VINUYA VS. SEC.

ROMULO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
MALAYA LOLAS Case

FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid
to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim
against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the
Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already
been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to
espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the
bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support
programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan.

RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’
claims against Japan.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

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One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a
foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case,
the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in
the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war.
He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our
relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would
mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s
conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against
Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether
further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the
individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect
for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is
its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected,
they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining
redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the
Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes
is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

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The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the
community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole,
and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus
cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international
norms of equivalent authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

People vs Guillen
G.R. No. 191756. November 25, 2013

FACTS:
On or about May 20, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, by entering the room of "AAA",4
poking a balisong at her neck, forcing her to lie down on the floor, pressing her with his thighs and removing her duster and panty and thereafter pulling
down his brief and shorts, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously [insert] his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having carnal knowledge
of "AAA" against the latter’s will and consent, thereby gravely endangering her growth and development to the damage and prejudice of the said "AAA”

"AAA" immediately went out and sought assistance from her sister-in-law. After being told of the incident, "AAA’s" sister-in-law contacted the police. When
the responding police officers arrived, appellant, who was readily identified by "AAA" since he was her neighbor, was immediately arrested.
The Medico-Legal Report issued by Dra. Soliman shows that private complainant’s hymen had "deep healed laceration at 7 o’clock position;" positive for
spermatozoa; and that there was "evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination.
Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he had a drinking spree at Galas, Quezon City and went home to Sampaloc, Manila at around 1:00
o’clock in the morning of May 20, 2002. He surmised that "AAA" filed the charge against him because of his prior altercation with "AAA’s" husband.

The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the felony of RAPE and pursuant to law, he is sentenced to suffer a prison term of
reclusion perpetua and to pay moral and exemplary damages.

The BJMP of the Manila City Jail was ordered to commit the accused to the National Bilibid Prison without unnecessary delay.

Appellant claims that the trial court gravely erred when it deemed his silence at the police station immediately after his arrest as an implied admission of
guilt. He also argues that aside from being incredible, "AAA’s" testimony is insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, he insists
that "AAA’s" healed lacerations do not prove that he indeed raped "AAA."
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the trial court in its Orderdated June 13, 2008. After the filing of the parties’
briefs, the CA rendered its Decision. the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the trial court dated June 10, 2008 is AFFIRMED.

ISSUE:

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Won the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of rape despite the prosecution’s failure to overthrow the constitutional presumption of
innocence in his favor.

RULING: NO.

The appeal lacks merit.

Indeed, records show that appellant remained silent and passive despite being confronted by "AAA" with the rape charge at the police station immediately
after his arrest. Owing to the complaint of the victim, the accused was apprehended by responding police officer[s] of the Sampaloc Police Station. At the
police precinct, the accused was presented to the victim and [he] was positively identified as the person who raped her. At this juncture, the accused after he
was positively identified as the malefactor who sexually molested and raped the victim x x x just [remained] SILENT. In other words, he did not DENY the
accusation lodged against him by the victim much less register any vehement PROTEST at the station.

The aforesaid blatant FAILURE of the accused to deny victim’s complaint against him is equivalent to an IMPLIED ADMISSION of guilt. Assuming arguendo that
he is innocent of the accusation filed against him, he should have stood firm in his contention that he didn’t rape/abuse the victim and should have stressed
at the police station that on the date and time of the incident he was having a drinking spree with his friends.

A person who is accused of a felony/offense which he did not commit should be as BOLD and FEROCIOUS as a LION in protecting the trampled rights as an
innocent person.

Appellant claims that his silence should not be used against him as he was just exercising his constitutional right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence
should not be taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state that appellant’s silence should be deemed as implied admission of
guilt. In fact, this right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel and any admission obtained in violation of this rule shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

It should be borne in mind that when appellant was brought to the police station, he was already a suspect to the crime of rape. As such, he was already
under custodial investigation. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides, viz:
“Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.” These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

SC we agreed with the Decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape. The trial court’s Decision convicting
appellant of rape was anchored not solely on his silence and so-called implied admission. More importantly, it was based on the testimony of "AAA" which,
standing alone, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code specifically provides that rape may be committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through
force, threats or intimidation.

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Appellant could only offer alibi and denial as his defenses. Aside from claiming that he was at Galas, Quezon City when the rape incident happened, he failed
to submit any proof to show that it is physically impossible for him to be at Sampaloc, Manila where and when the rape happened. Besides, appellant’s alibi
crumbles in the face of his apprehension near the scene of the crime immediately after "AAA" reported the incident to the police authorities.

The SC was not persuaded by appellant’s contention that he could not have raped "AAA" inside her room as the discovery of the crime would have been
more likely considering its proximity to the room of "AAA’s" sister-in-law. Jurisprudence teaches us that rape may be committed even in places where people
congregate. Thus, it is not impossible or unlikely that rape is perpetrated inside a room adjacent to a room occupied by other persons, as in this case.

Likewise, the failure of "AAA" to shout for help should not be taken against her. People react differently when confronted with a shocking or startling
situation. Some may show aggressive resistance while others may opt to remain passive. The failure of "AAA" to shout for help and seek assistance should
not be construed as consent, or as voluntarily engaging in an illicit relationship with the appellant, as implied by the defense. It would be recalled that
appellant poked a knife at "AAA’s" neck. Such threat of immediate danger to her life cowed "AAA" to submit to the carnal desires of the appellant. However,
immediately after appellant left, "AAA" lost no time in seeking the help of her sister-in-law and in reporting the incident to the police authorities. In fact, the
police authorities were able to apprehend appellant because "AAA" immediately reported the incident to them.

Anent appellant’s contention that "AAA’s" healed hymenal laceration does not prove rape, we find the same irrelevant and immaterial. Hymenal laceration,
whether fresh or healed, is not an element of the crime of rape. Even a medical examination is not necessary as it is merely corroborative. As mentioned
before, the fact of rape in this case was satisfactorily established by the testimony of "AAA" alone.

All the elements of rape having been established beyond reasonable doubt, both the trial court and the CA properly found appellant guilty as charged and
correctly imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Thus, the appellant was guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.

Carter v Canada
2015 SCC 5

In a momentous decision released February 6, 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Canadian Criminal Code prohibitions on voluntary
euthanasia (section 14) and assisted suicide (section 241(b)) violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Physician-assisted death will be legal in
Canada within 12 months.

The Supreme Court’s decision was based on the following factual conclusions drawn by the Trial Judge at the BC Supreme Court, following an exhaustive
review of empirical and expert evidence. Justice Lynn Smith found (and the Supreme Court accepted) that: “it was feasible for properly qualified and
experienced physicians to reliably assess patient competence and voluntariness, that coercion, undue influence, and ambivalence could all be reliably
assessed as part of that process.”

Further, with respect to slippery slopes and abuse of the vulnerable, Justice Smith found (and the Supreme court accepted) that there was: “no evidence
from permissive regimes that people with disabilities are at heightened risk of accessing physician-assisted dying;” “no evidence of inordinate impact on
socially vulnerable populations in permissive jurisdictions;” and “no compelling evidence that a permissive regime in Canada would result in a ‘practical
slippery slope.’”
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Ruling:
The Supreme Court’s decision turned on the legal analysis of the application of sections 7 and 1 of the Charter to the Criminal Code’s absolute ban on
physician-assisted death in light of these (and other) facts.

Section 7 of the Charter guarantees that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” In relation to section 7, the Supreme Court found that the prohibition of physician-assisted death
limits the right to life, liberty and security of the person as it: “deprives some individuals of life, as it has the effect of forcing some individuals to take their
own lives prematurely”; “denies people in this situation the right to make decisions concerning their bodily integrity and medical care and thus trenches on
their liberty”; and “by leaving them to endure intolerable suffering it impinges on their security of the person.”

In addition, the Supreme Court characterized the objective of the prohibition as protecting “vulnerable persons from being induced to commit suicide at a
time of weakness.” It concluded that a total ban on physician-assisted death “catches people outside this class [vulnerable persons]” and “sweeps conduct
into its ambit that is unrelated to the law’s objective”. The current ban is therefore overbroad and not in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.

Having found a violation of section 7, the Supreme Court turned to section 1 of the Charter. Section 1 establishes that the “The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society.” This means that limits on rights must be prescribed by law, they must serve a pressing and substantial objective, and the means
used must be proportionate to the ends. For the means used to be proportionate to the ends, there must be a rational connection between the means and
ends, the means chosen must minimally impair the rights being limited, and there must be proportionality as between the deleterious and salutary effects of
the rights limitation.

The Supreme Court found that a total ban on physician-assisted death does not minimally impair the right to life, liberty and security of the person since a
less restrictive regime could achieve the objective of the prohibition. Specifically, vulnerable Canadians could be protected while allowing a subset of
Canadians to access physician-assisted death. Therefore, the prohibition of physician-assisted death limited section 7 rights, was not saved by section 1, and
so violated the Charter.

In the end, the Supreme Court declared sections 14 and 241(b) of the Criminal Code invalid insofar as they prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent
adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life; and (2) has a grievous medical condition (including an illness, disease, or disability) that is
irremediable (cannot be alleviated by means acceptable to the individual) and causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the
circumstances of his or her condition. The Supreme Court then suspended the declaration of invalidity for 12 months to allow Parliament time to introduce
legislation that reflects the decision.

With this decision, the Supreme Court has sent a clear and strong message to federal/provincial/territorial legislatures that voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide must be permitted for a carefully circumscribed subset of Canadians. The members of the Supreme Court of Canada have done their job (admirably).
Now, it is time for Parliamentarians to step up and do theirs.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE vs. MANALO
G.R. No. 180906
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Facts:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters
of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of
Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present
places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military
custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by
the CA.

Issue:
WoN the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents’ life, liberty and security was violated.

HELD: Yes
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos’ right to security. The Writ of Amparo is the most
potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under
concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time,
even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained.
Rodolfo Fariñas vs Executive Secretary
G.R. 152161, December 10, 2003

FACTS:
In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed into law. Section 14 thereof repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code which states
that an elective official, except the President and the Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. Hence, under RA 9006, an elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files his certificate of candidacy for an elective office while he
is still in office.

Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an appointive official hall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, was however retained by the Fair Election Act.

Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group, questioned the constitutionality of Section 14 on the ground that it violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of Section 67 gave elective officials undue advantage over appointive officials
(discrimination).
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The Fariñas group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its entirety. They contend that irregularities attended to the creation of the said law. Fariñas
explained that RA 9006 originated as House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1741; that there were contrasting provisions between the two bills hence a
Bicameral Conference Committee was created; that in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is irregular already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had
its record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was never subjected to a conference with the lower house; that in the 2nd BCC, it appeared that
another compromised bill was agreed upon even though there was no meeting at all and that the Report as to how said compromise bill was reached was
instantly made and made to be passed around for signing – all these irregularities made the law unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional.

HELD:
Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional.

On Equal Protection

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.

In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of
the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Further, appointive officials, as
officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote;
while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine

The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA 9006 is overridden by the enrolled bill doctrine. Under this doctrine, the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. The Supreme Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules
are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever irregularities there may have been in the Bicameral Conference
Committee involve internal rules which cannot be inquired into by the Court.
THE UNITED STATES vs. BALDOMERO NAVARRO
G.R. 1272

FACTS:
The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano are convicted of the crime of illegal detention under Article 481 and of 483 of the
Penal Code. They were sentenced to life imprisonment.
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Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who shall lock up or detain another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished
with the penalty of prision mayor.

The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one who illegally detains another and fails to give information concerning his whereabouts, or does not
prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment.

The punishment for the crime mentioned in article 483 of the Penal Code is the penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to cadena perpetua, or in
other words one convicted of simply depriving a person of his liberty may be imprisoned for a term of from six to twelve years and one convicted of depriving
a person of his liberty and who shall not state his whereabouts or prove that he had set said person at liberty may be punished by imprisonment for a term of
seventeen years four months and one day, to life, as in this case. In other words, for failure on the part of the defendant to testify regarding the whereabouts
of the person deprived of his liberty, or to prove that he was set at liberty, the punishment may be increased from imprisonment for a term of six years to life
imprisonment.

On appeal, counsel for the defendants argued that the provisions of the law has the effect of forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or to
take a much severer punishment. The burden is put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the penalty, or, in other words, of incriminating
himself, for the very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts to a confession that the
defendant unlawfully detained the person. So the evidence necessary to clear the defendant, under article 483 of the Penal Code, would have the effect of
convincing him under article 481. It is claimed that such practice is illegal, since section 5 of the Philippine Bill provides that ". . . no person shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants' rights against self-incrimination were violated.

HELD: Yes.
The right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity - of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it
would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of
confessions by duress.

Under the present system, the information must charge the accused with acts committed by him prior to the filing of the information and which of
themselves constitute an offense against the law. The Government can not charge a man with one of the necessary elements of an offense and trust to his
making out the rest by availing himself of his right to leave the entire burden of prosecuting on the prosecution from beginning to end.

If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used against him as a confession of crime, or an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of
an offense, such disclosure would be an accusation against himself.

In the present case, if the defendant disclosed the whereabouts of the person taken, or shows that he was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used to
obtain a conviction under article 481 of the Penal Code.

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It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not
be called upon either by express words or acts to assist in the production of such evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a
right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in RTC Cebu. He posted bail for his provisional liberty. After 2 years of the
filing of information, respondent People of the Philippines, filed an urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order
against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the
arraignment and scheduled hearings.

RTC granted it. Petitioner filed MR but was denied. He thus filed an appeal.

Petitioner contends that the scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information and the right to travel
can only be impaired upon lawful order of the Court on grounds of "interest of national security, public safety or public health.

Issue:
WoN the RTC orders violate his constitutional right to travel

Held: No
Petitioner argues that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it
restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as compared to the
provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one provision. The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly
including the liberty of travel, thus:The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court or when necessary in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health.

The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them differently, to wit: Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution,
Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health." This is erroneous. Article III, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into
effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.
SPOUSES HING,Petitioners, v. CHOACHUY

FACTS:
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On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaintfor Injunction and
Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and
raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in
Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C,
adjacent to the property of petitioners;that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005,
Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;that in that
case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building,
which is adjacent to petitioners property;that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its
allegations;that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo
Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners property;that respondents, through their employees and without the consent of
petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going construction;and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners right to privacy.Thus, petitioners
prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

In their Answer with Counterclaim,respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras,nor did they order their employees to take
pictures of petitioners construction.They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Ordergranting the application for a TRO.

Respondents moved for a reconsiderationbut the RTC denied the same in its Orderdated February 6, 2006.

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decisiongranting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave
abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.The CA explained that the right to privacy of
residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. The CA alsosaid that
since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras.They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has
a separate juridical personality.Thus, they are not the proper parties.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy?

2. Whether or not respondents are the proper parties to this suit?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

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POLITICAL LAW: right to privacy

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitutionand in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or
from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities."It is the right of an individual "to be free
from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."Simply
put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone."

The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of
the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

CIVIL LAW: right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are excluded therefrom and only certain
individuals are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed
against him by other individuals. It states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts,
though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of
intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter."The phrase "prying into the privacy of
anothers residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers residence." This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy,
because the law covers also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as
are allowed to enter may come in.

Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he
has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or
even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to
privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

POLITICAL LAW: the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to determine whether there is a violation of the right to privacy.

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In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.In Ople v. Torres,we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a
persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals
"reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it
depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy
would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business office as it would be no
different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The operation by respondents of a revolving camera,
even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus
on respondents property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the
land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to
monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in
setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back.
Respondents camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would
violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a
residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their
consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the
issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, unless there is
grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners
are not entitled to an injunctive writ.
Pollo v. Constantino-David
G.R. No. 181881, 18 October 2011

Facts:
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The
respondent then formed a team and issued a memo directing the team “to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and
Legal divisions.”

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Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of
the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the
computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner,
who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of “fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed
personal files in his computer.

He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed
an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search
which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel,
and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy

Ruling:
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files was lawful and did not violate his constitutional right.

Ratio Decidendi:
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.

Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner
in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a “search and seizure”. Because the petitioner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area.
Moreso, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first,
that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable (objective).

Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy
against intrusions by police.”

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O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work
for the government instead of a private employer.” In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public
employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law
enforcement.

Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres,
G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.

The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.

As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard
drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope.

The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M.
Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the computer from which the personal files of the petitioner were
retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor.
Disini, et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al.
G.R. No. 203335, 11 February 2014

FACTS
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of
“presumed malice” even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners
argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel affected the requirement of “actual malice” as opposed to “presumed malice”
as basis for conviction of libel.

RULING
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is required to establish guilt. The defense of
absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the
cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and
implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict
the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs.

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But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence
(malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the
defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.

Facts:
This case involves graduating students of the STC-Cebu City; wherein, the students involved posted pictures on their Facebook account of them wearing
wearing no shirt, but only brassieres from waist up. Said photos were taken while they were changing into their swimsuits for a beach party. The said photos
were reported to the STC’s computer teacher, named Mylene Rheza Escudero. Escudero asked several of her students to show her other photos of Julia and
Julianne, above-mentioned graduating students, they saw photos of: them along the streets of Cebu wearing clothing which shows their black brassieres
(duh, Sinulog? Hello?); them drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar (Private property OUTSIDE school premises); and that their Facebook
accounts were accessible to any Facebook user.

Upon discovery thereof, Escudero reported the matter to the school authorities. The poor students involved were investigated and were barred to attend
their highschool graduation rites which is experienced by a person once in their lifetime. Heartless.

A case was filed against the STC and its officials for Injunction and Damages. Injunction as to the order of the school not to allow the poor children to attend
their graduation rites. A petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data was also filed. Petitioners (Parents of the students involved) assert that the
privacy of the children were unlawfully invaded. Since the Facebook accounts of the children are set at “Friends Only”; That the photos were owned by the
ladies, thus cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Old hag, however, violated this by saving digital copies and subsequently showed them to
the STC’s officials.

RTC issued the writ and directed the respondents to file their verified written return within 5 working days from service of the writ.

Respondent denied the petitioners allegation, among others, because there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy on Facebook.

RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data.

Issue:
Whether the writ of habeas data is a proper remedy?

Decision: No.

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

PURPOSE:

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It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IS NOT ONLY CONFINED TO CASES OF EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES.

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by: (a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored
portion of Section 2, a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.

It is designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.

RESPONDENT CONTENDS THAT IT IS NOT AN ENTITY ENGAGED IN THE GATHERING, COLLETING OR STORING OF DATA OR INFORMATION REGARDING THE
PERSON, FAMILY, HOME AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE AGGRIEVED PARTY. -THIS IS ERRONEOUS.

Such individual need not be in the business of such.

To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavor. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily
mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Regularity is immaterial.

THREE STRANDS OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY:

• Locational/Situational
• Informational (case at bar)
• Decisional

RIGHT TO PRIVACY WAS NOT VIOLATED because:

Facebook has privacy safeguard tools.

Utilization of this tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his right to informational privacy.

That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolsters the petitioners’ contention. It is well emphasize at this point that setting a post’s
or profile detail’s to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
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The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668)

Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel
documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return
to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6.
They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.

Held:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to
enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to
leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the
separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would
wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Obergefell v. Hodges
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576 US _ (2015)

Facts of the case

Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states'
bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in
each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of
plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples'
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.

Question
(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex?

(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in
another state?

Conclusion
Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority.

The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and
that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a
fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards
children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social
order.

Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples
from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law.

Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and
equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held
that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the
right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not
address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions.

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Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly
protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial
policymaking.

The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government
intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the
majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with
the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process.

Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.

In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court’s authority both by exercising the legislative,
rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-
sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most
basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the
majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution.

Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.

Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in
the Fourteenth Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the legislature and putting it in the hands of the
judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to
protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas
also argued that the majority opinion impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature to
determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent.

In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the
issue is reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to create a new
right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution
allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.
Mehran Karimi Nasseri

Mehran Karimi Nasseri is an Iranian refugee who literally lived at Paris’ Charles de Gaulle Airport from August 1988 until July 2006. Also known as Sir, Alfred
Mehran (the comma isn’t a typo), Mehran’s story is one of a kind, and so fascinating that Steven Spielberg actually made a hit movie based upon his
experiences - Remember ‘The Terminal’? The reason behind him spending almost two decades at Terminal 1 of the Charles de Gaulle Airport is that he wasn’t
allowed by the authorities to step out of the airport. He had lost his passport as well as other documents, while he was on his way to London from Paris, and
thus, wasn’t allowed to enter the country. He, therefore, returned to Paris, but since he had no legal documents, he was arrested by the officials as soon as
he reached Paris. However, since he had entered Paris legally, he was released but had nowhere to go. The only place he could legally stay was at the
departure lounge of Terminal one of the airport, and so he did. From that moment, he became the man with no country - claimed by no one.
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Childhood & Early Life:
Nasseri was born in 1942 in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company settlement in Masjed Soleiman, Iran. His mother was a Scottish nurse while his father was an
Iranian physician working for the company.
In 1973, he moved to the United Kingdom to study Yugoslav at the ‘University of Bradford’. After completing his education, he went back to Iran, and came to
know about the protests taking place against Mohammad Reza Shah.
He decided to join the revolution. Due to his political views and protests, he was eventually expelled from Iran in 1977.
After a constant struggle for a long period of time, he was finally granted the status of a refugee by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) in Belgium.
He was given the right to live and travel across Europe, and so he decided to live in the UK. He moved to the UK in 1986, and further decided to settle in
London around 1988.

A Lost Suitcase Turned His Life Upside Down:

In an unfortunate turn of events, Nasseri’s suitcase was stolen while he was still in Paris. His suitcase contained his passport as well as other legal documents.
Despite lost papers, he travelled to London with the hope that the authorities will listen to his plea, and help him find a solution. But nothing like happened
at the Heathrow airport in London.
He was sent back to Paris, as he didn’t have any of the required documents. He returned to Paris’ airport but faced a strange situation.
He was arrested for having no documents. The silver lining was that he had travelled to Paris on legal terms, so he was released. It was surmised that he had
nowhere to go but stay at the airport itself.
His case was further taken by Christian Bourget, a human rights lawyer in 1992, but the court ruled that he won’t be allowed to enter Paris unless he has his
documents. The same court also ruled that he cannot be asked to leave the terminal or expelled from the airport.
That was the beginning of him becoming an urban legend at the departure lounge of Terminal one of the Charles de Gaulle Airport.

Living At The Airport For More Than A Decade:

Nasseri got trapped at the airport on 26th August, 1988, and for the next 17 years, he continued living there.
His routine included waking up at 5.30 and using the washroom before the arrival of passengers. He used travel kits to brush his teeth and trim his beard.
He was adopted by the airport, and was offered food and meal vouchers by airport personnel. He had his own table and chair where he used to watch the
passengers moving, planes flying, and days passing, as he read his favorite books.
He also used to indulge into conversations with passersby, and staff of the airport. He used to wash his clothes late at night in the washroom.
Even after spending so many years living at the airport, Nasseri was always been very softspoken and took care of his personal hygiene. Keeping his dignity
intact, he many a time turned down money and clothes offered to him by people.

The Saga Finally Ended:

While the court had allowed Nasseri to stay at the airport in 1992, he struggled to get the Belgium refugee officials to mail Nasseri’s documents. They asked
Nasseri to physically present himself to them, so that they can be sure that he is the same man.
It was not possible for Nasseri to prove to the Belgium government that he was the same man who had been granted political asylum, since as per Belgium’s
law, a refugee who voluntarily leaves the country cannot return.
In 1995, the Belgium government agreed to send him his original documents, but there was a condition - he was asked to live in Belgium under the
supervision and control of a social worker. Nasseri decided not to go further with their proposal and continued living at the airport.
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It wasn’t until 1999 that he was finally granted the permission to not only move out of the airport, but also travel freely to any part of Europe. The only
problem was that he didn’t want to move out!
His reason was that his name was listed as an Iranian in the document. He wanted it to be British!
The medical doctor of the airport said that he was scared to leave the bubble, as it cannot be easy for any person to deal with such a major change after a
decade of living in a situation that is far from normal.

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