car decks to easily loaded onto the M/S Sea Wind without
compromising with the passenger vehicle amounts on other ships.

5 Sales on Routes

The following chapter discusses Tallink Silja’s cargo and passenger traffic. In section
5.1 I will discuss the sales on the Finland – Estonia route, and in section 5.2, the sales
on the Finland – Sweden route, 5.3 Factors that affect Sales, 5.4 Factors that have
Changed Sales, 5.5 Reasons for why all Traffic is not profitable and 5.6 Ways to Im-
prove Sales.

5.1 Sales on Finland – Estonia route

Tallink has operated its Helsinki – Tallinn route since 1990. Silja Line operated on the
same route first with Silja Line’s own brand in the 1990’s and as of 2000 with the Super
Sea Cat brand. Super Sea Cat operations were not part of Tallink Silja’s acquisition in
2006. In the 2000’s Super Sea Cat’s market share varied between 5-8 %, before it
ceased operations completely in 2008. Today Tallink Silja uses Tallink brand in traffic
between Finland and Estonia, whereas Tallink Silja brand is used between Finland and
Sweden. Between the years 2002-2012, Tallink’s market share in passenger traffic has
risen from 38 % to 59 %. Of all commercial traffic, Tallink’s market share on the
Helsinki – Tallinn route is 38 %. The yearly market trend of the Helsinki – Tallinn
route can be seen in the diagram below (figure 7).

25
100.00%
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
58.00% 59.00%
60.00% 55.00% 57.00%
50.00%
50.00% 45.00%
42.00% 42.00% 44.00%
38.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Figure 7. Tallink’s passenger amounts trend of all passenger amounts. (Adapted from
Fagerström, H. 29 Oct 2013)

Despite the end of tax-free sales on-board Helsinki – Tallinn ships in 2004, the Tallink
Silja has been able to increase its total amount of passengers every year. Today, not
only are Finnish people traveling on leisure trips to Tallinn, but Estonians are also
traveling for leisure and work to Finland. After the new concept, the Tallink Shuttle
was introduced in 2007, the total amount of passengers have almost doubled. Today,
Tallink operates two fast-speed cruise ferry’s between Finland and Estonia, which
travel in just 2 hours from port to port. Below can be seen the development of
Tallink’s passengers totals. The percentage in describes the share of the total amounts
transported on Helsinki – Tallin route. Since 2007 Tallink’s market share has steadily
risen and is currently over 60 % (Table 6).

26
Table 6. Tallink passenger amounts (Shippax Market 2013, 192.)
Year Helsinki - % of the total
Tallinn amounts3
2012 4,496,429 62.0 %
2011 4,270,254 61.3 %
2007 2,572,499 56.9 %

Tallink’s main competitors on the Finland – Estonia route are Eckerö Line and Viking
Line. They both operate from Helsinki to Tallinn with one ferry each. Both
competitors have managed to increase their sales over the last few years. Comparing
Viking Line’s passenger totals from the years 2007 and 2012 reveal that Viking Line
has managed to almost double its numbers. A reason for this might be their newly-
built M/S Viking XPRS, which was delived in 2008 and shuttles between two cities in
2,5 hrs. Viking Line has more departures and a shorter sea voyage making it more
competitive with Tallink’s shuttles ships. As of 2013 Eckerö Line has also modernized
its fleet, replacing the old M/S Nordlandia with a fast cruise ferry, the M/S Finlandia.
This allows Eckerö Line to directly compete against Tallinks shuttles ships, and it will
be seen in few years whether it will be able to increase its sales. Below are shown the
passenger amounts from Tallink’s two competitors (Table 7). (Fakta om Fartyg 2013a;
Fakta om Fartyg 2013d; Fakta om Fartyg 2013e).

Table 7. Competitors passenger amounts Helsinki Tallinn route (Shippax Market 2013,
192.)
Year Eckerö Viking
Line Line
2012 921,277 1,833,149
2011 938,351 1,762,136
2007 857,121 1,091,428

3Percentage of total passengers amounts includes the total passenger amounts of Tallink, Viking Line and
Eckerö Line

27
Tallink has been a market leader in cargo operations on the Helsinki – Talinn route
since 1999. In 1999 Tallink transported nearly 50,000 cargo units in a year. In the early
2000’s the total amounts remained quite steady, but since 2004 the amount of cargo
being transported has been steadily increasing. In 2006 Tallink transported 100,000
cargo units, and steadily increased until 2009 when there was a slight decrease. Since
2010 the numbers have been increasing again, and as of 2012 Tallink broke its new
record of transporting almost 140,000 cargo units. The market share trend between
1999-2012 can be found in Attachment 1. Below are Tallink’s transported cargo units
on the route and the percentage of the total cargo units transport compared against
Tallink’s competitors (Table 8).

Table 8. Tallink cargo units (Shippax Market 2013,192.)

Year Finland – Percentage % of the total
Estonia amounts
2012 136,142 72,0 %
2011 118,414 48.4 %
2007 112,285 55.7 %

Compared to Tallink’s rivals the difference in the amount of cargo transported is huge.
Whereas Tallink transports over 140,000 cargo units a year, Eckerö Line and Viking
Line remain well below 100,000. However, as mentioned earlier transporting cargo
units make up only 11 % of Tallink’s annual revenue, so for Tallink’s competitors it
might be smarter to focus on increasing passenger traffic. From 2005 to 2013 Eckerö
Line operated a ropax vessel, the M/S Translandia, which was transporting cargo be-
tween Helsinki and Tallinn. However when the new M/S Finlandia was taken into ser-
vice, the M/S Translandia was sold. It will be interesting to see in the next few years
whether the cargo amounts of Eckerö Line decrease due to them only having one ves-
sel. However, there is also a chance they might see an increase due to better efficiency.
Viking Line has experienced a steady increase in the amount of cargo it transports.
This is partly due to its new M/S Viking XPRS ship that can handle more cargo than
their older vessel. Below Table 9 shows the amounts of competitors transported cargo
units.

28
Table 9. Competitors cargo units (Shippax Market 2013, 192.)
Year Eckerö Viking
Line Line
2012 73,222 53,003
2011 75,292 51,095
2007 58,416 30,730

5.2 Sales on Finland - Sweden route

Silja Line has maintained operations on the Helsinki – Stockholm route and the Turku
– Stockholm route for over a decade. Silja Line’s main competitor in traffic between
Finland and Sweden has always been Viking Line. In the past Viking Line used to have
a slightly bigger market share in passenger traffic on the Finland – Sweden route com-
pared to Silja Line. The total passenger amounts from 1990 to 2006 are listed below in
Table 10.

Table 10. Passenger amounts FIN – SWE 1990- 2006 (Modified Dumell 2008, 75.)
Year Viking Line Viking Tallink Silja Tallink
Line % Silja %
1990 5,748,000 74 2,022,400 26
1991 6,277,300 72 2,465,100 28
1992 6,409,800 71 2,585,000 29
1993 5,414,000 53 4,734,100 47
1994 4,357,800 48 4,722,800 52
1995 4,549,000 46 5,259,000 54
2000 5,445,800 52 5,006,300 48
2005 5,372,300 53 4,688,100 47
2006 5,622,000 58 4,151,300 42

Since 2007 Silja Line has managed to gain over 50 % of the passenger amounts on
both the Helsinki – Stockholm and Turku – Stockholm routes. On both routes the
trend has been going up since 2009. Compared to the early 1990’s, Silja Line has man-

29
aged to gain a lot better market share compared to Viking Line. The change is signifi-
cant--increasing from 26 % to 55 % in 22 years. However in cargo transportation be-
tween Helsinki – Stockholm, Viking Line has been a market leader over the last couple
of years. The market trend of total passenger amounts can be found in Attachment 2.
Below are shown the passenger amounts on the Helsinki - Stockholm route (Table 11).

Table 11. Passenger amounts Helsinki – Stockholm (Shippax Market 2013, 194.)
Year Tallink Tallink Viking Viking
Silja Silja % Line Line %
2012 1,318,256 54.8 % 1,085,387 45.2 %
2011 1,315,020 54.6 % 1,093,981 45.4 %
2007 1,297,054 52.3 % 1,181,650 41.7 %

Viking Line has a greater market share in cargo operations between Helsinki and
Stockholm. This trend has been relatively stable since 2007. The Helsinki – Stockholm
route only has one daily afternoon departure. The amount of cargo shipped on this
route is considerably less than on the Turku – Stockholm route. Below are shown the
amounts of cargo units transported (Table 12).

Table 12. Cargo units transported Helsinki – Stockholm (Shippax Market 2013, 194.)
Year Tallink Tallink Viking Viking
Silja Silja % Line Line %
2012 19,280 47.0 % 21,724 53.0 %
2011 19,662 47.4 % 21,852 52.6 %
2007 19,884 45.5 % 22,889 54.5 %

On the Turku –Stockholm route Tallink Silja has also managed keep its over 50 %
market share in passenger traffic, and in the last few years the trend has been going up.
Since 2007 Viking Line’s passenger amounts have dropped significantly on the Turku –
Stockholm route. Tallink Silja managed to increase passenger amounts before 2012,
when its passenger amounts slightly decreased. In 2013 Viking Line introduced its
newly-built vessel, the M/S Viking Grace on the Turku – Stockholm route, and by the

30
end of the year it will be interesting to see whether Viking Line has managed to in-
crease its sales on this route. The market trend in passengers can be found in Attach-
ment 3. Below are the passenger amounts on Turku – Stockholm route (Table 13).

Table 13. Passenger amounts Turku – Stockholm (Shippax Market 2013, 194.)
Year Tallink Tallink Viking Viking Line
Silja Silja % Line %
2012 1,588,361 56.0 % 1,247,241 44.0 %
2011 1,670,763 56.9 % 1,264,165 43.1 %
2007 1,631,979 53.4 % 1,421,812 46.6 %

In cargo transportation Tallink Silja is a market leader. However between Turku and
Stockholm, Tallink Silja operates with two passenger ferries and one ropax cargo ferry,
the M/S Sea Wind. Viking Line does not have a cargo vessel; it only operates with two
passengers ships. Due to this reason the cargo unit amounts transported are not quite
comparable. Below are shown the amounts of cargo units transported (Table 14).

Table 14. Cargo units transported Turku – Stockholm (Shippax Market 2013, 194.)
Year Tallink Tallink Viking Viking Line
Silja Silja % Line %
2012 73,702 67.4 % 35,669 32.6 %
2011 75,498 68.1 % 35,293 31.9 %
2007 67,240 66.9 % 33,299 33.1 %

It can clearly be seen that after the acquisition of Silja Line by Tallink, the new compa-
ny has managed to increase sales on all its routes. Tallink Silja has made good decisions
on how to increase sales in both passenger and cargo traffic.

5.3 Factors that affect Sales

According to Marina Hasselblatt, cargo prices and the volume of cargo have the big-
gest effect on sales of Tallink Silja’s cargo operations. It is important to match the price
with the demand, so that the company can maximize the cargo volume on the ships. If

31
the ships sail half empty it will result in a big loss for the company. Tallink Silja makes
yearly contracts with logistics companies, but throughout the year contracts can be re-
vised in order to make sure the transportation volumes are high. Tallink Silja also con-
stantly follows how its rival companies behave. It is vital not to lose any contract cus-
tomers to rival companies, because getting them back is difficult once they switch over
to another firm (Hasselblatt, M. 17 Oct 2013).

There has been a major change in passenger traffic over the past twenty years. After
the Soviet Union collapsed and Estonia gained its independence in 1991, travelers have
become more interested in traveling to Estonia and to other Baltic countries. The Fin-
land – Sweden route has lost some of its interest among leisure travelers, whereas the
Helsinki – Tallinn route’s amount of passengers has started growing. Also in the past
ten years cheap airline companies have attracted customers away from Tallink Silja.
Nowadays it is getting cheaper to fly inside Europe due to low airline ticket prices.
People are more interested in spending weekends or short vacations on the other side
of Europe instead of cruising to a country nearby. Also EU’s Schengen agreement has
made traveling inside Europe more flexible and easier, bringing EU countries closer
together (Hasselblatt, M. 17 Oct 2013).

5.4 Factors that have Changed Sales

During the history of maritime traffic between Finland, Sweden and Estonia, there has
been historical changes in the world that have affected maritime traffic. These include
for example the collapse of Soviet Union, the economic crises in the early 1990’s and
again from 2008 onwards. There have also been legislative changes that have forced
shipping companies to adapt to market changes, and there have been incidents that
have changed passengers’ attitudes towards maritime traffic.

5.4.1 Wärtsilä Marine’s Bankruptcy

In 1989 a Finnish shipyard, Wärtsilä Meriteollisuus (eng. Wärtsilä Marine) declared

bankruptcy after failing to make any profit in the past few years of its existence. At the
time of the bankruptcy both Viking Line and Silja Line had ships being built by

32
Wärtsilä Marine’s shipyards. Maritime counsel Harry Österberg remembers how Silja
Line had to pay FIM 1 billion instead of FIM 700 million to cash its new cruise ferries
M/S Silja Serenade and M/S Silja Symphony out from the bankrupt shipyard. This was
far more than the company had first expected to pay. This caused huge financial prob-
lems for Silja Line’s parent company Effjohn Holding Oy, which already had to pay to
cover Rederi Ab Sally’s debts. Viking Line had only one new ship M/S Cinderella be-
ing built on the shipyard when the bankruptcy occurred, and because it was only a few
weeks away from being delivered, the cost to purchase it from the shipyard did not rise
dramatically (Dumell 2008, 118-120).

In the early 1990’s an economic recession hit Europe and many shipping companies
suffered because of it. In 1993 Rederi AB Slite, one of the two remaining owners of
Viking Line declared for bankruptcy and the newly-built M/S Europa was sold to Silja
Line. Viking Line’s remaining owner SF Line AB continued operations, but in 1993
Viking Line lost in total four ships owned by Rederi Ab Slite, and suffered a shortage
in its fleet size for several years (Dumell 2008, 118-120).

5.4.2 Safety Concerns

Before the mid 1990’s there had not been too many serious incidents in the maritime
traffic between Finland, Sweden, and Estonia. However in 1994, everything changed.
On 4 March 1994, M/S Sally Albatross ran aground close to the Finnish shore and
started to sink. The crew managed to evacuate the passengers safely, and the ship was
towed to shallow waters to save it from sinking. The ship suffered massive damages
and the repairs ended up being very costly. The cause was later found to be poor crew
training. (Onnettomuustutkintakeskus 1996, 16, 113)

On 28 September 1994, a very unexpected incident took place, and in one night com-
pletely changed the maritime traffic in Finland, Sweden and Estonia. The M/S Estonia
set sail the previous evening from Tallinn to Stockholm with 989 passengers on board.
Around 0100 heavy seas broke the Estonia’s bow doors open and water flooded the
car deck. The ship capsized in minutes and sunk. Only 137 passengers on board man-
aged to save themselves. This included 94 passengers and 43 crew members. Of all 137

33
survivors only 26 were women. Below are shown the survivor amounts according to
sex and as a percentage of the total passenger amounts (Table 15). Most of the survi-
vors were young and strong men aged 20 - 44 who managed to climb out from the
heeled ship. Most of the victims were Swedish (501) and Estonian (280). The incident
caused a lot of discussion about the safety of passenger ships, and as result, many
bookings were cancelled and volume of passengers plummeted (1997
Onnettomuustutkintakeskus 2000, 117, 175).

Table 15. Survivor amounts (Retrieved 1997 Onnettomuustutkintakeskus 2000, 117.)

Sex Survivors % of total passen-
ger amounts
Men 111 22
Women 26 5
Total 137 27

After the incident it was soon revealed that many other ships, including Viking Line
and Silja Line ships, had also experienced similar problems with their bow doors as the
M/S Estonia did, but these problems had not been revealed to the public. Now ship-
ping companies needed to win their customers’ trust back in order to successfully con-
tinue operations (Dumell 2008, 105).

In the first few weeks after the M/S Estonia incident, over 20,000 Viking Lines trips
were cancelled, and in 1995 the amount of passengers was 5 % less than in 1994.
However, gradually the amount of customers increased again, and after the incident all
shipping companies started to prioritize safety first (Sjöström 2009, 178-179).

Viking Lines former Marketing Director, Thomas Delden said that after the Estonia
incident the amount of female travelers on cruises decreased dramatically. They refused
to travel, lowering drastically the number of families that traveled on the cruises. In
addition, the amount of work-related conference traveling greatly decreased. If one
person in a group did not want to travel, then the whole group could not travel. A lot
of Swedish passengers also refused to travel. Never before had so many Swedes died in

34
an accident. The catastrophe hit Silja Line the hardest, since at the time it had more
Swedish clients than Viking Line (Dumell 2007, 127).

Retired captain Raimo Tiilikainen of the Suomen merivoimat (eng. Finnish Navy) men-
tioned in an interview held by MTV3 that today terrorism and fires are serious threats
for passenger ships. Mr. Tiilikainen was the captain in charge of the rescue operation
of M/S Estonia disaster, but he recalls that today it is very unlike that a similar incident
would occur. After the incident, shipping companies had to greatly lower the prices of
tickets in order to attract customers again. However, this process took several years
(MTV3. 2009, Dumell 2008, 127).

5.4.3 Changes in Tax Free Sales

Finland joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, and after that it was only a matter of
time before the tax-free sales on-board ships came to an end. On the 1 July 1999, tax-
free sales were stopped on ship routes between two EU countries. However Finland
received a special permit to continue tax-free sales as long as the ships stopped in
Åland on their way. Since then the Helsinki – Stockholm ferries and Turku – Stock-
holm ferries have stopped in Åland in order to continue tax-free sales. Estonia became
an EU country on the 1 May 2004, and on the same day tax-free sales between Helsinki
and Tallinn were ceased. Viking Line was uncertain if traffic between Helsinki and Tal-
linn would remain profitable anymore, and as a result, it switched its cruise ferry, M/S
Cinderella to another route and brought in a smaller and older ferry, M/S Rosella to
replace it. However after 2004 shuttling between Helsinki and Tallinn has been a suc-
cess so much, that Viking Line brought a brand new ship M/S Viking XPRS on this
route in 2008. Nowadays ships between Helsinki and Tallinn sail in two hours, making
commuting for business and leisure travelers easy. (Sjöström 2009, 185).

Lars Wendelin of Silja Line, records how the tax-free sales played a major role in the
ferry traffic in the Bothnian Bay, where the on-board sales accounted for over 50 % of
their profit. Silja Line had ships sailing between Vaasa and Umeå and after the tax-free
traffic ended in 1999 the amount of passengers dropped dramatically. According to
Wendelin, in 1999 Silja Line had almost one million passengers traveling in the

35
Bothnian Bay, but in 2000 only 300,000. When tax-free sales stopped the traffic died
and in 2000 Silja Line discontinued operations in the Bothnian Bay. Table 16 shows
the passenger amounts on Vaasa – Umeå route. After Silja Line ceased its operations a
new company RG Line operated on the route for eleven years before going out of
business in 2012 (Dumell 2008, 131, 136; Dumell 2007. Video).

Table 16. Passenger amounts Vaasa - Umeå (Information retrieved from Dumell 2007,
131.)
Operator Year Passenger
amounts
Silja Line 1991 1,000,000
Silja Line 1995 800,000
Silja Line 2000 300,000
RG Line 2006 70,000

5.5 Reasons for why all Traffic is not profitable

According to Marina Hasselblatt, all traffic is not profitable due to tough competition
among rival companies, operational expenses, and the wrong kind of marketing and
fleet mismatch (Hasselblatt, M. 17 Oct 2013).

Tallink Silja’ s Captain of the M/S Star, Vahur Söstra adds that because traffic on
routes is very seasonable, it is very difficult to make traffic profitable during the low
season. The highest peak of traveling is during the summer season and lowest after
New Year’s. Also there is a huge difference among the weekdays. Most of the passen-
gers on every route travel during the weekends, making Friday, Saturday and Sunday
the busiest days of the week. However, if there was not any traffic on other days of the
week, it would be difficult to have contracts with cargo operators and satisfy customers
who travel due to their needs (Söstra, V. 26 Oct 2013).

36
Captain Tarvi-Carlos Tuulik of the M/S Superstar says that marketing plays a very im-
portant role so that customers can find the services they need. If the target market or
the marketing ways are not correct, it is difficult to attract customers to travel on the
ships (Tuulik, T-C. 30 Sep 2013).

Presented on the next page are the Helsinki – Tallinn route statistics of both passenger
amounts and cargo units transported quarterly. Tables 17 and 18 show the trend how
Q1 (January – March) is low season for passenger traffic and Q2, Q3 and Q4 high sea-
son. Q3 (July-September) is the time when most Europeans have their summer vaca-
tions which is the peak of the season. That is the time of the year when most of the
people travel. In cargo transportation Q1 and for Q4 are low season. Most of the cargo
is transported on high season when consumers are ordering goods. The low season is
normally after New Year’s when consumers are not spending money as much, due to
Christmas Holidays. Q2 is the peak of the season for cargo transportation, it is before
people have their vacations, whereas Q4 is more quiet since most of the people are on
vacation.

The Statistics of the Finland – Sweden route passengers show that Q1 and Q4 is the
low season, but Q2 and Q3 is when the season is at its peak, (Table 19). In transported
cargo units the amount is steady throughout the year, (Table 20). This is explained be-
cause most of the cargo is transported between the Scandinavian countries (Finland,
Sweden, Denmark and Norway), whereas on the Finland – Estonia route most of the
traffic goes to other parts of Europe. The amounts of cargo transported between the
Scandinavian countries are far less than to other European countries. Therefore the
amounts can be divided equally throughout the year. There is a possibility for more
potential to transport more cargo in Q2 and Q3, but it is not possible due to the lack
of space onboard and to the longer sea voyage.

37
Table 17. Passenger amount Helsinki – Tallinn by quarters (Retrieved from Tallink
Silja. 2013b.)
Passengers Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2013 895,000 1,208,000 N/A N/A
2012 909,000 1,171,000 1,341,000 1,076,000
2011 879,000 1,092,000 1,257,000 1,042,000

Table 18. Cargo unit amount Helsinki – Tallinn by quarters (Information retrieved
from Tallink Silja. 2013b.)
Cargo units Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2013 29,000 40,000 N/A N/A
2012 34,000 36,000 32,000 29,000
2011 26,000 30,000 31,000 31,000

Table 19. Passenger amount Finland – Sweden by quarters (Information retrieved from
Tallink Silja. 2013b.)
Passengers Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2013 631,000 700,000 N/A N/A
2012 709,000 764,000 910,000 693,000
2011 739,000 786,000 925,000 715,000

Table 20. Cargo unit amount Finland – Sweden by quarters (Information retrieved
from Tallink Silja. 2013b.)
Cargo units Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2013 29,000 24,000 N/A N/A
2012 25,000 23,000 22,000 24,000
2011 25,000 25,000 22,000 24,000

38
5.6 Ways to Improve Sales

Improving sales is a constant battle for a company. There are several profitability fac-
tors companies use to improve sales. These include changing the sales price, sales vol-
ume, variable costs and fixed costs. There are two ways in which a company can affect
the sales price. It can either lower it to increase sales, or decrease it to specify the prod-
uct suitable for a certain target group. Usually this product does not have as much
competition. However, if the sales price is decreased, the pressure to sell more to break
even is higher, but increasing it automatically will lower the sales volume. By decreasing
fixed costs a company can make its operations more efficient, and keep its sales price
at the status quo. By decreasing variable costs such as starting to use different suppliers
for delivering products, and negotiating discounts and better terms of payments, the
sales price may be kept the same (Braun & Tietz 2013, 411-415).

According to Marina Hasselblatt, Tallink Silja is working all the time to improve its
profitability. Even if Tallink Silja is a market leader in some of its routes, it still needs
to work to develop its services in order to keep its market share (Hasselblatt, M. 17
Oct 2013).

In order to improve passenger traffic Tallink Silja is trying to find new customer
groups, and to make them more interested in leisure cruises. Tallink Silja must also
promote business to foreign travelers and those workers traveling on business. Arrang-
ing different kinds of theme cruises may also attract more customers (Hasselblatt, M.
17 Oct 2013).

In order to improve the profitability of cargo operations, Tallink Silja constantly fol-
lows the market trends, export and import statistics, and how the company is doing
compared to its rivals. If a logistics company is not transporting as many units as be-
fore, they will directly contact the customer in order to understand why this is the case.
Tallink Silja is constantly negotiating with logistics companies in order to design con-
tracts that are more competitive than what is being offered by rival companies
(Hasselblatt, M. 17 Oct 2013).

39
Captains Vahur Söstra and Tarvi-Carlos Tuulik add that in order to improve profitabil-
ity of commercial traffic, it is important to make the time spent in berth as short as
possible in order to avoid costly harbor fees, and to make loading and unloading of the
vessel as efficient as possible. There are also several other ways to cut costs to make
traffic more profitable. For example, the use of tug boats and harbor pilots when
mooring or disembarking can increase costs enormously, but because Tallink Silja does
not use either one of these, it gains a significant advantage. However, there are always
costs involving the crew of the vessel and fuel charges. It is difficult to lower crew
costs, because the ships need to always maintain enough crew members in order to
operate efficiently, but if the timetable is not too tight, ships may precede on their
journeys with a slower pace, making the fuel costs cheaper (Söstra, V. 26 Oct 2013;
Tuulik, T-C. 30 Sep 2013).

40
6 Future Challenges

This chapter discusses future challenges in maritime traffic. In chapter 6.1 sustainability
issues will be discussed with two subchapters focusing on competitive strategy and
environmental accounting. Chapter 6.2 analyzes new emissions regulations along with
various factors affecting traffic and prices. I will also discuss the criticism leveled
against new regulations.

6.1 Sustainability

Sustainability is important in today’s business world, and companies are trying to im-
plement positive changes by considering environmental issues. It is very important for
companies to avoid any negative feedback regarding environmental matters. As we
have seen, negative feedback in environmental issues can lead to huge boycotts around
world, and affect the company’s reputation and sales for years. Companies are using
sustainability as a driving force for continued evolution (Braun & Tietz 2013, 886).

Often sustainability is defined as the following:

"Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the pre-

sent without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs.” (Brundtland Report, 1987.)

Three main reasons why companies embed sustainability in their businesses are the
following:

Three main reasons why companies embed sustainability in their businesses are the
following:
1. Cost reduction
2. Regulatory compliance
3. Stakeholder influence
(Adapted from (Braun & Tietz 2013, 886)

41
6.1.1 Competitive Strategy

Companies have started to implement programs that support environmental sustaina-

bility. For example, hotels have advised their customers to reduce the amount of water
and electricity they use while staying at the hotel especially when they are not in the
room, and also giving customers the option of reusing their sheets and towels. These
procedures have lowering housekeeping costs, and overall costs for the hotel (Braun &
Tietz 2013, 887).

It is also more and more common for governments to set strict rules to comply with
emissions, air quality, waste management etc. It is beneficial for a company to evolve
and adhere to these standards because in many cases they will be eligible for govern-
ment tax credits or grants. These rules are expected to become more stringent in the
future, so companies that are already adapting will be more flexible when it comes time
to implement future changes (Braun & Tietz 2013, 887).

Stakeholder influence is often seen as being very important, and as a result, companies
will increase their commitment to environmental matters. Banks are also taking into
account environmental issues when making credit decisions. Investors seek companies
that are proactive in sustainability and for this reason, many companies have started to
publish sustainability reports (Braun & Tietz 2013, 888).

A competitive strategy helps companies cut costs and gain more revenues. This can
also result in a higher market share, and a better reputation for the company (Braun &
Tietz 2013, 889).

6.1.2 Environmental Management Accounting

In order for companies to support sustainability, they use Environmental Management

Accounting (EMA) to collect data about costs related to sustainability. This monetary
information is traditionally collected and includes the material costs of products, cost
of resources related to products, waste and emissions costs, and research and devel-
opment costs. Companies today also use physical information, which includes the

42
amount of solid waste generated, gallons of wastewater generated, and pounds of
packaging recycled. By monitoring these costs a company can clearly see what kind
impact changes in sustainability have on them (Braun & Tietz 2013, 891).

In 2005, Tallink was criticized for its environmental policies when it was revealed it
had released its waste waters into the sea, instead of bringing them to shore. The com-
pany claimed it had filtered the water according to set standards before releasing it to
the sea, but due to the negative publicity this generated in the media and subsequent
boycott threats from customers, the company quickly announced that it will pump all
waste waters on land in the future (YLE Uutiset 2005).

Today, Tallink Silja takes into account environmental issues very seriously. In 2008,
Tallink Silja received an Environmental Management Standard ISO 14001. Tallink Silja
has also mentioned its ships use low sulfur fuel, waste oils are recycled, all waste waters
are pumped onshore and ships recycle their wastes (Tallink Silja 2013e).

6.2 New Emissions Regulations in 2015

On January 1st 2015, new EU sulfur regulations will come into effect. According to
these new rules, ships are allowed to contain only 0,1 % of sulfur in their bunker fuel
in certain areas of the world. These emissions regulations will first come into effect in
so-called Sulfur Emission Control Areas (SECA) and by 1 January 2020, globally. The-
se SECA areas include the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, and coastal areas of California.
On a global scale as of 1 January, 2012, the sulfur amounts in fuel were 4,5 % > 3,5 %,
but as of 1 January 2020, they have to be 0,5 %. In SECA areas as of 1 January 2010,
1,5 % > 1 %, but as of 1 January 2015 these levels must only be 0,1 %. Figure 8 below
shows on red color the SECA area in Europe (Eriksson 2009.)

43
 S/E
CA

Figure 8. S/ECA area in Europe (Fagerström, H. 29 Oct 2013)

The idea behind these regulations is to reduce the amount of sulfur oxides (SOx), ni-
trogen oxides (NOx), particulate matters (PM) and carbon dioxide (CO2) released into
the air. In order to meet these new emissions regulations, there are several different
options that shipping companies can adopt. As a short-term solution, shipping compa-
nies may install so-called sulfur scrubbers4 in ships, which reduce the amount of emis-
sions that a ship’s funnels release into the air. Another possibility is to use lighter diesel
fuel, which is costly, but does not require modifications to ships (DNV Group 2013.
Video).

A long-term solution would be to build new ships that use liquefied natural gas (later
LNG) as their fuel. Viking Line has built one vessel, the M/S Viking Grace, which uses
LNG as its fuel. It was taken into service in 2013 (DNV Group 2013. Video).

According to the Finnish Transportation Safety Agency’s (later Trafi) report there are
also other long-run possibilities to adapt to the new emissions regulations. These in-
clude e.g. better propulsion technology to be used on ships, usage of larger ships, re-

4 Sulfur scrubbers are scrubbers installed inside the funnels of ships catalyzing the amount of pollution released
to the air. (Clean North Sea Shipping 2013)

44
duced speed at sea, shorter time in port, environmentally-friendly energy, and an effi-
cient power plant (Trafi 2011, 19-20; DNV Group 2013. Video).

6.2.1 Criticism towards New Regulations

Shipping companies have criticized these new emission regulations. Some reasons for
criticism are following.

- Transporting expenses will increase

- New emissions regulations only affect Northern Europe
- Distance from Finland to the middle of Europe is long and companies fear
transporting may shift from sea to land
(Trafi 2011, 16.)

According to an interview on the 3T website of Finnlines, Chairman of the Board,

Emanuele Grimaldi doesn’t see sulfur scrubbers as a solution to the new emissions
regulations. He sees sulfur scrubbers as taking too much space on ships, endangering
the stability of a vessel, and consuming too much energy. His solution would be in-
stead to make transporting more efficient. This would include keeping ships from sail-
ing only half empty, operating with larger ships, and reducing the cruising speed. He
also wishes oil companies would start producing low sulfur fuels (Lehtinen 2012, 3T).

6.2.2 Effects on Traffic and Prices

According to an interview with Marina Hasselblatt, the effects of the new EU sulfur
regulations will automatically increase the prices in both passenger ticket prices, as well
as in cargo sales prices. The new low sulfur diesel is more costly which leads to increas-
ing fuel surcharges. At the moment no one knows for sure what is going to happen,
but Tallink Silja and its competitors are all in the same situation. Tallink Silja’s ad-
vantage, however, is its modern fleet, which makes it easier to implement new modifi-
cations. New ships will stay in service for years to come and the modifications will
have time to pay back the costs (Hasselblatt, M. 17 Oct 2013).

45
Due to rising fuel costs in 2015, there is speculation that some cargo transportation
would shift from sea to land. Especially cargo transported from Germany and Poland
to Scandinavia. This would mean more trucks driving through the Baltic countries so-
called route “Via Baltica”. The longer the sea voyage is, the more the new emissions
regulations will have an affect on prices. This would eventually mean an increase in
cargo transported across from Estonia to Finland, since the sea voyage is short
(Fagerström, H 29 Oct 2013).

According to Trafi’s report, an EU study estimates additional fuel costs would raise
EUR 200-1,200 million a year. However this study didn’t take into consideration the
usage of sulfur scrubbers. Another survey estimates additional fuel costs to rise EUR
900 - 1,100 million a year in usage of low sulfur diesel, but if sulfur scrubbers are being
used costs would be EUR 170-560 million a year (Trafi 2011, 14.)

46
7 Discussion

Previous chapters of this research have introduced the background of this research,
introduction of the company and research, traffic revenues, research methodology,
sales in traffic, and future challenges. This chapter will discuss the reliability and validi-
ty in 7.1, the key findings of the research in chapter 7.2 and ideas for the future of
Tallink Silja in chapter 7.3.

7.1 Reliability and Validity

Reliability is essential when conducting a research and therefore when conducting the-
se interviews, I tried to gather as much reliable data as possible. I also gathered statis-
tics from different sources matching them together to make sure that the statistics are
correct and reliable. Validity of this research can be proven, since the information used
is current or only few years old. However since the markets and factors affecting sales
are changing constantly, these findings need to be revised in the future. In all I may say
that all findings are based on theoretical bases which are valid and reliable.

7.2 Key Findings

In the beginning of the research it became clear that interviewing the right people in-
side the company helps to find the answers to questions, and gaining different kinds of
perspectives. In a large corporation like Tallink Silja, it is important to make sure that
everyone’s goals are the same, as are the ideas and strategies to achieve these goals.

Researching information regarding sales volumes (both passenger and cargo) was im-
portant, because it has helped me to understand what kind of volumes are on specific
routes and how the volumes are divided. This also allowed me to better understand the
market trends in commercial traffic, and the reasons for traveling on-board cruises and
ferries. The sales structure of the companies revealed what factors comprise most of
the company’s income. The knowledge that on-board sales make up almost 60 % of
the sales income makes it easier to understand why a shipping company does not al-
ways make a profit even if the car deck is fully loaded with trucks.

47
Unused free capacity on ships can pose a threat to a shipping company. If ships sail
when their car deck or passenger capacity is not at full capacity, it raises questions
about whether or not the ship is being utilized on the proper route. Sometimes ships
are either too large or too small for a route, and companies need to shift their ships in
order to find out which one is the most suitable for a certain route. Modern ships are
designed so that renovating them to become more suitable for different traffic is pos-
sible. This means that for example, some companies may reduce the amount of cheap
cabins on-board next to the car deck in order to create more space for cargo. If they
decide later that more cabins are needed instead of cargo space, the ship can be modi-
fied vice versa. It is also possible to rebuild ships by adding floors or an entire new
section to them. This project is conducted by cutting the ship into two parts, floating a
new section between and welding it all back together. Silja Line considered this in the
1980’s for its ships, the M/S Silvia Regina and the M/S Finlandia, but instead of re-
building them it decided to order new ships. For example Stena Line conducted this
kind rebuilding project to its vessel, the M/S Stena Hollandica in 2007 (Fakta om
Fartyg, 2013f; Malmberg, T. 2007, 147).

It has also been important to learn the current situation of maritime traffic. Factors
that have affected sales in the past and factors that are likely to affect sales in the near
future are important to understand. It is interesting that decisions made in the past
have sometimes caused one company to almost go into bankruptcy, whereas for an-
other company the same strategy may have proven to be a success. In 1997 Tallink was
close to going bankrupt, but in 2006 it acquired one of its rival companies and is now
the market leader in maritime traffic in the Northern Baltic Sea region. Changes in the
emissions regulations over the next few years will have a major effect on maritime traf-
fic, and that is why it is important for companies to start adapting to these changes as
soon as possible in order to remain competitive in the future. Tallink Silja’s advantages
compared to its competitors are there large variety of routes and modern fleet. Tallink
Silja links four countries, making it easy especially for logistics companies to use
Tallink Silja’s services when transporting goods. The average age of Tallink Silja’s ves-

48
sels is 7.7 years, whereas Viking Line’s ships average age is 19.4 and the average age of
all cruise ships in the world is 16.2 years (Tallink Silja Oy. 2012c).

Shipbuilding in Finland has battled from crisis to crisis. Earlier in this research it was
mentioned about the bankruptcy of Wärtsilä Marine in 1989 and its consequences to
the shipping companies. In 2013 STX Finland the successor of Wärtsilä Marine, an-
nounced that it was closing one its shipyards in Rauma and 600 people will lose their
jobs. STX Finland has suffered of financial difficulties for several years and has not
been able to make any profit in the last six years. Problems faced 25 years ago in ship-
building business are a reality again. (Yle Uutiset 2013)

Safety has always to be taken seriously in maritime traffic. Ships with car decks are vul-
nerable for fires and to leakages. Especially today when trucks carry dangerous goods,
there is always a risk that a fire may erupt and it may danger the ship and its passen-
gers. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks terrorism has also been a threat for ships.
However harbor areas are today so called ISP areas, they are fenced and strictly guard-
ed in order to avoid any intruders to enter them. In the end it is also the responsibility
of the ship’s crew to double check that all cargo and passengers on board cannot be a
threat for anyone.

Logistics companies are battling against rising operating costs regarding the transporta-
tion of goods. In the past few years, fuel prices and taxes have gone up, forcing logis-
tics companies to try to find new solutions in order to keep operations efficient. Com-
petition is fierce and customers are not willing to pay a higher price for their goods. As
a solution some logistics companies have started to use cheaper labor from Russia and
other former Eastern Block countries. However, this may also prove to be a liability
because sometimes cargo transported on vehicles from these countries does not meet
the safety requirements in Finland, Sweden, and Estonia. Many times, the drivers are
not aware of the procedures required in these countries in order to transport certain
goods. Most important are requirements for transporting dangerous goods on-board a
ship. In the case that dangerous goods that are not authorized to be transported on a
ship end up being found on-board, it can lead the shipping company to be fined or in a

49
worst- case situations, lead to immediate evacuation of the whole ship. The resulting
financial loss can be thousands or millions of euros. Shipping companies need to take
these threats into account, and intensify their surveillance, and also do a better job of
communicating about the safety requirements with these drivers.

7.3 Ideas for the Future of Tallink Silja

In an interview conducted with Captain Tuulik, he explained that now that Tallink Silja
has a sufficient quantity of vessels and operations, it is more important than ever to
focus on the quality of services. I definitely agree with his perspective. Now that there
is strong foundation for operations, Tallink Silja needs to focus on customer satisfac-
tion and to improve its brand’s quality. This includes forming a united fleet, and focus-
ing on customer service and business strategies. For example, Tallink Silja should focus
on its brand image and have a unified livery among all of its ships that would represent
both the Tallink and the Silja brands. This would bring about a better brand image and
give an impression that Tallink is seriously focused on quality. As of 2013, Tallink Silja
had five different liveries in use and ships colors varied between green, red, blue and
white. Customer service should be managed in a way that allows crew members, and
other employees to fully understand and communicate fluently with the passengers
traveling on the ships. This means for example, that employees in Sweden are able to
communicate with Swedish customers fluently in order to provide the best possible
customer service. Working methods in all ships and ports should also be unified.
Sometimes customers complain about why certain things are managed differently in
for examples, Helsinki’s port than in Tallinn’s port. This causes confusion and dissatis-
faction among customers. Now seven years after Tallink Grupp acquired Silja Line Ab,
there are still customers who believe that these companies are separate entities. This
makes it clear that the company should increasingly promote itself as one corporation,
and clearly express this when advertising cruises and services. This will possibly help
Tallink Silja to increase sales in the future, and to represent a better brand image for
the company.

50
Tallink Silja has been operating during peak seasons, 14 departures on the Helsinki –
Tallinn route, and currently has eight departures daily between Finland and Sweden.
Not all of the departures are profitable every day of the week, but due to Tallink Silja’s
great selection of departures, its customer base is greater than that of its competitors.
Business travelers and logistics companies choose Tallink, because of the wide variety
of options regarding departures, which allows them to be much more flexible when
arranging travel. Due to the fact that traffic is very seasonable, in off-seasons, depar-
tures are not profitable. However, ceasing operations for that time of the year is not a
viable solution because then Tallink Silja would lose all of its potential customers. Af-
terwards it would be very difficult to try to attract these passengers back once they
have switched over to other companies. Sometimes keeping traffic on a route that’s
not profitable at all times, might help to make other routes become more profitable.

On board sales mark almost 60 % on the company’s income, therefore it is one of the
most important sources of income for Tallink Silja. Despite the tax free shopping was
stopped on Helsinki – Tallinn route in 2004, Tallink Silja has managed to keep shop-
ping prices low. This has attracted especially Finnish customers to travel to Estonia
after cheap alcohol and other products. However Tallink Silja could revise if it could
promote on board sales even more to increase sales income. Especially after Finland
changed its legislation making alcohol prices higher, people’s interest towards buying
products from Estonia has increased.

By 2015, we will have a much better understanding of the new direction and future of
maritime traffic. New emissions regulations will be in effect, and it is possible that the
structure and base for maritime traffic will change dramatically. It is also possible that
after 2015, shipping companies will wait for a few years to see how the market situa-
tion changes before they draw and conclusions and make definitive changes. My own
forecast is that in the beginning of 2020, all newly-built ships will be more of the
ropax-type vessels, where the cargo spaces will be greater than the passenger lounges.
It seems to me that luxurious cruises to Stockholm and Tallinn are slowly coming to an
end. Business traveling and cargo will play a major role in the next decade, forcing
shipping companies to change and adapt by bringing new kinds of vessels to replace

51
their current ones. Also, it is likely that more and more Finnish and Swedish sailors will
be replaced by crews from countries where labor is cheaper. We have already seen how
some shipping companies have started to use cheaper labor in their operations. How-
ever, I see Tallink and Silja as being a strong shipping company for many years to
come.

Throughout the process of putting together this research project, I have gained an im-
mense amount of knowledge about maritime traffic, and learned a great deal about
sales estimations. It was also very interesting to learn about the factors that affect sales,
and how maritime traffic has changed, and will continue to evolve. It will be interesting
to see how the future of Tallink Silja will play out in the next few years.

52
References

AS Tallink Grupp Yearbook 2012. Tallink Grupp

Braun, K & Tietz, W. 2013. Managerial Accounting, 3rd ed. Pearson Education, Inc.
New Jersey.

Brundtland Report. 1987. World Commission on Environment and Development

Clean North Sea Shipping. 2013. Scrubber. URL: http://cleantech.cnss.no/air-

pollutant-tech/sox/scrubber/. Accessed 28 November 2013

DNV Group 2013. DNV’s Shipping 2020. Video. URL:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gktmzbkv4NM. Accessed 20 November 2013

Dumell, M. 2008. Meritie Ruotsiin. Gummerus Printing. Suomi.

Dumell, M. 2007. Meritie Ruotsiin. Vidi-Press. Video. Accessed 27 November 2013

Eckerö Line 2013a. Konserni. URL:

https://www.eckeroline.fi/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/Content_10151_10001_-
77?page=index.php%3Foption%3Dcom_content%26view%3Darticle%26id%3D77%
26lang%3Dfi-FI&smi=128&menuid=215&storeId=10151. Accessed 7 November
2013

Eckerö Line 2013b. S-Etukortti. URL:

https://www.eckeroline.fi/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/Content_10151_10001_-
77?page=index.php%3Foption%3Dcom_content%26view%3Darticle%26id%3D30%
26lang%3Dfi-FI&smi=131&menuid=144&storeId=10151. Accessed 19 November
2013

53
Eriksson, L. Liikenne ja Viestintäministeriö 9.4.2009.
http://www.lvm.fi/docs/fi/509670_DLFE-7320.pdf. Accessed 7 November 2013

Estline. 2013. History. URL: http://www.estline.ee/. Accessed 29 November 2013

Fagerström, H. 29 Oct 2013. Director of Cargo. Tallink Silja Oy. Presentation. Baltic
Sea.

Fakta om Fartyg. 2013a. M/S Viking XPRS. URL:

http://www.faktaomfartyg.se/viking_xprs_2008.htm. Accessed 14 November 2013

Fakta om Fartyg. 2013b. M/S Gabriella. URL:

http://www.faktaomfartyg.se/frans_suell_1992.htm. Accessed 14 November 2013

Fakta om Fartyg. 2013c. M/S Viking Grace. URL:

http://www.faktaomfartyg.se/viking_grace_2013.htm. Accessed 14 November 2013

Fakta om Fartyg. 2013d. M/S Finlandia. URL:

http://www.faktaomfartyg.se/moby_freedom_2001.htm. Accessed 14 November
2013

Fakta om Fartyg. 2013e. M/S Translandia. URL:

http://www.faktaomfartyg.se/transgermania_1976.htm. Accessed 14 November 2013

Fakta om Fartyg. 2013f. M/S Stena Hollandica. URL:

http://www.faktaomfartyg.se/stena_hollandica_2001.htm. Accessed 20 November
2013

Finnlines. 2013. Rahti, toiminta-alue. URL:

http://www.finnlines.com/rahti/toiminta_alue. Accessed 29 November.2013

54
Hasselblatt, M. 17 Oct 2013. Cargo Sales Manager. Tallink Silja Oy. Interview.
Helsinki.

Huopana, J. 2013. Tallinkin ja Tallink Siljan vaiheita. Presentation. Accessed. 14

November 2013

Lehtinen, J. 3T. Grimaldi: Rikkipesuri ei ole ratkaisu 21.8.2012. URL:

http://www.3t.fi/artikkeli/uutiset/teknologia/grimaldi_rikkipesuri_ei_ole_ratkaisu.
Accessed 12 November 2013

Linda Line. 2013. Main page. URL: http://www.lindaline.fi/fi/?p=2136. Accessed 7

November 2013

Malmberg, T. 2007. Siljan viisi vuosikymmentä. Frenckelin Kirjapaino. Espoo. As-

sessed 7 November 2013

MTV3. 2009. Estonian pelastusjohtaja: Autolauttoihin kohdistuu uusia uhkia. URL:

http://www.mtv.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/artikkeli/estonian-pelastusjohtaja--autolauttoihin-
kohdistuu-uusia-uhkia/1872008. Accessed 3 November 2013

1997 Onnettomuustutkintakeskus. 2000. Loppuraportti M/S Estonia. Oy Edita Ab.

Helsinki.

Onnettomuututkintakeskus 1996. SALLY ALBATROSSin pohjakosketus Porkkalan

edustalla 4.3.1994. URL:
http://www.turvallisuustutkinta.fi/Satellite?blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobcol=urldata
&SSURIapptype=BlobServer&SSURIcontainer=Default&SSURIsession=false&blobk
ey=id&blobheadervalue1=inline;%20filename=49ipg62215.pdf&SSURIsscontext=Sate
llite%20Server&blobwhere=1330439890383&blobheadername1=Content-
Disposition&ssbinary=true&blobheader=application/pdf. Accessed 18 November
2013

55
Shippax Market. 2013. Shippax. Halmstad.

Sjöström, P-H. 2009. Tie Meren Yli. Breakwater Publishing Ab. Gothenburg.

Söstra, V. 26 Sep 2013. Captain M/S Star. Tallink Silja Oy. Interview. Helsinki.

Tallink Silja. 2013a. Matkustajille. URL: http://www.tallinksilja.com/fi/web/fi/paras-

hinta. Accessed 7 November 2013

Tallink Silja. 2013b. Interim Reports of AS Tallink Grupp. URL:

http://www.tallink.com/reports#tabs-content-3. Accessed 7 November 2013

Tallink Silja Oy. 2013c. AS Tallink Grupp URL: http://www.tallink.com/about. Ac-

cessed 29 November 2013

Tallink Silja. 2013d. Where we operate. URL:

http://www.tallinksilja.com/en/web/int/book-a-cruise. Accessed 7 November 2013

Tallink Silja. 2013e.Vastuullisuus. URL:

http://www.tallinksilja.com/fi/web/fi/tietoa-tallink-siljasta#tabs-content-2. Accessed
13 November 2013

Tallink Silja. 2013f. Club One kanta-asiakas ohjelma. URL:

http://www.tallinksilja.com/fi/web/fi/mika-on-club-one. Accessed 19.11.2013
Tallink Silja. 2013h. Tallink Company presentation 2013. Presentation. Accessed 20
November 2013

Tallink Silja. 2013i. Unaudited Interim Consolidated Financial Statements for the first
quarter of the 2012 financial year. Presentation. URL:
http://www.tallink.com/documents/10192/7944851/2012_Q1_interim_en.pdf/aee5
be51-09d6-43d6-8041-b177352217b5. Accessed 29 November 2013

56
Tallink Silja. 2013j. Tallink Siljan historia. URL:
http://www.tallinksilja.com/fi/web/fi/tietoa-tallink-siljasta#tabs-content-4. Accessed
29 November 2013

Taloussanomat. 2011. Nyt se loppuu: Halvimmat Tallinnan-matkat menivät jo. URL:

http://www.taloussanomat.fi/tyo-ja-elama/2011/07/21/nyt-se-loppuu-halvimmat-
tallinnan-matkat-menivat-jo/201110149/139. Accessed 7.11.2013

Trafi 2011. Vienti- ja tuontilogistiikan haasteet 13.10.2011. URL:

http://www.logistiikkamessut.fi/liitetiedostot/editori_materiaali/1789.pdf. Accessed
12.11.2013

Tuulik, T-C. 30 Sep 2013. Captain M/S Superstar. Tallink Silja Oy. Interview. Baltic
Sea.

Viking Line. 2013a. Laivat. URL: http://www.vikingline.fi/fi/suomi/valitse-

matka/laivat/. Accessed 7 November 2013

Viking Line. 2013b. Äkkilähdöt. URL: http://www.vikingline.fi/fi/suomi/viking-

club/risteilyt/akkilahtotarjoukset/14-h-miniristeily-xprslla-helsingista-tallinnaan/. Ac-
cessed 7 November 2013

Viking Line. 2013c. Viking Club. URL: http://www.vikingline.fi/fi/suomi/viking-

club/. Accessed 19 November 2013

YLE Uutiset. 2005. Tallink keskeyttää jätevesien laskemisen mereen. URL:

http://yle.fi/uutiset/tallink_keskeyttaa_jatevesien_laskemisen_mereen/5747161.
Accessed 13 November 2013

Yle Uutiset. 2013. Musta maanantai: STX:n Rauman telakka lopetetaan.

http://yle.fi/uutiset/musta_maanantai_stxn_rauman_telakka_lopetetaan/6832688.
Accessed 17 December 2013

57
Attachments

Attachment 1. Passenger amounts trend on Helsinki – Tallinn route.

Blue Tallink’s market share and green Silja Line’s. (Fagerström, H. 29 Oct 2013.
300,000
+2
- 8
250,000
%
200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000

0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Tallink Comp 1 Silja Comp 3 Comp 4

58
Attachment 2. Passenger amounts trend Helsinki – Stockholm.

(Tallink Silja 2013h)

59
Attachment 3. Passenger amounts trend Turku – Stockholm.

(Tallink Silja 2013h)

60