Article Ix Civil Service Commision
Article Ix Civil Service Commision
Article Ix Civil Service Commision
Section 2
ISSUE:
W/N Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was
suspended on March 16,1976.Petitioner’s contention: When Gov. Alfelor recommended to CSC the
change in the employment status of private respondent fromtemporary to permanent, which the CSC
approved as only temporary pending validation of the results of private respondent'sexamination for
supervising security guard, private respondent's appointment in effect remained temporary. Hence, his
subsequentqualification for civil service eligibility did notipso factoconvert his temporary status to that of
permanent.
SC Held:
Agrees with Petitioner’s contentions. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled to his claim
for backwagesfor the entire period of his suspension.
Ratio:
At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified
in an appropriateexamination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made
his appointment temporaryand without afixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the
pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on
is of no moment as his having passed the supervisingsecurity guard examination, did notipso
factoconvert his temporary appointment into a permanent one.
What is required is a newappointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the
temporary appointment — these are two distinct acts of theappointing authority The letter communicated
by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of power properly belonging to
theappointing authority. CSC has the power toapproveordisapprovean appointment set before it. It does
not have the power to makethe appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the
employment status of an employee. CSC should have endedits participation in the appointment of private
respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed thetemporary status of the latterwho lacked the proper
civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the
toesof the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter.
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this special civil action for certiorari are clear and
undisputed. The juridical status and relevant circumstances of respondent corporation have been
established in a case of illegal dismissal filed against it, as previously decided by the Court and
hereinafter discussed. However, submitted this time for Our resolution is a controversy on the propriety of
and requirements for certification elections in government-owned or controlled corporations like the
respondent.
On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office
No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the
workers in NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the
corporation. 2 The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated
November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation its
employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective
bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code." 3
From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations 4 where, acting thereon
in BLR Case No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77), Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of
dismissal and ordered the holding of a certification election. 5 This order was, however, set aside by
Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of November 21, 1978 6 upon a motion for
reconsideration of respondent NHC.
In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the reversal of the said resolution and prays that a
certification election be held among the rank and file employees of NHC.
In retrospect, it will be recalled that in a former case of illegal dismissal involving the same respondent
corporation, 7 We had ruled that the employees of NHC and of other government owned or controlled
corporations were governed by civil service laws, rules and regulations pursuant to the 1973 Constitution
which provided that "the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations." 8
It was therein stressed that to allow subsidiary corporations to be excluded from the civil service laws
would be to permit the circumvention or emasculation of the above-quoted constitutional provision. As
perceptively analyzed therein, "(i)t would be possible for a regular ministry of government to create a host
of subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code funded by a willing legislature. A government-
owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporation rations
would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free
from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission
on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraints of the open market nor to the
terms and conditions of civil service employment."
The rule, however, was modified in the 1987 Constitution, the corresponding provision whereof declares
that "(t)he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." 9
Consequently, the civil service now covers only government owned or controlled corporations with
original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of Congress or by special law, and not
those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. As We recently held —
..., the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by this Court in the
National Housing Corporation case ... appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987
Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned controlled corporations with
original charters and therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include government-owned
or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
corporations under the general corporation law. 10
While the aforecited cases sought different reliefs, that is, reinstatement consequent to illegal dismissal,
the same lis mota determinative of the present special civil action was involved therein.
The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees'
organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to
employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that "(t)he right of
the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged" 11
This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice and
Human Rights, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law ...."
Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5),
Section 2, Article IX B 12 which provides that "(t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to
government employees." The rationale of and justification for this innovation which found expression in
the aforesaid provision was explained by its proponents as follows:
... The government is in a sense the repository of the national sovereignty and, in that respect, it must be
held in reverence if not in awe. It symbolizes the unity of the nation, but it does perform a mundane task
as well. It is an employer in every sense of the word except that terms and conditions of work are set forth
through a Civil Service Commission. The government is the biggest employer in the Philippines. There is
an employer-employee relationship and we all know that the accumulated grievances of several decades
are now beginning to explode in our faces among government workers who feel that the rights afforded
by the Labor Code, for example, to workers in the private sector have been effectively denied to workers
in government in what looks like a grotesque, (sic) a caricature of the equal protection of the laws. For
example, ... there were many occasions under the old government when wages and cost of living
allowances were granted to workers in the private sector but denied to workers in the government for
some reason or another, and the government did not even state the reasons why. The government
employees were being discriminated against. As a general rule, the majority of the world's countries now
entertain public service unions. What they really add up to is that the employees of the government form
their own association. Generally, they do not bargain for wages because these are fixed in the budget but
they do acquire a forum where, among other things, professional and self-development is (sic) promoted
and encouraged. They also act as watchdogs of their own bosses so that when graft and corruption is
committed, generally, it is the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of self-organization
that become the public's own allies for detecting graft and corruption and for exposing it.... 13
There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC for
it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled
corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation of the last cited section of the
Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 111, thus:
... Right of employees in the public service — Employees of the government corporations established
under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their
respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to form associations for
purposes not contrary to law.
The records do not show that supervening factual events have mooted the present action. It is meet,
however, to also call attention to the fact that, insofar as certification elections are concerned, subsequent
statutory developments have rendered academic even the distinction between the two types of
government-owned or controlled corporations and the laws governing employment relations therein, as
hereinbefore discussed. For, whether the employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the
civil service laws, a certification election may be conducted.
For employees in corporations and entities covered by the Labor Code, the determination of the exclusive
bargaining representative is particularly governed by Articles 255 to 259 of said Code. Article 256
provides for the procedure when there is a representation issue in organized establishments, while Article
257 covers unorganized establishments. These Labor Code provisions are fleshed out by Rules V to VII,
Book V of the Omnibus Implementing Rules.
With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters
and who are, therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the guidelines for the exercise of their right to
organize is provided for under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to
12, regulates the determination of the "sole and exclusive employees representative"; Under Section 12,
"where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate organization
unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition order the conduct of certification election and shall
certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational
unit."
Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification in the Constitution that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" and that they shall also participate in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 14
(Emphasis supplied.)
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
dated November 21, 1978, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the conduct of a certification election
among the affected employees of respondent National Housing Corporation in accordance with the rules
therefor is hereby GRANTED.
FELIMON LUEGO
VS.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO
FACTS:
The petitioner was appointed Administrative officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor
Florentino Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the Civil Service
Commissionapproved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the
privaterespondent and another employee, and provided “there (was) no pending administrative acse
againstthe appointee, no pending protest gainst the appointment nor any decision by competent authority
thatwill adversely affect the approval of the appointment.” After protracted hearings, the Cicil
ServiceCommission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested
positionand directed Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer II in place of
Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked. Hence this petitionto
question that order and the private respondent's title.
ARGUMENTS:
The Solicitor-General says the petitioner could be validly replaced in the instant case because his
appointment was temporary and therefore could be withdrawn at will, with or without cause. Having
acknowledge such an appointment, it is argued, the petitioner waived his security of tenure and
consequently ran the risk of an abrupt separation from his office without violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on
the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of finding, order
his replacement by the latter
HELD:NO, The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to
do so,and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary.
REASONS:
The appointment of the petitioner was permanent. What was temporary was the approval of
theappointment, not the appointment itself. What made the approval temporary was the fact that it
wasmade to depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of
theappointee to the position.The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or
nature of the appointmentextended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing theappointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is
qualifiedand all other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to
theappointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. It has no authority to revoke the
saidappointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better quaified for that
wouldhave constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.Appointment is
an essentially dicretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it isvested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess thequalifications required by
law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground thatthere are others better qualified
who should have been preferred.
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that
the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the
DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS
contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus
have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the
petitioners from striking.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On
one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable
laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and
other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.”
Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from
doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees”
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
Issue:(1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.
(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as ´confidential agentµ was validly terminated on
thealleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to
saidposition after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.
Held:(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential.There are two instances when a
positionmay be considered primarily confidential: (1)When the President upon recommendation of
theCommissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to beprimarily
confidential; or (2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functionsof the office,
there exists ´close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power whichinsures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals ofpersonal trust or confidential
matters of state.µ In the case before us, the provision of ExecutiveOrder No. 265, declaring ´...confidential
agents in the several department and offices of theGovernment, unless otherwise directed by the
President, to be primarily confidentialµ brings withinthe fold of the aforementioned executive order the
position of confidential agent in the Office ofthe Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are
primarily confidential
.(2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her
services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positionsare
excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein isallowed by
the Constitution.This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of aprimarily
confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should benoted, however,
that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not ´removedµ or ´dismissedµ from
office ³ his term merely ´expires,µ in much the the same way as officer, whoseright thereto ceases upon
expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected,is not and cannot be deemed
´removedµ or ´dismissedµ therefrom, upon the expiration of saidterm.The main difference between the
former ³ the primarily confidential officer ³ and the latter isthat the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas
that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes
fixed and determined when the appointingpower expresses its decision to put an end to the services of
the incumbent.When this even takesplace, the latter is not ´removedµ or ´dismissedµ from office ³ his
term has merely ´expired.µBut even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not
primarily confidentialand that therefore her removal from said position for loss of confidence was in
violation of her security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the position of
Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have
abandonedformer position of ´confidential agent in the same office.
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 41226, both
the above-named petitioner and respondents interposed their respective appeals to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, however, certified the said appeals to this Court to avoid splitting them, it
appearing that, while the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the respondents' appeal, the amount in
controversy in the petitioner's appeal (P574,000.00) in damages and attorneys' fees, is beyond the
jurisdiction of the said appellate court.
The essential facts are as follows: On 7 March 1958, the petitioner-appellant, R. Marino Corpus, then
holding the position of "Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department" of the
Central Bank, a position declared by the President of the Philippines on 24 January 1957 as highly
technical in nature, and admitted as such by both the present litigants, was administratively charged by
several employees in the export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or
abuse of authority, oppression, conduct unbecoming of a public official, and of violation of the internal
regulations of the Central Bank.
On 18 March 1958, the Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office effective on said date and
created a three-man investigating committee composed of Atty. Guillermo de Jesus, chairman; and Atty.
Apolinar Tolentino, Assistant Fiscal of the City of Manila, and Professor Gerardo Florendo, senior
attorney of the Central Bank, members. In its final report dated 5 May 1959, the investigating committee,
"after most extensive hearings in which both complainants and respondent were afforded all the
opportunity to submit their evidence, and after a most exhaustive and conscientious study of the records
and evidence submitted in the case," made the following conclusion and recommendation:
(1) In view of the foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no basis upon which to recommend
disciplinary action against respondent, and, therefore, respectfully recommends that he be immediately
reinstated.
Nevertheless, on 20 July 1959, the Monetary Board approved the following resolution:
After an exhaustive and mature deliberation on the report of the aforesaid fact-finding committee in
conjunction with the entire records of the case and representations of both complainants and respondent,
through their respective counsel; and, further, after a thorough review of the service record of the
respondent, particularly the various cases presented against him, object of Monetary Board Res. No.
1527 dated August 30, 1955, which all involves fitness, discipline, etc. of respondent; and moreover, upon
formal statement of the Governor that he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special Assistant to
the Governor and In-Charge of the Export Department (such position being primarily confidential and
highly technical in nature), the Monetary Board finds that the continuance of the respondent in the service
of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to the best interests of the Central Bank and, therefore, in
accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the respondent R. Marino
Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension.
Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above resolution, but the Board denied it, after which he filed
an action for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and damages, with preliminary injunction, with the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The said court, after trial, rendered judgment declaring the Board
resolution null and void, and ordering, among others, the reinstatement of the herein petitioner and
awarding him P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. As aforesaid, both the petitioner and the respondents
appealed the judgment.
Per its resolution, the premises of the board in dismissing the petitioner are: (1) its deliberation of the
report of the committee, the records of the case and the representations of the parties; (2) the service
record of the petitioner, particularly the various cases against him in 1955; and (3) loss of confidence by
the Governor, with the implied concurrence of the Monetary Board. No specific findings were made; it is,
therefore, evident that the petitioner was removed on the third ground, since he was neither removed for
guilt of the charges against him in the administrative complaint nor on account of his previous cases in
1955 because he had suffered the corresponding penalty imposed upon him on the counts for which he
was then found guilty, and because he was thereafter promoted in salary and to the position in question
by the Monetary Board on recommendation of the Governor.1äwphï1.ñët
The appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary Board is planted on the proposition that officers holding
highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power,
and that such power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the Constitution:
Section 1. A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided
by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive examination.
It is argued that for the three classes of position referred to in the constitutional disposition (policy-
determining, primarily confidential and highly technical), lack of confidence of the one making the
appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal.
The court, therefore, cannot rely on the so-called "loss of confidence" as a reason for dismissal. And
inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but to
follow the mandate that —
No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law (Sec. 4, Art. XII, Constitution of the Phil.)
Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in positions that
are by their nature important, such as those that are "highly technical," the Constitutional safeguard
requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least demands that their
dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended with prudence and deliberation
adequate to show that said ground exists.
In the second place, the argument for the Monetary Board ignores the self-evident fact that the
constitutional provisions merely constitute the policy-determining, primarily confidential, and highly
technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the
basis of merit and fitness as determined from competitive examinations (sec. 1, supra) (Jover vs. Borra,
49 O.G. [No. 7] 2755), but that the Constitution does not exempt such positions from the operation of the
principle emphatically and categorically enunciated in section 4 of Article XII, that —
No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided
by law.
and which recognizes no exception. The absolute rule thus propounded is repeated almost verbatim in
Sec. 132 of the Central Bank Charter (Rep. Act 265) that provides in equally absolute terms that —
No officer or employee of the Central Bank subject to the Civil Service Law or regulations shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.
It is well to recall here that the Civil Service Law in force (Rep. Act No. 2260) divides positions into three
categories: competitive or classified; non-competitive or unclassified service; and exempt service, the last
being expressly excluded from the scope of the Civil Service Act (sec. 3, R.A. 2260). In view of sections 3
and 5 of the same law, providing that —
SEC 3. Positions embraced in the Civil Service.—The Philippine Civil Service shall embrace all branches,
subdivisions and instrumentalities of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, ...
SEC. 5. The non-competitive service.—The non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of
positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which
are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. (R.A. 2260)
it is indisputable that the plaintiff Corpus is protected by the Civil Service law and regulations as a
member of the non-competitive or unclassified service, and that his removal or suspension must be for
cause recognized by law (Unabia vs. Mayor, 53 Off. Gaz. 132; Arcel vs. Osmeña, L-14956, Feb. 27,
1961; Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, L-19748, September 13, 1962).
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public
functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence
in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal. But the situation is different for those
holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly
distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule
to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental
charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary technician, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or
engineer, enjoys security of tenure and may not be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such
as an economist or a scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be
removable at any time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. No technical men worthy of
the name would be willing to accept work under such conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocated by the
Bank would demand that highly technical positions be filled by persons who must labor always with an
eye cocked at the humor to their superiors. It would signify that the so-called highly technical positions will
have to be filled by incompetents and yes-men, who must rely not on their own qualifications and skill but
on their ability to curry favor with the powerful. The entire objective of the Constitution in establishing and
dignifying the Civil Service on the basis of merit would be thus negated.
Of course, a position may be declared both highly technical and confidential, as the supreme interests of
the state may require. But the position of plaintiff-appellant Corpus is not of this category.
The decision in De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, relied upon by the appellant Bank, is not
applicable since said case involved the office of city engineer that the court expressly found to be "neither
primarily confidential, policy-determining nor highly technical" (at p. 297, in fine).
Turning now to the appeal of plaintiff R. Marino Corpus. The latter complains first against the allowance of
only P5,000.00 attorney's fees by the court below stressing that the stipulation of facts between the
parties clearly recites that Corpus had agreed to pay his attorney P20,000.00 as fees. It is to be noted,
however, that the agreement between client and lawyer cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to
the fee contract. While the Civil Code allows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way of
damages, such fees must lie primarily in the discretion of the trial court, and no abuse of that discretion is
here shown. The same thing can be said as to plaintiff's recovery of moral damages; the trial court was
evidently not satisfied that such damages were adequately proved and on the record, we do not believe
we would be warranted in interfering with its judgment.
The claim for exemplary damages must presuppose the existence of the circumstances enumerated in
Articles 2231 and 2232 of the Civil Code. That is essentially a question of fact that lies within the province
of the court a quo, and we do not believe that in opining that the position of Corpus was one dependent
on confidence, the defendant Monetary Board necessarily acted with vindictiveness or wantonness, and
not in the exercise of honest judgment.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed without special pronouncement as to costs.
Facts:
Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946,
by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6,
and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the
position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interimappointment by the President to the
same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos
refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-
defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these
proceedings.
Issue:
whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his present position for assignment to another
position violates Section 4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee
in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."
Held:
Yes. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches
and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except
as those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made
only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination."
Section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service
pertain either to the classified service," and went on to say that "The classified service embraces all not
expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then section 671 described persons in the
unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of bureaus or
offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government whose appointments are
by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone."
Three specified classes of positions — policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly
technical — are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees
appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. None of these exceptions obtain in the present case.
The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly
technical. A confidential position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the
duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of
action for the government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With
specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him be
section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the
position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed
to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which
"highly technical" is employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the classified
civil service whose technical competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the
duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative in character and could very well be discharged by
non-technical men possessing executive ability.
Section 7
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President
allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of
the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations
and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision
provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their
deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states
that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive
Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise allowed by
law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such
as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member
and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the
constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional
provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government
for self enrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase “unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a
broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both
constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular
instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and
void.
FLORES V DRILON
FACTS
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of
Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to
appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of
its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman
and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo
City and thus an excepted circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double
compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to
another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments
which he may have received pursuant to his appointment.
HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the
Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is
precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective
official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect
his constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed”
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to
the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-
President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive
the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman
of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of
choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an
officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and
constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that
the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of
SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the
ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during
his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void;
he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such
benefits.
SECTION 8
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, dismissingPlaintiff’s
complaint for the recovery of accrued salaries, first taken to the Court of Appeals, and later certified to
us for the reason that said appeal involved only questions of law. The facts are simple and clear, and as
found by the trial court may be briefly stated as follows:
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The Rural Progress Administration (later referred to as Administration) is a public corporation created
for the purpose of acquiring landed estates through purchase, expropriation or lease, and later sub-
letting or sub-leasing the same to tenants or occupants. The officials and employees of the
Administration may be considered as civil service employees embraced in the classified service.
Sometime in 1947, one Aurelio R. Peña, then comptroller of the Administration and performing duties of
auditor in representation of the Auditor General recommended to the Board of Directors of the
Administration that for purposes of economy municipal treasurers be appointed agent-collectors of the
Administration, and this recommendation was adopted by the Board of Director. Thereafter, Faustino
Aguilar, then manager of the Administration, prepared the appointment for the post of agent- collector
on a part-time basis in favor of Plaintiff-AppellantBraulio Quimson, with compensation of P720 per
annum, the appointment to take effect upon assumption of duty. At the time, Quimson was deputy
provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal. Defendant-Appellee Roman Ozaeta who
by reason of his office of Secretary of Justice was acting as Chairman of the Board of Directors, signed
the appointment and forwarded the papers to the President through the Secretary of Finance for
approval. Without waiting for the said approval Quimson assumed his position on May 6, 1948 and
rendered service as agent-collector of the Administration until October 21, 1949, inclusive, when he was
informed that because of the disapproval of his appointment, his services were considered terminated.
There were several objections to his appointment, among them that of the Auditor General on the
ground that since Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, his
additional compensation as agent-collector would contravene the Constitutional prohibition against
double compensation. The Commissioner of Civil Service said that he would offer no objection to the
additional compensation of Quimson as agent-collector provided it was authorized in a special provision
exempting the case from the inhibition against the payment of extra compensation in accordance with
section 259 of the Revised Administrative Code. In this connection, it may be stated that this section of
the Administrative Code provides that in the absence of special provision, no officer or employee in any
branch of the Government service shall receive additional compensation on account of the discharge of
duties pertaining to another or to the performance of public service of whatever nature. Faustino
Aguilar as manager of the Administration asked for the reconsideration of the ruling of the Auditor
General, alleging that the appointment of the Plaintiff was for reasons of economy and efficiency, but
the Auditor General denied the request stating that reasons of economy and efficiency are not valid
grounds for evading the constitutional prohibition against additional compensation in the absence of a
law specifically authorizing such compensation. So, the services of Quimson as agent-collector of the
Administration were terminated. But R. Gonzales Lloret, then manager of the Administration on October
18, 1949, inquired from the auditor of the Administration whether Quimson could be paid for the period
of actual service rendered by him from May 10, 1948, and the said auditor gave the opinion that it could
not be done for the reason that in his opinion the appointment extended to Quimson was clearly illegal
and the Administration may not be obliged to pay him for the services rendered since it was a violation
of section 3, Article XII, of the Constitution prohibiting double compensation. At the same time he
expressed the opinion that under section 691 of the Revised Administrative Code the appointing official
who made the illegal appointment should be made liable for the payment of salary of the appointee,
and consequently, Plaintiff should claim his salary for services rendered against said appointing officer.
It is highly possible that this opinion was what induced and prompted Quimson to file the present case
against Roman Ozaeta who, as Chairman of the Board, signed his appointment, and the members of the
said Board, namely: Faustino Aguilar, Vicente Fragante, Roman Fernandez and Pedro Magsalin. The
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action was initiated in the Justice of the Peace Court which dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City, as already stated, the complaint was also dismissed.
For purposes of reference we are reproducing section 691 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“SEC. 691. Payment of person employed contrary to law. — Liability of chief of office. — No person
employed in the classified service contrary to law or in violation of the civil service rules shall be entitled
to receive pay from the Government; but the chief of the bureau or office responsible for such
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unlawful employment shall be personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the
employment been lawful, and the disbursing officer shall make payment to the employee of such
amount from the salary of the officers so liable.”
In our opinion, the present appeal can be resolved without much difficulty. Section 691 of the
Administrative Code above reproduced refers and applies to unlawful employment and not to unlawful
compensation. The appointment or employment of Plaintiff-Appellant Quimson as agent-collector was
not in itself unlawful because there is no incompatibility between said appointment and his employment
as deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer. In fact, he was appointed agent-collector by
reason of his office, being a municipal treasurer. There is no legal objection to a government official
occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility. Clerks of court are sometimes appointed or designated as provincial sheriffs. Municipal
Treasurers like Plaintiff are often appointed and designated as deputy provincial treasurer. The
Department Secretaries are often designated to act as Chairman or members of Board of Directors of
government corporations. The objection or prohibition refers to double compensation and not to
double appointments and performance of functions of more than one office.
According to law, under certain circumstances, the President may authorize double compensation in
some cases, such as government officials acting as members with compensation in government
examining boards like the bar examinations, or department secretaries acting as members of Board of
Directors of government corporations, and in such cases the prohibition against double compensation is
not observed. This undoubtedly, was the reason why the appointment of Quimson had to be coursed
through different offices like the Department of Finance, the Civil Service Commission, and the Office of
the Auditor General to the President for approval. If the President approves the double compensation,
well and good. The appointee whose appointment may then be regarded as valid from the beginning
could receive extra compensation. If it is disapproved, then the appointment will have to be withdrawn
or cancelled, unless of course, the appointee was willing to serve without compensation, in which case
there could be no valid objection. This is another proof that the appointment of Quimson was not illegal
or unlawful. It was only the double compensation that was subject to objection. The trouble was
that Plaintiffherein assumed office without waiting for the result of the action to be taken upon his
appointment and compensation by the President and the different offices which the appointment had
to go through.
Furthermore, Quimson would appear to have assumed office without notifying the official who
appointed him, namely, Roman Ozaeta. Plaintiff, therefore, took the risk or hazard of not being paid for
any service that he may render in the meantime. His counsel now contends that the appointing official
should have known that double compensation was prohibited by law and therefore he should not have
appointed Quimson as agent-collector. That is seemingly a plausible stand. But it should be borne in
mind that there are exceptions to the prohibition; that the very comptroller of the Administration,
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representing the Auditor General, recommended the appointment of municipal treasurers, like
the Plaintiff, as agent-collectors, and so DefendantOzaeta and the other members of the Board of
Directors may have believed that the Chief Executive might approve Plaintiff’s appointment. Besides, it
may also be said that Quimson himself, a Deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer, a
financial officer expected to be tersed in government disbursements and payments of salaries and
compensation should have also known and undoubtedly he knew about that prohibition against double
compensation. He should have known that his appointment had to go over or through several obstacles
and hazards, but he took the risk and began serving as agent-collector before his appointment was
approved. We are afraid that he has no one to blame but himself.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.