U.S.

Supreme Court
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)

Oetjen v. Central Leather Company

No. 268, 269

Argued January 3, 4, 1918

Decided March 11, 1918

246 U.S. 297

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HUDSON COUNTY

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Syllabus

The court notices judicially that the government of the United States recognized
the government of Carranza as the de facto government of the Republic of
Mexico on October 19, 1915, and as the de jure government on August 31, 1917.

Semble, that the Hague Conventions, in view of their terms and international
character, do not apply to a civil war, and that the regulations

Page 246 U. S. 298

annexed to the Convention of 1907 do not forbid such a military seizure and sale
of private property as is involved in this case.

The conduct of our foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the

executive and legislative -- the political -- departments of the government, and
the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision.

Who is the sovereign de jure or de facto of a foreign territory is a political

question the determination of which by the political departments of the
government conclusively binds the judges.

When a government which originates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the

political department of our government as the de jure government of the country
in which it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect, and validates
all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the
commencement of its existence.
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed
of by sovereign powers as between themselves.

The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be

successfully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to a case
involving the title to property brought within the custody of a court as to claims for
damages based upon acts done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the
highest considerations of international comity and expediency.

In January, 1914, General Francisco Villa, while conducting independent

operations as a duly commissioned military commander of the Carranza
government, which had then made much progress in its revolution in Mexico,
levied a military contribution, and, in enforcing it, seized and sold some hides
then owned and possessed by a citizen of Mexico. Held that the act could not be
reexamined and modified by a New Jersey court in replevin.

87 N.J.L. 552, 704, affirmed.

This cases are stated in the opinion.

Page 246 U. S. 299

MR. JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.

These two cases, involving the same question, were argued and will be decided
together. They are suits in replevin, and involve the title to two large
consignments of hides which the plaintiff in error claims to own as assignee of
Martinez & Co., a partnership engaged in business in the City of Torreon,
Mexico, but which the defendant in error claims to own by purchase from the
Finnegan-Brown Company, a Texas corporation which it is alleged purchased
the hides in Mexico from General Francisco Villa on January 3, 1914.

The cases were commenced in a circuit court of New Jersey in which judgments
were rendered for the defendants, which were affirmed by the Court of Errors
and Appeals, and they are brought to this Court on the theory that the claim of
title to the hides by the defendant in error is invalid because based upon a
purchase from General Villa, who, it is urged, confiscated them contrary to the
provisions of the Hague convention of 1907 respecting the laws and customs of
war on land, that the judgment of the state court denied to the plaintiff in error this
right which he "set up and claimed" under the Hague Convention or treaty, and
that this denial gives him the right of review in this Court.
A somewhat detailed description will be necessary of the political conditions in
Mexico prior to and at the time of the seizure of the property in controversy by the
military authorities. It appears in the record, and is a matter of general history,
that, on February 23, 1913, Madero, President of the Republic of Mexico, was
assassinated; that immediately thereafter, General Huerta declared himself
Provisional President of the Republic

Page 246 U. S. 300

and took the oath of office as such; that, on the 26th day of March following,
General Carranza, who was then Governor of the State of Coahuila, inaugurated
a revolution against the claimed authority of Huerta, and, in a "Manifesto
Addressed to the Mexican Nation," proclaimed the organization of a constitutional
government under "the plan of Guadalupe," and that civil war was at once
entered upon between the followers and forces of the two leaders. When General
Carranza assumed the leadership of what were called the Constitutionalist
forces, he commissioned General Villa his representative, as "Commander of the
North," and assigned him to an independent command in that part of the country.
Such progress was made by the Carranza forces that, in the autumn of 1913,
they were in military possession, as the record shows, of approximately two-
thirds of the area of the entire country, with the exception of a few scattered
towns and cities, and after a battle lasting several days, the City of Torreon in the
State of Coahuila was captured by General Villa on October 1 of that year.
Immediately after the capture of Torreon, Villa proposed levying a military
contribution on the inhabitants for the support of his army, and thereupon
influential citizens, preferring to provide the required money by an assessment
upon the community to having their property forcibly seized, called together a
largely attended meeting and, after negotiations with General Villa as to the
amount to be paid, an assessment was made on the men of property of the city,
which was in large part promptly paid. Martinez, the owner from whom the
plaintiff in error claims title to the property involved in this case, was a wealthy
resident of Torreon, and was a dealer in hides in a large way. Being an adherent
of Huerta, when Torreon was captured, Martinez fled the city and failed to pay
the assessment imposed upon him, and it was to satisfy this assessment that, by
order of General Villa, the hides in controversy

Page 246 U. S. 301

were seized, and on January 3, 1914, were sold in Mexico to the Finnegan-
Brown Company. They were paid for in Mexico, and were thereafter shipped into
the United States and were replevied, as stated.

This Court will take judicial notice of the fact that, since the transactions thus
detailed and since the trial of this case in the lower courts, the government of the
United States recognized the government of Carranza as the de
facto government of the Republic of Mexico on October 19, 1915, and as the de
jure government on August 31, 1917. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S.
202; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250.

On this state of fact, the plaintiff in error argues that the "Regulations" annexed to
the Hague Convention of 1907 "Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land"
constitute a treaty between the United States and Mexico; that these
"Regulations" forbid such seizure and sale of property as we are considering in
this case, and that therefore, somewhat vaguely, no title passed by the sale
made by General Villa, and the property may be recovered by the Mexican owner
or his assignees when found in this country.

It would perhaps be sufficient answer to this contention to say that the Hague
Conventions are international in character, designed and adapted to regulate
international warfare, and that they do not, in terms or in purpose, apply to a civil
war. Were it otherwise, however, it might be effectively argued that the
declaration relied upon that "private property cannot be confiscated" contained in
Article 46 of the Regulations does not have the scope claimed for it, since Article
49 provides that "money contributions . . . for the needs of the army" may be
levied upon on occupied territory, and Article 52 provides that "requisitions in kind
and services may be demanded for the needs of the army of occupation," and
that contributions in kind shall, as far as possible, be

Page 246 U. S. 302

paid for in cash, and, when not so paid for, a receipt shall be given and payment
of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible. And also for the reason
that the "Convention" to which the "Regulations" are annexed, recognizing the
incomplete character of the results arrived at, expressly provides that, until a
more complete code is agreed upon, cases not provided for in the "Regulations"
shall be governed by the principles of the law of nations.

But, since claims similar to the one before us are being made in many cases in
this and in other courts, we prefer to place our decision upon the application of
three clearly settled principles of law to the facts of this case as we have stated
them.

The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the

Constitution to the executive and legislative -- "the political" -- departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. United States v.
Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 27 U. S. 307, 27 U. S.
309; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511, 37 U. S. 517, 37 U. S. 520; Williams v. Suffolk
Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415, 38 U. S. 420; In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 143 U. S. 499.
It has been specifically decided that:
"Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but is a
political, question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive
departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all
other officers, citizens, and subjects of that government. This principle has
always been upheld by this Court, and has been affirmed under a great variety of
circumstances."

Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 137 U. S. 212.

It is also the result of the interpretation by this Court of the principles of

international law that, when a government which originates in revolution or revolt
is recognized by the political department of our government as the de

Page 246 U. S. 303

jure government of the country in which it is established, such recognition is

retroactive in effect, and validates all the actions and conduct of the government
so recognized from the commencement of its existence. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.
S. 176, 96 U. S. 186; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 168 U. S.
253. See s.c., 65 F. 577.

To these principles we must add that:

"Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other

sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be available
of by sovereign powers as between themselves."

Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 168 U. S. 252; American Banana Co. v.

United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347.

Applying these principles of law to the case at bar, we have a duly commissioned
military commander of what must be accepted as the legitimate government of
Mexico, in the progress of a revolution, and when conducting active independent
operations, seizing and selling in Mexico, as a military contribution, the property
in controversy at the time owned and in the possession of a citizen of Mexico, the
assignor of the plaintiff in error. Plainly this was the action, in Mexico, of the
legitimate Mexican government when dealing with a Mexican citizen, and, as we
have seen, for the soundest reasons, and upon repeated decisions of this Court
such action, is not subject to reexamination and modification by the courts of this
country.

The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be

successfully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to a case
involving the title to property brought within the custody of a court, such as we
have here, as it was held to be to the cases cited, in which claims for damages
were based upon acts done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the
highest

Page 246 U. S. 304

considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit the validity of

the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the
courts of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable relations between
governments and vex the peace of nations."

It is not necessary to consider, as the New Jersey court did, the validity of the
levy of the contribution made by the Mexican commanding general under rules of
international law applicable to the situation, since the subject is not open to
reexamination by this or any other American court.

The remedy of the former owner, or of the purchaser from him, of the property in
controversy, if either has any remedy, must be found in the courts of Mexico or
through the diplomatic agencies of the political department of our government.
The judgments of the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey must be

Affirmed.