Administrative Tribunals Notes

CHAPTER I
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS*
The Administrative Tribunals Act, 19851, was enacted by Parliament in
pursuance of article 323 A of the Constitution of India. The jurisdiction and
power to decide disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and
conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in
connection with the affairs of the union or of any state as also any local or
other authority is brought within the exclusive jurisdiction of the central or the
state administrative tribunal, as the case may be. The Act provides for the
exclusion of jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court with respect
to disputes or complaints in service matters. As a result, in respect of matters,
which fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, the jurisdiction
of the High Court stands excluded. It is necessary, first of all to understand
the scope and extent of articles 323 A and 323B of the Constitution.
Scope of articles 323A and 323B

These two articles were inserted into the Constitution along with other
far-reaching amendments made to the Constitution under the Constitution
(Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. These articles constituted a distinct
landmark in the Indian constitutional and administrative law, as these provisions
not merely authorised the creation of the state and central tribunals, for matters
specified in articles 323 A and 323B of the Constitution but also empowered
the appropriate legislature to exclude the jurisdiction of all the courts in respect
of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the tribunals, except that of the
Supreme Court under article 136 of the Constitution. These articles read:
323A. Administrative Tribunals: (1) Parliament may, by law, provide for
the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints
with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to
public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any
State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under
the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled
by the Government.
* Revised by P. Puneeth, Assistant Research Professor, ILL

1 Act No. 13 of 1985. Herein after referred to as 'Act'.
808 Services under the State
(2) A law made under clause (1) may

(a) provide for the establishment of an administrative tribunal for the
Union and a separate administrative tribunal for each State or for two
or more States;
(b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for
contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said
tribunals;
(c) provide for the procedure (including provisions as to limitation and
rules of evidence) to be followed by the said tribunals;
(d) exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes or
complaints referred to in clause (1);
(e) provide for the transfer to each such administrative tribunal of any
cases pending before any court or other authority immediately before
the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the
jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such
suits or proceedings are based had arisen after such establishment;
(f) repeal or amend any order made by the President under clause (3) of
Article 37 ID;
(g) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions
(including provisions as to fees) as Parliament may deem necessary
for the effective functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases
by, and the enforcement of the orders of, such tribunals.
(3) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything
in any other provision of this Constitution or in any other law for the time
being in force.
323-B. Tribunals for other matters: (1) The appropriate Legislature may,
by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by tribunals of any disputes,
complaints, or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in
clause (2) with respect to which such legislature has power to make laws.
(2) The matters referred to in clause (1) are the following, namely:
(a) levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax;
(b) foreign exchange, import and export across customs frontiers;
(c) industrial and labour disputes;
(d) land reforms by way of acquisition by the State of any estate as
defined in Article 31A or of any rights therein or the extinguishment
or modification of any such rights or by way of ceiling on
agricultural land or in any other way;
(e) ceiling on urban property;
Administrative Tribunals 809
(f) election to either House of Parliament or the House or either House

of the Legislature of a State, but excluding the matters referred to
in article 329 and article 329A;
(g) production, procurement, supply and distribution of food-
stuffs(including edible oilseeds and oils) and such other goods as
the President may, by public notification, declare to be essential
goods for the purpose of this article and control of prices of such
goods;
(h) rent, its regulation and control and tenancy issues including the
right, title and interest of landlords and tenants;
(i) offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified
in sub-clauses (a) to (h) and fees in respect of any of those
matters;
(j) any matter incidental to any of the matters specified in sub-clauses
(a) to (i).
(3) A law made under clause (1) may -
(a) provide for the establishment of a hierarchy of tribunals;
(b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish
for contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of
the said tribunals;
(c) provide for the procedure (including provisions as to limitation
and rules of evidence) to be followed by the said tribunals;
(d) exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to all or any of
the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the said tribunals;
(e) provide for the transfer to each such tribunal of any cases pending
before any court or any other authority immediately before the
establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the
jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which
such suits or proceedings are based had arisen after such
establishment;
(f) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions
(including provisions as to fees) as the appropriate Legislature
may deem necessary for the effective functioning of, and for the
speedy disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders
of, such tribunals.
(4) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything
in any other provisions of this Constitution or in any other law for the time
being in force.
Explanation: In this article, "appropriate Legislature", in relation to any
matter means Parliament or, as the case may be, a State Legislature competent
to make laws with respect to such matter in accordance with the provisions
of Part XI.
Similarities in scope and purport of the two articles
The scope and purport of the two articles, which are common, are:
(1) The legislature is empowered to enact a law providing for establishment
of tribunals for the adjudication of disputes between the state and the
individual relating to certain specified matters and also to specify the
jurisdiction and powers of such tribunals.
(2) The legislature can also prescribe the procedure to be followed by
such tribunals including the period of limitation for institution of tribunals
and the rules of evidence.
(3) The 'aw also couW provide for the transfer of cases pending before
any court or other authority except the Supreme Court at the time of
establishment of each tribunal, to such tribunal.
(4) Such law could exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except that of
the Supreme Court under article 136 of the Constitution in respect of
such specified matters.
(5) Such law could also confer on the tribunal the power to punish for
their contempt.
(6) The provisions of both the articles have an overriding effect on other
provisions of the Constitution or any other law in force.
Distinction between articles 323A and 323B
Article 323A enables only Parliament to enact a law for the establishment
of administrative tribunals for deciding disputes and complaints of public
servants in respect of service matters of the union and of the states. Only one
tribunal for the union and a separate tribunal for each state or for two or more
states could be constituted by law made in pursuance of article 323 A, whereas
under article 323 B, the tribunals could be constituted in respect of any of the
matters specified in clause (2) thereof. The power to enact the law under this
article is vested in the appropriate state legislature, i.e. either Parliament or
state legislature, according to their respective legislative competence over each
of the subjects specified in the article.
To put in a nutshell, these two articles provide for conferment ofjurisdiction
and power ofjudicial review of administrative action, vested in the high courts
under article 226, on the tribunals concerned in respect of matters which fall
within their respective jurisdiction and to exclude the jurisdiction of the high
courts in respect of those matters so that the parties aggrieved by the decisions
of the tribunal could only approach the Supreme Court under article 136 of the
Constitution. The object and purpose of the articles is speedy disposal of
cases falling under those categories.
Salient aspects of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985

The preamble to the Act states that the Act is enacted pursuant to Article
323 A of the Constitution. The Act was made applicable, insofar as it relates to
the Central Administrative Tribunal, to the whole of India and insofar as it
relates to administrative tribunals for states, it was made applicable to the
whole of India except the state of Jammu and Kashmir2. However, the
provisions of the Act are not made applicable to 3 : (i) any member of the naval,
military or air force or of any other armed forces of the union; (ii) any officer
or servant of the Supreme Court or of any high court, and (iii) any person
appointed to the secretarial staff of either House of Parliament or to the
secretarial staff of any State Legislature or a House thereof or, in the case of a
Union Territory having a legislature, of that legislature. Later on in the year of
1987, even the officers and servants of the subordinate courts were also
excluded from the purview of the Act4 .
Section 3(q) of the Act defines "service matters" thus: "service matters",
in relation to a person, means all matters relating to the conditions of his
service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any
local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation or society
owned or controlled by the Government, as respects-
(i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement
benefits;
(ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion,
premature retirement and superannuation;
(iii) leave of any kind;
(iv) disciplinary matters; or
(v) any other matters whatsoever.
Sub-section (1) of section 4 provides for the establishment of ce/itral
administrative tribunals. Sub-section (2) of section 4 empowers the central
government to establish an administrative tribunal for any state on receipt of
such a request from the State government. Section 5 provides for the
composition of tribunals and benches thereof. According to sub-section (1) of
section 5, each tribunal shall consist of a chairman and such number of vice-
chairmen [and judicial and administrative members]5, as the appropriate
government may deem fit and subject to the provisions of the Act, the
jurisdiction, powers and authority of the tribunal may be exercised by the
2 Sec. 1 (2) of the Act.

3 Sec. 2 of the Act.
4 Ins. by sec. 2 of Act No. 51 of 1987 (w.e.f. 22:12:1987).
5 Subs. By sec. 6 ofAct 19 of 1986, for the words "and other members" (w.e.f. 01:11:1985).
Benches thereof. Section 5(2) provides that a bench shall consist of one judicial
member and an administrative member. Section 5(4)(b) authorises the chairman
to transfer the vice-chairman of a Bench or other member thereof to any other
bench. Section 6( 1), (2) and (3) prescribes the qualification for appointment
as chairman, vice-chairman and judicial member and administrative member.6
Sub-section (4) and (5) of section 6 designates the President as the
appointing authority to appoint chairman, vice-chairman and members of the
central as well as the state tribunals. However, the appointments to the state
tribunals shall be made after consultation with the Governor of the state
concerned. Section 6(7) provides that appointment of chairman or vice-
chairman or member possessing the qualification specified in sub-section (3)
of section 6 should be made only after consultation with the Chief Justice of
Qualifications for appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other Members-

(1) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Chairman unless he-
(a) is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or
(b) has, for at least tvyo years, held the office of Vice-Chairman; or
(c) has, for at least two years, held the post of a secretary to the government of
India or any other post under the central or a state government carrying a
scale of pay which is not less than that of a secretary to the Government of
India.
(2) Λ person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Vice-Chairman unless hc-
(a) is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a judge of a high court; or
(b) has, for at least two years, held the post of a Secretary to the Government of
India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a
scale of pay which is not less than of a secretary to the Government of India;
or
(bb) has, for at least five years, held the post of an Additional Secretary to the
Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government
carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of an Additional Secretary
to the Government of India; or
(c) has, for a period of not less than three years, held office as a Judicial Member
or an Administrative Member
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judicial Member unless he-
(a) is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a Judge of a High Court; or
(b) has been a member of the Indian Legal Service and has held a post in Grade I
of that Service for at least three years.
(3A)A person shall not be qualified for appointment as an Administrative Member
unless he-
fa) has, for at least two years, held the post of an Additional Secretary to the
Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government
carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of an Additional Secretary
to the Government of India; or
(b) has, for at least three years, held the post of a Joint Secretary to the Government
of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying
a scale of pay which is not less than that of a joint secretary to the Government
oflndia,
and shall, in either case, have adequate administrative experience.
India. Section 8 fixes the tenure of office of chairman, vice-chairman as five

years or 65 years of age, whichever is earlier and of the member as five years
or 62 years of age, whichever is earlier. However, provision has been made
for re-appointment for another term of five years subject to the upper age limit
of 65 or, as the case may be, 62 years. Section 9 provides for the procedure
for resignation and removal of chairman, vice-chairman and other members
of the tribunal. Section 10 of the Act authorizes the central government to
prescribe the salaries and allowances and terms and conditions of services of
the chairman, vice-chairman and members of the Tribunal, but, however, the
same can't be altered to their disadvantage after their appointment. Section 11
of the Act bars the chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal, on ceasing
to be such chairman, from holding any further employment either under the
Government of India or under the government of states. The vice-chairman
and members of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the chairman, vice-
chairman and members of the State Administrative Tribunal are also prohibited,
after ceasing to be such chairman, vice-chairman, or, as the case may be,
member of central or state Administrative tribunal, from holding any other
employment either under the central or under the state Government except
those employment to which they were expressly made eligible under the Act.
Section 14 which confers jurisdiction, powers and authority on the central
administrative tribunal reads: -
Section 14. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the
Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day,
all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that
day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to -
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All India
Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the
Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services,
being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian;
(b) all service matters concerning:-.
(i) a member of any All-India Service; or
(ii) a person not being a member of an All India Service or person
referred to in clause (c) appointed to any civil service of the
Union or any civil post under the Union; or
(iii) a civilian not being a member of an All India Service or a person
referred to in clause (c) appointed to any defence services or a
post connected with defence, and pertaining to the service of
such member, person or civilian, in connection with the affairs
of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority
within the territory of India or under the control of the Government
of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by
the Government.
(iv) All service matters pertaining to service in connection with the

affairs of the Union concerning a person appointed to any service
post referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) of clause (b)
being a person whose services have been placed by the State
Government or any local or other authority or any corporation or
society or other body, at the disposal of the Central Government
for such appointment. (Emphasis added).
Section 15 is similarly worded and specifies powers and authority of state
administrative tribunals in relation to service matters and recruitment to state
civil services and posts. Section 17 confers power on the tribunal to punish
for contempt of itself in the same manner as the high court has under the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Section 18 provides for
distribution of business amongst the benches. Clause (1) of section 18 provides
that the appropriate government may, from time to time, by notification,
distribute the business of the tribunal. Clause (2) of section 18 provides that if
any question arises as to whether any matter falls within the purview of the
business allocated to a bench of a tribunal, the decision of the chairman thereon,
shall befinal.Section 19 provides for making the applications before the tribunals.
Section 20 provides that the tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application
unless the applicant has exhausted the remedy available under the relevant
service rules. Section 21 prescribes the period of limitation as one year for
making an application from the date on which the final order was made. Section
22 prescribes the procedure and powers of the tribunals. According to the
said provision, the tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down by the
Civil Procedure Code, but is required to act in conformity with the rules of
natural justice. Sub-section (3) of section 22 confers on the tribunal the power
available to a civil court under the Civil Procedure Code, in respect of matters
specified in clauses (a) to (i) thereof. Section 23 provides that every applicant
before the tribunal has a right to take the assistance of a legal practitioner.
Under section 24, normally, the tribunal cannot pass any interim order unless
copies of the application are served on the opposite parties and opportunity is
given to such parties .of being heard, but under certain circumstances the
tribunal can dispense with the above requirement and grant an interim order
for a period not exceeding 14 days. Section 25 confers power on the chairman
to transfer cases from one bench to another. Section 26 provides that the
decision of the bench shall be taken by majority. Section 27 provides for the
execution of the orders of the tribunal. Section 28 provides for exclusion of
jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court under article 136 of the
Constitution and section 29 provides for transfer of all pending cases before
any court, which falls within the jurisdiction of the tribunal under section 28
of the Act.
Section 30 of the Act declares that all proceedings before the tribunal shall
be deemed to be judicial proceedings. Section 31 says that the members and
staff of the tribunal shall be deemed to be public servants. Section 32 protects

the actions taken in good faith. The Act was given an overriding effect under
section 33 of the Act. Section 34 confers the power on the Central Government
to remove difficulties. Sections 35 and 36 of the Act confer power to make
rules on the central government and appropriate government respectively.
Section 37 provides for lying of the rules before the Parliament or, as the case
may be, state legislature for consideration.
Under the provisions of the Act, Central Administrative Tribunal was
established with its principal bench at New Delhi with effect from 1 November
1985. It has 16 other benches located in various parts of the country to
adjudicate service related disputes of the central government employees and
other employees specifically covered by it. In addition, administrative tribunals
in eight states were established by the Central Government on the request of
the respective state government to adjudicate service related disputes of state
government employees.
Does jurisdiction to decide disputes and complaints in service matters
include jurisdiction to decide constitutional validity of service laws?
In view of the express provision contained in clause (d) of article 323A(2),
and in view of clause (3) of article 323A there was no room for doubt that
every dispute in respect of service matters of public servants fall within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal concerned and consequently the
jurisdiction of the concerned high court over those matters stands totally
excluded. In other words, the administrative tribunal substitutes the jurisdiction
of the high court in respect of disputes and complaints in service matters.
Consequently the jurisdiction of the high courts stands denuded to that extend.
Therefore, on and after the date of conferment of jurisdiction on the
administrative tribunal, the high courts have no power to retain or entertain
any petition in respect of disputes and complaints in service matters. As the
jurisdiction and power to decide the constitutional validity of service law is
entirely of a different dimension, the following fundamental question was raised
before the High Court of Karnataka in the case of S.M.Pattanaik v. Secretary
to Government of India'?
Whether on the coming into force of the Administrative Tribunals Act
1985 and the establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal,
the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India to retain or entertain petitions presented under that Article
before it, challenging the constitutional validity of any law regulating
recruitment and conditions of persons appointed to public services
and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and decide
7 ILR 1986 Kar 3954.

such petitions stood excluded and got vested in the Central

Administrative Tribunal?
Earlier a division bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of M.B.
Shukla v. Union of India* had taken the view that as the jurisdiction of the
Iiigh court under article 226 was an extraordinary jurisdiction, to issue
prerogative writs, the writ proceedings do not fall within the meaning of the
word 'proceedings' used in sections 28 and 29 of the Administrative Tribunals
Act and, therefore, the high court can continue to entertain or retain petitions
under article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of prerogative writs even in
respect of service matters. The Karnataka High Court disagreed with the above
view and held that as the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the high court in
respect of service matters was authorised by article 323A(2)(d) and as clause
(3) thereof gave overriding effect to the provisions of the article, the jurisdiction
of the high court under article 226 had to yield to the provisions of article
323A read with the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act enacted
there under. The court further held that the word 'proceeding' was wide
enough to include writ proceedings and consequently the high court can neither
entertain nor retain the writ petitions on and after the constitution of the
administrative tribunal, in respect of disputes and complaints in service matters
of public servants falling, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal.
However, the court held that the jurisdiction to decide disputes and
complaints did not, under the scheme of the Constitution, include the jurisdiction
to decide constitutional validity of service law and accordingly answered the
question in the negative. In coming to the conclusion, the high court relied on
the ratio of the four Constitution bench decisions of the Supreme Court in
Jugul Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank,9 East India Commercial
Company v. Collector of Customs,10 Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v.
Dikshitalu,u and Raja Ganga Pratap v. Allahabad Bank,12 in which the
Supreme Court had interpreted the provisions of the Constitution relating to
the position and role assigned to the high courts under the Constitution and
had also laid down the guiding principles for the interpretation of constitutional
provisions. The relevant portion of the judgment reads:
We have to construe the words 'disputes and complaints' used in
Article 323A of the Constitution. Under the said Article, Parliament is
given the power to establish Administrative Tribunals for deciding
disputes and complaints in respect of recruitment and conditions of
service of civil servants. Clause 2(d) of the Article enables... Parliament
8 AIR 1986 All 2.

9 AIR 1967 SC 1494.
10 AIR 1962 SC 1893.
11 AIR 1979 SCI 93.
12 AIR 1958 SC 293.
to exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court

under Article 136 of the Constitution with respect to the above matters.
The words 'disputes and complaints'" have not been defined either in
the Constitution or in the Act. The words 'service matter' is defined
vide Section 2(q) of the Act, which indicates that every type of dispute
or complaint which a civil servant might raise, relying on the law
regulating any of his conditions of service or recruitment, would be a
service matter and therefore falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
Neither Article 323A nor Section 2(r) which defines 'service matter'
nor Sections 14, 28 or 29, provide that disputes and complaints which
could be raised before the Tribunal would include questions relating
to the constitutional validity of the law regulating the conditions of
service and recruitment of civil servante. A jurisdiction of that
magnitude has to be conferred and cannot be inferred. Therefore, the
very absence of a provision in Article 323A of the Constitution which
enables... Parliament to confer on an Administrative Tribunal the
jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of the laws constitutes
a strong ground to say that judicial review of legislation, which is
expressly conferred on the Courts established by the Constitution
itself, namely, the High Courts and the Supreme Court, which was
exclusive before the insertion of Article 323 A continues to be exclusive
even after its insertion. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the
case of Dikshitalu, if...Parliament intended to include officers and
servants of High Court and the subordinate Courts and members of
judicial service in the expression 'civil servants'... Parliament would
have expressly stated so. Similarly in this case if.. .Parliament intended
that the Administrative Tribunals to be constituted under a law enacted
by the Legislature, should be invested with the jurisdiction to decide
constitutional validity of the laws regulating the conditions of service,
it would have used the words 'including questions relating to the
constitutional validity of laws regulating recruitment and conditions
of service' after the words 'disputes and complaints' used in Article
323 A of the Constitution, particularly when the jurisdiction to decide
the constitutional validity of all laws was vested in the High Court by
virtue of Articles 226 and 228 and continued to be vested in the High
Court by Article 228-A introduced by Section 42 of the 42nd
Amendment itself. The very fact that such words are not included in
Article 323-A (1) after the words 'disputes and complaints'' takes the
jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity of the laws outside the
purview of Clause (1) and consequently outside the purview of the
Administrative Tribunal constituted pursuant to a law made by virtue
of the power given under the Article and therefore the exclusion of
jurisdiction of the High Court which could be provided for in view of
Clause (d) and the overriding effect given to Article 323A by Clause
Services under the State
(3) thereof, would not operate in respect of the jurisdiction of the

High Court to decide constitutional validity of any law regulating
recruitment and conditions of service.
Further, a careful analysis of some of the new Articles, which affected
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the high court;, and also
imposed conditions on the exercise of their jurisdiction and power,
which were inserted into the Constitution by the Constitution 42nd
Amendment Act, which brought about far reaching changes in the
structure of the Constitution by which Article 3 23 A was also inserted
into the Constitution would also show that such a conclusion is correct
and irresistible.13
... The vital changes brought about by the Amendment in respect of
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts and regarding
its exercise were:
Only a Bench consisting of a minimum of Seven Judges of the Supreme
Court could decide the constitutional validity of law that too only by a
two-third majority;
144Λ. (1) The minimum number of Judges of the Supreme Court who shall sit for the
purpose of determining any question as to the constitutional validity of any Central
law or State law shall be seven.
(2) A Central law or a State law shall not be declared to be constitutionally invalid by the
Supreme Court unless a majority of not less than two thirds of the Judges sitting for the
purpose of determining the question as to the constitutional validity of such law hold
it to be constitutionally invalid.
228Λ. (1) No High Court shall have jurisdiction to declare any Central law to be
constitutionally invalid.
(2) Subject to the provisions ofArticle 131 A, the High Court may determine all questions
relating to the constitutional validity of any State Law.
(3) The minimum number of judges who shall sit for the purpose of determining any
question as to the constitutional validity of any State law shall be five: Provided that
where the High Court consists of less than five Judges, all the Judges of the High Court
may sit and determine such question.
(4) A State law shall not be declared to be constitutionally invalid by the High Court
unless:-
(a) where the High Court consists of five Judges or more, not less than two-thirds of
the Judges sitting for the purpose of determining the validity of such law hold it to
be constitutionally invalid; and
(b) where the High Court consists of less than five Judges, all the Judges of High
Court sitting for the puipose hold it to be constitutionally invalid,
(5) The Provisions of this Article shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained
in this part.
Explanation: In computing the number of Judges of a High Court for the purpose of this
Article, a Judge who is disqualified by reason of personal or pecuniary bias shall be
excluded.
Only a Bench consisting of not less than Five Judges of the High
Court could decide the constitutional validity of law that too only by a
two-thirds majority.
Thus, it may be seen, conditions which were not existing from the
date of commencement of the Constitution on the exercise of
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in relation to
the adjudication of cases involving constitutional validity of the laws
were imposed by Parliament by enacting the 42nd Amendment to the
Constitution. Having incorporated such conditions even on the Supreme
Court and the High Courts for the exercise of the jurisdiction and
power to decide the constitutional validity of the laws, it is difficult,
nay impossible to agree that Articles 323-Aand 323-B of the same Act
intended to authorise the appropriate Legislature to constitute a Tribunal
and to confer on it the jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity
of the laws, on the topics specified in the two Articles. No doubt that
all the above Articles which imposed such conditions on the exercise
of the power of the Supreme Court and the High Courts to decide the
constitutional validity of the laws, were deleted, by the Constitution
43rd Amendment and thereby the status quo ante 42nd Amendment
was restored. However, in view of the well settled principles of
interpretation discernible from the decisions of the Supreme Court,
discussed earlier, for the purpose of ascertaining the true scope and
ambit of Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution, the other
provisions introduced by the 42nd Amendment Act as a part of single
legislative scheme are relevant and they throw a flood of light on the
crucial point arising for consideration and give a conclusive indication
that the jurisdiction to decide constitutional validity of the laws was
not at all intended to be conferred on a Tribunal to be constituted
under a law enacted by Parliament or State Legislature under Article
323-B.
Further, a contrary view would lead to astounding results. There can
be no doubt that the power to decide constitutional validity of laws
includes the power to decide as to whether an amendment to the
Constitution is invalid on the ground that it affected the basic structure
of the Constitution. Take for instance a civil servant, who is dismissed
from service, while challenging the legality of the order, by which he
was dismissed, on the ground that second opportunity after the findings
were recorded by the Inquiring Authority was not given, chooses to
challenge the constitutional validity of Section 44 of the 42nd
Amendment Act on the ground that the amendment of Article 311(2)
deleting the requirement to give second opportunity affects the basic
structure of the Constitution, the Tribunal constituted under the Act
could also decide such question, and to the exclusion of the High
Courts.
Similarly, a State Legislature, in view of the provisions of Article 323-
B, which is similarly worded as Article 323-A, could enact a law
constituting a Tribunal to decide disputes arising, inter alia, under
Land Reform Laws or Taxation Laws and exclude the jurisdiction of
the High Court in such matters, in which event such a Tribunal would
also be invested with the jurisdiction to decide the constitutional validity
of the provisions of such law but not the High Court. Further, such a
Tax Tribunal could also decide the validity of the 46th Amendment to
the Constitution by which the definition of the word 'sale' was
expanded which is the subject matter of several Writ Petitions before
this Court. Certainly such a result was not intended.
The high court accordingly ruled that "On the coming into force of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and the establishment of the Central
Administrative Tribunal the jurisdiction of the high court under article 226 of
the Constitution of India to retain or entertain petitions presented under that
Article before it, challenging the constitutional validity of any law regulating
recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services
and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, and decide such petitions
stand excluded and did not get vested in the Central Administrative Tribunal".
For these very reasons the court disagreed with the view taken by the
Allahabad High Court in Shukla.14
The substance of the decision is that, the jurisdiction of the high court to
entertain or retain writ petitions in which the constitutional validity of any
service law is challenged which were required to be heard only by a seven
judge Bench of the Supreme Court or by afivejudge bench of the high court,
had the Article 141A and 228A were not deleted by the 43rd amendment,
continues to vest only in the high court and all other writ petitions in service
matters cannot be retained or entertained by the high courts and they fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal.
The high court in its judgment has also explained the matters, which fall in
such category, in the following paragraphs:
In view of the respective and mutually exclusive jurisdiction of the
High Courts and of the Administrative Tribunals, it is necessary to
clarify as to the categories of cases, which fall within the exelusive
jurisdiction of the High Courts and of the Administrative Tribunals. In
this behalf, it is necessary to note that there is a clear difference
between enforcement of fundamental rights and other provisions of
the Constitution as reflected in the laws enacted or otherwise, while
questioning the legality of an order imposing penalties on a civil servant
14 See supra note 8.

or affecting any of his conditions of service or any of his rights in

matters relating to recruitment, and, enforcement of the fundamental
rights and other provisions of the Constitution by way of challenging
the constitutional validity of the law regulating the conditions of service
or recruitment. The first category would be squarely within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal and therefore excluded from the jurisdiction
of the High Court and the second category is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the High Courts and not included in the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal.
A few illustrations would show the clear difference between the two
categories:
(1) Articles 14 and 16 confer right to equality and equal opportunity in
matters relating to employment under the State:
(a) A challenge to an order of termination of service on the ground
that it is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution does not involve constitutional validity of any law
but only would involve question of constitutional validity of the
order (See: Government Branch Press, Mercara v. D.B.
Belliappa)}s
(b) A challenge to an order of termination of service on the ground
that the rule which authorised termination of service without
assigning any reason, itself was violative of Articles 14 and 16,
would be a case involving constitutional validity of the law, for,
unless the rule is held to be void the termination of service cannot
be set aside. (See: Motiram Deka's case;16 T.C. Srinivasa Murthy
v. Union of Indian1 and Central Inland Water Transport
Corporation Limited v. Brojonath).]S
(2) (a) A complaint that a selection and appointment made was in violation
of the order providing for reservation of posts in favour of
backward classes, whether by exceeding reservation or not giving
effect to the reservation and thereby the right guaranteed under
Articles 14 and 16 was denied, is a matter which does not involve
any question of constitutional validity of the law.
(b) But a complaint that reservation order itself is, unconstitutional
on the ground of arbitrary classification or excessive reservation
would be a matter involving constitutional validity of the law.
15 AIR 1979 SC 429.

16 AIR 1964 SC 600.
17 1982 (l)LLJ 268.
18 AIR 1986 SC 1571.
(3) (a) If a civil servant says that though he was senior, his case was not
considered for promotion as required under the rule and seeks a
direction for his promotion, it is only a case of enforcement of
the relevant rule as also right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution. (See: District Registrars. KB. Kayya Kutti™
and Union of India v. M.L.Capoor).20
(b) If non-promotion of civil servant is challenged on the ground that
the rule, which denied him the promotion, was violative of Articles
14 and 16, it would be a case involving the question of
constitutional validity. (See: N.S. Mehta v. Union of Indian Smt.
Juthika Bhattacharya v. The State of M.P. ;22 and S.L Sachdev
v. Union of India)?11
(4) Article 311(2) of the Constitution ensures security of tenure to civil
servants.
(a) If an order imposing penalty of dismissal or removal from service
is challenged on the ground that it was violative of Article 311(2)
and/or the rules regulating disciplinary proceedings, it would be a
case of enforcement of the rule concerned and also Article 311 (2).
(b) If an order which brought about the termination of service of a
civil servant is challenged on the ground that the Rule or Law
pursuant to which determination of tenure was brought about is
violative of Article 311(2), it would be a case of challenge to the
constitutional validity of the law (See: Motiram Deka24 and also
G.S. Sidhu v. State of Punjab).25
Therefore, a clear distinction must be made between:
(1) The cases in which the provisions of Article 14 or 16 or 311 or any
other provision of the Constitution are invoked while challenging the
legality of an order or action on the ground that the provision of a law
intended to give effect to those Articles of the Constitution had been
violated, or in the absence of any such law, the provision of the
Constitution itself was violated and,
(2) The cases in which the provisions of a law regulating recruitment and
conditions of service under which an order or action, the legality of
which is challenged, was made or taken, itself is challenged on the
19 AIR 1979 SC 1060.

20 AIR 1974 SC 87.
21 AIR 1977 SC 1673.
22 AIR 1976 SC 2534.
23 AIR 1981 SC 111.
24 Supra note 16.
25 AIR I964SC 1585.
ground that it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 or 311 or any other

provision of the Constitution.
It is only the second category of cases, which could be retained or
entertained by the high courts.
It is also necessary to observe that in order that a petition by a civil servant
in respect of his service matter is maintainable before the high court, the relief
sought for should be such as could be granted only upon a declaration that the
law the validity of which is challenged in the petition, is invalid. Therefore, by
merely adding a prayer in a writ petition for declaring a provision of service
law invalid, though the relief sought for does not depend upon its invalidity,
jurisdiction of this court cannot be invoked.
The said question i.e., whether the power and jurisdiction to decide
constitutional validity of the service laws also stood vested in the administrative
tribunal and consequently the high courts were divested of the jurisdiction
was specifically raised before the apex court in J.B. Chopra v. Union of
India.26 In Sampath Kumar v. Union of India,27 which was decided prior to
Chopra, the said question was not raised before the apex court. However, in
Chopra, the apex court has proceeded on the premise that the issue has been
resolved in Sampath Kumar itself. This is evident from the following observation
of the apex court made in Chopra's case:28
In S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India and others (J.T.I 986 SC
996) the Constitution Bench has held that the Act is a law made by
Parliament under cl (1) of art. 323 A to exclude the jurisdiction of the
high court under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Section 28 of
the Act which bars the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme
Court is relatable to cf. 2(d) of art. 323A for adjudication of service
matters including questions involving the validity or otherwise of such
laws on the ground that they abridge the fundamental rights under
arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution, and that the Administrative
Tribunal set up under section 4 of the Act is a substitute for and not
supplemental to the high court, providing an equally efficacious
alternative remedy for adjudication of such disputes. It has further
held that the establishment of the Administrative Tribunal under the
Act therefore takes away the jurisdiction and power of the High Courts
to interfere in such matters but it is not violative of the doctrine of
judicial review which is a fundamental aspect of the basic structure
of our Constitution because Section 28 of the Act which bars the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts.226 and 227 of the
26 AIR 1987 SC 357.

27 Infra note 33.
28 Supra note 26.
Constitution preserves the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme

Court under Arts. 32 and 136 of the Constitution. It accordingly follows
that the Administrative Tribunal being a substitute of the High Court
had the necessary jurisdiction, power and authority to adjudicate upon
all disputes relating to service matters including the power to deal
with all questions pertaining to the constitutional validity or otherwise
of such laws as offending Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution.
As can be seen from the four questions formulated in the case of Sampath
Kumar, the precise question namely, as to whether the administrative tribunal
has the power to decide the constitutional validity of a law regulating the
conditions of service and consequently the jurisdiction of the high court even
in respect of those matters stood excluded by the provisions of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, was neither raised nor considered. This aspect
has not been brought to the notice of the bench, which decided Chopra. On
the other hand it appears that the representation made was the question had
already been decided by the Constitution Bench in Sampath Kumar. However,
the fact remains that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chopra,
the administrative tribunals have the power to decide constitutional validity of
service laws, i.e. the rules framed by the President or the Governor, as the
case may be, or the laws enacted by Parliament or the appropriate legislature,
and the high courts have no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions even in
respect of those matters. If this position were to hold the field, on the
constitution of tribunals to decide disputes and complaints in respect of various
matters by laws enacted under article 323B, and on the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the high courts under these laws, the jurisdiction to decide
constitutional validity of all such laws would be vested in those tribunals and
the high court would be denuded of the jurisdiction to decide the constitutional
validity of law on all those topics. Any State legislature by enacting an ordinary
law could divest the high court of its constitutional jurisdiction under articles
226 and 227 to decide constitutional validity of laws in respect of such matters
specified in article 323 B as would fall within the competence of State legislature.
Thus the author, in the last edition, has expressed his concern that "this question
goes to the very root of our constitutional system as understood so far, and
hence, it is prominently a question to be specifically considered and decided
by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court".
The said question has, however, been considered by a seven judge

constitutional bench of the apex court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of
India29 where the court, while holding that "though the subordinate judiciary
or tribunal created under the ordinary legislation cannot exercise the power of
judicial review of legislative action to the exclusion of the high courts and the
29 (1997) 3 SCC 261

supreme court, there is no constitutional prohibition against their performing a

supplemental - as opposed to a substitutional - role in this respect", has
observed as follows:30
If the power under Article 32 of the Constitution, which has been
described as the "heart" and "soul" of the Constitution, can be
additionally conferred upon "any other court", there is no reason why
the same situation cannot subsist in respect of the jurisdiction conferred
upon the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. So long
as the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and that
of this court under Article 32 is retained, there is no reason why the
power to test the validity of legislations against the provisions of the
Constitution cannot be conferred upon Administrative Tribunals
created under the Act or upon Tribunals created under article 323 - B
of the Constitution. It is to be remembered that, apart from the
authorisation that flows from articles 323 - A and 323 - B, both
Parliament and the State Legislatures possess legislative competence
to effect changes in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
the High Courts. This power is available to Parliament under Entries
77, 78,79 and 95of List I and to the State Legislatures under Entry 65
of List 11; Entry 46 of List III can also be availed of both by Parliament
and the State Legislatures for this purpose.
The apex court, however, has made a suggestion to insert a proviso to
section 5 (6) of the Administrative Tribunals Act to the effect that, "whenever
a question involving the constitutionality of any provision arises the matter
shall be referred to a two-member bench, one of whom is a judicial member".
So that, questions involving the vires of a statutory provision or rule will never
arise for adjudication before a single member bench or a bench which does
not consist of a judicial member. In Government of T.N. v. S.
Balasubramanian?x the apex court, while reiterating its stand, has held that
"case involving question of validity of statutory rules should not be heard and
disposed of by tribunal comprising an administrative member alone.
Thus, in L. Chandra Kumar, though the apex court has reiterated that the
tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of the statutory
provisions are questioned, the vigour of J.B. Chopra was watered downed to
certain extent. In Chopra, it was held that the tribunals set-up under the
Administrative Tribunals Act are 'substitute for' and not 'supplemental to'
high courts whereas in L. Chandra Kumar, per contra, it was held that their
function is supplementary and all such decisions of the tribunal will be subject
to scrutiny before a division bench of the respective high courts. And, further,
30 Id, para 81
31 (1995) 6 SCC 642.
in L. Chandra Kumar, the power of the tribunal to test the vires of statutory
provisions including subordinate legislations and rules was made subject to an
important exception that the tribunal shall not entertain any question regarding
the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a tribunal
which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional.
However, in L. Chandra Kumar, various issues raised in Pattanaik s judgment
by the Karnataka High Court32 have not been answered by the apex court.
Thus, the question has still not been convincingly resolved. But the present
position is that, by virtue of L. Chandra Kumar s ruling, the tribunals set up
under article 323 A or 323 B are competent to test the vires of statutory provisions
subject to an exception mentioned above. However, their function in this respect
is only supplementary to the high courts. The mounting arrears of service
matters before the high courts since independence is one of the justifications
offered by the apex court in arriving at this conclusion.
Creation of administrative tribunal does not affect basic structure

In S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of Indian the constitutional validity of
the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act was challenged mainly on
the ground that exclusion ofjudicial review of administrative action from the
purview of the high court and its conferment on the administrative tribunal
affected the basic structure of the Constitution. In the said case, the Constitution
Bench formulated the questions that arose in view of the contentions urged by
the parties. They were:34
(a) Judicial review is a fundamental aspect of the basic structure of our
Constitution and bar of the jurisdiction of the high court under Arts.
226 and 227 as contained in S.28 of the Act cannot be sustained.
(b) Even if the bar ofjurisdiction is upheld, the Tribunal being a substitute
of the High Court, its constitution and set up should be such that it
would in fact function as such substitute and become an institution in
which the parties could repose faith and trust. *
(c) Benches of the Tribunal should not only be established at the seat of
every High Court but should be available at every place where the
High Courts have permanent benches.
(d) So far as Tribunals set up or to be set up by the Central or the State
Governments are concerned, they should have no jurisdiction in respect
of employees of the Supreme Court or members of the subordinate
judiciary and employees working in such establishments inasmuch as
exercise ofjurisdiction of the Tribunal would interfere with the control
32 Supra note 7.
33 AIR 1987 SC386.ATR 1987 SC 34.
34 Id, at 393.
absolutely vested in the respective High Courts in regard to the judicial

and other subordinate officers under Art.235 of the Constitution.
The apex court while negating the first contention has observed as follows:35
[J]udicial review by this Court is left wholly unaffected and thus
there is a forum where matters of importance and grave injustice can
be brought for determination or rectification. Thus exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the High Court does not totally bar judicial review. This
Court in Minerva Mills36 ...pointed out that "effective alternative
institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review" can be
made by Parliament... The debates and deliberations spread over almost
two decades for exploring ways and means for relieving the high
courts of the load of backlog of cases and for assuring quick settlement
of service disputes in the interest of the public servants as also the
country cannot be lost sight of while considering this aspect. It has
not been disputed before us - and perhaps could not have been - that
the Tribunal under the scheme of the Act would take over a part of
the existing backlog and a share of the normal load of the High Courts.
The Tribunal has been contemplated as a substitute and not as
supplemental to the High Court in the scheme of administration of
justice. To provide the tribunal as an additional forum from where
parties could go to the high court could certainly have been a retrograde
step considering the situation and circumstances to meet which the
innovation has been brought about. Thus barring of the jurisdiction of
the High Court can indeed not be a valid ground of attack.
With reference to the second question, the Supreme Court held that it is of
paramount importance that the substitute institution - the tribunal- must be a
worthy successor of high court in all respects. Accordingly it ruled that:37
So far as the chairman is concerned, we are of the view that ordinarily
a retiring or retired Chief Justice of a High Court or when such a
person is not available, a Senior Judge of proved ability either in office
or retired should be appointed. That office should for all practical
purposes be equated with the office of Chief Justice of a high court.
We must immediately point out that we have no bias, in any manner,
against Members of the Service. Some of them do exhibit great
candour, wisdom, capacity to deal with intricate problems with
understanding, detachment and objectiveness but judicial discipline
generated by experience and training in an adequate dose is, in our
opinion, a necessary qualification for the post of Chairman. We agree
35 Id, at 395.
36 AIR 1980 SC 1789.
37 Supra note 33 at 397.
that a Vice-Chairman with these qualifications and experience of two

years may be considered for appointment as chairman but in order
that the Tribunal may be acceptable to the litigants who are themselves
members of the various services, S.6 (1) (c) should be omitted. We
do not want to say anything about Vice-Chairman and members dealt
with in sub-sections (2), (3) or (3A) because so far as their selection
is concerned, we are of the view that such selection when it is not of
a sitting Judge or retired Judge of a High Court should be done by a
high powered committee with a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court
to be nominated by the Chief Justice of India as its Chairman. This
will ensure selection of proper and competent people to man these
high offices of trust and help to build up reputation and acceptability.
Once the qualifications indicated for appointment of Chairman are
adopted and the manner of selection of Vice-Chairman and Members
is followed, we are inclined to think that the manning of the Tribunal
would be proper and conducive to appropriate functioning. We do
not propose to strike down the prescriptions containing different
requirements but would commend to the Central Government to take
prompt steps to bring the provisions in accord with what we have
indicated. We must state that unless the same is done, the Constitution
of the Tribunal as a substitute of the High Court would be open to
challenge. We hasten to add that our judgment shall operate
prospectively and would not affect appointments already made to the
offices of Vice-Chairman and Member - both administrative and
judicial.
The Supreme Court also observed that section 8 of the Act which prescribed
that the term of office of the chairman, vice-chairman or members shall be 5
years or till the date on which they reach the age of superannuation, whichever
is earlier, was not conducive for attracting younger competent members from
judicial service or Bar as they would have to go out of office after 5 years of
service even when they are far below the age of superannuation and therefore
required an amendment, which Parliament might consider.38
Thus, the apex court, in Sampath Kumar, has perceived the tribunals set
up under the Administrative Tribunals Act as 'substitute for' and not
'supplemental to' the high courts and proceeded further, by suggesting
measures, to make them worthy successors of high courts.
However, in L. Chandra Kumar39 where again the question, whether the
power of judicial review vested in the high courts and in the Supreme Court
under articles 226/227 and 32 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution,
38 Ibid.
39 Supra note 29.
was specifically considered, the apex court has held that the power of judicial
review over legislative action vested in the high courts under article 226 and in
the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential
feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily,
therefore, the power of high courts and the Supreme Court to test the
constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded.
Accordingly, clause 2 (d) of article 323-A and clause 3 (d) of article 323-B, to
the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the high courts and Supreme Court
under articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution were held unconstitutional.
Consequentially, section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and the
"exclusion of jurisdiction " clauses in all other legislations enacted under the
aegis of articles 323-A and 323-B were also held as unconstitutional. "The
jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon
the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution have been declared as
a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution".40
Thus, in L Chandra Kumar, though the provisions ousting the jurisdiction
of high courts and Supreme Court under articles 226/227 and 32 respectively
were held unconstitutional, the apex court was of the opinion that the tribunals
may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by
article 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution since there is no bar for playing
such a supplemental role under our constitutional scheme.
Whether law declared by high court is binding on administrative tribunal
or not?
Much Before the enactment of the Forty-Second Constitutional Amendment
Act and the consequential Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the constitution
bench of the Supreme Court in the case of East India Commercial Company
v. Collector of Customs41 had held that the law declared by a high court is
binding on all the tribunals located within the territory with respect to which
the high court exercises its jurisdiction. There are already large numbers of
decisions rendered by the high courts on questions of law concerning service
matters, before the constitution of the tribunal. Further even under the scheme
of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, proceedings pending in writ appeals
are not transferred to the administrative tribunal. The question is, whether the
decision rendered by the high court concerned earlier to the constitution of the
tribunal or by an appellate bench of the high court after the constitution of the
tribunal, are binding or not on the administrative tribunal, for, if they are not
binding on the administrative tribunal and the questions could be re-opened
before the tribunal, the possibility of conflicting decisions could not be excluded.
40 See id., paras 78, 99.

41 Supra note 10.
Further even in service matters, incidental questions relating to procedure,

privilege and questions relating to interpretation of constitutional provisions
arise for consideration, and the question would be, if there is already a
pronouncement of the high court concerned, whether such declaration of law
will not bind the tribunal though it is located within the territorial jurisdiction of
the high court concerned. This was another question of great constitutional
importance, which was considered by the apex court in State of Orissa v.
Bhagaban Sarangi.42 In this case the apex court has ruled that the "Tribunal
in this case (Orissa Administrative Tribunal) is nonetheless a Tribunal. It is
bound by the decision of the high court of the state and it can not side-track or
by pass it". In Shreedharan Kallat v. Union of India?* where the Central
Administrative Tribunal has commented upon the judgment delivered by the
high court and denied the binding effect of the judgment on the ground of
alleged inconsistency with the rules, the apex court has held that "the legal
position already settled by the high court on the basis of a plausible interpretation
of rules pursuant to which selection and appointments are already made should
not be disturbed by Tribunal, after its coming into existence under the Act on
the basis of another interpretation of the rules when even the Supreme Court
in SLP has refused to interfere with the view of the high court. Such a view of
the high court is against judicial comity and propriety".
Application of 'doctrine of precedent' to administrative tribunals

Another important question to be discussed is whether the law declared
by an earlier bench of the tribunal is binding on the subsequent co-ordinate or
smaller benches of the tribunal?
In Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaswal,Ai while answering the above
question affirmatively, the apex court has held that where a subsequent bench
of the tribunal took a view different from that taken by an earlier bench, it
ought to have referred the matter to a larger bench. Thus, a wrong decision
given in the teeth of the earlier decision based on the decision of the Supreme
Court could not be sustained in the name of equity. The same view was reiterated
by the apex court in K. Ajit Babu v. Union of Indian
Sub-Inspector, Rooplal v. Lt. Governor,46 where a bench of Central
Administrative Tribunal, though aware of a judgment of a co-ordinate bench
on a similar issue, took a different view contrary to the view taken by an
earlier bench, the apex court, while deprecating such an approach, has observed:
42 (1995)1 SCC 399.

43 (1995) 4 SCC 207.
44 (1994) 4 SCC 212.
45 (1997) 6 SCC 473.
46 (2000) 1 SCC 644 .
...the manner in which a co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal has

overruled, in effect, an earlier judgement of another co-ordinate bench
of the same Tribunal is most dissatisfying. This is opposed to all
principles of judicial discipline. If at all, the subsequent bench of the
Tribunal was of the opinion that earlier bench of the same Tribunal
was incorrect; it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench
so that difference of opinion between two co-ordinate benches on the
same point could have been avoided. It is not as if the latter bench
was unaware of the judgment of the earlier bench but knowingly it
proceeded to disagree with the said judgement against all known rules
of precedents. Precedents, which enunciate rules of law, form the
foundations of administration of justice under the Indian systems.
This is a fundamental principle which every presiding officer of a
judicial forum ought to know, for consistency in interpretation of law
alone can lead to public confidence in the judicial system in India. The
Supreme Court has laid down time and again that precedent law must
be followed by all concerned; deviation from the same should only on
a procedure known to all. A subordinate court is bound by the
enunciation of law made by the superior courts. A co-ordinate bench
of a court cannot pronounce judgements contrary to declaration of
law made by another bench. It can only refer it to a larger bench if it
disagrees with the earlier pronouncement.
Relying on the above view, the Supreme Court again in Government of
A. P. v. A.P. Jaiswal,47 has observed that:48
Consistency is the cornerstone of the administration of justice. It is
consistency which creates confidence in the system and this
consistency can never be achieved without respect to the rule of
finality. It is with a view to achieve consistency in judicial
pronouncements, the courts have evolved the rule of precedents,
principle of stare decisis etc. These rules and principles are based on
public policy and if these are not followed by courts then there will be
chaos in the.administration of justice, which we see in plenty in this
case.
Thus, the doctrine of precedent is made applicable in judicial processes of
administrative tribunals as well and the subsequent co-ordinate and smaller
benches of the tribunal are bound by the judgment of the earlier bench of the
same tribunal.
47 (2001)1 SCC 748.

48 Id, para 24.
Whether power of superintendence of high courts under articles 226

and 227 is excluded in respect of administrative tribunals?
The constitution bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Jugal Kishore*9
has held that every tribunal situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the high
court is subject to the power of superintendence and control of the high court
concerned. Clause (7) of article 37ID which provided for the constitution of
an administrative tribunal for Andhra Pradesh expressely excluded the power
of superintendence of the Andra Pradesh High Court over the said tribunal.
There is no such clause either in article 323A or 323B. Further, article 226
empowers a high court to ensure that tribunal situated within its territorial
jurisdiction do not exceed their jurisdiction and also to compel any tribunal by
mandamus to discharge its duty, if there is failure to do so. Therefore, if in a
given case a writ petition is filed before a high court praying either for the
issue of a writ of prohibition against the administrative tribunal not to proceed
with a case on the allegation that it had no jurisdiction to entertain and proceed
with a case or to decide a case expeditiously on the ground that there is delay
in disposal of the case by the administrative tribunal, the question would be
whether the high court has or has not the power to entertain and decide such
petitions particularly for the reason that a clause like clause(7) incorporated in
article 37ID is not incorporated in article 323A and further that would not be
a service matter in respect of which the jurisdiction of the high court is excluded.
A related question would be, whether under the scheme of the Constitution, a
tribunal could be constituted within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court,
which is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the high court and which is
not bound by the law declared by the high court?
The apex court while dealing with the above question in L. Chandra
Kumar50 has categorically held that the power vested in the high courts to
exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts and tribunals
within their respective jurisdiction is also part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. Relying on L. Chandra Kumar, the apex court has, in T. Sudhakar
Prasad v. Government ofA.P.,sl further observed as follows:52
Transfer of jurisdiction in specified matters from High Court to
Administrative Tribunals equates the Tribunal with the High Court in
so far as the exercise of judicial authority over specified matters is
concerned. That, however, does not assign the Administrative Tribunals
a status equivalent to that of High Court nor does that mean that for
the purpose of judicial review or judicial superintendence they cannot
49 Supra note 9.
50 Supra note 29.
51 (2001)1 SCC 516.
52 Id, para 19.
be subordinated to the High Courts. It has to be remembered that

what has been conferred on the Administrative Tribunal is not only
the jurisdiction of the High Court but also of the subordinate courts as
to specified matters. The High Courts are the creatures of the
Constitution and their judges hold constitutional office having been
appointed under the constitution. The Tribunals are creatures of
statutes and their members are statutorily appointed and hold statutory
office. In State ofOrissa v. Bhagaban Sarangi,53 it was held that the
administrative tribunal is nonetheless the tribunal and so it is bound by
the decision of the high courts of the state and it cannot side track or
by pass it... we are therefore clearly of the opinion that there is no
anathema to the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction of the High Court and
in that sense being supplemental or additional to the High Court but at
the same time not enjoying status equivalent to the High Court and
also being subject to judicial review and judicial superintendence of
the High Court.
Thus, the administrative tribunals set-up under the Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985, are amenable the judicial review and judicial superintendence power
of the high court concerned under article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
Jurisdiction of administrative tribunal does not extend to members of
subordinate judiciary and officers and servants of subordinate courts
Section 2 of the Act, as originally enacted, excludes the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal in respect of: (i) any member of the naval, military or
air force or of any other armed forces of the Union; (ii) any officer or servant
of the Supreme Court or of any High Court; (iii) any person appointed to the
secretarial staff of either House of Parliament or to the secretarial staff of any
State legislature or a house thereof or, in the case of a Union territory having a
legislature, of that legislature. In view of this provision, the service matters in
respect of civil servants other than the above three categories fall within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal and consequently the high court would
have no jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition. However, there was no express
provision excluding the officers and servants of subordinate judiciary from
the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunals. Thus, in the absence of such an
exception, the question that emerged was whether the members of the
subordinate judiciary have to approach the administrative tribunal in respect of
disputes or complaints, against the decision rendered by the high court on the
administrative side. However, prior to the establishment of the administrative
tribunals, the constitution bench of Supreme Court, in Dikshitalu,54 had ruled
53 Supra note 42.

54 Supra note 11.
that in view of article 235 of the Constitution, the effective control over the
members of subordinate judiciary and over the officers and servants of the
subordinate courts is vested in the high court and therefore the Andhra
administrative tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide disputes of members of
judicial service or officers and servants of subordinate courts. In view of the
ratio of that decision, notwithstanding the omission to specify in section 2 of
the Act "the members of judicial service and officersand servants of subordinate
courts ", the administrative tribunal cannot exercise jurisdiction in respect of
their disputes and complaints in service matters. Thus, relying on the judgment
of the Supreme Court in Dikshitalu, the following question was raised before
the Karnataka High Court in the case of Kaverappa v. District and Sessions
. Judge, Mysore:55
Whether the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain writ petitions
preferred by the officers and servants of the subordinate courts or
members of the judicial service has been divested and vested in the
State Administrative Tribunals constituted under Section 4 of the
Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985?
The question was answered in the negative following the ratio of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Dikshitalu holding that the expression 'civil
servants' used in article 37ID would not take in members and staff of
subordinate judiciary. The relevant portion of the judgment reads:
The ratio of the decision in Dikshitalu's case applies to the interpretation
of Art. 323 A. Therefore, officers and servants of the High Court and
of subordinate courts and members of the judicial services do not fall
within the meaning of the expression 'civil service' used in Art.323A
and consequently fall outside the purview of Article 323A of the
Constitution. From this it follows that they also fall outside the scope
of the Act. Section 2(c) of the Act expressly excludes the jurisdiction
of the Administrative Tribunal in respect of officers and servants of
the Supreme Court and of any High Court. But there is no express
exclusion as far as 'members of the judicial service' and 'officers and
servants of the subordinate courts'. Since these categories of civil
servants fall outside the purview of ΑΠ.323Α itself, the circumstance
that there is no express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the
Administrative Tribunal in respect of them does not make any
difference. Obviously, having regard to this clear position in law, the
learned Attorney General of India has made a written submission on
behalf of Union of India before the Supreme Court in the case of S.P.
Sampath Kumar v. Union of India... to the effect that an amendment
would be effected to the provisions of the Act, in order to clarify the
55 ILR 1987 Kar 892.

position and place the matter beyond any controversy.

Accordingly, an express provision was made in section 2 of the
Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1987 excluding the 'officers and
servants of the subordinate courts' from the purview ofAdministrative Tribunals
Act, 1985. The said amendment came into force with effect from 22nd
December 1987.
Jurisdiction of administrative tribunal in the absence of an order
Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act provides that a person
aggrieved by any 'order' pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a
tribunal may make an application to the tribunal fpr the redréssal of his grievance.
Relying on section 19, the following question was raised before the High
Court of Karnataka in the case of*Dr. Kshama Kapur v. Union of India:56
Whether in view of Sec. 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
an Administrative Tribunal Constituted under sub-section (1) or (2)
of Sec.4 of the Act, has no jurisdiction to entertain applications
regarding redressal of the grievances of civil servants of the Union or
of the State concerned, as the case may be, in respect of service
matters relating to recruitment in the absence of an order made by the
Government or any other authority and to issue appropriate directions
or to make appropriate orders, and if so, whether in such
circumstances, a writ petitionfcraying for the issue of an appropriate
direction or order is maintainable before this Court?
The question was answered in the negative for the following reasons:
Section 19 of the Act which provides for making an application only
against orders and Sec.20 which provides that application against an
order under Sec. 19 should not ordinarily be entertained unless the
civil servant had exhausted all the remedies available under the service
rules, but could be entertained if no order is passed by the higher
authority on the appeal or representation preferred under the relevant
rules within six months after the presentation, being procedural
provisions, cannot have the effect of diminishing the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal conferred under Sec. 14 or Sec. 15 of the Act, as the case
may be. Therefore, in cases where the complaint is not against any
order but it is against inaction by the authority concerned, an application
could be made invoking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal conferred
under Sec. 14 or Sec. 15 of the Act. To such an application against
inaction, Section 21, which prescribes limitation, also would not be
attracted, for, unless an order is made, the period of limitation would
56 ILR1986 Kar 4007.

not commence. But in such cases the Tribunal could decline to exercise
its jurisdiction applying principles like inordinate delay, laches,
acquiescence etc., which were governing the exercise of jurisdiction
by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Whatever
that may be, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to entertain applications
in respect of grievances of civil servants in all service matters even in
the absence of an order.
Thus, the tribunal has the power to entertain applications/complaints against
administrative inaction and give appropriate relief.
Power to reduce penalty
The tribunal is invested with the powers of all the courts whose jurisdiction
is shifted to it. No such court had the power to interfere with the quantum of
penalty and reduce the penalty when found excessive having regard to the
gravity of the charges proved. It is only the industrial tribunal/labour court,
which has the power under section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
to reduce the penalty of dismissal or removal from service. But its jurisdiction
is not shifted to the tribunal. On the other hand, it is expressly saved. In the
absence of such an express provision conferring the power to interfere with
the quantum of penalty, the question is whether the administrative tribunals
can interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed in the disciplinary
proceedings?
The apex court while dealing with the above question, in Union of India
v. Parma Nanda,51 has held that the tribunal has ordinarily no power to interfere
with the punishment awarded by competent authority in departmental
proceedings on the ground of penalty being excessive or disproportionate to
the misconduct proved, if the punishment is based on evidence and is not
arbitrary, mala fide or perverse. It was further observed that the jurisdiction
of the tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment could
not be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The tribunal cannot interfere
with the findings of the inquiry officer or competent authority where they are
not arbitrary or utterly perverse. The same view was adopted in Union of
India v. J.R. Dhamin5& and Commandant, T.N. Special Police, 9th Battalion
v. D Paul59 as well.
In Om Kumar y. Union ofIndia60 where again the question was considered,
the apex court has observed that "the quantum of punishment in disciplinary
matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority to decide and the jurisdiction
57 (1989) 2 SCC 177.

58 (1999) 6 SCC 403.
59 (1999) SCC (L&S) 789.
60 (2001) 2 SCC 386.
of the high court under article 226 of the Constitution or of the administrative
tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or the other of the
well-known principles known as Wednesbury Principles".61 It was further
observed that the court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that
wednesbury's principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to
administrator for fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in
extreme and rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by
the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the court, can the court
substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment.62
However, recently the apex court, in Hombe Gowda Education Trust v.
State of Karnataka,63 has taken a slightly different stand and observed:
The Tribunal's jurisdiction is akin to one under section 11-A of the
Industrial Disputes Act. While exercising such discretionary
jurisdiction, no doubt it is open to the tribunal to substitute one
punishment by another; but it is also trite that the Tribunal exercises a
limited jurisdiction in this behalf. The jurisdiction to interfere with the
quantum of punishment could be exercised only when, inter alia, it is
found to be grossly disproportionate.64
This court repeatedly has laid down the law that such interference at
the hands of the tribunal should be inter alia on arriving at a finding
that no reasonable person could inflict such punishment. The Tribunal
may further more exercise its jurisdiction when relevant facts are not
taken into consideration by the management, which could have direct
bearing on the question of quantum of punishment.65
The apex court has reinforced the above proposition again in A. Sudhakar
v. Post Master General where it has upheld that the charge of 'defalcation
of the money tenderedfor deposit' was sufficient for the disciplinary authority
to impose 'compulsory retirement' as a penalty.
Power to punish for contempt of itself
Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 expressly provides
that the tribunals shall have, and exercise, the same jurisdiction, powers and
authority in respect of contempt of itself as a high court has and may exercise
under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The question whether
the said provision of the Act has ceased to exist in view of the decision of the
61 Id., para 24.

62 Id., para 68 and 71.
63 (2006) 1 SCC 430.
64 Id., para 17.
65 Id., para 18.
66 (2006) 4 SCC 348.
Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar61 was specifically raised before the

apex court in T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. ofA.P6S The apex court while
holding that section 17 of the Act is constitutionally valid in view of sub-clause
(b) of clause (2) of article 323-(A) as well as sub-clause (g) thereof, has
observed:69
... the Constitutional Bench has not declared Art. 323-A (2) (b) or
323-B (3) (d) or Section 17 of the Act ultra vires the Constitution.
The high court has, in its judgement under appeal noted with emphasis
the Tribunal having been compared to like 'court of first instance'
and then proceeded to hold that the status of Administrative Tribunals
having been held to be equivalent to courts or Tribunals subordinate
to the High Court the jurisdiction to hear their own contempt was lost
by the Administrative Tribunals and the only course available to them
was either to make a reference to the High Court or to file a complaint
under Sections 193, 219 and 228 IPC as provided by section 10 of
the Act. The High Court has proceeded on the reasoning that the
Tribunal having been held to be subordinate to the High Court for the
purpose of Articles 226/221 of the Constitution and its decisions having
been subject to judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226/227, the right to file an appeal to the Supreme Court against
an order passed by the Tribunal punishing for contempt under section
17 of the Act was defeated and that on these twin grounds section 17
of the Act became unworkable and unconstitutional. There was no
basis for drawing such a conclusion.... Section 17 of the Act derives
its legislative sanctity therefrom. The power of the High Court to
punish for contempt of itself under Article 215 of the Constitution
remains intact but the jurisdiction, power and authority to hear and
decide the matters covered by sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the
Act having been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals the
jurisdiction of the High Court to that extent has been taken away and
hence the same jurisdiction which vested in the high court to punish
for contempt of itself in the matters now falling within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunals if those matters would have continued to be heard by
the high court has now been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals
under Section 17 of the Act. The jurisdiction is the same as vesting in
the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution read with the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971... While holding the
proceeding under Section 17 of the Act, the Tribunal remains a Tribunal
and so would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under
67 Supra note 29.

68 Supra note 51.
69 Id., para 17.
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution subject to the well-established

rules of self-restraint governing the discretion of the High Court to
interfere with the pending proceedings and upset the interim or
interlocutory orders of the Tribunals. However any order or decision
of the Tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the
Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of order appealed against
in view of the specific provision contained in section 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the Administrative
Tribnunals Act 1985... the concept of intra-Tribunal appeals i.e., appeal
from an order or decision of a Member of a Tribunal sitting singly to
a Bench of not less than two members of the Tribunal is alien to the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985... The distinction between order
passed by the Administrative Tribunal on matters covered by section
14 (1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and orders punishing for
contempt under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read
with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, is this: as against
the former there is no remedy of appeal statutorily provided, but as
against the latter, the statutory remedy of appeal is provided by Section
19 of the Contempt of Courts Act itself.
Thus, though the power of administrative tribunals to punish for contempt
of itself is same as the power of the high court under article 215 of the
Constitution read with the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, the exercise
of the said power by the tribunals is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the
high court under article 226/227 of the Constitution subject to an exception
that the order punishing contempt is appealable only to the Supreme Court.
However, the tribunals while considering contempt petition cannot reverse
its earlier decision, which formed subject matter of contempt petition,70 nor it
can issue directions, which have the effect of reviewing its original order.71
The Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Bill, 200672
In view of the request made by three of the eight state governments (i.e.,
Government of Himachai Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu) for
abolition of the state administrative tribunals and to bring the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 in conformity with the apex court's decision in L. Chandra
Kumar, a Bill to amend the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was introduced
in the Parliament in the year 2006. The important changes proposed to be
brought about by the Bill are as follows:
70 Daya Ram Singh v. R.K. Takkar, 1999 SCC (L & S) 1076.

71 K.G. Derasari v. Union of India, (2001)10 SCC 496.
72 Bill No. XXVIII of 2006.
1. The Bill proposes to omit section 17 of the Act: Section 17 of the

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 conferred the power to punish
for contempt of itself on administrative tribunals. This power is similar
to that of the high courts under the provisions of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. The apex court has since held, in L. Chandra Kumar,
that writ jurisdiction of the high courts under articles 226 and 227
shall continue to be with high courts and administrative tribunals shall
be subject to such jurisdiction of the high courts. The high courts
being courts of record already have the power to punish for contempt,
it was felt, as the tribunals have become subject to the jurisdiction of
the high courts, that it is no longer necessary to retain such power to
punish for contempt with them.
2. The Bill contains a new Chapter IVA on Abolition of Tribunals':
The Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 does not contain any specific
provisions for abolition of a tribunal. Since Government of Himachal
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, have requested the Central
Government for abolition of the state administrative tribunals, a need
was felt to amend the Act in order to provide for an enabling provision
for abolition of the tribunal and also for transfer of pending cases to
some other authority after the tribunal is abolished.
The Bill has also propose to incorporate necessary provisions for
taking care of the service conditions of its functionaries, viz., chairman,
vice-chairman and members and officers and other staff of the tribunal
in case the tribunal is abolished.
3. A new chapter IVB on 'Appeal to High Court': The Bill further proposes
to amend the Act to provide for appeal against the order of an
administrative tribunal to the respective high courts to bring the Act in
line with the judgment of Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar. The
amendment provided that any person aggrieved by any decision or
order of the tribunal may file an appeal to the high court, which shall
be heard by a bench of two judges. It further provides that such
appeal shall be preferred within a period of sixty days from the date
of communication of the decision or order of the tribunal. However,
the power to condone the delay is conferred on the respective high
courts, which shall be exercised on subjective satisfaction.

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CHAPTER I

Scope of articles 323A and 323B

* Revised by P. Puneeth, Assistant Research Professor, ILL

(2) A law made under clause (1) may

(f) election to either House of Parliament or the House or either House

Salient aspects of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985

2 Sec. 1 (2) of the Act.

Qualifications for appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other Members-

India. Section 8 fixes the tenure of office of chairman, vice-chairman as five

(iv) All service matters pertaining to service in connection with the

staff of the tribunal shall be deemed to be public servants. Section 32 protects

7 ILR 1986 Kar 3954.

such petitions stood excluded and got vested in the Central

8 AIR 1986 All 2.

to exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court

(3) thereof, would not operate in respect of the jurisdiction of the

14 See supra note 8.

or affecting any of his conditions of service or any of his rights in

15 AIR 1979 SC 429.

19 AIR 1979 SC 1060.

ground that it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 or 311 or any other

26 AIR 1987 SC 357.

Constitution preserves the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme

The said question has, however, been considered by a seven judge

29 (1997) 3 SCC 261

supreme court, there is no constitutional prohibition against their performing a

Creation of administrative tribunal does not affect basic structure

absolutely vested in the respective High Courts in regard to the judicial

that a Vice-Chairman with these qualifications and experience of two

40 See id., paras 78, 99.

Further even in service matters, incidental questions relating to procedure,

Application of 'doctrine of precedent' to administrative tribunals

42 (1995)1 SCC 399.

...the manner in which a co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal has

47 (2001)1 SCC 748.

Whether power of superintendence of high courts under articles 226

be subordinated to the High Courts. It has to be remembered that

53 Supra note 42.

55 ILR 1987 Kar 892.

position and place the matter beyond any controversy.

56 ILR1986 Kar 4007.

57 (1989) 2 SCC 177.

61 Id., para 24.

Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar61 was specifically raised before the

67 Supra note 29.

Articles 226/227 of the Constitution subject to the well-established

70 Daya Ram Singh v. R.K. Takkar, 1999 SCC (L & S) 1076.

1. The Bill proposes to omit section 17 of the Act: Section 17 of the

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