RP Vs. Heirs Of Felipe Alejaga Sr.

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Facts:
 December 28, 1978: Respondent Felibe Alejaga Sr. filed with the District Land
Office of Roxas City a Free Patent Application of a parcel of land. (.3899 hectares,
Roxas City)
 Efren Recio, Land Inspector, submitted the necessary report regarding the
application. (Investigation & Verification Report)
 March 14, 1979: The District Land Officer (DLO) approved the application and the
issuance of a Free Patent to the applicant. It was then forwarded to Register of
Deeds for the registration and issuance of a OCT.
 Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title and a Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 was
issued to Alejaga.
 April 4, 1979: The heirs of Ignacio Arrobang requested the Director of Lands of
Manial for the investigation of DLO (conducted by Isagani Cartagena) in Roxas for
the irregularities in the issuance of a title of a foreshore land in favor of Alejaga.
 After investigation, the Land Management Bureau of Manila requested the Director
of Lands to cancel the Free Patent and the corresponding OCT.
 In the meantime, Alejaga obtained a NACIDA loan. The loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage to PNB.
 April 18, 1990: The government through the Solicitor General instituted an action
for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against respondent
Alejaga, the PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City
covering Free Patent Application of the land. While the case was pending, Alejaga
was substituted by his heirs.
 RTC ruled against responding saying that the OCT and Patent were obtained
through fraud and misrepresentation. Hence, null and void. CA reversed RTC’s
ruling.
Issues:
1. WON there was fraud in the issuance of the OCT and Free Patent. YES
(Topic: PATENT)
2. WON the State has an imprescriptible right to cause the reversion of a piece of property
belonging to the public domain. YES
(Topic: NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTY AND DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED
LANDS)

Held:

ISSUE No. 1 PATENT:

Fraud attended the application of Free Patent

Republic (petitioner) has adduced a preponderance of evidence before the trial court,
showing manifest fraud in procuring the patent. This Court agrees with the RTC that in
obtaining a free patent over the lot under scrutiny, petitioner had resorted to
misrepresentation or fraud, signs of which were ignored by the Court of Appeals.

First reason: Issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the law
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the procedure laid
down by CA or the Public Land Act. Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the
application are true.

Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient notice to the
municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in order to give adverse claimants
the opportunity to present their claims. Note that this notice and the verification and
investigation of the parcel of land are to be conducted after an application for free patent
has been filed with the Bureau of Lands.

There was no proper investigation and verification of the application

In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.’s Application for Free Patent was dated and filed
on December 28, 1978. On the other hand, the Investigation & Verification Report
prepared by Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the District Land Office of the Bureau of
Lands of Roxas City was dated December 27, 1978.

As correctly pointed out by the trial court, investigation and verification should have been
done only after the filing of the application. Hence, it would have been highly anomalous
for Recio (Land Inspector) to conduct his own investigation and verification on December
27, 1998, a day before Felipe Alejaga Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent.

Second reason: The claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was
conducted is not sustained by the Verification & Investigation Report itself, which
bears no signature.
Their reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty31 is thus
misplaced. Since Recio’s signature does not appear on the December 27, 1978 Report,
there can be no presumption that an investigation and verification of the parcel of land
was actually conducted. Strangely, respondents do not proffer any explanation why the
Verification & Investigation Report was not signed by Recio. Even more important and as
will later on be explained, this alleged presumption of regularity -- assuming it ever existed
-- is overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner.

Third reason: The the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not
been successfully rebutted.
In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an
investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagena’s statement on
Recio’s alleged admission may be considered as "independently relevant." A witness may
testify as to the state of mind of another person -- the latter’s knowledge, belief, or good
or bad faith -- and the former’s statements may then be regarded as independently
relevant without violating the hearsay rule.

Doctrine of independently relevant statements

The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations
communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless
of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such
statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue or (b)
is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.

Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had
conducted, his testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial
court.

The Free Patent was void (The issuance of the Alejagas’ patent and title was tainted
with fraud)
There are several badges of frauds (check the list above). Thus, the free patent granted
to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void. Such fraud is a ground for impugning the validity of the
Certificate of Title. The invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the Certificate
of Title issued in consequence thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the former.

Issue No. 2: NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTY AND DEALINGS WITH

UNREGISTERED LANDS

Titles obtained by fraud and misrepresentation are not indefeasible; Patent does
not vest title it merely confirmed registrant’s existing one
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued, the land
covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property.
Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible a year after
the issuance of the latter.

However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent under the
Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrant’s already
existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.

The State may still bring an action for reversion even after the lapse of one year
Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the State -- even after the
lapse of one year -- may still bring an action for the reversion to the public domain of land
that has been fraudulently granted to private individuals. Further, this indefeasibility
cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how the title has been acquired, if
the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been committed
in securing the title.

Prohibition Against Alienation or Encumbrance

Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas’ title was validly issued, there is another basis for
the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. Section
118 of Commonwealth Act No. 14156 proscribes the encumbrance of a parcel of land
acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years from its grant. The prohibition
against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the
approval of every application.

The mortgage of the land (granted under free patent) violated Section118 of Public
Land Act
In the case at bar, Free Patent No. 335860 was approved and issued on March 14, 1979.
Corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-1561 was issued on the same date. On
August 18, 1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent, Felipe Alejaga Sr.
obtained from Respondent PNB a loan in the amount of P100,000. Despite the statement
on the title certificate itself that the land granted under the free patent shall be inalienable
for five (5) years from the grant, a real estate mortgage was nonetheless constituted on
the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-15.

Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr. falls squarely within the
term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Public Land Act. A mortgage
constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of the mortgage would
necessarily result in the auction of the property.

Reason for prohibition against encumbrance

"It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable
agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.
Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the
homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of the patent."

Mortgage over a parcel of land acquired through a free patent grant nullifies the
award and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the state
"SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or
executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one
hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one
hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution
and shall produce the effect of annulling and canceling the grant, title, patent, or permit
originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the
reversion of the property and its improvements to the State."
The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land
acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent.
Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion
of the land to the public domain.

Since Alejaga violated the condition of the free patent, the property must revert
back to the public domain
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent, within five years from its
issuance, Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not have encumbered the parcel land granted to him.
The mortgage he made over the land violated that condition. Hence, the property must
necessarily revert to the public domain, pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.

REPUBLIC VS BENJAMIN GUERRERO

G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006

FACTS:

 December 1964: Benjamin Guerrerro filed with the Bureau of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales
Application covering a parcel of land situated at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City. This application was
approved and Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued subsequent thereto.
 Angelina Bustamante later filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that Guerrero obtained
the sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission of material facts. This was
however dismissed by the Director of lands and further affirmed by then Minister of Natural
Resources.
 Through a MFR, an ocular investigation and relocation survey found out that 83 sq. m. of the titled
property of Guerrero is under actual physical possession of Marcelo Bustamante, husband of
Angeluna. Thus, upon the directive of the Office of The President, the Director of Lands instituted
a petition for the amendment of plan and technical description.
 Guerrero opposed said motion through a motion to dismiss but however was dismissed thereafter.
However, the RTC ruled in favor of Guerrero stating that the Republic failed to prove its allegation
that Guerrero obtained the sales patent and certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation.
RTC also ruled that the original certificate of title in the name of Guerrero acquired the
characteristics of indefeasibility after the expiration of 1 year from the entry of the decree of
registration. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the Republic has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Guerrero procured
Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT through fraud and misrepresentation.
2. W/N Guerrero’s title acquired the characteristic of indefeasibility.

HELD:

1. NO.
the property in question, while once part of the lands of the public domain and disposed of via a
miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were
brought under the operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903.
Under the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue an official certificate of title
to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such
liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.

Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes registered land. Time
and again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of
the person whose name appears thereon.

However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an action
to reopen or revise a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud. However, the Republic in this case
failed to prove that there is actual and extrinsic fraud to justify a review of the decree. It has not adduced
adequate evidence that would show that respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the
patent and the corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented
from asserting its right over the lot in question and from properly presenting its case by reason of such
fraud.

2. YES. Guerrero’s title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was vested with th
garment of indefeasibility.
NB: The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not
run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is
worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have
to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The government,
recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued
thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.

While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of registration of titles to lands,
justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or
negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third
persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the
legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise
subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and
inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.

G.R. No. L-28917 September 30, 1971

CARLOS S. GABILA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FLORENCIO BARRIGA, defendant-appellee.

Isidro & Isidro Law Office for plaintiff-appellant.

Cirilo A. Goc-ong for defendant-appellee.

VILLAMOR, J.:
From the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao in its Civil Case No. 4911 dismissing his
complaint, the plaintiff has appealed directly to this Court.

On December 18, 1965, Carlos S. Gabila filed a complaint against Florencio Barriga, which he
amended on July 26, 1967, primarily to include the Director of lands as co-plaintiff. In the amended
complaint it is alleged: .

(a) that from 1935 to 1953, Daniel Perez and Anacleta N. Perez, plaintiff Gabila's predecessors-in-
interest, were in lawful, continuous, open, adverse, public and uninterrupted possession and
occupation of two parcels of land situated in Bunawan, Davao City, known as Lots 1 and 2, Fis-
10887-D of District Land Office No. 20, Davao City, introducing on Lot 2 improvements consisting,
among others, of a fishpond, banana plants and coconut trees most of which were already fruit-
bearing;

(b) that since April 21, 1953, when Anacleta N. Perez died, plaintiff's wife, Leonarda F. Gabila, has
continued the occupation of the two aforementioned lots which, being a foreshore area bordering on
river banks, are not disposable;

(c) that a portion of Lot 2 occupied and cultivated by plaintiff Gabila, containing an area of
approximately five hectares, was surreptitiously and fraudulently surveyed and included in a sales
application filed by the defendant with the Bureau of Lands;

(d) that through fraud and misrepresentation the defendant succeeded in securing in his name
Original Certificate of Title No. P-1747 which included that portion of Lot 2;

(e) that to conceal the fraudulent manner in which he secured his title, the defendant destroyed
plaintiff's fishpond improvements, thereby erasing old land marks;

(f) that the defendant misled the Bureau of Lands into believing that the area applied for by him and
subsequently titled in his name could be legally alienated and disposed of by the said bureau, when
in truth the same, being foreshore land, could only be the subject of lease;

(g) that in the event of cancellation of the defendant's title, the parcel of land covered thereby would
revert to the Bureau of Lands;

(h) that the defendant has never attempted to eject plaintiff Gabila from the portion of Lot 2 occupied
by the latter;

(i) that plaintiff Gabila did not have the opportunity to be heard in the proceedings leading to the
issuance of the defendant's title;

(j) that due to the defendant's fraudulent acts and misrepresentation, plaintiff was unlawfully deprived
of that portion of Lot 2 occupied and cultivated by him, as well as of the improvements thereon; and

(k) that since the date of entry of the decree of registration awarding a certificate of title in
defendant's favor on December 18, 1964, no rights of an innocent purchaser for value have
supervened.

The complaint prayed that the decree of registration and the title issued in the defendant's name be
cancelled and/or amended with respect to the portion actually and continuously occupied and
cultivated by plaintiff Gabila, and that the said plaintiff be granted such other relief as the court might
deem just and equitable in the premises.

On December 8, 1967, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the
grounds that the action being one for cancellation of a free patent and of the certificate of title issued
on the basis thereof, the Government, through the Solicitor General — not a private individual like
plaintiff Gabila — was the real party in interest; and that although the Director of Lands was included
as party plaintiff, the complaint was signed by a lawyer representing only plaintiff Gabila, without any
showing as to who was appearing for and in behalf of the Director of Lands, who — by the way —
was not shown to have been authorized by the Solicitor General to enter the case as plaintiff; thus,
the said Director of Lands was without legal capacity to sue. Plaintiff Gabila opposed the motion.

The parties were heard on the motion to dismiss. On February 9, 1968, the court below granted the
motion for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The court was of the opinion that while the
Director of Lands was included as a party plaintiff, there was no showing in the complaint that he
was being represented by an authorized agent or representative; hence, actually, the only plaintiff in
the case was Carlos S. Gabila who, however, had neither legal competence nor interest to sue the
defendant for cancellation of the latter's title. According to the trial court, the real party in interest was
the Republic of the Philippines, which is the only entity that can, legally maintain thru the Solicitor
General — an action to cancel a title issued by virtue of a land patent, considering especially, as the
court said, that the defendant's title has already become indefeasible.

The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated on Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules
of Court, i.e., failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, for it alleges in paragraph 12 thereof
that the plaintiff admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the
defendant's title, because, even if the said title were cancelled or amended, the ownership of the
land embraced therein, or of the portion thereof affected by the amendment, would revert to the
public domain. In his amended complaint the plaintiff makes no pretense at all that any part of the
land covered by the defendant's title was privately owned by him or by his predecessors-in-interest.
Indeed, it is admitted therein that the said land was at all times a part of the public domain until
December 18, 1964, when the government issued a title thereon in favor of the defendant. Thus, if
there is any person or entity to relief, it can only be the government.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff's own averments negate the existence of such a right, for it would
appear therefrom that whatever right might have been violated by the defendant belonged to the
government, not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant argues that although his complaint is captioned as
one for cancellation of title, he has nevertheless stated therein several causes of action based on his
alleged rights of possession and ownership over the improvements, on defendant-appellee's alleged
fraudulent acquisition of the land, and on the damages allegedly incurred by him (plaintiff-appellant)
in relation to the improvements. These matters are merely ancillary to the central issue of whether or
not defendant-appellee's title should be cancelled or amended, and they may not be leaned upon in
an effort to make out a cause of action in relation to the said focal issue. Indeed, the principal relief
prayed for in the amended complaint is the cancellation or amendment of defendant-appellee's title.

While it is true that the amended complaint has included the Director of Lands as a party plaintiff, the
said government official is a plaintiff only in name. The amended complaint is signed by a lawyer
admittedly representing only plaintiff Carlos S. Gabila. The Solicitor General or his representative, or
anyone else for that matter, has not represented the Director of Lands at any stage of the case.
Consequently, it would appear that the inclusion of the Director of Lands in the amended complaint
without his knowledge or consent was but an afterthought of plaintiff Gabila engendered by his
correct belief that the nature of the suit he wanted to file called for the inclusion of the government as
a party to the case.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. The records of this case are ordered
returned to the court of origin where the party interested should formally implead the Director of
Lands, with notice to the solicitor General, subject to the terms and conditions which the trial court
may impose, with the understanding that if the aforementioned official is not impleaded, this case
shall be dismissed. No special pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 163610 September 27, 2010

HEIRS OF ENRIQUE TORING, represented herein by MORIE TORING, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF TEODOSIA BOQUILAGA, represented herein by PAULINO CADLAWON, CRISPIN
ALBURO, VIVENCIO GOMEZ, EDUARDO CONCUERA and PONCIANO NAILON, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

For review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the Decision1 dated
July 11, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70432 which affirmed the
Decision2 dated January 27, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61
dismissing Civil Case No. BOGO-00105 except as to the land covered by reconstituted Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3989 (T-16805) in the name of Enrique Toring, and the Resolution
dated April 5, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The case antecedents:

On October 10, 1996, the heirs of Enrique Toring (petitioners) filed before the trial court a petition for
"production, delivery, surrender of documents, annulment of document" against the heirs of
Teodosia Boquilaga (respondents). The petition was subsequently amended to include as
defendants Attys. Joseph Bernaldez, Earvin Estandarte and Marlo Cugtas.

Petitioners alleged the following:

3. During the lifetime of the late Teodosia Boquilaga, and more particularly on June 3, 1927,
said Teodosia Boquilaga sold to Enrique Toring now deceased, parcels of land for a
consideration of Five Hundred and Eleven Pesos (P511.00), and particularly described as
follows:

"Lot No. 1835, Cadastral Case No. 7, Cadastral Record No. 442, Decree No. 230740, with
Original Certificate of Title No. 13720"

"Lot No. 2248, Cadastral Case No. 7, Cad. Record No. 442 Decree No. 231111, Original
Certificate of Title No. 14057"

"Lot No. 2249, Cadastral Case No. 7, Cadastral Record No. 442, Decree No. 23112 (sic)
[231112], Certificate of Title No. 14167"

"Lot No. 1834, Cadastral Case No. 7, Cadastral Record No. 442 Decree No. 230739,
Original Certificate of [Title] No. 13719"
 These voluntary dealings of the above described parcels of land is (sic) evidenced by a deed
of absolute sale written in Spanish, hereto attach[ed] as annex "A";

4. This deed of absolute sale was duly registered with the [Register] of Deeds, and the fees
for the registration were duly paid. Thereafter, new Transfer [Certificates] of [Title] were
issued by the Office of the [Register] of Deeds in the Province of Cebu, for all the parcels of
land, in the name [of] Enrique Toring, and attached as annex "B" and made [an] integral part
of this petition;

5. That from the issuance of [Transfer Certificates] of Title, particularly August 20, 1927,
plaintiffs have been in possession and religiously paid the real taxes due on said described
lots, and collecting the proceeds of the fruits of the land. However, during World War II, the
canceled Original Certificate in the name of Teodosia [Boquilaga], and the Transfer
[Certificates] of [Title] in the name of Enrique Toring in the books of the Register of Deeds
were destroyed;

6. That lately, while plaintiffs exercising their right of ownership over these parcels of land,
defendants refused to share the proceeds and fruits of land on the reason that they owned
the land. The matter was referred to the Office of the Barangay Captain, and in a conference,
defendants presented Original Certificates of Title. Surprised by these Original [Certificates]
of [Title], plaintiffs made verification from the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, and
from the Regional Trial Court Branch 16, Cebu City, and discovered that defendants
representing the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga filed a petition for reconstitution of title, and
succeeded in having the original certificates of title reconstituted covering the four parcels of
land in the name of Teodosia [Boquilaga]. The petition, the decision, the reconstituted titles,
and the certification to file action are hereto attached as annexes "C", "D", "E", and "F" and
as part and parcel of this petition;

7. Plaintiffs were never served any notice of the petition for reconstitution of the Original
Certificates because the persons alleged in the petition as the actual possessor, or the
adjacent lot owner alleged in the petition have long been dead, thus resulting into the
success of the petition, and the failure of plaintiffs to interpose their opposition;

8. Meanwhile, in an earlier date, lot no. 1834 was reconstituted and new Certificate of Title
was issued in the name of Enrique Toring attached hereto as annex "G", and as a part of this
petition;

9. For the services rendered by the [law] office in the reconstitution of the original certificate
of titles, lot 1835 was transferred in the name of defendants Attorneys Joseph Bernaldez,
Ervin B. Estandarte, and Marlo Cugtas under transfer certificate of title no. 97615, attached
and made an integral part of this petition as annex "H";

10. Under P.D. 1529, registration is the operative act that conveys and affects the land, and
that there is a need by plaintiffs to confirm the operative act made in the year 1927, and thus
intend to register the sale with the Register of Deeds;

11. It is imperative for plaintiffs to take hold of the reconstituted Original [Certificates] of [Title]
and the Transfer Certificates of Title 97615 now in possession with defendants to register
and confirm the sale made in the year 1927, which documents are unjustifiably withheld by
defendants;

x x x x3 (Italics supplied.)
Petitioners thus sought the issuance of an order directing the defendants to deliver, produce and
surrender the reconstituted Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) (RO-13240, RO-13238 and RO-
13239) and TCT No. 97615. Should the defendants refuse to deliver the said titles, it is prayed that
the court (a) declare OCT Nos. RO-13240, RO-13238 and RO-13239 and TCT No. 97615 null and
void; (b) direct the Register of Deeds to cancel said titles and in lieu thereof issue new TCTs in the
name of Enrique Toring; and (c) declare OCT No. 13237 null and void for being cancelled by TCT
No. RT-3989.4

In their Answer with Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses, defendants denied petitioners’ allegations
and asserted that it was the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga who have been in possession of the land
since time immemorial, enjoying the fruits thereof and paying the taxes due thereon as evidenced by
tax receipts issued for the years 1992 to 1995. They likewise denied "for want of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth x x x relative to the original certificate of title in
the name of Teodosia Boquilaga which was cancelled and the transfer certificate of title in the name
of Enrique Toring were destroyed in the advent of the second world war." Prior to the reconstitution
by defendants, it was verified from the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu and the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) that no such titles were issued covering the subject lots; petitioners
have yet to register their alleged deed of sale but that is now not proper. Defendants averred that Lot
Nos. 1834, 2248 and 2249 rightfully belong to the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga, while the lot covered
by TCT No. 97615 (Lot No. 1835) was acquired by Attys. Bernaldez, Estandarte and Cugtas in good
faith and in consideration of services rendered, hence acquired by innocent third persons in good
faith and for value. As special and affirmative defenses, defendants contended that the RTC has no
jurisdiction in this case since the assessed value of the properties involved does not exceed
₱20,000.00, and that petitioners are guilty of laches for failing to act and take corrective measures
with the Register of Deeds for sixty-nine (69) years on the alleged destruction of the documents.5

The parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of position papers,
memoranda/comment and other documentary evidence in support of their respective claims.

On January 27, 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision dismissing the case on the ground that it
cannot interfere with or render null and void the decision made by a co-equal and coordinate branch
of the court which ordered the reconstitution of the OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga. Under
the circumstances, petitioners’ owner’s duplicate certificates of title in the name of Enrique Toring
are deemed "overtaken by the reconstituted title[s]." Further, the trial court found petitioners guilty of
laches in not reconstituting the original TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring and in not making any
opposition to the reconstitution proceedings filed by the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga. However, it
was declared that the dismissal of the case will not affect the reconstituted TCT No. RT-3989 in the
name of Enrique Toring.6

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that the
action is one for the annulment of the order of the court which granted reconstitution, when in truth
the petitioners merely sought the delivery of the owner’s duplicate copies of the reconstituted OCTs.
They also faulted the trial court in failing to consider that the defendants’ predecessor-in-interest had
long ago sold the lots to Enrique Toring, which document of sale defendants have not denied, and
therefore defendant-heirs are no longer owners. Petitioners further assailed the trial court in finding
them guilty of laches despite recognizing the existence of the owner’s duplicate of TCTs in the name
of Enrique Toring; the submission by the petitioners of annexes in their Comment/Reply to
defendants’ memorandum showing that there were previous cases wherein petitioners have
asserted and defended their right over the subject properties and prevailed; and the fact that the
OCTs were reconstituted by defendants only in 1995 and the petitioners instituted this case in 1996.7
By Decision dated July 11, 2003, the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s ruling. It
held that apart from the bare assertion that their predecessor-in-interest, Enrique Toring, purchased
the subject lands from Teodosia Boquilaga for which TCTs in his name were issued but were lost
during the last world war, petitioners have not established any right over the subject lands, and
hence the reconstituted OCTs stand as strong evidence of ownership by the heirs of Teodosia
Boquilaga. The appellate court likewise upheld the trial court’s finding that petitioners were guilty of
laches, citing their unexplained failure or neglect to have the alleged lost or destroyed TCTs
reconstituted for more than fifty (50) years which weighs heavily against their claim and even
bolsters the defendants-appellees’ claim that no such titles really exist.8

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the CA denied the same in its
Resolution9 dated April 5, 2004.

Petitioners submit the following arguments in this petition for review on certiorari:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND DISREGARDED CONCLUSIVE

EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS WERE ALREADY SOLD AS
EARLY AS JUNE 3, 1927 BY TEODOSIA BOQUILAGA, RESPONDENTS’
PREDECESSOR, TO ENRIQUE TORING, PETITIONERS’ PREDECESSOR, AS
EVIDENCED BY THE ANCIENT DEED OF SALE IN SPANISH LANGUAGE DATED JUNE
3, 1927 – WHICH EVIDENCE, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE CHANGED
THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND DISREGARDED CONCLUSIVE

EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF
THE ORIGINAL OWNERS’ DUPLICATE TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN THE
NAME OF ENRIQUE TORING WHICH ARE GOOD PROOF OF PETITIONERS’
OWNERSHIP OF SUBJECT LANDS - WHICH EVIDENCE, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
WOULD HAVE ALTERED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE TITLES THAT
PETITIONERS HAD RECONSTITUTED WERE THE CANCELLED ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN THE NAME OF TEODOSIA BOQUILAGA WHICH DO NOT
PROVE OWNERSHIP OF THE LANDS BECAUSE THEY WERE ALREADY CANCELLED
BY ENRIQUE TORING’S TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES

JUST BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO RECONSTITUTE TORING’S ORIGINAL TRANSFER
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE ON FILE IN THE RECORDS OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS, IT
APPEARING THAT THEY AND THEIR PREDECESSOR HAVE BEEN IN ACTUAL
POSSESSION OF THE LAND SINCE 1927 AND ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE ORIGINAL
OWNER’S DUPLICATE TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN THE NAME OF THEIR
PREDECESSOR, ENRIQUE TORING.
 V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
THAT THE COMPLAINT/PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH THE TRIAL COURT
WAS TANTAMOUNT TO AN ACTION TO ASSAIL THE DECISION OF A CO-EQUAL
COURT, IT APPEARING THAT THE SAID COMPLAINT/PETITION WAS MERELY TO
COMPEL DELIVERY OR SURRENDER BY RESPONDENTS OF THE RECONSTITUTED
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE.10

The issues raised are purely questions of fact that this Court cannot review in a petition filed
under Rule 45. Ultimately, we are asked to determine the ownership of the subject lots originally
registered in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest.

The CA declared that petitioners failed to establish any right over the lots other than their bare
assertion that their predecessor-in-interest purchased these properties from Teodosia Boquilaga and
subsequently titles in his name were issued but were lost during the last world war. It agreed with the
trial court in finding that whatever claim petitioners have on the subject properties was lost by their
unexplained neglect for more than fifty (50) years since the destruction of the records in the registry
of deeds during the last world war, under the principle of laches. As to the nature of the action filed
by petitioners, the CA likewise affirmed the trial court’s ruling that it is one for annulment of the
reconstituted title, which essentially assails the judgment or order of a co-equal court.

As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the CA, are
conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.11 There are recognized
exceptions to this rule, among which are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations. surmises
or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
(7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the
findings of the CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to
the admissions of both parties.12

In the case at bar, the records showed that the original petition was filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Bogo-San Remigio, Cebu but was subsequently transferred to the RTC on motion of the
petitioners. TCT Nos. 16802, 16803, 16804 and RT-3989 (T-16805) were attached to the petition
together with annexes "A", "C" to "G" mentioned therein.13 However, upon elevation to the CA, the
records transmitted had missing pages, including the pages subsequent to the original petition
where copies of the aforesaid TCTs should have been attached.14 At any rate, there appears to be
no indication from the pleadings filed and orders/decision issued by the trial court throughout the
proceedings that such documentary evidence was not submitted by petitioners. Hence, the CA could
have been misled by the absence of these annexes from the records transmitted on appeal.
Petitioners submitted to this Court the photocopies of TCT Nos. 16802, 16803 and 16804 certified as
true copy from the records by the RTC of Bogo, Branch 61 Clerk of Court VI Atty. Rey Dadula
Caayon.15

TCT Nos. 16802, 16803 and 16804 in the name of Enrique Toring clearly indicate the corresponding
lots and Original Certificates of Title from which each title was derived, the dates of issuance of such
OCTs, as well as Cadastral Case Decree Numbers of the original registration, correspond to the
recitals in the Escritura de Venta Absoluta pertaining to the properties being conveyed by Teodosia
Boquilaga (TCT No. 1680216 which is a transfer from OCT No. 13720 issued on November 22, 1926
covering Lot 1835 pursuant to Decree No. 230740; TCT No. 1680317 which is a transfer from OCT
No. 14057 issued on November 29, 1926 covering Lot 2248 pursuant to Decree No. 231111; and
TCT No. 1680418 which is a transfer from OCT No. 14167 issued on November 29, 1926 covering
Lot 2249 pursuant to Decree No. 231112). As to Lot 1834, the reconstituted title TCT No. RT-3989
(T-16805)19 also in the name of Enrique Toring likewise shows on its face that the lot covered
thereby (Lot 1834) was originally registered on November 22, 1926 pursuant to Decree No. 230739
in Cad Rec. No. 442 under OCT No. O-13719, which again corresponds to the recitals of the
aforesaid document of sale executed by respondents’ predecessor-in-interest. It must be noted that
petitioners presented before the trial court the owner’s duplicate copies of the said TCTs in the name
of Enrique Toring. Indeed, had these pieces of evidence been duly considered on appeal, the
resolution of the issue of ownership would have tilted in petitioners’ favor.

But first, we resolve the issue of the propriety of the suit filed by the petitioners. The nature of an
action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought by plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action was filed irrespective of whether he is
entitled to all or only some of such relief.20 As gleaned from the averments of the petition filed before
the trial court, though captioned as for delivery or production of documents and annulment of
document, petitioners’ action was really for quieting of title and cancellation of reconstituted titles.

Petitioners had prayed for the following reliefs before the trial court:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that an order be issued;

a. Directing defendants to deliver, produce, and surrender Original [Certificates] of Title Nos.
RO- 13240, 13238, 13239, and Transfer Certificate of Title [No.] 97615 to plaintiffs, and
should defendants refuse to surrender these documents, to declare Original Certificate of
Titles Nos. – RO- 13238, 13239, 13240, and Transfer Certificate of Title 97615 null and void,
and directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, to cancel said Original
Certificates of Title, and Transfer Certificate of Title and in lieu thereof issue new Transfer
Certificates of Title in the name of Enrique Toring;

b. Declare as null and void Original Certificate of Title 13237, being canceled by Transfer
Certificate of Title RT-3989;

c. Directing defendants heirs of Teodosia [Boquilaga] to pay P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Plaintiffs, pray for other remedies just and equitable applicable to their case, pertinent with law and
equity.21

Petitioners contend that the delivery of the reconstituted OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga
was necessary to confirm and register the 1927 sale in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Enrique
Toring. It appears that the remedy contemplated is a petition for surrender of withheld owner’s
duplicate certificates provided in Section 107 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.

SECTION 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. -- Where it is necessary to issue a new
certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the registered
owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of
the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the
party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds.
The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate
certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon
such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of
the court, or if [for] any reason the outstanding owner’s duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the
court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu
thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (Emphasis supplied.)

However, petitioners themselves alleged that the 1927 sale had long been duly registered -- OCT
Nos. 1379, 14167, 14057 and 13720 in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga covering Cadastral Lot
Nos. 1834, 2249, 2248 and 1835, respectively, as mentioned in the Escritura de Venta
Absoluta22 dated June 3, 1927, were cancelled and in lieu thereof TCTs have been issued in the
name of Enrique Toring on August 20, 1927. Their predecessor-in-interest having already
succeeded in registering the deed of sale as early as 1927, it is clear that the procedure under
Section 107 of P.D. No. 1529 is inapplicable.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty
with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure "…
an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is
invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from
any danger of hostile claim."23 In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper
places, and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the
one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of
doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce the improvements he
may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit.24

In alleging that petitioners were not served any notice as actual possessors or adjacent owners of
the petition for reconstitution (Cad Case No. 7, Cad. Rec. No. 442, Decree Nos. 230739, 230740,
231111 and 231112) filed by the respondents for reconstitution of OCTs in the name of Teodosia
Boquilaga which was granted by the court; and that the said OCTs have already been cancelled by
the issuance of TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring by virtue of a deed of sale executed in 1927 by
Teodosia Boquilaga – petitioners did not just seek to remove any doubt or uncertainty in the title of
their predecessor-in-interest over the subject real properties, but also claimed irregularity and
defects in the reconstitution proceedings which resulted in the issuance of reconstituted OCT Nos.
RO-13237, RO-13238, RO-13239 and RO-13240 in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga.

The governing law for judicial reconstitution of titles is Republic Act No. 26. Based on the provisions
of said law, the following must be present for an order for reconstitution to issue: (a) that the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are
sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the
petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of
title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and
boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.25 If indeed, as petitioners claimed, the OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga
were already cancelled and new TCTs have already been issued in the name of Enrique Toring as
early as 1927, then the reconstituted OCT Nos. RO-13237, RO-13238, RO-13239 and RO-13240
issued in Cad Case No. 7, Cad Rec. No. 442 are null and void.

It may also be noted that the petition for reconstitution filed by respondents and the Certifications
issued by the LRA stated only the registration decree numbers issued in favor of Teodosia
Boquilaga without mentioning the numbers of the OCTs and dates of their issuance.26 The
reconstituted OCTs on their face contained no entry whatsoever as to the number of the OCT issued
pursuant to the decrees of registration, nor the date of its issuance. We have held that such absence
of any document, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate of title and date when
the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of a petition for
reconstitution.27 Moreover, notice of hearing of the petition for reconstitution of title must be served
on the actual possessors of the property. Notice thereof by publication is insufficient. Jurisprudence
is to the effect settled that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the
land involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition.28

The decision granting the petition for reconstitution filed by the respondents was promulgated on
May 9, 1996. There is no allegation or proof that petitioners availed of the remedies of appeal,
petition for relief, certiorari or annulment of judgment before the CA questioning the validity of the
said reconstitution order.

Notwithstanding petitioners’ failure to avail of the afore-mentioned remedies, the decision in the
reconstitution case is not a bar to the adjudication of the issue of ownership raised in the present
case. The nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings is the restoration of an instrument or the
reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in
its original form and condition. Its purpose is to have the title reproduced after proper proceedings in
the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred and not to pass upon the ownership
of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.29

We explained in the case of Heirs of Susana De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals30 that:

[I]n x x x reconstitution under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 and R.A. No. 26, the nature of the action
denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition. The purpose of the action is merely to have the same reproduced, after
proper proceedings, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred, and does not
pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. It bears stressing at this
point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the
Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in
a separate suit, which is exactly what the private respondents did when they filed Civil Case No. 95-
3577 ["Quieting of Title and Nullification and Cancellation of Title"] before Branch 74. The trial court
will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the
issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)

After a careful review, we hold that petitioners have satisfactorily established their claim of
ownership over the subject lots by preponderance of evidence. The existence and due execution of
the Escritura de Venta Absoluta was never disputed by the respondents. Petitioners’ documentary
evidence showed that the registration fees for the transfer of the lots mentioned in the said deed of
absolute sale was duly paid, resulting in the issuance of TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring.
Thereafter, petitioners took possession of the land, sharing in the fruits thereof and paying the realty
taxes due on the lands.31 While the original owner’s duplicate TCTs were in the possession of
petitioners, the original transfer certificates of title on file with the registry of deeds were lost or
destroyed during the last world war. Petitioners were also able to judicially reconstitute TCT No. T-
16805 (RT-3989) on November 11, 1994, as per the annotation thereon.32

On the other hand, respondents have not adduced competent evidence other than the reconstituted
OCTs in their possession. The tax receipts presented revealed that they belatedly paid real estate
taxes in 1995 (for the years 1992 to 1995),33 which weakens their claim of possession since time
immemorial. While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet,
when coupled with proof of actual possession, tax declarations and receipts are strong evidence of
ownership.34 And even assuming that respondents are indeed occupying the lands or portions
thereof, it is not clear whether they occupy or possess the same as owners or tenants.

Clearly, the trial and appellate courts seriously erred in disregarding material evidence strongly
supporting petitioners’ claim of ownership of the disputed lots. There is likewise no basis for the
conclusion that laches had set in, as to defeat the right of the petitioners to assert their claim over
the subject properties.

Laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.35 This equitable defense is based upon grounds of
public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society. Indeed,
while it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may
lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.36 In this case,
however, laches cannot be appreciated in respondents’ favor.

It should be stressed that laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. The following
elements must be present in order to constitute laches:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;

(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or
notice, of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and

(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or
the suit is not held to be barred.37

Only the first element was present in this case, which occurred from the moment respondents
refused to give petitioners’ share in the fruits and proceeds of the land, claiming that they are owners
thereof. In the ensuing barangay proceedings, respondents presented the reconstituted OCTs
prompting petitioners to verify with the office of the registry of deeds. It was only then that petitioners
discovered that respondents indeed filed a petition for judicial reconstitution. There being no
personal notice to them as actual possessors or adjacent lot owners, petitioners never had the
opportunity to file their opposition. The order of reconstitution was issued in May 1996. Petitioners’
filing of the present suit for the delivery and cancellation of said reconstituted OCTs in the
possession of respondents on October 20, 1996, after the lapse of only five months, cannot be
considered as unreasonable delay amounting to laches.

Additionally, petitioners showed that they were never amiss in asserting their rights over the subject
lots whenever any incident threatened their peaceful possession and ownership. They attached as
annexes to the Comment/Reply dated September 4, 1997, copies of the judgment rendered in a
criminal case for qualified theft filed against one Genaro Amoro Regala (Crim. Case No. CU-2312)
and Orders issued in Civil Case No. B-571 and CAR Case No. 1197. In these instances, the courts
have recognized petitioners’ ownership of the lands involved.38

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 11, 2003 and Resolution dated
April 5, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70432 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioners Heirs of Enrique Toring are hereby declared the lawful owners of Lot Nos. 1834,
1835, 2248 and 2249 (Cad. Case No. 7, Cad. Rec. No. 442, Decree Nos. 230739, 230740, 231111
and 231112) situated in Bogo, Cebu.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.