Sumaljag v. Sps. Literato (2008)

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578 Phil. 48
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 149787, June 18, 2008 ]
JUDGE ANTONIO C. SUMALJAG, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES
DIOSDIDIT AND MENENDEZ M. LITERATO; AND MICHAELES
MAGLASANG RODRIGO, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals ("CA") dated June 26, 2001 and
its related Resolution[2] dated September 4, 2001 in CAG.R. SP No. 59712. The
assailed Decision dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Judge Antonio
C. Sumaljag (the "petitioner") in the interlocutory matter outlined below in Civil Cases
B1239 and B1281 before the trial court. The challenged Resolution denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On November 16, 1993, Josefa D. Maglasang ("Josefa") filed with the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC"), Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte a complaint[3] (docketed as Civil Case No. B
1239) for the nullity of the deed of sale of real property purportedly executed between
her as vendor and the spouses Diosdidit and Menendez Literato (the "respondent
spouses") as vendees. The complaint alleged that this deed of sale dated October 15,
1971 of Lot 1220D is spurious. Josefa was the sister of Menendez Maglasang Literato
("Menendez"). They were two (2) of the six (6) heirs who inherited equal parts of a
6.3906hectare property (Lot 1220) passed on to them by their parents Cristito and
Inecita Diano Maglasang.[4] Lot 1220D was partitioned to Josefa, while Lot 1220E was
given to Menendez.
The respondent spouses' response to the complaint was an amended answer with
counterclaim[5] denying that the deed of sale was falsified. They impleaded the
petitioner with Josefa as counterclaim defendant on the allegation that the petitioner, at
the instance of Josefa, occupied Lot 1220D and Lot 1220E without their (the
respondent spouses') authority; Lot 1220E is theirs by inheritance while 1220D had
been sold to them by Josefa. They also alleged that the petitioner acted in bad faith in
acquiring the two (2) lots because he prepared and notarized on September 26, 1986
the contract of lease over the whole of Lot 1220 between all the Maglasang heirs (but
excluding Josefa) and Vicente Tolo, with the lease running from 1986 to 1991; thus, the
petitioner then knew that Josefa no longer owned Lot 1220D.
http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/45894 1/8
Civil Case No. 1281[6] is a complaint that Menendez filed on April 4, 1996 with the RTC
for the declaration of the inexistence of lease contract, recovery of possession of land,
and damages against the petitioner and Josefa after the RTC dismissed the respondent
spouses' counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1239. The complaint alleged that Josefa, who
had previously sold Lot 1220D to Menendez, leased it, together with Lot 1220E, to the
petitioner. Menendez further averred that the petitioner and Josefa were in bad faith in
entering their contract of lease as they both knew that Josefa did not own the leased
lots. Menendez prayed, among others, that this lease contract between Josefa and the
petitioner be declared null and void.
Josefa died on May 3, 1999 during the pendency of Civil Case Nos. B1239 and B1281.
On August 13, 1999, Atty. Zenen A. Puray ("Atty. Puray") the petitioner's and Josefa's
common counsel asked the RTC in Civil Case No. 1239 that he be given an extended
period or up to September 10, 1999 within which to file a formal notice of death and
substitution of party.
The RTC granted the motion in an order dated August 13, 1999.[7] On August 26, 1999,
Atty. Puray filed with the RTC a notice of death and substitution of party, [8] praying
that Josefa in his capacity as plaintiff and third party counterclaim defendant be
substituted by the petitioner. The submission alleged that prior to Josefa's death, she
executed a Quitclaim Deed[9] over Lot 1220D in favor of Remismundo D.
Maglasang[10] who in turn sold this property to the petitioner.
Menendez, through counsel, objected to the proposed substitution, alleging that Atty.
Puray filed the notice of death and substitution of party beyond the thirtyday period
provided under Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
She recommended instead that Josefa be substituted by the latter's fullblood sister,
Michaeles Maglasang Rodrigo ("Michaeles").
The RTC denied Atty. Puray's motion for substitution and instead ordered the
appearance of Michaeles as representative of the deceased Josefa. This Order provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit and instead order the appearance of Mrs. Mechailes Maglasang
Rodrigo of Brgy. Binulho, Albuera, Leyte, as representative of the deceased
Josefa Maglasang.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The RTC subsequently denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an order[12]
dated May 25, 2000.
The petitioner went to the CA on a petition for certiorari (docketed as CAG.R. SP No.
59712) to question the above interlocutory orders. In a Decision[13] dated June 26,
2001, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court similarly
denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its Resolution[14] dated September
4, 2001.

The present petition essentially claims that the CA erred in dismissing CA G.R. No. SP
59712 since: (a) the property under litigation was no longer part of Josefa's estate
since she was no longer its owner at the time of her death; (b) the petitioner had
effectively been subrogated to the rights of Josefa over the property under litigation at
the time she died; (c) without an estate, the heir who was appointed by the lower court
no longer had any interest to represent; (d) the notice of death was seasonably
submitted by the counsel of Josefa to the RTC within the extended period granted; and
(e) the petitioner is a transferee pendente lite who the courts should recognize
pursuant to Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Court.

THE COURT'S RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The Governing Rule.
The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a
pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the
duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty
shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or
if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court
may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased,
and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased.
The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. (Emphasis ours)
The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party
to the litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is
herself or himself protected as he/she continues to be properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.[15]
Application of the Governing Rule.

a. Survival of the pending action

A question preliminary to the application of the above provision is whether Civil Case
Nos. B1239 and B1281 are actions that survive the death of Josefa. We said in
Gonzalez v. Pagcor:[16]

"The criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of a
plaintiff or petitioner was elucidated upon in Bonilla v. Barcena (71 SCRA
491 (1976). as follows:
. . . The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the
nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which
survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property
and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while
in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to
the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. . . .
Since the question involved in these cases relate to property and property rights, then
we are dealing with actions that survive so that Section 16, Rule 3 must necessarily
apply.
b. Duty of Counsel under the Rule.
The duty of counsel under the aforecited provision is to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after the death of his client of the fact of death, and to give the name and
address of the deceased's legal representative or representatives. Incidentally, this
is the only representation that counsel can undertake after the death of a client as the
fact of death terminated any further lawyerclient relationship.[17]
In the present case, it is undisputed that the counsel for Josefa did in fact notify the
lower court, although belatedly, of the fact of her death.[18] However, he did as well
inform the lower court that
"2. That before she died she executed a QUITCLAIM DEED in favor of
REMISMUNDO D. MAGLASANG over the land in question (Lot No. 1220D of
Benolho, Albuera, Leyte), evidenced by a QUITCLAIM DEED, copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex "B" who in turn sold it in favor of JUDGE ANTONIO
SUMALJAG, evidenced by a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex "C"."
Further, counsel asked that "the deceased Josefa Maglasang in her capacity as plaintiff
and as Third Party Counterclaim Defendant be substituted in the case at bar by JUDGE
ANTONIO SUMALJAG whose address is 38 Osmena Street, Ormoc City" pursuant to
"Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure".
This notification, although filed late, effectively informed the lower court of the death of
litigant Josefa Maglasang so as to free her counsel of any liability for failure to make a
report of death under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. In our view, counsel
satisfactorily explained to the lower court the circumstances of the late reporting, and
the latter in fact granted counsel an extended period. The timeliness of the report is
therefore a nonissue.

The reporting issue that goes into the core of this case is whether counsel properly
gave the court the name and address of the legal representative of the deceased that
Section 16, Rule 3 specifies. We rule that he did not. The "legal representatives" that
the provision speaks of, refer to those authorized by law the administrator, executor
or guardian[19] who, under the rule on settlement of estate of deceased persons,[20] is
constituted to take over the estate of the deceased. Section 16, Rule 3 likewise
expressly provides that "the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator . . .".
Significantly, the person now the present petitioner that counsel gave as substitute
was not one of those mentioned under Section 16, Rule 3. Rather, he is a counterclaim
codefendant of the deceased whose proferred justification for the requested
substitution is the transfer to him of the interests of the deceased in the litigation prior
to her death.

Under the circumstances, both the lower court and the CA were legally correct in not
giving effect to counsel's suggested substitute.

First, the petitioner is not one of those allowed by the Rules to be a substitute. Section
16, Rule 3 speaks for itself in this respect.

Second, as already mentioned above, the reason for the Rule is to protect all concerned
who may be affected by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and her
estate. We note in this respect that the Notice that counsel filed in fact reflects a claim
against the interest of the deceased through the transfer of her remaining interest in
the litigation to another party. Interestingly, the transfer is in favor of the very same
person who is suggested to the court as the substitute. To state the obvious, the
suggested substitution effectively brings to naught the protection that the Rules intend;
plain common sense tells us that the transferee who has his own interest to protect,
cannot at the same time represent and fully protect the interest of the deceased
transferor.

Third, counsel has every authority to manifest to the court changes in interest that
transpire in the course of litigation. Thus, counsel could have validly manifested to the
court the transfer of Josefa's interests in the subject matter of litigation pursuant to
Section 19, Rule 3.[21] But this can happen only while the clienttransferor was alive
and while the manifesting counsel was still the effective and authorized counsel for the
clienttransferor, not after the death of the client when the lawyerclient relationship
has terminated. The fact that the alleged transfer may have actually taken place is
immaterial to this conclusion, if only for the reason that it is not for counsel, after the
death of his client, to make such manifestation because he then has lost the authority
to speak for and bind his client. Thus, at most, the petitioner can be said to be a
transferee pendente lite whose status is pending with the lower court.

Lastly, a close examination of the documents attached to the records disclose that the
subject matter of the Quitclaim allegedly executed by Josefa in favor of Remismundo is
Lot 1220E, while the subject matter of the deed of sale executed by Remismundo in
the petitioner's favor is Lot 1220D. This circumstance alone raises the possibility that
there is more than meets the eye in the transactions related to this case.

c. The Heirs as Legal Representatives.

The CA correctly harked back to the plain terms of Section 16, Rule 3 in determining
who the appropriate legal representative/s should be in the absence of an executor or
administrator. The second paragraph of the Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, as amended, is clear the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator. Our decisions on this matter have been clear and unequivocal. In San
Juan, Jr. v. Cruz, this Court held:

The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals x x x that
priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the executor or
administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the
appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs
resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt
the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the
deceased, is no longer true.[22] (Emphasis ours)
We likewise said in Gochan v. Young: [23]
For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous
instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent,
even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When
no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more
reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased.
Josefa's death certificate[24] shows that she was single at the time of her death. The
records do not show that she left a will. Therefore, as correctly held by the CA, in
applying Section 16, Rule 3, her heirs are her surviving sisters (Michaelis, Maria,
Zosima, and Consolacion) and the children of her deceased sister, Lourdes (Manuel,
Cesar, Huros and Regulo) who should be her legal representatives. Menendez, although
also a sister, should be excluded for being one of the adverse parties in the cases
before the RTC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We
AFFIRM the Court of Appeals decision that the surviving heirs of the deceased Josefa
namely Michaelis M. Rodrigo; Maria M. Cecilio; Zosima D. Maglasang; Consolacion M.
Bagaw; and the children of Lourdes M. Lumapas, namely Manuel Lumapas, Cesar
Lumapas, Huros Lumapas and Regulo Maquilan should be her substitutes and are
hereby so ordered to be substituted for her in Civil Case Nos. B1239 and B1281.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing (Chairperson), Tinga, Reyes, and LeonardoDe Castro,. JJ., concur.

* Designated as additional member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 504
dated May 15, 2008.
** Designated as additional member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 505
dated May 15, 2008.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justice
Eubulo G. Verzola (deceased) and Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes; rollo, pp. 85
91.
[2] Id., p. 92.
[3] Annex "A," id., pp. 3034.
[4] In Civil Case B641 for Partition and Damages.
[5] Annex "B," rollo, pp. 3644.
[6] Annex "D," id., pp. 4854.
[7] Annex "G," id., p. 75.
[8] Annex "H," id., pp. 7677.
[9] Id., p. 79.
[10] It appears from the records that Remismundo D. Maglasang is the son of Zosima D.
Maglasang.
[11] Order dated December 16, 1990, Annex "I," rollo, pp. 8182.
[12] Annex "J," id., pp. 8384.
[13] Annex "K," id., pp. 8591.
[14] Annex "L," id., pp. 9293.
[15] Napere v. Barbarona, G.R. No. 160426, January 31, 2008, citing Heirs of Bertuldo
Hinog v. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460, 478 (2005).
[16] G.R. No. 144891, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 533.

[17] Lavina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78295, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 691;
Haberer v. CA, Nos. L42699 to L42707, May 26, 1981, 104 SCRA 540.

[18] Annex "H," rollo, p. 76.

[19] In the commentary of Justice Oscar M. Herrera (ret.) in his book Remedial Law ,
Volume 1, 2007 edition, he stated that the terms "administrator, executor, or guardian"
to whom the notice of death should be addressed under the old Rules, were deleted and
deemed included in the term "legal representative or representatives."

[20] Rule 7390 of the Rules of Court.

[21] Section 19. Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the action may
be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the
person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted I the action or joined with
the original party.

[22] San Juan, Jr. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 167321, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 410.

[23] Gochan v. Young, G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001, 354 SCRA 207.

[24] Annex "F," rollo, p. 74.

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