Caring For The Soul in A Postmodern Age PDF

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LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
2000
Caring for the Soul in a Postmodern Age: the

Political Thought of Jan Patocka.
Edward Francis Findlay
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
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Findlay, Edward Francis, "Caring for the Soul in a Postmodern Age: the Political Thought of Jan Patocka." (2000). LSU Historical
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CARING FOR THE SOUL IN A POSTMODERN AGE:
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAN PATOCKA
VOLUME I
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty o f the

Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment o f the
requirements for the degree o f
Doctor o f Philosophy
in
The Department o f Political Science
by
B A ., University o f Virginia, 1988
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1997
May 2000
UMI Number 9979259
UMI*
UMI Microform9979259
Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company.
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unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company

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ACKNOW LEDGM ENTS
I would like to acknowledge and extend my gratitude to a number o f individuals
and organizations without whom this study would have been impossible. First and
foremost, I am grateful to Professors G. Ellis Sandoz and Cecil Eubanks o f the
Department o f Political Science at Louisiana State University for their invaluable
support and assistance. Further, I am indebted to the Center for Theoretical Study o f
Charles University and the Academy o f Sciences in Prague, in the Czech Republic, for
hosting and facilitating my research. I would particularly like to thank Ivan Chvatik for
his support and his critical perspective, and Ivan Havel for permitting me to make
valuable use o f the facilities at CTS. I would also like to acknowledge the support o f the
William J. Fulbright Commission o f the United States and the Fulbright Committee in
Prague for making my experience there possible. Lastly, I want to thank my wife,
AlzbSta, and my father, Edward J., for their constant encouragement and sage advice.
This is for you both.
ii
TABLE O F CONTENTS
VOLUM E I
ACKNOW LEDGMENTS...................................................................................................... ii
A BSTRACT.............................................................................................................................v
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................... 1
End Notes................................................................................................... 21
2 “CONCRETE HUMANS IN THEIR CORPOREAL WORLD” : AN

INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER.....................24
H usserl....................................................................................................... 26
The Influence o f Heidegger................................................................. 52
A Phenomenology o f M ovem ent............................................................68
C onclusion................................................................................................77
End N o te s............................................................................................... 83
3 PHILOSOPHY AFTER THE DEATH OF METAPHYSICS:

PATOCKA AND GREEK THOUGHT................................................... 93
Plato an d E urope................................................................................... 101
Caring for the S o u l................................................................................. 110
Metaphysics and “Negative Platonism”................................................ 120
The Idea, the Good, and the T ruth ........................................................129
End N o te s................................................................................................ 143
4 A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND A THEORY OF POLITICS .151

The Basis o f Human Historicity............................................................156
A Philosophy o f H istory.........................................................................162
The Polis in H istory............................................................................... 177
Two Elements o f Historical Life: Freedom and Problematicity . . . 180
Philosophy o f History and Politics........................................................190
Europe, Science, and M etaphysics........................................................197
End N o te s................................................................................................207
VOLUME n
5 POLITICS AND ETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY........... 215

Pato£ka and P olitics...............................................................................216
The Heretical Essays and the Twentieth C entury.............................. 236
The Spiritual Person and the P o lis.................................................... 258
Ethics and Morality 267
End N o tes............. 282
6 CONCLUSION: FOUNDATIONS AND PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS

AND PO STM O DERNISM .....................................................................292
The Problem o f M eaning.......................................................................299
Meaning, Politics, and Conflict............................................................ 309
Conclusion.............................................................................................. 318
A Critical Perspective.......................................................................... 320
End N otes................................................................................................332
WORKS C ITED ..................................................................................................................337
APPENDIX: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE..................................................... 346

Erazim K ohak............................................................................................ 350
Aviezer Tucker.......................................................................................... 363
Postmodernism, Foundationalism, and R eligion...................................374
Other Commentaries................................................................................ 390
End N otes...................................................................................................396
V IT A ................................................................................................................................... 404
iv
ABSTRACT
This study undertakes to examine the political thought o f the late Czech
philosopher and Charter 77 spokesman, Jan Pato£ka. It leads to a consideration o f the
fundamental problem of contemporary and postmodern theory, the question o f a
metaphysical foundation for our philosophical and political self-understanding.
Pato£ka asserted the common origin o f philosophy and politics in ancient Greece
and maintained that their animating force was freedom, understood ontologically as our
ability to transcend the merely objective and relative in life and to see human being as a
being o f possibility. He called this insight, embodied in the activity o f Socrates, the
original spirit o f European civilization and the common link between the Greek polis
and contemporary democracy. Yet the development o f science and philosophy since
Plato, Patoika argues, has failed to remain true to the Socratic insight; instead,
objectified, or “metaphysical,” versions have arisen that not only betray its essence but
also contribute to the subordination o f politics to ideology. As philosophy became
objectively metaphysical, it made itself readily accessible to man and offered him the
possibility o f a firm foundation upon which to justify a system o f politics or ethics —but
only at the cost o f its spirit o f freedom.
I develop this problem by examining four aspects o f Patodka’s thought: his
relationship to Husserl and Heidegger, his relationship to Plato and Greek thought, his
philosophy o f history and understanding o f the nature o f politics, and his application o f
this framework to politics in the twentieth century. I conclude that Patodka’s work
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describes a mode o f self-understanding, and a mode o f politics, that does not rest on a
naive, metaphysical foundation; it is, instead, problematic, yet still provides meaning
and unity for human beings. Though explicitly anti-foundational, it serves a
foundational function —it allows men to construct a community and endow it with a
non-relative sense o f meaningfulness and ethics. I examine this previously unexplored
body o f work as an attempt to demonstrate that the postmodern critique o f
foundationalism and metaphysics need not imply the impossibility o f a coherent and
consistent politics and ethics.
vi
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CHA PTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Czech philosopher Jan Pato£ka died in a Prague hospital on March 13,
1977, aged 69. The cause of death was a brain hemorrhage, brought on by a series o f
exhausting interrogations at the hands o f the StB, the Czechoslovak secret police.
Patocka had been under interrogation for his involvement in a protest, in the name o f
human rights, against the deceitful rule o f the communist government in
Czechoslovakia. This protest took the form o f a document and was called Charter 77. Its
purpose was, in Socratic style, to inform the regime publicly of its own hypocrisy, o f its
failure to abide by the Helsinki agreement to which it was a signatory. The Charter
admirably accomplished this task, gaining in the process international respect and
admiration and launching the dissident career of the young playwright Vaclav Havel
who, just over a decade later, was to assume the presidency o f the newly democratic
Czechoslovak republic. Without PatoCka’s involvement as a spokesman, it is doubtful
whether the Charter would have had the effect that it did. Patodka was explicit in
saying, shortly before his death, that there are things worth suffering for.1 In choosing to
speak for the Charter, he chose to speak the truth, not merely in private, but in the public
realm. In acting in this way politically, in speaking truthfully before his own Athenian
Senate knowing full well the cost involved, Jan Pato£ka, like his model Socrates,
signaled that there was an unsunderable relationship between politics and philosophy,
between truth and the realm of our social being. Through his actions as well as his
words, Patocka made it clear that we must not only be aware o f this fact, we must act
according to it. In the work that follows I will pursue the nature o f this relationship as it
is developed in the work of Jan Patocka. In undertaking an exegesis o f the political
thought o f this seminal philosopher, I hope to enrich the field o f political theory and
bring a still relatively unknown thinker o f substantial importance to the attention of
political science.
Jan Patocka was a thinker who spoke in one moment as a dedicated classicist, in
another as a thorough postmodernist. It is conceivable, depending on the texts upon
which you choose to focus, to defend his work from either perspective. This is in fact a
temptation for the contemporary reader, to read Patocka as merely a tolerant proponent
o f the side o f the theoretical spectrum that one wishes to defend. The temptation is to
read him, for example, as a moral Platonist who is enough o f a contemporary to pay
attention to postmodern theory or, alternately, as a committed postmodern who is
willing to pay lip service to the classics. Both readings, I would like to stress at the
outset, must be avoided, for they are inaccurate. With this study I will demonstrate that
the voice o f Jan Patocka is a distinctive one in contemporary philosophy, that his work
deserves recognition not merely as an alternative reading o f already established bodies
of work, but as a unique contribution to philosophy and to political theory.
As a Czech in the middle o f the twentieth century, Patodka was literally
surrounded by German influence, politically as well as educationally. It is not surprising
to note, therefore, that the context o f his work is largely determined by German
philosophy. Patocka naturally came under the influence o f the towering philosophical
figures o f the time and place, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. It is Husserl and
Heidegger, above all others, who account for the specific direction o f his work. As a
doctoral student in the twenties and thirties, however, Pato£ka was also well read in the
works of, among others, Brentano, Bergson, Scheler, Koyre, Radi, Ingarden, and
Levinas.2
Although o f the age when political developments forced many o f his
contemporaries to emigrate to the United States, Pato£ka chose to remain in
Czechoslovakia for the duration o f the National Socialist, as well as the Communist,
occupations. Among those contemporaries who were able to pursue their work in the
relative freedom o f the West, the names o f Voegelin, Strauss, Arendt, and Habermas
come to mind. PatoCka shares a great deal with these thinkers and can be accurately
situated in the broad context of the themes which they pursue. He speaks directly, in
addition, to contemporary thinkers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricoeur
from France and, from the United States, the postmodern pragmatist Richard Rorty.
Methodologically, what ties Pato£ka to these thinkers is his engagement with
phenomenology and ontology, with philosophy pursued through direct, experiential
evidence combined with an attempt to illuminate the structures inherent to human being.
Thematically, he shares with many o f his contemporaries an interest in the classical
philosophy and politics of ancient Athens combined with a postmodern interest in the
problem o f metaphysics and the source, the foundation, o f the shared sense of
meaningfulness that underlies Western civilization. Yet Pato£ka’s work belongs in the
context o f these other thinkers not only from the perspective o f method and theme; he
belongs with them because o f the significance and relevance o f what he has to say. This
point, however, will require a considerable effort to establish conclusively.
PatoCka’s work takes its primary inspiration from the goal that Edmund Husserl
expressed in his last major work, the Crisis o f European Sciences. As a reaction to this
“crisis” -- the crisis o f rationality related to the increasing dominance of positivism and
its subordination o f the question o f relevance to one o f method or objectivity —Husserl
sought a renewal o f the spirit that was at the heart o f Western culture, the spirit o f
Reason.3 As Husserl’s student during the 1930s, when this theme was formulated,
Patocka took upon himself the task o f pursuing and clarifying this strand o f Husserl’s
thought —a strand that occupied the German phenomenologist only at the end of his
life. What Pato£ka realized, however, was that Husserl’s transcendental
phenomenology, while it proceeded from unimpeachable insight about the importance
o f the direct experience o f phenomena (as opposed to the more indirect experience of
phenomena perceived through the anticipatory lenses o f theory or ideology), was in
many ways inappropriate to the task. Husserl’s understanding o f reason was still
anchored in Enlightenment thinking; Patocka wished, in contrast, to renew a classical
sense o f reason, a sense he felt would ultimately conform with the insights o f much of
contemporary philosophy.
Patocka chose, therefore, not to pursue the problem along Husserlian lines, as a
search for a universal philosophy in the Cartesian tradition. He felt that rationality
primarily indicated a mode o f living, o f examining reality, that had as a model the
dialectical activity o f Socrates. His was a concrete question, a question o f the being o f
man in the world and in history. For the development o f this insight Pato£ka looked to
the work o f Martin Heidegger. Heidegger was particularly important in two ways: first,
he brought to Patocka a thematic exploration o f human being, and second, he stressed
the importance o f history, o f understanding humanity as situated temporally,
historically. Husserl had pointed to rationality, the Greek “insight,” as the underlying
principle o f European civilization. Patocka wanted to renew it as a principle, however,
not by looking at ancient thought instead of contemporary thought, but with the help o f
contemporary thought. Reason had to be re-understood phenomenologically and
ontologically, and this meant understanding it —following Heidegger’s critique of
metaphysics -- in a non-metaphysical sense.4
Husserl and Heidegger, then, profoundly influenced the political thought of Jan
Patocka. Their work is important to contemporary thought to a degree that many
political theorists attempt to locate a coherent theory o f politics in their work directly. It
is generally true, however, that these attempts have not had great success. The fact is
that neither Husserl nor Heidegger lends himself readily to political theory. Yet their
work is crucial to the contemporary critique of the Western theory that political theorists
look to as justification for their normative political stances. What is perhaps needed,
then, is not an attempt to read Husserl or Heidegger as political thought, but an attempt
to write political thought in light o f their work. This is an appropriate description of
Patocka’s task; he does not begin from the conviction that he should remain faithful to
the methods of his German teachers, but that he should develop a philosophy with
political relevance that draws on their insights yet is independent of their frameworks
and their own problems with reductionism.
German philosophy was not the only influence that made a decisive impression
on this oeuvre, however. Pato£ka lived in a time and place o f great upheaval and
conflict. Czechoslovak hopes for political freedom were crushed repeatedly during the
course o f his life: first at Munich in 1938, then during the occupation by the Third
Reich, once again with the Communist putsch after World War II, and finally in 1968
with the Soviet-led invasion in the wake o f the Prague Spring. It is no exaggeration,
then, to remark as Josef Novak did that “PatoCka’s bibliography is inseparable from his
biography.”5 To note and take account o f the influence of history, however, is
something substantially different from drawing the conclusion that Patocka’s work is
determined by that history, that he is essentially, for example, a “dissident” philosopher.
To make such a charge is to imply that it is the dissident experience, not the philosophy,
that is substantive. Pato£ka is not, in this regard, a dissident philosopher. His work does
not depend upon his historical experience with dissidence; rather, it is the dissident
experience that is made additionally meaningful through his political philosophy.
Rather than a simple response to external events, PatoCka’s political theory is
philosophy in the best sense of the term. It realizes first o f all that philosophy, like all
human achievements, is an historical one, and secondly, that new philosophies do not
simply replace older ones but are continuous with them. To take these principles
seriously is to accept the challenge offered by Patodka -- the challenge to reveal the
dialogue and the continuity between the ancient and the new, between the classical and
the postmodern.
Before approaching the question o f the significance o f this material —the
question o f the goal o f this study -- a few more words need to be said about the
disparate nature o f much o f Patodka’s work. As a result o f the reality o f communism,
Jan Patocka was only for very short periods able to work and conduct research as a
university professor. He was also unable to publish much o f the work he did
accomplish. Though he wrote a vast amount in his lifetime, relatively little o f it is in the
form of significant texts to which one can authoritatively point as reflecting a center o f
the philosopher’s canon. As Josef Moural put it in a short essay on this topic, “[t]here is
too little o f finished big works, and too much o f sketches, fragments, lectures for
various levels o f listeners.”6 Even among works that can be called major, there is a
variety of topics considered. In addition to his attention to phenomenology, Patocka was
also a philosopher o f history and, some would also say, a historian o f philosophy.7
There is a question, therefore, about the existence o f a genuine center in the
philosopher’s work. At least one Czech commentator, Moural notes, has argued that
there is no “core” to PatoCka’s work, no “project” in any systematic sense. In this view,
Patocka’s greatness lies in his ability to interpret other philosophers.8 In defense o f this
position, a former student, the Czech philosopher Ladislav Hejdanek, maintains that
Patocka did not genuinely pursue phenomenology as the centerpiece o f his
philosophizing. There are others, however, who make the opposite claim. Moural also
points to a perspective which holds that phenomenology —particularly the unfinished
projects o f an “asubjective” phenomenology and the theory o f three movements o f
human existence —was in fact the “center o f gravity” that determined a basic unity in
this work.9
While both viewpoints can be adequately defended, Moural appropriately notes
a third element, “one that is more difficult to identify and describe.”10 This is the theme
that the editors o f PatoCka’s Collected Works have chosen to title “Care for the Soul.”
As those editors, Ivan Chvatik and Pavel Kouba, put it, this title indicates “the works
that concern the position of human being in the world and in history: from the moral
and religious questions o f the individual through the attitudes towards current social and
political events up to general reflections on the philosophy o f history.”11 These texts,
which contain political as well as historical reflections, are highlighted by the one work
that most would agree to call a magnum opus: the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f
History. In pointing towards these works, Moural correctly implies that here, in this as
yet fully unexplored theme in PatoCka’s work, may be the core, the most significant
project, o f Patodka’s lifetime of philosophy. It is Moural’s contention, indeed, that the
theme o f “care for the soul,” which “emphasizes the necessity of radical
self-clarification to be achieved through historical enquiry,”12 may be viewed as
encompassing, rather than standing in contrast to, the interest in phenomenology.
Moural places the question of care for the soul within the broader confines o f an
inquiry into historicity, and in this he is at least partly correct. In addition to history, I
maintain that Patocka is also inquiring into the nature o f politics and the political model
conducive to human freedom. Philosophy, he argued, is the care for the soul that takes
place within the “care for the polis, for the optimal state.”13 In his brief essay, Moural
leaves the reader with a challenge to undertake an examination o f Pato£ka’s work in
light o f the theme o f history; this is a challenge that leads to what I consider the “core”
o f Patocka’s work: the question o f the “social being o f humans.”14 With this interest, not
solely in being but in social being, the Czech philosopher incorporates into his study o f
Husserl and Heidegger a Platonically-inspired devotion to the reality o f human beings in
community —in other words, to politics.
It is this part of PatoCka’s work that belongs under the heading o f “care for the
soul,” and it is the central focus o f this study. It leads, not inwards into the
methodological questions o f phenomenology, but outwards into the world o f human
social life, the world o f political and historical activity. Yet phenomenology remains a
crucial part o f the equation, for Patodka argued that “the question o f human social being
is also in the first place a phenomenological question.”15 Thus to get at the philosophy
o f history and politics that is at the center of Patodka’s work, one must first work
through the implications o f the phenomenology and ontology o f Husserl and Heidegger.
Only when this is done is the question o f history, that “domain o f changing social being
o f humans,” fully illuminated. It is only in history, PatoCka concludes, that the “social
being o f humans can manifest itself as essentially fre e.16
Care for the soul thus implies care for the social being o f humans; it is the
political theme at the center o f the philosophy of Jan Pato£ka. Directed toward the
social reality of human beings, this work is naturally relevant to the sciences that study
that reality. Thus it is, in his series of phenomenological lectures entitled Body,
Community, Language, World that Patocka stresses the need o f a philosophical
justification for the social sciences. “[F]or all social sciences,” he writes, “the point at
which they become genuine sciences is penetration through self-illusions,
self-deceptions, our idols of ourselves. Providing a philosophical foundation for actual
human scientific disciplines demands that we find access to this situation, not an
empirical, but a foundational, justifying one.”17
Thus setting out his own goal, Patocka brings us to the question o f the
significance o f his achievement. As a student o f Heidegger, it is correct to assume that
when PatoCka speaks about a philosophical “foundation,” he is not referring to the type
of “metaphysical” foundation o f which Heidegger was so critical.18 Since the critique
offered by Heidegger and, before him, Nietzsche, the question o f the foundation has
been at the center o f contemporary thought. It is a fundamental question, and in many
ways a dilemma, o f postmodernism. The notion that theory and philosophy should be
pursued on the basis o f an objectively transcendental foundation has been discredited. It
is in light o f this that Pato£ka maintains, along Heideggerean lines, that we are in a
“post-metaphysical” era or, as others would say, an age o f postmodernism.
The contours o f the postmodern dilemma take form as the question is raised o f a
justification for political and ethical values or norms. Without a solid foundation on
which to construct arguments and base conclusions, questions as fundamental as those
of morality and justice lose their anchor. It is a loss that cannot be replaced through
scientific method; the most elaborate arguments o f utilitarianism notwithstanding, social
problems inevitably require answers from the realm o f morality. The
10
“post-metaphysical” world, Patodka argues, is grounded in nihilism, a fundamental
meaninglessness; its apparent options are to commit to a stance o f ethical relativism, the
relativism o f all meaning, or to seek a renewal o f metaphysics through anthropocentric
substitutes for transcendental certainty, such as are offered by teleological philosophies
o f history or eschatological political movements.
This postmodern dilemma is centered, then, in the question o f meaning. If one
rejects metaphysical meaning, certain meaning that has its source beyond man, then
there seems to be no recourse but to commit to meaning that is merely relative, meaning
as a function o f the will o f humans. Jan Pato£ka is a postmodern philosopher in the
sense that he denies what he terms “simply given meaning.” Meaning or knowledge that
is simply given, as from an objective being or beings beyond human reality, is meaning
that is naively received. It is meaning that seeks to end the need for questioning, rather
than encourage it. Yet Patocka is not satisfied with this critique o f metaphysics. Human
life, he contends, is meaningful in a non-relative way.
Patocka’s work, therefore, seeks to respond to this problem o f meaning, o f the
foundation o f meaningfulness in human life. Because he does not conceive of the
individual as an independent, disconnected being, but rather as a being integrated into
historical relationships with the world and with other beings in a social setting, this is a
question that cannot be abstracted from its political or historical context. Meaning, and
the sense o f a ground upon which humans can build continuity, is a factor of our living
truthfully in the world and of our relating to the world, not as a collection of objects, but
as a whole. What Patodka describes, in his work under the rubric o f care for the soul, is
11
a foundation for politics and ethics in the contemporary world ~ a foundation that is
itself non-metaphysical.
In terms of its value for political philosophy, Pato£ka’s work is outstanding in its
attempt to develop an approach to philosophy and politics that is non-foundational in
the traditional sense, yet does not abandon ethical insight, such as that offered in
classical thought by Plato and Aristotle and, in the modem period, by philosophical
politicians such as the first Czech president T. G. Masaryk. It is this region between the
two poles o f a rejection o f a simply-given, absolute reality on one hand, and the refusal
to descend into an amoral nihilism on the other that must be explored by political
theory. An evaluation o f PatoCka’s work is therefore crucial to contemporary political
thought.
What Patocka offers, however, is not a “solution” either to the problem o f
meaning or o f history. To the contrary, he demands a recognition that meaning is not an
objective constant in human life, it is problematic. What is constant, however, what is
“absolute,” is the “possibility” inherent in human being. By virtue of an ontological
reality noted by Heidegger —the fact that, as humans, we take an interest in our own
being -- we have the possibility to pursue this interest toward an intensification, a
growth o f that being. For PatoCka, this can best be done through an understanding of our
social being and the possibilities available to it -- the possibilities o f freedom and of
historical action. Here, then, are the concepts that emerge from PatoCka’s philosophy of
history and politics. It is through active freedom in a social and political setting inspired
by the model o f the Greek polis -- that is, a mode! grounded in the fragile consistency of
12
a community which accepts the conflict and uncertainty natural to free and equal beings
—that human life is most fully open to a non-relative meaningfulness.
With this study o f the political thought in the philosophy o f Jan Patocka, I intend
to illuminate and evaluate this argument for a retheoretization o f the ground, o f the
foundations, o f Western thought. What is at stake is more than an intellectual exercise,
for as Patodka clearly points out, the contemporary world, particularly in regard to its
political realities, is mired in a crisis. We exist in an age with all the characteristics o f a
technological “super-civilization” that is unable to break its search for meaning free
from entanglement with the metaphysical remnants o f past theoretical endeavors.
Modem civilization searches for meaning by seeking a solution to the problem o f
history. It seeks to solve history by mastering it -- through a political or a philosophical
system so perfect as to preclude the possibility o f an insoluble problem. To do so is to
seek to end history. “Yet the problem of history,” Patocka is adamant, “may not be
resolved, it must be preserved as a problem.”19
In order to illuminate the problematic conception o f history and politics that
makes sense of this enigmatic statement, to illuminate the sense o f caring for the soul as
a primary function o f the polis, I will present five substantive chapters o f analysis,
appended to which will be a review of the literature on the work o f Jan PatoCka. Chapter
Two, the chapter immediately following this introduction, will focus on reading Pato£ka
as an interpreter of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Here I will discuss the way
in which phenomenology, Husserl’s methodology for studying reality “as it appears to
the ordinary observer or as we encounter it in direct, immediate experience,”20 forms a
13
basis for Pato€ka’s approach to philosophy. In addition, I will trace the influence o f the
later Husserl, the author o f the Crisis o f European Sciences, on the young Patodka’s
view o f history and the spirit o f the European world. Husserl, however, is only a part of
the story. PatoCka is not a follower o f phenomenology so much as an interpreter o f it,
and this interpretation is primarily indebted to the ontological insight o f Martin
Heidegger. Thus I will also review Heidegger’s influence, as well as the way in which
Patocka takes a consciously different path than Heidegger, a path that leads back to the
realm o f politics rather than outward into the realm o f art. Lastly, in Chapter Two, I will
discuss Patodka’s own phenomenological contribution: a phenomenology o f three
movements in human life that become the theoretical basis for his work in philosophy
o f history.
The influence o f Husserl and Heidegger is undeniably important, but it is not in
this contemporary theory that Patodka finds his greatest inspiration. Consciously
departing from Heidegger in this regard, Patodka looks to the classical thought o f Plato
or, more particularly, the figure o f Socrates as epitomizing the approach to philosophy
he wishes to emulate. This Socratic approach, however, is viewed through
Heideggerean eyes. Thus in the third chapter I will consider the philosopher’s relation to
Greek philosophy. Here a number o f important texts stand out. First is the series of
lectures entitled Plato and Europe, which present the thesis that the care for the soul, as
Patocka understands it, is the “spirit” o f European life, a spirit that has been made
progressively opaque in the course o f Western history. In the same vein is the important
essay “Negative Platonism,” which gives a clear account o f Patodka’s reading o f
14
Socratic activity as non-metaphysical and develops a distinction between the figure of
Socrates and the later work of Plato. This chapter will be crucial, therefore, to
establishing the feasibility of the attempt to, in effect, combine classical theory and
symbolism with contemporary critique.
The fourth chapter will shift to the philosophy o f history that, as Josef Moural
pointed out, belongs within the context of the theme o f caring for the soul. Patoika’s
philosophy o f history is contained, for the most part, in the first three o f his Heretical
Essays in the Philosophy o f History. I will discuss these chapters with the aim of
uncovering both the controversial nature and the intent o f the contention that history can
be said to have a particular beginning, coinciding with the origin o f both philosophy and
politics in Greek antiquity. This review of the meaning o f history in Patocka’s work will
lead naturally to a discussion of the site of historical activity (the polis) and its
characteristics (freedom and a recognition of problematicity). This chapter will
conclude, then, with an introduction of the theme o f politics in this work.
I will turn, in the fifth chapter, directly to a consideration o f politics, starting
with a review o f some o f Patocka’s other political texts and concluding with an
examination o f the final two of the Heretical Essays, in which the social and political
reality of the contemporary world is subject to significant critique. The aim of Chapter
Five, entitled “Politics and Ethics in the Twentieth Century,” is threefold. First, it is to
bring out the details o f Patocka’s analysis o f contemporary civilization and its
technological character. This analysis culminates in the striking and controversial essay
“Wars o f the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War,” with which
15
PatoCka concludes his Heretical Essays. I will demonstrate, with a look at not only this
essay but also a number o f lesser known essays written at the same time, that there is a
fundamental consistency in Patodka’s writings, even if those writings are marked by
drastic shifts in tone and metaphor. The point to be stressed is that, even as Pato£ka
shifts from a Platonic style stressing care for the soul to a more Nietzschean style in his
discussion o f war and conflict, he is not undergoing a change in his philosophy. The
challenge for readers, as I noted earlier, is not to read this thinker as you wish him to be,
as, for example, a Platonic moralist whose talk of conflict is inexplicable. Rather, as I
will seek to show, Pato£ka occupies a nontraditional space in philosophy. His
understanding o f care for the soul is not one that leads to a transcendental harmony; care
for the soul is rather a difficult process that involves conflict and requires a willingness
to sacrifice.
The second aim o f this chapter is to illuminate the attributes o f the individual
who is genuinely able to care for his soul, the individual who exemplifies the
self-understanding characteristic of a historical and political actor. This individual,
whom Patodka calls a “spiritual person,”21 is neither a typical politician nor a
“Guardian” in the sense o f Plato’s Republic. Rather, he or she may be a member of any
profession. What is important is the person’s willingness to accept a “problematic” life
and to speak truthfully in the public realm. In this way, Pato£ka emphasizes, the
“spiritual person” o f whatever profession is nonetheless political.
My third aim, in Chapter Five, is to introduce an essential element o f Patodkan
politics: the element o f ethics and morality. PatoCka’s final writings, which came in
16
defense of Charter 77, stress the “moral attitude” o f the spiritual person and o f the
political state to which he belongs. Moral sentiment, it is argued, is sovereign over both
the individual and the state. Patodka’s political thought thus culminates in a
commitment to a certain unconditionality o f ethical comportment. Yet this position
leads to a potential objection. How is it possible to require an unconditional ethics if one
is committed to a critique o f metaphysics? Can postmodern critique be applied to
political theory without dissolving into ethical relativism?
With these questions I return to the central theme o f this study and of PatoCka’s
political theory, the problem o f the foundation. I will conclude this study with a sixth
and final chapter that focuses on an exploration o f this theme. It is, in Patodka's terms, a
problem of the meaningfulness o f human reality. The world as a whole is the
meaningful context o f our lives, yet it is not an abstract, metaphysical objectification.
To the degree that this can be demonstrated persuasively, and Patocka attempts to do so
using phenomenological analysis, then the essential ground for politics and ethics takes
on an alternate form, one that contrasts distinctly with the variety o f forms given to it in
the technological, as well as the pre-technological, eras.
Pato£ka’s philosophy, I contend, is an internally consistent and convincing
alternative to political theory that styles itself as either “postmodern” or “classical.” It
most certainly belongs in the canon o f contemporary theory. It is not, however, without
its shortcomings, and I discuss the project in Chapter Six with a critical eye, noting the
limits of its perspective and the opposition it is likely to provoke. As an appendix to this
study, I also include a detailed review o f the major English-language literature on the
17
work o f Jan Pato£ka. As a scholar whose ability to work and publish was suppressed by
an authoritarian state, Patodka has not been the subject o f a significant literature outside
his native land. This has begun to change rapidly in the last decade but, as I note in the
appendix, the literature (particularly in English) is still limited and not o f a consistently
high quality. I hope to begin to correct this deficiency with this study.
In concluding this introduction, it will be pertinent to note a few o f the
biographical details of Jan Patocka’s life.22 Patocka was bom in 1907 in the town o f
Tumov, in what was then the Czech part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He was the
third o f four boys in a family o f modest means but superior education. Patodka’s father
was a well-known classical philologist with a wide-ranging interest in the literary arts,
and his mother was trained in opera. Although the family was forced to live modestly
due to the elder Patocka’s ill health, it is certain that the children were not at a loss for
education.
The young Pato£ka began a course o f study in philosophy at Prague’s ancient
Charles University in 1925 and was able to gain a stipend, four years later, to study in
Paris. It was here, at the Sorbonne, that Patocka attended a series o f lectures given by
Edmund Husserl, the Paris Lectures, that were to develop into the Cartesian
Meditations. This exposure undoubtedly influenced the Czech philosophy student,
although it would be several more years before he would work directly with the German
phenomenologist.
After completing his degree from Charles University, Patocka again sought an
international fellowship, this time ending up in Freiburg to study directly under Husserl
18
and, importantly, also to attend the lectures of Martin Heidegger. The association with
Husserl was to blossom into a close relationship. Back in Prague in the mid-30s,
Patocka was instrumental in bringing the renowned phenomenologist to the Czech
capital to lecture. These “Prague lectures,” from November o f 1935, became the basis
for Husserl’s last major work, the Crisis o f European Sciences, which was inordinately
influential on the direction o f Patofika’s career.
In the years that followed, Pato£ka’s world fell apart. Following the Munich
Diktat and the Nazi invasion o f Czechoslovakia in 1938, all non-German universities
were closed and life became extraordinarily trying. During the war itself,
Czechoslovakia was spared major battles or destruction. Patoika was able to continue to
write occasional articles, this despite being forced to work, in 1944, as a tunneler in
Prague. This last job, for which his academic inclinations did not well prepare him,
fortunately did not last long. By 1945 the war came to an end and the philosopher was
finally able to take up a position at Charles University as a full professor.
Once again, however, international political forces were to intrude decisively on
his career. His return to the university, where he immediately began to fill the needs o f a
student population starved for instruction, was only short-lived. By 1948 the
Communist Party was in control o f the government and the forty years of Czechoslovak
communism had begun. Pato£ka was again dismissed from the university, and this time
effectively barred from print. For the next fifteen years -- when he was at the age when
scholars are generally most productive —Pato£ka was reduced to working in archives.
Actually, his years in archives dedicated to Masaryk and Komensky (Comenius) were
19
quite productive. In the first piace, he was able to avoid all involvement with the
political regime, and in the second, he made use o f the time to produce a tremendous
amount o f scholarly material on these two Czech thinkers. With the exception o f a
number o f unpublished manuscripts, however, he was unable to pursue his own
philosophical research interests.23
It was not until the late 1960s that the regime began to liberalize and PatoCka
was able to return to the university. Again his career took on a second wind and a
number o f his most significant lecture series, such as the Body, Community, Language,
World lectures, were delivered to appreciative students during this period. The
liberalization o f the Prague Spring was also short-lived, however, and the Soviet-led
invasion o f 1968 crushed the hopes and dreams o f open-minded Czechs in devastating
fashion. The blow to the psyche o f Czech intellectuals was unimaginable. Many had
genuinely believed that they were entering a period that would be truly free and just.
Their bitterness and inner conflict was intense, and some of this is reflected in the tone
o f the underground “apartment seminars” that Patocka held during the 1970s.
The invasion, o f course, meant the end o f Pato£ka’s career at the university. He
was ‘prematurely’ retired in 1969 and again barred from print. But this did not stop him,
now that he was a retiree, from pursuing his philosophical and pedagogic ambitions.
Patocka continued to lecture to students in the 1970s, but this time illegally in
underground seminars held surreptitiously in the private apartments o f willing
individuals. The Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History were written during this
20
period and published privately as samizdat, with carefully guarded copies typed, retyped
and circulated for willing students.
For Patocka, these activities meant that he was pursuing the two things that
mattered most to him: philosophy and education. For the authorities, however, it meant
dissidence. Many o f Pato£ka’s students or admirers during this time, such as the young
playwright Vaclav Havel, were willing to voice opposition to the regime and take the
consequences for it. Thus it was in 1977 that Havel, along with a number of other
dissident intellectuals, decided to issue a protest under the name o f Charter 77. For the
document to carry weight, however, they needed the support o f a recognized and
respected figure. Although he was hesitant, Jan Pato£ka, at the age o f 69, accepted that
role. It was to be the role that brought him international fame, and cost him his life. It
was, however, a role entirely in keeping with his political philosophy.
E nd Notes
'See Jan Patocka, “What We Can and Cannot Expect from Charta [sic] 77,” in
Jan Patocka: Philosophy and Selected Writings, ed. Erazim Kohak, (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1989) 346.
2On Patodka’s educational influences, see Ivan Blecha, Jan Patocka, (Prague:
Votobia, 1997), 22.
3For a discussion o f this theme, see Edmund Husserl, “The Vienna Lecture,” in
The Crisis o f European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1970), 269-299.
4Patocka also took from Heidegger, and from Nietzsche, the contention that
human historical reality precluded a foundation in an ahistorical, “metaphysical” reality
such as a theory o f a “true world” o f which the human world is but a reflection. This is
the basis o f the critique o f metaphysics which grounds much o f contemporary thought
including Patocka’s. He also took from them a distrust o f the Enlightenment sense o f
reason.
21
5Josef Novak, “Selected Bibliography o f Jan Pato£ka’s Writings,” Kosmas:
Journal o f Czechoslovak and Central European Studies 5, no. 2 (winter 1986): 115-139.
6Josef Moural, “The Question o f the Core o f Patocka’s Work: Phenomenology,

History o f Philosophy, and Philosophy o f History,” Report o f the Center fo r Theoretical
Study, CTS-99-05, (Prague: Center for Theoretical Study, 1999), 1.
’During the long periods when he was barred from university life, Pato£ka found
stimulating refuge in archives dedicated to the works o f the Czech philosophers Jan
Amos Komensky (Comenius) and T. G. Masaryk. He wrote extensively on both thinkers
during these periods, putting together what could be termed a history o f the philosophy
o f each. The texts on Komensky alone will occupy two volumes o f Pato£ka’s Collected
Works.
8Moural, “The Question o f the Core of Patodka’s Work,” 2.
’Ibid., 3. Moural situates himself somewhere in-between these perspectives,

pointing out that, while it would be wrong to contend that Patodka was not a
phenomenologist, it is true that “he did relatively little o f topically oriented
phenomenological analysis, of doing phenomenology rather than speaking about it.”
Ibid., 4.
l0Ibid., 3.
"Ivan Chvatik and Pavel Kouba, “Pfedmluva k souboru Pe£e o duSi” (Preface to
the Collection: Care for the Soul), in Sebrane Spisy Jana Patocky, sv. 1 (The Collected
Works o f Jan Patocka, vol. 1), Pece o dusi I: Soubor stati a prednasek o postaveni
cloveka ve svete a v dejinach (Care for the Soul I: A Collection o f Articles and Lectures
on the Position o f Man in the World and in History), eds. Ivan Chvatik and Pavel Kouba
(Prague: OIKUMENE, 1996), 10 (Hereafter Pece o dusi I).
12Moural, “The Question o f the Core of PatoCka’s Work,” 8.
13Jan Pato£ka, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History, trans. Erazim

Kohak (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1996), 104.
"Ibid., 154.
"Ibid., 149.
"Ibid., 154.
I7Pato£ka, Body, Community, Language, World, trans. Erazim Kohak (Chicago:
22
Open Court Press, 1998), 97-98.
18See, for example, Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans.

Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 182-189.
l9Pato£ka, Heretical Essays, 118.
20Hans Meyerhoff, introduction to M an’s Place in Nature, by Max Scheler

(Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), xiv.
21Pato£ka, “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” unpublished translation by

Edward F. Findlay, TMs. See also “Duchovni clovek a intelektual, in Pece o dusi, Sv. 6:
Kacirske eseje o filosofii dejin a texty k Charte 77 (samizdat), eds. Ivan Chvatik and
Pavel Kouba (Prague: Jan Patocka Archive, Center for Theoretical Study, 1988).
Patocka uses the term “spiritual” knowing full well that it does not “sound pleasant
today.” “It sounds,” he continues, “in some way spiritualist and we don’t like such
phrases nowadays; but does there exist a better expression for what I have in mind?”
Ibid., 1.
-T he most complete biographical material on Patodka I have found is in Ivan

Blecha’s philosophical biography o f the thinker published in Czech in 1997 and simply
entitled Jan Patocka. My information is largely based on this text.
23There are a number of significant texts from this period, however, such as
“Negative Platonism” and “Supercivilization and its Inner Conflict.” Yet these texts
were not published in Patodka’s lifetime and are ofren unedited or even unfinished.
23
C H A PT ER 2
“ C O N C R ETE HUMANS IN T H E IR CO RPO REA L W ORLD” : AN

IN TER PRETA TIO N O F HUSSERL AND H EID EG G ER
For those familiar with the philosophical traditions associated with Edmund
Husserl and Martin Heidegger, the first inclination upon encountering Jan Pato£ka is to
view his work as a modification o f their, more original, theses. To some extent this is
justifiable, for the Czech philosopher is most definitely a student o f Husserl and
Heidegger, and his work is built upon conceptualizations worked out by these two
thinkers. The road to an understanding o f Pato£ka’s philosophy leads through both
Husserl and Heidegger. Yet to conceive o f Patodka as primarily a “Husserlian” or,
alternately, a “Heideggerean” thinker is to miss the main thrust o f his thought, the most
original aspect o f his philosophy. Patocka’s approach to philosophy is not determined,
in the end, by the methodology o f either thinker -- neither by strict attention to
phenomenological method nor by complete immersion in the ontology of being and
understanding. His attention, as he describes it, is directed to the human experience o f
reality as a whole. In indicating the “whole” o f reality, Pato£ka wishes to place
particular emphasis on one area that is not served particularly well by Husserl or
Heidegger. Through his philosophy, he wishes to illuminate human social and political
reality. Patocka’s interpretation is geared toward the uncovery o f a ground for the being
of humans in society. As a result, it is necessarily disloyal to the thought o f his teachers.
While drawing insight from both, he purposefully chooses not to follow either too
closely.
24
Pato<Ska’s intent is to bring the insights o f Husserl and Heidegger into direct
contact with the social sciences. This requires, as he admits with reference to his
philosophy o f history, a bit o f heresy. An examination o f PatoCka’s reliance on these
two thinkers will demonstrate that he does not apply their work so much as he interprets
it. Developing a philosophy that speaks to being in its concrete, social activity means
that Patocka cannot simply follow the framework o f either thinker. He must pursue
phenomenology on the level o f its insight, rather than on the level o f its method. This
means, for example, that he engages with the whole Heidegger, both the early analyst o f
Being and Time and the later thinker who looks to poetry, world and earth. This is not a
quirk in PatoCka’s approach, it is a necessity.
As a starting point for this study o f Jan Patodka and political theory-, I must
examine the nature o f his relationship with the two contemporary figures on whom his
work relies most heavily. I will show how, through analysis and interpretation o f both
German thinkers, Patodka is able to develop a philosophy that brings their work to bear
on an understanding o f contemporary political reality. As Patocka understood his task,
he was taking their work in a direction that it was meant to go -- although neither
philosopher took it very far in that direction himself. Though Patocka is a
phenomenologist and an adherent o f many o f the ontological insights explicated by
Heidegger, he is more o f a critic o f the two philosophers than a follower. He does not
deny the validity o f their insights, but refines their thought and takes it in directions to
which it, as originally presented, was not appropriate. The fact that Patocka is neither
25
simply a Husserlian nor a Heideggerean thinker makes his work politically relevant
where theirs has largely failed to be.
The basic logic o f Patodka’s critique of Husserl and Heidegger concerns the
being o f humans in the world, inevitably implying human action in community, i.e., the
relation o f humans not only to their consciousness, but to their bodies, their
communities, and their world. As Patodka himself describes it, this philosophy is one of
“concrete humans in their corporeal world.”1It is a world in which human movement is
“shared” movement and the being o f humans is historical and social —and thus,
political. PatoCka’s “phenomenological philosophy,”2 seen in this light, forms a
consistent and coherent basis for his more explicitly political writings. The story of
Patocka’s philosophical achievement begins with his association with Edmund Husserl.
Husserl
Professionally, Pato£ka was most closely connected to Husserl, with whom he
worked as a young man. He began his association with the German phenomenologist in
1929 when, as a student concluding his studies at the philosophical faculty o f Charles
University in Prague, he was able to spend a year on an exchange program at the
Sorbonne in Paris. Husserl, at the time, was at the Sorbonne to deliver his Paris
Lectures, which became the basis for his famous Cartesian Meditations. It was during
this lecture series that PatoCka was first introduced to Husserl, albeit only briefly.
The association with Husserl began in earnest, however, in 1933, after Patocka
had completed his doctoral work and was in Berlin on a grant from the Humboldt
foundation. While studying Greek thought in Berlin under Jacob Klein, the suggestion
26
was put to him to relocate to Freiburg, where he might be closer to Husserl and might
also hear Martin Heidegger, with whom Klein had studied. Patodka promptly addressed
a letter to Husserl in Freiburg asking to be sponsored and, to his surprise, received a
warm invitation. Husserl let Patodka know that he thought of him as a fellow
countryman -- Husserl had been bom in Moravia, in the present-day Czech Republic —
and conditioned the invitation only with the requirement that Patodka come free o f
“preconceived philosophical convictions.”3
The experience o f 1933 in Freiburg was singularly influential in terms o f the
development of Patodka’s phenomenological philosophy. Here his working relationship
with Husserl began, and it was here as well that Patodka was first able to hear
Heidegger, who was at the height o f his fame after the publication o f Being and Time.
Patocka worked most closely in 1933 with Husserl’s assistant, Eugen Fink; he
developed, during this period, both a deep appreciation for the aims and methods of
Husserlian phenomenology and a critical stance towards many of the presumptions
upon which it rested. Fink, also o f independent mind when it came to the philosophy o f
his teacher, seems to have encouraged the younger Czech in the latter, even encouraging
Patocka to consider Heidegger’s critique o f phenomenology. Ultimately, Patodka did
just that and it was, as Ivan Blecha put it in his 1997 work on the Czech thinker,
“[precisely this location between Husserl and Heidegger and the attempt at a specific
synthesis of the motives o f both sides that later helped Patodka to find a distinctive
place in phenomenology.”4
27
Despite his working mainly with Fink, a close relationship between the young
Czech and the elder Husserl did develop. This relationship advanced in the years
following the Freiburg stay, with Pato£ka even being invited to spend Christmas with
the Husserls in 1934. More important for Patodka’s philosophy, however, was the
progression o f their professional relationship. The high point o f the association
undoubtedly occurred in 1934-35, when Husserl was laying the groundwork for his last
major work. The Crisis o f European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. It
was the content o f this work that was to act on Pato£ka as a springboard for his lifelong
pursuit o f philosophy. Husserl’s first public expression o f the themes of the Crisis came
in a letter he sent -- in lieu o f a personal appearance —to the World Philosophical
Congress o f 1934, held in Prague. At Husserl’s request, the letter was read to the
Congress by Jan Patocka, and it represented Husserl’s answer to the request o f the
Congress for comment on “the mission o f philosophy in our time.”5
A more significant presentation o f the themes o f the Crisis, however, took place
a year later, also in Prague, and also as a result o f action by Patocka. In November of
1935, the young Czech hosted Husserl for a series o f lectures to the Prague Circle, the
Cercle philosophique de Prague pour les recherches sur I 'entendement humain. The
content o f these lectures, entitled “The Crisis o f European Sciences and Psychology,”
became the basis for the larger work, the first parts o f which were published a year later
in 1936.6 The more well-known “Vienna Lecture” was actually a precursor to the
Prague lectures, taking place in May o f 1935.
28
The Crisis o f European Sciences
While Patodka is a critic o f many of the assumptions upon which Husserl bases
his phenomenological texts, his philosophical career was nonetheless significantly
determined by the themes outlined in Crisis.1 Patodka was distinctly influenced by his
close association with Husserl in the mid-1930s, and it is this association that provided
Patocka with a raison d'etre for his philosophical career. Husserl’s Crisis was an
incomplete work, an introduction to a new expression o f the phenomenological outlook.
Nevertheless, Patodka found in it themes that resonated, that had the potential, if
correctly analyzed, to lead philosophy back to itself, that is, back to a consideration o f
existence as it is concretely experienced. Patodka’s career is, to a large degree, a
detailed critique, elaboration and exploration of themes that were o f concern to Husserl
at the end o f his life.
Primary among these themes is the “crisis” o f European rationality. The
perception o f a pervading sense o f crisis in Europe at this time was evidenced by the
increasing popularity o f the Existenzphilosophie of Jaspers and Heidegger, of early
existentialism.8 Husserl strongly opposed this movement as a solution to the problem --
considering it a form o f antirationalism; he did admit, however, as David Carr puts it,
that Existenzphilosophie had “given needed expression to something real: a deeply felt
lack of direction for man’s existence as a whole, a sense o f the emptiness of Europe’s
cultural values, a feeling o f crisis and breakdown, the demand that philosophy be
relevant to life.”9
29
Accepting the relevance o f this diagnosis, Husserl proposed a philosophical
approach to the problem that seemed quite unlike his earlier work: he proposed a
historical approach that sought to uncover the guiding principle behind philosophy
itself. This was not an antirationalistic endeavor, he emphasized; it was rather its
opposite. It was an attempt to rescue rationalism from the decline to which it had been
subject with the rise o f natural science methodology during and after the Age of
Enlightenment.
The argument, encompassing a critique o f scientism and positivism, claims that
the stunning advances in the natural sciences led to the summary dismissal of the
methods o f the humanistic sciences as mere subjective reflections on the
“unconditionally universal elements and laws” o f nature itself, which could only be
truly accessed by the development of the exact sciences.10 The methods of the exact
sciences, then, came to be seen as the exclusive mode o f access to what became the
basis o f reality -- the “unconditionally universal” idealizations of the hard sciences. In
this situation, lived experience is merely a subjective reflection o f that reality, often
distorted and innaccurate. This transfer o f ontological validity to the constructs of
science is at the root o f what Husserl called the crisis o f Western rationality."
Rationality in the West had gone astray, but this did not necessitate an antirational
solution. As Husserl put it in his Vienna lecture,
I too am certain that the European crisis has its roots in a misguided
rationalism. But we must not take this to mean that rationality as such is
evil or that it is o f only subordinate significance for mankind's existence
as a whole. Rationality, in that high and genuine sense o f which alone we
are speaking, the primordial Greek sense...still requires, to be sure, much
clarification through self-reflection; but it is called in its mature form to
guide [our] development. On the other hand we readily admit (and
30
German Idealism preceded us long ago in this insight) that the stage of
development o f ratio represented by the rationalism o f the Age o f
Enlightenment was a mistake, though certainly an understandable one.12
The renewal o f reason required an examination o f its origin and its status as the guiding
principle o f European life. This examination needed to proceed historically, and it
needed to refer directly to the origin o f philosophy in Greek antiquity.
Husserl argues that in order to understand the crisis o f Europe, the very concept
o f “Europe” must first be understood. Europe, he writes, is indistinguishable from its
spiritual telos.13 It is “the historical teleology o f the infinite goals o f reason,” and it has
its birthplace in ancient Greece. In other words, Europe begins with and is defined by
philosophy, in the original sense o f the word. Philosophy, the ‘ piimal phenomenon o f
spiritual Europe,” is distinct from the philosophy o f other civilizations by virtue o f
essential differences.14 “[OJnly in the Greeks do we have a universal (“cosmological”)
life-interest in the essentially new form of a purely “theoretical” attitude, and this as a
communal form.”15 In distinguishing this “theoretical” attitude as something new, he
contrasts it to a “natural” attitude that is prior to the theoretical.16 With the concept o f
the “natural” attitude, Husserl is describing a pretheoretical, or pre-philosophical
perspective on life in which things are accepted as simply given. The breakthrough o f
philosophy, he says, came with the adoption o f a theoretical attitude towards human
existence that amounted to a skeptical interrogation o f simply given knowledge. This
was the beginning o f explicit self-reflection in Western thought and the essence of
rationalism. The downfall o f Europe has been a result o f its estrangement from this
essence, its hope for escape from this crisis contingent on its ability to renew this “spirit
o f philosophy.”17
31
Like Husserl, Patodka was convinced o f the reality o f a crisis, or degradation, of
European rationalism. He saw Husserl’s diagnosis o f the problem as relatively sound;
the German philosopher’s prescription for solving it, however, was not. The centrality
o f the theme o f the crisis to Patodka’s philosophy, as well as his certainty as to the
inappropriateness o f the Husserlian approach, are clearly demonstrated in two, quite
distinct texts -- one from the beginning, the other from the end, o f his career. The first
text, entitled “Masaryk’s and Husserl’s Conception of the Spiritual Crisis of European
Humanity,” comes from 1936, when Husserl was still involved in the writing o f the
Crisis and Patodka was in close contact with him. The second text represents a lecture
given in Warsaw in 1971 entitled “Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy o f the Crisis of the
Sciences and His Conception o f a Phenomenology o f the Life-World.” Despite the gap
of 35 years, both texts reveal a similar critique: a fundamental disconnectedness in
Husserl from the substantiality o f the concrete world, which is a world o f action and a
world o f “good and evil” represented, in the earlier article, by the Czech
philosopher-president T.G. Masaryk.
In this first essay, Patodka notes that both Masaryk, a “civilizer and an
organizer,” and Husserl, a “contemplator,” are convinced o f the debilitating effect on
European society of a “protracted spiritual crisis.”18 Their approaches to the problem are
drastically different, however, and it is evident from the text that, though the young Jan
Patodka takes much inspiriation from both, he sees the need for a third approach that
avoids their mistakes. Masaryk’s failing stems from his theology, founded in an
“objectivistic conception o f God,” which he appended to an understanding of
32
philosophy based on Descartes. Although Patodka could not agree with Masaryk’s
combination o f theology and Cartesianism, he was nevertheless an adherent o f the
solidity o f Masaryk’s ethical and political stances, the practical nature o f his thought.19
While the intellectual foundations were untenable, he concluded, the goals were
consistent with human reality; the chore was thus to uncover the authentic foundations
for the moral and political posture exemplified by T.G. Masaryk.
Husserl, in contrast, follows “a purely theoretical path” —“that of analysis and
reflection, without regard for practical questions, striving solely for clarity and precision
of philosophical results.”20 This theoretical philosophy, pursued with exacting rigor, is
Husserl’s prescription for a solution to the crisis o f rationality -- a return to philosophy
in its essence, guided by phenomenology. As Patodka points out, however, there is a
certain weakness in this disregard for the practical, just as there is intellectual weakness
in Masaryk’s adherence to a practical religiosity:
A man o f action, like Masaryk, expresses himself in his active

conception o f faith; a man o f uncompromising intellectual consistency,
like Husserl, might find that it interferes with his work. Perhaps we
might say, paraphrasing one o f Masaryk’s well-known sayings, that the
German is weak in his strength, the Czech is strong in his weakness.21
The Masarykan stress on individual action, on “personal decision which does not follow
from theories or rest on arguments,” represents an attempt to provide answers to
genuine problems o f human existence, problems which Husserl’s philosophy does not
address, “though it can perhaps serve as the ground on which such answers can be
built.”22 In this early article, Jan Patodka is convinced of two things: the need for a
33
solution to the crisis o f European humanity is indeed real, and the best approach to such
a solution will draw upon a combination o f practical and theoretical considerations.
By 1971 and the time o f the Warsaw lecture, the critique o f the Husserlian
approach had been elaborated in detail; the basic insight o f 1936, however, remained
intact. Patocka is even more convinced, after the passage o f three and a half decades,
that Husserl’s “diagnosis” o f the root o f the modem condition as the ascendency of
scientific method over all else is relevant. The essential foci remain rationality and
responsibility: as the essential ingredients o f philosophy, these make up the core o f a
“life in truth,” the symbolic goal of Patofika’s philosophy. He neatly summarizes, in the
Warsaw lecture, this essential core of Husserl’s concerns:
We might formulate Husserl’s thoughts on philosophy, science and

rationality roughly as follows. Science is genuinely a science ~ rationally
grounded and internally clear knowledge —only as long as it remains in
close contact with philosophy, which is its starting point and its
foundation. Philosophy is nothing other than a life (dedicated to thought)
which responds to the call for a fully responsible thought. An attitude o f
responsibility is one which makes its opinions conform to its intuitions
o f the matters themselves, not inversely. We can see that only such a
responsible attitude makes possible the life in truth which is the essence
of philosophy and o f every science that has not lost touch with it. Life in
truth, in turn, is rationality. This life in truth, as the characteristic bios, is
what the ancient Greeks had founded as an ongoing tradition whose
meaning is always capable of being rediscovered and o f being renewed
and enriched thanks precisely to the possibility o f being rediscovered.23
Modem science, however, had abandoned responsibility by proposing a universal
systematization o f scientific method. The result was a “crisis” o f rational civilization.
The same science which increasingly makes life possible “at the same time strips life o f
all higher reasons for living, leaving us alone in the face o f the chaos o f instincts and o f
traditions devoid o f any but merely factual cohesion.”24 The granting o f special status to
34
the methods o f natural science has facilitated a debasement o f the spiritual aspects of
life, rendering it increasingly empty.
Despite the perspicacity o f the diagnosis, the solution proposed was not
persuasive. The basis o f Patodka’s critique concerned the degree to which Husserl’s
“natural” world was a purely theoretical construction, disconnected from the
concreteness o f practical human action in the world. As Husserl described the “natural”
world, it led to a “metaphysical outcome” that was “unsatisfactory” and “in the end
disappointing.”25 Husserl described this “natural” world not as a substantial world, but
rather in terms o f a great transcendental intersubjectivity, meaning that the world could
only be conceived o f as a collection o f all o f the subjective perceptions o f individual
consciousnesses. The end result was a world deprived o f all independence o f being. This
necessitated a detailed critique and a thorough revision o f the concept.
Husserl’s approach to philosophy, which sought a “postulate of philosophy as an
absolutely apodictic science,”26 revealed that his conception o f rationality, or reason,
was determined, not so much by the Greek understanding o f reason to which he pointed
-- expressed in the differentiation o f the concept o f “intelligence,” or nous27 —but rather
by a more modem, Cartesian vision of reason and knowledge. Patodka knew that reason
did not lead to apodicticity, to certainty, and so he took over Husserl’s goal by shifting
the direction o f its inquiry. He was to examine, in his career, not only the ontological
work o f Martin Heidegger, but also the Platonic theme o f rationality as a component of
caring for the development o f the human soul. In this way, Patodka not only moved
35
beyond Husserl, he also managed to remain faithful to the understanding o f reason
expressed by the Greeks rather than to that characteristic o f the modems.
Nevertheless, PatoCka’s close contact with Husserl during the decade o f the
1930s was certainly critical in determining the direction o f his philosophical career.
Husserl’s basic goal from The Crisis o f European Sciences — a resuscitation o f the
concept o f reason via a turn to history and a reconsideration of the origin o f philosophy
in ancient Greece —was taken on as a central aim by Pato£ka as well. Yet Pato£ka did
not simply follow his teacher in an application o f the principles he had laid down. He
sought a more complete understanding o f the content o f reason than that offered by
Husserl. This led him, in the end, to secure his own place in philosophy by moving
away from Husserl and developing a phenomenological and ontological philosophy that
embraced many o f the insights o f Martin Heidegger and applied them to the social being
of man.
The Insight of Phenomenology
Prior to developing an ontology, however, Patocka was a dedicated student —
and critic —o f phenomenology. His commentary on Husserl is by no means limited to
his writings about the Crisis; he also wrote extensively on phenomenology and the
phenomenological method, writings which in themselves justify PatoCka’s inclusion on
a list o f the century’s significant philosophers.28 Though a critic o f many aspects o f
Husserlian phenomenology, Pato£ka nonetheless considered himself to be a
phenomenologist.
36
Patodka agreed with Husserl that the goal o f phenomenology was to grasp
phenomena without distortion, to attempt to see things as they are. This did not mean
seeing and describing things as they are ideally, or “in themselves,” but rather as they
genuinely appear to us in our experience, for only in this way could we avoid the
mistake o f perceiving things as we believe them to be, rather than as they are. As he
wrote, “for Husserl the reflection on phenomena means delving into the way things
present themselves to us in our ordinary experience/’29 This is by no means something
obvious, as Patodka explains in rather tortured language, further paraphrasing Husserl:
the difficulty, he writes, “is that we frequently think we see and know what in reality we
only think, that we do not know how to see what we see, that intermediate links
insinuate themselves between the seen and our knowing and must be systematically
removed.”30 This task o f seeing things as they genuinely appear, undistortedly, is the
broad goal o f phenomenology; it is the goal o f reflecting upon the world and upon
human affairs as they truly are, rather than as we may perceive them abstractly, or as we
may wish them to be.
In the academic year 1968-69, Jan Patodka delivered a series o f lectures at
Charles University in Prague that belong among his most original contributions to the
study o f phenomenology. Entitled Body, Community, Language, World, this text
(compiled from notes taken by his students and translated into English by Erazim
FCohak) offers as clear and coherent a picture o f his revision o f the approaches of
Husserl and Heidegger as can be found. Patodka begins the lectures by making it clear
that the philosophical course he is pursuing is phenomenological, rather than
37
metaphysical. He argues that metaphysics, “which constructs philosophy as a special
scientific system,” is the very opposite o f phenomenology. “Phenomenology examines
the experiential content o f such theses; in every abstract thought it seeks to uncover
what is hidden in it, how we arrive at it, what seen and lived reality underlies it.”31 For
philosophy to claim intellectual validity, it must resist the temptation o f the scientific
system and remain committed to human experience.
The phenomenology pursued by Patodka, however, is not to be confused with a
repetition o f the technique o f Husserl. This point is made in the first o f his lectures on
the Body, Community, Language, World problem: “[b]y phenomenology we shall not
mean the teachings o f Husserl. What we have defined as phenomenology —learning to
think and see precisely (how to read, how to articulate what we see) -- is always present
in philosophy.”32 Patodka’s approach to philosophy is not primarily a method. It is
rather a thematic attempt to clarify the experiential essence o f philosophy.
Phenomenology as Patocka pursues it is a means to place distance between the art o f
human self-reflection and the metaphysical baggage that has accumulated around
philosophy as practiced in Europe for more than two thousand years. Patocka’s
interpretation, which rejects the subjective element o f Husserl’s work and instead
pursues problems related to the corporeality o f the body and the “movements” o f human
beings within the world, is less an abstract theoretical venture than an application o f
theoretical insight to the concreteness o f human experience. This, he was convinced,
also was characteristic o f the Socratic pursuit o f truth. It is in this sense that ontological
38
phenomenology, meaning primarily the insights o f Husserl and Heidegger taken
together, is inherently linked to the world o f ancient philosophy. As he explains it.
Phenomenology left the greater part o f the whole modem tradition

behind, but this ontological phenomenology goes to the very beginnings
o f our European tradition o f thought, because it shows that ancient
philosophy is already ontology which hinges on the problem o f truth —
but this was not taken sufficiently deeply by it.33
Jan Patocka sought to pursue phenomenology in a different way than did either Husserl
or Heidegger. He called it a process o f doing phenomenology over again from its very
roots.34
This is not meant to imply that Patodka ignored the method o f phenomenology
which Husserl elaborated in his earlier work —to the contrary. Patocka wrote
extensively on Husserl and took his early work with the utmost seriousness. His
numerous publications and scripta on this topic stand by themselves within the narrower
field o f phenomenological studies. A thorough examination o f these texts, however, is
beyond the scope of this study. Here I m ust be content with only a brief overview o f his
critique o f Husserl, and that primarily within the scope of the broader theme: the degree
to which Patocka’s phenomenology is a form o f political philosophy.
The Critique o f Husserl and the Concept o f the “World as a Whole”
The phenomenologist Erazim Kohak has characterized Jan Patocka’s
Introduction to Husserl s Phenomenology as a “major philosophical achievement.”35
This book, also derived from a lecture series delivered at Charles University at the end
o f the 1960’s, is, as Kohak points out, more o f an in-depth interpretation o f Husserl than
an introduction. In it, Patodka offers a detailed review and critique o f the methods o f
39
Husserlian phenomenology; in his other lecture series o f that time, Body, Community,
Language, World, he presents an outline o f his own revision of that phenomenology. Of
the elements of phenomenology Patodka chooses to revise or reconceive, none are more
central than the concepts o f the “natural world” and the “world as a whole.”36
Patocka’s first philosophical work, presented in 1936 for h abitatio n as full
University Professor and entitled “The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem,”
began with the following sentence: “The problem o f philosophy is the world as a
whole.”37 This question o f the world does not concern the physical world, the planet, but
rather the whole that is the context and constant background of our lives and experience.
The question o f our understanding and relationship to this whole is key to the
philosophical undertaking, for no human action or experience can take place absent the
world. Following Husserl, Patodka was convinced that “[o]ur individual experience
always presupposes a context preceding it.”38 This context, this prior whole, determines
the meaningfulness o f the particularities which are contained within it, for particulars
become meaningful only in the context o f the whole which defines them.39 What
Patodka calls the “world as a whole” is a concept crucial to phenomenological
philosophy. His conception o f this world, however, is distinctly different from
Husserl’s. To get at the heart o f this difference, and to grasp Patodka’s understanding of
our perception of the world, I must first review certain elements o f Husserl’s
understanding. Here Erazim Kohak’s explanation in his “Philosophical Biography” is
helpful.
40
For both Husserl and Patocka, human perception is more than the mere noting o f
particulars with which we come into daily contact. When we perceive an object, we may
do so not merely as we see it, from one side or from a certain angle, but as we know it
to be. We also perceive it categorially, as a complete whole and an invariant structure
greater than the limited access o f our particular perspective —this is something Husserl
refers to as ‘'eidetic intuition” and Patodka translates as “perception o f the universal.”40
In effect, then, we are able to perceive more than is actually present before us. Patocka
describes this experience when he writes that “far more is present to me as real than
what is actually given: whatever stands in some relation to the self-given is also actual.
Things beyond our senses are present to us.”41 For Patodka, significantly, the perception
o f things “beyond our senses” is not an abstraction. Such things are also experiential,
they are actual. We are not limited to that which is directly given in our ability to
perceive reality.
Husserl’s approach to our experience of objects as reality focuses on the act of
experiencing in the human consciousness, the mode in which the object is given to us in
consciousness. As we consider objects, we can never forget that we are experiencing
them in a particular, perspectival manner. Husserl concludes from this that, in fact, no
objects are truly independent o f our experiencing o f them in our consciousness. The
very existence o f objects, and o f the world itself, is relative to the positing of them by
the subjective consciousness. This, in simplified form, is the achievement o f Husserl’s
early work: the grounding of objectivity in the subject.42 Husserl is seeking to
demonstrate with his phenomenology “that the objectivity of the object is thinkable only
41
if we start out from the subjectivity o f the subject.”43 It is here that Pato£ka centers his
critique o f Husserlian phenomenology.
For Husserl, not only are individual objects of perception grounded in the
subject’s relation to them, so also is the collective totality o f those objects —the world.
As Kohak explains, “the world o f material objects [in Husserl] is no more than a
product o f acts of synthesis of perspectival views, and so always dubitable, contingent,
not absolute.”44 For Patocka, however, this is entirely insufficient; not only the objects
o f the world but also the world as a whole are indubitably actual and irreducible to
subjective consciousness. While Patodka agrees with Husserl that the world should be
understood not metaphysically but phenomenologically, -- as “a phenomenologically
given universal rather than a constructed, abstract one”45 -- he is unable to accept
Husserl’s derivation o f that universal from human subjectivity. Pato£ka recognizes the
world as a whole as fundamentally autonomous, as an element o f reality with which the
human being must interact in a dialectical relationship. Whereas with Husserl the drama
o f perception proceeds within the human consciousness, for Patocka we must admit to a
certain autonomy for the world as a whole which precedes the particularities o f
perception. The world itself can never be perceived as a particular, it exists via a
nonperceptual givenness that is itself a condition for the perception o f particulars. The
recognition o f the world as a whole is also a condition for a type o f human action that
bases itself, not upon the particular needs o f a given moment, but upon the overall
situation o f human being within the cosmos. As he describes it:
The nonperceptual, prevenient givenness of the whole is then the basis o f

special modes o f human comportment not directed at particulars, at the
42
resolution o f particular situations or at one-sidedly oriented measures
within the world, but o f modes in which man comports himself with
respect to the whole as such.46
These modes o f comportment, as we shall see, are essential to the conduct o f life in
philosophical and political truthfulness —what Pato£ka calls “life in truth.”
Patodka thus borrows from Husserl’s original conceptualization o f the world as a
phenomenologically given universal, but rejects the reduction o f that world to the
subjective consciousness. Pato£ka’s construction is less a matter o f pure
phenomenology in the Husserlian sense, and more relative to a broader, philosophical
perspective on the situation o f man in his concrete context, his culture, his community,
his history. Yet Patodka remains committed to avoiding the trap o f abstracting a world,
he wishes to proceed phenomenologically. He also wishes, as we have seen, to proceed
asubjectively, that is, to avoid Husserl’s reliance on subjectivity as the ultimate “ground
o f certainty.”47 What, then, of the concept o f the “world as a whole”? How is it
delimited, and how does it use phenomenology to avoid a fall into abstract
metaphysics?
In the early chapters of Body, Community, Language, World, Pato£ka offers a
description of the world o f humans that differentiates further, beyond the simplicity of
the world as a basic “context.” In fact, the context description is seen to be more
appropriate for animals than for humans. Animals live in immediate relation to their
context, to what interests and affects them immediately. Humans, by contrast,
constantly place themselves into situations beyond the immediately given -- they project
into the past, the future, into imagination, into possibility. They do this, however,
43
without escaping from their corporeal situation in the present. “For us humans, what is
immediately present in each moment is also a focus of other possibilities, of partial
worlds and so on. What is characteristic o f us is our variety of possibilities, a freedom
from the present, from the immediately given.”48 Human orientation is not limited to its
immediate context, as it is for animals. Our living, Patodka writes, with its ability to
transcend the immediate, is a living in a world, not simply a context. In our experience,
the human world is not a subjective entity; it is autonomous and concrete. Yet this does
not imply that it is limited to our immediately given physical context. The world is both
a concrete reality and the setting for our projection into possibility beyond the
limitations of the given.
Although the whole is conceived as a unity it is necessary that there exist variety
within it, a variety o f different landscapes within which the human being can project
himself and pursue possibilities. Patocka designates these landscapes using the
phenomenological concept, or metaphor, of “horizons.”49 They represent a way in which
the unity of the whole is preserved while permitting the exploration o f particular
possibilities, of variety, within it. The horizon, as Pato£ka defines it, “is something that
circumscribes all the particulars o f a given landscape, its visual part, but transcends it.”50
It is that which we cannot see yet know to be present at the edges o f that which we can
see —the ultimate context o f our perceptual landscape. It is the presence o f that which is
not directly present before us, but which is only anticipated, suggested by experience.51
Human beings do not live only among things immediately present before them.
They also live in horizons, “amid possibilities as if they were realities.” The essence of
44
life in horizons is the fact that such a life is not directed inwardly, but outwardly. Man
does not live inwardly, directed towards himself; instead, he aims outwardly, towards
horizons, towards possibility and, as Pato£ka wants to emphasize, towards the world. To
live in this way, to live in horizons, is to “broaden actuality immensely,” and it is
“typically human.”52 Horizons, which demarcate the particular landscapes o f the world,
do not imply an escape into a metaphysically transcendent reality. To the contrary, they
point to our living, not in ourselves, but among things —they point towards our living in
the world. “The projection into the world never ceases, we never live in ourselves, we
always live among things, there where our work is, living in horizons outside ourselves,
not within.”53
With his explication o f human consciousness as horizonal, o f humans as beings
that project outwards from themselves into the world and its possibilities, Patocka is
beginning to sketch out his revision o f phenomenology. Already, the direction o f this
revision is clear. It is directed towards the concrete and experiential elements o f human
life and action in concreto, in the world. The thrust of PatoCka’s critique is to suggest
that philosophy, if it hopes to remain consistent with experience, cannot avoid the
fundamental situatedness o f humans within a concrete world and, as we shall see, a
concrete community. It is what Erazim Kohak has demarcated as potentially Patodka’s
“great contribution to phenomenology”: the recognition o f what Patocka termed the
“hardness of reality.”54 The movement indicated here is from philosophy as a theoretical
venture towards philosophy in the concrete context of human life in the world, o f
human political life.
45
It remains to consider, however, the concept o f the world as Pato£ka presents it.
In what way is it to be understood, if neither as an objective entity nor an abstract
metaphysical construction. PatoCka’s explanation is phenomenological; the world can
be described only as it manifests itself to us. This is to say that it cannot be described as
a “thing.” It appears, rather, as a framework, anticipated as a whole, and “in this
anticipation it is not given as a reality, it does not appear, it is not itself a phenomenon:
it is what phenomenalizes.”55 In this sense it can be understood neither as a reality
relative to my subjectivity, nor as objective reality —it is rather in the form o f an
interval, something “in-between” the two that “cannot be understood in terms o f things
themselves.”56
In the final analysis, the whole will resist concrete definition because it does not
manifest itself as a thing whose limits or boundaries are able to be firmly grasped. The
whole as Patocka wishes to express it is the reality o f our being, and as such is only
available to us in glimpses, in particulars. “Reality is never revealed to us as a whole,”
Patocka writes. “In understanding the whole we encounter particulars but the
understanding o f the whole, o f being, conceals itself in understanding particulars.”57
Patocka’s conception o f being, here, is inherently connected to human striving within
the world and influenced, as we shall see, by Heidegger. Thus the limitations o f the
Husserlian framework are, in the end, dissatisfying. Husserl’s approach by means o f the
phenomenological reduction is overly speculative, rather than reflective.58 For Patocka,
human striving within the world is grounded in the “vital act” o f reflection; human
46
existence is “an existence on the way to itself, seeking itself, understanding itself, that
is, understanding its possibilities.”59
Understood in this way, the Husserlian reduction is less relevant, while the
concept o f the whole becomes even more important. The whole is the context o f this
human striving; it is, in a sense, its foundation. Though it cannot be wholly grasped
analytically, it clearly exists experientially, as the foundational constant supporting the
myriad possibilities and directions o f human lives. Patodka goes so far as to say that it
provides us with an “objectival meaning,” though, he would wish to be clear, not in the
metaphysical sense of a supreme being or Idea:
Even though we might not be able to analyze the structure o f this

antecedent whole, set it clearly before us, it is present in the functioning
references, in the phases o f dealing with things. It leads us from moment
to moment, it allows us to deal with the same, to have before us an
objectival meaning constant in diverse operations (emphasis mine).60
Here the whole is understood in terms o f its ontological significance: it is the necessary
backdrop for our individual reality. The diverse operations which individuate us and
through which we come to understand reality are united in their common participation
in the whole. Humans belong to this whole, but in a special mode, that o f human beings,
who are uniquely capable o f comprehending the presence o f the whole that is the
backdrop o f their existence and o f relating to it in our actions and understanding o f
particulars. This is in fact definitive o f our being as humans:
It means that humans by their living single themselves out of the whole
in an explicit relation to it and that their most intrinsically human
possibility -- that o f existing in a human way -- lies in their
understanding this specific trait, that humans are capable of encountering
being as things are not.61
47
In this relation to the whole, this “openness” to being, lies our essential humanity and
the font o f our ability to pursue possibility.
Patocka has replicated, to some degree, an ancient conception o f humanity as
existing within a cosmos-like62 whole comprehensible in its order though not graspable
in its entirety. We exist within it as individual beings, united in our singular ability to
grasp the uniqueness of our situation, and defined as human by our pursuit of such
understanding, by our vital reflection. Though the conception o f the whole is by no
means new, Patofika pursues an approach to it that can justifiably claim to be. It is an
approach grounded in phenomenological experience, pursued not along the lines of
Husserlian subjectivism, but rather with an emphasis on our concrete surrounding -- the
world, both in its particularites and as a whole. The world as a whole is not an objective
entity. It does, however, exist as an experiential constant in human life. In this sense it
can be said to make up part of the ground of human existence. It is not a metaphysical
foundation for human life, however, for it is neither posited as an objective entity nor as
an ethical guide-post for our human decision-making. Patocka wishes, above all, to
avoid constructing a foundation in metaphysics. The question o f ethics and
decision-making is a relevant one, however, and demands exploration. The concluding
chapters of this study, therefore, shall explicitly explore the questions o f ethics and
politics and their relation to the theme of the “world as a whole” as a non-metaphysical
ground for a life o f praxis.
48
The “Natural” World
Whereas most phenomenologists seem to focus on Husserl’s earlier, explicitly
phenomenological work, I have already noted that it was the concerns o f the later
Husserl that most strongly influenced Patocka, namely, the themes o f the Crisis texts. In
these writings, Husserl aimed towards a resuscitation o f European rationalism by
turning back to the very beginnings o f that rationalism: to the pretheoretical “natural
attitude” of what he called the Lebenswelt, or life-world, and to the development o f the
“theoretical attitude” in philosophical thought. Understanding the life-world was crucial
to the task of recovery from the “crisis” wrought by the progressive and unreflective
domination o f the methods o f natural science over human life. Patoika’s interest in a
life-world, or what he called the “natural” world, stemmed from these sources in
Husserl.63 As Patocka put it in his 1967 article, “The ‘Natural’ World and
Phenomenology,” the philosophical concern with the “natural” world “is the effort to
render problematic once more the unquestioned way in which we are governed by the
metaphysics of science and technology (or, better, of technoscience). The purpose o f
that problematization o f the obvious is to liberate our vision.”64
For Husserl, the life-world was something o f an abstract conceptualization. It
was the “pregiven world,” the world in which objects were “straightforwardly intuited”;
it was the world as it would have been prior to the arrival o f science.65 Patodka once
again appreciated Husserl’s insight, but felt that the concept as it was worked out was
untenable. He spent a considerable amount o f time on the idea o f the “natural” world,
both in his early work (e.g., in his habilitation thesis) and again in the last decade o f his
49
life. Patocka lays out the details o f his revision o f the “natural” world in two articles
from his later period, “Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy o f the Crisis of the Sciences and
His Conception o f a Phenomenology o f the ‘Life-World,’” his Warsaw Lecture from
1971, and “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology” from 1967.
The thrust o f Patoika’s critique o f the life-world follows the pattern o f his other
critique. Husserl’s conception is overly theoretical, divorced from the tactile realities o f
human existence in the world. Husserl conceives o f his life-world in terms o f pure
intuition o f objects while Patoika sees it as the setting for human life in its
concreteness, in its activity.66 In his Warsaw Lecture, Patodka refers to Husserl’s
concept as a form o f “phenomenological metaphysics” that is “in the end
disappointing.” It is, he continues, conceived as “a product o f the common
achievements (Leistungen) of subjectivities for whom this world is nothing but a
commmon link devoid o f any genuine substantiality.”67 A conceptualization o f this kind
might, he admits, be appropriate as a means o f analyzing certain aspects o f scientific
inquiry. But what o f actual human practice, of, for example, human politics and life in
community? Can a Husserlian subjectivity “show us a positive way for reason to follow
so that it could found not only a new science or a new foundation for science, but a
genuine human praxis?”68 To this end, PatoCka is convinced, is required a more human
conception o f the “natural” world, a conception grounded in the world in which we live.
The problem with Husserl’s life-world is that it is abstractly posited as a
quasi-metaphysical entity, a site independent o f the “historical contingencies” o f human
development. Patocka, however, is clear to recognize that man is at all times an
50
historical being, even in those cases where he chooses to act ahistorically. The thematic
exploration o f the “natural” world in Patodka’s work is not to be understood as a search
for a hypothetical “state o f nature,” but rather for the mode o f self-understanding that
governs when we live simply and without reflection. It is not a search for humanity
prior to or abstracted from civilization, but simply prior to the development o f
self-reflective theory, of self-interpretation as the basis for community. The “natural”
world reflects the most elemental movement o f human existence; it is a cornerstone of
our self-understanding.
For Patodka, this must be a w'orld o f an active order, a world in which one could
say that humans live. This is the crux of his disagreement with Husserl. As he explains
it in his Warsaw Lecture, Husserl’s life-world focuses on the “perception” or
“observation” of objects by intuition;69 the fundamental concept is that o f perception.
For Patocka, however, the world as an active order is centered more around an “I can”
than an “I perceive.” It is based on this understanding that the ‘natural’ world can
justifiably be called a world o f good (and o f evil.) Experientially, the world comes to us
in these terms, not in terms of intuition o f objects.70
From this viewpoint, the “natural” world can be understood entirely

naturally: it is a world where we can live, live in a community in which
we can find a place and be accepted, enjoying the protection which
enables us to take on the concrete tasks o f defense and o f struggle against
what threatens us in the context o f humans and of things alike. It is the
world o f embodied living beings who work and struggle, who approach
each other and draw back, living in mutual respect; who communicate
with the world of others by word and understanding; who relate to this
existence in its totality and so also to the world as such.71
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With this analysis, PatoCka transforms the Husserlian “natural” world from an
abstraction into a concrete conceptualization o f a basic, pre-reflective mode o f human
existence that can be applied to human history. Pato£ka’s view o f the “natural” world
becomes, as we shall see, a key component o f his phenomenology o f three human
“movements” as well as his philosophy o f history.
The Influence of Heidegger
The significant influence of the the work of Martin Heidegger upon Patocka’s
philosophy is undeniable. Though his association with Heidegger was negligible —he
attended a few o f his lectures in Freiburg in 1933, but never studied directly under him
—Patocka felt that the German philosopher’s ontological perspective was one o f the
great accomplishments o f the twentieth century. The controversy surrounding
Heidegger’s politics has doubtlessly contributed to the eagerness with which many
interpreters of twentieth century philosophy make use of the labels “Heideggerean” or
“anti-Heideggerean” in describing contemporary philosophy. This tendency is certainly
present in interpretive work on Patocka, whose texts are replete with Heideggerean
concepts. Analysts seem to consider it o f the highest importance to demonstrate that
Patocka either is or is not a Heideggerean thinker.72 As I argue in my review o f the
literature (see Appendix), however, this approach is not helpful if you want a genuine
understanding o f this material. Pato£ka is a student o f both Husserl and Heidegger who
draws on many o f their conceptualizations; yet he is also a critic in both cases, making it
inaccurate to label him simply a Husserlian or a Heideggerean thinker. In this study I
start from the assumption that he is neither “type” o f thinker, but an independent mind
52
whose variations on the themes o f German phenomenological and ontological
philosophy take it in an innovative direction.
As is the case with Husserl, Patodka’s critique o f Heidegger leads toward a
self-understanding of human existence as political existence, as solidly grounded in the
concreteness o f life in the world and in community. It is, as PatoCka makes clear, a
critique arising from the contention that Heidegger’s philosophy is not fully appropriate
to an understanding of man in his concrete, corporeal existence —an existence that
relates not only to his self-understanding, but also to the concrete realities o f his body,
his community, his language, and his world. It is only this broader understanding, which
does not sunder but rather emphasizes its ties to classical Greek philosophy, that will
enable the development o f a conception o f man relative to his pursuit o f Life in a
community, a polis.
The previous paragraph notwithstanding, it is clear that Pato£ka felt that the
insights o f Heidegger’s ontological philosophy were essential, although perhaps not
entirely sufficient, to the development of a philosophical understanding o f the existence
o f “concrete humans in their corporeal world.”73 In many crucial respects, they proved
for him far more appropriate than Husserl’s work towards the development o f this
understanding. Not the least o f those respects was the emphasis Heidegger placed on the
importance o f history, and the role o f freedom and responsibility therein. Pato£ka also
considered history to be essential to the proper pursuit o f phenomenological analysis. It
was evident to him in this regard that Husserlian methodology was insufficient, reliant
as it was on the concept o f an ahistorical, disinterested spectator (as the locus o f
53
perception).74 Heidegger, however, rejected Husserl’s ahistorical subjectivity and
concerned himself instead with the relationship o f man to his being, an inherently
historical relationship that manifests itself in human freedom and responsibility. As
Patocka put it in his Heretical Essays on the Philosophy o f History, explaining his
preference for Heidegger over Husserl in this regard: “Heidegger is a philosopher o f the
primacy o f freedom and in his view history is not a drama which unfolds before our
eyes but a responsible realization o f the relation which humans are. History is not a
perception but a responsibility.”75 Here, but not only here, the historico-ontological
work o f Heidegger was to provide for Patocka a means o f getting closer to his goal o f
understanding human existence not in the abstract, but in the concrete.
Primarily, however, it was the above-mentioned relationship o f man to his own
being, as Heidegger pursued and elucidated it, that most captured and held Patodka’s
attention. Patocka’s movement in the direction o f Heideggerean ontology cannot
accurately be traced chronologically. Though his use of language inspired by Heidegger
is more apparent at certain times than at others, his overall concern is to integrate it with
his work on themes drawn from Husserl. To charge to the contrary -- that Patocka’s
philosophy is at certain times Heideggerean, at others Husserlian or humanist —is
effectively to deny that Pato£ka has a philosophical direction independent o f his two
teachers.76 But Patodka does pursue such an independent direction, and he consciously
attempts, not a synthesis o f the two thinkers, a straightforward combination o f their
work, but an interpretative variation that will stand apart from the work o f either
German philosopher. Thus there is no trepidation in admixing Heideggerean concepts
54
into a Husserlian phenomenological framework. Judged strictly from the perspective o f
either of the two elder philosophers, this attempt may seem at times untenable. But to
appraise in this manner is to fail to appreciate the Czech philosopher’s attempt at a
unique perspective —one informed by a radically different set o f cultural and political
circumstances than in the case o f Husserl or Heidegger.
The Ontological Insight
It is in his series of university lectures from the 1970s entitled Body, Community,
Language, World that Jan Patodka makes his most concerted effort to elaborate an
original interpretation o f phenomenological philosophy. It is an interpretation that, as
we shall see, is specifically directed towards an application to the human, or social,
sciences. To this purpose, the ontological insight o f Heidegger, the sense that man is
‘interested” in his own being and, in fact, accomplishes that being rather than simply
lives it, is an essential component. This insight forms the core o f a perspective on
human existence as an activity rather than as an entity or thing. For Heidegger, the
fundamental question o f philosophy is the ontological question, the question of our
being. Humanity is uniquely constituted in that it alone takes an interest in its own
being, and it is this phenomenon that prompts the revival of the ontological question
originally asked by the pre-Socratic philosophers. This non-indifference to our own
being, as Patocka explains in his Heretical Essays, is thus both the starting point and the
condition for understanding the phenomenon o f being; it is the condition for “the right
understanding o f the significance of phenomenology in general.”77
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A proper phenomenological approach to human existence, then, requires an
appreciation for its interestedness, for the fact that it does not act objectively, but
interestedly. As PatoCka puts it in Body, Community, Language, World:
Such a being [as man], concerned with its own being, cannot in principle
be grasped in its distinctiveness by observation. A mere observing look
can never capture this active nature o f our being for ourselves, its
interestedness, its interest in itself.78
Implicit here is a prioritization o f this aspect o f the Heideggerean approach over the
Husserlian approach, and Pato£ka borrows explicitly here from Being and Time to do
so.79 He reiterates the basic Heideggerean standpoint when he asks whether “human
experience by its very nature [is] something essentially different from what can be given
in object experience? That is a question which Husserl never raised.”80 We can come to
understand our own being, not through object experience, but only through an
examination o f how we live that being, how we create it. “[LJiving means
accomplishing our being. So it is not the case that we first are and then do something;
our being takes place entirely in that doing.”81 Our mode o f access to being is thus
relative to the way in which we live, not merely to the way in which we understand
ourselves theoretically.
It is evident that Patodka is not satisfied with the theoretical posture of a
“disinterested spectator,” and Heidegger is helpful in this regard. The theoretical nature
of Husserl’s work and his background in mathematics and Cartesianism make his
methodology suitable to a philosophical foundation for the hard sciences. Patocka,
however, is interested in a philosophical foundation for the social sciences, including
56
politics, and to this end the ontological themes of Heidegger are invaluable. An
approach to the social sciences cannot rest on the empirical, on the simply observable:
Husserl's phenomenology would do as a philosophical foundation for the

natural sciences.... Social sciences, though are sciences because they
uncover something about personal and social reality that we cannot learn
by simple introspection. Social sciences normally appeal to mere
empirical data. However, they need also a philosophical foundation in
order to locate their fundamental problem.82
The study o f humanity, the subject o f the social sciences, is not marked by the clarity
which the empiricist assumes. Human being, human existence in the world, is not a
clear and transparent phenomenon, and this represents a problem for those who would
study it.
The problem itself arises in the human disciplines as we penetrate to a certain

aspect of ourself which is clear to us in one sense and not in another. For that
reason, for all social sciences, the point at which they become genuine sciences
is penetration through self-illusions, self-deceptions, our idols o f ourselves.
Providing a philosophical foundation for actual human scientific disciplines
demands that we find access to this situation, not an empirical but a
foundational, justifying one.83
It is by a phenomenological philosophy, founded not upon Cartesian principles but upon
ontology and geared towards an understanding o f human movement in the world, that
Patocka hopes to penetrate through the delusions that confound our scientific attempts
to grasp social and political reality. One o f the greatest o f those delusions is the belief
that man is an objective creature whose motivating impulses are clearly evident in his
outward bearing. It was Heidegger rather than Husserl who resisted this presumption,
arguing that there is an element o f “concealment” that must be considered. By taking up
this phenomenon thematically, Heidegger's work had an advantage over Husserl's and
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so became a model for Pato£ka’s pursuit. “In virtue o f that,” PatoCka wrote, Heidegger’s
phenomenology “can become the philosophical foundation o f human science.”84
The subject o f Patodka’s debt to and interpretation o f Heidegger is a vast one.
The present work must limit itself to a few, basic points. Patodka is convinced that
human existence requires consideration o f the human’s interaction with his world, the
things in it, and the multitude of possibilities created by that interaction. This interaction
is definitive o f not only man’s life, but also his very being. The being o f humans, which
Heidegger denotes as Daseirt, is distinquished from other beings not only because it
takes a thematic interest it itself, in its own being, but also because it is self-constitutive
via its pursuit of the possibilities open to it. Pato£ka seeks to explore the possibilities of
human being in a way that is concrete, and not speculative or abstract. As he put it,
“When Heidegger says that existence is something that in its very being relates to its
being, it sounds metaphysical and speculative. We shall show, however, that it is
something that can be exhibited descriptively.”85 This is PatoSka’s task in regard to
Heidegger’s philosophy, and also his challenge generally.
Patoika proceeds in this manner in his interpretation o f both Husserl and
Heidegger, taking philosophical constructs and judging their validity against the
experience of human beings living in a historical world. In this sense Patocka explicates
his philosophy in a different way than did either of the two German philosophers -- the
specter o f the concreteness o f our lives, o f the world and its objects, o f human relations
and politics, is always present.
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Finitude and Other Heideggerean Themes
Patocka appears directly to follow Heidegger nowhere more explicitly than in
his focus on the essential finitude o f human life. The Heideggerean notion o f finitude, of
“being-towards-death,”86 is a central theme in Patodka’s writings. As Patodka uses it,
however, it takes on a different significance; the resulting concept is one applicable, not
only to the self-understanding o f the existential individual, but also to the community,
to actual political and historical life.
Patocka was strongly influenced by what he called Heidegger’s
“phenomenology o f finitude.” In contrast to Husserl, in whom even the finitude o f our
relation to the world can be suspended, the Heideggerean view claims that finitude
“penetrate [s] the very content o f our being so deeply that it constitutes the fundamental
content o f our being in all its moments and expressions.”87 It is not simply that humans
are finite, for all living beings share that trait; it is rather in our awareness o f and
relation to our own death that humans exhibit a certain uniqueness. We have noted that
Patocka has set for himself the task o f exhibiting phenomenological and ontological
concepts descriptively and experientially. This requires that he discuss them in terms of
their effect on human life. He does this with the concept o f finitude in his Body,
Community, Language, World lectures:
Finitude is not easily described though we can say what must belong to
it. Human beings are always threatened; in all their acts they deal with
their limitations. Humans are not delimited like stones or like animals
who are not aware o f their own perishing, humans know their limitations,
are constantly relating to their own finitude as to their own being, caring
for and looking after their needs.88
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Our awareness o f our finitude, and our acceptance o f it, directly colors our pursuit o f the
activities and possibilities o f life. Heidegger even grounded the definitive activity of
reflection in the finitude o f being human.89
The crucial element in Patocka’s application o f this concept to social being is his
contention that the Heideggerean stress on finitude shares something with the Platonic
melete thanatou, the “learning to die” of the Phaedo. That sense is grounded in the
notion that, in order to care for life, to live authentically, one must care for death and not
attempt to evade it. In Heidegger, Pato£ka finds particularly relevant the discussion o f
the attitude o f “everydayness” that characterizes “they” who effectively deny the
certainty o f death. Denying death, o f course, is tantamount to fleeing from it; the
Platonic philosopher, in contrast, “overcame death fundamentally by not fleeing from it
but by facing up to it. This philosophy was melete thanatou, care for death; care for the
soul is inseparable from care for death which becomes the true care for life.90 The
Platonic conception o f “care for the soul” as the base component o f the truthful life, is
thereby brought into direct relation to the insight o f Heidegger. Patocka places the
Socratic “care for the soul” on the same page with Heidegger’s “being-towards-death.”
In doing so, he brings Heidegger into contact with the Platonic focus on the construction
o f community.
This merging o f two conceptions o f finitude does not exhaust Patocka’s use of
the theme, nor his application o f it beyond the limits o f the Heideggerean analysis. In
his Heretical Essays, Patodka makes the theme central to his analysis o f the politics of
war that is prevalent in the twentieth century. Here, in the final chapter entitled “Wars o f
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the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War,” the near-continual warfare
o f the first half o f this century is analyzed in terms o f finitude. Resistance to human
finitude, in the form o f the promise that victory in war will protect us from death,
becomes a means to justify ideological warfare. Life becomes the highest value, so
much so that humans are objectified and their deaths rendered anonymous in its pursuit.
The target here is political ideology, the systematization of life in the name of an idea,
as, for example, the idea that mere life is more significant than free life. The refusal to
face death, to care for it, to understand its function as a pole o f life that is essential in
determining our finiteness, all o f this Patocka finds immediately present in the political
conflagrations of the twentieth century. A solution to these crises, as with the crisis of
modem science noted by Husserl, lies in the ability to see human life as a whole, and
that requires a recognition o f death as the ultimate possibility o f that life. As he explains
it, “we relate to death as the ultimate possibility, the possibility o f a radical
impossibility o f being. That impossibility casts a shadow over our whole life yet at the
same time makes it possible, enables it to be a whole.''’ Relating to death “does not mean
thinking about death. It means, rather, rejecting that way o f life which would live at any
price and takes mere life as its measure.”91 Patocka’s explication o f finitude has laid a
Platonic stress upon a Heideggeran theme and applied it directly to human social being,
exhibiting its effect descriptively, in terms of its concrete effect upon human life.
The theme o f finitude has been examined in some detail because it is a
Heideggerean theme that is fundamental to Patocka’s work, and also because it is
representative of the way in which the Czech philosopher applies the work of
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Heidegger. The use o f Heideggerean themes, however, is determined by the fact that
Patocka is not, in the end, a Heideggerean thinker. Pato£ka’s critique o f Heidegger is
exemplified by the fact that, while the Czech strongly felt the intimate connection
between philosophy and politics, Heidegger, at least after his disastrous foray into
politics in the 1930s, completely abandoned it. Before examining the basis o f this
critique in more detail, let me first note a few of the other Patockan themes that draw
from Heidegger.
PatoCka makes use of another central theme in Being and Time when he speaks
of “care.” For Heidegger, the notion o f “care” (Sorge) is definitive o f the being of
Dasein and implies a concern and solicitude in terms o f our relations to beings in the
world.92 Patocka embraces the Heideggerean analysis, but attempts to add to it the sense
of care present in the Socratic dialogues —that of caring for the soul by nurturing it and
attuning it towards the eternal. Implied in the Socratic version is the necessity of choice
—the individual choice of whether to pursue care for the soul or whether to deny it. Yet
Patocka is not consciously abandoning the Heideggerean for the Socratic here, he feels
that the two concepts are related. Heidegger’s use of care, as Jacques Derrida has noted,
certainly invokes, as Patocka contends, something of the concern and solicitude
signified by the Platonic melete thanatou.93
In appealing to the Socratic sense o f care, Patocka is nevertheless trying to
remain faithful to another Heideggerean theme, the critique o f metaphysics. Socrates, as
he argues in the essay “Negative Platonism,” which I will discuss shortly, acts in such a
way as to reject metaphysical knowledge, even as he speaks in metaphysical symbols.
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Pato£ka is with Heidegger in excluding metaphysics, but he does not agree to exclude
the wisdom o f Socrates in the process. Other Heideggerean themes figuring in Patocka’s
philosophy include the question o f the essence of technology -- directly related for
Patocka to the dominance o f metaphysics over Western civilization —and the
Heraclitian notion o f conflict, or polemos, as not only a unifying factor in human
existence, but one with a certain ontological priority. With each o f these themes,
Patocka draws directly upon Heidegger. Yet in each case, the emphasis and application
is distinctly different, pointing to a political philosophy that is primarily concerned with
human being, not in existential abstraction, but in the concrete context o f life with other
beings, life in community.
The Critique o f Heidegger
To complete this overview o f the importance o f Heidegger to the thought o f Jan
Patocka, it is necessary to clarify what so far has only been implied -- the critique of
Heidegger in Pato£ka’s work. Although Pato£ka makes significant use o f concepts
pioneered by Heidegger, he does so with a view towards a quite different picture of
human existence. He questions openly, in fact, whether the “fundamental ontology” of
Heidegger is, in itself, appropriate to that which Patocka seeks: an understanding of
man in his relations to community and history. He asks, in his essay “Cartesianism and
Phenomenology,” whether the Heideggerean approach to human existence via an
exploration o f Daseirt, is “also adequate to serving as an ontological projection o f a
science or sciences o f man?” “Certainly,” he continues,
a fundamental ontology makes possible an understanding o f human life

both in its fall into nonhumanity and in its moral outreach; but is what it
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offers a sufficient basis for a philosophy o f man in community, in
language and custom, in his essential generativeness, his tradition, and
his historicity?94
Patocka concludes that, in and o f itself, it is not. Though Heidegger took the
philosophical study o f humanity in directions previously unexplored by modem
thinkers, there is nonetheless a sense o f reductiveness in his work. He is so deeply
immersed in ontology that the experience o f humans in the world is often eclipsed. This
perception is summarized succinctly in a short essay entitled simply “Heidegger,” in
which the respective faults o f both Heidegger and Husserl are compared.
Perhaps it’s possible to say that Heidegger’s philosophy suffers from the
opposite sickness than the philosophy of Husserl. The latter lacked the
understanding o f the ontological sphere, it was however able to analyze
the mass o f ontic phenomena, which revived great interest in psychology,
sociology, etc. o f the post-war period. Heidegger’s philosophy
distinguishes anew the ontological sphere, however it doesn’t find its
way back to anthropology.95
For Patocka, an authentic philosophy o f mankind must examine “all o f that to which
human life has access,” all aspects o f life given to humans in the form o f experience.96
Thus broadly characterized, I can briefly examine several specific points of
contention with the Heideggerean focus, discussed in Pato£ka’s Body, Community,
Language, World. In this work, Pato5ka stresses the need for phenomenology to take
account of our corporeity, meaning not only the simple fact o f our existing in a body,
but also the connection it implies between humans and objects within and o f the world.
This marks a point o f contention with the Heidegger o f Being and Time, for whom
everything is centered in our relation to ourselves. “Existential philosophy, for instance
the early Heidegger,” Pato£ka writes, “defines existence in terms o f self-relatedness.”97
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It is an account that stresses our relation to our own being, rather than our relation to the
things around us. Yet the things around us are inherently relative to our being. The
simple fact that we exist in a corporeal body means that we relate to things, and that
relation is not insignificant. It is, rather, analogous to our self-relation. Pato£ka explains
as follows:
What is characteristic o f Heidegger’s analysis o f being in the world is

how little space is devoted to the concrete phenomena involved, for
instance to the phenomenon o f corporeity. Heidegger’s entire analysis
takes place in the dimension o f the moral struggle o f humans for their
own autonomy. Only by the way does Heidegger recognize that the
struggling being is a corporeal one, without explicating it. Yet precisely
in the course o f that explication does it become apparent that our relation
to things is fully analogous to our self-relation, that it is a continuation of
our life in the body. It is not something sharply different from the way
we live in our body, relating to ourselves.98
Our relation to ourselves, our self-understanding as autonomous entities, therefore, is
not the sole factor that is constitutive o f our being. Because o f our corporeity and the
nature o f our lives as played out in communities, we relate to other beings, both objects
and persons, and we relate to the world that is their context. These relations are part of
our being, they enable our successful self-relation. In order to actualize that
self-relation, Patoika writes, our personal being “must go round about through another
being. We relate to ourselves by relating to the other, to more and more things and
ultimately to the universe as such, so locating ourselves in the world.”99
This relating to the world and its contents is characteristic o f all living beings,
even those who are not imbued with self-understanding. It is characteristic not only of
adult humans, but o f children and o f animals as well —all relate to the world in a
similarly harmonious way; this is a fact o f their living. In Heidegger, however, the focus
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is exclusively laid on the mode o f self-understanding, as if it were exhaustive o f our
existence. Here, Patodka argues, “Heidegger is leaving something out, setting it aside.
.. .the elementary protofact o f harmony with the world is the same for humans, children,
animals. That can only mean that in human living not everything is given solely by
understanding, as Heidegger would have it.”100 In the adult human the mode o f
understanding may be dominant; but this does not mean that the modes o f humanity that
are prior to understanding simply cease to be o f importance. In fact, human activity may
partake o f different levels o f being, including the animal’s and the child’s prelinguistic
mode, relating simply and directly to the world. “[0]ur human existence in a (working,
pragmatic) world,” Patodka writes, “presupposes the existence o f the childish and o f the
animal-like within us.”101 The mode o f understanding pursued by Heidegger does not
exhaust human reality. The direct relation to the world o f the child and the animal
belongs to what Pato£ka calls the first movement o f being human, and is contrasted with
modes o f human movement through work and philosophy.
I have already noted that what is characteristic o f man is the variety o f
possibilities present to him. The location o f the self in the world, the world o f objects
and the world o f human beings, is largely determinative of the extent o f these
possibilities. We become aware o f our possibilities not as we delve deeper into
ourselves, but as we become involved in something other than ourselves, as we interact
with other beings. Our becoming involved in the world “is at the same time the
movement in which we become embodied in something other than ourselves, become
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involved, become objective. This becoming involved in what originally we are not but
what we become reveals our possibilities to us.”102
For Patoika, the realm o f our involvement with the world in this particular
sense, that is, in the sense o f involvement with other beings and with the situations
presented by this interaction, is the political realm. Our politics — our understanding and
organization o f our relations with and among the community and our relations to the
objects o f the community such as laws —can never be a matter o f indifference to the
philosopher. O ur being is, as Pato£ka notes, a “shared being,” and it is on this point that
Heidegger’s analysis is insufficient: “ .. .for Heidegger the dimension o f shared being
(that the thrust toward the world always involves being with others) plays a minor role;
it is mentioned but not adequately analyzed and made concrete.” 103
The final point o f criticism has to do with the way in which Heidegger portrays
our relation to the world. For PatoCka, it is a fundamentally positive relation. It is for us
to understand, not to escape. And this, PatoCka notes, is distinctly different from the
Heideggerean conception of our relation to the world as a “fall.”
Heidegger understands the relation o f existence as a fa ll into the world.

Existence must fight its way out o f the world, must be liberated from it
by carrying out a certain ‘purification.’ The fall consists o f the important
phenomenon that we fall into things, devote ourselves to them, and
thereby objectify ourselves.... Liberation from the fall into the world is a
liberation from this objectification, a return to existing in the strong
sense, as distinct from mere being.104
The possibility o f human objectification is real for Pato£ka as well, but he does not
consider it to be an inevitable result o f our “fall into things.” Our existence in the world,
in human community, can be the source o f our self-understanding, not only o f our
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self-alienation. “Herein our conception is fundamentally different” from Heidegger’s,
PatoCka continues, “The relation o f humans to the world is not negative in that way but
rather positive, it is not a self-loss but the condition o f the possibility of
self-discovery.”105 The thrust into the world is for humans the positive opening up o f
possibility, o f the possibility for positive development, but also for negative alienation
and distortion. Thus the proper understanding o f human action in the world, via the
human or social sciences, is directly relevant to our philosophical understanding o f our
existence.
A Phenomenology of Movement
Beyond what has already been noted in the discussion o f Husserlian
phenomenology, that is, the pursuit of an “asubjective” phenomenology with a focus on
corporeity, Patodka makes his most original contribution to phenomenological
philosophy by developing an understanding o f human existence in terms o f three
movements. An approach to philosophy via movement is certainly nothing new,
Patofika admits, but two factors contribute to the uniqueness o f this attempt. First, it is
understood “independently o f the dichotomy between subject and object,” and second, it
represents an attempt to combine the Aristotelian concept o f dynamis with the modem
analysis o f existence that understands life “as possibilities in a process of realization.”
While the first factor refers to the insufficiency of modem attempts at interpreting
human movement in objective terms as simple locomotion (the foundation o f
technology), or in subjective terms via the psychological approach o f Bergson; it is the
second factor that reflects the core of Patodka’s philosophy.
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It is the focus on the corporeity o f our existence that leads Pato£ka to movement,
for our awareness o f ourselves as bodily is an awareness o f our mobility. Our
experience is that o f corporeal beings, and thus o f beings in motion. We live in the
s
world by engaging with it, by involving ourselves and by realizing our possibilities
through our actions. “We realize possibilities only by moving, by being physical. Every
realization takes place ultimately through movement.”106 This understanding o f human
movement is not o f something that we carry out, that we choose to do when it suits us.
It is rather that we are movement, it defines us in the world. Like Aristotelian energeia,
this movement “is a realization of remaining possibilities.”107
Pato£ka takes the Aristotelian conception o f life as movement and the realization
of potential as his starting point and inspiration, though he does not accept it
unqualifiedly. It is Aristotle’s objectification o f movement, his “making it into
something that requires an objective bearer to make its dynamic aspect possible,” that is
problematic. The notion o f an “unmoved object” presupposed in Aristotle’s account as
the foundation for human movement and unity, is discarded by Pato£ka as
metaphysical.108 Instead, the hope is to understand existence non-metaphysically. In this
way Pato£ka is led again to Heidegger, and to the similarity between Aristotle’s
dynamis as the realization o f potentialities, and Heidegger’s view of life in terms of the
realization o f possibilities. “Let us try to compare this Aristotelian conception o f
movement with the modem conception o f existence. Let us try to understand existence
as a movement, from the standpoint of movement.”109 The key, as we have noted, is our
“lived corporeity,” the notion that human life is a bodily existence as well as a noetic
69
one. Life is a process that is integrated into the world itself; it is not only in the world, it
is o f the world. Heidegger’s understanding o f existence, therefore, does not exhaust the
possibilities o f existence. “To understand existence as movement means to grasp
humans as beings in and o f the world. They are beings that not only are in the world, as
Heidegger tells us (in the sense of understanding the world), but rather are themselves a
part of the world process.”' 10
In addition to the notion o f being as active and in motion, Patodka also adopts
from Aristotle the conception o f a hierarchy o f being. This is the notion that being,
understood and expressed in terms o f its activities, its motion, has a hierarchical
structure, with activities such as comprehension, understanding and knowledge at the
highest level. This is not to say that these represent the highest human values as such,
but that their pursuit by humans is the highest form o f human activity, the most fully
human activity. This insight is crucial to the diagram o f human existence which Pato£ka
presents -- one composed o f three movements or “vital lines” o f human life. These
movements are arranged hierarchically, but not as a ladder o f values. Rather, all are
movements in which humans participate naturally; the primary possibility o f human
life, though, the possibility to achieve understanding and truth, is to participate most
fully in the highest level, the authentically human movement o f existence.
Though Patocka sets off from Aristotelian philosophy in his reliance upon the
concept of movement, the tripartite framework o f existence which he presents has a
Heideggerean foundation. The structure which Heidegger presents in his analysis of
existence, as Patocka understands it, is the structure o f care: “a project in a given
70
situation which brings us into contact with things.” The three-fold structure o f care
implies a situation that encompasses the past, a projection into the future, and a presence
in our contact with things. In this way “the things with which we deal and which we
modify are revealed.” It is a basic structure o f three divisions, and it serves as a model
for Patocka’s own interpretation o f three movements. In Patocka, however, the structure
is not understood as a “trinity o f undifferentiated moments but rather as a trinity o f
movements in which our life unfolds.”111 He thus proposes three movements o f human
life that effectively represent an Aristotelian hierarchy o f being —one structured,
however, around activities drawn from the insights o f Heideggerean philosophy. In the
Body, Community, Language, World lectures the three movements are described as
follows:
1. the movement o f sinking roots, o f anchoring —an
instinctive-affective movement o f our existence;
2. the movement o f self-sustenance, o f self-projection —the movement
o f our coming to terms with the reality we handle, a movement
carried out in the region o f human work;
3. the movement of existence in the narrower sense of the word which
typically seeks to bestow a global closure and meaning on the regions
and rhythms o f the first and second movement.112
In the Heretical Essays, the three movements are described in a more metaphorical, less
Husserlian manner: there they are referred to as the movements o f acceptance, o f
defense (of life), and of truth.
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Jan Patodka argues that human existence partakes in each o f these three
movements, although to varying degrees. Our life “takes place in a polyphony o f three
voices.”" 3 While characteristics o f one movement may appear in an other, it is more
broadly the case that the assumption of one movement suppresses the previous. The
most fundamental movement, the one common to all humans which acts as a center for
human life, is the first movement. This is the movement in which humans simply accept
their situation, are in harmony with the world, and anchor themselves in it by accepting
it as given. It is, Patodka writes, the acceptance o f the entire world as if it were a
mother’s lap -- an instinctual, prereflective acceptance."4 In this movement we sink
roots into our surroundings, and we accept our dependence upon another for safety and
warmth. It is an instinctive-affective movement that provides us with our center in life.
The affective movement does not submerge us into the world as into a
purposive, practical milieu but rather as into an all-embracing context o f
landscapes which address us in a certain wholeness and a priori make it
possible for humans to have a world, not only individual entities.... it
bears within it a central vital core, a core o f vital warmth which is not
only an addition to the being o f what surrounds us but a condition of the
being o f our life."5
This movement reflects an acceptance o f the cosmos without reflection; we are at home
in it but it is necessarily characterized by a lack o f self-understanding."6 It is also a
situation in which the human does not exert control over his situation. He is therefore
completely subject to contingency, to chance and fortune.
This mode of life is broken up by the second movement o f life, however. This is
the movement in which we come into contact, and come to terms, with the things that
are present in our world. Here we extend our existing into things and work to preserve
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and reproduce our lives. With this movement we ensure our physical continuity; “this is
the sphere in which we primarily live.”" 7 This is also the sphere o f what Patodka calls
self-surrender, for when we work we surrender ourselves to the burden o f living, the
necessity o f prolonging life via our labor. Here, and particularly in the contrast between
this movement and the third, the work o f another contemporary philosopher comes
directly into play. Hannah Arendt’s work on the movement from the sphere o f the
household to the sphere of the polls in The Human Condition provided Pato£ka with a
thesis upon which he based much o f the philosophy o f history found in his Heretical
Essays."6 As I have argued, Patodka’s approach to phenomenology and to Husserl and
Heidegger was influenced by his desire to broaden the scope o f this philosophy to
encompass humanity in its communal and political activities. Thus the
phenomenological interpretation o f existence as movement draws upon a fundamental
distinction first noted by Arendt between the movement o f labor and the movement of
freedom in the polis. This second movement o f existence is the movement in which we
defend our lives by accepting the burden o f work. Here we bind ourselves to that life
and to the Earth which provides us with the opportunity to work."9 “This is a realm,”
Patocka writes, “o f the average, o f anonymity, o f social roles in which people are not
themselves, are not existence in the full sense (an existence which sees itself as
existence), are reduced to their roles.” 120
In the first two movements of existence, humans do not exist in the fullness of
their potential because they are bound to the Earth. “The third movement is an attempt
to break through our earthliness.” 121 It is the human movement through which we
73
achieve some distance from all particulars and so attain a view o f that which we could
not see before, a view o f the whole. The third movement is the movement o f truth and
o f existence in the true sense. In the first two movements we are bound to life and so
our finitude cannot be considered reflectively and taken into account. We see life, not as
a whole, but as a series o f moments, lacking an overall conception. Shaking our
bondage to the Earth, to things, and coming to terms with our finitude leaves us free to
see our life as a whole. “The Earth preoccupies us too much, leading us to live within
our individual preoccupations, so that ultimately we would not need to see our finitude,
our life as a whole. Therein precisely consists the rule o f the Earth over us.” By pointing
to the desire to shake this rule, to disturb it, Pato£ka is not implying an attempt to escape
our human limitations. It is not an attempt to rise above our humanity and dominate it as
a superman, it is rather the opposite —to recognize our finitude and to come to
understand that our existence is not exhausted by its material aspect. In doing so, we
pursue a fundamentally different movement o f life, a movement o f truth, a “living in
truth.” The third movement is an attempt at breaking free, but “[w]e do not conceive o f
the attempt at breaking free as a grasp at mastery, at seizing power, it is not a will to
domination but an attempt to gain clarity concerning our situation, to accept the
situation and, by that clarity, to transform it.” 122 Pato£ka finds historical examples o f this
“breaking free” o f the bondage o f the Earth, interestingly, in the Buddhist metaphor of
the quenching o f thirst and in the Christian attack of self-centeredness.123
With his phenomenology o f movement, Pato£ka has approached philosophy
from a perspective grounded in the simple conviction that the essence o f human reality
74
cannot be abstracted from its concrete elements, namely, the fact that we are corporeal
beings, objective creatures in an objective world. On the basis o f this understanding
Patocka was able to interpret existence as a series of movements, of three vital lines
that, in addition to describing the ways in which humans exist, also help to define the
actual content o f that existence: human history. History and politics are never far
removed in Patocka's writings, and this for good reason. His approach to philosophy, as
I have tried to show in this overview o f his phenomenology, attempts to demonstrate its
connectedness to history and politics. The pursuit of a phenomenology o f movement,
which is attempted by a combination o f ancient and modem philosophy, Aristotle and
Heidegger,124 serves to illuminate this fundamental connectedness. The three
movements o f being human can bring us to understand ourselves historically and
politically, as we shall see in the following chapters. “Only by starting out from these
three fundamental lines,” Pato£ka writes,
from understanding how they presuppose and negate each other

mutually, can we, after analysis, achieve a certain insight into the way in
which these three strands (two movements governed by the Earth, a third
breaking free o f it) make up the overarching human movement we call
history.125
Body, Community, Language, World, therefore, though its subject is phenomenology,
concludes with an explicit appeal to history.
History and politics, in the end, are to be interpreted in terms o f the concept of
living in truth. This concept has its foundation in Patocka’s phenomenology, in his
understanding of the way in which people encounter and perceive the world. The
essence o f this encounter is the perception o f the world, not as merely a collection of
75
particular entities, but as a whole in itself. In this sense Pato£ka sees his understanding
o f the world as more radical than Heidegger’s because it focuses not only upon our
encounter with particulars, but also on our encounter with and interest in the world as a
whole. It is only through this conscious encounter, Patocka argues, that people can live
in truth.
Humans are the only beings which, because they are not indifferent to
themselves and to their being, can live in truth, can choose between life
in the anxiety o f its roles and needs and life in a relation to the world, not
to existing entities only.126
Seeing beyond the particular, the attachment o f our lives to the material, is the
fundamental step in the movement o f truth. Only in the light o f this distance do things
appear as they are. Nowhere is this more true than in the realm o f politics, as is made
evident in the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History.
Patocka further demonstrates his concern with the movement o f human history
by concluding Body, Community, Language, World with something o f a political
critique. He notes that phenomenology, as he has pursued it, touches upon “something
that all modem humanism neglected, what that humanism lacks.”127 This is the notion of
“nonindifference to being,” that we become human only insofar as we perceive our
being as something to which we must pay attention, something which challenges us as it
presents itself to us as not simply given, not simply human. Rather it is approachable via
a movement (the third) that we can attain only through that nonindifference, only by
responding to the challenge, the responsibility o f accomplishing our being. Humanism,
by contrast, “thrives on the idea that humans are in some sense the heirs o f the
absolute,” o f a reality that is given as a gift rather than achieved. The result is the belief
76
that humans “have a license to subjugate all reality, to appropriate it and to exploit it
with no obligation to give anything in return, constraining and disciplining
ourselves.”128 Here Patocka provides a link to his analysis o f metaphysics and its role in
the development o f Western civilization, and in doing so connects his
phenomenological work with his political concerns.
Conclusion
Patocka’s phenomenological work certainly deserves a more complete and
informed analysis than can be offered here; it is an attempt to transform significantly
contemporary phenomenological philosophy, and that not simply by a synthesis o f
Husserl and Heidegger. He aims to be faithful to the core assumptions o f
phenomenology and so to experience, yet still to take account o f human existence in its
active, corporeal, and communal aspects. The phenomenology that I have described
here is the ground upon which this philosophy will proceed as it engages contemporary
history, politics and the question o f the telos o f European civilization.
Husserl and Heidegger are criticized for a lack o f applicability to the human
sciences, to the sciences o f concrete human activity. The reality o f the world and our
understanding o f it can neither be reduced to the subjective consciousness nor to
Heideggerean ontology. The world and our existence within it -- existing not only in the
world but as part o f its vital processes —are also determinative o f our being and cannot
be left out of any investigation o f reality. This situation, that we relate to things as well
as to ourselves, is the foundation upon which the process o f achieving our potential, our
77
being, takes place. It is also the ground upon which Patocka takes issue with both
Husserl and Heidegger.
The social sciences, because they deal with humans that are not indifferent to
their own being, are distinct from the natural sciences. Yet our understanding o f
ourselves is neither given in objective clarity nor objectively accessible. It is obscure,
and is only uncovered as we participate in life actively and as we reflectively examine
ourselves and the way in which we live.
The point is the essential primacy o f practice. At the very

protofoundation o f consciousness, o f thought, o f the subject, there is
acting, not mere seeing. That explains why there is so much opaque,
obscure, in our clarity. Such a being, concerned with its own being,
cannot in principle be grasped in its distinctiveness by observation.129
As an approach to social science, then, Heidegger’s philosophy had a distinct advantage
over Husserl’s by reason o f its assumption o f nonobjectivity and self-concealment.130
Yet this assumption, this ontological perspective, did not complete the picture. As a
fundamental ontology, it did not sufficiently pursue the human relation to things that is
analagous to our relation to ourselves. Human being is an interaction o f the interested
human, not only with his own being, but with the objective world, the world o f
individual objects and the world as a whole.
I have argued in this chapter that Patodka’s work is marked by an interpretive
application o f the work o f Husserl and Heidegger to problems that superseded the scope
o f their own philosophical visions. It is this interpretive approach to the German
philosophers that not only leads to the uniqueness o f Pato£ka’s work, but also blunts the
edge of the most likely criticism to be levied against him by followers o f Husserl or
78
Heidegger -- the question o f consistency. While Patoika’s negative analysis of the
shortcomings o f the work o f Husserl and Heidegger is relatively clear, several aspects o f
his positive application o f their thought are much less so. Foremost among these, and
the subject o f the following chapter, is the use o f this contemporary German philosophy
to analyze and emulate the classical thought and symbolism o f Plato and Socrates.
Patocka’s is a philosophy that emulates the Socratic while proceeding along the lines of
the Husserlian and Heideggerean. Pato£ka is convinced o f the compatibility of not only
Heidegger and Husserl, but also o f Heidegger and Socrates.
While Patodka’s specific relationship to Greek philosophy will be dealt with in
succeeding chapters, it is nececessary here to note only that that relationship, that belief
in the relevance of Platonic thought, was basic to his thought. His interest in the whole
o f human reality led to an unwillingness, an inability, to overly restrict himself
methodologically or theoretically. To portray adequately the reality of man in
community, Patocka had to draw upon Socratic metaphor and insight, just as he had to
approach Husserl, or the early and the late Heidegger, in a way that many will find
inconsistent or questionable.
In terms o f his phenomenology, the primary questions concern Patocka’s use,
not only of Heidegger alongside Husserl, but also of the early and the late Heidegger
almost interchangeably. In regard to the former, I have made the point that it is
inappropriate to label Patoika as either a Husserlian or a Heideggerean. His work is
based on insights drawn from both, yet resists the argument that it is simply an
extension of the work o f either one. Pato£ka’s approach, as he expressed in Body,
79
Community, Language, World, is to demonstrate that those elements o f Heideggerean
philosophy o f which he makes use are not speculative, but can be “exhibited
descriptively.” By this he means that the terminology o f ontological phenomenology
can be spoken o f in terms o f its clear relation to our experiential reality -- it can be
described in terms to which we can relate concretely, not speculatively. His use of
Heideggerean philosophy, therefore, is intended to be judged not against the
conclusions at which Heidegger arrived in his own explication o f that philosophy, but
against the experience o f “concrete humans in their corporeal world” which Pato£ka
describes as his starting point. The same logic applies to Patodka’s use o f Husserlian
and Greek philosophy.
There is little sense, then, in trying to judge whether in the end he is most
fundamentally with Husserl or Heidegger or Plato or Socrates. He uses all o f them in
ways that could be arguably inconsistent if one were to judge from the standpoint o f the
particular conclusions reached by any one of these philosophers. In terms o f the
difference between the early Heidegger of Being and Time and the later Heidegger —the
well-known Kehre or ‘Turn” in his work -- Patocka’s attitude is revealing. He mixes an
insightful understanding o f the change in Heidegger’s thought with a refusal to respect
that change as fundamental, as effectively requiring the reader to choose between two
Heideggers.131 Instead, Patocka draws upon both the early and the late Heidegger,
placing analytical concepts drawn from Being and Time next to the metaphorical and
poetic language o f the later, post-war Heidegger. PatoCka’s focus, as I have noted, is not
with ontology as an exclusive science. His interest is the reality o f the active human in
80
the social world, and as a result he finds it not only accceptable, but necessary to take
Heidegger as a whole. Both sides o f Heidegger’s corpus, his rigorous analysis o f being
along with his poetic emulation o f the “saving power” that is attendant to the essence o f
technology,132 are relevant to the degree that the philosophy reflects human reality and
can be “exhibited descriptively,” can be described in terms o f our experience o f that
reality.
This approach, for students o f philosophy committed to methodological
consistency, has been perceived as inconsistent. Erazim Kohak and James Dodd, for
example, the translator and editor o f the recent editions of Pato£ka’s works in English,
both o f whom approach Pato£ka from the perspective o f phenomenology, have spoken
o f what they see as inconsistency. Kohak, largely because he reads the Czech
philosopher as Husserlian, sees an “evident tension in Patocka’s thought between his
Husserlian and his Heideggerean heritages.”133 James Dodd, in his introduction to Body,
Community, Language, World, sees a similar problem. The phenomenology, he points
out, is problematic for the philosopher grounded in methodology; it asks of the reader a
willingness to set aside prejudices bom of an analytical heritage. As Dodd puts it,
[tjhere is too much o f a sense that the conceptual ground has not been
prepared enough, that the force of these descriptions o f human life rely
too much on the commitment of the readers (and, originally, the
listeners) to engage faithfully in the effort o f “seeing” what it is that
Pato£ka is endeavoring to put into words.134
Dodd is correct here; Patodka is convinced that human experience at times exceeds our
analytical abilities. The resort to evocative forms o f symbolization is not only
81
acceptable, it is necessary. Thus for a Husserlian, Patodka’s phenomenology must
disappoint on methodological grounds.
For the phenomenological purist, then, Pato£ka is something o f a problematic
figure. Both Kohak and Dodd argue that he has not completely succeeded in his task,
that the tensions have not been ironed out, the contradictions cleared up, the “conceptual
ground” fully explicated. But rather than exhibiting a discriminating understanding o f
Patocka’s work, these conclusions tend to prevent, rather than assist, us in seeing the
intent and the full impact of this philosophical body o f work.
But the story o f PatoCka’s philosophy does not end with his interpretation o f
phenomenology and Heideggerean ontology. Also at the heart o f his work is the figure
o f Socrates. It is to Greek philosophy and Socrates that I will turn in the following
chapter in order, not only to understand Patodka’s broader philosophical aims, but also
to illuminate the foundation for the connection —inherent in this work -- between
philosophy and politics. As I have sought to explain in summarizing the Patodkan
critique of Husserl and Heidegger, the test o f philosophy must always be reality as we
encounter it on the ground, so to speak —in the interactions o f an objective and
corporeal creature with an autonomous world and the concrete objects within it. This
implies, as the rest o f Patodka’s philosophical work bears out, the need for a focus, not
only on the self and the relationship of the individual to his or her own being, but also
on the relationships most fundamental to active man, the relationships with one’s
community and one’s history.
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End Notes
'Jan Patocka, Body, Community, Language, World, 73.
2Patocka calls his work “phenomenological philosophy,” distinguishing it from

phenomenology, in his Plato and Europe lectures. On this differentiation, see footnote
22 in Chapter Three o f this work, below.
3Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl a PatoSka,” trans. V. Hruba, Promeny 24, no. 1

(spring 1987): 34; quoted in Erazim Kohak, Jan Patocka, 9.
4Ivan Blecha, Jan Patocka, (Prague: Votobia, 1997), 29. See also pp. 27-28 in
regard to Pato£ka’s relation to Eugen Fink and the latter’s personal critique o f
Husserlian phenomenology.
5See David Carr, translator’s introduction to The Crisis o f European Sciences

and Transcendental Phenomenology, by Edmund Husserl, xvi.
6In a Preface to Parts I and II o f the Crisis, Husserl wrote that “The work has
grown from the development of ideas that made up the basic content of a series of
lectures I gave in November, 1935, in Prague (half in the hospitable rooms o f the
German university, half in those o f the Czech university), following a kind invitation by
the Cercle philosophique de Prague pour les recherches sur I entendement humain.”
See David Carr, ibid., footnote 1,3.
7See also Erazim Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” in Jan Patocka, 24.
8Ibid., xxv.
9Ibid., xxv-xxvi.
'“Husserl, “The Vienna Lecture,” in Crisis, 271.
"On this point, see also Kohak’s explanation in “The Crisis o f Rationality and
the ‘Natural’ World,” 88.
I2Husserl, “The Vienna Lecture,” 290.
"Importantly, the term “Europe” is used here by Husserl, and later by PatoCka as
well, to refer to what would more commonly be called the “West”: “How is the spiritual
shape of Europe to be characterized? Thus we refer to Europe not as it is understood
geographically, as on a map, as if thereby the group o f people who live together in this
territory would define European humanity. In the spiritual sense the English Dominions,
the United States, etc., clearly belong to Europe, whereas the Eskimos or Indians...do
83
not. Hence the title ‘Europe’ clearly refers to the unity o f a spiritual life, activity,
creation, with all its ends, interests, cares and endeavors, with its products o f purposeful
activity, institutions, organizations.” Ibid., 273.
14Ibid., 276. Pato£ka explains Husserl’s position in his Warsaw lecture o f 1971:
“As Husserl sees it, what makes Europe special is precisely the fact that reason
constitutes the central axis o f its history. There are numerous cultural traditions, but
only the European places the universality o f evidence -- and so o f proof and o f reason ~
at the very center o f its aspirations. The vision o f living in truth, o f living, as Husserl
has it, responsibly, emerged only in Europe, and only here did it develop in the form o f
a continuous thought, capable o f being universally duplicated and o f being deepened
and corrected through a shared effort.” Patocka, “Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy o f the
Crisis of the Sciences and His Conception o f a Phenomenology o f the L ife - W o r ld in
Kohak, ed. Jan Patocka, 223.
15Husserl, Crisis, 280.
l6This version o f the ‘natural attitude,’ as David Carr points out, was a distinctly
different approach than was taken in Husserl’s early phenomenology. It is clearly
“something other than the ‘natural attitude’ o f Ideen, Vol. I.” Carr, translator’s
introduction to Crisis, ibid., xxxix.
I7Husserl, ibid., 299.
l8Jan Patocka, “Masaryk’s and Husserl’s Conception o f the Spiritual Crisis o f

Europe,” in Jan Patocka, 146.
,9On Pato£ka’s critique o f Masarykan philosophy, see, e.g., “An Attempt at a

Czech National Philosophy and its Failure,” transl. Mark Suino, in T.G. Masaryk in
Perspective: Comments and Criticism, Mili£ ta p e k and Karel Hruby, eds. (Ann Arbor:
SVU Press, 1981).
20Patocka, “Masaryk’s and Husserl’s Conception...”, 154.
2'Ibid.
22Ibid., 155.
^Patocka, “Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy o f the Crisis,” in Jan Patocka, 226.
24Ibid., 233.
25Ibid.
84
26Patodka, “Cartesianism and Phenomenology,” in Jan Patocka, 315.
27See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI. 6, trans. Martin Ostwald (New York:
Macmillan Publishing, 1962), 154-55.
1%The Collected Works o f Jan Patocka (Sebrane spisy Jana Patocky) in Czech,
presently being published by OIKOYMENH Press in Prague, has allocated three
volumes for PatoCka’s phenomenological writings.
29Patocka, “Cartesianism and Phenomenology,” in Jan Patocka, 293.
30Ibid„ 294.
3'PatoCka, Body, Community, Language, World, 3.
32Ibid., 4.
33Patocka, “Martin Heidegger, myslitel lidskosti: Improvizovana uvaha po

zprave o Heideggerovd smrti” (Martin Heidegger, a Thinker o f Humanity: An
Improvised Reflection upon the News o f Heidegger’s Death), Filosoficky Casopis 43,
no. 1 (1995): 3-5.
34Patocka, “Autoruv doslov k Francouzskemu vydani prirozeneho sveta” (The

Author’s Postscript to the French Printing o f The 'Natural' W orld’), in Prirozeny svet
jako filosoficky problem (The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem), (Prague:
Ceskoslovensky spisovatel, 1992): 256.
35Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” in Jan Patocka, 83. See also, Jan Patocka,
An Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology, trans. Erazim Kohak, (Chicago and
LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Press, 1996).
36Patocka’s discussion o f the ‘whole,’ it should be noted, draws from Husserl

rather than Heidegger.
37Pato£ka, Prirozeny svet jako filosoficky problem, 13.
38Patocka, Body, Community, Language, World, 165.
39Ibid.
40See Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” 86.
4'PatoCka, Body, Community, Language, World, 36.
85
42Kohak notes that: “The grounding o f (mathematical) objectivity in the subject
is the achievement of Husserl’s Philosophy o f Arithmetic, the transcending o f an
arbitrary psychologism that o f Logical Investigations.'’’1“Philosophical Biography,” 88.
43Patocka, Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology, 102-103.
44Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” 92.
45Ibid.
46Pato£ka, “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology,” Jan Patocka, 253.
47“Asubjective” phenomenology, a term borrowed from Eugen Fink, refers to

Patocka’s desire to move beyond the Husserlian “quest for a ground o f certainty in
subjectivity,” as Erazim Kohak describes it, and towards an asubjective meaning o f the
whole. See Erazim Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” pp. 6-8 and 83-97. Corporeity is
the explicit subject o f Body, Community, Language, World, in which Pato£ka extends
the work on corporeity of, among others, Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology o f
Perception). See, e.g., Body, Community, Language, World, pp. 47-50.
48Patodka, Body, Community, Language, World, 33.
49Edmund Husserl had used the concepts o f the “horizon” and the “world” in his
Crisis writings, for example, in his Vienna Lecture: “Now natural life can be
characterized as a life naively, straightforwardly directed at the world, the world being
always in a certain sense consciously present as a universal horizon, without, however,
being thematic as such.” Husserl, “The Vienna Lecture,” in Crisis, 281.
50Pato£ka, Body, Community, Language, World, 34.
5IIbid., 39.
52Ibid., 35.
53Ibid., 36.
54Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” 100. The phrase “hardness o f reality” is

found in Patocka’s Body, Community, Language, World where it is used in reference to
the “grandiose optimism” o f Hegel’s philosophy, which, though it did not “mask the
hardness o f reality,” understood the sorrows o f life as mere stages on the way to a final
peace {Body, Community, Language, World, 74).
86
“ Ibid., 166-167.
57lbid., 168.
58On the concept o f the phenomenological reduction, see Edmund Husserl,

Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson
(London: Collier MacMillan Publishers, 1962), 101-103. The details o f Patocka’s
response to Husserl’s position can be found in his Introduction to Husserl's
Phenomenology, 87-106.
S9Pato£ka, Body, Community, Language, World, 165-166.
“ Ibid., 165.
6lIbid., 170.
62Coming to the conclusion o f his discussion o f the whole in Body, Community,

Language, World, PatoSka asks if there is not a sense here of rehabilitating an ancient
idea: physis as arche, which “rules in all particulars.” This is an understanding first
expressed in ancient fragments o f Anaximander, o f the whole in which all individuals
come into being and perish. Ibid., 169.
“ Because the term “natural” world is somewhat ambiguous in English (though

not in Czech), I will follow the example o f Erazim Kohak and emphasize its specific
connotation with quotation marks. In PatoCka’s usage, the “natural” world does not refer
to the world of nature (prirodnl svet) but rather to the world as it presents itself to us
naturally, or simply, without our having reflected on it or studied it at all -- the
prereflective or “pretheoretical” world. This meaning is adequately rendered in Czech
by the term prirozeny svet; English, however, has no equivalent and is limited to the
term “natural” world. For Kohak’s explanation o f the same, see “Philosophical
Biography,” 22-23.
“ Patocka, “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology,” 245.
65Husserl, Crisis, 121, 123.
“ This has been noted by several commentators. Paul Ricoeur noted in his
introduction to the Heretical Essays that while Husserl’s “natural” world was
pre-scientific, Patodka’s was pre-historical, meaning that while the former thought
theoretically, the latter had a significantly more concrete notion in mind. Erazim Kohak
concurred with this diagnosis, writing that while the “natural” world was a “pre-human,
neutral epistemological datum” for Husserl, whereas for Patodka it is “ab initio a human
world, a world o f moral subjects living, again ab initio, in a network o f moral relations,
87
having to make decisions and to bear responsibility for them.” Erazim Kohak, “The
Crisis o f Rationality and the ‘Natural’ World,” Review o f Metaphysics 40 (September
1986): 91.
67Patodka, “Edmund Husserl’s Philosophy o f the Crisis,” in Jan Patocka, 233.
68Ibid., 237.
69“By intuition here we need to understand a rational insight in the Husserlian

sense, that is, the primordial presence o f the intended object before the mental gaze o f
the subject.” Ibid., 232.
70Patocka writes that, “The Husserlian demand o f the primordial givenness, the
delving beneath all that is derivative to the primary source, takes from the world as a
corelate [sic] o f an intuition presenting things themselves..., toward a world that is first
o f all one of good (and of evil) and that, in virtue of this, deserves to be called the world
o f actual human existence.” Ibid., 235. Patodka’s conception o f good, in this context,
interestingly combines elements from Aristotle and Heidegger. The good is that towards
which all things aim, yet it is not a metaphysical entity but rather described in terms o f
Heidegger’s discussion o f das Worumwillen, or that “_/br the sake o f which” we act. See
Ibid., 234-235. See also Heidegger, Being and Time, I. 3, pp. 118-122; I. 5, 184-187; I.
6, 235-240.
7'Ibid., 236.
72Raymond Klibansky, for example, stresses the point that, in his opinion,
Patocka’s path is “totally different” from Heidegger’s. Even Richard Rorty and Erazim
Kohak, both o f whom are respected as sober analysts who recognize the influence o f
both Husserl and Heidegger in Patodka’s work, cannot resist voicing some opinion in
the matter. Interestingly, while Rorty concludes that “[i]n the dialogue between Husserl
and Heidegger, then, Patocka is mostly on Heidegger’s side,” Kohak comes to the
opposite conclusion: considering Patodka as a whole, he says, it is the Husserlian strand
that is “dominant.” See Raymond Klibansky, “Jan Patodka,” in La
Responsabilite/Responsibility, eds. P. Horak and J. Zumr, (Prague: Filosoficky ustav
CSAV, 1992), 17-35; Rorty, “The Seer o f Prague,” 37; Kohak, “Jan Patodka’s Search
for the Natural World,” 137.
74See Patodka, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History, 45-46.
75Ibid„ 49.
76One commentator, Avezier Tucker, for example, argues to this effect, dividing
88
Patocka into a Platonic humanist and a Heideggerean reactionary, depending on the
situation. Erazim Kohak as well, though to a lesser degree, reads Patocka in terms o f his
Husserlian and his Heideggerean leanings. See Appendix.
77Pato5ka, Heretical Essays. 46.
79On the self-interestedness o f Dasein, see the Introduction to Heidegger’s Being

and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper and Row,
1962).
80Patocka, Body. Community, Language, World, 94.
81Ibid„ 95.
82Ibid., 97.
83Ibid.
S4Ibid.
85PatoCka, Body, Community, Language, World, 31. Czech, like German, allows
for the easy distinguishing o f “being” (Sein in German or byti in Czech) from “beings”
(Seiende or jsoucno). This is a problem in English that some seek to solve by rendering
Seiende as “existents” or “what-is.” I find these solutions to result in less rather than
more clarity, thus I prefer to render Sein or byti traditionally, as “being,” and to translate
the various forms of Seiende or jsoucno as “a being,” “beings,” or, if the situation
requires, “beings as a whole.” Ralph Manheim, the translator o f the Yale University
Press edition o f Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics, argues that this solution,
while essentially accurate, is to be avoided because it inevitably results in confusing
formulations such as “Being is not a being.” I must disagree with his conclusion. In the
end, if one hopes to read Heidegger and his students there is no alternative to
developing a familiarity with the terminology sufficient to render such constructions
comprehensible.
86Heidegger’s “existential analysis o f death,” or “being-towards-death,” can be

found in Being and Time, II. 1, 246-260.
87Pato£ka, “Varna Lecture: The Dangers o f Technicization in Science according

to E. Husserl and the Essence of Technology as Danger according to M. Heidegger,” in
Jan Patocka, 334.
88Pato£ka, Body, Community, Lanaguage, World, 73.
89
89Ibid., 176.
’‘’Patodka, Heretical Essays, 105.
9'Ibid., 153.
92See Heidegger, Being and Time, I. 6, 191-200.
93Jacques Derrida, The Gift o f Death, 13. That Heidegger does not quote the
“canonical passage” from Plato’s Phaedo in Being and Time, is, for Derrida, surprising.
94Patodka, “Cartesianism and Phenomenology,” 316.
"Patocka, “Heidegger,” trans. Edward F. Findlay, Report o f the Center fo r

Theoretical Study, CTS-98-06 (Prague: Center for Theoretical Study, 1998), 4.
"Patodka, “Filosofie vychovy” (A Philosophy o f Education), in Pece o dusi I

(Care for the Soul I), 377.
"Patodka, Body, Community, Language, World, 49.
98Ibid., 49-50.
"Ibid., 31.
I00Ibid., 133.
IOIIbid., 138.
102Ibid„ 49-50.
l03Ibid., 50.
,04Ibid., 49.
,05Ibid.
I06lbid., 79. Patodka notes that even inactivity, the holding back of movement,
also belongs to the movements o f the body.
107Ibid., 80.
108Ibid., 154. Patodka explains his interpretation o f the Aristotelian concept as a
90
“radical ization”: “To understand the movement o f human existence, for that we need to
radicalize Aristotle’s conception o f movement. The possibilities that ground movement
have no preexisting bearer, no necessary referent standing statically at their foundation,
but rather all synthesis, all innner interconnection o f movement takes place within it
alone. All inner unification is accomplished by the movement itself, not by some bearer,
...objectively understood.” Ibid., 147. For Aristotle’s concept o f the “unmoved mover,”
see, for example, Metaphysics 3.8. 30-31.
I(WPatocka, Body, Community, Language, World, 155.
"°Ibid., 155-156.
11‘Ibid., 143.
" 2Ibid., 148.
" 3Ibid.
IUPatocka, “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology,” 264.
“ 5Patocka, Body, Community, Language, World, 149.
“6Ibid., 150.
“7Ibid.
" 8See Patodka, Heretical Essays, 23. See also, Hannah Arendt, The Human
Condition, (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 29-49.
" 9It is important to distinguish the concept o f the “Earth” from that o f the
“world,” described earlier. Here Patodka is using the notion o f the Earth in a
quasi-Heideggerean sense. It is not the literal earth, but rather the “unshakable ground”
to which our movement relates. It is the referent o f our movement, that which does not
move when we do, that which is firm. The Earth symbolizes the power our corporeal
nature exerts on and over us. For the Heideggerean perspective, see “The Origin o f the
Work o f Art,” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San
Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 171-175.
l20Patocka, Body, Community, Language, World, 151.
121Ibid.
I22lbid., 160.
91
123Ibid., 160-161.
,24Pato£ka writes that he follows Merleau-Ponty in his analysis of corporeity as

the basis for a critique o f Heidegger, and “On the basis o f this criticism we
demonstrated the possibility o f interpreting existence as a triple movement. That we did
using both an ancient and a modem idea. The modem idea was Heidegger’s, that life is
a life in possibilities characterized by a relation to our own being; we project that for the
sake of which we are, that fo r the sake o f is the possibility o f our life; in the world a
totality o f possibilities is always open to us. The ancient idea -- Aristotle’s definition o f
movement as a possibility in the process o f realization, not motion in Galileo’s sense.”
Patocka, Body, Community, Language, World, 177.
125Ibid., 161.
I26lbid., 177.
I27lbid., 178.
I28lbid.
I29Ibid., 96-97.
130Ibid., 97.
13'In the course o f an underground seminar delivered on the occasion of the

publication o f the Der Speigel interview shortly after Heidegger’s death, Patodka gives
his students an insightful description o f the difference between the early and the late
Heidegger. The early Heidegger, he says, works from the conception that "das Sein ist
das Sein des Seienden ” (Being is the Being o f beings), while the later Heidegger would
say that “das Seiende ist das Seiende des Seins ” (beings are the beings o f Being). In the
former conceptualization Heidegger stresses that Being must not be thought of as “a”
being, but rather as the ways in which beings appear, thus stressing the notion that what
we understand as Being is taken from us as beings; in the latter formulation this
situation is reversed. Here Heidegger shows himself to be no longer focused on beings
so much as on their Being. This is the Heidegger o f Holderlin’s poetry, o f the four-fold
o f earth, sky, divinity and mortals. See Patocka, “Documenta Philosophiae: Diskuse k
Heideggerovi,” Filosoficky casopis 43, no. 2 (1995): 218.
l32On the “saving power,” see Heidegger’s evocation of Holderlin in “The

Question Concerning Technology,” Basic Writings, 333-334.
133Kohak, “Philosophical Biography,” 134.
l34James Dodd, introduction to Body, Community, Language, World, xxxi.
92
CHAPTER 3
PH ILO SO PH Y A FTER T H E DEATH O F METAPHYSICS: PATOCKA AND

GREEK THOUGHT
As an interpreter of Husserl and Heidegger, Jan Patodka takes up the Husserlian
goal o f a renewal o f rationality in the West and considers it alongside his commitment
to the Heideggerean critique o f metaphysical philosophy. He seeks to recover the
insight of the classical conception o f reason, in other words, but without becoming
entangled in traditionally metaphysical formulations. Contemporary philosophy,
particularly as expressed by Heidegger, has made a facile reliance on metaphysical
thought impossible. Neither Husserl nor Heidegger, for example, focuses his efforts on
the classic elements o f Greek thought. Yet Patodka does not find the twilight of
metaphysics to signal a need to abandon classical theory. To the contrary, his work is
distinguished by its direct engagement with and emulation o f the political theory of
Plato. The notion, then, is one o f classical philosophy sans the explicit element o f
metaphysics. It is, in other words, an interpretation o f classical thought as something
fundamentally other than the positing of a metaphysical reality and the developing o f a
means of grasping it through the pursuit of dialectical reasoning. In this chapter I pursue
the question that distinguishes Patodka’s work from Husserl's and Heidegger's: the
question o f a non-metaphysical interpretation o f Socrates and Plato. To the extent that
the legacy o f Nietzsche and Heidegger requires that Platonic thought be abandoned,
there is little hope for a genuine philosophy of politics and ethics. As Patodka interprets
it, however, the essence o f classical thought is not defined in contrast to contemporary
critique, but rather integrated into it.
93
The center o f gravity in Patodka’s work, as much as it relies and comments upon
the phenomenological thought of Husserl and Heidegger, is found in the figure o f
Socrates. Patodka’s philosophy, therefore, is not primarily directed toward a revision o f
twentieth-century phenomenology. It surely attempts such a revision, but as a
methodological means towards a larger goal, a goal that is as much political and
historical as it is philosophical. Rather than discard classical thought as hopelessly
metaphysical, Patocka seeks to examine it anew, to put its spirituality and metaphysical
formulations to the test o f contemporary critique. These formulations, he is convinced,
particularly the Socratic injunction to “care for the soul,” continue to be relevant in the
post-metaphysical age precisely because their essence does not impel us to seek a
metaphysical foundation for our scientific inquiry into the nature o f reality.
Patodka attempts, then, to reexamine Greek philosophy through the lenses o f
phenomenological philosophy; his hope is to recover that which Husserl sought in his
later years, the essential “insight” o f Western rationality that is the epitome o f the
European ideal o f civilization. This is an insight, though, an understanding o f reason,
that has become progressively deformed as it has been subject to attempts at
metaphysical systemization over the past several millenia. The first step on this road of
deformation was taken by Plato himself, when he expressed the human potential in
terms of transcending the apparent images o f our experience, via the dialectic, and
reaching the real, the ideal forms o f reality.1 What Plato offered in merely symbolic
form, however, tempered by an assertion of the limits o f human striving, reached a
culmination in the modem world with the claims o f science, inspired by the aspirations
94
o f the metaphysical quest, to be the final “key that unlocks all doors.”2 This scientific
self-certainty, o f course, is emblematic o f the “crisis” in the West that Husserl hoped to
reverse by looking to the origin o f Western rationality —its most elemental insight.
Patodka is convinced, in contrast to Heidegger, that this insight upon which
Europe is founded is embodied in the figure o f Socrates and represents the greatest
achievement o f Western civilization. Yet since Plato —and here he is with Heidegger --
philosophy has been in decline, a story o f insight corrupted. Drawing upon
phenomenology, Patodka attempts a reinterpretation o f Platonic philosophy. He begins
with the notion o f reason, the anchor o f Western civilization, describing it not as a
motionless concept but as an active mode o f living and questioning, a
phenomenological movement. Yet to symbolize this movement, this fundamental and
defining activity central to the history of the West, he abandons the language of
twentieth-century phenomenology and returns to an elemental Socratic injunction: the
requirement to “care for the soul.”3
Patocka’s response to the Husserlian perception o f a crisis, o f a dissolution of
the center o f Western civilization, is not to create a new philosophy, a new
understanding o f Man, but reconsider our heritage in a new light. The task he sets for
himself is to examine the contribution o f classical Greek philosophy to Europe via the
analytical tools o f the contemporary work o f Husserl and Heidegger. The task of this
chapter is to analyze the character o f this reinterpretation o f classical thought. The
underlying question is whether the classical and the post-metaphysical are at all
reconcilable, and whether a coherent conception o f politics and ethics can result from
the attempt. Patodka is convinced that the answer to these questions is yes.
95
The Czech philosopher’s extensive writings on Plato, Europe and history are the
heart o f his philosophical work; they represent not only the application o f his
phenomenological interpretation of Husserl and Heidegger, but also his enduring
conviction that politics and history, as the material upon which civilization is
constructed, are inherently connected to philosophy. The initial force behind these
writings, most certainly, was the quest for a renewal o f reason, Husserl’s goal o f
re-clarifying what he considered to be the telos o f European humanity. Whereas
Husserl’s career was coming to a close as he developed the thesis of the Crisis, making
it impossible for him to pursue the problem in any detail, Pato£ka’s was just beginning.
The young Czech, however, did not pursue the question along the lines laid down by
Husserl, instead he followed his own philosophical leanings. Patocka is attempting to
reconstruct the dissipated center of Western civilization, but he is by no means
reinforcing traditional Western philosophy. With Heidegger, he concludes that Western
philosophy has by and large taken its lead from a tendency first visible in Plato and
Aristotle: this is the tendency to encapsulate the philosophical insight represented by
Socrates in a systematic, quasi-objective form. Philosophers since Plato have generally
pursued philosophy as metaphysics, as the objectification o f a transcendental,
metaphysical reality. It is this objectification, this cessation o f the essential movement
and uncertainty o f philosophy, this metaphysical systematization criticized by
Heidegger,4 that is itself at the heart o f the crisis o f rationalism. The recovery o f
philosophy, and o f the center of Western civilization itself, requires an explication of
96
that center that is itself non-metaphysical, and thus heretical with regard to traditional
thought.
Patocka wrote extensively on Greek philosophy, particularly in his later years,
when his banishment from University and professional life ended his career but freed
him to concentrate, albeit illegally, on topics close to his heart yet forbidden by
communist censorship. He focused most particularly on the Socratic problem o f the
mode of life most conducive to truth, life as care for the soul. This is, o f course, also the
mode o f life reflective of genuine philosophy, and so a characteristically European
activity —one eclipsed, however, by the progressive domination in western thought of
metaphysics. Among his numerous lectures and texts on ancient thought, three stand
out. First and foremost is a series of lectures from 1973 entitled Plato and Europe,
delivered illegally to dedicated students in private apartments and concentrating
specifically on this topic. Nearly simultaneous with the preparation for these lectures
was a book-length text written for publication in German and eventually entitled Europe
and the Post-European Age. Finally, in another series o f underground lectures from
1973, entitled “Four Seminars towards the Problem o f Europe” and published as
samizdat, Patodka returned to these topics and, in response to student questions, to their
relationship to the later Heidegger.3 The theme that ties these works together is the
notion o f “caring for the soul”; this symbol is the epitome of the Greek contribution to
European civilization, a contribution that grounds that civilization and is the core of any
claim it may have to universality.
97
In the background o f each o f these later texts is a seminal article from 1952
which also requires a closer look. In “Negative Platonism’' Patodka elucidates his thesis
o f a non-metaphysical “negative” Platonic philosophy rooted in the Socratic dialogues
and the concepts o f Socratic ignorance and continual questioning —notions that
implicitly reject, according to Patodka, any “positive” or objective ground for human
knowledge. Socrates and, for the most part, Plato are characterized as “shakers,” as
challengers o f systematic knowledge rather than propagators o f it.
Patodka’s dedication in these works is to the very notion o f philosophy itself.
Along with Husserl, he defines it narrowly: as the originally European practice of
self-reflection pioneered among the philosophers o f ancient Greece.6 Rather than an
attempt to discover and map out a preexisting given truth, philosophy is an activity that
effects human reality in the course o f examining it. Human reality, then, is not a fixed
constant. It is variable, dependent largely upon the particularities o f the situation in
which the human being stands. “The situation o f man,” Patodka writes in Plato and
Europe, “is something that changes when we become conscious o f it. A naive and a
conscious situation are two different situations. Our reality is always situational, so that
if it is reflected upon, it is already different by the fact o f our having reflected upon it.
O f course the question is whether it is in this way better.”7 This last comment, the
question o f whether we improve reality by reflecting upon it, is not meant rhetorically.
Reflection is an activity with definite consequences, and Patodka feels that these
consequences are and must continue to be positive for human life. He maintains that
“philosophical thought ought to have a different sense, that philosophical thought
98
should somehow help us in our need.”* Though philosophy is a dangerous undertaking
in terms o f its challenge to authority, its primary effect is positive: reflection has the
effect o f introducing clarity: “[I]n every case a reflective situation is -- in contrast to a
naive situation —to a certain degree clarified, or at least on the path to clarity.”9
Pato£ka’s understanding o f philosophy stresses reflection as the questioning o f
that which we suppose to be certain, simple and clear; it is the questioning o f knowledge
received and accepted without reflection. To the extent it succeeds, it necessarily
challenges the everyday certainties o f life; it calls them into question. The early pursuit
o f philosophy in ancient Greece was o f this type, Pato£ka argues, and this is crucial to
the very concept o f reason in Europe. Reason does not naively look to authority for
knowledge, it challenges that naivete.
The process o f the conscious breaking through o f everyday certainty, everyday

mediocrity, which does not ask the question o f what man lives for, was most deeply
experienced in Greek philosophy, from which all o f our philosophy comes, and one
o f its greatest masters, Plato, urgently described this process for us in his dialogues.
He wanted to show that philosophy is not merely the conveying o f some doctrine, of
certain pieces o f information (pieces of information are that which is contained in
the sciences), but that philosophy is motion, a certain process in the core o f man
which is connected in its essence with our recoil or rebound from the naively natural
and limited everydayness.10
In this form, philosophy can be described as the pursuit o f truth and freedom: two
notions that are meaningful only where we actively question knowledge instead of
living as if it were given.
The spirit o f freedom and truth is the Socratic spirit. Socratic activity, and
Pato£ka clearly considers Socrates a historical figure quite distinct from Plato,
exemplifies the phenomenological movement o f truth described in Body, Community,
99
Language, World. It is what is elsewhere called a “life in truth.”11 Patodka’s picture of
Socrates, rather than repeating the traditional understanding, is instead drawn with the
help o f Heideggerean insights; his is a Heideggerean Socrates. This is particularly
interesting as Heidegger looks to the presocratics rather than to Socrates for inspiration
in An Introduction to Metaphysics.I2 The difference is significant, for although the
influence of Heidegger is clear, there remain fundamental differences that point
Patocka’s philosophy in an explicitly ethical and political direction, in distinct contrast
to Heidegger.
Patodka’s approach to Socrates and classical thought is to take seriously the
analysis o f Heidegger, yet to resist following him too closely. When Patodka contends
that freedom is an essential component o f truth, for example, a kinship with the
Heideggerean essay “On the Essence of Truth” (in which the essence o f truth is
described as freedom) is evident. Yet Patodka also differs distinctly from the German
philosopher in how he interprets and applies this point.13 When Patodka speaks of
freedom, he speaks o f it in the fullness of its social and political, as well as its
phenomenological, implications. Truth is indeed the freedom to “let beings appear,” as
Heidegger describes it, but it is also a movement of life, a way o f living which humans
have the potential to achieve and which is characterized by an explicitly ethical side.
Truth is the freedom, not only to let beings appear, but also live freely and humanly, it
is the freedom that enables the philosopher to stand and challenge naive faith and
simply given knowledge. “Truth... is an internal battle of man for his essential, inner
freedom, a freedom which man has in his core not factually, but essentially. Truth is a
100
question o f the truthfulness o f man.14 In this conception, truth is as much a matter o f the
way in which man lives in the long term as it is a product o f the authentic disclosure o f
beings in a particular moment. This is a significant point o f contrast, for it emphasizes
truth as a mode of being, a way o f life with an implicit moral element.
Plato and Europe
In Plato and Europe, the work most often held up as emblematic o f Patodka’s
abiding morality, the following claim is made: “I believe that it is perhaps possible,”
Patocka writes, “to venture to put forward the thesis that Europe.. .arose out o f care fo r
the soul, TES PSYCHES EMPIMELEISTHAI. This is the embryo out o f which grew
that which Europe was.”15 This is the thesis o f Plato and Europe, and it is a direct
response to the concerns raised by Edmund Husserl in his late writings on the Crisis o f
the Sciences. Yet Plato and Europe, which consists of a series o f private lectures from
the year 1973, is far more than just an attempt to respond to Husserl. Along with the
Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History, Plato and Europe and its accompanying
texts represent the high point o f the political philosophy that had been progressively
developing in Jan Patodka’s thought. Here the question is not philosophy in the abstract,
but in the concrete setting o f its relation to European history and civilization. The
problem o f Europe, Patodka concludes, is a spiritual problem. It is the problem o f the
“care for the soul.”
The Plato and Europe lectures are the centerpiece o f the many illegal apartment
lectures given by Patodka during the 1970s, via which he was able to continue to
philosophize even after he was “retired” from the university by its communist
101
administrators. This was the period o f “normalization,” a particularly disheartening time
in Czechoslovak history as the government ruthlessly snuffed out all trace o f the
freedoms enjoyed in the reformist period o f the late 1960s. Plato and Europe responds
to this despondent situation as Patodka is explicit in seeking “hope” for the future in his
reflections. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that these lectures were merely
dissident texts with the primary aim o f offering hope to students discouraged by
communism; they were in fact broad philosophical reflections directed towards
civilization in the West as a whole. The distorted ideology o f Czechoslovak
communism was itself a manifestation o f the crisis o f the West, and Patodka intended to
examine the roots o f that crisis.
These lectures, as their title suggests, establish a connection between Greek
philosophy and European civilization. They claim that Europe is distinctive by virtue of
its historical assumption o f the standpoint o f classical Greek philosophy, the standpoint
o f reason, as a guiding principle. The decline o f Europe, both in the narrower sense of
the loss o f its geopolitical dominance and in the broader sense o f the crisis o f reason
affecting the West as a whole, is a consequence o f its misunderstanding o f this
principle. Its hope for the future, which is a universal hope to the extent the concept of
reason and its manifestations such as political democracy are considered to be
applicable to mankind generally, depends on its ability to renew its heritage. Patodka
felt that the phenomenological philosophies o f Husserl and Heidegger were necessary
aids in the pursuit o f this goal, although not by themselves sufficient. They were crucial,
however, to an understanding o f care for the soul in a contemporary context.
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Interestingly, it was often the case that the students to whom Patodka lectured were
more interested in pursuing the Heideggerean and phenomenological details than the
Socratic. Yet Patocka made it clear in these lectures that his abiding focus was Western
civilization rather than contemporary philosophy, and this focus necessitated an
exploration o f the concept o f “care for the soul.” This was, as he stressed, the essence of
European reality:
One thing, however, puzzles me, that all of you have only questions on
phenomenology and Heidegger, etc., but not even one question has come
having to do with Europe, with that which was my most actual thesis;
that European reality, in spite o f the two great turning points, consists in
the concern for and care o f the soul resuming the whole o f antiquity, and
everything that connects with it.16
The very reality of European civilization, he argues, is tied up in its “spiritual
foundations.”17
At the heart o f these lectures is the sense that an understanding o f the European
heritage can positively affect human life, both in terms o f the self-constitution o f the
individual and o f the ordering o f the civilization itself. Our Platonic heritage, despite its
damaged reputation, still contains the seeds of an authentic life. Those philosophical
seeds, however, must be understood in relation, not to dreams o f a perfect system, but of
what Patodka calls the “hardness o f reality.”
[A] further question is whether in that which it would be possible to

demarcate as the European heritage, there exists something that could be
credible to us to a certain degree, that could affect us in such a way that
we could again see hope in a certain perspective, in a certain future,
without indulging in illusory dreams and without in some way
underestimating the hardness and seriousness o f the situation in which
we find ourselves.18
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In accepting the hardness o f reality and assuming responsibility for the formation o f the
soul, humans attest to a mode o f living that is truthful, that is constant and of a higher
order than material reality. To explicate this argument, a closer look at Patodka’s
understanding o f Europe and o f the concept o f the “care for the soul” is required.
As the dominant geopolitical entity in the world, Patodka argues, Europe has
effectively ended, its position destroyed during two wars in the space o f thirty years.
The world has entered a post-european age and it is the role o f philosophy to assist in
restoring equilibrium -- not by returning Europe to its former position o f power, but by
seeking to understand the path that Europe traveled and how it failed to take up the
challenge presented by its Socratic heritage. It is a quest, Patodka asserts, that touches
not merely upon the relationship o f European man to his own history, but o f humanity
in general.
But the question is, when we go towards the roots o f the present
disequilibrium, whether we must not go to the beginnings o f Europe
itself and through these beginnings ail the way to the very relation
between man and his place in the world; whether the disequilibrium that
we observe today is something that has to do not only with European
man in a particular historical age, but something that today concerns man
in general in his relation to the planet. I think that it is necessary to
answer this question positively: it concerns man and his relation to the
planet. And this is clear precisely today, when Europe has ended. When
Europe, that two-thousand-year construction which was able to carry
humanity to a quite new level of reflectivity and consciousness, and also
power and strength, when this historical reality, which for so long
assumed that all o f humanity was contained in it, that it is humanity and
all others insignificant, has definitively ended.19
Patodka explains the decline o f Europe as a result of two main factors: disunity and
enormous power. Disunity, meaning the prevalence o f numerous sovereign states at
varying levels o f development without any higher authority, was coupled with
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enormous power, available as a result o f modem technical and scientific knowledge.
Both factors, he notes, are specifically modem, for while the disunity o f sovereign states
in itself is neither new nor negative, it is only in the modem era that this situation occurs
in the absence of a higher, unifying authority.20 Europe is not a single state, and Patodka
does not propose to make it one; it does possess a common history and heritage,
however. The argument in Plato and Europe contends that, more than any other single
factor, the recognition and philosophical explication o f the heritage o f Europe as “care
for the soul” has the potential to provide relief from the history of the twentieth century
as war.21
The lectures o f Plato and Europe point backwards from the contemporary
disunity to the Greek polis as the foundational moment in European history. The
spiritual core o f Europe is found in the Greek polis; the Roman Empire, and Christianity
following it, both draw upon that heritage in their attempts to order European
civilization. In arguing for the singular importance o f the Greek experience, Patodka
must contend that both the Judaic and the Christian traditions are not independent poles
of European culture, but derivative poles in that they had first to “travel through” Greek
thought in order to become what they did for European civilization. Judaism, he argues,
had to Hellenize itself, whereas Christianity itself is indebted to Athens for the thought
of the “other world” o f justice and pure good.22 Though arresting, this analysis is
insufficiently backed by argumentation; it is asserted but not defended with historical
evidence, making it a shortcoming in Patodka’s work.
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What is it that characterizes Greek philosophy in such a distinctive way?
Patocka describes it in terms o f a conscious decision to no longer accept life and its
inevitable decline as simply given, but to challenge it. Greek philosophy, he contends, is
characterized by the refusal to accept the simple fate o f a world and a life ever in
decline. It resisted the inevitability o f decline and, in doing so, discovered both the
“eternal” and human freedom. The battle against the degenerative tendency o f the
world, the resistance to it, is precisely human freedom; this is what the Greeks called
care fo r the soul.
The philosophical discovery o f eternity is a special thing. From the point

o f view o f modem natural science it is naturally incomprehensible. But
what is contained in it? It is precisely resistance, it is a battle against that
fall, against time, against that entire degenerative tendency o f the world
and o f life. This battle is in a certain sense understandably lost, but in a
certain other sense not, because the situation in which man is, is different
according to how he stands in relation to it. And the freedom o f man
rests —possibly —precisely in this! The Greeks, Greek philosophers, in
whom the Greek spirit is expressed most sharply, expressed human
freedom in the following terms: care for the soul.23
With this we have the first hint as to the explicit content o f the concept o f caring for the
soul. The assumption o f an attitude o f caring for the soul changes the situation in which
man stands; it enables him to stand freely, but it demands o f him a burdensome
responsibility.
In the second chapter o f Plato and Europe, Patodka attempts to demonstrate that
his concern with Greek philosophy and Socrates is related to his phenomenology. It was
through Edmund Husserl that he came to be engaged in the pursuit o f the principle upon
which European life was founded, and it is through Husserlian phenomenology that he
wished to demonstrate the relevance o f his conclusions. Yet Patodka makes a point of
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recognizing the differences between his work and Husserl’s. He describes his work
phenomenologically yet also recognizes an essential difference between it and pure
phenomenology. Patodka pursues, in Plato and Europe, what he calls
“phenomenological philosophy.” This is a purposeful distinction, implying the
contention that philosophy properly pursued is inseparable from the social realm, the
realm o f human interaction with other beings and with the things o f the world.
“Phenomenological philosophy,” he writes, “differs from phenomenology in that it not
only wants to distinguish phenomena as such, but it also wants to deduce consequences,
it wants to deduce from this metaphysical consequences, that means it asks about the
relation between phenomena and beings.”24 In other words, Patodka wishes his
phenomenological philosophy to have a broader aim than just the distinguishing o f
phenomena. It is to touch directly upon issues consequential to the act o f philosophizing
itself, issues such as the relation o f the philosopher to society and to the concrete world.
Importantly, however, Patodka attempts to make it clear that phenomenology, as
a science of revealing, is still appropriate to that at which he aims. This is so because the
distinguishing of phenomena is for him no abstract venture. It is tied to human
comportment in the world both in terms o f the consequences mentioned above, and in
relation to the effect on human action o f morality, o f the differentiation between good
and evil. When we decide how to comport ourselves, when we decide how to act in
relation to good and evil, we reveal ourselves. And that which leads us to decide how to
act is also revealed. As Patodka puts it,
Just when man does not want to merely recognize, when he wants at the
same time to act, when he orients himself with respect to good and evil,
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everywhere there something must —this is clear -- show itself to him.
Precisely that must show itself to him which designates good and evil
and, naturally, because good and evil are something that concern us, we
must at the same time reveal ourselves to ourselves.”25
It is in revealing itself that something genuinely becomes a “phenomenon,” that is,
something distinguished from a mere being. Phenomena are beings that have been
revealed, or that manifest themselves. They show themselves in truth.26
In the case o f the human being, this is a crucial distinction. Man is a being o f
truth, meaning a being who has the potential to live truthfully, to show himself and view
others without distortion. He is unlike other beings in this possibility. Yet this remains
for him only a possibility, not a given characteristic. “Man has, on the basis o f the fact
that he stands between phenomena and mere being, the possibility to either capitulate
andfall into mere being, or to realize himself as a being o f truth, a being o f
phenomena,”27 The human situation is one that is in-between truth and mere being. Man
has the choice to live as if the objects and equations and given knowledge around him
are exhaustive of reality, but he also has the choice to open himself to the possibility
that phenomena are more complex than they at first appear. The course of human life,
Patocka contends, is determined either by the pursuit o f the higher movement or
capitulation to the lower.
The mode o f truth, however, the mode o f revealing human life as it truly is, does
not deliver man o f pain and insecurity. In fact, it may do the opposite by revealing the
basic problematicity o f life. Man is a being in a precarious situation; his world is not
simple and secure, it is fundamentally problematic. Living philosophically, living in
truth, does not solve problems so much as it presents them. The recognition of man as a
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being o f truth damns him to a life o f problematicity as it frees him from bondage to the
merely material. The consciousness o f man as a being o f problematicity is not new to
Greek philosophy, however, it is present in myth as well, in the common notion o f
man’s standing in the universe as an insecure one. It was the greatness o f the Greek
philosophers, Patodka argues, not merely to recognize this problematicity, but to infer
from it a “plan o f life” that was not a curse, but was a form o f human greatness.
“Everything from insight,” is how Patocka describes it.28 Mankind is not doomed by the
precariousness o f his existence that shows itself so clearly in, for example, the myth of
Oedipus. To the contrary, our insight enables us to rise up from out o f our situation of
desperation. As a result o f insight, human life is shown to be other than as in traditional
myth, that is, doomed to a certain futility, to a helplessness in the face o f fate, by virtue
o f man’s essential separateness from the realm o f the divine.
Insight is the mode by which we apply a philosophical vision to human life. It is
the mode by which we order our existence in the world, it is our means to create a just
order out o f chaos. The solution o f Greek philosophy is to show that man, though not
divine, is not merely an object among others in the world. He is privileged with the
possibility o f living on a higher level than other beings o f nature, a level approaching
the divine. Because of this, the Greeks could see that “[m]an would be able, in certain
circumstances, to make o f the human world a world o f truth and justice. The way in
which it is possible to achieve this,” Patodka concludes, “is precisely the object o f
caring for the soul.”29
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The “care for the soul” is recognized as the instrument o f such an action, an
action that would enable man to live, not as a mere being, but as a being of insight. It
would enable him to take from his knowledge of living with other humans, for example,
the “moral insight,” which is itself the “sedimentation and codification” of human
experience.30 The result is that Patodka believes that Europe is characterized precisely
by this call to reflection, for only in Europe did this movement from myth to philosophy
occur. European history, broadly speaking, is the history of various attempts to embody
institutionally this care for the soul.31
C aring for the Soul
The process o f philosophy is that o f caring for the soul. Yet as I have attempted
to stress, this process is understood, not by a traditional Platonic analysis, drawing upon
metaphysical concepts, but through a set o f analytical lenses derived largely from
phenomenology and the work o f Martin Heidegger. The process o f caring for the soul,
therefore, must be examined in greater detail, as must its component parts.
The component that first springs to mind, particularly in relation to Heidegger, is
the active part o f the process, the act o f caring. In Being and Time “care,” or Sorge, is
described as the being of Dasein, as the existential a priori that precedes the situations
of Dasein?2 Patodka’s concept of care, however, differs distinctly from that which
Heidegger describes. It is more accurately described, as Jacques Derrida wrote in The
Gift o f Death, as a concept that combines the Platonic meaning o f “learning to die,”
melete thanatou from the Phaedo, and Heidegger’s Sorge?3 Another commentator,
Avezier Tucker, argues somewhat one-sidedly that the concept is entirely Socratic.
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Pato£ka’s “care for the soul,” he writes, is a Socratic concept in its entirety. Apart from
stressing the importance o f finitude, it “bears little resemblance to Heidegger’s ‘care,...’
Patocka’s ‘care’ is far more humanistic and metaphysical.”34 Derrida is the more
accurate here, however, for although “care for the soul” comes directly from the
Platonic dialogues, it is read negatively, that is, under the influence o f the Heideggerean
critique o f metaphysics. In his Heretical Essays, for example, the Platonic melete
thanatou shows the influence of “being-towards-death”: “Another important moment
is that the Platonic philosopher overcame death by not fleeing from it but by facing up
to it. This philosophy was melete thanatou, care for death; care for the soul is
inseparable from care for death which becomes the true care for life; life (eternal) is
bom of this direct look at death, o f an overcoming o f death.”35 PatoCka’s aim, in
responding to the Husserlian call for a phenomenological rediscovery o f the European
spirit, is to combine in his interpretation of “care for the soul” the traditional concern for
ethics integral to Greek philosophy with the liberating aspects o f the contemporary
perspective. Heideggerean influence is undeniably present in this interpretation o f
Socratic philosophy, and it is also reflected in the attempt to pinpoint the elusive nature
o f the second component of “care for the soul”: the soul itself.
In his discussion of care for the soul, however, PatoCka appears to contradict his
own stated aim to avoid metaphysics by making use o f concepts that are clearly
metaphysical in content, as, for example, the notion o f the “soul.” In common
understanding, the soul seems to be nothing other than an objectification of a
transcendental concept -- the embodiment of something that is beyond objective reality
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so as to make our way in the world more secure, more full o f answers. Following
Heidegger, Patodka would be expected to eschew the use o f such terms. Yet he argues
emphatically that the adoption o f a non-metaphysical stance with regard to philosophy
does not necessitate the abandonment o f metaphor and symbolism that is traditionally
considered metaphysical —insofar as those symbols reflect human reality. The notion o f
the soul, or to be more specific, the Greek soul, is an example o f such a symbol. It is
incumbent, then, to inquire into the content of this concept.
Patodka begins by noting that philosophy from its Greek beginnings defines the
soul as that in the human being which is capable o f truth.36 This, however, is merely
descriptive. It is more instructive to understand the Greek soul in terms o f the essential
element o f philosophy: human understanding. And so Patodka writes in a text from a
series o f seminars dedicated to the problems of Plato and Europe that “[w]hen thinking
begins, the most it is possible to say is that on one side here stands the world, like a
collection o f everything which is, on the other side stands the philosophizing man with
his ability to understand that which is the world. This ability to understand, this is called
soul, in the Greek conception. This is the original understanding, that, on the basis of
which man has the ability o f truth and o f individual truths.”37 The soul is thus defined in
terms of an ability, a human characteristic that looks beyond the simply material in
human reality.
Soul is the characteristic o f man that gives him the ability of truth. And truth, as
I noted in my discussion o f phenomenology, is a function o f what Patodka terms the
“movements” o f human life —it is the highest of those movements.38 In this way it can
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be said that both the soul and the truth that it can effect are directly relative to action, to
human movement. This is nowhere more to the point than in considering the activity of
human decision-making. In one o f his post-WWII lectures on Greek philosophy at
Charles University, Patodka noted that the meaning o f the soul in ancient Greece
changed with Socrates. Human fate came to be seen as an internal phenomenon, relative
to our decision-making, rather than an external one over which we have no control.
“With Socrates,” Patodka writes, “the soul is also the bearer o f fate. But it is inner fate,
the inner lot o f man. The soul decides for itself and has a power towards this end which
is its alone -- the recognition o f truth, the strength o f distinguishing good and evil.”39
The soul acts upon us in those moments when we must decide, when we encounter the
possibility o f exerting control upon our own fate by refusing to give in to the weight of
events as they come at us. It acts upon us by recognizing truth, and by differentiating
between good and evil. This, however, is not a given characteristic. It exists for man as
an inherent possibility, one available to him only if he pursues it via caring for the soul.
It comes, also, at a price, for the decision to act based upon recognition o f good and evil
is the decision to accept the burden o f a life that is no longer simple and instinctive, but
problematic.
Why, then, would one choose to care for the soul, why would one choose to
distinguish good from evil and thereby problematize life? The answer, Patodka argues,
lies in the relationship of the soul, via its movement, to being. It is with a fundamental
ontology, rather than a metaphysics, that this conception o f the soul can be understood.
In other words, to understand the soul one must not think of it as an entity, a thing, but
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rather as the locus o f our relationship to our own being. The soul is the centerpoint of a
hierarchy of being in Patodka’s work. It is the ability to understand our own being, a
figurative point from which we may move either toward a growth o f our being (which
would be a movement towards “good”), or towards a loss o f being (evil). Care for the
soul is in this way emblematic o f Patodka’s non-metaphysical approach to classical
theory.
At the center o f Patocka’s interpretation o f phenomenology, as I noted in
Chapter One, is the concept o f movement. According to Plato, the defining
characteristic o f the soul is its self-movement; the soul is defined by its motion.40 But
motion towards what? The human ability to recognize truth and good is not a given
characteristic but a possibility that the human must pursue in his being. The motion of
the soul, therefore, its basic function, is tied to the development o f our being —a
development that is expressed either in terms of a heightening, an expansion, o f being,
or a degradation o f it. PatoCka explains his notion in his discussion o f care for the soul
in Europe and the Post-European Age:
In the ontological-cosmological representation o f reality care for the soul

consequently reveals itself as a theory of motion, like Phaedrus’ AUTO
HE AUTO KINUN [that which moves itself]. On the other hand it is
possible to formulate care for the soul itself, from this point o f view,
more precisely: the soul is that which defines itself in the direction o f its
being and that which consequently directs itself either towards legitimate
growth, towards a growth o f being, or on the contrary towards decline
and a loss o f being: the soul is an indicator o f the main arteries o f
being.41
The soul, as I have noted, has a differentiating function, and these arteries of being that
it indicates run parallel to the human categories o f good and evil. In distinguishing these
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avenues, the soul helps to distinguish that which is good, for the good exists as that
toward which we aim when we develop our being, when we heighten it by the act o f
reflection.
In this, then, its most fundamental role is manifested even more

markedly. The soul is that which has a sense o f good and evil. The soul
can exist only when good exists, for its basic motion is motion in the
direction of good, but on the other hand good itself has meaning as the
goal and vanishing point o f everything only at the point where there
exists motion. Only insofar as there exists something that can heighten its
being by motion towards the good is good operative, meaning it is
(exists). The soul thus not only makes possible a conception o f the
overall hierarchy of being in the sense of good, i.e., a teleological
conception, but it is at the same time a justification o f good, it gives an
answer to the question (which even Nietzsche expressly asked), why
choose good and not evil, why truth and not (the possibly more practical)
seeming.42
We choose good, in this explanation, not because it is an eternal and concrete value in
and o f itself, something that we can grasp and hold on to, but because our motion
towards it represents a heightening o f our being.
As Patocka explains it, good itself is no concrete object, it is neither simple nor
unambiguous. Because it is not a concrete, static category, knowledge o f good (and evil)
is also subject to ambiguity, to a lack o f clarity. This truth, Pato£ka notes, is found even
in pre-philosophic myth and tragedy.43 Oedipus, for example, represents the painful
ambiguity of knowledge of truth. Through philosophy and myth we try to see the world
as a whole, to see it in truth; in doing so, however, we see that there can be ambiguity in
matters o f good and evil. As human, we see the world only in perspectives. It is
revealed to us in parts. “The world is given to us as a whole, but that doesn’t mean that
it isn’t given to us perspectivally and that it’s given everywhere in its fullness....it is a
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fullness from a certain point o f view. The world.. .is revealed to us necessarily
perspectivally.”44 With this phenomenological argument -- it is phenomenology that
reveals to us the fact that, because we encounter objects in a series o f (one-sided)
perspectives, our access to them as a whole is not achievable objectively —we cannot
but be convinced o f the tenuousness o f any claim we have to overall knowledge. Access
to truth is, instead of an objective process, a factor o f our reflection and insight, or what
Husserl referred to as intuition.45 Such is the case, as well, with the world as a whole,
along with the ability to distinguish between good and evil. “Clarity,” Patodka notes in
his discussion o f Oedipus, “is the domain o f gods. Into it man strayed and in it man
wanders.”46 Man is not a creature o f divine knowledge. He is ignorant o f the most
important things, but he is possessed o f the potential for insight, as the Greeks
discovered. His mode o f access to knowledge and to good is through his ability to care
for his soul, and so to increase his being, to be more fully human.
Caring for the soul occurs via movement that reveals to us our possibilities as
human beings, and thereby lays a foundation for our choices, our actions. It is the
movement o f European philosophy, Patodka argues, and it reveals that the soul is in
motion between two fundamental possibilities, two levels o f being. The first is the level
o f DOXA, or opinion, the second that o f reflective insight. The soul has the possibility
to embody either of these two degrees o f being.
Care for the soul is thus at the same time a discovery of two fundamental
possibilities o f the soul, two regions in which it moves. The soul o f
everyday intercourse with things and people in naively accepted
solidarity is the soul o f uncertain immediacy, its environment is
intrusive, binding, but uncertain, diffuse, it wavers without solid outlines
and limits: it is the soul proper to DOXA. Opposite to this is the soul o f
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questioning examination o f the reflective spirit, persisting in solid
outlines, purity and exactness.47
The movement o f the soul is movement between these two possibilities. This, in itself,
Patoika argues, is the action o f philosophy. It is not an action that is or can be justified
objectively, its success is not determined by quantitative results. Rather, its goal is unity
in man by the formation o f the soul in solid outline, a soul that is certain in the
consistency o f its reflective insight.
The soul caring for itself is thus in motion from uncertain immediacy to a
determining reflection. In this motion is philosophy, and this motion is
reality. Philosophy is hence comprehended and achieved by action; there
does not exist any “objective” proof o f philosophy, as there are objective
proofs o f mathematical theorems which do not concern our being, do not
have an influence on it and are independent o f it. In this motion consists,
on the other hand, actual philosophizing; for that reason its cause cannot
be erected on anything on the earth, nor hanging from the sky, but takes
place in the soul in the form of sparks which maintain themselves.48
The soul is the locus o f the action o f philosophizing —philosophy as care for the soul.
Philosophy is thus defined, via Patocka’s reading of Plato, not as the custodian
o f the soul on its journey to a final truth, but as the action o f directing the continual
movement o f the soul by a process o f thinking through questions, or “thinking
questioningly.” Patodka thereby arrives at the final element o f care for the soul: its
effect on our activity. One cares for the soul, then, by a philosophical process directed
by the putting o f questions. “Care for the soul generally takes place by thinking
questioningly .”49 The form of philosophy indicated by care for the soul is one o f
thought-directed motion, continual and without a concrete goal. It “leads man towards a
goal only in the sense that he keeps always in his mind that he continually persist.”50
The goal itself does not exist in any concrete, achievable form. The existence o f such a
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goal would contradict the urge to investigate itself; it would instead become an urge to
find. “[I]n the acceptance of investigation,” Patodka notes, “is a concomitant certainty
that there does not exist any end.”51
Care for the soul, understood in this way, is the origin o f the philosophical idea
that is independent o f systems.52 This characterization o f a philosophy inherently
resistant to any attempt to systematize it, to capture its essence in a replicable plan of
action, seems to imply, however, that it could only with great difficulty serve as a stable
foundation upon which human action and politics could be based. This is, in one sense,
true. Philosophy cannot provide the stability and safety of a concrete, consistent and
unmoving ground under our feet. But, and this goes to the heart o f Patodka’s argument
for a philosophy o f politics, this does not preclude all solidity, all sense o f continuity or
consistency. The argument for a phenomenological philosophy o f movement, based on
an interpretation o f Socrates as a quasi-heretical figure who aimed to shake the
foundations of Greek society rather than set them in concrete, does not condemn the
philosophical endeavor to a conclusion that is nihilistic or a form o f postmodern
relativism. It does not mean that we are unable to speak o f ethics as anything other than
relative to a situation or to our will. Patodka argues precisely to the contrary.53
What this philosophy does preclude is the summation of life into a simple
“truth” based on evidence that is “given” to us in a seemingly self-evident manner. “The
reflecting Socrates, who refutes all those who assume that they have the truth,
concentrates his attack especially on those who assume that they can deduce new rules
o f life from that which is present, from that which is self-evident and given. Just the sort
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o f rules o f life, as that which says it is good to care for one’s own welfare at all cost.”54
Yet this Socratic “attack” is not directed toward a critique o f all solidity in human life.
To the contrary, its exposure o f the naive and the unreflective is directed toward an
illumination o f that which is truly solid and lasting.
In a very real sense, the concept o f the soul and our care for it can act as a
foundation for human comportment. It gives enduring and unified form to that part o f
our being which directs our movement and activity. By the thinking that is at the center
of Patocka’s view o f philosophy, we engage in a process o f “the inner formation o f the
soul itself, formation in something uniformly solid and, in this sense, existing —exactly
because it is engaged in thinking.” Through the process o f care, he continues,
the soul first comes to be what it can be, i.e. a unity, not contradicting
itself, excluding and exorcising all possibility o f dispersing in
contradiction, and thus does it come to dwell in the end in something that
lasts, that is solid. And in the end, everything must be founded upon that
which is solid. Upon this is founded our conduct as good men, and upon
this also our thinking is founded, because only that thinking which
reveals that which is solid, reveals that which is.55
The solidity achieved by caring for the soul consists neither o f an objectively derived
system based on material elements, nor o f a simple, divine being upon whom we can
fall back when we are in doubt. It is, rather, a ground for our conduct based on the fact
that our very being is taken up and formed, unified, by the process that is most distinctly
ours as human beings: the process o f “thinking questioningly” that leads to
understanding. The soul that does not engage in this inner questioning is at the mercy of
the waves o f delight and distress that go hand in hand; the soul that does gains a solid
form against this fate. Care for the soul is an effort to “stand solidly in the tempest o f
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time,” to give to our being a sense of solidity and a connection to that which is not
subject to the caprice o f fortune and fate. And on this basis, it is an effort to find a
consistency in our humanity such that we can direct our own comportment in a way that
transcends time.
M etaphysics and “Negative Platonism ”
Yet to be discussed is perhaps the most important element o f PatoSka’s
interpretation o f Greek philosophy. This is his critique o f metaphysics, which is the
pillar upon which he constructs his interpretation o f Plato, Europe and philosophy. The
basis o f the critique, which he calls a “negative Platonism,” is an argument that the
Socratic “care for the soul” is something fundamentally different from the metaphysical
Platonism from which Western philosophy and science took its lead and to which it has
been indebted since Plato. The Pato£kan critique takes its lead from Heidegger, but
whereas the Heideggerean attempt at a post-metaphysical philosophy rejects Platonic
writings -- including the ethico-political arguments o f the Socratic dialogues —in favor
o f the work o f the pre-Socratics, Patodka focuses on the figure o f Socrates. The Socratic
dialectic, he argues, represents the motive core o f philosophy; it is the living essence o f
what later became metaphysics. “Negative Platonism” is a post-metaphysical approach
to Socrates and Platonism, and it is one o f the major achievements o f his career. The
thesis o f “Negative Platonism” is found in an article o f the same name (along with
several accompanying texts), stemming from the 1950s.56 Though these articles were
not published during Patodka’s lifetime, they represent the philosophical ground upon
which his later interpretation o f Europe, history and politics was able to proceed.
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Pato£ka notes at the beginning o f “Negative Platonism” that there seems to be a
common consensus in philosophical and intellectual circles that the “metaphysical phase
of philosophy has come to an end.” Metaphysics as philosophy is said to be fatally
unclear, a “surpassed, obsolete science,” and little more than a “secularized theology.”57
If a careful analysis is undertaken, however, it can be shown that those philosophies that
trumpet the death o f metaphysics most loudly —positivism and Hegelianism, for
example -- merely take over, rather than dispense with, the fundamental question of
metaphysics, the question o f the whole. These philosophies lead to an integral
humanism that, rather than discarding the problem o f the whole, absorbs it into its own,
anthropocentric perspective on human reality. In spite o f all the resistance to the forms
that metaphysics traditionally assumed in history, this modem humanism “continues to
operate within the matrix set down by this tradition, precisely as a militant opposition to
it.”58
O f what then, PatoCka is prompted to ask by the shortsightedness o f the modem
perspective, is or was metaphysics actually comprised and how does it relate to
philosophy as such? Exactly what it is that is supposed to have died is unclear, he
argues, because the question itself has yet to be posed adequately.59 An examination of
metaphysics begins with the pre-Socratic “protophilosophy,” for, though we lack a good
history o f earliest philosophy, it is clear that here an as yet undifferentiated theory began
to take shape. This theory took on a form distinguishing itself from other forms of
inquiry with the philosopher whom Pato£ka calls “the last representative o f this
primordial form o f thought”: Socrates.60 In recognizing Socrates as a “representative”
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of protophilosophy, Pato£ka is making an argument that is crucial to distinguishing his
work from Heidegger’s. Rather than follow Heidegger back to the pre-Socratic thinkers
and so dismiss the insight o f the dialogues, Pato£ka argues that Socrates is a distinct
figure, one needing to be considered separately from the core o f Platonic writings. The
figure of Socrates, whether or not a historical reality, is distinct in that he represents and
personifies the “philosophical protoknowledge” which offers a pre-metaphysical and
ontological insight into reality.61 Socrates is not to be understood as the tradition sees
him, as “a mere introductory chapter o f Platonism.” Socrates is not a witness for the
humanism that ensued from the classical tradition of metaphysics; to the contrary, he is
opposed to it.62
While separating out Socrates for special consideration, PatoCka agrees with
Heidegger that Plato is the founder o f metaphysics. His thesis departs from Heidegger
with its conviction that the Socratic dialogues and their depiction o f the polis and the
role of the philosopher in it is too insightful to be disregarded. Despite this difference,
Patocka claims to remain in basic agreement with the approach to metaphysics o f which
Heidegger is a representative -- termed the “new” critique of metaphysics. Unlike
humanist philosophy with its attempt to negate metaphysics and deny the relevance of,
as in the case o f positivism, questions about human reality not grounded in quantifiable
fact, this “new” critique recognized the deadening effects o f metaphysical
systematization without negating the genuine insight into humanity, at the core o f the
human desire to look beyond the given, to search for the whole.63 PatoCka’s own
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perspective on metaphysics, notwithstanding its distinctness from the Heideggerean
critique, also claims to reflect this approach. As he puts it,
[t]he purpose o f these reflections is now to show that this new way of
overcoming metaphysics, unlike the older attempts, does not limit itself
to mere negation and does not impoverish humans by taking away any
essential aspect o f their being,... For that very reason, this new way can
understand even metaphysics itself, taking from it, in a purified form, its
essential philosophical thrust and carrying it on.64
It is not a simple rejection o f metaphysics that Patodka is after, but a genuine
understanding of its internal history, its experiential essence and the way in which it
abandoned that essence in attempting to capture it in a system.
Plato is the creator o f metaphysics, yet still he “remains rooted in this
premetaphysical soil”; he shows this through his focus on and description o f Socrates.65
The story o f metaphysics that Patodka traces thus begins with the form o f knowledge
represented by Socrates, contrasted to that later developed primarily by Plato and
Aristotle. Socratic knowledge, o f course, is commonly described as Socratic ignorance,
or, as Patodka notes, as “learned ignorance, that is, as a question.”66 Socrates continually
challenges his interlocutors through questions —questions that skeptically analyze
assertions based on finite knowledge. The finite, earthly knowledge o f particulars
commonly thought to constitute wisdom is shown to be faulty and insufficient. It is
knowledge that relates only to things directly present, and so neglects to relate to the
whole. While the Socratic mode o f questioning directly concerns life as a whole, it is
unable, in keeping with its skeptical nature, to capture the essence o f that whole in
words. This, Socrates knows, is a human impossibility, and he unveils this reality as
“one of the fundamental contradictions o f being human, that between the relation to the
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whole, intrinsic to humans, and the inability, the impossibility o f expressing this
relation in the form o f an ordinary finite knowledge.”67 This self-understanding is
characteristic o f the figure o f Socrates. As Patodka reads him, however, Plato took steps
beyond the limits o f the Socratic model. He did so by laying out a plan for, and setting
as a goal, the transcendence o f this situation o f fundamental uncertainty. In doing so, in
formulating a conception o f ideal forms and considering a means to reach them, Plato,
charges Patocka, laid a groundwork for the development o f a form o f knowledge that is
not uncertain and intangible but objective.
The “premetaphysical soil” mentioned above is far from a secure foundation.
Through questioning, Socrates casts into doubt the naive security o f those with whom
he speaks; he acts so as to “shake” the simple foundation upon which they thought they
stood safely. He conceives o f life as a question without a simple answer —an inherently
unsettling formulation. In contrast to this approach is metaphysics: “[t]he essence of
metaphysics as Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus formulated it consists in offering an
answer to the Socratic (or pre-Socratic) question, one which the philosopher seeks to
derive from the question itself.”68 Plato, as Patodka describes him in this article, took
that step by describing philosophy as not only as a movement transcending the sensible,
but as one seeking to reach the transcendent Being. It was a movement from the
“apparent” to the “real” that took place via a dialectical process, a system by which one
sought the unconditional, the indubitable.69 Patodka locates this movement towards a
metaphysics first in the Platonic conceptualization o f the Ideas and then in the
presentation o f a conceptual systematics, a dialectic “that permitted an ascent from the
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sensible to the suprasensible as well as a descent in the opposite direction.”70 This was,
Patocka argues, “the first adumbration of a positive (rationalistic) metaphysics” that not
only contributed to a philosophy o f metaphysics, but to positive science as well,
offering a paradigmatic example o f a “conceptual systematics” from which Western
science took its lead.71 It was a movement towards a positive form o f knowledge distinct
from the negative, skeptical approach o f Socrates. What was ignorance becomes a form
of knowing, “a true knowledge more secure than anything on earth and in the
heavens.”72
This development changes the face o f the fledgling project o f philosophy at its
very outset. Both Plato and Aristotle, Patodka notes, moved from a conception o f the
Idea as “rigorously transcendent” to a consideration of “mundane, astronomic
hierarchies.” The results o f this movement towards ideal being, towards an absolute
form o f knowledge and a solid, stable foundation upon which humanity can rest and
from which it can take comfort, are summed up by Patodka in no uncertain terms:
Finally, human comportment, the meaning o f human life, too, receives

its formation from ideal being. The integrity of human life is broken.
Man becomes one o f the beings ruled by ideas; ethics and politics as a
grand unity take on the task o f discovering the inner ideal law o f a
humanly perfect life. Thus all these metaphysical disciplines, bequeathed
to us by the inspired protooriginators and preserved for us by a long
tradition, manifest the fundamental substitution of a transcendent,
nonexistent Being for the perennial existents [beings], a substitution
bound up with the crucial conception of what-is [beings as a whole] as
perennial. Thus the living force o f transcendence is replaced by an image
o f reality which may be harmonious, “spiritual,” but is rigid and lifeless;
so in place o f the living reality o f Socrates' struggle against the
degeneration o f life we now have the imitation o f the eternal world of
Ideas. The absolute claim o f truth now appears guaranteed by an
invincible conceptual system and actualized in the form o f the perfect
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state. The Idea, the source o f absolute truth, becomes at the same time
the source o f all that is and o f all life within it.73
Politics and ethics reflect this substitution o f the static for the motive, the concrete for
the intangible, as much as does philosophy itself. The striving for the perfect state, for
perfection on earth, is directly related to the positing o f what is essentially a concrete
and eternal world o f Ideas, the notion being that no activity is more worthy o f man than
the attempt to replicate that perfection.
Despite his critique o f Plato, Pato£ka’s goal here is still to illuminate a
“Platonism.” What Plato has done is to conceptualize a ground, a soil, from which
metaphysical thinking could spring. He did not construct a philosophy that could stand
solidly on that ground. There is much in the Platonic corpus to make clear that the
metaphysical problem had not in any way been resolved, and Patodka recognizes this
fact clearly. It is for this reason, in the end, that he shifts much o f responsibility for the
project o f metaphysics onto the shoulders o f the more systematic and scientific
approach taken by Aristotle. It is Aristotle who becomes the standard, the
“philosopher,” who inspires Western philosophy as well as science. The result is that
“the attempt to build a science o f the absolute, objective, and positive whole crowds out
all other motifs and becomes the point of contention for the next two millennia.”74
Modem humanist thinking, as I have noted, tended to replicate anthropologically
the goal o f “a global understanding of the whole” embodied in metaphysics even as it
decried metaphysics itself. It was not until the relatively recent, twentieth-century
attempts to dominate social reality on the basis o f a radical humanism, however, that
this form o f thought, newly emboldened by advances in technology, came to its fully
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mature form.75 M odem politics, which Pato£ka describes as embodying a “rule o f
Force,” is grounded in this anthropocentric transformation o f metaphysics.76
At the heart o f Socratic teaching was an experience o f freedom that Patodka
seeks to illuminate. It began with the oracle’s injunction to “know thyself.” In the
understanding o f logical positivism, Patodka points out, this would mean looking only
to “external experience” to fulfill this requirement. The injunction itself, however, urges
us to understand, not only the experience we have, but the experience we are.77 In the
case o f Socrates, the experience that we are is the experience o f freedom. Socratic
knowledge (or ignorance) is absolutely free; the philosopher frees himself from the
material and objective limitations to which his interlocutors remain bound and can thus
master them in the course o f the dialectic.
He could not be that masterful contestant if he were not wholly free, if he

were bound to something finite in heaven or on earth. Socrates’ mastery
is based on an absolute freedom; he is constantly freeing himself of all
the bonds o f nature, or tradition, o f others’ schemata as well as o f his
own, o f all physical and spiritual possessions. That is an immensely
audacious philosophy.78
It is a philosophy characterized not only by its audacity but by its freedom. This is the
experience articulated by the character o f Socrates in the dialogues. It is “negative” in
the sense that, rather than positing some positive content, it takes on “the negative
character o f a distance, o f a remove, of an overcoming o f every objectivity.”
Establishing a distance from the concrete and positive objects o f the world enables one
to view them, for the first time, in the context o f the whole.79 The experience of freedom
enables one to make decisions from a perspective o f some remove, which is a
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perspective o f clarity. In articulating this “negative” experience o f transcending the
objective realm through freedom, Socrates does not enter into metaphysics.
Patodka contrasts what he has described as a “positive” Platonism with his own
interpretation o f Socratic freedom, a freedom that presumes a gap, or a “fundamental
separation between Ideas and our reality” that in no way seeks to, or is able to, be
bridged. This is what he calls “negative Platonism,” a non-metaphysical interpretation
of Platonic philosophy that will serve as a basis for a more authentic approach to human
experience. Negative Platonism bases itself, not on metaphysics, but on the historical
experience o f human beings:
The interpretation o f our human experience, the experience o f historical

beings, is something in principle different from metaphysics. While
metaphysics discovers a new universe, taking it as its starting point and
transcending it, the interpretation o f experience discovers, uncovers,
sheds light on this, our given life-world, uncovering what had been
hidden in it, its concealed meaning, its intrinsic structure, its internal
drama.80
Negative Platonism, Patodka maintains, is an approach to mankind’s historical reality
that is neither metaphysical nor an anthropocentric humanism. It is not, however, a
rejection o f the experience of transcendent reality. To the contrary, Patodka seeks to
“preserve” this experience -- the abiding essence within metaphysics to which
traditional metaphysics refers. Humanity’s yearning for a transcendent reality is not an
irrational folly, and the goal here is to understand this desire and to explain its source in
human experience —to explain why “the human spirit returns to metaphysics ever
again,.. .in spite o f its being indefensible, even meaningless from the standpoint of
objective rationality.”81
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Negative Platonism presents itself as a philosophy that is in the “precarious
position” of not having anything to lean against for support. It is an attempt at
understanding Western philosophy that affirms the experience o f transcendence, but not
as a distinct realm with positive contents. It argues that, in a certain sense, humans are
subject to both a degree o f relativity determined by context, and certainty determined by
the truth of man’s search for something that transcends his own particular objective
context.
[Negative Platonism] preserves for humans the possibility o f trusting in a

truth that is not relative and mundane, even though it cannot be
formulated positively, in terms of contents. It shows how much truth
there is in man’s perennial metaphysical struggle for something elevated
above the natural and the traditional, the struggle for the eternal and the
supratemporal, in the struggle, taken up ever again, against a relativism
of values and norms —even while agreeing with the idea o f a basic
historicity o f man and o f the relativity o f his orientation in his context, of
his science and practice, his images of life and the world.82
Negative Platonism interprets and affirms ancient philosophy in light of the insights o f
twentieth-century phenomenology and phenomenological ontology. It is not a “new”
philosophy so much as an attempt to understand what we have, what makes up the fiber
of European civilization.
The Idea, The Good, and the T ruth
Patocka’s philosophy, despite the appeal to Socrates, proceeds from a
contemporary philosophical perspective. Yet it relies on the language of classicism, a
reliance that leads one to question whether a claim for a non-metaphysical philosophy
can be sustained while one speaks o f a “life in truth” and a movement towards “good.”
Patodka insists that these symbolizations are intrinsic to philosophy by virtue o f their
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reflection o f the human experience o f reality, yet his own philosophical perspective
precludes the argument that they refer to objective essences, that they are in any way
concrete or tangible. While contemporary theorists are often willing to dismiss any text
that relies on such terminology as hopelessly traditional, Patodka wishes to persuade us
that these concepts can and must be understood nontraditionally, that is,
non-metaphysically. If he is unable to do so, his own work will not succeed: it will face
cursory dismissal by postmodern thinkers at the same time as it is viewed with
suspicion by traditionalists for its reliance on Heidegger. The text o f “Negative
Platonism” presents an example o f this mode o f interpretation as it examines the
concept of the “Idea” in some detail, demonstrating that it can be understood differently
than the historical understanding o f the Platonic Idea. Along with the “Idea,” I will look
at Patocka’s use o f the concepts o f the “good” and “truth.”
Patodka’s concept o f the Idea, based upon but carefully distinguished from that
o f the Platonic Idea, is prominent in Patodka’s early work. Already in 1946, in an article
entitled “Ideology and Life in the Idea,” the concept is presented as something
fundamentally nonobjective, as a symbol to represent the essence o f the philosophical
perspective. Significantly, it is presented as inherently connected to politics, with both
Socialism and Fascism described as degradations o f the logic o f the Idea into ideology.
The Idea, Patodka writes in this short essay, is that of human freedom.83
It is not until “Negative Platonism” in 1953, however, that Patodka makes a
concerted effort to explain this conclusion, that is, the conception o f the Idea that does
not refer to any tangible object. He again seeks help from Heidegger, here, referring to
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the Greek term chorismos, used in Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics to refer
to a separation between ideas and reality. In Patodka’s understanding, which leads to a
distinctly different conclusion than Heidegger’s, chorismos does not refer to the kind o f
separation or gap one might imagine. It is not a gap between two realms o f objects, a
gap that begs to be bridged:
[cjhorismos meant originally a separateness without a second object

realm. It is a gap that does not separate two realms coordinated or linked
by something third that would embrace them both and so would serve as
the foundation of both their coordination and their separation. Chorismos
is a separateness, a distinctness an sich, an absolute one, for itself.84
Chorismos denotes an insuperable distance between reality as it is directly present to us,
as objective and tangible, and transcendent reality. It is, one might say, the sense that we
are not limited to the objective, that our being can reach beyond the objects o f our
present vision and broaden its experience o f reality. It implies the sense o ffreedom that
is inherent to all spiritual experience:
the mystery o f the chorismos is like the experience o f freedom, an

experience o f a distance with respect to real things, o f a meaning
independent o f the objective and the sensory which we reach by
inverting the original, “natural” orientation o f life, an experience o f a
rebirth, o f a second birth, intrinsic to all spiritual life, familiar to the
religious, to the initiates o f the arts, and, not least, to philosophers.85
Chorismos, then, is a symbol o f freedom. It is also the symbol of the Idea, for the Idea is
not an object, present or transcendent, but instead the very notion that one can free
oneself from the power of objectivity.
The understanding o f transcendence as Patodka is developing it here is crucial as
well to the contention that man is a historical being. In thinking historically, one is
projecting beyond the present into the past and, perhaps, the future. Historical man
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escapes the bonds o f the present and brings into relevance a present that, so to speak,
does not exist because it is past. The historian, as well as man as a historical being, is
capable o f distinguishing between that which is present and that which is no longer
present. This is, Patodka argues, the very power o f freeing oneself from the present that
is implicit in the Idea. “A historical being,” he writes,
leans on the past, using it to open up the horizon o f the given, with its
help overcoming the given and the present. He can do that, however,
only if the power o f dissociation is available to him, the power o f
dissociation from mere givenness and presence, the power o f liberation
from the purely objective and given -- in Platonic usage, that is, the
power o f the Idea.86
The essence o f the Platonic Idea, then, is akin to the freedom to reach beyond the given
to embrace even that which is not there in front of us. This understanding o f freedom is
applied politically as in both the aforementioned critique o f ideology and, as we shall
see in the following chapters, in a broader critique o f the pursuit of politics as a
technology, as a political program that abandons freedom for the surety achieved when
one restricts oneself to manipulating the given.87
In phenomenology, a thing in general or “as a whole” is necessarily
transcendent to its perception.88 Patodka’s phenomenological philosophy draws
significantly upon this insight; it argues through the lens o f classical Greek philosophy
that European civilization is, or was, characterized by the recognition that life is fully
human only to the extent that it can recognize those values, that sense o f the whole, that
explicitly transcend the objects o f our present perception, our simply given experience
—that we refuse to allow ourselves to be captive to the materially, directly given. This
insight is, according to Patodka, encapsulated in the notion of the Idea. “Thus the Idea,”
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he writes, “is the pure supraobjective call o f transcendence.”*9 It is in no way an object
but rather a “deobjectifying power”90 —the singular human ability to perceive the
transcendental and to act upon it, thereby preserve the possibility o f a life in truth.
Patodka contends that his analysis o f the Platonic Idea is crucial to his
application o f philosophy to the social and political realms. The Platonic Idea developed
so as to present itself to man positively, as an absolute ideal in which he can participate.
It became something obtainable and mankind, uniquely capable o f obtaining it, was thus
challenged to demonstrate this uniqueness by dominating his world. Understood in this
way, “positive” Platonism urged man to conceive o f himself as a being without limits, a
being capable o f anything, unrestricted. This is precisely the self-understanding,
Patocka argues, that has resulted in a politics o f force, in “the twentieth-century as
war.”91 Because o f its importance, the relevant text deserves to be cited at length:
The Idea, as we understand it, is not the power of absolute objectification

—as the historic Plato’s Idea promises to be. As the absolute object,
Plato’s Idea is a challenge to man to place himself at the center o f the
universum and to dominate it, the way he finally does dominate the entire
intelligible and sensible cosmos through the Idea, through participation
in the ideal universum. This tendency o f Platonic metaphysics did not
have its full effect and flowering in Plato’s own philosophy or in
antiquity and the Middle Ages since there it was still blanketed by the
overall mythical or theological orientation o f the men o f the time.
Modem metaphysics, however, with its anthropologism and its will to
total supremacy o f men over object beings, with its naturalism,
constructivism (technicism), and will to power represents the full
unfolding of a tendency which is potentially present already here. By
contrast, Platonism as we here interpret it shows forth not only man’s
dignity but also the limits he cannot transcend. It approves the rule
humans are instituting over object being but shows that man’s calling is
not so to rule but to serve. It shows that there is something higher than
man, something to which human existence is indissolubly bound and
without which the most basic wellsprings o f our historical life dry up.92
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Here, in the early 1950s and in a text inspired by a critique o f positive metaphysics, we
have an example o f the very language later used by Patodka to justify the grounds upon
which the human rights protest Charter 77 was founded —language appealing to
something that is “higher” than both man and his government, something that limits
man morally and reigns in his desire to rule. Whereas in the texts o f Charter 77 Patocka
appears to be speaking in metaphysical (Kantian) terms, urging the communist
government to bow down before an objective morality that stands over them, here in
“Negative Platonism” and throughout his discussion o f “care for the soul” he is adamant
in declaring that his negative Platonic philosophy is inherently “deobjectifying.” This
philosophy rejects the notion o f a higher objectivity, a higher Being that defines our
limits for us. It is instead the power o f transcendence that limits us, the power o f our
ability to transcend the present, objective realm, to see beyond objectivity altogether and
thereby take account o f the inherently nonobjective world as a whole. With this
argument, to which I will return in the following chapters, the groundwork is laid for an
explicit approach to human ethics and, indirectly, to politics.
In addition to the concept o f the Idea, the reader also encounters the terms
“good” and “truth,” used in ways that appear metaphysical. Yet Patodka makes clear
that they are to be understood not as objective values or entities, but in terms o f the
movements of life and the openness to the world as a whole that are at the center o f
Patodka’s philosophical perspective. In “Eternity and Historicity,” a work from the
1950s belonging to the cycle o f “Negative Platonism” texts and only recently published
in Czech, Patodka notes that the Socratic question concerns the “good.” What, if any,
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content, we have to ask, is contained in this concept? In asking after the good, Patodka
contends, Socrates is seeking the “single, universal fundamental goal of human life.”93 It
is an intense and specific question that has, regrettably, lost its relevance over time.
Now it is commonplace to hear one ask in the broadest terms about the meaning of life;
but this is a far cry from the question posed by Socrates. How, then, should the original
question be understood?
This question in its original Socratic intensity means: what is the goal in
life which is not itself directed as a means to any other goal? Where is
the unity to which it is possible to subordinate one’s whole life to the end
and without exceptions? And to this question Socrates himself has no
positive answer, he rather admits that he does not know.94
For the philosopher, there is no positive answer to this question. What we do receive
from Socrates, expressed through his actions, is “care for the soul.” This becomes, then,
the Socratic answer to the question of the good, o f the goal o f life. “Philosophy as the
care for the soul is the Socratic answer to the Socratic question.”95
The good as care for the soul is not a positive answer to the Socratic question,
for care for the soul is not a positive, objective thing, but rather a human movement
directed toward a growth in human being itself. There is no reference to an objectivity
situated in the heavens or on earth. The good as care for the soul refers instead to a mere
possibility in human life, yet it is a possibility that is solid and intrinsic to human
existence. As I noted earlier, the existence o f the good as the goal o f movement is
meaningful only insofar as there is such movement, only insofar as, by moving towards
the good, something is effecting a heightening o f its being.96 In this regard, it is quite
clear that the good is no solid object or value, existing and unchanging regardless of
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human attention or indifference to it. It is inherently related to human action, to a
turning o f the human and a movement that is not arbitrary or related to our desires, but
is a result o f the active nurturing of the soul, the upward formation o f our being. This
reflects the reality o f our soul, that it not only is, but must also be cared for or formed.
This process o f caring for the soul, of moving towards the good, is something
the human being must undertake in his or her own life. It cannot be encapsulated in a
few simple rules for living; life is not, as the Sophists understood it, a technical
problem. It is not possible to live well in the same way as it is possible, say, to be a
good shoemaker.97 And so, “for this reason Socrates also cannot in his own sense
preach, as (based on misunderstanding) Xenophon's Socrates does; for Socrates does
not have any dogma which he could recommend to people, and no positive moral
teachings which could be translated into recipes for life; his work is to wake people to
their own being, to their own essence.”98 As formulated by traditional metaphysics, the
good receives objective form such that it can indeed be translated into dogma or
“recipes” for living. But for Patodka the good has no such form. Instead, it takes shape
as people are awakened to the possibilities of their lives, as they come to be aware o f the
potential of their humanity. Socrates moves toward the good as he wakes himself and
wakes others to their own being.
Negative Platonism, just as it rejects objectified versions of the Idea and the
good, also rejects an objectification o f a single, eternal truth. The contours o f that
“negative” Platonic version o f truth are discussed in a companion article to “Negative
Platonism” entitled “The Problem o f Truth from the Perspective of Negative
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Platonism.” This essay begins with a description o f the problem o f truth, which is said
to be “from the beginning the basic question o f philosophy,” and the various ways in
which it has been interpreted in the modem world.99 It concludes that the problem not
only has not been solved, it has not even been adequately framed. In framing the
question from the point o f view o f negative Platonism, Patodka notes that truth is “finite
truth,” in that it is “the truth o f a finite being.”100 Finite truth is revealed to finite beings
in the course of history, in the problematic process o f making sense out of human life.
Truth has a foundation, however, just as the human ability to make sense o f life
is not an arbitrary work o f man but is grounded. This foundation, which Patodka
describes not as “finite” but as “absolute,” comes to man in his relation to the Idea. Our
relation to the Idea, recalling “Negative Platonism,” is our relation to the ability o f man
to distance himself, or free himself, from the hold o f objective beings. This relation to
the Idea is the relation o f truth, and thus a further formulation o f the concept results:
“truth is that which frees man and that which is therefore far from being a work o f man,
to the contrary, it forms man.”101 Though truth is finite, it is not a creation o f man. Truth
is embedded in human freedom, and the call o f freedom is a call to truth. Only through
free action, Patodka explains, can we hope to see things clearly and thus act truthfully in
relation to them. Freedom is not a guarantee o f truth, but it is nevertheless its source:
Freedom, which forever withdraws us from objectivity and by whose

power we always exist partially beyond the reach o f reality, which is thus
at the source o f the most varied illusions and errors, is nevertheless also
the source o f all truth; for without it there is no distance towards reality,
and so also clarity about it, except for the immediate functioning of
instinctive signals and conformative reactions.102
137
The call o f truth, then, is first a call to freedom. It also represents, though, an openness
to the possibility o f error. It is an invitation to uncertainty and is therefore grounded in
risk. Metaphysics, to the contrary, attempts to provide life with the certainty that it
otherwise lacks. It gives to mankind a transcendent foundation that is objective and so
acts as a palliative to the anxiety we are heir to as human.103
In contrasting his own perspective with that o f metaphysics, Patodka comes to a
further attempt to narrow the understanding o f truth. It is not and can never be
something solid and simple, requiring neither deliberation nor decision. Truth is not
something we can easily get hold of, and even less something that we can carry around
with us in security. Rather, it is an elusive and disproportionate component o f our active
lives, present when we act in freedom, when we “turn” from error and decline and begin
an ascent in our lives.
From the fact that truth is disproportion -- that it’s never given and, if
passively received or spontaneously offered in ready form, can never be
other than a treacherous fa ta morgana —results the unstableness and
precariousness o f truth. It cannot actually “be” — it is nothing defined,
definite (only in the form o f its always relative and inadequate
expression), but is rather defining. We always lag behind truth, always
guiltily, and it exists for us only in the form o f a turn [my emphasis], an
attempt at focusing, in the form of a reaction against the mistake, error,
decline, into which we are absorbed in our original passivity.104
The truth o f metaphysics claims to be present whether we are active or passive, whether
we reach out and seek it or not. Thinking non-metaphysically, truth is seen as relating to
our own activity and movement in life, to our actively seeking a heightening o f our
being. Truth is not a defined and given constant, but neither is it simply a matter o f our
138
arbitrary will. We do not create truth, but are formed by it, just as we are formed by our
relationship to freedom.
Patodka’s search for good and truth without recourse to metaphysics is an
exceptionally difficult, some might say impossible, task. In the final chapter o f this
study, after a consideration o f the politics o f this philosophy, I will consider Patodka’s
attempt in greater detail. With regard to his phenomenological treatment o f Greek
philosophy, however, one important objection must be dealt with immediately. This is
the objection that Socrates cannot and should not be distinguished from the later
Platonic corpus, that he, too, was engaged in plainly metaphysical speculation about
good and truth. The substance o f this objection argues that Patodka’s “negative”
Platonic interpretation of Socrates is misplaced, for Socrates was in fact searching for a
new and undiscovered good that underlies all relative goods. With his insistence upon
moral consistency and a “life in truth,” this objection goes, Jan Patodka represents the
same metaphysical lineage that he claims to be circumnavigating. Focusing on Socrates
instead o f on Plato as a whole does not acquit one o f the charge o f being metaphysical,
for the line o f demarcation between them is a false one (or at least Patodka does not
succeed in drawing it convincingly). Socrates, and so also the Patodkan theory based
upon his mode of understanding, is engaged in a search for an undiscovered “other
world” that must be considered a metaphysical construction.
Responding to this critique, Patodka defends Socrates and thereby his own
interpretation. Socrates is simply not engaged in such an abstract venture. He is
concerned not with discovering something new, such as the metaphysical essence of
139
good, but rather something old: the meaning o f the concrete good with which we deal in
our daily lives. The critique, Patodka writes, “misses that which Socrates really wants
and to which he dedicates his untiring activity. Socrates’ question first gets its true
meaning at the point when it is not a question seeking after something new, but after the
true sense o f the old, after the true meaning o f all the good which has always occurred
in life.”105 Socrates is seeking, in this conception, an understanding o f phenomena that
he knows must be transcended in order to be understood. The transcendence that
Socrates effects is a skeptical one, contrary to the assumption o f the critical view that it
is and must be a transcendence toward a metaphysical foundation. It is achieved by
establishing a certain distance from the particular and material aspects o f the
phenomena and examining them in that light. In that process, the object o f
contemplation will be viewed freely and without distortion, and so will be more open to
human understanding. Socrates does not seek a new good, but the meaning o f the good
that we encounter in daily life.
The Socratic mode o f life leaves us with uncertainty, but it does not leave us
aimless. Socrates is not searching for a new certainty in the heavens because he knows
that such a search, rather than increasing our self-understanding, instead distorts it. He
argues that in place o f that metaphysical certainty there is a human consistency
grounded in the way in which we act and the way in which we interrogate reality.
Rejecting metaphysical certainty is a vital decision, for it appears to leave us defenseless
and without security, but in actual fact it offers us a unity and a security o f a different,
particularly human form.
140
Socrates consequently refutes presumed certainty and at the sam e time
invites a persistence, a continuity in this fundamental decision o f vital
importance. This work points toward an unheard o f inner unity and vital
concentration: so that even when there isn’t a positive, general and
content-related answer, still the question itself, if abided to, a s untiring
activity effects in man that after which he asks.106
Rather than destroying continuity, this skeptical mode of being opens us to a life that is
truly human, for it is a life that aims toward an ever-increasing understanding o f itself
and its world, the natural world with which it interacts. And it is this “inner unity” and
“continuity” that forms the basis for action geared toward the establishment o f ethical
and political order in human life, as we shall see in the following chapters.
Patodka’s defense against this critique, which is an interpretation o f the person
o f Socrates based on the Platonic dialogues, is convincing. The alternative to which the
critique o f this position leads, setting up a dichotomy between metaphysics and
non-foundationalism such that the only available options with regard to truth and the
good are abstract constructs on one hand and a total relativism on the other, is
impermissible. If our own experience o f reality is a guide there must be an alternative
approach, and Patocka’s phenomenological interpretation of Greek thought makes
precisely this attempt. The larger question o f foundationalism, however, o f the need for
some concrete basis upon which to make moral judgments and o f the ability of
phenomenological insight to respond to this dilemma, must be examined even more
explicitly in Patodka’s work. So it is to politics and history that we m ust turn, following
Patodka himself, to seek some conclusion to this philosophical and political story that
moves agilely between and among contemporary phenomenological and ontological
philosophy and ancient Greek thought.
141
I have sought to show, in this chapter, that the character o f Patodka’s
interpretation of classical philosophy, expressed most directly in his formulations o f
care for the soul and negative Platonism, is such as to offer a compelling, contemporary
alternative to the rejection o f classicism in much o f the thought influenced by
Heidegger. PatoCka’s engagement with Greek thought is a positive engagement, despite
the fact that it takes place in an anti-metaphysical context. What it shows is that there is
a distinct difference between the essence o f metaphysics, the impulse to transcend the
objective, and the systematization o f metaphysics that abandons its own essence and
takes on an objective form itself. The figure o f Socrates, far from representing as
Nietzsche would have it the degradation o f philosophy, is the epitome of this difference.
Pato£ka shows that philosophy, the quest for reason in the full light o f its
classical symbolism, not only is possible in the wake o f metaphysics, it takes on its full
meaning only when it rejects a facile reliance on metaphysics in favor of a return to the
negative insight and uncertainty o f life as care for the soul. This classical symbolism, in
turn, is shown to refer to an ontological self-interestedness, to a movement toward a
heightening o f one’s being and a realization o f its possibilities. It is a forward
movement, yet not a movement toward a concrete, transcendental goal. Human
movement toward the good is, in PatoCka’s formulation, movement in total ignorance o f
any final goal. And yet it is characterized by a consistency, a degree of certainty that the
results o f a mode o f living that examines reality rather than accepts it as given will be an
increase, not a decrease, in harmony and excellence. As Pato£ka puts it, “[o]n the basis
o f this ignorance o f the final goal, which explicates itself in continual questioning and
142
examination, there appears the possibility o f a just life, harmonious and concentrated;
there appears a life with an avoidance o f mistakes, a life as it should be, a life with its
specific arete, its perfection.”107
In Chapters Two and Three I have set forth the groundwork on which Pato£ka
will attempt to engage the reality o f human historical and political existence. It is via his
interpretation o f the phenomenological and ontological work o f Husserl and Heidegger
and his application of this interpretation to classical thought and the figure o f Socrates
that Patodka is able to offer the philosophy o f history and politics that is found in his
Heretical Essays on the Philosophy o f History and other late writings. It is with this in
mind that I will proceed, in the following chapter, to an analysis o f Patodka’s
philosophy o f history and its focus on the institution o f the polis and the place o f ethics
therein.
E nd Notes
'See, for example, Plato’s discussion of the “divided line” in The Republic,
5 10A-51IE. Great Dialogues o f Plato, trans. W.H.D. Rouse (New York: Penguin
Books, 1984), 310-311.
2Patocka, “Negative Platonism,” 205.
3Plato, “Apology,” in Great Dialogues o f Plato, 27D-29E, 436.
4See Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) 179-88. Patodka’s thought is dominated by
the phenomenologically inspired refusal o f abstract theory as interfering in the direct
and true experience o f a particular phenomenon. For a phenomenon to be examined free
of distortion, we must abstain from speculation about it, simply let it appear. Starting
from this phenomenological principle, it was but a short step for Patoika to the critique
of metaphysics offered by Heidegger —the contention that all of European thought
since Plato suffers from the distortion wrought by metaphysics, the systematization of
Platonic thought into ideal essences serving as objective, transcendental models for
earthly phenomena.
143
sNone o f these texts have as yet appeared in English translation, although a
translation o f Plato and Europe is being prepared by Stanford University Press. Europe
and the Post-European Age and Plato and Europe have recently been published in the
Czech volume Pece o dusi II, the 2nd volume o f PatoCka’s collected works, published in
1999 by OIKOYMENH publishers and the Jan Pato£ka Archive. In addition to these
texts, the four published volumes o f PatoCka’s university lectures on Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle and the Presocratics during the years 1945-49 also belong in the category of
significant texts on Greek philosophy.
6See Husserl, “The Vienna Lecture,” 276-277.
7Pato6ka, Platon a Evropa (Plato and Europe), in Sebrane Spisy Jana Patocky,
sv. 2 (The Collected Works o f Jan Pato£ka, vol. 2), Pece o dusi II: Soubor stall a
prednasek o postavenl cloveka ve svete a v dejinach (Care for the Soul II: A Collection
o f Articles and Lectures on the Position o f Man in the World and in History), eds. Ivan
Chvatik and Pavel Kouba (Prague: OIKUMENE, 1999), 149 [Hereafter Plato and
Europe].
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Patocka, “Filosofie vychovy” (Philosophy of Education), in Pece o dusi I, 367.
uSee, e.g., Patoika’s “Filosofie vychovy” (Philosophy o f Education) in Pece o

dusi 1, 434; this is the same phrase that Vaclav Havel has made famous as a symbol for
his own “antipolitical” approach to politics. See Vaclav Havel, “Politics and
Conscience” and “The Power o f the Powerless,” in Open Letters, (London: Faber and
Faber, 1991).
I2See Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 125-45.
,3For the discussion o f truth as freedom, see Patocka, “Problem pravdy z

hlediska negativniho platonismu” (The Problem of Truth from the Perspective of
Negative Platonism), in Pece o dusi 1,460; Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence o f
Truth,” in Basic Writings, 115-38. Heidegger writes that “The openness o f comportment
as the inner condition o f the possibility o f correctness is grounded in freedom. The
essence o f truth is freedom.” Ibid., 123.
14PatoCka, “Nadcivilizace a jeji vnitfrn konflikt” (Super-civilization and its Inner

Conflict), in Pece o dusi I, 289.
144
I5Pato£ka, Plato and Europe, 227.
16Ibid., 313.
l7Ibid.
l8Ibid., 159.
I9Ibid., 156.
20Ibid., 157.
2‘See essay six of Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History, entitled “Wars
o f the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War.”
22Patocka, Plato and Europe, 228. As a contrast to Pato£ka’s approach, see Eric
Voegelin’s multi-volume Order and History, in which the author conducts an equally
in-depth analysis of Judaism and Christianity in regard to the source o f conceptions o f
order in the Western world. Voegelin’s work may be instrumental for those seeking a
fuller explication o f the roots o f the European spirit than that which PatoCka offers.
23PatoCka, Plato and Europe, 159-160.
24Ibid., 177.
25Ibid., 162.
26See ibid.
27Ibid., 181.
28Ibid., 180.
29Pato£ka, Plato and Europe, 180.
30PatoCka, Europe and the Post-European Age, 30.
31PatoCka, Plato and Europe, 181.
32 See Heidegger, Being and Time, I. 6, 225-241.
33Jacques Derrida, The Gift o f Death, 13. See also Plato, “Phaedo,” in Great
Dialogues o f Plato, 484-485.
145
’•‘Tucker, Fenomenologie a politika, 54.
35Pato£ka, Heretical Essays, 105.
36PatoCka, Plato and Europe, 172.
37PatoCka, Ctyri seminare k problemu Evropy (Four Seminars on the Problem of

Europe), in Pece o dusi, Sv. 3. Soubor stati, prednasek a poznamek k problematice
postaveni cloveka ve svete a v dejinach (Care for the Soul, Vol. 3: Collection o f Essays
and Notes on the Problems of the Situation o f Man in the World and in History),
(samizdat), (Prague: Jan Patodka Archive, Center for Theoretical Study, 1988) 319.
38See Chapter Two, above, pp. 72-75.
39Patocka, Sokrates, eds. Ivan Chvatik and Pavel Kouba (Prague: Statm
pedagogicke nakladatelstvi, 1991), 109.
40Plato, Phaedrus 245C-E, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff

(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995), 29-30.
“ PatoCka, Europe and the Post-European Age, 72.
42Ibid., 72-73.
43See Chapters three and four o f “Plato and Europe” for a discussion of the
relationship between myth and philosophy. On Greek tragedy, see Sokrates, 19-23.
“ Ibid., 51.
45See Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R.

Boyce Gibson (London: Collier MacMillen Publishers, 1962), 48-50.
46Patocka, Plato and Europe, 197.
47Patocka, Europe and the Post-European Age, 68.
48Ibid„ 69.
50Pato5ka, Europe and the Post-European Age, 67.
5lIbid.
146
53See the discussion o f ethics on pp. 276-281, below.
“ Ibid., 224.
55Ibid.
56See “Negativni platonismus,” “VgCnost a dfcjinnost” (Eternity and Historicity),

and “Problem pravdy z hlediska negativmho platonismu” (The Problem of Truth from
the Perspective o f Negative Platonism), in Pece o dusi I, (Care fo r the Soul, vol. I).
57Pato£ka, “Negative Platonism,” 175.
“ Ibid., 178.
“ Ibid., 175.
“ Ibid., 179-180. In referring to “protophilosophy,” Pato£ka has in mind such

pre-Socratic philosophers as Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Pythagoreans.
61As to the question o f whether Socrates was a historical reality, Patodka writes:
“Whether Socrates the philosopher is a literary myth or a historical reality -- personally,
I continue to favor the second possibility —it seems certain that in the figure of Socrates
we have before us, in Plato’s writings, a special active, anthropologically oriented
version o f this philosophical protoknowledge.” Ibid.. In addition, a chapter o f PatoCka’s
volume o f university lectures on Socrates bears the title “What we know about
Socrates’s life,” and consists o f a detailed reconstruction o f ancient references to
Socrates, further demonstrating the conviction that Socrates was in fact a historical
character. See Patocka, Sokrates.
62Pato£ka, “Eternity and Historicity,” in Pece o dusi I, (Care fo r the Soul, vol. I),
142 .
63The basic outline o f this critique of metaphysics, Pato£ka argues, emerged

separately and for different reasons in two disparate disciplines, theology and the
philosophy o f existence, and precisely at the time when anthropocentric humanism was
reaching its height. It arose in theology “seeking to free itself from the metaphysical and
so also the anthropological habit,” and in existentialism “insofar as it [was] an
expression o f a revolt against anthropologism, against integral humanism.” Patodka,
“Negative Platonism,” 188.
“ Ibid.
147
65Ibid., 180.
“ Ibid.
67Ibid.
“ Ibid., 181.
“ Ibid., 195.
70Ibid. In Plato, see, for example, the discussion o f the “divided line” in The
Republic 508E-51 IE.
71Ibid.
72Ibid.
73Ibid., 182. Note: in those instances where the translator, Erazim Kohak, uses
the terms “existents” and “what-is” to refer to different forms o f the Czech “jsoucno, ” I
have noted the alternate translation o f “beings” or “beings as a whole.” See footnote 83
in Chapter Two.
74Ibid.
7SIbid., 188.
76Patocka, Heretical Essays, 117.
78Ibid., 180.
79Ibid., 196.
80Ibid., 197.
81Ibid.
82Ibid., 205-6.
83Pato£ka, “Ideology and Life in the Idea,” trans. Eric Manton, Report o f the
Center fo r Theoretical Study, CTS-96-09, (Prague: Center for Theoretical Study, 1996).
^Patodka, “Negative Platonism,” 198. The reference to a chorismos draws upon
148
Heidegger’s analysis in hisv4/i Introduction to Metaphysics, 106. This analysis, which is
brief and dismissive of the Platonic experience, forms the basis for much o f “Negative
Platonism.” Heidegger writes that via Platonism,
[a] chasm, chorismos, was created between the merely apparent essent
here below and real being somewhere on high. In that chasm Christianity
settled down, at the same time reinterpreting the lower as the created and
the higher as the creator. These refashioned weapons it turned against
antiquity (as paganism) and so disfigured it. Nietzsche was right in
saying that Christianity is Platonism for the people.
Unlike Heidegger, Patodka discerns an important difference between Socrates and later
Platonism and so interprets the chorismos differently. For PatoCka, the chorismos does
not represent metaphysics (Heidegger) but freedom. Heidegger, via his analysis o f the
chorismos and the separation o f being, or Idea, from appearance, is led to a distinction
between being and thinking. Here the contrast with Pato£ka is strongest, for Heidegger
finds this distinction to represent the spirit o f the West, and he stands against it. “In the
seemingly unimportant distinction between being and thinking we must discern the
fundamental position o f the Western spirit, against which our central attack is directed.”
(117)
85Ibid., 198-9.
86Ibid., 199.
87In articulating what could be called a “philosophy o f freedom,” PatoCka takes

care to distinguish his own endeavor from that o f German Idealism. The interpretation
of the Idea presented here has the advantage o f avoiding subjectivism:
The philosophy o f freedom is usually identified with the doctrines of
German idealism; undoubtedly, it is most closely linked to them
historically, yet German idealism is a philosophy o f an absolute,
sovereign subjectivity, of the supremacy o f the humanly historical ‘I’ to
whom it attributes the significance o f absolute substance. As a
subjectivism, German idealism is metaphysical.... By contrast, the
Idea.. .has the advantage that, if stripped o f metaphysical encrustations, it
stands above both subjective and objective existents;...
Ibid., 200.
“ Husserl, Ideas, 118.
89Pato5ka, “Negative Platonism,” 204.
90Ibid., 203.
9ISee Patodka, Heretical Essays, Chapter Six, “Wars o f the Twentieth Century
and the Twentieth Century as War,” 119-137.
149
92Pato5ka, “Negative Platonism,” 204-5.
93Pato5ka, “Eternity and Historicity,” in Pece o dusi I (Care for the Soul, Vol. I),
144.
94Ibid., 146.
95Ibid.
^See note 38, above.
97Patocka, “Eternity and Historicity,” 147.
98Ibid., 146.
"PatoSka, “The Problem o f Truth from the Perspective o f Negative Platonism,”

in Pece o dusi I, 447.
I00Ibid„ 458.
101Ibid., 459.
102Ibid., 461.
103See ibid., 460.
I04lbid., 465.
l05Patocka, “Historicity and Eternity,” 145.
106Ibid.
l07Pato£ka, Sokrates, 115-6.
CH A PTER4
A PH ILO SO PH Y O F H ISTO RY AND A TH E O R Y O F PO LITICS
Despite international renown as a phenomenologist, the most influential and
significant work in the corpus o f Jan Patocka is his 1975 collection of Heretical Essays
in the Philosophy o f History. Distinguished by what the French philosopher Paul
Ricoeur has called a “sense o f grandeur7’ and a “dense beauty,”1the Heretical Essays
have been translated into more than a half dozen languages and are also the most widely
recognized o f Patocka’s numerous texts. They represent the culmination o f his mature
philosophy, aiming at an understanding o f human reality in which history, philosophy
and politics merge in mutual interdependence, each relating inherently to the other to
form a perspective on being and society that constitutes the Czech philosopher’s most
important contribution to philosophy and political theory.
With his essays on philosophy o f history, Patocka makes two fundamental
contentions: first is that the emergence o f the Greek polis, and o f politics, constituted a
“breakthrough” in human history, an event that conceptualized human freedom and
marked the first time that humans were presented with the possibility o f acting in a truly
historical manner. In this period, in this simultaneous rise o f politics and philosophy, the
spirit of Western civilization was bom. Secondly, the Heretical Essays trace the course
of history in the West as a series of developments that represent the abandonment o f the
possibility presented by this breakthrough. The present state o f the European world, as it
is vividly described in his final two essays, is characterized by the prevalence o f a
desire, not for a genuinely historical life, but for a life that offers a solution to the
151
problematicity and vicissitudes o f history. With the analysis o f history and politics that
is the capstone o f these essays, Patocka attempts to provide philosophy and politics in
the West with an alternative to its present predicament; he seeks to present the
possibility o f a recovery, in light o f the insights of postmodern thought, o f a mode of
politics that reflects the spirit and heritage of life in Europe. It is a mode o f being,
however, that modern civilization has steadily resisted.
Patocka’s analysis o f the contemporary world, which I shall discuss in more
detail in Chapter Five, points above all to difficulties related to the void o f meaning that
has been increasingly predominant in human life since the twilight o f traditional forms
o f metaphysics diagnosed by Nietzsche. We live, he argues, in a post-metaphysical
world, yet we remain human beings who cannot exist for long in a situation of pervasive
meaninglessness. The norm o f contemporary life in the West is the basically nihilistic
worldview o f mathematical natural science, in contrast to the transcendental
metaphysics o f the past. In light o f the dominance o f this view, it is natural for humans
to seek options that are meaningful (i.e., full of meaning). The twentieth century has
been marked by the rise and fall o f one such option after another. Politically, the human
urge for metaphysical certainty and meaning has manifested itself in political or
philosophical systems that amounted to secularized versions (often radical) of
metaphysics “in which humans or humanity step into God’s place.”2 Yet these
movements, despite their pervasiveness in particular regions, have not succeeded in
gaining support worldwide.
152
There are also countries, particularly those with liberal democratic traditions,
that have been able to resist the urge to transform the realm of politics into a substitute
for metaphysical meaning. Yet this alternative, it is argued, does not represent a solution
to the problem. Political formulations grounded in the nihilistic assumptions o f the
natural sciences —formulations that order humans as one would material objects —do
not satisfy the desire for meaning. They do not consider humans as individuals, but as
roles (even “equality” is a role!)3 As such, it appears that both the natural meaning of
pre-philosophical societies and the given meaning o f traditional metaphysics have been
overcome, and nothing has been left in their place but political radicalism as a substitute
for meaning, or the conviction that we can live full and complete lives on the basis o f a
natural scientific methodology that views human beings in neutral, material terms.
Neither approach, Patocka contends, responds to the needs of human social being. The
politics of radicalism offers humans false meaning, while the scientific approach avoids
the question of meaning altogether and thereby prompts individuals to seek either
substitutions for meaning or an escape from the question altogether. Theories that
discard the question o f meaning are as insufficient as the positive meaning of
metaphysics they seek to replace.
God is dead, yet the material nature, producing with lawlike necessity
both humankind and its progress, is no less a fiction and it has the special
weakness that it includes no mechanism that would restrain individuals
in their individual effort to escape and make themselves at home in the
contingent world as if no one were to come after them, having their little
pleasures o f the day, their pleasures o f the night.4
The United States, perhaps above all, lacks a mechanism to “restrain individuals” in
their pursuit of substitutes for transcendental meaning or, perhaps more problematically,
153
their pursuit o f means to “escape” the question o f meaning altogether. The particular
dilemma o f the contemporary world is that, since Nietzsche and Heidegger, the
destruction o f metaphysics has not led to an understanding o f history or o f meaning.
Patocka’s aim with his philosophy of history and politics is to respond to this
dilemma with an approach to meaning and politics that is not traditionally metaphysical,
but responds to the void o f meaning that prompts men to choose either substitution or
escapism. Nietzsche was right in his description of the nihilism o f the modem era:
“Thus the diagnosis of European society of the nineteenth century as nihilistic sums up
all the crises o f the time: the political and the social crises are rooted in a moral crisis.”5
What is needed is an understanding of meaning in human life and its relation to
historical action. This would provide, not only the possibility o f a political solution, but
also a means to alleviate the ethical anomie of contemporary life.
Patocka argues, in the Heretical Essays, that a philosophical understanding of
the human being and his interaction with the world must contain, at its core, a
philosophy o f history. The elemental fact of historicity means that an analysis of human
activity can be successful only once the implications o f that historicity have been clearly
defined. The fact that human being is historical being, however, does not mean that all
human activity is historical. Humans do not act historically insofar as they live only in
order to put food on the table and to keep from dying. As they create a politics,
however, in order to discuss issues of greater significance than the mere preservation of
life, they epitomize historical action. Patocka’s political thought, then, from his
reconceptualization o f human freedom to his understanding o f the polis as an
154
institutionalization o f freedom —can be grasped only through an analysis o f his
philosophy o f history.
Rather than an attempt to solve the question o f history, Patocka’s work seeks to
understand it as a problem. Understanding problematicity, therefore, is crucial to the
incorporation o f freedom into everyday activity as well as to our prospects for a
recovery from the political reality o f “the twentieth century as war.” As long as we
continue to misunderstand history by seeking to solve it we will continue to rule
ourselves in an essentially arbitrary or accidental way. It is in this sense, then, that
Patocka concludes that the “chief possibility” o f our civilization is the “possibility o f a
turn from accidental rule to the rule o f those who understand what history is about.”6
In order to arrive at a coherent sense o f Patocka’s political theory, then, it will be
necessary to begin with human historicity and the specific content o f the Patockan
understanding o f history. From here I can proceed to the thesis, drawn from Edmund
Husserl, that history in the specific sense has a particular “beginning,” and that this
beginning coincides with the origin o f the science o f politics. It is in the emergence o f
the Greek polis, Patocka contends, that freedom and problematicity come to be first
revealed as themes o f human existence. From this origin o f politics in freedom I will
follow Patocka as he traces the progressive estrangement o f both politics and philosophy
from their essential beginnings. This discussion of history will bring us not only to a
new conceptualization o f the basic content o f politics and its roots in historical action,
but also to a consideration o f two further problems: the crisis o f politics in the twentieth
century (Chapter Five), and the more fundamental problem o f the foundation that
underlies our self-understanding as human beings (Chapter Six).
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The Basis o f Hum an Historicity
It is important to note, as Erazim Kohak does in his philosophical biography,
that Patocka was a historian of ideas in addition to a philosopher. He wrote extensively,
for example, on two o f the greatest figures in Czech political and philosophical history:
Jan Amos Komensky (Comenius), and T. G. Masaryk.7 It would be a mistake, though,
to conclude from this that Patocka was interested in recording the history o f thought in
any sort o f objective, historicist manner. In the first place, it is clear that to a large
degree, the extensive work done on Comenius and Masaryk was more a product o f
circumstance than the fulfillment o f a genuine desire to create a historical record of
these thinkers. Under the Czechoslovak communist regime, Patocka was repeatedly
denied the right to work, teach or publish in his chosen specialty, and was grateful to
find somewhat meaningful employment and opportunity to publish as an archivist at the
Masaryk Institute and then, after that was dissolved by the authorities, at the Comenius
Archive o f the Pedagogic Institute in Prague.
Patocka was, in all respects, a philosopher o f history. His approach was
distinguished by a clear and unambiguous critique o f the study o f history as a search for
an objective order or for governing natural laws. The objective order o f history offered
no clue to human meaning, this despite the fact that human meaning occurred explicitly
within the order o f history. Patocka focused on history, but he was no historicist. Nor
did he believe that history could usefully be studied in compartmentalized form, as, for
example, the isolated study o f “economic history” or the “history of philosophy.” Such
studies, he wrote, offered us “so little satisfaction” as to make us aware o f the need “to
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widen our perspective.”* History, as Patocka understands it, cannot be observed
“objectively” as by a disinterested observer; the recording o f events and the keeping of
annals, therefore, does not constitute the writing o f history.
A proper understanding o f history is essential to philosophy because the human
being is inherently and continually a historical creature. Historicity is a condition of his
being, demonstrated in his most basic activities. One o f those activities that
demonstrates historicity is speech ~ the use o f language. Throughout his work, Patocka
consistently claims that individuals are not open to the possibilities o f their lives until
they overcome the hold which the world o f things —the material, objective world —has
upon them. In “Negative Platonism,” it is the human ability to communicate via
language that proves to be crucial to our effectively dealing with this world o f things,
thereby preserving the possibility o f rising above that world. The central point is that in
language we not only respond to things, we anticipate them. In doing so, we
demonstrate our ability to transcend the given present.9 Through language we can move
beyond the limits of the present, making language “thus a history, not a structure given
once and for all.” “This historicity,” Patocka continues, “of the structure of language,
however, is possible only because humans are not fixed in their relation to sense
data. ..because they are ‘free.’”10 Through language we confirm a freedom with regard
to sense objects; we show that we can create a certain “distance” from things and, in
doing so, transcend the immediate necessity o f their hold on us. In language we project
temporally beyond the present moment and object. “Here we become aware that every
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assertion, and so also language as a whole, presupposes the temporal horizon intrinsic to
man, a horizon o f ongoing experience.” 11 This is the horizon o f our historicity.
It is not only language that demonstrates our historicity, however. We are also
historical by virtue of the fact that, as Heidegger notes, we are interested in our own
being and we reach out in seeking to form it, to give it substance. This is an historical
act, for history is not simply defined by the events which take place before our eyes, but
also by our engaging in those activities that are most fully human —in other words, by
pursuing a heightening o f our own being. Here the influence o f Husserl and Heidegger
on Patocka’s philosophy o f history demands attention even though, in the end, it is
evident that the Czech pursues a different course than either of his German teachers.
Although it is Husserl to whom Patocka is indebted for inspiring a focus on
European history and its central axis o f “the idea o f rational insight and life based on it
(i.e., a life in responsibility),” it is only with the help o f Heidegger that he is able to
work out the specifics o f a philosophy o f history that avoids an extreme subjectivism.12
The influence o f both Husserl and Heidegger is evident even in Patocka’s earliest
writings. For instance, in his very first essay on the subject of history, the 1934 piece
entitled “Some Comments Concerning the Concepts o f History and Historiography,” the
focus on an understanding of human freedom as the crucial element to our historicity
betrays an early study o f Heidegger -- specifically, as Erazim Kohak notes, o f the first
division o f Being and T im e13 This emphasis did not characterize all o f Patocka’s early
work on history, however, for in another article written just a year later the emphasis on
Heideggerean themes is entirely absent. Instead, “Some Comments Concerning the
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Concept o f a ‘World History” ’ from 1935 begins by expanding upon the critique o f the
positivistic approach to history mentioned in the earlier article. W hat is described in
1935 as a “naive historical positivism” that reduces history “to whatever can be
objectified,” is more reminiscent o f Husserl’s critique o f the “misguided” rationalism o f
the European sciences in his “Vienna Lecture” than of any Heideggerean theme.14 The
political direction in which Pato£ka takes his reflections in this article is, as we shall
see, also quite non-Heideggerean.
The different lines o f thought evident in these early essays are reconciled only
40 years later, in the Heretical Essays on the Philosophy o f History. Here the
relationship between history and phenomenology is explicitly dealt with, and the
relative merits of the Husserlian and Heideggerean approaches directly compared.
Patocka compares Husserl and Heidegger on the question o f history because he is
convinced that history is crucial to the pursuit o f phenomenology. Although it might
seem that phenomenology as Husserl first elaborated it was primarily concerned with
static phenomena, Patocka notes a shift in interest in Husserl’s work toward the motive,
the genetic element o f phenomena. This shift is evidence, he argues, for the importance
of historical analysis to phenomenological philosophy.
In the course o f his intellectual career, Husserl increasingly stressed the

genetic over static analysis, as well as the role o f passive genesis, the
genesis of all presumably merely given components o f lived experience
in internal time consciousness. Everything that is static points to a
genesis and so to history. Thus history is the deepest content level which
phenomenology can re a c h ” (emphasis added)15
Yet Husserl’s approach to history, though it points in the right direction, cannot be
considered genuinely historical. This is so because it bases its understanding o f “deep”
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phenomena on the perspective of an impartial subjectivity, a “disinterested spectator.”
Claiming a disinterested status, it betrays “a subjectivity that is fundamentally
ahistorical in our sense o f the term.”16 Heidegger, in contrast, resists the attempt to
establish a disinterested perspective as the basis for an understanding o f being. His
analysis is therefore historical where Husserl’s fails to be.
By contrast, Heidegger’s conception is historical, not only in the sense

that phenomenological analysis leads to a definite genesis but most o f all
in rejecting the disinterested spectator as a presupposition o f
phenomenologizing. Instead, it focuses on an interest in being as the
starting point and the condition for understanding the deep phenomenon,
the phenomenon o f being.17
We act historically in those moments when we demonstrate that we are human, that is,
in those moments when we take an interest in and actively care for our humanity, our
being, our soul.
Patocka considered the methodology pioneered by Heidegger to be “better suited
to serve as a starting point for philosophizing about history,” for it was grounded in the
understanding that we are interested in our own being, and it sought to investigate the
problems of freedom and responsibility that accompanied it.18 In this, Heidegger’s work
would help to shed light on the nature of historical action where Husserl’s was unable
to. Patocka, then, is quite explicit in making use of Heideggerean themes in the
Heretical Essays. He notes as much in the second o f his essays, but also makes clear
that the deductions he derives from his study of Heidegger are entirely his own. “The
reflections that follow,” he writes, “will attempt to explicate several problems o f older
and contemporary history in light of motifs taken over from it [Heidegger’s
philosophy]. The author alone, to be sure, must bear responsibility for his deductions.”19
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The particular influence of Martin Heidegger is evident in these essays on the
philosophy o f history. Despite the common motifs, however, it would be incorrect to
assume —as does, for example, Aviezer Tucker —that Patocka o f the Heretical Essays
has become what one might call a “Heideggerean.” By this Tucker means to say that
Patocka, while he may have been a Platonic ethicist in Plato and Europe, veered
towards a pessimistic attitude o f Heideggerean relativism in the E s s a y s This,
however, is simply not the case. Patocka explicitly attempts to keep his use of
Heideggerean motifs consistent with his assumption of an ethics that firmly rejects
relativism and nihilism. Ethics and the need to assure concrete freedom within a
political setting are of significant concern to Patocka throughout his career, and he finds
that, not only is it possible to reconcile these themes with Heideggerean philosophy, it is
necessary to examine them in its light; only in this way, he argues, can we hope to
comprehend the unique situation in which the human being finds himself.
While Patocka begins from Heideggerean motifs, as noted, he proceeds to make
“deductions” from them for which he alone is responsible. The general tenor of these
conclusions, with their emphasis on concrete political and ethical comportment, could in
fact be said to often run directly counter to the Heideggerean approach, which exhibits a
distinct lack of interest in these elements o f human life. In contrast to Heidegger and to
many of his followers (the seminal figure o f Hannah Arendt excepted), Patocka
attempts to show a consonance between Heideggerean onto-phenomenological motifs
and the type of philosophy developed by Socrates, with its emphasis on both truth and
morality and its setting, not in a secluded forest hut or a distant Academy, but directly in
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the center o f human society ~ in the polis. In the explication o f Patocka’s philosophy of
history and politics to follow, it will be readily apparent that, even as the Czech
philosopher continues to make use o f Heideggerean concepts, he derives from them
conclusions as to the relationship o f politics and philosophy that are uniquely distinctive
and quite removed from the arguments generally proffered by the cadre o f
contemporary Heideggerean philosophers.
A Philosophy of History
Patocka’s interest in history was first o f all directed at distinguishing it from
mere historiography, from the simple recording o f events. Action was truly historical,
he argued, when it established a continuity with the future by virtue o f its grounding,
not in the instinctual desire for self-preservation, but in the characteristically human
potential for self-reflection and freedom. We act as historical beings simultaneously
with our reflective consideration o f the possibilities open to us as human beings. The
epochal moment for the Western world came with the development o f philosophy.
Philosophy marked a turning point in human self-understanding; it marked the
development o f a mode o f activity that was explicitly self-reflective and skeptical of
simply-given knowledge. By invoking a claim to reason, men gave up the surety of
simply-given knowledge in favor o f a problematic, but characteristically human,
approach to life. From this point onward one could speak o f events relating, not merely
to the desire for self-preservation, but to the possibility inherent in a being who is
interested in his own being. It marked the beginning o f the mode o f human activity to
which Patocka is referring when he speaks o f “historical” activity.
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As I indicated in Chapter Two, the influence o f Edmund Husserl’s Crisis o f
European Sciences was inordinate on the development o f Patocka’s philosophy, and this
is nowhere more true than in regard to his philosophy o f history. Although the Czech
philosopher does not follow Husserl in the latter’s insistence on a subjective
transcendental phenomenology, he does adopt the basic outline o f history that Husserl
controversially proposes in Crisis. Patocka’s adoption o f that outline, with its positing
of a “prehistory” and a “history proper,” is somewhat surprising; it appears, on the
surface, to be superficial and counterintuitive. Looking beyond the surface, however,
one finds a carefully differentiated concept of history and an argument that is cogent
and well defended. History in Patocka’s account does not refer to human activity as
such, but to that activity made possible by our ontological self-awareness. History is
primarily determined by the depth o f the relation o f the human to his own being.
Patocka’s philosophy o f history, then, has a Husserlian framework but an
ontological core. In the early chapters o f the Heretical Essays, this framework is
discussed in detail and the relevant concepts analyzed in terms o f their ontological
significance. Before proceeding to discuss the core o f this work, however, some
significant difficulties presented by Husserl’s framework need to be considered. In the
first place, as I explained in Chapter Three of this study, Husserl’s speculative
philosophy -- and this includes his philosophy o f history —suffered from the lingering
influence o f Cartesian philosophy, resulting not only in an inappropriate subjectivism
but a misguided hope that one could methodologically transform philosophy into an
“apodictic” science.21 This latter aspect is particularly problematic, for it seems to imply
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that Husserl’s framework for history is tied to the very dream o f absolute knowledge
against which the Heideggerean critique is directed. Patocka, however, makes it very
clear that not only does he not follow Husserl in this pursuit, but the very idea of such
an apodictic certainty is impossible in philosophy. He refers directly to Husserl when he
writes that:
Philosophically it is not possible to preserve (i) the postulate of

philosophy as an absolutely apodictic science, or (ii) the idea that a
transcendental idealism...would either correspond to this idea or could
guarantee to the world the meaningfulness which the struggle against a
merely factological science and against a privately subjective philosophy
of mere world views demands. (In particular, it cannot resolve the
question o f truth and o f transcendence.)22
Philosophy does search for a meaningfulness that is neither “privately subjective” nor
“merely factological,” but it is vain to hope to overcome these problems via a
philosophical search for apodicticity. Philosophy does not lead to absolute certainty.
A second problem, which I will discuss in more detail shortly, has to do with the
apparent reduction o f all o f human history to the European experience. This trait, in
light o f the ever-increasing awareness o f non-westem cultures and the content of their
cultural and intellectual traditions, does represent a weakness in Patocka’s work that it
may be hard for many readers to overcome. It is not, however, the most important
element o f this philosophy.
The central point o f Patocka’s philosophy of history represents a clear response
to the deficiencies o f Husserl’s work. History is redefined, in the Heretical Essays, in
terms o f a fundamental ontology. The recording o f events is not history; events are
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historical only insofar as we are interested in them because they have a lasting effect on
us. History, Patocka writes,
is meaningful or meaning-related only when someone cares about

something, when we do not have before us sequences merely observed
but rather ones which can be understood in terms o f an interest in and
relating to the world, o f an openness for oneself and for things.23
Only with the addition o f a fundamental ontology can Patocka propose Husserl’s outline
o f history as a starting point. The understanding gained by the ontological analysis
forms the basis o f Patocka’s philosophy; the analysis o f the relation o f history to the fact
o f the rise o f the Greek polis provides the basis for a theory of politics.
Patocka’s philosophy o f history incorporates two major elements: first is the
question o f the origin o f history and what it signifies for Europe, and second is an
analysis o f the content o f historical action and its importance for our self-understanding.
The content o f history is human activity in and for freedom. Historical activity
incorporates the realization “that there are possibilities o f living differently than by
toiling for a full stomach in misery and need.” It is in this sense that history as Patocka
strictly defines it is directly tied to the outburst o f civilization in ancient Greece: “The
Greek polis, epos, tragedy, and philosophy are different aspects o f the same thrust
which represents a rising above decline.”24 This thesis, as we shall see, when applied to
the social being o f humans in light o f the insight of contemporary, post-metaphysical
theory, constitutes a wholly new approach to the question o f the foundation o f politics.
Husserl and Eurocentrism
Apart from its Heideggerean influences, Patocka’s philosophy o f history is also
distinguished by a further Husserlian element that bears discussion at the start, for it
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represents a weakness inherent to this line o f thought. It is the notion, again drawn from
Husserl’s Crisis texts, that not only the particular history being discussed, but the very
concept o f history itself, is essentially Western. In the Heretical Essays, Patocka
describes the Husserlian account quite explicitly. “Edmund Husserl,” he writes,
speaks o f European history as a teleological nexus whose axis is the idea

o f rational insight and life based on it (i.e., responsibility). In his view,
this teleological idea distinguishes European culture from all others; at
the same time, the idea o f a life in reason, the insight-ful life, singles out
Europe from among other cultures as the essential among the contingent.
Insight and reason are the “inborn” idea of humanity as such; thus the
European spirit is at the same time universally human. European culture
and civilization are universally valid; the others only particular, however
interesting they may be.25
Patocka recognizes that, on its face, this seems a somewhat naive form o f rationalism;
nevertheless, he ascribes to its main point, that “history,” as he will define it, is
primarily a European phenomenon and central to the brand o f phenomenological
philosophy that he is pursuing.26 The reason behind this conclusion, simply stated, is
that true history is directly related to the emergence o f philosophy, the study o f reason,
which is itself a Greek, or European, phenomenon. It is assumed that the world or, as
Patocka puts it, the “whole o f beings,” is uniquely able to reveal itself, to manifest its
own nature, through the “process o f philosophizing” traceable to the Greeks.27
The key elements here are first o f all the claim that the European spirit, reason,
is universally human and second, that it is only via philosophy as it developed in Europe
that it can become manifest to us as a theme o f our existence. Reason, one may grant, is
indeed a concept that coherently describes the quest for understanding definitive o f
human existence. Further, it can be argued convincingly that the European heritage,
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particularly the heritage o f ancient Athens, is an unparalleled attempt to uncover the
nature o f this quality, an attempt that resulted in social and political institutions
dedicated, not to the preservation of the household, but to imbuing human affairs with
the quality o f reason. The account of Husserl runs into trouble, however, with the
following assumption: that European philosophy is not only the best, i.e., most highly
differentiated, account o f human rationality, but it is the only account that in any way
points towards the experience of reason. The philosophical thought o f non-Westem
cultures, the argument goes, simply did not achieve a conceptualization o f reason as the
essential human characteristic, and so is necessarily secondary in comparison to Europe.
This conclusion, however, appears to be based upon merely a superficial glance at
non-Westem or mythical achievements and a dismissal the content of those
experiences.28 Such a superficial glance is decidedly insufficient.
The question at hand is not one of comparing contemporary European
civilization with non-European, however, Europe, too, has failed to embrace its own
heritage and has lived largely under the influence o f metaphysical transfigurations o f
essential reality. But in European history, at various moments, history (as Patocka
defines it) has broken out and the heritage o f insight and care for the soul has again been
reflected in human actions. The quest with respect to the non-European world must be
to examine other cultures with an eye towards similar moments, albeit in different form.
Following Husserl, Patocka fails to extend his search beyond the limits of the European
experience. A claim of universal validity, however, as both Husserl and Patocka present
it, demands at a minimum a more wide-ranging exploration.
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There is, therefore, an element o f reductionism in Patocka’s presentation and
reliance on Husserl’s attempt at philosophy o f history. Yet the Czech philosopher is not
so naive as to ignore the implications of his reduced scope o f history. He defends this
scope by arguing that the insight which defines European civilization has but a single,
genuine pole —and that is philosophy.
Commonly it is said that European culture, or whatever you call it, has
two poles: the first is the Judeo-Christian tradition and the second is
antiquity. In my view, as I have tried to characterize it, Europe stands on
a single pole, and that is so because Europe is insight, Europe is life
founded on insight.
This pole, o f course, is that o f Greek philosophy; the Judeo-Christian tradition, though
certainly essential to Europe, had its effect only after it had been Hellenized:
The Judaic, which is o f course enormously important in the

Judeo-Christian tradition, had to Hellenize itself, had first to travel
through Greek thought, in order that it could become that which it is for
Europe. Christian dogmas are spoken about, but Christian dogmas
nevertheless justified themselves. Christian dogmas were not merely
myths. And the thought itself of the other world, the other, just world,
and of the deity who is a deity o f pure good, this is nowhere other than in
Plato, it is there fo r the first timeP9
Although the argument in outline does have a certain cogency, it is insufficiently
defended by historical research. The research required, no small amount, was most
likely well beyond the realm o f possibility given the sharp restrictions placed upon
Patocka’s academic freedom. This is regrettable, for such research would greatly
strengthen the conclusions reached without necessarily contradicting the main thrust of
the argument —that the contribution to humanity offered by Greek philosophy is indeed
unique, and in no way more so than in its use as the ground upon which to construct
social and political institutions. It is perhaps here, in the confluence o f philosophy and
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political freedom, that the Greek, or European, heritage is most unique and, perhaps,
most universal. The promise o f this historical epoch, however, remains undelivered,
even (if not especially) in Europe. It is Patocka’s hope that, by uncovering its roots and
reexamining them through the powerful and penetrating lenses provided by
contemporary philosophy, he can encourage or effect change, not only in the way
mankind lives, but in the way it organizes itself politically.
Prehistory and the Beginning o f History
Despite the attention that has been paid to the Husserlian and Heideggerean
influences in Patocka’s work, Patocka’s conception o f history was not limited to what
he learned from his two teachers. In “Some Comments Concerning the Concept o f a
‘World History’” from 1935, for example, Heidegger is not mentioned and his influence
seems negligible; instead, Patocka’s own concerns come to the fore: namely, a
prominent concern for the specificity o f history and its relation to the concrete world.
This article introduces a concept of history as present, not in novel events or
occurrences, but in actions that reflect continuity, actions o f “more than individual
significance in which we participate when we sense a community of interest with
something that has been.”30
The perception o f continuity manifests itself in terms o f perceived “primordial
forces” that seem to govern our lives. In speaking o f historical “forces,” Patocka realizes
quite well the apparent contradiction with his own dislike o f historical abstraction; he
notes that “we are, to be sure, expressing ourselves abstractly and we could lead the
reader to an error, compromising, in a sense, the historicity o f these concepts.” But he
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makes clear that none o f the “forces” o f which he speaks stands outside o f the stream o f
history or is “given prior to history, so that it would constitute, so to speak, an
extrahistorical explcmans o f history.”31 Rather, these are historical commonalities that
are actual only within specific historical formulations. Among the forces that Patocka
has in mind are several that determine our political existence; with this explicit, early
acknowledgment a tone is being set that will determine the course o f his philosophy o f
history and politics in contradistinction to the work o f Heidegger in particular.
Among the examples o f such primordial forces let us cite the desire to
govern, capable o f broad variations, leading both to imperialistic
expansion and to lawful affirmation o f the civil society in a state.
Another such force is what is often called the “spirit,” that is, the
conscious relationship o f a human to his own world in the forms o f
philosophy (and science), o f art, wisdom, religion. Every such force
stands in the polarity o f the individual-social tension, it is both a matter
of the individual and o f the society, though in most diverse gradations
and relations.3-
The “individual-social tension” at the heart o f the concept o f politics is, in Patocka’s
explanation, something to which humanity is inherently subject in its very historicity.
The relation o f the individual to society even affects the human desire to understand
oneself and one’s situation in the world and cosmos. In this early article on philosophy
of history, Patocka’s conviction as to the relationship o f politics and philosophy is
clearly evident. It is a conviction that remained with him throughout his life, and it
illustrates the basis for the claim that his work is often best understood as political
philosophy, making it quite distinct from that o f his more illustrious instructors.
This political emphasis is reflected in Patocka’s introduction to the specifics o f
his philosophy o f history in Chapter One o f the Heretical Essays, in which he offers a
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further critique o f Heidegger’s approach. Heidegger, he claims here, is deficient in
lacking a viable perspective on the whole o f the world in which we live, the “natural”
world. His perspective is limited to a single mode o f comportment within the world: the
mode having to do with the thematic understanding o f being. But, Patocka writes, “the
‘natural’ world, the world o f human life, can only be comprehended as the totality o f the
fundamental modes o f human comportment.” Heidegger focuses on the “fundamental
philosophical question of the meaning o f being,” but neglects the other modes that do
not deal with this explicitly.33 Human comportment is always a type of movement, but
only one human movement is explicitly oriented to the theme of its own openness, its
own manifestation. This is what Patocka elsewhere called the “movement of truth,” and
it is, he contended, only a part, albeit an important one, o f overall human movement.
Other movements or modes o f comportment have to do with our rooting ourselves in
the world and in our protection and preservation o f that world. “Only an examination
and a comprehension of the mutual relations o f all these movements,” Patocka
concludes, “would provide a picture o f the natural world, the Lebenswelt, the world o f
human life.”34 An understanding o f human existence in its fullness, encompassing
politics, requires such a picture o f the “natural” world if it is to be accurate. Without it,
the possibility is raised that crucial questions, questions o f the political tension between
the individual and society, will be set aside if one focuses, as Heidegger, solely on the
thematic question o f being. There is the additional risk that, instead o f being ignored,
politics may come to be considered a mere handmaiden o f the greater question o f being,
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opening the door to its misuse as a means to an end, a means justifiable in light o f that
end.
The “natural” world, however, is not the world o f human history. History, rather
than representing an “organic extension” of the “natural” world, represents instead a
radical disruption of it.3SWhereas human life is composed o f multiple movements,
human history, with its appeal to a continuity transcending the individual, is expressed
via the movement of truth. Patocka’s definition o f “history” is thus far from
conventional. The making o f history occurs when we are able to rise above mere life,
that is, above a life of service to our physical needs. The degree to which we are able to
differentiate, therefore, between a life whose sole aim is to continue living and one open
to a greater range of possibilities, is one factor by which it is possible to distinguish a
historical life from a life that is unable to transcend the “natural” world.
This is not the only means by which we can make this distinction, however.
Patocka writes that we can also speak o f the “natural” world “in a somewhat different
sense,” as the “world prior to the discovery o f its problematic character.”36 Referring to
the world as preproblematic, Patocka is contending that the “natural” world -- which we
noted earlier was a world in which humans lived simply, that is, intuitively and without
self-reflection -- is one of pregiven meaning. It is a world in which meaning comes
simply and directly from tradition and from the gods who stand over humans and rule
them. Thereby the world is reliable and meaningful for humans; it is also, however,
unreflective and thus unproblematic. “The basic framework for the possibility o f such
natural dwelling on earth is to exist unproblematically.”37 In the sense that the ultimate
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goal here is merely to live, there is a way in which such a life resembles that of animals
—but only to a point. As humans, the possibility is always present to problematize life,
even if that possibility is hidden and unlikely to break forth. The world described here,
the preproblematic world, is also, according to Patocka, a “prehistorical” world. In it,
we do not attempt to differentiate between life and meaning as it is simply given to us
and the possibilities o f life and meaning available to us through reflection.
At this point in Chapter One o f the H eretical Essays, Patocka begins to draw
upon the work o f Hannah Arendt, a philosopher who was instrumental in focusing his
attention onto the sphere o f politics. “Here,” Patocka writes, “we need to attempt to take
up, phenomenologically, the analysis o f ‘practical, active life’ carried out by Hannah
Arendt and inspired by Aristotle’s distinctions between theoria, praxis, and poeisis .”38
Arendt’s investigations were crucial because, unlike Heidegger’s, they took account of
those aspects o f human existence not exclusively concerned with the Heideggerean
theme o f unconcealment ~ namely, those concerned with the practical, active life. They
reinforced the broad outlines of Patocka’s own critique o f Heidegger, and offered
support for the Czech’s intuitive sense o f the importance o f the realm o f politics.
The key Arendtian distinction for Patocka was between work and action,
between the household and thepolis, and it greatly helped to clarify the distinctions
Patocka had already drawn between the realm o f the “natural” world and that of the
Socratic realm o f freedom.39 Arendt’s influence is reflected in both the phenomenology
o f movement and the philosophy o f history being developed in the Heretical Essays. In
terms o f human existence, it is work that is our inescapable fate; it is, Patocka writes,
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our “fundamental mode o f being in the world” because, as human, as living, we are
constantly exposed to an inescapable need to consume to which work is our response.40
We work in order to keep ourselves alive. Work, therefore, reflects our bondage to life.
It also, however, presupposes a possibility of freedom, for as we come to resent the
impositions of our work, as we perceive it as a necessary imposition upon us, so we see
that there are possible periods in which we need not work. “The world in which the
bondage o f life to itself takes place on the basis of a concealed freedom,” Pato£ka
writes, “is the world o f work; its proto-cell and model is the household, the community
of those who work to assure their sustenance.”41
In concluding that work, the “fundamental” human mode o f being, reflects a
bondage o f life to itself, Patocka is saying that insofar as work is the center o f our
existence we do not live historically. The civilization constructed around work, whose
model is the household, is not historical —it is prehistorical. Work, Patocka argues, is
“not only a nonhistorical factor but actually one working against history, intending to
hold it at bay.” The great civilizations of the ancient world, in their devotion to the
continuance of life, were, in this sense, great households, and were entirely
prehistorical.42 Work, o f course, does not disappear with the rise of history; it is merely
the case that historical eras are defined by their self-conscious attempt to seek
something in life beyond the simple continuance o f the biological functions guaranteed
by work. Here, the unconventionality of this philosophy o f history is evident. History
does not have to do with past occurrences simply, nor with their recording through
writing or historiography. The relating o f events and the keeping o f annals may reflect a
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prehistorical understanding of existence if they take place within an era or civilization
based upon the household and geared simply towards the maintenance of life.
With the advent o f Greek and Roman civilization both Patocka and Arendt
recognize that the rule of the household undergoes an important change. In place of the
household, a public sphere arises and offers the citizen a new possibility. This is the
thesis to which Arendt points, and from which the Heretical Essays take their impetus:
“that the house ceases to be the core o f the world as such, becoming simply a private
domain alongside and juxtaposed to which there arose, in Greece and Rome, a different,
no less important public sphere.”43 With this development a space is opened up for free
action, for political action. This is the twin beginning o f philosophy and politics and,
Patocka contends, also the first time that humans begin to consciously act so as to
challenge, to question and to reflect thematically upon the uniqueness of their situation
in the world. They begin, at this time, to act historically. Patocka’s goal in these essays
is to demonstrate that the essence o f human freedom and possibility, that is, the
realization that humanity could break the chains of its bondage to the order of work and
the household and live freely, first began to take form with the development o f the idea
of the polls. “Starting from this thesis,” he writes, “we shall, in what follows, endeavor
to demonstrate that the difference is that in the intervening period [between the
replacement of the civilizational model of the household with that of the polis] history
in the strict sense had begun.”44
In this way and with the help o f Arendt, Patocka advances his thesis as to the
development o f the mode o f action that deserves to be called historical. In doing so,
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however, he must delimit as nonhistorical all those millennia o f human experience that
fall outside of the rather narrow band of the European experience. Philosophy, politics,
and history, then, are specific modes of human being, not to be understood in general
terms. They are all human phenomena, however, and so remain in essential contact with
the “natural” world o f human existence and the nonhistorical movements o f humanity.
Yet they also represent a significant break from that “natural” world. The nonhistorical
mode of life, Patocka has suggested, can be spoken o f as “natural” for it is
fundamentally non-reflective, non-questioning. It accepts world and c o m m unity “as
something simply given, something that simply manifests itself’ in the interplay o f gods
and mortals.45 The break to which both Arendt and Patocka point comes about when
humans decline to accept their situation as simply given, when they, in the terms o f
ontological phenomenology, begin to thematically explore the question of why the
world and its contents manifest themselves as they do.
To uncover what is hidden in manifestation entails questioning, it means

discovering the problematic character not o f this or that but o f the whole
as such, as well as o f the life that is rigorously integrated into it. Once,
however, that question had been posed, humans set out on a long journey
they had not traveled hitherto, a journey from which they might gain
something but also decidedly lose a great deal. It is the journey of
history.46
The journey of history begins with inquiry into the world as a problem.
The phrase “the beginning o f history” refers to the beginning o f an epoch; it is a
beginning Patocka locates in ancient Athens, when a thematic approach to ontological
understanding first came to light. While the phenomenological movement o f truth that is
characteristic o f historical periods did exist in ancient, non-Greek empires organized on
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the model o f the household, such empires lacked the “explicitly thematic orientation
characteristic o f a historical epoch.” Instead, these civilizations saw life as something o f
an “ontological metaphor” with the world of nature standing for and symbolizing the
being that was its foundation.47 With the development o f philosophy and politics,
however, a rupture took place from which, at least for European man and his
descendants, there was no turning back. Life opened itself up to the possibility that labor
and work were not the only opportunities available.
The Polis in History
In addition to Arendt’s thematization o f labor, work and action, she further
contributes to Patockan political philosophy through her political interpretation o f the
Heideggerean emphasis on the polis. Patocka follows Arendt in the realization that, it is
not only the development o f philosophy that is crucial to the mode o f free action, but
also the institutional model o f the polis. The polis was the location in which a
philosophy o f freedom could concretely manifest itself; it represented the opportunity
for the self-aware citizen to reach forth, to no longer merely accept but to actively risk
and strive. The polis was both the means to and the symbol o f a new human possibility
that announced an historical era: the possibility to initiate rather than simply accept. It
was also, inherently, a foundational model for democracy —an institution unthinkable
on any basis other than the equality o f citizens.
This new human possibility is based on the mutual recognition o f

humans as free and equal, a recognition which must be continuously
acted out, in which activity does not have the character o f enforced toil,
like labor, but rather of the manifestation o f excellence, demonstrating
that in which humans can be in principle equal in competition with each
other. At the same time that means living fundamentally not in the mode
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o f acceptance but of initiative and preparation, ever seeking the
opportunity for action, for the possibilities that present themselves; it
means a life in active tension, one o f extreme risk and unceasing upward
striving in which every pause is necessarily already a weakness for which
the initiative o f others lies in wait.48
The polis, Patocka argues, was a place in which men could act historically. They could
live in awareness o f the insights opened up by philosophy, consciously abandoning a
nonhistorical culture o f passive acceptance for a life in active tension. Patocka sees the
rise o f the polis and o f politics as an attempt to incarnate freedom into active human
life. It is a turning point in the course of human development for it offers to man, for the
first time, a concrete setting in which to act freely and self-reflectively, to act
historically. For these reasons the rise o f the polis is connected to what Patocka
unabashedly calls “the very beginning o f history in the proper sense of the word.”49
Patocka recognizes in these pages that he is dangerously close to engaging in the
very speculative historiography that he has from the start condemned. He recognizes
that the rise o f the p olis was a gradual process and can be neither localized —traced to a
particular few individuals —nor attributed to an ideal dedication to human welfare.
“These reflections,” he says, “should not be understood as an idealization of the Greek
p o lis, as if it arose from the spirit o f selfless devotion to ‘the common good.’”50
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the polis is morally neutral. In both Plato and
Europe and Europe and the Post-European Age, Patocka points to a certain “moral
insight” tied to the care o f the soul that originated with the Greek polis. He does not
claim, however, that this took the form o f a supra-historical event o f some kind, an
event that somehow stands above history, as, for example, an instance o f revelation. The
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origin o f the polis and its moral insight was an historical event in the sense that, just as
human history reflects the moral relations inherent in periods o f growth and decline, so
“moral insight is nothing other than the sedimentation and codification o f this
experience ”51 The polis, entailing the recognition o f its citizens as free and equal, gave
concrete form to this sedimentation o f moral experience.
The emergence o f the polis, then, was an event o f epochal significance. In it is
incarnated the spirit of the Western world, a spirit which, Patocka m aintains in
following Husserl, has a significance that is universal. It is the spirit o f human
possibility:
Here, in very specific conflicts on a modest territory and with minimal

material means is bom not only the Western world and its spirit but,
perhaps, world history as such. The Western spirit and world history are
bound together in their origins: it is the spirit of free meaning bestowal,
it is the shaking of life as simply accepted with all its certainties and at
the same time the origin o f new possibilities o f life in that shaken
situation, that is, o f philosophy. Since, however, philosophy and the
spirit of the polis are closely linked so that the spirit of the polis survives
ultimately always in the form o f philosophy, this particular event, the
emergence of the polis, has a universal significance.52
Despite his attempts to defend his conclusions from the charge of historical idealism, it
is arguable that Patocka overreaches in proclaiming the Greek polis to be the origin of
“world history as such.” As I have already noted, Patocka’s account lacks the
comparative investigation of non-Westem experience minimally necessary for such a
claim to be accepted.
These essays are indeed heretical in regard to history, for they abrogate the
conventional understanding in its entirety and replace it with an understanding o f
history as activity that concretely reflects the insight o f philosophy. These are essays
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about philosophy and about the origin o f a particular conceptualization o f the role o f
politics. Yet this conceptualization, a Western one, concerns a matter applicable to all
humans: the question o f freedom. For this reason and despite Patocka’s overly narrow
definition of history, the content o f these essays remains profoundly significant for
human beings and their political institutions. It remains to follow the thread o f these
reflections to their conclusion, and from there, judge both their coherence and their
relevance more fully.
Two Elements of Historical Life: Freedom and Problem aticity
As we move towards a conceptualization o f the realm o f politics as the site of
philosophical action, we increasingly come into contact with two concepts that form the
basis for Patocka’s conclusions: the concepts of freedom and problematicity. Action on
the Socratic model is action grounded in freedom and a recognition o f problematicity.
The two are, in fact, mutually interdependent.
Freedom
The concept o f freedom, we will recall, is central to the non-metaphysical stance
o f Patocka’s negative Platonism.53 In that article, freedom is defined in terms o f our
ability to transcend the realm o f objectivity. This transcendence, however, is not
transcendence toward any thing, in the sense o f a transcendent Idea or Being, but rather
transcendence over and away from those things or objects that exert a hold upon us. In
the Heretical Essays, Patocka expands upon and clarifies this conception, noting that
transcendence, not intentionality, is the “original trait” o f a life that differentiates itself
from those things that have no concern for their own being, things that “do not exist for
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their own sake nor have any ‘for the sake o f —or have only a glimpse o f it, as animals
might.”54 The element o f transcendence is a human element, differentiating us from
things and animals.
In transcending the material and the objective, we do not move away from the
world, but towards it. The transcendence o f humans is always towards, not the things o f
the world, but towards the world as a whole, and the foundation o f our transcendence is
freedom. Here again, in grounding this human attribute in freedom and not in reason,
Patocka must recognize a debt to Heidegger: “transcendence towards the world,
however, is originally not given by the activity o f thought and reason, as it was for
Kant; its foundation, rather, is freedom.” And it is Heidegger who is recognized as the
philosopher o f freedom for it is he who first views history not as a series o f independent
events but as, in Patocka’s words, a “responsible realization” o f our humanity. “History
is not a perception but a responsibility.”55 Our responsibility is to be fully human, and to
do so requires that we examine our lives, that we pose the question o f our own being. In
posing questions in this way, in acting with both responsibility and freedom (for
questioning after being is predicated upon that transcendence o f the objective realm
definitive o f freedom), we are immediately faced with the realization that the world is
not as simple and unproblematic as we may have thought it to be. Questioning, by its
very nature, shakes the certainty o f all that we once took for granted as given.
Responsibility, Patocka contends, extending Heidegger’s analysis, “presupposes not
only an understanding for being but also a shaking o f what at first and for the most part
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is taken for being in naive everydayness, a collapse of its apparent meaning to which we
are led... in the explicit posing o f the question o f being.,,S6
Here, however, Patocka takes the analysis in a new direction, a direction that
Heidegger did not pursue. Although freedom and historicity remain the fundamental
concepts, they are set into the context o f the social realm. Patocka’s understanding of
our being, unlike Heidegger’s, has a decidedly practical element to it: it concerns our
social existence and our concrete attempts to order it. This analysis, then, does not
repeat Heidegger’s, as we shall see by tracing its movement toward, not merely a
consideration o f the polis, but a consideration of the polis as a model for a politics of
freedom and equality.
Freedom is indispensable to the quest to understand our situation in the world
and to live in truth. It has another characteristic, however, and that is risk. It requires
both a distancing o f ourselves from the objects of the world and a recognition that, in
doing so, we open ourselves up to the risk o f error and to problematicity in life.
Freedom is therefore a daunting prospect, Patocka declares, but one essential to our
living as fully human beings. He writes that
[fjreedom thus means risk; it means the continual possibility o f error and
it means the necessity for deciding; it means the hardness of
contradiction, the need to decide about it as if we were sovereign, and at
the same time the impossibility of sovereignty; it means thus anxiety
before (the apparent) void into which man is set by his limiting
position.57
The possibility o f error, the hardness o f contradiction, the necessity o f decision -- all are
elements distinguishing a free and responsible life from a life which is ruled by myth
and a hierarchy o f simple, given meaning. These are elements that form a necessary
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backdrop to a life of freedom, and therefore to those forms o f democratic organization
that attempt to incarnate that freedom into government.
The way in which Patocka speaks of freedom, however, may lead to the
objection that its experience is an elitist, existentialist adventure available and relevant
to only a certain few individuals. These individuals, in declaring their freedom, would
raise themselves above the common needs and restrictions o f mankind, becoming free
o f traditional authority. In this case, freedom would be something not universal but
limited; it would be o f little importance to the mass o f humans subject to a daily
struggle for subsistence. Yet this impression is counter to Patocka’s intentions and
would represent a misreading o f his analysis. He attempts to explain that freedom,
though experienced to different degrees by different people and perhaps understood
thematically only by a few, is yet profoundly relevant to all. He writes that “[t]he
experience o f freedom, it is true, is less common than passive experience, but freedom,
or, better, the possibility of freedom, is something relevant to humans as such.” “W e can
also say,” he continues, “that every human has some experience o f freedom,” even if he
does not encounter it in the context o f an overall understanding.58 It is clear, though, that
certain humans experience a great deal more freedom than others, perhaps even to the
extent that some may be completely unaware o f the very possibility o f a free life. But
does this make freedom a relative privilege for the few? Patocka argues emphatically
that it does not. The possibility o f freedom, he says, is available to all and is the ground
for our humanity as well as our dignity.
Freedom is not an aristocratic privilege, rather, it is relevant and valid for

all; without it human would not be human. Human dignity stems from it
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also, even when humans are not aware o f it, not from the putative fact
that “Man” is the most powerful among the animals.59
Our humanity is a result, not o f being merely the strongest o f many forms o f animal life,
but by being essentially different from animal life. The foundation o f that difference is
the possibility o f freedom, which itself is contingent upon the human possibility of
comprehending our place in the world and understanding the ground o f our freedom,
understanding our being as human.
Patocka’s conception o f freedom does not reduce to a form o f existentialist
individualism. Rather, it is developed as a specifically social —or political —concept,
presupposing a responsibility not only to oneself but to one’s society. In a text entitled
“The Philosophy o f Education,” based on pedagogical lectures given in 1938-39 and
only recently published for the first time, Patocka reflects on human freedom in a more
concrete context, discussing the responsibility which accompanies it. The fundamental
freedom o f life, he says, that o f “[d]eciding about one’s life, about its meaning and its
depth, rests in our hands, in the hands o f every individual, he cannot be in any way
delivered o f it.”60 This responsibility, however, though it must be assumed by the
individual alone, does not play itself out in isolation. Though its source is the self, its
purpose is not self-serving. “Does freedom mean,” Patocka asks, “ . ..a life exclusively
fo r oneself! Complete freedom means life out of one’s self, in truth about one’s self, but
not only fo r one's se lf alone.” The weight of responsibility accompanying freedom
extends beyond the individual to society. “The free man then realizes this relation of his
own actions to society as a necessarily assumed relation and experiences it as a feeling
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of responsibility ,”61 And that responsibility to society, I might add in conclusion,
implies a concomitant responsibility to the just authority and law o f that society .62
Problematicity
“Problematicity as a theme in Patocka’s work is treated most thoroughly in a
text based on apartment lectures from the 1970s. This text, entitled “The Spiritual
Person and the Intellectual” and intended to comment upon and accompany the
Heretical Essays, refers directly to the problems introduced in the Essays and helps us
to read them in the context of Patocka’s lifelong philosophical and ethical concerns.
Whereas the Essays, particularly the last, resort to a use o f metaphor and symbol that
can confuse or put off the first-time reader, “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual”
serves to remind us o f the essential Socratism o f the themes under discussion. Here we
return to what Patocka maintains is a Socratic notion o f philosophy as recognition o f the
essential problematicity of life. The Socratic individual does not live so as to avoid the
problematic. To the contrary, he lays himself open to all of the experiences —including
the problematic —that we are naturally heir to.
The experience of problematicity, it is argued in “The Spiritual Person and the
Intellectual,” is a common human experience. We are all confronted, at some point in
our lives, with situations in which our simple beliefs, our self-evident understandings,
are shattered. “Those experiences, which show us that this whole way o f seeing the
world as self-evident and assumed is something that disappoints, something open to
negative outcomes, these experiences are rare; they are rare but, in the end, everyone
encounters them in some way or another.”63 It is not simply the encounter with such
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experience, of course, that is crucial. It is our response to that encounter that marks the
decisive movement.
The experiences to which Pato£ka refers are variable, from those common
moments when we come to realize that the people around us in whom we believed are
themselves flawed and live in contradiction, to those more devastating tribulations
associated with disaster, death and political upheaval. What these experiences are
common is that they show us that our life, which we thought so obvious and logically
ordered, is in fact neither.
All o f them show at once that life, which appeared so obvious, is in

reality somehow problematic, that something doesn’t correspond, that
something is not in order. Our original attitude is that it is in order, that
all o f these small unpleasantries, disagreements and incongruences have
no significance and that it is possible to get over them.64
The subject o f Patocka’s reflections in this essay is the individual capable o f facing up
to this contingency, to this problematicity in life. The ability or courage shown by this
individual, that o f the willingness to resist coloring reality via reductive thinking, is the
same quality first noticed by Plato when he sought to distinguish the virtuosity o f a
Socrates from that very different, technical virtuosity o f the Sophists. It is, Patocka
argues, not a question o f occupation, but a spiritual quality. Thus he will refer to the
Socratic individual as a “spiritual person,” this despite the fact that such phrases are out
of fashion in the modem world.6S
The Socratic way o f life, properly understood, is one that accepts reality as it
appears, in unadulterated form -- in all its uncertainty and problematicity. This implies a
way of life that does not hide from negative experiences, but relegates itself to their
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inevitability; the spiritual person “lays him self open to these very things and his life
consists in being in this way exposed.”66 This way o f life, first exemplified in the figure
o f Socrates but then overshadowed by a descent into a Platonic metaphysics o f the Idea,
is a free and self-reflective way o f life. The price o f this freedom, however, is high. The
spiritual person must relinquish the safety o f the solid ground under his feet. He or she
must accept the responsibility to “live in no way on solid ground but on something that
moves; to live without an anchor”57 This is life, not as a fulfillment o f a plan, but as a
journey or a quest; it is a life of unceasing movement seeking understanding.
The court o f final appeal, here, is neither a supreme Being nor an objective
science or methodology, but one’s own fragile humanity and reason. Accepting this
understanding, however, humanity does not emerge to find itself lost at sea without
either anchor or rudder. Life is not futile or aimless, but supported by the fact that
self-understanding, expressed through philosophy, is itself a foundation that supports
even as it must refuse to set its framework in concrete to give the appearance o f solidity.
Philosophy problematizes in order to dispel the illusion o f a secure foundation in favor
o f one that reflects human reality. The foundation it uncovers, however, must itself be
recognized ever again as problematic.
Essentially, all of philosophy is nothing other than the development of

this problematicity, in the way that great thinkers have grasped and
expressed it. The battle to extract out o f this problematicity something
that emerges from it; to find a solid shore, but to again problematize that
which emerges as that shore.68
The notions o f freedom and problematicity relate not only to a politics o f freedom, but
to the philosophy itself. Living in truth, living not as a sophistic intellectual but as a
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spiritual person, requires the openness to reality that philosophy —epitomized by the
Socratic perspective —attempts to capture.
The Greek experience is o f such importance to Patocka because it represents, not
only the emergence o f philosophy, but also the simultaneous emergence o f politics. In
the rise o f political life on the model o f the polis, in the rise o f a public space where
citizens can debate the conditions o f their existence within a framework o f equality, the
same uncertainty, problematicity and uprootedness define the conditions o f existence.
Political life is not a passive, accepting life, it is life characterized by a reaching forth, a
“ life unsheltered.” “Such life,” Patocka writes, “does not seek to escape its contingency,
but neither does it yield to it passively.”69 Political life on the model o f the polis
demands initiative o f its citizens. It demands that they abandon a life o f acceptance for
one o f outreach. In moving to the model o f the p o lis the old myths upon which the
household-based society was held together are let go. As Patocka puts it, “nothing o f the
earlier life o f acceptance remains in peace; all the pillars of the community, traditions,
and myths, are equally shaken, as are all the answers that once preceded questions.”70
The life o f freedom in the polis, the life envisioned in Socratic philosophy and
described again by Hannah Arendt as the life o f action, is one in which metaphysical
anchors are untied and discarded. We uproot ourselves from the soil of myth and
tradition, meaning, not that we simply reject it, for much in myth and tradition is
reflective o f truth, but that we abandon it as a crutch to which we turn for simple
answers when life presents us with difficult problems. In this way we confront our life,
we assume responsibility for it. Patocka writes o f political life as “life in an urgent
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time.” “This constant vigilance,” he continues, “is at the same time a permanent
uprootedness, lack of foundation.” It is a life that is confronted by its own
precariousness and finitude. Only in facing it can a truly free life unfold.71 The
recognition o f problematicity is, at the same time, a rejection o f all such systems, gods,
and methods that would “save” us, that would deliver us from problematicity. To
assume freedom and recognize problematicity is to act as a human being. “Without
aspiring to the superhuman, [life] becomes freely human.”72
The concepts o f freedom and problematicity and their relation to history were
introduced, in this discussion, in regard to their analysis in Heidegger. What I have
shown, however, is how Patocka applied those concepts not only to the way in which
we reflect on our own being thematically, but also to the way in which we “carry out”
our being. Our “carrying out” o f our being, our “comportment,” is defined by Patocka
as “our practical dealing with the practical things o f our surrounding world.” He
considers it not only the most visible component of our being, but also the best point of
entry for a penetration to its depths.73 Our relations to things and to other beings in our
practical dealings with them reveal our relation to the whole which is determinative of
our being. Heidegger is a model for Patocka only to a certain point. Whereas Patocka
pursues the questions o f freedom and problematicity through an analysis and
understanding o f our comportment in the realm o f politics, along Socratic lines,
Heidegger takes a course that leads him, not in the direction o f politics (excepting his
ill-fated adventures with National Socialism), but rather explicitly away from it.74
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Philosophy o f History and Politics
Philosophy and politics, Patocka concludes in the Heretical Essays in the
Philosophy o f History, are inseparable; the care o f the one implies and necessitates the
care o f the other. The thesis o f the co-dependence o f politics and philosophy makes
Patocka a political philosopher in the truest sense o f the term.7S To justify this claim,
however, I need to examine the links between what Patocka defines as philosophy and
what he understands as authentic politics. Two points are relevant in this regard. First,
Patocka contends that the historical emergence o f politics occupies a special position in
relation to philosophy —it is more closely connected to philosophy than either religion
or art, for example. And second, he concludes that it is the simultaneous and
interdependent rise o f politics and philosophy that is responsible, in the end, for the very
emergence o f the possibility of history itself.
The relation of politics to philosophy occupies as central a role in Patocka’s
philosophy as it did in Plato’s. Although the role o f politics becomes the subject o f
explicit analysis only in his later work, it is present as an embryonic theme throughout
his career. Even the earliest essays contain evidence o f the centrality o f politics. In a
1933 essay on political Platonism, for instance, Patocka writes that, while the
philosopher is never exactly a politician, “his activity in the world is based on the
philosopher possessing a political idea.”76 The philosopher must be active, and this
activity cannot be understood as exclusive o f the issues related to the organization o f
society.
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In Plato and Europe it is the “care for the soul” that is the subject of
investigation. Even here, however, the centrality o f the political is never neglected. Care
for the soul, I noted in Chapter Three, symbolizes the insight derived from Greek
experience and embedded in the European consciousness as its spiritual principle. What
has not yet been noted is the way in which care for the soul has a particular, tripartite
structure. In Europe and the Post-European Age, which is a more concise discussion o f
the themes o f Plato and Europe, Patocka bases his chapters on each o f the three
elements: care for the soul as an expression o f an ontological arrangement, care for the
soul as care for the polis, and care for the soul as self-understanding and self-control. It
is the second o f these perspectives that concerns us at the moment.77 Care for the soul as
care for the p olis restates the notion at the center o f Plato’s Republic, that the order o f
the city naturally reflects the order o f the individual soul.78 Thus caring for the soul
requires that one act with constant reference to the political —that one care for the polis.
Patocka’s most explicit discussion o f the connection between politics and
philosophy takes place, however, in the notes he appended to his H eretical Essays. Here
he directly addresses the special status o f politics, a status concordant with that of
philosophy. Patocka begins these notes by asking himself a series o f rhetorical questions
about his attribution o f such preeminent importance to the development o f philosophy
and politics in the ancient Greek period, questions which he proceeds to answer in his
own defense. After first questioning the status given to philosophy over, for example,
poetry and art, he asks o f himself:
[furthermore, is it not as unfair as inconsistent to attribute a special

importance to politics in relation to philosophy, to declare philosophy
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and politics in nearly the same breath to be the founders o f history
strictly speaking when in terms o f collective social influence we might
be far more justified in attributing that role to religion, which, as in the
case o f Israel, clearly had the decisive word in the formation o f the
bearers o f history, such as nations?79
His answer, o f course, is no. Patocka makes his point clear in these comments: politics
and philosophy together constitute the foundation o f history; they represent a mode o f
being that is o f greater importance to the creation o f history than is religion. How is this
so? Politics, in its proper form the epitome of the social being of man, presents him with
the most direct means to express the freedom and the active striving that represent the
highest level o f human movement, the movement in which the variety o f possibilities of
man qua man are examined and pursued. The original point of politics is freedom, and
freedom is the greatest of human possibilities.
Politics, then, as conceptualized and epitomized in the mode o f Socratic
philosophy, occupies a higher position in relation to philosophy than either religion or
art, for original politics has as its purpose the transmission of philosophical insight to
humanity as a whole in its most fundamental mode —the mode o f its social being.
Politics presents us with the possibility to strive for and live a free life. It connects the
spiritual life to praxis while religion and art can only symbolize that spirituality.
The reason for this special position o f politics is that political life in its
original and primordial form is nothing other than active freedom itself
(from freedom, for freedom). The goal of striving here is not life for the
sake o f life (whatever life it may be) but only life for freedom and in it,
and it is understood, that is, actively grasped, that such a life is possible.
That, however brings this original politics into a wholly different
proximity to philosophy than that o f religion and art, however great their
importance in spiritual life. If then spiritual life is the fundamental
upheaval (shaking of immediate certainties and meaning), then religion
senses that upheaval, poetry and art in general depict and imagine it,
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politics turns it into the practice o f life itself, while in philosophy it is
grasped in understanding, conceptually.80
While philosophy has as its goal the understanding of human being, politics, as Patocka
is trying to clarify it, “turns it into the practice o f life itself” This conceptualization,
strongly influenced by Hannah Arendt, attempts to define politics in distinct contrast to
those minimalist contemporary understandings that see it as merely a means to the
organization o f labor or allocation of resources.81 For Patocka, politics reflects our
essential humanity, embodied in the ultimate human possibility o f freedom. For this
reason, it can never be an arbitrary exercise. Freedom is available to us only in a setting
modeled after the essential core o f the Greek polls, a setting that provides for a
“community of equals.”
We have sought to show that the invention of politics does not simply
coincide with the organization o f work on a foundation of religion and
power. That is the source o f empires, but not of politics which is possible
only with the conception of bestowing meaning on life out o f freedom
a n dfo r it, and that, as Hegel said, cannot be brought about by a solitary
one (a ruler, the pharaoh) being “conscious o f freedom.” Humans can be
that only in a community of equals. For that reason, the beginning o f
history in the strict sense is the p o lis h
Karl Marx was wrong in declaring politics the organization of work on a basis of
religion or power, and he was even more wrong in positing an abstract dialectical
structure of relationships governing human history. The Heretical Essays have
demonstrated this point. Politics is far more significant than modem political theory
makes it out to be.
It is not only Marxism with which Patocka takes issue, however, it is any
philosophy grounded in abstraction rather than the genuine experience o f phenomena. It
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is the grounding o f these philosophies in the abstract rather than in the concrete that is
the root o f their weakness. Patocka’s position is clear: “We need to philosophize on the
basis o f phenomena and not o f hypothetical constructs out o f principles." This means
we need above all to remain faithful to experience. “What,” he continues, “does
phenomenon mean? Phenomenon is what we see, what is present in our experience,...
Thus the question o f human social being is also in the fust place a phenomenological
question.”83 This reliance on the themes o f phenomenology, above all, attests to the
conviction that it is experience that must guide theory, and never the reverse. For this
reason a study o f history, the terrain o f human experience, is inherent to philosophy.
And the study o f history in these pages leads to the conclusion that the history cannot be
defined as the general recording o f events and facts, but must refer specifically to those
human activities geared towards a thematic understanding or expression o f that which
defines our humanity.
Let me turn now to a consideration o f the reliance of Patocka’s view o f history,
not only on a philosophy o f freedom, but on a politics of freedom as well. History,
Patocka argues, first becomes possible on a broad scale with the common emergence o f
philosophy and politics. The importance o f this common historical event consists in that
it sets in motion an earthquake of sorts —its rise effects a “shaking” o f the foundations
o f earlier civilizational models, foundations built up upon naive and absolutist
understandings o f meaning. The assumption o f the responsibility inherent in this
shaking presents us with manifold possibilities, albeit merely human ones. As Patocka
puts it, “history arises from the shaking o f the naive and absolute meaning in the
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virtually simultaneous and mutually interdependent rise o f politics and philosophy.
Fundamentally, history is the unfolding of embryonic possibilities present in this
shaking.”84
The rise o f philosophy and politics, conditioned upon the understanding that true
meaning is never as simple as an objective fact, opens up for man the possibility to be
free. A free existence, again, is one that distances itself from metaphysical constructs as
well as from upon the most basic instinct of the natural world, the simple will to live.
Humanity has the possibility to be ruled neither by a “system” —o f gods or o f
dialectical forces —nor by a bondage to the simple will to live that is characteristic of
the natural world. The conception o f history that Patocka has sought to impart is
grounded in the recognition o f this possibility. The rise o f philosophy and politics, he
contends, first bring this possibility into the center o f human life —via the creation o f a
setting for these pursuits in the Greek polis. This perspective is reflected, and perhaps
adequately summarized, in a passage from an article about the politics and philosophy
o f the Czech president T.G. Masaryk which I will cite in full:
This curious fact [that philosophy, precisely defined, exists only in

societies arising from out o f Greek thought], it seems to me, depends
exclusively on the historical nature o f philosophy. Philosophy, thinking,
by its emergence creates history, that unique impact on the overall
activity o f mankind. Only by means o f politics and philosophy, those
two closely related expressions o f freedom, did man become historical in
the real sense o f the word, i.e. living not just naturally, simply using what
was available, what could simply be affirmed, but by what always,
though unseen, accompanies human life, seemingly as marginalia, but
what in truth is the precondition o f all human life and behavior. History
arises when people in a certain insignificant region o f the earth cease to
live for life and begin to live in order to conquer, for themselves and
those who share their will, the space for their recognition, the space for
freedom. That is politics in its original definition: life from freedom and
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for freedom. But freedom is equivalent to a space for thought, i.e. the
realization that freedom is not a thing among things, that free existence
stands on the border between what exists and what cannot be called
existing, since it frees man from the dependence on things in order that
he might perceive them and place himself outside o f them, understand
them and his own position among them.85
This “heretical” philosophy o f history, which speaks of politics in the same breath as
philosophy, is the basis for a theory o f politics.
The notion o f politics that Patocka envisions, I should add in conclusion, is not
one that ignores questions o f political order. Although he does not pursue political
theory in the sense of a blueprint for political organization, Patocka’s philosophy is
directed towards the more practical side of politics in a way that Heidegger’s, for
example, is not. While one may argue that the Heideggerean conception o f the polis is
not political, no such claim can be made for Patocka. Richard Rorty, for example, has
noted that, while Heidegger was uninterested in the difference between democracy and
totalitarianism, Patocka was clearly concerned with the “connection between philosophy
and the ideally free and happy community.” This was a connection, Rorty continued,
that “repelled Heidegger.”86 Not so Patocka: “care for the soul,” the Czech philosopher
concluded, “is possible obviously only in a well-ordered community.”87
It is the model o f the well-ordered polis, then, a community o f equals held
together by philosophical insight, that responds directly to philosophy as care for the
soul. Jan Patocka’s life and career, however, did not play out in such a community. He
began his studies amidst the experience o f a crisis in contemporary thought and pursued
his career through a succession o f devastating political upheavals and periods of
totalitarian repression. He saw, in the world of the twentieth century, a predominance of
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extreme views. Patocka sought, in his political philosophy, a recovery o f principles
exemplified for him in a particular institutional model and a particular mode of living.
European politics and philosophy had become wedded, by the arrival o f the twentieth
century, to a pervasive nihilism that people sought to overcome through political
movements -- movements promising a secularized version o f the metaphysical certainty
they had enjoyed up until the twilight o f traditional religion and metaphysics.
Europe, Science, and M etaphysics
In the previous chapter’s discussion o f metaphysics and “Negative Platonism,” it
was noted that the influence o f metaphysical thinking was crucial to the conquest o f
nature via the progressive development o f science and technology. The movement from
Greek thought to the thought of the scientific Enlightenment was not, o f course, a rapid
or direct step. Between the two lies a vast period o f time during which both scientific
and philosophical thought were subsumed within the dominant perspective o f European
Christianity. A significant part o f the philosophy of history that Patocka outlines in his
Essays is dedicated to tracing a continuity in European thought tied to a basic
metaphysical framework. The positing o f an absolute and objective Idea was an event,
he charges, that affected not only the development of Christianity but also the
development of science and, in its wake, a scientific or objectivistic understanding o f
politics. Patocka outlined this argument first in the 1950’s with “Negative Platonism,”
but then again in greater detail in the 1970’s with the third o f his Heretical Essays. it is
this latter text that contains the details o f his thesis and the profound effect that it had on
his understanding of contemporary politics and its shortcomings.
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Light and Darkness
In Chapter Three o f the H eretical Essays, Patocka characterizes both the positive
potential o f genuine philosophy as well as its decline into metaphysics via a
metaphorical description o f events that reverses the conventional symbolic meaning of
“light” and “darkness.” Philosophy, he argues, had offered to man a new vision o f
eternity in the concept o fphiisis, the eternal and imperishable genesis and perishing of
all that there is. Implicit in this concept o f nature and the cosmos was a sense o f
mystery, an image of a darkness out o f which the light o f the dawn o f the cosmos and its
order is bom. There is, in this image o f a dark night, a sense o f the transcendent mystery
o f human reality that is positive, for out o f it order and meaning are created. Like
philosophy, however, this sense o f the metaphor o f darkness was soon to be eclipsed by
the human desire for certain meaning, for foundation in objectivity.
However, just as the life o f the free polis was granted but a short time to
unfold in its free daring, fearlessly aiming for the unknown, so also
philosophy, aware o f its bond with the problem o f the po lis and sensing
in the germ already its perils and perishing, was led by a striving for a
definitive and new bestowal o f meaning to see in that darkness only a
lack o f light, the night as a waning o f the day (emphasis mine).88
The transition that Patocka is describing here is one away from a philosophy that
responds to being, found by Heidegger in presocratic philosophy but by Patocka in the
example of Socrates, who remained linked to his predecessors, and towards a
metaphysical philosophy that substitutes an objective absolute for the mysterious
uncertainty o f reality. With the certainty of an absolute all is sunshine and light and the
symbol o f darkness, o f a tentative mystery, is reduced to a negative counterpart. The
symbol o f darkness, which is prominent in the sixth o f the H eretical Essays and
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certainly contributes to the controversial tone o f that essay, is considerably clearer when
seen in this context, for it is evident that Patocka uses it to symbolize the element of
problematicity inherent to the free polis and to the care for the soul.89 This uncertainty,
this darkness, is the origin o f light; to ignore its generative properties and attempt to
negate it as one grabs for clarity is, in Patocka’s imagery, an attempt to deny one’s
humanity.
Christianity and Metaphysics
The rise of Christianity in the Roman Empire was an event o f world-historic
proportions, and one not unrelated to the change in philosophy and the decline o f the
free polis that it followed. In the Patockan analysis, there is a continuity between the
formulation which set into motion that change -- the Platonic Idea as an “other” world —
and the Christian conception o f God. The development o f Christianity from out of
Judaism was contingent upon the inheritance of a conceptual formulation from Greece.
As he puts it, “[d]ivine transcendence, whose conceptual foundations undoubtedly do
not lie in Israel’s treasury o f ideas, is an inheritance of the ‘true world’ formulated once
by Plato and transformed theologically by Aristotle.”90 The Christian conception of the
human relationship to a divine and transcendent God, in what is unfortunately a
somewhat superficial account given in broad strokes, is described as a response to the
perception that even metaphysical philosophy could not deliver the certainty it
promised. Though in a sense it sought to do so with metaphysics, philosophy still could
not provide humans with clearly intelligible and positive meaning. In faith, however,
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“God’s word addressed to humans and the response to this word,” positive meaning was
guaranteed and along with it a means to face human misery without utter resignation.91
Christianity, while it did not allow man to understand God in perfect clarity,
offered the security o f a reciprocal relationship in faith, a new community to replace the
loss of the polis. That community, grounded in a metaphysical relationship rather than
in freedom, nevertheless offered a genuine meaningfiilness and sense o f equality.
Thus the question of meaning is resolved positively by dismissing

philosophy and by countering scepticism with the word from an
otherwise inaccessible “true” world. On this basis there grows a new
community and a new way o f coming to cognitive terms with the totality
o f what-there-is. It is a new community, which, to be sure, is no longer
simply the work of humans but in which humans do participate freely. It
is not only a community of humans with each other, a mutual recognition
in which they guarantee each other a spiritual perpetuation in the
memory o f glory. It is, rather, a community o f humans with God who is
their eternal memory and the perception of their essential spiritual being.
It is a community in which, for all its hierarchy, all humans are equal
before the face of the ultimate “true” reality; in which they are thus true
fellow participants in a meaningfiilness which they did not create but
which they are called to bring about.92
Christianity offered a positive meaningfiilness and a community that could withstand
the tribulations o f human life in the world, including those o f despotic political regimes
in which equality was denied. Equality, after all, was an integral part o f the human
compact with God and thereby guaranteed on a higher level.
With the rise o f Christianity, as with metaphysics, a foundation for human life
and understanding is achieved and with it the sense o f security that accompanies the
feeling of solid ground under one’s feet. This understanding and security provided man
with another attribute previously held in check by the inherent uncertainty o f freedom. It
provided him with daring. The foundation provided by the metaphysical basis o f
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Christianity left man free to pursue “all speculative daring” without fear of a fall into
meaninglessness.
Here, then, we need to grasp the new place and significance which
metaphysics assumes in the complex o f Christian faith and doctrine...
The significance o f metaphysical thought and metaphysical
inquiry...becomes that, within the framework provided by faith and
guaranteed thereby, it is possible to some extent to come to understand
what faith offers. Rational cognition thus reaches transcendent goals
without fear o f going astray, while on the other hand we can devote
ourselves to all speculative daring without being led to the regions of
scepticism where meaninglessness lurks. Reason as the natural organ for
the understanding o f truth loses its place o f pride in life, but we might
claim that this loss is at the same time a gain: for it gains firm
foundation, certainty, and with it daring.93
The “speculative daring” to which Patocka refers was exemplified, in Western history,
in the scientific quest for knowledge and control o f nature.
Science and Metaphysics
The development o f science, it was noted earlier, was a process also contingent
upon the ascendency o f metaphysics over a philosophy o f freedom. In the analysis of
Patocka and others, it was a specific characteristic o f the Christian assumption of
metaphysics that humans were set above nature in such a way that it, in effect, became
theirs to rule and control. One o f those cited by Patocka as a source for this line of
reasoning is Karl Lowith. Lowith, Patocka notes, cited a relationship between the
Christian view o f nature and the modem crisis of meaning epitomized by nihilism.94 It is
a relationship upon which Patocka builds in his own analysis o f science and the
foundation o f meaning in the modem world.
According to [Lowith]..., another Christian source o f nihilism is the

relation to nature as a reservoir of objects given to humans to rule and
care for. The idea which first meant care for things entrusted to humans
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turned in the modern age into a doctrine o f domination and exploitation
o f the treasury o f nature with no regard not only for nature itself but for
future humankind as well.
More important, however, is that for the Christians nature need
not be that concrete reality within which they are submerged and to
which they belong as to one o f the fundamental loci o f the epiphany o f
its mystery but rather, at least since the age o f nominalism, an object o f
judgment and speculation. Nature is not given and evident but rather
distant and alien, to be formed by the means o f our psyche. The locus o f
meaning and being is God in God’s relation to the human soul: nature is
the locus o f cold, abstract reflection. Thus with regard to nature modern
humanity builds not on antiquity,.. .but rather on the Christian mode o f
regarding it with a cool distance and distrust.95
The view o f nature as something to be examined, controlled and exploited, when
combined with the “speculative daring” with which man is imbued when he is secure o f
a foundation o f meaning, was in turn instrumental in the development and progressive
advancement of natural science. Nature, no longer something autonomous with which
we interact, began to be considered a formal object, an object of natural science
investigation.
Christianity, then, positively influenced the development o f the very thing that
would challenge its supremacy in the world. The scientific worldview would not only
overthrow Christianity on the European stage, it would dethrone it with an appeal to a
nihilism, a refusal to recognize beings other than those explicable by science. The
success of mathematical natural science, Patocka explains,
... becomes the source o f a new, soberly audacious view o f the whole o f
reality which recognizes no beings other than those at which we arrive by
such mathematical reconstruction o f the world o f the senses in which we
naturally move. Thus, with the help o f the Christian conception o f
meaningfulness and nurtured by Christianity, a new conception o f reality
grew in the womb of the Western European society.96
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This new conception o f reality, unlike the conception it gradually replaced, did not look
for a sense o f meaningfulness. In fact, it became inevitable that the success o f the
sciences would increasingly make irrelevant the very notion o f a non-scientific source
of meaning.
The transition from a theocentrism to a scientific anthropocentrism, however,
does not mean that Western man has rid himself of the longing for truth or meaning.
This longing persists in the anthropocentric age, and manifests itself in movements that
offer, on a secular or scientific level, the same certainty of meaning once offered by
Christianity.
European humanity has become so accustomed to this Christian

conception o f the meaning o f history and of the universe that it cannot let
go of some o f its substantive traits even where fundamental Christian
concepts such as God the creator, savior, and judge have ceased to be
significant for it, and that it continues to seek meaning in a secularized
Christian conception in which humans or humanity step into God’s
place.97
In these “secularized” formulations of metaphysics meaning and ultimate clarity is
provided, based either on the infallibility o f method as in the natural sciences and
positivism, or, more perniciously, as when the formulations concern supposed social or
historical forces, on the promise of a redemptive end in a political movement or a
philosophy o f history that explains itself in terms of logical sequences. It is possible,
particularly with the latter type o f formulation, that whole societies may be drawn into
an anthropocentric metaphysical scheme. Most such schemes, like Comte’s “Cult of
Humanity,” will not be successful, but there is also the possibility that societies may:
“by force and defiance seek to enforce meaning where ex datis there can be none, as in
the case of Marxism. Not Marxism as a teaching, as a critical social science, rather, as
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the ‘sacred’ doctrine o f new, restructured, and aggressive societies, exploiting the
corroding scepticism o f the old.”98 In addition to Comte and Marx, Patocka points to
Hegel and Sartre for the metaphysical nature o f their philosophical programs. Nietzsche,
though often praised for his diagnosis o f the problem, also reflects the fallacy of the
anthropocentric solution to the lack o f meaning. In fact, Patocka writes, the
phenomenon o f the “secularized Christian conception” is actually “an unwitting
example o f the Nietzschean contradiction embodied in the prescription that if there is no
meaning, we need to create it ‘by imposing an order on the portion o f the world within
our reach.’”99 Thus the phenomenon o f the secularization o f metaphysics is present in
politics and science as well as in speculative philosophy.
In the modem scientific perspective, which now dominates even the social
sciences, the human is often considered as little more than “an organism maintaining a
metabolic exchange with its context and reproducing itself.”100 In this case, Patocka
notes ironically, it is as if man has reverted to a situation characteristic o f prehistory, a
bondage o f human life to itself.
Thus it seems as if the whole movement o f history, after all the drive for
absolute meaning in politics, in philosophies o f a metaphysical cast, in
religion that probed as deeply as Christianity, ended up where it began —
with the bondage of life to its self-consumption and with work as the
basic means of its perpetuation.101
In truth, however, this comparison does not do justice to the age of prehistory. It may
seem as if the nihilism of modernity has something in common with the period prior to
philosophy, “[y]et it is not so,” Patocka contends. “Prehistoricity is not characterized by
a deprivation o f meaning, it is not nihilistic like our times. Prehistorical meaning may
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be modest, but it is not relativistic.”102 A pervasive meaninglessness is Dot a
characteristic o f civilization founded on the model o f the household; it is rather a
consequence o f the human desire to replace human meaning, problematic meaning, with
a certain truth. When certain truth turns out not to be compatible with scientific inquiry
and skepticism, the result is a descent into nihilism.
A Recovery
This question o f meaning is a problem for the contemporary world, and nowhere
more so than in the realm o f politics. The lack o f a center o f meaning in the wake o f the
decline o f metaphysics is not merely a sociological problem (though Patocka notes that
the whole discipline of sociology basically grew up out of the perceived need to
understand the pathologies specific to modem man), it is a political problem. Politics,
Patocka wrote, turns the subject matter of philosophy into the practice o f life itself; and
in the post-metaphysical world, the practice o f life has taken its lead from the void of
meaning left by the decline o f metaphysics.
The human need for meaning has not evaporated in the scientific era. To the
contrary, insofar as traditional forms o f meaning are no longer available or convincing,
then the search for meaningful substitutes becomes increasingly prevalent. Patocka’s
analysis o f the modem world implies that metaphysics has been replaced in the realm of
politics by two things, neither o f which are satisfactory. The choices open to man are:
first, as 1 discussed above, the philosophical systems or political movements that aim to
provide a substitute, on the level o f the secular, for metaphysical meaning and certainty.
On the other side o f the coin, however, are the liberal-democratic political systems that
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manage to evade this temptation by grounding themselves in a scientific materialism
that avoids the question o f meaning altogether.
In the fifth “heretical” essay, Patocka deals with the question o f the “decadence”
or “decline” o f the contemporary world, by which he means not its failure in the realm
o f morality, but its loss o f contact with “the innermost nerve of its functioning,” the
self-awareness that comes with an understanding o f history and the care for the soul.
The options open to “post-metaphysical” man, he concludes, encourage this decline, for
they resolutely avoid, after the decline o f metaphysics, a genuine and open approach to
the question o f meaning. Whereas scientifically-grounded liberalism seeks to avoid the
question o f meaning (such that the citizens o f modem democracies delve ever deeper
into orgiastic forms of “escape” from responsibility for meaning), radical political
movements do even worse in offering false, secular “substitutes” for a lost sense o f
meaning and certainty.
Patocka’s philosophy of history and politics is a concrete response to a situation
he feels is one of crisis. The rediscovery o f history in the active pursuit o f freedom, the
epitome o f which was the historical founding o f the polis as a site grounded in the
rejection o f given meaning and the acceptance o f the problematicity o f merely human
meaning, is directed to this end. This philosophy o f history and politics is a response to
the twin philosophical and political problems of the contemporary world: the problem
o f scientific nihilism on the one hand and objective versions o f metaphysics on the
other. He is not the first to suggest a solution to this perceived crisis, but his approach is
unique in finding, in European history, a conception o f freedom and a view o f the soul
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that neither limits itself to the human and avoids the meaningfiilness o f the whole within
which humans exist, nor turns that experiential whole into an objectified being or goal
that can offer a certainty o f meaning not available to authentic humanity.
Dostoyevski proposes Byzantine Christianity, Nietzsche an eternal return

o f the same as the solution to the crisis. Yet the very foundation of
Christianity, the rediscovery o f eternity, presupposes a repetition of
something which once was real at the very beginning o f the European
era: the soul as that within us which is related to that unperishing and
imperishable component o f the whole which makes possible truth and in
truth the being not of a superman but of an authentically human being.103
Patocka’s philosophy o f history and his analysis o f the polis aim at this “repetition” o f
an insight that was alive at the beginning of the European era. It is not a repetition in
any common sense, however, for it an option to us only now, after the insight of
contemporary thought has renewed the possibility o f our access to it.
In order to concretely consider the feasibility o f a politics integrated with an
understanding of history, Patocka must first examine in greater detail the condition of
the contemporary age that makes his work an imperative. He must also describe the
content o f that politics and defend its problematic conception o f meaning. In the
following chapter, I will take up Patocka’s view o f politics in the twentieth century and
its shortcomings, and will outline in concrete terms the type of philosophical politics he
envisions as our only authentic alternative. I will conclude by examining the role —and
the form -- o f ethics in the politics that emerges from this philosophy o f history and the
soul.
End Notes
‘Paul Ricoeur, Preface to the French Edition o f Jan Patocka, H eretical Essays in
the Philosophy o f History, viii.
207
2See Patocka, Heretical Essays, 69.
3Ibid., 92.
4Ibid.
sibid., 93.
«Ibid., 118.
7See Kohak, Jan Patocka, 26.
8Jan Patofika, “Some Comments Concerning the Concept o f a ‘World History,’”

unpublished translation by Erazim Kohak, TMs (photocopy), 9. See also the original
“Nekolik poznamek o pojmu 'svetovych dejin, Ceskd mysi 3 1, (1935) 86-96.
9Patocka, “Negative Platonism,” 191.
I0Ibid.
MIbid.
,3See Patocka, “Nekolik poznamek k pojmum dejin a dejepisu” (Some

Comments Concerning the Concepts o f History and Historiography), in Pece o dusi I,
43-44. See also Erazim Kohak, “A Philosophical Biography,” 28; and Heidegger, Being
and Time, “Division One: Preparatory Fundamental Analysis o f Dasein.”
I4Patocka, “Some Comments Concerning the Concept of a ‘World History,’” 1.
16Ibid., 46.
17Ibid.
lsIbid., 51.
19Ibid.
20Tucker, Fenomenologie apolitika, 63. See also the Appendix to this work, pp.
370-372.
208
21A similar critique o f Husserl was made by Eric Voegelin, also a Central
European scholar on whom Husserl’s Crisis o f European Sciences made a significant
impression. Voegelin writes o f his shock at Husserl’s search for an apodiktische Anfang
an “apodictic beginning” to a final philosophy. Philosophy can never, Voegelin argued,
have the character o f apodicticity. Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis, trans. and ed. by Gerhart
Niemeyer (Columbia, Missouri: University o f Missouri Press, 1990) 9-10.
—Patocka, “Cartesianism and Phenomenology,” in Jan Patocka, 315.
^Patocka, H eretical Essays, 27.
24Ibid. 103.
^ b id ., 44.
2<5Patocka writes, “At first glance this conception seems to revive the naive
rationalism o f the eighteenth century for which enlightenment, light, is the sole source
o f life. In truth, it is integral to the entire cast o f Husserl’s phenomenology and
phenomenological philosophy.” Ibid., 44-45.
27Ibid., 45.
2sThe content o f alternative philosophies or cultural symbols are open to

successful analysis in an attempt to discover the commonalities in the experiences that
underlie them. On this point, see Eric Voegelin’s discussion of the concept o f
“equivalences of experiences” in, for instance, “Equivalences of Experience and
Symbolization in History,” in The Collected Works o f Eric Voegelin, Vol. 12: Published
Essays 1966-1985, ed. Ellis Sandoz (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1990) 115-133.
30Patocka, “Some Comments Concerning the Concept of a ‘World History,”’ 4.
31Ibid., 5-6.
32Ibid., 5.
33Patocka, H eretical Essays, 10.
34Ibid., 11. On the question o f the “movements” o f life, see Chapter Two o f this
work, pgs. 67-76, above.
209
3SSee Kohak, “A Philosophical Biography,” 120.
37Ibid., 13.
38Ibid., 14.
39On this point see, for example, the 1953 text, “Negative Platonism.”
^Patocka, Heretical Essays, 14. See also Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition
(Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1958).
41Patocka, Heretical Essays., 15.
42Ibid., 16.
43Ibid., 23. See also Arendt, The Human Condition, 38-49.
-“Ibid.
45lbid„ 25.
^ b id .
47Ibid., 29.
4SIbid., 37-38.
49Ibid., 40.
50Ibid., 41.
5IPatocka, Europe and the Post-European Age, 30.
52Patocka, H eretical Essays, 41.
S3See Chapter Three, pp. 126-28, above.
5Slbid., 49.
56Ibid.
210
57Patocka, “The Problem o f Truth from the Perspective o f Negative Platonism,”
461.
“ Patocka, “Negative Platonism,” 194.
59Ibid.
“ Patocka, “Filosofie Vychovy” (The Philosophy of Education), in Pece o dusi I

(Care for the Soul, Vol. I), 434.
6IIbid., 435.
“ Freedom, Patocka wrote in another early essay, “must o f itself aim at an

authority, at submission to clear overall perspectives, in short, at a lawgiving on which
all are free to colaborate [sic] though under the rigorous eye o f the guardians o f what w
have achieved thus far (though that need not be people but rather certain spiritual
deeds).” “The Idea of Liberal Education and its Contemporary Relevance,” unpublished
translation by Erazim Kohak, TMs, 17. See also “Myslenka vzdelanosti a je ji dnesni
a/ctualnost, ” Kriticky mesicnik 1, no. 6 (1938) 241-53.
“ Patocka, “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” 2.
“ Ibid., 2.
6S“I think that the world spiritual does not sound pleasant today, it sounds in
some way spiritualist and we don’t like such phrases nowadays; but does there exist a
better expression for what I have in mind?” Ibid., 1. See also Chapter One, above, p. 16
“ Ibid., 3.
“ Ibid., 4.
“ Ibid.
“ Patocka, Heretical Essays, 39.
70Ibid„ 39-40.
71Ibid„ 39.
7-Ibid.
73Ibid., 47.
211
74This is clearly evident in the works o f the 1930’s. For example, in “On the
Essence o f Truth,” Heidegger makes an analysis upon which Pato£ka builds, concludin
that “the essence of truth reveals itself as freedom,” which in turn is defined as
disclosure or unconcealment. In “The Origin o f the Work o f Art,” however, the
questions o f freedom —or unconcealment —and history are examined, not in terms o f
how they play themselves out in the realm o f the social or political, but rather in terms
of art. It is art and poetry, not politics, that dominate Heidegger’s later philosophy. Art
attains to history through its founding activity, and so relates most directly, not merely
to beings in their practical manifestations, but to beings as a whole: “Art as poetry is
founding,... Always when beings as a whole, as being themselves, demand a grounding
in openness, art attains to its historical essence as foundation. This foundation happened
in the W est for the first time in Greece. What was in the future to be called Being was
set into work, setting the standard.” Martin Heidegger. “The Origin o f the Work o f Art,
in Basic Writings, 201.
7SThis conclusion contrasts distinctly, I should note, with the opinion o f Erazim
Kohak, who wrote that, “Jan Patocka, after all, had never been...a political
philosopher.” Kohak, “A Philosophical Biography,” 3.
76Patocka, “Platonism and Politics,” in Two Articles by Jan Patocka, trans. Eric
Manton, CTS-96-09, (Prague: Center for Theoretical Study, 1996), 2.
7sSee Plato, The Republic, 368c-d. See also the discussion o f the
“anthropological principle” in Eric Voegelin, The New Science o f Politics (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1987), 61-63.
79Patocka, “Author’s Glosses to the Heretical Essays,” in H eretical Essays, 139.
80Ibid., 142-143.
SIHere I would note David Easton’s definition o f politics as the “authoritative

allocations o f values for society as a whole,” or Harold Lasswell’s more pithy view as
“who gets what, when, and how.”
82Ibid., 148.
83Ibid., 149.
8SPatocka, “An Attempt at a Czech National Philosophy and its Failure,” in T.G.
212
M asaryk in Perspective, ed. M. Capek and K. Hruby (New York: SVU Press, 1981) 1.
86Rorty, “The Seer o f Prague,” 36, 37.
89The “controversial tone” o f the last o f the Heretical Essays has been noticed b
numerous commentators, among them Paul Ricoeur, who noted in his introduction to
the Essays the “strange, frankly shocking passages” about darkness and war.
"Patocka, Heretical Essays, 67.
91Ibid., 66-67.
"Ibid., 67.
"Ibid., 68-69.
94See Karl Lowith, M eaning in History: The Theological Implications o f the

Philosophy o f History (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1949).
9SPatocka, H eretical Essays, 69.
m id ., 70.
97Ibid., 69.
"Ibid., 72. Further discussion o f the critique of Marxian materialism may be

found in Four Seminars on the Problem o f Europe, Patocka’s unpublished series of
underground seminars from 1973. Here Patocka notes that the Marxian pretense of the
dialectic to totality and absoluteness is destructive o f the historicity o f being. See Ctyri
seminare kproblem u Evropy (Four Seminars on the Problem o f Europe), 327.
"Ibid. On Hegel and Sartre see Patocka’s comments in Body, Community,

Language, World, p. 53 and p. 60, respectively.
1“ Patocka, Heretical Essays, 73.
10tIbid., 74.
102Ibid.
213
I03Ibid., 93.
214
CARING FOR THE SOUL IN A POSTMODERN AGE
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAN PATOCKA
VOLUME II
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty o f the

Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment o f the
requirements for the degree o f
Doctor o f Philosophy
in
The Department o f Political Science
by
B.A., University o f Virginia, 1988
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1997
May 2000
CHA PTER 5
PO LITIC S AND ETHICS IN THE TW EN TIETH CENTURY
In the last two o f his Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History, Pato£ka
turns from the development of a philosophy of history to an application o f its principles
in the contemporary world. We see, in these essays, an expression o f the political side of
his philosophy. Although Jan Patodka became known as a dissident in Czechoslovakia
in the 1970s, his political philosophy cannot accurately be characterized as “dissident”
philosophy. Its focus is not resistance and its relevance is not limited to periods of
ideological repression. The ground o f Patodka’s political dissidence is a form o f
political morality and commitment to truth. Politics must be subservient, he argues in
Charter 77, to something that transcends it and holds it accountable. What on the
surface may resemble a commitment to a straightforward metaphysics o f morals,
however, is something quite other. Metaphysics as the foundation for politics is
precisely what Patoika wishes to avoid. PatoCka’s philosophical outlook, as we have
seen in the preceding chapters, is grounded in an understanding o f human historicity and
problematicity that explicitly denies the possibility o f a simple metaphysics. There is an
unambiguous moral element to the political philosophy o f Jan PatoCka, an element that
he claims is the product of, rather than in conflict with, his ontological philosophy of
history.
In this chapter I will examine Patoika’s political texts -- including the final two
and most radical o f his Heretical Essays —with the aim o f coming to grips with the
political and ethical implications contained therein. It is PatoSka’s belief that an
215
understanding o f human ontology and human historicity, as he has developed these
concepts, will lead the individual to a mode o f comportment that is inherently truthful
and ethical. And it will do so in a way that avoids the pitfalls o f metaphysics. This
behavior on the part of dedicated individuals, by extension, provides the greatest
possibility for the genuine improvement of not merely political societies but Western
civilization as a whole. It would represent a recovery o f the spirit o f rationality in the
West that had its origin in Greek philosophy and was alluded to by Husserl in his work
on the crisis o f the European sciences.
The texts in question, not merely the final two Heretical Essays but also texts on
the spiritual basis of political activity and the competition in Europe among various
manifestations o f modem “supercivilization,” reveal not only Patodka’s understanding
of political ethics but also his personal relationship to the tumultuous political scene in
Central Europe during this century. These texts will also lead us to an examination of
his experience with communism and his decision to act as a dissident, culminating in his
fatal involvement with Charter 77.
Pato£ka and Politics
In the contemporary world, Pato£ka argues, governance has the character o f an
“accidental rule.”1It is not a rule infused by an understanding o f either man or history —
but by a misunderstanding. Such misunderstanding is reflected not only in the politics
of totalitarian movements, but also in the more conventional politics of the scientific
age, where the individual is often reduced to a mere role and conceived o f as a “force”
216
rather than a human being. “The question,” Patodka writes, “is whether historical
humans are still willing to embrace history.”2
Embracing history means understanding human historicity; it means
understanding freedom and transcendence and accepting the problematicity inherent in
human life. It involves an openness, not only to the things o f the world, but to the world
as a whole that transcends those particulars. Modem civilization has as yet failed to
embrace history in large part because it continually seeks to solve it, to end its fatal
uncertainty and contingency. “Modem civilization suffers not only from its own flaws
and myopia but also from the failure to resolve the entire problem o f history. Yet the
problem o f history may not be resolved, it must be preserved as a problem , (emphasis
mine)”3 An age that reduces understanding to a mathematical equation cannot hope to
understand history as a problem that is not subject to a solution. Rather, contemporary,
technologically-oriented civilization views history as a problem to be solved, and
humans as forces to be manipulated to this end. The recognition o f history —o f human
life as problematic, and o f man as a historical being ~ is precisely what technological
civilization denies. Problematicity and contingency are viewed as something to be
overcome and controlled, rather than recognized.
In the last two o f his Heretical Essays, Patodka explores the effect o f these
phenomena on the twentieth century. His aim, after diagnosing the situation and its root
causes, is to consider the variety o f responses available to the individual. The hope for a
simple solution has already been rejected —it is contrary to the very nature o f human
historicity. Accepting this fact, however, is a difficult prospect requiring considerable
217
struggle and fortitude. Again following Plato and Socrates rather than Heidegger or
Husserl, PatoCka locates hope not in history or in society, but in the individual, the
“spiritual person” who is able to recognize and accept problematicity. Only through
such people does the possibility exist for a “metanoesis,” a “turn” o f the civilization as a
whole.4
Though Pato£ka requires that “spiritual people” act politically, he is not
suggesting a system o f rule on the order of Plato’s Republic. It is not a question of
placing them in the position o f guardians or rulers. In contemporary society they already
occupy positions o f importance: they may be engineers or artists, writers or clerics,
perhaps even political leaders. The question is not one o f their becoming politicians, but
o f their acting politically —their acting publicly and in mutual recognition so as to lead
society towards the understanding of history that is presupposed by the existence o f a
historical civilization.
The question of Patoika’s political writings is not a simple one; there is a
genuine lack o f secondary source material on the subject. Yet contrary to the contention
o f Erazim Kohak, who argued that “Jan PatoCka, after all, had never been a political
activist or, for that matter, even a political philosopher,”5 the Czech philosopher both
expressed himself politically on many occasions and consistently made explicit the
underlying relevance o f his philosophy to politics. The relevant essays appear, not
merely in his dissident phase, but throughout his career; in order to grasp the core of my
disagreement with Kohak, to grasp Pato£ka as a “political” philosopher, I must examine
these texts carefully.
218
Europe and Existentialism in Pato£ka’s Early Work
The course of Pato£ka’s career was heavily influenced by the events of his time
—o f this there can be no doubt.6 The first o f many decisive turns o f history for Patocka
and the Czechs occurred when the glory o f the first independent Czechoslovak Republic
under Masaryk was confronted with the rise o f Adolph Hitler and National Socialism,
followed shortly thereafter by the betrayal o f the West at Munich and the Nazi
occupation o f the Sudetenland. Like Husserl in his Crisis lectures, Pato£ka expressed
his critique o f this approaching storm in terms o f resistance to an attack on the
philosophical spirit o f Europe. The young Patodka was greatly inspired by the elder
philosopher’s rejection o f this “irrationalism” and his call for a rebirth o f Europe
“through a heroism of reason.”7 Unlike Husserl, however, the young Czech saw
something in the Existenzphilosophie of Jaspers and Heidegger that did not conflict with
his search for the rational spirit of Western thought. In many of his texts of the thirties,
these influences combine to produce a philosophical approach that, while recognizable
as that o f a young man -- characterized by a sense o f philosophy as heroic resistance and
a rejection o f all naive “leaning on an absolute power” for support* —nevertheless
projects a basic continuity with his more mature work.
Characteristic o f these texts, for example, is a strong critique of religion and an
exhortation o f a life in “amplitude” over a life in “balance.”9 He also takes issue,
significantly, with T.G. Masaryk’s condemnation o f what he called “titanism.”
Titanism, as Masaryk saw it, was equivalent to Dostoyevsky’s understanding of
“nihilism as a deification o f man, enthroning man in place o f God as the highest
219
lawgiver.” Whereas “Dostoyevsky speaks o f nihilism, Masaryk speaks o f titanism.”10
This critique, though, is decidedly not in favor of nihilism. Rather, he criticizes
Masaryk's oversimplification of the problem into one o f subjectivism versus
objectivism, o f modem subjectivism versus the idea o f an objective reason in God. For
the young Pato£ka, Masaryk’s formulation is over-determined. It implies that “man’s
striving to give meaning to his life” is tantamount to Titanism, and that the man who
does so, who “gives up the moral crutch o f an external command” and denies his
dependence on “salvation from without,” inevitably finds himself in a “blind alley.”11
Patocka rejects the deterministic nature o f this conclusion. In fact, he argues, the
subjective “titanic” approach may actually uncover the “germ o f a solution” in its
rejection o f an absolute and objective foundation in God.12The alternatives are not as
clear-cut as Masaryk’s dichotomy between a nihilistic subjectivism and a moral
objectivism would suggest. Above all, Pato£ka wants to examine human existence
through the concepts of man and the world, never through a notion o f a concrete,
transcendental being who picks us up when we stumble. For Pato£ka it is the world as a
whole and our relation to it that transcends man and forms the context for our striving.
Thus he issues an apology of sorts, contra Masaryk, for the philosophical “titan” willing
to reject facile objectivism.
There is a dangerous element to this quasi-existential posture, of course. It could
be argued that Patodka comes close to titanism in the nihilistic sense to which
Dostoyevsky refers. Such a conclusion, however, would be inaccurate. The curious mix
in these early texts of what Erazim Kohak described as “existentialist passion with
utmost scholarly rigor,”13 manifests instead a tension between a youthful, existentialist
220
urge to reject traditional philosophy and a Husserlian urge to renew European reason.
Although PatoCka’s early writings are distinctly characterized by this heroic conception
o f philosophy, yet they are not essentially existentialist, and certainly not nihilistic,
texts.14 While Pato£ka recognized and appreciated in existentialism its critique o f
traditional thought and its diagnosis o f crisis, his own prescriptions called for a
reflective renewal, rather than a rejection o f the spirit o f European philosophy and
politics.
Pato£ka rejects neither “European culture” nor the Nietzschean critique o f that
culture. He wants to learn from Nietzsche and the theme o f the titanic resistance to the
gods. This is so because Pato£ka’s conception o f philosophy demands a quasi-titanic
courage, a willingness to forego an absolute foundation for our ethical and social being.
Yet he does not wish to follow Nietzsche into his nihilistic conclusions. Never does he
succumb to the ultimate danger of placing oneself in the position reserved for God --
that is, the Nietzschean recourse to the superman. In 1934, the young Patocka
characterized the key difference in his own approach to philosophy as follows:
As Christianity by consecration, as Buddha by dissolution into the

universal, as socialism by the vision of a future society, so Nietzsche
wants to redeem life through the Superman. Could philosophy ultimately
mean that there is no salvation in life?15
Patocka does argue that life cannot be saved, but by this he means that it has no recourse
to an objective savior, neither to an absolute being nor to a system that will bring
progressive perfection. The lack o f a savior, however, does not mean an ultimate
nihilism and does not subordinate morality to will to power. As Husserl contended,
Western civilization need not be abandoned; it must merely be understood once again in
221
relation to its nucleus in the ancient Greek concept o f reason —the nucleus o f the
concepts o f philosophy and politics, democracy and the polis.
The degree to which Patodka defends the essential spirit o f European
philosophy, even in his early years, is evident in a 1939 article entitled “European
Culture” and aimed against the rise o f National Socialism. Here the universalist spirit
that defines European civilization is defended against the romanticism evident at the
core o f National Socialism. That nationalistic romanticism, Pato£ka clearly saw,
represented a serious threat to the progress in democratic governance associated with
Western politics since the Enlightenment: that free people could govern themselves with
voluntary self-discipline. The rise o f National Socialism showed, in fact, that that
principle “in and o f its e lf was not enough to overcome international tension.16The idea
of the Enlightenment was not itself the idea of Europe; it reflected some aspects o f that
spirit, but obscured others. In this very brief text, PatoCka refers only superficially to a
“contemplative aspect” o f European civilization, represented by Greek philosophy. The
road to the truly universal essence o f European civilization, which offers the best hope
for overcoming the international tendencies towards political dissolution, must lead
through this aspect. “If some kind o f cure for the ills o f European civilization is to come
about,” Patocka writes, “a way must be found back to the idea that is a correlative to the
contemplative, and to recapturing the inner life. The Enlightenment must be revitalized
on its true, purified foundations.”17 The argument o f this essay by no means compares to
Patocka’s more mature work, but it does illustrate the fact that, beneath the verbiage
222
about a heroic “life in amplitude,” Pato£ka remained dedicated to constructing, rather
than dissolving, the bonds of European civilization.
Patodka’s early conception o f philosophy, though somewhat immature and at
times overdetermined in favor o f a youthful heroism, nevertheless prefigures his
understanding o f history as the relinquishing o f an absolute ground under our feet and
over our heads. In the years following World War II and the liberation o f the country,
Patocka returned to the University and focused his energies on filling a desperate need
for lectures in the basics o f Western philosophy. His work from this period consists
primarily o f these collected lectures on the Greeks. His interpretation o f Socrates, Plato
and Aristotle was to result in his “negative Platonism,” with its notion o f freedom as a
rejection o f objectified, metaphysical constructions.
“Supercivilization” and the Question of Socialism
The period o f the 1950s saw Patodka attempt to engage and understand the
historical epoch in which he lived. This meant dealing with the concrete aspects o f
contemporary, rational civilization. With the end o f the second world war, it was clear
that the traditional form o f European civilization had come to an end. Empires had been
dismantled and faith in traditional models o f civilization had given way to a competition
for supremacy among various forms o f rationalist, universal civilizations. Patodka’s
response to this situation was a thematic consideration of the very question of
contemporary civilization; he sought to understand whether the modem variety
represented just another civilization among civilizations, or whether it was something
fundamentally different, a form o f “super-civilization.” This question meant that he
223
would have specifically to take up the two dominant versions o f modem civilization, the
socialist versus the liberal democratic.
It was in this period that Pato£ka wrote one o f his most explicitly political
essays, concluding in it that the current civilizational epoch was one unlike any other ~
it was an epoch o f rational “super-civilization.” This article —an unfinished piece
entitled “Supercivilization and Its Inner Conflict” —is a fascinating example o f political
philosophy, containing some o f Patodka’s most explicit analysis of the theory behind
contemporary western civilization. In it, Patoika attempts to expose the essence o f
contemporary civilization, paying particular attention to the conflicting possibilities it
offers. It is a consideration o f the very concept o f modem civilization undertaken, as
Ivan Blecha notes, from within one version o f it.18 Pato£ka contended, in summary, that
the concept, or idea, o f modem civilization, characterized by its commitment to
universalism and faith in a “heightened rationalism,” was o f a different order than with
civilizations o f the past. This “supercivilizational” order manifested itself in the
superiority o f the sciences and the reduction o f philosophy to a question o f method.19
The bulk o f the article, however, is not simply a description o f the supercivilization, but
an analysis o f the ongoing conflict among different versions of it. Pato£ka not only
offers an insightful look at what he calls “radical supercivilization,” which is the
embryo o f totalitarianism,20 but he contrasts it with a similarly insightful analysis o f the
alter ego o f modem totalitarianism, the liberal democratic order that is a more moderate
version o f supercivilization.
224
Modem supercivilization, Pato£ka argues, is distinguished by “moderate” and
“radical” forms, exemplified in liberal democratic and totalitarian political regimes
respectively. While the former is consciously self-limiting, concerned with questions o f
means rather than o f goals, the latter, the “radical” supercivilization, seeks a form
analogous to the idea o f a “universal church.”21 It is radical supercivilization, Patodka
contends, that is geared towards the totalizing o f life by means o f rationalism; it seeks a
new center, “from which it is possible to gradually control all layers all the way to the
periphery.”22
Pato£ka sees numerous examples o f radical supercivilization in recent history;
he cites, for example, the Cult o f Reason and the French Revolution, Comte, Marx and
Engels, and also the British utilitarians Bentham and James Mill. Characteristically
present in these movements is not only a rationalistic universalism, but also a sense that
they can provide the means to life’s fulfillment. Historicity loses its force in their
movements, for they lay a claim to the whole o f time:
Supercivilizational radicalism also reconstructs the ancient concept of

kairos, the entirety o f time, o f course no longer in the form o f religion,
but o f religious-political salvation; a “time for” action, for a great,
decisive work, a “day” o f freedom and definitive accounting, the
decision o f which is given specifically to that delegated, so to speak
characteristically chosen, committee o f elected theocrats.23
In this experience there is also a quasi-mystical component o f radicalism, manifesting
itself in the stress on collectivism, on the totalizing character o f the experience. Radical
supercivilization favors explosive, revolutionary changes in society; in this sense it has
more in common with “the irrational side o f man over the reasoning.” Despite this,
radicalism often has an acute sense o f moral issues and an ability to appeal to them
225
heroically, making it particularly attractive to “young individuals and nations,” to the
civilization “m statu nascendi,”24
Pato£ka’s analysis o f modem radicalism is insightful, but it forms only a part of
his achievement in this article. What is particularly significant, I think, and what
differentiates this political analysis o f modernity from others, is its analysis not only o f
radicalism, but also o f moderate supercivilization. In contrast to radicalism, moderate
civilization conserves the spirit of “rational criticism and construction” by retaining a
sense of distance from it, that is, by making use o f it, but without giving it a dogmatic
character, without making it the “exclusive principle” o f all life.25 “Supercivilizational
moderatism is protector to its own rational principle,” Pato£ka writes, “precisely
because in moderate society there is a great variety o f interests, among which reason can
function as a balancing authority.”26
The moderate form o f the rational supercivilization has as its function the
formation o f political societies that respond to its essence. In contrast to radical forms, it
seeks to ensure that rule does not issue from the arbitrary will o f particular people or
decrees, but instead respects human freedom.27 Moderate civilization, however, is not
immune to the faults o f radicalism; it is always in danger, Pato£ka writes, o f slipping
into the irresponsibility that characterizes radical forms. Yet in its moderate version,
modem civilization is able to resist the descent into radicalism; its conservation o f the
spirit of reason protects it from the dangers o f dogmatic ideology: “ ...unlike its
opponent it is not so easily subject to the danger o f phrases and hysteria.”28
226
The primary values o f the universal supercivilization are grounded in freedom
and in the individual. While the historical roots o f these values trace to ancient Greek
and Judaic civilizations,29 the emergence o f the supercivilization is more directly
connected to the appeal to individual freedom characteristic o f early liberalism.
Importantly, however, he does not connect individual freedom to economic forms of
liberalism, but to the emergence of liberal thought in the realm o f religion —the
Protestant movement in the 16th to 18th centuries for the “religious self-determination
o f the individual before God.” The “modem principle o f freedom,” he continues, “does
not stand or fall with economic liberalism.”30 An economic, or “atomistic,” liberalism,
in fact, is not an exemplary but a degenerate form of moderatism, and may impel people
towards radicalism rather than protect them from it. Thus the crisis o f moderate
civilization, the question o f its ability to resist radical influence and preserve its moral
essence, is simultaneously a crisis of liberalism. It is a question o f whether liberalism
will proceed along atomistic or positivistic bases, or will recover a more essential view
o f human being. “The crisis of liberalism is the crisis o f moderate civilization, but
liberalism and moderatism are not the same,” Patocka concludes.31 While the concept of
the supercivilization itself has at its core the question o f the individual, this question is
not adequately reflected in the atomistic tendencies o f liberal individualism.
The principle o f the supercivilization stresses the individual, not by defining him
as an atom, but by allowing him to distinguish himself in an altogether new way. While
other societies have distinguished between the levels o f the human and the divine, they
have nonetheless presented them as reciprocally interpenetrating on the same level. The
227
modem supercivilization, in contrast, has for the first time made possible a distinction
between these levels, a distinction “between that which is in the power o f man, a finite
being, that which is the region o f his positive and subject knowledge and his
rationality,...and that which is beyond him.” Here two levels are distinguished with the
understanding that human life extends to both, that the level o f the objective is
penetrated by something that it is not possible to simply judge, that is not at our
disposition.32 In this conceptualization, the human individual is understood as distinct
from the divine, the transcendental, but not as indifferent to it. At this level, as opposed
to its degenerate form in radical individualism, man is not indifferent to others.
It is the atomistic form o f liberalism, however, that has dominated in the modem
world. The result, Pato£ka alleges, has been a degree o f crisis in the very concept o f the
modem., rational civilization, leading to an increased temptation towards radicalism.
Thus Patocka appears as a critic o f liberalism, not with the goal o f destroying it, but o f
rescuing it from its own tendency toward decline. Liberalism needs reform, not in order
to destroy individualism, but to set it back on its proper foundation.33 The goal is a
political theory that responds to the individual as a responsible human being, rather than
as an indifferent atom. Explicitly excluded, here, is the notion that a certain technique o f
societal organization, an institutional engineering, is enough to correct for the
manifestations o f crisis in modem life. To the contrary, the greater the degree to which
liberal society is schematized, is reduced to an exportable set o f institutions, the greater
is the inclination towards the systematization of life itself, and so to a strengthening o f
general decline.34
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The analysis in “Supercivilization and its Inner Conflict” thus presents the
concept o f the universal, rational civilization as potentially positive, but it makes clear
that, in practice, it has more often than not manifested itself in degenerate form. The
twentieth century has seen a battle between such forms for supremacy, the battle of
radical Marxist-Leninist or National Socialist forms o f collectivism versus the offspring
of moderate supercivilization represented by atomist and positivist forms o f liberalism.
For Patodka, working on the level o f political philosophy, the challenge was always the
same: to explore thematically the roots o f political phenomena and ideology, and to
uncover a path by which European civilization could recover and renew its
understanding o f and commitment to individual human freedom. Rather than contesting
a particular regime ~ including, for a time, his own —he explored below the surface, for
it is only at the elemental level o f the relationship of politics to human being, the level
o f philosophy, that truly effective change can hike place.
One way in which PatoCka’s commitment to the exploration o f possibilities may
have manifested itself was in his critical relationship to his own regime —the
Czechoslovak socialist government. In the decades after the war Pato£ka led the life o f a
decidedly nonpolitical philosopher. While it was clear that he rejected the communist
power-holders in Czechoslovakia ~ he declined a request to sign with the Party even
though it meant the end o f his career ~ he otherwise refrained from political critique,
even when the Stalinist excesses of the regime were at their worst. PatoCka’s
relationship to socialism and the politics o f the fifties and sixties may reflect the fact, as
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Ivan Blecha concludes in his study o f the thinker, that he was “caught off guard by the
developments o f the time.”35
By remaining resolutely apolitical and by virtue of the fact that he was “buried
away” in the Masaryk and Comenius archives, Pato£ka was able to retain his personal
integrity without the necessity o f direct political confrontation. He seems to have chosen
to neither throw himself “at all cost into a foolish confrontation with power,” nor to give
up his principles.36 Yet Pato£ka’s relation to communist politics was not simply a matter
of avoiding confrontation. He also expressed a degree o f uncertainty about the political
situation that seemed to occasionally manifest itself, as his former students attest, in an
apologetic attitude towards the communists. He is reported to have said, for example,
that “somewhere there must be a reason why their present lie at one time gained so
much power not only over people, but even in people. Apparently it has its original,
truthful core.”37
This stance, or perhaps lack thereof, disappointed those o f his students who
sought a more unequivocal judgment. One o f them, the future Rector o f Charles
University Radim PalouS, has gone so far as to attribute to Pato£ka a weakness for the
“gnostic infection” that had decimated the university authorities. PalouS is referring,
here, to the concept elaborated by Eric Voegelin to describe the immanentization of
transcendent reality into an anthropocentric hubris, typical of totalitarian communist
ideology.38 PalouS argues, in fairly explicit terms, that Pato£ka, though he never let
himself be “seduced” by the advantages o f joining the communists —he remained “a
persecuted intellectual” -- nevertheless reflected a “mistaken inclination” towards his
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persecutors by refusing to discount the potential for “some positive social trend” in their
ideology.39
PalouS’s conclusion, it should be noted, is among the more uncompromising o f
the reactions o f Czech intellectuals to this phenomenon. Perhaps more representative is
the analysis o f Ivan Blecha, who concludes that Pato£ka was “uncertain” about the
situation and attempted, before condemning the situation outright, “first to understand
the age from within.”40 Even Radim Palous makes clear that, in the end, it is impossible
genuinely to fault Patodka. He recognizes that the philosopher, after all, “never bowed
to idols” and, despite the fact that “he himself ‘suffered under Pontius Pilate,”’ he
“refused to allow himself an incomprehension out o f ressentiment.”41 PalouS, in fact,
comes to a conclusion similar to Blecha’s: that Patodka consistently sought ~ perhaps,
in this case, too much so -- to understand fully the phenomena around him before
issuing judgment. Patodka’s attitude, one might conclude, is representative of the
perspective symbolized by the Prague Spring o f 1968, that brief period which former
dissidents often remember with even greater fondness, however bittersweet, than they
do the events o f 1989. In the Prague Spring, Czechs sought to dismantle, not the
institutions o f their communist government or its purported ideal o f social justice, but
the ideological lies and untruths upon which it rested. The goal was to rid the
government o f its ideological, “gnostic” essence and to introduce freedom in the form of
a socialism “with a human face.” Czech society was full o f the hope —naive, as it
turned out -- o f positively affecting political developments without resort to warfare.
This was a hope, it seems, that Pato£ka also harbored.
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Charter 77 and Individual Dissent
Hope for positive reform peaked in the Spring o f 1968, and was cruelly crushed
in the Autumn o f 1968. The Soviet-led invasion o f Czechoslovakia brought an end to
the Dubfiek reforms and a beginning to what came to be known as the period o f
“normalization.”42 Czech students and intellectuals were particularly devastated by the
invasion. Once again banned from the University, this became the defining period for
the development o f Patodka’s political thought. Not only was it the period o f both the
Plato and Europe lectures and the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History, it also
marked the Czech philosopher’s explicit incursion into the realm of political action as a
spokesman and author of Charter 77. Patodka reacted against his banishment —a
“premature” retirement -- by simply continuing to work. He began to lead underground,
“apartment” seminars for interested students willing to risk their careers for the sake of
truth and their studies. There is a palpable sense in his lectures from this period o f the
philosopher responding to the direct needs o f his students, each o f whom was seeking a
reason to continue to hope in the wake o f the crushing Soviet invasion. It is the
individual, the “spiritual person,” to whom Patodka turns in his consideration o f history
and politics in these lectures. In hoping to effect change, to bring about an open and
moderate form o f civilization, structural reforms were insufficient. The locus o f change
had to be in the soul o f the individual.
Despite the fact that he risked persecution by holding illegal seminars in private
apartments, PatoCka remained basically apolitical even into the early 1970s. In 1976,
however, a dissident movement that included many o f Patodka’s students began to
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coalesce around the fate of an obscure rock group, the “Plastic People o f the Universe,”
who were being persecuted for lyrics unbecoming the socialist state. The trial o f the
“Plastic People,” who played a style o f music that Pato£ka considered unlistenable,
nevertheless was to lead the now elderly philosopher into a role with which he was
unfamiliar -- that o f dissident protester.
Under the leadership o f Vaclav Havel and Jin Hajek, a document was proposed
that would do no more and no less than call to general attention the fact that the trial of
the “Plastic People” meant that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was failing to
adhere to the Helsinkii Agreement on human rights to which it was a signatory and
which therefore had the force o f law in Czechoslovakia. Though it took some
persuasion, Havel and others were able to convince the scholar to take on the role of
co-spokesman for the Charter. He accepted this role despite the clear understanding that
he would be subject to persecution, and in the name o f a style o f music which he could
not stand. In 1977, at age 69, Patocka began to speak and write as the philosophical and
moral voice of Charter 77. The Charter was, for all intents and purposes, a moral
protest in the name of truth.
Patodka’s participation in Charter 77 not only lent the protest -- it was a protest
rather than a political or human rights “movement” —the respectability it sought, it also
gave it its first and greatest martyr. The interrogations to which Pato£ka was subject
after his inevitable arrest were too much for him, and he suffered a stroke and died
several days later. PatoCka’s premature death came as a result o f standing up and telling
the state what it did not want to hear, that is, the truth. His death in this way suggests an
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analogy to the fate o f Socrates that is both so obvious as to seem cliche, yet so fitting as
to demand recognition.
The analogy to Socrates is not out of place, for Pato£ka lent to the Charter the
sense that it was led by a figure committed to truth. His activity on behalf o f the Charter
was most certainly driven by this commitment. Charter 77 was a reflection o f Patodka’s
philosophical perspective in many ways. It was not, importantly, a political movement
organized around or representing a competing ideology, it did not advocate the
overthrow of the government or any particular action beyond the act o f speaking the
truth. And the truth it advocated was contained in the contention that politics was not a
matter o f technical control but of moral sentiment —that this morality was binding upon
government because it preceded it. “Humans do not invent morality arbitrarily, to suit
their needs, wishes, inclinations, and aspirations. Quite the contrary, it is morality that
defines what being human means.”43
Charter 77 did not represent an attack upon government; it sought to the
contrary to “strengthen [its] legality.”44 The Charter did so by standing for the simple
principle of the equality o f citizens before the law. It did not seek to enumerate
individual rights that would stand above history to insulate the individual from that
state; rather, it argued that government must respond to the same conviction that
governs the individual. This was this conviction o f the unconditional “sovereignty of
moral sentiment” over states and individuals45 Charter 77's hope for politics was that
citizens could learn to act as free and responsible persons, and that government would
recognize this orientation by respecting the moral dimension o f political life.
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Although his involvement in Charter 71 was a natural outgrowth o f his political
philosophy, Pato£ka did not use his position as spokesman to try to bring the
complexities of his work to a wider audience. To the contrary, he kept his message
simple. When speaking o f the source o f the “moral sentiment” to which he referred,
Pato£ka in fact alluded to the analysis o f our obligation to ourselves associated with
Kant. He spoke o f the driving force o f the Charter as a “commandment that is higher
than any political privileges and obligation and which is indeed their genuine and only
firm foundation.”46 It appears, from this language, that Patodka’s interest lay in
discovering an unconditional, ahistorical ground for both politics and ethics. This
assumption, however, could not be farther from the truth.
One might argue that the language o f PatoCka’s texts as Charter spokesman had
what Leo Strauss would call an exoteric element to them.47 They were intended as
pamphlets for public consumption. These documents posited a moral sentiment without
the phenomenological and historical analysis that makes transparent the way in which
morality is not a product o f an ahistorical categorical imperative or other metaphysical
framework. What appears as an adoption o f a metaphysics of human rights is not. I will
discuss the source o f this morality below in Chapter Six; but in order to determine the
precise relation between PatoCka’s political thinking -- including his involvement in
Charter 77 —and his philosophy, I must first examine the concluding chapters o f the
Heretical Essays.
The focal point o f Charter 77 was o f course the individual, and the context of
communist Czechoslovakia o f the 1970s demanded that the individual be prepared to
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sacrifice. Any action in resistance to the ideology o f the regime carried with it the
certainty o f punishment, it amounted to a premeditated sacrifice. It is to these
individuals that Pato£ka is speaking in the last o f the Heretical Essays, showing them
that their resistance, their sacrifice, in fact draws on the very principle o f rational
civilization. When the powers that be have co-opted the symbols o f “light” and o f “day”
and have turned them to ideological purpose, the truthful must have recourse to different
symbols.
The H eretical Essays and the Twentieth C entury
With the last two o f the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History, Pato£ka
takes up the issue o f the contemporary world and its relation to the problem o f history.
He does so first in terms o f an analysis o f the fundamental character o f the modem age
(essay five), then by applying that analysis to the major political events o f the century
(essay six). Though he often relies on a Heideggerean idiom in these essays, a close
reading demonstrates the consistency o f his position. At the heart o f our contemporary
civilization lies the question o f the individual and the thematic understanding o f his or
her historical being. Here as elsewhere in his body o f work, the self-understanding o f
the individual is symbolically achieved through care for the soul.
The subject matter of the fifth essay is framed as a question, and it again draws
upon the Heideggerean analysis o f the character o f technology. In what he calls a
“sketch o f the rise o f the modem age and o f its fundamental metaphysical character,”48
Pato£ka asks the question: “Is Technological Civilization Decadent?” His question,
however, is not a moral but an ontological one. Having argued that the truly human life
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is inherently historical, meaning grounded in freedom and acted out in relation to being,
Patodka now seeks to explore the degree to which modem, technological society denies
this as a possibility. To answer this question, he writes, the first thing we need is a
“criterion, a standard by which we could judge something decadent or positive.”49 The
criterion sought, the notion o f “decadence” or “decline,” should be relative, not to the
question of value judgments, it should not be an abstract value or a moral concept, but
instead to the very nature o f human life in its basic functioning. A life is positive when
it functions according to its possibilities as human; it is decadent when it loses contact
with those possibilities, “when it loses its grasp on the innermost nerve o f its
functioning.”50 A society, a civilization, is considered decadent to the degree it
encourages such a life.
The thesis o f this essay holds that the technological age, by virtue of a general
reduction of meaning to that which is quantifiable, has increasingly eliminated the
manifold of possibilities by which humans relate to themselves, to their own being and
responsibility. This technological age, Patodka contends, is a time unlike any other, with
science and technology having “swept away -- definitively, it now seems --
humankind’s other, older attempts to shape, even to produce their lives.”51 And despite
objections,52 the progress towards greater and greater production o f force and mastery of
nature continues to proceed optimistically. Patodka makes the historical argument that
the spirit of this modem, scientific rationalism is not a recent phenomenon. Rather, the
most recent developments can be traced backwards to certain practical tendencies of
Christian theology, which themselves trace to the influence o f Platonism. The bulk of
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this chapter is made up o f Patodka’s outline o f the transition from the foundations of
authentic historical activity in, for example, epic and dramatic poetry (tragedy), through
Plato, neo-Platonism, Christianity, the Reformation and the rise o f modem capitalism
and science. He sketches a line that is semi-continuous, purporting to show, not the
uniqueness o f the modem age, but its continuity with the dominance o f metaphysics
over European life since Plato.
Patodka draws on Heidegger’s analysis o f inauthenticity for this analysis —on
his description o f humans relating not to their own humanity but only to the things
around them.53 In the application o f the thesis, modem individualism is shown to be
merely a facade over an age which actually encourages the individual to identify himself
with a “role” in society. His freedom is the freedom to choose whatever role suits him.
Modem civilization thus largely ignores the genuine problem o f the individual —“the
problem o f the human person” —which implies that he or she not “be identified with
any role they may assume in the world.”54 The individualism o f Western liberalism does
not respond to this problem; in fact, encouraged by technological progress, it
increasingly reduces the individual to the status o f a physical force. It is for this reason,
on this ontological basis, that Pato£ka concludes provocatively that the problem cannot
be reduced to the level o f the political regime, for no contemporary regime-type
corresponds precisely with the individual freedom to which he is pointing: “the real
question concerning the individual,” he writes, “is not at issue between liberalism and
socialism, between democracy and totalitarianism, which for all their profound
differences equally overlook all that is neither objective nor a role.”55
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The problem o f modem, technological civilization, then, is that it lays
ontological questions to one side, it dismisses the Socratic injunction to examine one’s
self and one’s life.56 The modem individual, in accepting the notion o f the “role” offered
to him by technological civilization, effectively gives up his own self. He becomes
disinterested in his own being as a problem and a question, and so gives up his
humanity. “Being ceased to be a problem,” Patodka writes, “once all that is was laid out
before us as obvious in its quantifiable meaninglessness.”57 With the loss of the problem
o f being, the self is also lost. Whereas modem civilization increasingly enables people
to live longer and healthier lives, it does not respond to the principal human need, which
is “not only to live but to live in a humanly authentic way.”58
To live humanly requires that we relate to ourselves and to the world in which
we live. Yet industrial civilization threatens to deny this possibility; here a fully human
life becomes “more difficult because the matrix of its possibilities does not include the
relation o f humans to themselves and so also to the world as a whole and to its
fundamental mystery.”59 To compensate, the technological world increasingly offers
means for humans to avoid themselves through the pursuit o f the superficial. Patodka’s
fifth essay offers extensive analysis o f the problem o f the way in which the “orgiastic”
increasingly overtakes human responsibility.60
Patodka’s analysis, while decidedly pessimistic, is not despairing. Returning to
his original question, Patodka concludes that, despite this analysis, technological
civilization cannot simply be labeled “decadent.” This for two reasons: first, it has
become evident that the character of the modem age is not entirely o f its own making,
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but the bequest o f earlier ages. Second and more importantly, and here Pato£ka returns
to the point made in his 1950s analysis o f moderate “supercivilization,” despite the
restriction in the scope of certain human possibilities wrought by this age, “it is also true
that this civilization makes possible more than any previous human constellation: a life
without violence and with far-reaching equality o f opportunity.” So even though this
goal may yet elude us in actuality, it remains within our potential and brings with it an
even more significant possibility. The “chief possibility” that emerges with our
civilization and its potential is that o f a “turn” away from the “accidental rule” o f those
whose aim is to enforce a preconceived meaning, and toward the rule of those “who
understand what history is all about.”61 In other words, the technological achievement o f
this civilization, though it supplies increased opportunities for humans to avoid the
responsibility o f understanding history, also presents, and perhaps for the first time, the
possibility that those who understand the nature of human historicity and freedom will
be able to rule. If we are able to free ourselves from the “struggle with external want”
on a global or civilizational basis, then humans may be afforded this possibility. Rule
can transfer from those whose aim is nothing other than to preserve life to those who
understand that history is not a problem to be solved but one that “must be preserved as
a problem.”62
While the overall analysis, Patoika admits, stems from insight developed by
Heidegger, the application of that insight has an original, political quality. The most
serious consequences of the modem estrangement from the question of being become
manifest, not in individual psychoses or sociological maladies, but primarily in our
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political existence. From the perspective o f states, the quantification o f being has meant
that humans can be perceived as little more than forces to be manipulated. Force itself
becomes a metaphysical entity, a foundation through which geopolitical activity is
realized. “The next and last chapter of our essay about history,” Patodka adds, “will seek
to show how this is reflected in contemporary historical events and the alternatives they
present.”63 The politics of the twentieth century, exemplified by the first World War,
show that a world transformed into a laboratory o f accumulated forces is a world subject
to the release of those forces in uncontrolled warfare.
“Wars o f the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War”
It is the last o f Patodka’s Essays that generally appears to readers as the most
striking and “heretical.” “Wars o f the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as
War” is an examination of the politics and philosophy o f warfare from the perspective
outlined in the previous chapter ~ the Heideggerean analysis o f beings that have ceased
to relate to their own being, that have ceased to be interested in their own humanity.
Instead, they relate to themselves and to others as to particular roles and to physical
forces. This relation, Patodka argues, is connected both characteristically and causally to
the devastating warfare, both hot and cold, o f the twentieth century. It is important to
note that this essay, more so than the earlier parts o f the Heretical Essays, is a text
whose clear context is the struggle of Czechoslovak dissidents against the communist
regime. While the bulk of the Essays construct and elaborate a philosophy o f history
and human historicity, the final essay draws upon specific aspects o f that philosophy
and applies them to twentieth century politics. The result is a striking essay that, while
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not particularly representative o f either the tone or content o f Patodka’s overall
philosophy, extends and applies that philosophy without betraying it.
“Wars o f the Twentieth Century,” o f course, is the essay to which analysts point
when they wish to argue that Patodka may not be the consistent defender o f European
reason that he has appeared to be.64 The reason, quite simply, is what appears to be the
essay’s evocation o f war, conflict and darkness over the values o f peace and “the day.”
These are the passages that even Paul Ricoeur, an admirer o f Patodka, has called
“strange,” and “frankly shocking” in their elaboration o f the “darkness and the demonic
at the very heart o f the most rational projects o f the promotion o f peace.”651 have
argued in this study, however, that even the most disconcerting o f Patodka’s metaphors
and analyses do not imply an outlook that differs, in any fundamental way, from that
presented in Plato and Europe or any o f his other works organized around the concepts
of a “life in truth” and “care for the soul.” In examining the controversial themes and
metaphors o f the essay we will see that while the tone and idiom is undeniably different
than the bulk o f Patodka’s work —the contention can be justified that this essay
overextends its application o f Heideggerean themes to political reality and presents that
reality in an oversimplified and foreboding light —its basic conclusions fit into overall
scheme o f Patodka’s philosophy. It remains the figure and philosophy o f Socrates,
extended somewhat with an appeal to the pre-Socratic, Heraclitian theme o f conflict, or
polemos, to whom Patodka looks as a model for philosophical and political activity in
the polis.
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“Wars o f the Twentieth Century” begins with an examination o f the character o f
the first world war, a war that Pato£ka calls “the decisive event” of the century,
determining “its entire character.”66 This war, he writes, was revolutionary, and thus
typical attempts to explain it based on conventional ideas fail to reveal its character.
Underlying the war was a new ideology, a growing Nietzschean conviction that the
traditional faith upon which Europe saw itself resting had imploded:
The shared idea in the background o f the first world war was the slowly
germinating conviction that there is nothing such as a factual, objective
meaning o f the world and o f things, and that it is up to strength and
power to create such meaning within the realm accessible to humans.67
One answer to this perceived lack o f meaning was in science and, in this regard and
appearances to the contrary, it was post-Bismarckian Germany that was the most
revolutionary, for when it is noted that “the democratic states o f Europe were also the
most vigorous representatives o f Europe’s imperial idea, their claims to democracy
begin to appear as components in their defense o f the global status quo.”68 Germany,
though, was leading a revolution toward the enforcement o f “the reality o f the new
technoscientific age.” It was creating and enforcing this idea in its pursuit o f the
organization and accumulation o f energy and the creative power of its working
masses.69 This was the idea that force was the dominant and necessary feature o f the
modem age.
Germany, o f course, was not the only country moving in this direction, but its
progress was the most revolutionary, the movement o f other countries like France being
somewhat “humanized by their desire for individual life.”70 The end o f the war brought
the defeat o f Germany, but not o f its revolutionary aim; that aim was ably taken over by
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Russia, which succeeded where Germany had failed. The Soviet Union was able to
mobilize its society behind a form o f rule based in pseudoscientific rationalism. The
first world war, Patodka continues, was decisive because it demonstrated that the
transformation o f the world along techno-scientific lines -- into a laboratory o f forces —
can proceed only with the help o f war, i.e., “acute confrontation,” because such
confrontation is the most effective means o f releasing the inevitable buildup o f forces.
World War I, then, represented “a definitive breakthrough o f the conception o f being
that was bom in the sixteenth century with the rise o f mechanical natural science.”71
War, it is important to note, has been defined here as “acute confrontation,” for it is not
merely military combat between nations to which Patodka is referring, but the process
of confronting and sweeping away all that stands in the way o f the transformation or
revolution in progress. War, the “acute confrontation” with all of the “conventions” that
inhibit the release of force, is the means by which the rule o f force actualizes itself. “In
this process humans as well as individual peoples serve merely as tools.”72
What Patodka is attempting to describe in these pages is a picture o f the
twentieth century primarily drawn from his experience with communist totalitarian rule.
The Russian Revolution and the resulting decades o f Soviet rule epitomize that picture,
for they represent the clearest example o f the political incarnation of the “new
technoscientific age.” The power o f organization and the manipulation o f individuals
become the guiding principles o f this rule, which they effect by means of continuing
warfare.
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After the end o f the world wars, warfare does not come to an end. What ceases
are the brief, violent conflicts, but warfare against the conventions o f society that resist
its transformation persists. The new war is “a war that establishes itself as permanent by
‘peaceful’ means.”73 It is the “war against war,” the war to establish a permanent peace,
and it progresses by informing people weary o f violence and death that the highest o f all
values is life itself. Only when convinced o f the overriding value o f mere life are people
willing to play the roles demanded o f them in order to preserve it. It is, essentially, a
rule of ideology; importantly, however, it is not restricted to authoritarian or totalitarian
systems, but is present in any movement in which the goal o f peace and mere life is
given an eschatological significance.
The ideology o f Soviet communism was one that promised both lasting peace
and a new life, though it demanded both the body and the soul o f the individual in
return. This ideology, of course, was originally considered the most enlightened and
progressive o f political movements. It epitomizes, in this sense, what Patodka calls the
“forces o f the day.” The forces o f the day are the forces o f eternal progress; they seek a
perfect peace and condemn conflict and contingency as barriers to that goal. At their
most elemental level these forces are not unique to the twentieth century; they can be
described in eschatological terms as movements aiming towards a “solution” to human
problematicity: a final peace, an end o f history, etc.. From their perspective, “life,
especially historical life, appears as a continuum within which individuals function as
the bearers o f a general movement which alone matters.74
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In violent wars fought for ideology, these are the banners under which we fight
and die. The second half o f the twentieth century, however, enforces the rule o f force
and technology primarily by peaceful means. Warfare transmutes itself into “acute”
confrontation with the “conventions” o f the past, “those muting factors represented... by
respect for tradition, for former ways o f comprehending being which now appear as
outworn superstitions and a means o f manipulating others.”75 The modem understanding
o f the individual as merely a role or a force merges in this century with an eschatology
o f peace, o f a “better tomorrow.” The pursuit o f this dream by means o f a nonviolent
war against non-technological ways o f comprehending being, however, combines with
the hot wars of the first half o f the century to define the century as one, not o f peace, but
o f war.
All o f this represented, as Patodka and the Czechoslovak dissidents knew very
well, a battle against the individual. It was one o f Patodka’s great achievements (and
partly his purpose) in this essay to reveal a means by which embattled individuals could
come to realize the significance o f their resistance. Patodka did this through analysis of
the concept o f sacrifice. In doing so he both justifies continued dissidence and offers
solace to those whose personal sacrifice is overwhelming. The analysis draws upon the
writings o f two witnesses to the horrors o f the first world war: the Frenchman Teilhard
de Chardin and the German Ernst Junger.76 The particular sacrificial experience
analyzed is that o f the front line soldier. The phenomenon o f the front line, which is
“absurdity par excellence” in its murderous brutality, is such that it has the potential to
effect a fundamental transformation of human existence. Despite its horror, perhaps
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because o f its horror, “in the depths o f that experience there is something deeply and
mysteriously positive.”77
The paradoxical nature o f this contention rests on the fact that, in most cases, the
forces that have brought the soldier to the front are the “forces o f the day,” those
quasi-eschatological visions of a final peace, victory and freedom that accompany and
justify warfare. Drawing on Teilhard de Chardin and Junger, Patodka argues that the
experience o f the front is such that these visions lose their power over the soldier. He is,
in the horror and absurdity o f his situation, freed absolutely from the hold o f the abstract
idea or ideology. “The front-line experience...is an absolute one. Here, as Teilhard
shows, the participants are assaulted by an absolute freedom, freedom from all the
interests of peace, of life, of the day.”78 On the front line, visions o f the day have no
power over the individual. He instead realizes that these visions do not depict reality,
but rather a false image o f it. Thus, Patodka argues, the experience of the front justifies a
reversal o f the prevailing metaphors. The symbols of peace and the day do not
adequately depict our human reality; instead, it is the symbol o f the night that responds
to the mystery and problematicity that is our being. And so, with this in mind, Patodka
maintains that “[t]he grandiose, profound experience of the front with its line o f fire
consists in its evocation o f the night in all its urgency and undeniability.”79
The front line soldier offers Patodka a clear analogy to the fate o f the dissident in
a communist state. He describes the situation in which, as described above, war has
been continued by “peaceful means.” “Currently war,” he says, “has assumed the form
o f that half peace wherein opponents mobilize and count on the demobilization o f the
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other.”80 This is the strategy o f the rule o f ideology in peacetime —it is to produce a
state of “demoralization” in its opponents by appealing “to the will to live and to have.”
The rule o f force is accepted as the price one must pay to live well. While a return to a
front line in rejection o f this state is something difficult to actively desire, Patodka
argues that there are situations in which it can mean an “immense liberation from
precisely such servitude” as under communism.81
Thus the notion of being on the front line becomes, for Patodka and his dissident
students, the symbol for their resistance to the ideology o f untruth in communist
Czechoslovakia. “The front line is the resistance to such ‘demoralizing,’ terrorizing, and
deceptive motifs o f the day. It is the revelation of their real nature, it is a protest paid for
in blood which does not flow but rots in jails, in obscurity, in life plans and possibilities
wasted.”82 Here the reference to the dissident is explicit, for it is he who rots in jails in
obscurity, sacrificing life plans and possibilities for the sake o f the truth. Indeed, the
analogy can be extended further to the philosopher himself who, as Socrates testifies,
inevitably comes into conflict with the city. In this activity, despite its requirement o f
sacrifice, one does attain the freedom that one seeks. The front line is the site o f true
freedom: “It is to comprehend that here is where the true drama is being acted out;
freedom does not begin only ‘afterwards,’ after the struggle is concluded, but rather has
its place precisely within it -- that is the salient point, the highest peak from which we
can gain a perspective on the battlefield.”83
The narrow focus of this essay notwithstanding, Patodka’s philosophy continues
to aim at a resuscitation o f contemporary western civilization broadly speaking. In this
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regard, the point o f the essay is not the presentation o f a solution but the asking o f a
question. Patodka recognizes that, despite the devastating wars in this century and the
multitude o f front line soldiers who have returned from war to help reorganize their
societies, the effect o f their experiences on society has remained essentially “nil.” Thus
the question: “How can the ‘front-line experience’ acquire the form which would make
it a factor o f history?”84 The fact that this experience has, as yet, failed to become a
factor o f history make it clear that this is not a question with a ready answer. Yet it is a
crucial question, for it reflects upon the potential influence of philosophy -- which, like
the clarity gained on the front-line, is bom when one shakes oneself loose from the hold
o f naive, undifferentiated and unreflective thought -- on history and politics.
Two points are stressed in Patodka’s account. First, it is eminently clear that the
core o f a solution, to the extent one can be said to be possible, lies in the fostering of
understanding —of history, o f freedom, o f the essence of philosophy that demands that
one forego the surety o f simply given knowledge and ideology. More concrete,
however, is Patodka’s second point. The experience described by Teilhard and Jiinger
does not transfer to society because it is an individual experience. What is needed, both
in the case o f dissidence in Czechoslovakia in the seventies and in terms o f an approach
to political action in the modem age generally, is something more than individual
experience. What is needed is a concerted effort by those who have shaken loose o f the
hold o f ideology, what Patodka calls a “solidarity o f the shaken.” “The means by which
this state is overcome,” he writes, “is the solidarity o f the shaken, the solidarity o f those
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who are capable o f understanding what life and death are all about, and so what history
is about.”85
The goal, then, is twofold. It is first and foremost the general goal o f philosophy
as Patodka sees it: to “shake” human beings into an awareness o f their own historical
nature, their own possibilities for freedom via the assumption o f a self-reflective stance
and the rejection o f ideology. In the specific context o f the problems o f the twentieth
century, this translates to a more specific action —the attempt to make those capable of
understanding willing to accept the sacrifice that is required. In other words, the goal is:
To shake the everydayness o f the fact-crunchers and routine minds, to

make them aware that their place is on the side o f the fro n t and not on the
side o f even the most pleasing slogans of the day which in reality call to
war, whether they invoke the nation, the state, classless society, world
unity, or whatever other appeals, discreditable and discredited by the
factual ruthlessness o f the Force, there may be.86
Accompanying this is a second goal, one which Patodka himself helped to realize with
his sponsorship o f Charter 77. This is the goal o f concerted action, o f solidarity. In the
context o f a communist state in the late twentieth century, it took just such a solidarity
to call the world’s attention to the fate o f free thought in Central Europe in 1977.
When both goals are combined, Patodka contends, the effect on political society
can be profound. The effect referred to, however, will not be an explicitly political one,
for the “solidarity o f the shaken” is not conceived of as a political movement or party. It
is not a coordinated scheme to wrest power from those who hold it.
It will not offer positive programs but will speak, like Socrates’
daimonion, in warnings and prohibitions. It can and must create a
spiritual authority, become a spiritual power that could drive the warring
world to some restraint, rendering some acts and measures impossible.87
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The action o f Charter 77, which proposed no political “program” and was not a political
“movement,” epitomized the goal o f Patodka’s “Wars o f the Twentieth Century and the
Twentieth Century as War.” It was a protest with the goal o f simply speaking the truth,
which is always the greatest threat to a corrupt government. Though Charter 77 did not
result in the fall o f the communist regime in 1977, the spiritual authority that it
represented and created, led by Vaclav Havel and other students o f Patodka, was
singularly influential in leading the “Velvet Revolution” o f a decade later.
In the concluding paragraph o f “Wars o f theTwentieth Century,” Patodka
appeals to a different symbol, one that arguably runs counter to the tenor o f his Platonic
writings —he appeals to the Heraclitian symbol o fpolemos, or conflict.88 Once again,
his inspiration is Heidegger and his goal to show that the ground o f human reality
cannot be reflected in a simple, metaphysical structure.89 Heraclitus’ depiction o f being
as polemos is appropriate, Patodka argues, for it reflects the same vision noted
independently by both Teilhard and Junger in their analyses o f the front-line experience
—a vision of unity attained in the midst o f conflict. Nevertheless, Patodka’s appeal to
this symbol appears somewhat inapposite for several reasons. First, the symbol of
polemos, often translated as “war,” seems to contradict the tenor o f the essay, which
condemns the phenomenon o f war in the twentieth century. A second and related
problem has to do with the appeal to Heidegger, for the use o f the concept o f polemos in
Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics is associated, by virtue o f both the timing
o f the original lecture and its language, with the German philosopher’s involvement
with National Socialism. Based on Patodka’s invocation o f polemos, therefore, it would
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be conceivable to read this essay as a glorification o f war; this would be, however, a
misinterpretation.90
It is, in the end, the theme o f polemos, as well as that o f the ‘night,’ that stand
out in this essay, tending to obscure its connection to Charter 77 and the activities o f
Czechoslovak dissidents and human rights activists. These symbols, then, must be
examined in terms o f the themes they are meant to reflect. Otherwise, it is
understandable that the effect o f this essay on the reader will continue to be primarily
one o f the “shock” referred to by Ricoeur.
In the case o f polemos, the first point to be dealt with must refer to its translation
into English. The intent o f the symbol as Patodka uses it is to refer, not to “war” in the
sense of a militarized struggle, but to “conflict.” In conflict, we have a parallel to the
phenomenon that is at the very root o f philosophy, the shaking o f naive faith in
simply-given knowledge that is the first step towards an attitude o f self-reflection.
Polemos cannot be understood to symbolize the wars that have characterized this
century for, as Patodka went to great lengths to clarify, these wars represented, not a
struggle to free the world o f metaphysical, ideological thought, but rather a campaign to
enforce such thought and make it permanent through the rule o f force.
In regard to the second point, it is again the case that, despite the inspiration that
Patodka derived directly from Heidegger, there is a significant difference between the
two philosophers in the way in which the symbols are used and the impression that they
leave on the reader. When Heidegger refers to Heraclitus’ use o f the concept of
polemos, he speaks o f it as the conflict inherent in the process o f history as
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“world-building.”91 His stress is on the “creators” in the nation, who must struggle to
open up a world. The use o f the Heraclitian symbolism in this manner, coming as it did
in the mid-1930s, carries with it an association o f German romanticism, a sense of
longing for a movement such as that described infamously in Heidegger’s Rectoral
address at Heidelberg: “The Self-Assertion o f the German University.” The association
is unavoidable and it is difficult to read Heidegger’s invocation o f polemos and
“world-building” in this text without thinking o f his involvement with National
Socialism. In Patodka’s case, the dominant association is precisely opposite. What is
sought is a concept o f politics that above all else resists the lure o f a resolution to the
problems o f history.
For Patodka, polemos is a symbol that neatly expresses the essential
commonality o f politics and philosophy. To be genuine, politics must be free, meaning
it must struggle with the addiction to mere life and simply-given wisdom that
characterize pre-historical civilizations in which freedom is not an explicit theme.
Philosophy, too, is a struggle. That this is in fact the sense in which Patodka understands
the concept is made clear when he argues that it is only through this struggle that one
sees into the nature o f things -- “to phronein. Thus phronesis, understanding, by the
very nature o f things, cannot but be at once common and conflicted.”92 The spirit of
conflict and the struggle for excellence {arete) among equals within the boundaries o f a
city is essential not only to the operation of the polis, but also to the very insight that is
practical wisdom. “Thus polemos is at the same time that which constitutes the polis and
the primordial insight that makes philosophy possible.”93 As a symbol it is not
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appropriate to a discussion o f the warfare that regularly raged unchecked in this century.
Rather than a force that dissipates, it is one that can serve as a foundation for unity and
wisdom.
Despite this clarification of the concept, it was, and is, entirely possible that one
could misread this discussion as an evocation o f an extreme standpoint ~ o f a
Nietzschean, or a postmodern, rejection o f a moral center to the polis. Conflict can, of
course, be extended to extremes, and so it was, Patodka told his students, “[fjor
precisely this reason that the moral side o f conflict is important, as Socrates represented
it.”94 Even though the concept is pre-Socratic it nonetheless is emblematic o f Socrates
and his dialectical interrogation o f reality. It was only with the gradual movement to a
concrete metaphysics that human struggle was de-emphasized. Neither was it the case
that Patodka sought to elevate polemos into the kind o f extreme symbol that could be
used as a rallying-cry for resistance and revolution. The concept was intended to reflect
reality, not to take on the characteristics o f a metaphysical guidepost that stood above
reality. Patodka in fact warned his students against just this sort o f misunderstanding,
saying in the same series o f seminars that “I did not speak about conflict as about some
kind of universal guide, to assume something like this is precisely what we must guard
against.”95 The vision o f Heraclitus is a relevant parallel, then, in the sense that it is only
through an understanding o f life as problematic, as characterized by a lasting struggle
rather than a lasting peace, that humans can hope to experience freedom.
Though polemos is perhaps the dominant metaphor that emerges from “Wars of
the Twentieth Century,” also disturbing is the way in which Patodka subordinates the
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values o f “peace” and the “day” to that of “darkness.” This reversal o f metaphors is
certainly counter to the conventions o f the Western tradition; in Christian and
Enlightenment symbolism, for example, the symbols o f light and peace are often used to
illustrate the highest goods.96 Yet Pato£ka’s symbolism is not intended to reflect an
extreme attitude towards political reality. Rather, the use o f the symbol of the
“darkness” over that o f “light” or of “day” is meant to reintroduce the notion of
mystery, o f uncertainty and problematicity, that is an inevitable component o f human
existence. Darkness, it is noted, is the basic condition out o f which light or knowledge
first arises. It was with the progressive development o f metaphysics, Patodka claims,
that darkness came to be viewed as merely an absence o f light, that problematicity came
to be seen as a condition to be rejected, to be overcome.
In his lecture on “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” from the same
period as the Heretical Essays, Patodka introduces the idea that the “light o f dawn” does
not emerge from a void, it emerges from darkness. Knowledge emerges from
uncertainty, not in the sense that uncertainty is simply the absence of knowledge, but
that it is a necessary precondition for knowledge to appear that we struggle with
uncertainty and problematicity and accept them as factors that cannot be avoided. He
writes:
Doesn’t this suggest that there belongs to the nature o f reality —when we
take it as a whole, namely, as a reality that shows itself, that is revealed --
something that is itself problematic, that is in itself a question, that is
darkness. This does not mean darkness which is perhaps only our
subjective ignorance, our subjective lack of knowledge, but rather
something that is a precondition for a thing to appear in the world at
all;...97
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with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The symbol o f darkness that Patodka uses to such effect in “Wars o f the Twentieth
Century” and elsewhere, then, is a metaphor for his analysis o f human problematicity. It
is, in addition, a constant reminder that we are finite, that our life is precarious and our
politics an urgent attempt to maintain order in the absence o f a permanent and stable
foundation upon which we could rest.98 The concepts o f problematicity and finitude are
crucial to a unifying theme o f Patodka’s philosophy, the acceptance o f responsibility via
the conscious rejection o f metaphysical symbolizations o f an absolute reality. Patodka’s
outline o f an ontological understanding o f historicity in the Essays is grounded in this
theme.
In his analysis o f the twentieth century and its wars, there is a sense in which the
text is profoundly personal. “Wars o f the Twentieth Century” bears the distinct imprint
o f resistance, o f a call to the enlightened to draw upon unexpected sources in their
search for a reason —and the strength —to continue in their struggle. It is, in large part,
a dissident text, by which I mean that the political circumstances surrounding it directly
relate to the fact that the language o f the essay is overdetermined in favor o f dark, poetic
imagery. Patodka’s argument is directed towards his fellow dissidents. He argues that,
given the modem condition in which man and society are often held captive by a
politics of force and a mechanical understanding of human being (exemplified by
Czechoslovak communism in the seventies), the required posture is one o f resistance,
sacrifice and a hope derived, not from the corrupted symbolisms o f the regime, but from
the more mysterious regions of human reality. Thus the symbols o f the regime are
unmasked as hypocritical, and the notion that one can draw strength and experience
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freedom in the depths o f repression and uncertainty is stressed. Yet precisely what made
this work effective in its time weakens it when the experience to which it refers fades
from memory. In this sense, because it clearly refers most directly to the experience o f
Czechoslovak dissidents in the 1970s, its relevance, at least o f the use o f provocative
imagery, is diminished with the passing o f the dissident experience.
Although one could draw a parallel between the experience o f the front-line and
confrontation between Socrates and the Athenian Senate, the imagery Patodka chooses
makes this a difficult proposition to accept. Nevertheless, several factors do favor a
more Platonic reading o f this essay. First, despite the imagery, the concepts with which
the essay concludes are Platonic: first is the symbol o f the “metanoia,” or “conversion,”
experienced by the philosopher, and second is the symbol o f the Socratic daimonion."
The former, a “turn” towards understanding characteristic o f Plato’s liberated cave
dweller, is the most for which the individual may hope, and the latter the closest he will
come to an actual guidepost for political action.
The importance o f these elements, secondly, is supported by an accompanying
text that belongs to the body o f work on the philosophy o f history. “The Spiritual
Person and the Intellectual,” a transcript o f an apartment lecture delivered shortly after
the writing and distribution o f the Heretical Essays, is explicitly relevant to the
conclusions o f the Essays. This text, as yet unpublished in English, both complements
and contrasts with the Essays. Its subject is the “spiritual person,” meaning the person
indicated in “Wars of the Twentieth Century” as capable o f conversion, or metanoia.100
“The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual” is a distinctly different treatment o f the same
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theme central to “Wars o f the Twentieth Century”: that meaning must be sought, not in
slogans and promises and ideologies, but in the very fact o f our freedom and our ability
to recognize and come to terms with the problematicity of historical existence and the
impenetrability o f being.
T he Spiritual Person and the Polis
The “spiritual person,” like the front-line soldier, is also a “shaken” individual.
He is a responsible person. In this essay, however, the characteristic individual is a
philosopher, or a true intellectual, rather than a soldier. Though it is Socrates who
exemplifies the “spiritual” attitude, this is not an essay about philosophers. Instead,
Patodka describes the way in which the term “intellectual” properly describes, not the
sophist, who o f course may also call himself an intellectual, but the spiritual person who
is able to understand human reality. The “spiritual” perspective is not restricted to a few
elite philosophers. With this essay the point is made that the “solidarity o f the shaken”
is not something comparable to the fellowship o f guardians in Plato’s Republic. It is not
Patocka’s argument that spiritual people should band together as a political party, as a
concentration o f power, but rather that they should draw from their solidarity the
strength to assume a leading position in their chosen fields.
This theme, the question o f the role of the spiritual person in the city, makes up
the broad background o f “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual.” In the sense that
Patocka imparts to the term, spirituality has all the characteristics o f the Socratic mode
of living. The primary concept, which I discussed in the previous chapter, is that of
“problematicity.” The spiritual person -- or the philosopher -- not only recognizes that
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human existence is problematic, he is impelled by a commitment to freedom (for others
as much as for himself) to impart this wisdom to the city, and in doing so to contradict
and condemn its naivete and shake its very foundations. The purpose o f the philosopher
is to awaken the city to a new possibility, a new ground; in the case o f Socrates and
Plato, this was done by problematizing knowledge, not by simplifying it.
Socrates and Plato were problematizers o f life, they were people who did
not accept reality as it is given, but saw it via a shaking —but the
consequence of this shaking for them was precisely the possibility o f
some kind o f particular, other life, another direction o f life, something
like a new ground on which it is now possible to measure what is and
what is not.101
The Socratic approach reveals a possibility to live in a new way -- it is the possibility of
a meaningful freedom. As a philosopher, Socrates cannot be silent about this “other
life.” He thereby assumes a crucial yet bothersome role in the city; by his activity and
his questioning he problematizes the traditional foundations o f the polis.
Patocka’s reference to the possibility uncovered by Socrates and Plato as a “new
ground,” brings our attention to the question of the degree to which this philosophy can
provide a foundation upon which to base a political society. The challenge to
metaphysical foundationalism is an approach we associate with contemporary
philosophy since Nietzsche. It is PatoCka’s contention, however, that this challenge -- a
non-metaphysical attitude -- is characteristic o f Socrates and his dialectical questioning
o f reality. Socrates is thereby a figure both ancient and new. Despite the involvement
through Plato in the development o f metaphysics, the activity o f Socrates in the city
reflects the essence o f the critique o f contemporary, anti-metaphysical theory.
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And because Socrates stands solidly, this man who, under the reign o f
the tyrants, at the risk o f his own life, maintains his opinion that it is
worse to do injustice than to suffer it. and because this man on the other
hand continually repudiates with his way o f speaking those who presume
to have knowledge o f the good, meaning that he shakes the prevailing
certainty upon which the polis lives, and at the same time he himself
does not say what the good is, but only appeals to people to do a bit of
hard thinking, to reflect as he does, in order to seek, in order that they
responsibly examine every one o f their thoughts, -- this means not
accepting mere opinion as if it were insight, as if it were the insight to
live based on the authentic examination o f that which is here, which is
present —therefore Socrates is at the same time a man both ancient and
new, both merging in one.102
This is the Socrates that epitomizes the spiritual person. His goal is not to create a new
myth for the city, but to shake it loose from the grasp o f all mythologizing. Nietzsche
and Heidegger are wrong in failing to pursue what they seem to recognize grudgingly —
that the essence of Socrates is not a facile pursuit o f metaphysics, it is a challenge to the
polis to stand free o f all forms o f simply given knowledge and to think responsibly.
As I discussed in Chapter Five, Pato£ka understands philosophy as
interdependent with politics, each informing the other. With “The Spiritual Person and
the Intellectual,” he takes this theme a step further, discussing the consequences o f this
interdependence for the individual and for the city. Drawing upon Plato, Pato£ka notes
three choices open to the philosopher. First is the path o f Socrates: “to show people how
things are in reality,” though this means conflict with the city and the likelihood that
one will lose one’s life. Second is the path that Plato chooses —“withdrawal from the
public,” withdrawal from conflict with the city in the hope o f creating a “community o f
spiritual people” where the philosopher may live and not die. Beyond these choices,
Patocka writes, “the third possibility is to become a sophist. There are no others.”103
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Although one could argue, particularly in light o f Patodka’s own history o f
noninvolvement with politics up until 1977, that the second option o f an Academy
detached from the polis is a just one, by this late stage in his career Patodka had
resolutely come to the conclusion that the only choice was the first one, despite the
sacrifice it involved. The second option, in fact, was something o f a false one to the
degree that its goal was to separate philosophy from society. This, Patodka argued in
Plato and Europe, could not be done. “The true person, the philosophical man, cannot
be a philosopher only for himself, rather he must exist in society,.. .in society with
others, because in the end no one wrenches himself loose from this situation.”104 The
goal for the philosopher, implicitly, was to make this society truthful, one in which the
philosopher could actually live.
Society does not easily live up to its possibilities, however. The role o f the
philosopher -- or o f the spiritual person —is not only to explore those human
possibilities himself, but also to move society in their direction. This is, Patodka rightly
contends, a political task. While spiritual activity does not evoke politics in the modem
sense o f the term, it is nonetheless political activity.
The spiritual person is obviously not a politician in the usual sense o f the
word, he isn’t political in the common sense o f the word: he doesn’t take
sides in the disputes that rule this world —but yet again he is political in
a different way, obviously, and he cannot not be, for the non-self-evident
nature o f reality is exactly that which he hurls in the face o f society and
o f that which he finds around him.105
It is not only for its own sake but for the sake o f society that the philosopher is
concerned with declaring the “non-evident” nature o f reality. Yet society, as Plato
recognized in his Socratic dialogues, does not appreciate being shown a vision o f reality
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that is other than the one upon which it rests. Rather than embrace it, the holders of
power will fight against it, thus the inevitable conflict between the philosopher and the
city which Plato described. Patodka’s addition to this theme, in his later work, consists
o f an analysis o f the political responsibility inherent in the spiritual standpoint. The
spiritual person is political because he must stand before the “positive powers” of
government, and “the person o f spirit must, o f course, advocate his position.”106
Sacrifice and Responsibility
For all its surface idealism, this responsibility —as Central European dissidents
knew well —demands o f the individual a very real sacrifice. It is to Patodka’s credit that
he appends to his late philosophy an analysis of this phenomenon, the meaning of
sacrifice itself in its relation to a life in truth. Although I noted above that the proper
choice for the philosopher was engagement with the city “despite” the sacrifice
involved, there is a clear theme running through Patodka’s later work to the effect that a
true sacrifice, even o f one’s own life, provides a benefit to the spiritual person from an
ontological standpoint that outweighs the suffering. The spiritual person is rewarded not
despite his or her sacrifice, but through it.
Patodka writes most specifically on this theme in his Varna Lecture from 1973,
appending a discussion o f sacrifice -- which he notes is “mythico-religious” in origin --
to a consideration o f Husserl and Heidegger on the question o f technicization and
technology.107 There is something in sacrifice, and perhaps also in the Christianity that
makes it such a central concept, that counteracts the damage done to the individual in
the modem world. The notion o f sacrifice implies an understanding that cannot exist in
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a purely rational or technological view o f the world. It implies a recognition that some
things are higher, of a different order, than others: “A sacrifice for something or for
someone presupposes the idea o f a difference o f order between human being and the
being of things, and within the sphere o f the human in turn possibilities o f
intensification or of failing of being.” 108 In the technological age, as I have noted, the
individual (and so also the individual as victim) is reduced to a role, the question o f
being reduced to a mathematical equation. But an examination o f the theme of sacrifice
“points to an entirely different understanding o f being than the one exclusively attested
by the technological age.”109 The understanding o f being that Patodka wishes to renew
in Western thought is one that demands that the individual not reduce human relations
to technological or economic calculations; living in the truth of this understanding may
also necessitate the sacrifice of gain or security offered by those calculations. “The
paradoxical conception here,” he concludes, “is that man gains by a voluntary loss.”110
Through a comprehension o f his sacrifice, a person may recover his being even as he
loses all else.
When formulating his conception o f sacrifice, Patodka refers to the example o f
two Russian thinkers: Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov. Their example
exemplifies the meaning o f the concept in two ways. First, their willingness to sacrifice
helps us understand the content o f “freedom” as an ontological, rather than a physical
condition. Freedom is not here defined negatively, as in the absence o f restrictions upon
movement or the avoidance o f jail and other threats to a comfortable and safe life.111 To
the contrary, freedom can be gained even as we voluntarily relinquish certain aspects o f
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it. It can be gained through action that is self-revealing, that makes us aware that we are
not, and need not be, beholden to the rule of ideology or to the hold exerted on us by
mere life.
Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov were also important in a very different sense, though,
one that relates directly to the notion o f the “solidarity o f the shaken.” These two
Russian thinkers, in many respects, could not have been more different. While
Solzhenitsyn was a religious man, concerned with continuity, nation and tradition,
Sakharov “exemplifie[d] an entirely post-metaphysical modernity.” He was, in
Patocka’s words, a “hypermodem man.”112 In the difference between these two men, in
the fact that, despite their differences, they would speak and act in a sort o f concert to
oppose communist oppression, is the essential force o f the “solidarity o f the shaken.”" 3
The common element with Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, as with the vision in
Teilhard de Chardin o f enemy soldiers in the front-line trenches coming to feel a greater
solidarity with each other than with the politicians in the rear, was a sense o f the truth o f
their own humanity that outweighed any material advantage or dogmatic slogan that
could be offered to them. Acting upon this sense, rather than upon the advantages or
slogans, defines what PatoCka means when he speaks o f responsibility. Responsibility is
not a moral value. It has no abstract content. Nor is it an Aristotelian virtue, responding
to a sense o f proportion or moderation. Instead, it describes the manner o f living in
which one acts in response to one’s own being, as well as to the world perceived as a
whole. The sense Pato£ka gives to responsibility implies something akin to the Socratic
daimonion, not offering positive programs but “speaking in warnings and prohibitions.”
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It is a “spiritual authority,”114 but one that originates from our own sense o f being, not
from a being external to us. As we respond to our being, as we are interested in it, we
are captivated by our responsibility and we cannot be indifferent to it. In the opposite
situation, when we try for whatever reason to escape from or forget ourselves or our
humanity, then we abdicate our responsibility. The responsible attitude is one in which
we are exposed; sacrifice, as in the case o f Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, can be a
responsible act."5
There is also, in Pato£ka’s concept o f responsibility, an element that makes it not
only an individual event but a communal one. Responsibility and the possibility that it
may entail sacrifice, as we have seen, mean linking one’s life to freedom. Yet,
consequent to Patoika’s stress on our social nature, there is the added factor that
freedom is not simply an individual matter, it relates not only to the individual, but also
to others. It is in this sense that Pato£ka describes human being, as opposed to mere
consciousness, as “something capable o f accepting responsibility and respecting
responsibility, that is, the freedom, o f others,...116 We relate inherently to others because
our being is never an isolated, enclosed entity. It is in the world, o f nature, o f objects, of
other beings. Our work, including the work that is our striving for freedom, is never
pursued for oneself alone. As Pato£ka put it in another context: “Responsibility means:
it is not only for me, it is also for the other and it has to be for the other, I don’t work for
myself, I am not free in relation to myself alone, rather I am free in relation to all, I am
free for the society which supports me.”117
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Responsibility makes sacrifice no longer an individual event, but something
undertaken for all. There is a parallel to be made to the Christian conception of sacrifice,
and Pato£ka is not unwilling to make it. Thus it is in his discussion o f sacrifice in his
Varna Lecture from 1973 that he notes that “Christianity., .placed at the center a radical
sacrifice in the sense o f the interpretation suggested above and rested its cause on the
maturity of the human being.” He continued, “perhaps it is in this sense that we need to
seek the fully ripened form o f demythologized Christianity.”" 8 This last comment,
somewhat startling considering his otherwise unambiguous rejection o f dogma,
religious or otherwise, brings to mind the objections o f Jacques Derrida as well as a
question as to what is intended by the term “demythologized.” Derrida, in his essays on
The Gift o f Death, argued that the distinction made between conventional Christianity
and a Christianity “thought through” was largely superficial."9 He felt that, despite a
rejection o f religious dogma and other protestation to the contrary, Patoika’s
formulation of the problem implied a final recourse to a metaphysical foundation, a
foundation in an absolute being. Yet Derrida’s analysis does not appreciate, or
purposely discounts, the depth of PatoCka’s analysis.
Christianity in its dogmatic forms, Pato€ka consistently argued, presents a
metaphysical foundation for the morality it proposes. Yet many o f its themes, like that
o f sacrifice, undeniably reflect human experience. A demythologized Christianity, then,
might be one that continued to press its themes and symbolisms yet was delivered o f a
dogmatic reliance on an absolute being that is given and concrete. Patodka does in fact
seek a non-dogmatic, or experiential, ground for ethical activity —he seeks to ground it
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in phenomenology. This is not, however, equivalent to that which Derrida charges: a
search for a “non dogmatic doublet o f dogma”120 that amounts, in the end, to just
another form of metaphysics. Though Derrida does not give him credit for it, Patodka
makes a serious and concerted attempt to develop a sense of ethics that avoids the
problems of foundationalism.
Ethics and M orality
Socrates, as I have noted, did not have simple “positive moral teachings” to give
to people, and this is the model from which PatoCka takes his lead. Yet at the moment
when he achieves his greatest international renown, as spokesman for Charter 77,
Patocka introduces a formulation that seems to contradict his “problematic”
interpretation of reality. He writes o f an unconditional morality, higher than and binding
on both the individual and the state. At least one analyst, Aviezer Tucker, has stressed
this language in concluding that PatoCka’s philosophy leads to a positive formulation of
certain universal human rights. But Tucker’s conclusion is inconsistent with the Czech
philosopher’s denial o f all metaphysical and supra-historical formulations.121 The
question to be asked now is whether this critique o f metaphysics is not contradicted by
the appeal to morality of the Charter. Can Pato£ka, in other words, make a coherent
appeal to a transcendental political ethics without contradicting the tenor o f his own
philosophy?
PatoCka’s work, in line with the Czech tradition that produced T. G. Masaryk,
has a clear and unambiguous respect for ethics and morality, particularly in the practice
o f politics. This is strongly reinforced by his reliance on Platonic language, something
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Heidegger purposefully avoided. The high point o f Pato£ka’s appeal to morality, most
certainly, came with his participation in Charter 77. It is this experience that leads
Tucker to his conclusions about human rights, and it is from this period that Patocka
makes the following statement:
No society, no matter how well-equipped it may be technologically, can

function without a moral foundation, without convictions that do not
depend on convenience, circumstances, or expected advantage. Yet the
point o f morality is to assure not the functioning o f a society but the
humanity o f humans. Humans do not invent morality arbitrarily, to suit
their needs, wishes, inclinations, and aspirations. Quite the contrary, it is
morality that defines what being human means.122
Morality is not only crucial to human society, it is actually defining o f human being.
Humans don’t invent morality, it invents them.
How can man be defined by morality if it does not exist a priori, over and above
him? While we can agree that, no matter what its source, a moral order should not be
arbitrary, simply suiting our “needs, wishes, inclinations, and aspirations,” the question
o f a “moral foundation” that defines us is rather more difficult. The language o f the
texts written in defense o f Charter 77, more so than in any other example from his
corpus, seems to imply a metaphysics o f morality. States, he wrote, are subject to
“something unconditional that is higher than they are, something that is binding even on
them, sacred, inviolable.”123
What PatoCka describes as a “binding” force, however, is not intended to invoke
a metaphysical constant -- a form o f knowledge or a commandment. Instead it is
described as a “moral sentiment.” That which is binding on states is not something to
which one can simply point as to an object. It is neither simply relative to an individual
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or a group of individuals, nor does it originate entirely outside o f humanity. The source
o f the morality to which Patodka points is human being itself. Pato£ka wishes to
demonstrate that, if we delve into the question of the possibilities presented by our
being, particularly the possibility o f enhancing it, and if we take account o f the world as
a whole rather than as a collection o f particulars, then we will arrive without the help of
metaphysics at the conviction described above -- the moral content of a life in truth.
“Charta 7T’ (sic), he states, “is an outgrowth of this conviction.”124
This interpretation o f Charter 77 is contested, however, by the claim that
Patocka’s ethics, in the end, revert to a Kantian formulation. It is a claim supported by
the author’s own oblique reference. He writes that Charter 77 “does, however, remind
us explicitly that, already a hundred and eighty years ago, precise conceptual analysis
made it clear that all moral obligations are rooted in what we might call a person’s
obligation to himself.” 125 The reference is clear: PatoCka associates the moral obligation
proposed by the Charter with Kantian analysis. Are we to understand, then, that the
ground for our behavior is a categorical imperative? Is the Kantian analysis the
non-metaphysical formulation we are searching for?
The answer to these questions is “no,” despite the fact that the way in which
Patocka describes the moral aspect of Charter 77 does indeed bear comparison to the
categorical imperative. In fact, Pato£ka was asked by a student about this very point
during one of his “Four Seminars on the Problem o f Europe,” and his response is
revealing. Pato£ka says that he considers Kant’s thought to be an attempt to get at the
root o f the problem, to formulate the essential “difference” referred to above -- the
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difference between being and beings, in Heidegger’s language. But there is a problem in
that Kant’s formulation is “decidedly nonhistorical, it is valid for every person in every
circumstance the same.”126 It takes the form o f a universal formula that stands above
humanity and history. In this it is certainly easier to explain, to appeal to, but it fails to
adequately respond to what Pato£ka sees as our historical nature.
In the examples of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov cited above, Patocka implies that
the meaning o f their sacrifices is tied to their particular situations. In their circumstances
they were able to increase their freedom and enhance their humanity (or being) through
their actions. Their appeal in doing so was not to a universal formula or set o f abstract
rights, but to a moral sentiment tied to the fact o f their humanity, the fact that they could
perceive and live truthfully and that such a life would make them more, not less, human.
As Patodka described it with particular reference to Kant, the action o f the Russians
“does not have to do with some universal formula like the categorical imperative, but
about something, that only in a concrete historical situation has force and validity.”127 In
his philosophical writings and seminars, the connection of human freedom and human
action to history is clear and unambiguous. In his public proclamations in support o f
Charter 77, however, which were intended to be as brief and easily accessible as
possible, the historical aspect is not made explicit. Instead, it is the concept o f the moral
sentiment that is stressed. In doing so, PatoSka ran the risk o f being misinterpreted in a
Kantian light. Yet in the context o f his philosophical work there can be no confusion.
His thought is inherently historical; it does not reduce to a universal formula but stands
on the basis o f the fact of human historicity.
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Thus we end up with an ethics based in a “moral sentiment” that is both
transcendental —in the sense o f transcending the particularities o f our will or desires —
and historical. The realm o f this moral sentiment, this insight, does not exist for us in
concreto. It is there not as a present reality, but only insofar as we respond to it in an
historical situation. Patodka attempts to explain this point, the question o f human
morality, in a consideration o f the meaning o f the term “intelligence”:
If, then, intelligence in the sense o f free reflection is always bound to a

moral posture, to choosing between right and wrong, with which is
connected loss or gain o f the authentic, spiritual “I,” then by virtue o f it’s
final assumption it is still only a realm into which we penetrate via
“moral attitude,...” O f the realm into which we grow via moral insight,
it’s possible to truly say that it is “not o f this world,” because this realm
does not make itself out, does not determine itself as given and present,
but rather opens itself such that we hear a certain claim and we respond
to it.128
We hear and respond in particular situations, and in doing so we move in truth, we
appeal to a realm that exists insofar as we act to enhance and fulfill our possibilities as
human beings.
The Nihilist and the Humanist
In addition to his critique o f Kantian ethics, Pato£ka attempts to clearly
distinguish his own interpretation from two other possibilities open to modem man. The
spiritual person, in rejecting metaphysics, is tempted by but must ultimately resist the
pull o f both nihilism and humanism. In “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,”
Patocka notes that the individual who lives through and accepts problematicity is
ultimately subject to a cruel fate. There is a cruelty in the seemingly endless skepticism
to which he must subject the world, for it leads, almost inevitably, to an
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all-encompassing doubt, a negation o f all meaning. The spiritual person is tempted to
resign himself to “the thought that life and the world are not only problematic, but that
meaning as an answer to this question not only is not found, but that it cannot be found,
that the ultimate result is nihil —a self-negation, a self-denial.”129 He is tempted to
resign himself, in other words, to nihilism.
Yet nihilism is not a solution nor is it the only possible recourse in a world
where all other idols have been broken. In the concept o f problematicity all is not
negative and lacking unity. A unified life is possible on skeptical basis, on a basis o f
problematicity: “In the spiritual life it is consequently possible to find unity precisely
without a solid ground, and it is possible without dogma to overcome this complete
negativity, negative skepticism, negative nihilism.”130 The spiritual life does not rest on
a “solid ground,” it admits to no dogma, but its interrogation o f reality does not make
life subjective or nihilistic. To the contrary, the questioning attitude o f philosophy “is
something that rests upon the deepest foundations o f our life.”131 Unity is possible
without a unifying doctrine.
This does not exhaust Patoika’s analysis o f nihilism, however. He also responds
to Nietzsche, whose diagnosis o f the death o f metaphysics was followed by a search for
a creative means o f replacing it. In Chapter Three o f the Heretical Essays, Pato£ka takes
up the challenge o f those who would embrace nihilism in the wake o f a loss o f faith in
absolute meaning. This was Nietzsche’s solution, to embrace nihilism and accept the
death o f absolute meaningfulness, but to put in place o f the latter a creative will to
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power that itself can acquire relative meaning. But as Pato£ka conceives o f the
relationship between life and meaning, this must be an impossible attempt:
In its practical unfolding, life cannot rest on a relative meaning which

itself rests on meaninglessness, since no relative meaning can ever render
the meaningless meaningful but, rather, is always itself dragged into
meaninglessness by it. An authentic life in utter nihilism, with the
knowledge of the meaninglessness of the whole, is impossible, becoming
possible only at the cost o f illusions.132
While Nietzsche’s diagnosis o f the crisis of meaning is acute, his nihilistic prescription
for the active creation o f meaning through will to power is unworkable. One could
persist in an attempt o f this sort only be deluding oneself and others, by creating the
illusion o f a meaningful life. Nihilism, then, takes on the form of a dogmatic solution
that is just as illusory as what it hoped to replace: “the theses o f a nihilism so conceived,
however, are no less dogmatic than the theses of a naive unbroken faith in meaning!”133
Nietzsche, in his headstrong confrontation with the loss o f meaning, ends up not with a
liberating freedom but with another form of uncritical dogma.
Nietzsche’s embrace o f nihilism has not been the only option open to people in
the post-metaphysical age, however. Accompanying the very crisis of faith to which the
will to power is a reaction has been a tremendous rise in human scientific knowledge.
This advance in human knowledge, in fact, is one o f the primary causes o f the decline in
traditional metaphysics. Humans are solving by scientific means many o f the great
mysteries o f humanity. As a predictable result, we have seen a transference o f faith from
superhuman sources o f rationality to mundane or simply human sources. Faith is placed
in humans themselves and in their ability to continually progress towards a better and
more knowledgeable future. I am speaking, rather broadly, of what is known as
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humanism. In Patodka’s analysis, modem anthropocentric humanism is discarded, along
with nihilism, as a solution to the question o f meaning —and for similar reasons.
In two essays that deal with the topic o f humanism, Pato£ka speaks o f it in two
forms. The first is a humanism characterized by a general faith in man and progress that
Patocka terms “harmonism” and associates with some o f the works o f Masaryk. This
general humanistic attitude “forms the background o f the great majority o f moral and
social thought o f modem humanity,” he wrote in an undated essay from the end o f the
1930s entitled “The Harmonism o f Modem Humanists.”134 In his essay “Negative
Platonism” o f a decade or so later, Patodka is even more specific in pointing to an
integral humanism with ties to positivism and the conviction that the scientific conquest
of nature will replace the need for theology. In both cases, PatoCka’s position is clear:
modem humanism bears the same characteristic markings as the metaphysics it claims
to be doing away with. It is an elevation o f man and his rational abilities to a status
formerly reserved for the divinities.
In the earlier article, Pato£ka discusses humanism in terms o f what he calls
“harmonism,” the particularly modem conception o f mankind based on the conviction
that internally, man is a harmonious figure with limitless potential for progress. As he
puts it: “Man in the faith of harmonism is in his essence a happy figure, whose nature is
meant for uninterrupted growth.135 PatoCka’s critique of this posture is straightforward.
Far from comprehending man in his essence, this view reflects a transference of faith
from traditional sources to an anthropocentric conception o f rationality. The result is a
simplified and distorted picture of human being. “The man o f harmonism is a closed,
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ready being, simple and entirely transparent.”136 Though it was never finished, the point
of the essay is clear: a harmonistic ethics, an approach to moral problems based on this
simplified notion o f humanity, is insufficient and unable to respond to the complexity of
human being.
In the more polished “Negative Platonism,” we will recall that Patoika conducts
an analysis o f the metaphysical roots o f modem scientific rationalism and concludes
that, rather than overcoming the metaphysical desire for a complete understanding o f
the whole, modem humanism has actually taken over the aspiration in new form. This is
surprising, on the face o f it, for humanism generally defines itself in opposition to
abstract metaphysics. Yet in two modem perspectives that both result in humanism,
positivism and dialectical humanism or Hegelianism, “metaphysics is said to be an
abstract formulation o f theological ideas which will vanish under the light o f successful
human conquest of nature, o f the resolution o f social problems, and o f a reordering of
human society.”137 Though these approaches certainly differ in other ways, both result in
a humanism reflecting this conviction.
The very factors intended to bring about an eclipse o f metaphysics, however, the
scientific “conquest o f nature” and the “resolution o f social problems,” themselves
reflect metaphysical goals. Though they set themselves up in opposition to tradition,
they still carry on its search for a solution to history. As PatoCka puts it, “ .. .in spite o f
all its resistance to tradition and to the form that metaphysics assumed within the
church, within the traditional state, and in their schools, modem humanism continues to
operate within the matrix set down by this tradition, precisely as a militant opposition to
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it.”138 Modem humanism mirrors the goals o f metaphysics primarily in its faith in the
ability o f rational rule to encapsulate itself into a system that will solve the problems o f
humanity. Rather than God, however, man is now at the center. While its positivistic
side restricted itself to the empirical and the objective, trying to develop a “calculus of
utility and well-being,” it was another version, that o f Hegel and dialectical humanism,
that truly represented the high point o f modem, metaphysical thought. With this
systematization o f man and history, culminating in Marx, it
became entirely evident that, in a full working out o f the spirit of

metaphysics that means man, as historical and as social, placing himself
in the position once reserved for the gods and for God, myth, dogma, and
theology were reabsorbed into history and flowed into a philosophy that
discarded its time-honored name o f a simple love o f wisdom in order to
become a scientific system.139
The humanist dream of devising a rational system perfect enough to respond to all
contingencies and illuminate all mysteries is itself the victim o f the metaphysical desire
for the fullness o f knowledge denied to Socrates. Like nihilism, it severely limits the
way in which we are permitted to view ethics and meaning. While the Nietzschean
nihilist would limit his search for ethics and meaning to that which he can create by the
force o f his own will, the anthropocentric humanist would restrict the factors going into
his own understanding to that which he can grasp wholly through his own reason and its
systematic methodologies.
Though one could take issue with Patodka’s characterization o f the broad
category o f humanism as reductive or oversimplified, the point would remain the same:
in his search to comprehend the ground of human reality, neither a nihilistic nor an
anthropocentric humanist perspective is sufficient. The rejection o f nihilism and
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humanism as means through which to understand human reality, and so human ethics,
brings us back to our earlier question: if we must discard not only traditional
metaphysics but also humanist and nihilistic-romanticist reactions to it, can it be said
that there is any foundation for ethics at all?
The Foundation o f Ethics
“Ethics are not built upon metaphysics...;” this is the contention that grounds not
only Pato£ka’s political thought, but also his concepts o f “care for the soul” and “life in
truth.”140 Yet, as these Platonic concepts imply, some form o f non-relative ethical
thought is elemental to his philosophy. Pato£ka’s ethics have their source in our
understanding o f our own being. It is our being and the character o f our relationship to it
that largely determine our lives. Understood properly, human being is something quite
distinctive from the simple existence o f things, creatures, objects. Human being, as we
have seen, is most open to its possibilities insofar as it relates, not simply to the contents
o f the world but to the world as a whole. In Patoika’s analysis o f those relations, he
stresses movement as the primary concept.
Conceived o f phenomenologically, human movement was shown to have a
hierarchical structure. Certain movement, such as that directed toward freedom (i.e.,
historical movement), was instrumental in opening up human possibility; it aimed for
more than the simple preservation o f life. This movement acted to heighten our being,
and so could be classified as a higher type o f human movement. It was a “movement o f
truth,” he explained further, and was exemplified in particular human activities like the
philosophical interrogation of reality. Another activity that Patodka later demarcated as
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potentially a movement o f truth, a form o f historical action, was the phenomenon of
authentic sacrifice.
To illuminate the overall point, let’s return for a moment to the discussion of
sacrifice. With a meaningful sacrifice, a sacrifice that reflects human being rather than
the being of things, the presence o f a hierarchical structure to being is revealed.
Meaningful sacrifice, Pato£ka maintains, shows that “there exists something like a
difference, a hierarchy, a fundamental dividing line. Otherwise all so-called values are
subjective and relative.141 This is the dividing line between that which is most basic to
humanity, i.e., our being and our ability to understand our being, and that which
characterizes things or mere beings. It is a difference that is not relative, but
fundamental. It is what Heidegger would describe as the difference between being and
beings.142
In Patodka’s reading, this is the difference that determines the way we act. It is,
he says, “a difference which is, which manifests itself in two basic manners o f being:
namely, in the manner o f being o f things, which are indifferent to the fact that they
exist, and in the manner o f being o f man, in whom it is not like this.” 143 The key point is
the latter, that this difference manifests itself in human behavior, in a “manner o f
being.” It is a hierarchical difference that precludes a relativity o f values, but still does
not exist in such a form that it can be translated into a universal ladder o f values. It is a
difference that manifests itself, not independently and objectively, but in the course of
our historical actions. It manifests itself in a “manner o f being” which is precisely the
“moral attitude” described in the Charter 77 texts. Only having established this
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connection can Pato£ka proceed to speak o f non-relative human ethics in the context of
a critique o f metaphysics.
Despite the focus on movement and our way o f being, we are still left to deal
with what seems to be a metaphysical teleology: Patodka argues that care for the soul
means movement o f the soul in the direction of good. Yet as I have already
demonstrated, this classical formulation hides a content that specifically denies
metaphysics. Care for the soul in its ontological and phenomenological sense is a
“theory o f motion,” and the movement of the soul towards the good is not a movement
towards an immovable object.144 Instead, both the soul and the good have to be
understood in terms o f their relation to each other and to our being. The soul is
effectively a summation o f the relationship o f the individual to being; it is a story of
growth and decline. It “ —is that which defines itself in the direction o f its being and
that which consequently directs itself either towards legitimate growth, towards a
growth of being, or on the contrary towards decline and a loss o f being: the soul is an
indicator o f the main arteries o f being.”145
In indicating these “arteries o f being,” these human possibilities, the soul also
indicates what we call good and evil. Indeed, the soul could not exist without good and
evil, for without “arteries o f being” how could an indicator o f those arteries exist. Good
is demarcated by the action o f the soul, but the soul itself is dependent on the existence
o f good. Here, it seems, is a case of circular logic. Its resolution requires an emphasis on
motion and possibility. We can say there is good not insofar as humans merely exist, but
only insofar as they live humanly, meaning in the possibility o f the intensification of
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their own being. Pato£ka attempted to express this formulation in a passage from
Europe and the Post-European Age which, though cited earlier, bears repeating:
The soul is that which has a sense o f good and evil. The soul can exist
only when good exists, for its basic motion is motion in the direction of
good, but on the other hand even good itself has meaning as the goal and
vanishing point o f everything only when there exists motion. Only
insofar as there exists something that can heighten its being by motion
towards the good is good operative, meaning it is. The soul thus not only
enables a conception o f the overall hierarchy o f being in the sense o f
good, i.e., a teleological conception, but it is at the same time a
justification o f good, it gives an answer to the question (which even
Nietzsche expressly asked), why choose good and not evil, why truth and
not (the possibly more practical) seeming.146
So we can, in the end, only speak o f the “good” as a foundation for ethics in a very
particular sense. Good is not an independent entity, nor is it relative to our will,
conventions, desires, and so forth. It relates, instead, to our very humanity, the
movement that is our soul. The operative concept, the crucial factor, is our
understanding o f being. Being is something that we can describe in hierarchical terms,
as in the classical description o f good, but it is not an objective telos.
It is by virtue o f the ontological character of our humanity -- our interest in our
own being, not simply our humanity as such —that we are able to speak o f ethics at all.
Ethics have their source in this humanity and in our relation to the world as a whole.
Though we cannot speak o f ethics as ahistorical values, we need not revert to the
relativistic conviction that ethics are simply created by human will, or are merely the
product o f a historical period. The contemporary dilemma, in many respects, is one of
being caught between two unsatisfactory visions of reality. It is a choice between a
metaphysical foundation for morals or an anthropocentric humanism which, in the end,
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must result in an ethical relativism. Jan Patocka’s work is directed towards an
exposition o f the false nature o f this dichotomy. This is the heart o f his ethical thought;
what I have presented thus far, however, does not resolve this problem so much as
introduce it as a problem and indicate the direction in which Pato£ka moves.
PatoCka’s political philosophy concludes in an exposition o f the relation of the
individual to society. In his case this took the form o f dissent. Yet dissent is not, in and
o f itself, a political value. It is simply the way in which Pato£ka’s commitment to
politics manifested itself in the given situation. Jan Patodka’s dissent was a form o f
historical action, a manifestation o f the mode o f living that his philosophy seeks to
describe concretely. Using the Platonic symbolisms o f “caring for the soul” and “living
in truth” PatoCka points his thought in the direction o f a ground for politics in freedom
and problematicity, and a ground for the political individual in a commitment to an
ethics that, if understood in relation to the limits o f human existence, must be
recognized as non-metaphysical.
Patocka’s analysis o f the political reality o f the contemporary world
demonstrates the degree to which politics in the West has abandoned this ground. The
means to recovering a politics o f freedom that respects the possibility inherent in the
human being can be found, if we use Patodka as a guide, in a reexamination o f classical
themes and symbols through the lenses of contemporary critique. “Care for the soul” as
“care for the polis” can be retrieved as a guiding principle o f contemporary, universal
supercivilization only insofar as it can be understood in its essence —purified, if you
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will, o f the metaphysical baggage o f two thousand years. This quest forms the core of
Patocka’s political thought.
The discussion o f ethics in this chapter, however, points to a larger, more
fundamental problem that has still not been fully resolved. In the conclusion to this
study I will analyze PatoCka’s attempt to resolve the problem o f metaphysics by getting
to its source. If we accept that there is a moral sentiment connected to humanity that is
unconditional, then we must admit to an ultimate source for that phenomenon. The
question o f a source is the question of foundations, and it is the animating question o f
much o f contemporary political theory if not of all o f postmodernism.
End Notes
'Patofika, Heretical Essays, 118.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Pato£ka refers to the possibility o f a “metanoesis ’’’in his Heretical Essays, 75.
5Kohak, “A Philosophical Biography,” 3.
6Josef Novak, for example, has noted the importance o f twentieth-century

European history on Patocka’s work, writing that “Patocka’s bibliography is inseparable
from his biography.” Josef Novak, “Selected Bibliography o f Jan Patodka’s Writings,”
115-139
7Edmund Husserl, “The Vienna Lecture,” in Crisis, 299.
8Pato£ka, “NSkolik poznamek o mimosvitske a svgtske pozici filosofie” (Some

Comments on the Worldly and the Extra-worldly Posture o f Philosophy), 66.
9See Ibid., 62-65; Idem, “Zivotni rovnovaha a zivotni amplituda” (Life in

Balance and Life in Amplitude), Kriticky mesicnik (Critical Monthly) 2, no. 3 (1939):
101-106.
282
"PatoCka, “Titanism,” in Jan Patodka, ed. Erazim Kohak, 140.
"Ibid., 142.
l2Ibid., 143.
I3Kohak, “A Philosophical Biography,” 17.
14“The Doubtfulness o f Existentialism,” a brief essay from 1947, laid to rest any
questions as to whether PatoCka’s own philosophy pointed in this direction.
"Patodka, “Some Comments on...Philosophy,” 64.
l6Pato£ka, “European Culture,” trans. Paul Wilson, Cross Currents no. 3 (1984):
4.
"Ibid., 6.
I8Blecha, 100.
"Jan Patodka, “Nadcivilizace a jeji vnitfni konflikt” (Supercivilization and its

Inner Conflict), in Pece o dusi I (Care for the Soul, Vol. I), 249.
20This analysis o f “radical supercivilization,” which often takes the form o f a

“universal church” complete with millenarian tendencies, is comparable to the analyses
o f totalitarianism in the work o f both Eric Voegelin and Hannah Arendt, also Central
European scholars.
"Patocka, “Supercivilization...,” 251.
22Ibid., 253.
^Ibid., 256.
24Ibid., 256-257.
25Ibid„ 257.
26Ibid.
27As opposed to the political religions characteristic o f radicalism, Patodka notes

that Christianity belongs with moderate versions o f civilization. Christianity, he says,
“in its consciousness that the empire of God is not o f this world, structurally belongs
283
today in connection with moderate (even when factually this is not always so).” Ibid.,
260.
28Ibid.
29Ibid., 259-260.
30Ibid., 258.
3’Ibid., 285.
32Ibid., 292.
33See Blecha, 104.
34Pato£ka, “Supercivilization...,” 295.
3SIvan Blecha, Jan Patocka, 100.
36Ibid., 98.
37RecoIlection o f Zden6k Urbanek, in Jan Vladislav, Vzpominky a pocty: na

pamet ’Jana Patocky (Recollections in Honor o f the Memory o f Jan Patodka) (samizdat)
(Prague: 1980), 116, quoted in Ivan Blecha, Jan Patocka, 99.
38See Eric Voegelin, The New Science o f Politics, 107-132.
39Radim Palous, “Patodka and the Community o f the Shaken,” TMs, Jan Pato£ka
Archive, Center for Theoretical Study, Prague, 3.
40Blecha, 100.
41Palou§, 7.
42Insightful analysis of the ideological nature o f rule during normalization can be

found in the essays o f Vaclav Havel. See “The Power o f the Powerless” and “Politics
and Conscience” in Open Letters: Selected Prose 1965-1990, ed. Paul Wilson, (London:
Faber and Faber, 1991).
43Patocka, “Two Charta 77 Texts,” in Jan Patocka, 341.
44Ibid.
45Ibid.
284
46Ibid., 342.
47On Strauss’s notion o f exoteric writing, see for example, Kenneth L. Deutsch
and Walter Nicgorski, “Introduction” to Leo Strauss: Political Philosopher and Jewish
Thinker (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), 8.
49Ibid., 97.
50Ibid.
5IIbid., 95.
52The very field o f modem sociology, Patofika points out, is “basically an

outgrowth o f an awareness o f the danger, or even o f a sense o f the pathological nature,
of the development o f the industrial civilization up to now.” Ibid., 96.
53See the reference to Heidegger in Ibid., 117. See also Martin Heidegger, Being
and Time, 126-30, 176-80.
54Patocka, Heretical Essays, 114-115.
55Ibid., 115.
56See “Apology,” in Great Dialogues o f Plato, 443.
58Ibid., 117.
59Ibid.
“ Ibid., see pp. 98-103, 113-115.
6IIbid., 118. Note: here Pato£ka makes use of the symbol o f a “turn,” prefiguring
the discussion o f the individual capable o f “conversion,” or “metanoia,” with which he
concludes the Heretical Essays. See p. 256, above.
“ Ibid., 118.
“ Ibid., 117.
285
“ See the analyses o f both Erazim Kohak and Aviezer Tucker in the Appendix to
this work, below.
6SPaul Ricoeur, “Preface to the French Edition o f Jan Pato£ka’s Heretical

Essays,” in Heretical Essays, viii.
“ Patodka, Heretical Essays, 124.
67Ibid., 121.
68Ibid.
69Ibid., 122. Patoika adds that “[t]he revolution taking place here had its deep
driving force in the conspicuous scientification which all prewar experts on Europe and
on Germany saw as the chief trait o f its life: a scientification which understood science
as technology, actually a positivism,...” Ibid., 123.
70Ibid.
7IIbid„ 124.
72Ibid., 125.
73Ibid., 133.
74Ibid., 120.
75Ibid., 128.
76See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, “La nostalgie du front,” in Ecrits du temps de

la guerre (Paril: Grasset, 1965), and Ernst Junger, Die Arbeiter: Herrschaft und Gestalt
and Die totale Mobilmachung, in Samtliche Werke, Zweite Abteilung, vol. 7-8
(Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1980).
77Pato6ka, Heretical Essays, 126.
78Ibid., 130.
79Ibid., 129.
80Ibid., 134.
81Ibid., 133-134.
286
“ Ibid., 134.
“ Ibid.
“ Ibid.
“ Ibid.
“ Ibid., 136.
“ Ibid., 135.
“ Plato does not stress polemos, as does Heraclitus, but it is worth noting that he
speaks o f an “immortal battle” among good and bad things in heaven that requires o f us
an “amazing guard.” See Plato, The Laws o f Plato 906a-b, trans. Thomas L. Pangle
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1980), 306.
“ See Patocka, Heretical Essays, 136-137. See also Heidegger, An Introduction

to Metaphysics, 62-63.
“ Erazim Kohak writes in his biography o f Patodka that “a number of Western

readers” have in fact read the essay in this light. He is completely correct in responding
that such an interpretation is “totally and tragically erroneous.” Kohak, “A Philosophical
Biography,” 129.
91Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 62.
“ Ibid., 43. On polemos as constitutive o f unity in the polis, see pp. 314-318,
below. The Heraclitian perspective, it should be noted, is not only explored in the
Heretical Essays, but also in Plato and Europe, where Patodka makes an analogy to
Sophocles7 Oedipus and the harmony that comes to exist through struggle and through
an examination o f the ambiguity between good and evil. See Plato and Europe, pp.
191-192.
94Patodka, Four Seminars on the Problem o f Europe, 315.
“ Ibid., 329.
“ Light is a prominent symbol o f the highest good in Christian and

Enlightenment thought; peace is also considered the highest of goals for rational
thought: see, for example, Immanuel Kant’s “On Eternal Peace.” Plato’s treatment of
287
light and reason in the Divided Line in The Republic is, on the other hand, a more
nuanced presentation with parallels to Patocka’s.
97Pato£ka, “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” 6.
98See Heretical Essays, 39.
"See ibid., 134-35. For a discussion o f the “conversion” in the context o f its
source in Plato’s “Allegory o f the Cave,” see ibid., 60-61. The metaphor o f the turn is
also significant in the interpretation o f Eric Voegelin. See his discussion o f periagoge in
Order and History, Vol. Ill: Plato and Aristotle, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1957), 114-15.
100Ibid., 134. In distinct contrast to “Wars of the Twentieth Century,” Pato£ka’s

individual possessed o f understanding is not a soldier, here, but a “spiritual person”
(duchovni clovek). Far from evoking a glorified image o f war, this title seems to do the
opposite, calling to mind a religious sentiment that is also foreign to modern ears: “I
think that the word [sic.] spiritual person does not sound pleasant today, it sounds in
some way spiritualist and we don’t like such phrases nowadays; but does there exist a
better expression for what I have in mind?” Patocka, “The Spiritual Person and the
Intellectual,” 1.
l01Pato£ka, “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” 5.
l02Patocka, Plato and Europe, 223-24.
103Patocka, “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” 6.
w Plato and Europe, 269.
i°s“The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” 8.
106Ibid.
l07Patodka, “The Dangers o f Technicization in Science,” in Jan Patocka,

327-339.
I08lbid., 336.
109Ibid., 337.
"°Ibid., 336.
11'On the idea of “negative” freedom, see Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of
288
Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1969.
ll2Pato£ka, “Four Seminars on the Problem o f Europe,” 340.
1I3On this point, see the analysis by Ivan Chvatlk in his essay, “Solidarity o f the
Shaken,” in Telos 94 (New York: 1993): 164-165.
" 4Patocka, Heretical Essays, 135.
ll5See Ibid., 98-102; “Four Seminars on the Problem o f Europe,” 336-337.
116Heretical Essays, 153.
II7“A Philosophy o f Education” (Filosofie vychovy), 435. “The work, which a

certain artist or theoretician performs apparently for himself alone, is in actuality work
for all possible, work for a possible society, enriching not only himself, but man in
general. The free person thus comes to understand this relation o f his own actions to
society as a necessary assumption, and he experiences it as a feeling o f responsibility.”
U8Pato6ka, “The Dangers o f Technicization in Science,” 339.
,,9See my review o f The Gift o f Death in the Appendix to this study, below.
l20Derrida, Gift o f Death, 49.
121See my review o f Tucker’s work in the Appendix to this study, below.
122Patocka, “Two Charta 77 Texts,” in Jan Patocka, 341. Note: In Erazim

Kohak’s translation o f these two short texts, he leaves the title “Charter 77” in its Czech
form, which is “Charta 77.”
l23While Charter 77 is often considered to be a “human rights” document or to

represent a human rights movement, it actually does not presume or enumerate any
particular human rights. It contends, instead, that “[t]he idea o f human rights is nothing
other than the conviction that even states, even society as a whole, are subject to the
sovereignty o f moral sentiment: that they recognize something unconditional that is
higher than they are, something that is binding even on them, sacred, inviolable, and
that in their power to establish and maintain a rule o f law they seek to express this
recognition.” Ibid.
,24Ibid.
I25Patodka, “Two Charter 77 Texts,” in Jan Patocka, 342.
289
126Pato£ka, “Four Seminars on the Problem o f Europe,” 336.
l27Ibid.
l28Pato£ka, “Opposition and Intellectuals,” trans. Edward F. Findlay, Report o f

the Center fo r Theoretical Study, Prague. CTS-98-07 (July 1998), 5.
l29Pato£ka, “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” 5.
130Ibid., 6.
I3,Ibid.
132Ibid.
133Ibid. Even as a young man, when his view o f philosophy was as a heroic
enterprise and he could have been justifiably criticized for a rhetoric that tended towards
“titanism,” i.e., a deification o f man in the wake o f the death o f God, Patodka was never
tempted by the Nietzschean solution. In commenting on the task o f philosophy in 1934,
the young philosopher already sees a connection between, for example, Nietzsche’s
Superman and Marx’s dreams o f the socialist man to come, characterizing both as
seeking a substitute for a lost meaning. While Nietzsche viciously condemns Socrates
the philosopher for standing in the way o f the creator, still naively seeking
understanding, Pato£ka argues that philosophy is not, as Nietzsche characterized it, a
naive intellectualism. To the contrary, Pato£ka’s vision o f philosophy sees it as
relinquishing all recourse to salvation. See Pato£ka, “Some Comments on the
Otherworldly and Worldly Position o f Philosophy,” in Care fo r the Soul, Vol I, 58-67.
l34Pato£ka, “Harmonismus modernich humanistu: Mravnlproblemy a hlediska

soucnasne filosofie” (The Harmonism o f Modem Humanists: Moral Problems and the
Perspective o f Contemporary Philosophy), in Pece o dusi /, 356.
135Ibid. In addition to Masaryk, PatoCka refers to Fourier, Comte and Herder as

examples o f this type o f thought.
I36Ibid., 362.
I38lbid., 178.
I39Ibid., 186. Note: the Kohak translation o f this passage contains what I assume
to be a typographical error -- a period between the words “God” and “myth” —which I
have taken the liberty to correct based upon the Czech original.
290
I40Pato6ka, Europe and the Post-European Age, 73
I4lPato£ka, Four Seminars on the Problem o f Europe, 336.
142See Martin Heidegger, “Being and Time: Introduction,” in Basic Writings,

46-50.
l43Pato6ka, Four Seminars on the Problem o f Europe, 336.
145Ibid.
146Ibid., 73.
291
C H A PT ER 6
CONCLUSION: FOUNDATIONS AND PHILOSOPHY, PO LITIC S AND

POSTM ODERNISM
Postmodernism, taking its lead from Nietzsche and Heidegger, presents a
significant challenge to political theory with its contention that metaphysical
foundationalism is a facile and impermissible ground for understanding. The effect o f
this critique on politics is particularly acute, for it implies that no consistent ground for
ethics or political responsibility can be said to exist. The result is a postmodern
dilemma, an inability to conceptualize an ethics that transcends the particular moment.
Yet Patoika, despite his allegiance to the Heideggerean critique o f metaphysics,
proposes just such an ethics. He posits a “moral attitude” that is neither ahistorically
absolute nor entirely relative. It is not governed by a metaphysical reality nor is it
subject to human will or whim. PatoCka’s understanding o f ethics stems from a
fundamental ontology and a phenomenological relationship o f the human to the world
as a whole. Patodka stakes out, with his discussion of the ethical content o f taking an
interest in one’s own being (or caring for one’s soul), a space in-between the two poles
o f the debate over foundationalism. He argues that the dilemma of a choice between
postmodern relativism and metaphysical absolutism is a false one. Contemporary
critique is compatible with a classical concern for ethics.
With contemporary thought, the question of foundations becomes an explicit
theme —it is dealt with as a philosophical problem in its own right.1Postmodern theory
makes this problem particularly acute because it challenges, not only traditionally
metaphysical conceptions o f meaning, but also the very notion o f the need or possibility
292
o f a foundation in political and social thought at all. Pato£ka’s thought has as its central
axis the attempt to demarcate a ground for a politics, and a life, that represents a morally
consistent alternative to either o f the two poles o f the foundationalist issue. He makes a
claim for a ground that is non-foundational, a morality without metaphysics. Yet is this
a tenable position? Can the existence o f such a ground be defended philosophically? An
answer to these questions demands an exploration o f the concept o f the foundation in
Patocka’s work, and a search for the ultimate source for the meaning that he sees as
unconditional in human life even though it does not rest upon a naive metaphysics.
What Jan Patodka describes as his foundation is the intuitive human experience o f
reality that finds it meaningful in a non-relative sense. Abandoning an objective,
transcendental source, meaning becomes something problematic; a new mode o f
meaning is uncovered that, without succumbing to relativism, must understand itself as
conditional on the relationship o f the individual to the world and to his own being.
As political philosophy, Patodka’s contention is that we can and must speak of
ethics, but only within a framework characterized, not by a concrete foundation, but by
problematicity. Political life, he states at one point, is “a permanent uprootedness, lack
o f foundation.”2 Interestingly, Pato£ka borrows an English phrase to describe the limits
o f the political realm: politics does not properly permit hope for what he terms the
“happy end.”3 Instead, politics is an historical endeavor that should take its lead from
the principles found in the early Greek polis. It should allow for, rather than seeking to
end, free and conflictual interaction.
293
Despite the fact that political life is described as lacking foundation, it is not
accurate to refer to Pato£ka as anti-foundationalisl —as does, for example, Richard
Rorty.4 Even as the spiritual twin o f politics and a risky and uncertain endeavor,
“[p]hilosophy searches for founding.”5 Although the “spiritual person” must forego
metaphysical certainty, he or she is not reduced to indecision and immobility.
Philosophy properly searches for founding, but it is true philosophy only insofar as it
understands the character o f what it hopes to find.
In Europe and the Post-European Age, Pato£ka characterizes the promise of
philosophy with his description o f ancient Greek thought as a fundamental breakthrough
in the way the world is understood. Pointing to presocratic thinkers such as Heraclitus
as well as to Socrates, Pato£ka depicts the opening up o f a new perspective. This
breakthrough, however, does not consist in an answering o f questions. Rather, it further
complicates things. Its basic characteristic is a “deepening” o f the horizon o f the world,
an introduction o f a new situation in which a searching lostness regarding questions of
good and evil shifts from being our “fate” to our “mission” in life. The world speaks to
man differently now -- he is no longer philosophically naive. “It is no longer an
undamaged world..., but an ambiguous world.”6 Naive and comforting mythical
demarcations between gods and man disintegrate; the cosmos is deepened and for the
first time revealed in its all-encompassing depth. Now, Patodka notes, man must
recognize himself as a question —“Who am I?” —and he must learn to expect that an
answer will come only from himself.7
294
It is this insight into the ambiguity o f the human condition that characterizes the
limits o f any foundation to which we may aspire. We have true access only to
immediate reality, never to the whole o f reality that it presupposes. The concept o f the
“whole” o f reality plays a key role in Patodka’s phenomenological philosophy, of
course. As an experiential horizon, however, the whole does not exist as a concrete
phenomenon. It is not an entity upon which we can ground our activity. It is,
nevertheless, our ontological directedness toward this “whole” that defines our
humanity. The whole is itself no foundation, but rather a “presupposition” o f our
founding activity, o f our search for understanding. Without a sense of a whole we would
be frozen in nihilism, unable to move. PatoCka explains his position in a passage from
Europe and the Post-European Age that deserves to be quoted at length:
Man stands with one leg in the immediacy o f reality, in givenness, but
that givenness fully lays open the content o f its reality only at the point
when it is not taken as what it passes itself off to be, but when we are
able to gain support and foundation together and in terms o f the whole.
The universe revealed in this way is an actual foundation, and only this
foundation founds in the true sense o f the word....If we stood on both feet
in reality, on the ultimate soil o f the all-encompassing whole, we would
never be exposed to wandering, to vain hopeless groping in circles; then
our path would be consistent and clear, continually meaningful, never
recurring. This we cannot guarantee nor achieve. But we can procure
immediacy with a question mark and attempt to bring our path, our steps,
from one immediacy to another, from one experience to the next, from
one thought to another, in such a way that they will be unified and will
not be destructive o f each other. Then it also forms a sort o f ground upon
which it is possible to move. The final foundation, in view of which we
experience and we think, i.e., we are in a human way, thus forms the
presupposition for our concrete assigning o f reasons, for the action o f
founding. Philosophy searches for founding.8
Human activity does not take place on the sure and eternally continuous footing o f a
metaphysical foundation. Instead, we move from immediacy to immediacy, from one
295
interaction with the immediate world to another. If we do so, however, in such a way
that we do not live only for those immediacies but rather in search o f a fuller
understanding o f the whole that all immediate phenomena presuppose, then we evoke a
certain consistency and unity that is itself able to serve as a “sort o f ground upon which
it is possible to move.”
This “consistency,” as Patodka has argued, is not characteristic o f m odem
Western civilization. The universal civilization that developed out o f the roots o f
Europe, which has been called a new form o f supercivilization, suffers from confusion,
or rather a misplaced sense o f security, with regard to its foundations. The creation of
the modem supercivilization —and its crisis —we will recall, was connected to the
problem o f metaphysical philosophy in the contemporary world. The age in which we
live is a “post-European” age, not simply because o f the end o f European hegemony, but
because the age is post-metaphysical. Traditional metaphysics has, over a course of
centuries, been abandoned for science and rationality. Yet as Patodka concludes in his
essay on the “Supercivilization,” this process was less an abandonment o f metaphysics
than a “negation” o f it. The result was a negative metaphysics that attempted to
reproduce reality by non-metaphysical, that is, scientific, means. Yet rather than
overcoming metaphysics, this attempt merely succeeded in repeating its mistakes in
rationalistic form. Following Husserl, PatoCka takes issue with the use o f science as a
replacement for metaphysics, as a new foundation. His approach is not to discredit
science itself, but to argue for the necessity o f understanding its limitations.
The process o f the passage from metaphysical forms o f thought and life
to nonmetaphysical cannot be capped by attempts that are negatively
296
metaphysical, consequently impoverishing man in regard to the
possibility o f possibilities; its consummation can only be a division of
these possibilities, a measurement o f their autonomy. New society cannot
be founded on illusions; nor can it be founded on the illusion that we
have a direct access to reality and that (at least in its basic characteristics)
we understand the whole. Negative metaphysics rested mainly on the
metaphysicalizing o f science; the de-metaphysicalizing o f science does
not mean the de-realization o f science, the claim that it doesn’t capture
reality (of objects), but merely that it doesn’t capture it as a whole and
directly, but rather merely partially and schematically.9
The problem o f modem society, then, is that it has long sought a new foundation to
replace that which has been discredited. This is the state o f the “post-metaphysical” age;
despite the twilight o f metaphysics, modem European civilization has sought to replace
the traditional metaphysical means o f political organization with quasi-rationalist means
that replicate the goals o f metaphysics rather than revealing a genuine alternative to
them.
In his writings on the philosophy of history, PatoCka argues that properly
historical action is “free” action primarily in that it rejects the goals and ends inherent in
traditional metaphysics and its scientific descendent. It rejects the need for a foundation
that is solid and irrefutable. In giving up certain forms o f metaphysics, modernity did
not cease to search for the irrefutable. Indicative o f this end, as Pato£ka puts it in the
fifth o f his Heretical Essays, is the fact that modem civilization consistently yet vainly
seeks to treat history as a problem to be solved. “Modem civilization suffers not only
from its own flaws and myopia but also from the failure to resolve the entire problem o f
history. Yet the problem o f history may not be resolved, it must be preserved as a
problem” (emphasis mine).10 The key to the positive possibilities o f modem, rational
civilization, then, is an understanding o f history that recognizes it as a problem that
297
cannot be solved. It is an understanding o f historical activity as activity grounded in our
freedom from a search for objective and metaphysical foundations. Philosophy searches
for foundations and politics requires a ground, but in order for either to succeed the
nature o f that foundation, that ground, must be recognized as problematic.
Pato£ka expresses his vision o f the ground upon which political society can form
in a text accompanying the Czech edition o f Europe and the Post-European Age. In this
text, entitled “The Pattern o f History,” the foundation o f political society is tied, not to
the notion o f the preservation o f life that is the foremost characteristic o f liberal society,
but to the preservation o f freedom as a possibility that takes precedence over the simple
preserving o f life. The concept that captures this dynamic is Patodka’s concept o f
history:
This means, however, that history is and will be only insofar as there are
people who do not want to merely “live,” but are truly willing, in their
detachment from mere life, to lay down and preserve societal
foundations o f mutual respect. What is founded in this way is not a safe
securing of life, but freedom, i.e., possibilities which exceed the level o f
mere life. These possibilities are in essence o f two forms, namely the
responsible care for the other and an expressed relation to being, i.e.,
truth. In these relations man is neither dependent nor a consumer, but in
the essential sense a builder, founder, expander, preserver o f society -- o f
course, as has already been said, never without exposure to danger. This
building is the building of a world which is founded in the non-visible
region, but it must be made into a visible and lasting form in order to
bear human life and to offer to man the possibility to be historical
henceforth and always anew."
What is required is the building o f a concrete and “visible” society, yet one grounded in
the non-visible region. This is the region that is the ultimate source for human meaning.
It is PatoCka’s challenge to describe it without recourse to the foundationalism that he is
determined to avoid.
298
The Problem o f M eaning
In the Heretical Essays on the Philosophy o f History the concept o f a foundation
for historical action is subsumed under the question o f meaningfulness. “Does History
have a Meaning?” is the title o f the third essay; in it, he seeks to inquire to what degree
history, in the specific, ontological way in which it is defined, is dependent upon a
foundation in meaning. The postmodern perspective grounded in the Heideggerean
critique o f metaphysics, o f course, is clear in its rejection o f a transcendent meaning of
history. But does this mean, Pato£ka wishes to ascertain, that history can make no claim
to meaning at all? Contrary to what one would expect from an anti-foundationalist,
Patocka concludes that history is dependent upon meaning. As he puts it in response to
the solution offered by Nietzschean nihilism: “An authentic life in utter nihilism, with
the knowledge o f the meaningless o f the whole, is impossible, becoming possible only
at the cost o f illusions.”12 But the meaning that characterizes historical (or
philosophical) man, Patodka is clear to point out, is o f a distinctly different character
than the accepted, positive meaning o f prehistorical or metaphysical man. The essential
characteristic o f history remains the rejection, or the “shaking,” o f naivete. Yet this
shaking is not a rejection o f all meaning; its counterpart is the positive formulation of
the freer, more demanding meaningfulness epitomized by political life.
PatoCka’s analysis o f the source o f meaning in this chapter makes his work
explicitly relevant to the contemporary problem o f foundationalism in political theory.
Insofar as a society is grounded in a given and unshakable meaning, as in “prehistoric”
civilization, then a positive, concrete foundation is presumed. The shaking o f meaning
299
in Pato£ka’s philosophy o f history is consistent with a critique o f that foundationalism —
yet Patocka is not simply an anti-foundationalist. He argues coherently that meaning is
essential to human life, particularly political life. A meaningful ground upon which we
can move and progress is possible, but it is dependent on a fuller understanding o f both
our being and our relationship to the world as a whole. Thus Pato£ka attempts to
respond to the problem of foundationalism by centering it in a philosophical approach
informed by contemporary ontology and phenomenology. His philosophy moves
in-between the Husserlian search for a foundation in a pure phenomenological approach
to reason, and the (early) Heideggerean approach o f avoiding any foundational
temptation entirely.
Pato£ka wishes to illuminate a “soil” upon which it is possible not only to move
but also to live in community, to construct a viable politics; yet he commits himself to
this task under the stricture o f a critique of metaphysics. What are his results? Patodka
concludes that the meaning upon which human history properly unfolds is problematic
meaning. To understand meaning as problematic, to accept even the possibility o f a total
absence o f meaning, is to begin to understand humanity in terms o f our actual
experience o f it. Thus Pato£ka concludes that meaning lies in the “seeking which flows
from its absence,” and that this dynamic first appears in the Greek world as a “new
project o f life” instituted by Socrates.13 As Pato£ka explains it, Socrates struggled not
with a lack o f meaning, but with the problematicity o f meaning (based partly on the
possibility o f its absence). It is precisely via our grasp o f this problematicity, entailing
the realization that meaning is not simply and objectively there but is something that
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can be won or lost, that we are able to experience meaningfulness in its genuine, human
sense.
PatoCka’s unwillingness to posit a concretized metaphysics means that it is
impossible to conceive o f meaning as something autonomous, as independent o f being.
To do so, he argues, would be tantamount to abandoning the question o f meaning’s
source: “To have recourse to a metaphysics means to treat meaning as something
ready-made and to give up for good the question of its origin (not in a
temporal-empirical but in a structural-philosophical sense).”14 It is the “origin” o f
meaning that we are interested in, however, for this points us to the ultimate foundation
for which philosophy searches.
Rather than searching for a static source o f meaning, Pato£ka asks us to think
about meaning non-objectively -- in relation to being. Things, and the values we attach
to them, attain their meaning only in terms o f our understanding o f them.15 It is not the
things themselves to which we must look for the origin o f meaning, it is to our sense for
them. The basic determinant of this sense for things, he continues, is our “openness” to
the world, our willingness and ability to understand things in relation, not to other
things, but to the world as a whole. The source of meaning, then, to the degree it can be
located at all, is in our self-conscious movement through life.
Things have no meaning for themselves, rather, their meaning requires

that someone “have a sense” for them: thus meaning is not originally
lodged in what is [beings, things] but in that openness, in that
understanding for them; an understanding, though, which is a process, a
movement which is no different from the movement at the core o f our
life.16
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In this way, therefore, it is clear that the source o f meaning is in us; it is we who bestow
meaning on things via our relationship to them.
To leave the discussion of meaning at this point would be a mistake, however,
for Pato£ka wishes to demonstrate that what he is describing is something quite other
than the idea that we create meaning and that it is in our power to do so. Meaning is not
relative to our subjective desires, or, as he puts it, “the bestowal o f meaning on things is
not a function o f our will and whim.”17 Even as beings possessed o f understanding, we
have no power to keep things from appearing meaningless in certain situations, just as
we are unable to prevent other things from appearing meaningful. The same beings, in
fact, can “manifest themselves now as meaningful, now as meaningless, signifying
nothing.” And what does that mean, he concludes, “if not the problematic nature of all
meaningfulness?”18 Meaning is problematic because it is never guaranteed; attempting
to make it so, to absolutize it, contradicts its very nature. The significance o f the
problematicity o f meaning, then, is that it “warns us that we should not yield to the
inclination to absolutize particular ways of understanding meaning.”19
Yet to be discussed in PatoCka’s analysis is the source o f that openness for
things and for the world that has been denoted as the origin o f meaningful relations. As
I noted earlier in this section, Pato£ka finds the source o f meaning to be located in the
activity o f searching for meaning, which was best expressed in the Socratic approach to
life. But what is the initiating factor for the Socratic mode o f being? It is, he argues, the
experience o f the loss o f meaning.20 It is the experience o f the loss o f meaning that
forces us to abandon objective, simply-given conceptions o f meaning. Once we
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understand that the meaning we once took for granted is in fact tentative, we can return
to it only with a much greater degree o f awareness. It will “no longer be for us simply a
fact given directly in its integrity; rather, it will be a meaning we have thought through,
seeking reasons and accepting responsibility for it.”21 The result is that something new
emerges via our experience o f loss o f meaning.
It means that there emerges a new relation, a new mode of relating to

what is meaningful; that meaning can arise only in an activity which
stems from a searching lack o f meaning, as the vanishing point o f being
problematic, as an indirect epiphany. If we are not mistaken, then this
discovering o f meaning in the seeking which flows from its absence, as a
new project o f life, is the meaning o f Socrates’s existence. The constant
shaking o f the naive sense o f meaningfulness is itself a new mode o f
meaning, a discovery o f its continuity with the mysteriousness o f being
and what-is [beings] as a whole.22
A new mode o f meaning —a human mode —arises as we act to shake ourselves free o f
the given. Whereas meaning grounded in a naive metaphysics relieves us o f the
responsibility o f acting so as to ensure meaning ~ given meaning is there no matter how
we act —Socrates’ existence demonstrates the consistency and meaningfulness o f an
attitude that refuses foundations just as Socrates denied true knowledge.
This disquisition on the source o f meaning accurately reflects the heart o f Jan
Patocka’s philosophizing. He seeks an understanding o f human reality that allows for a
coherent ethics and politics, that gives us a soil upon which we can move, but not at the
cost o f positing a “solid ground” or explicit foundation. Yet is it clear that his approach
to meaning and to foundationalism is entirely non-metaphysical? Even in the passage
just cited, Patodka refers not only to the “new mode o f meaning” that defines the
Socratic life, he also refers to the continuity that this new mode o f meaning has with the
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“mysteriousness” o f being and beings as a whole. In doing so, in speaking o f an
appreciation for “beings as a whole” or the “world as a whole” as inherent to the
openness that invites meaningfulness, one is forced to ask whether a new foundation is
tacitly being created ~ one simply further removed and more shrouded in mystery than
other, more explicitly metaphysical foundations.
The critique to which Pato€ka’s work is most susceptible, in the end, is not that
his work falls too heavily on the side of Heidegger or anti-foundationalism, though
some have made this suggestion. The clarity and urgency o f Patodka’s commitment to
ethics and to transcendence denies it. Instead, it is the contrary critique -- the critique
that Derrida levels against all those who would try to avoid religious dogmatism without
giving up the language o f moralism and metaphysics ~ that is the most penetrating. It is
the argument that, despite protestations to the contrary, Pato£ka verges on a form o f
metaphysics to a degree sufficient to undermine his intentions. The implications o f this
critique are troubling. If Pato£ka is shown to be just another metaphysician then
credence is lent to the conclusion that it is simply impossible to speak o f a coherent
political morality without falling into metaphysics. If this is the case, then we are
reduced to speaking about ethics in an entirely relative manner, in eliminating the type
of general principle evoked by Patodka in both Charter 77 and in his use o f Platonic
symbolism.
Although Jacques Derrida’s portrayal o f Pato£ka, in his lecture-series published
as The Gift o f Death, as a Christian thinker with designs on a political transformation of
Europe on a Christian-messianic model was highly inaccurate, he makes a second, more
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reasonable argument in this text that must be taken more seriously. In his second
chapter, Derrida indicts any attempt (including Heidegger’s) to use religious
symbolization while trying to avoid religion or, as he puts it, any attempt that tries to
create a “non-dogmatic doublet” o f religious dogma.23 The critique is a subtle one that
will perhaps become clearer if rephrased. In terms o f the discussion o f this chapter,
Derrida appears to argue that, regardless of the degree to which one decries all forms o f
dogma, one is still metaphysical and dogmatic if the possibility of an absolute source of
meaning is even considered. For Derrida, meaning is and can only be relative or
situational.
While the force o f Derrida’s critique in The Gift o f Death is inappositely placed
on an interpretation o f Patodka as a closet Christian thinker —which he is not -- it is
nonetheless true that the Czech philosopher speaks of an “absolute” meaningfulness
without which life is impossible.24 The relevant question, therefore, given the argument
that the meaningfulness of which we are speaking is not relative, is whether there exists
a source for this meaning that is equivalent to a foundation. While Derrida is incorrect
in surmising that Patocka derives meaning from a foundational faith in a Supreme
Being, his cause is taken up and advanced in a more insightful way by one o f Patocka’s
own students, the Czech scholar Ivan Chvatik.
Chvatik, in an essay on “The Heresy o f Jan Patodka in Reflections on the Crisis
o f Europe,” contends that Pato£ka does, in the end, allow himself to rely upon a
metaphysical foundation. What Chvatik points to, however, is not religious imagery but
rather the philosopher’s use o f the symbol o f a “vanishing point” o f meaningfulness.
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This symbol, he attests, amounts to the positing o f a quasi-concrete source o f meaning,
and thus a basic foundationalism.25 Chvatik argues that, while his teacher denies any
search for an objective source o f “absolute meaning,” he nevertheless engages in such a
search, merely cloaking his goal in “mystery” and “darkness.” For Chvatik, the symbol
of the “vanishing point” —a translation of the unusual formulation “ubezny bod' in
Czech —is evidence o f Patodka’s positive Platonism. Although the philosopher has
meticulously developed an ontology rather than a metaphysics as the basis for his
thought, Chvatik holds a Heideggerean line: “meaning may not be identified with
being.”26 It is not permissible to derive from the reality o f our being any but relative
meaningfulness arising in a concrete situation.
Patocka, however, would dispute this argument. When he speaks o f the concept
o f “good” having meaning “as the goal and vanishing point o f everything,” he adds that
this is only true insofar as there exists “motion.” The motion to which he refers is
human activity in the form o f an exploration o f oneself and o f reality. It is by our
acceptance o f a mode o f living as self-examination that a consistency is revealed. It is
not being itself that is the source o f meaning but our search for being. As Patodka
describes it: “Actually we are dealing only with the uncovering o f meaning that can
never be explained as a thing, which cannot be mastered, delimited, grasped positively,
and dominated, but which is present only in the seeking o f being.”27
Though it is difficult if not impossible to counter effectively a consistent
skepticism such as Chvatik’s, there are two points in Patodka’s favor. First, there is a
compelling logic to his argument. It is neither being itself, conceived (incorrectly) as a
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constant entity, nor even our constituting of being that is the source o f meaning, it is
rather the responsibility o f the search which we accept as we come to realize that
meaning is uncertain or potentially even wholly lacking. The accepting o f this
responsibility, which is not equivalent to being but merely a possibility inherent in our
being, is a problematic proposition which, at bottom, has no metaphysical anchor or
ballast. The mysterious vanishing point is not a point, but it is a possibility that is
consistently ours and independent o f relative particularities. By putting the source o f
meaning firmly in the center o f the motive process, rather than in any certainty o f result
to which we can point prior to beginning our quest, Pato£ka comes as close, I think, as
is possible to a solution to the question o f the foundation o f meaning with which it is
possible to live.
The second point in support o f Patocka and in contrast to Chvatik’s
Heideggerean skepticism is contained in the argument that merely relative
meaningfulness cannot provide the stability needed for human life to unfold. Relative
meaning, it has been argued, cannot stand by itself on a base o f total meaninglessness. A
fundamental meaninglessness o f the whole would not permit relative meaning to exist
independently —it would drag such meaning into its wake, making life impossible. “In
its practical unfolding, life cannot rest on a relative meaning which itself rests on
meaninglessness, since no relative meaning can ever render the meaningless meaningful
but, rather, is always itself dragged into meaninglessness by it.”28 Humans, he
concludes, “cannot live in the certitude o f meaninglessness.”29
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The dogmatic belief in meaninglessness, in addition, is itself a truth and a
certitude that contradicts the tenor o f its own rejection o f absolute meaning. The
experiential truth is that we are never certain of meaning or o f meaninglessness, but we
can experience a consistency that transcends the particular when we accept a foundation
that is not like any other foundation ~ a foundation o f possibility that understands that
the essential core of human reality is a “mystery” that we will never fully unravel.
And, ultimately, is there not at the very core o f reality itself something
like the mysterious and the mystery?... Is not the infinite depth o f reality
possible only because we cannot see its bottom, and is not just that a
challenge and an opportunity for humans in their reach for meaning
which is more than the flowering and perishing o f the lily o f the field in
the eyes of the gods?30
The Patockan shaking o f naive meaning, therefore, winds its way in-between the poles
of a concrete, metaphysical meaning on one hand and an utter meaninglessness or
nihilism on the other. The appeal to mystery or a “vanishing point” cannot be simply
dismissed as a metaphysical Platonism hidden by smoke and mirrors. It is patently
closer to experiential reality than either of the two alternatives which it opposes.
Patodka’s conclusion is thus ironic; man can only achieve the foundational
absoluteness necessary to allow him to live insofar as he rejects the naive
meaningfulness that posits itself as the source o f meaning —that posits itself as a
concrete foundation. “Thus the shaking o f naive meaning is the genesis o f a perspective
on an absolute meaning to which, however, humans are not marginal, on condition that
humans are prepared to give up the hope o f a directly given meaning and to accept
meaning as a way.”31 This is, Pato£ka maintains, an approach to meaning that is both
more demanding and more free than its dogmatically certain alternatives. It also
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provides, he argues further, evidence o f the inherent connection between philosophy and
politics.
M eaning, Politics, and Conflict
The debate over foundationalism in theories o f politics and ethics can be reduced
to a simple question: whether “meaning” is to be understood as entirely relative and
situational, or, to the contrary, whether there exists a means o f persuasively analyzing
meaning in human life in such a way that it can be seen to have a source that is not
relative. Only in the latter case could we speak o f meaning, and thus o f values and
ethics, in a way that transcends the particularities of a specific historical situation. And
political thought, or political science, inherently requires us to think not solely in terms
o f particularities, but in terms o f general principles. It is for this reason that Chvatik
concludes that Pato£ka’s thought “cannot be a guideline for political action and cannot
found a political science,” and it is for the very same reason that I disagree with him. It
is certainly true that Pato£ka’s thought is not suitable as a straightforward guideline for
political activity; it is not the type o f political thought to which one can look for specific
help in establishing a constitutional order. Yet it is not accurate to insist that it cannot be
used in establishing a founding set of principles that will act as a guide for a science o f
political order. At the very foundation of any political order must be an understanding
of human meaning and its limitations. Politics, inasmuch as it is tied to the
contingencies of historical reality, must ground itself not in visions o f absolute meaning
and grand plans o f a society that embodies it, but in a persuasive depiction of the limits
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o f human meaning, limits beyond which politics may not trespass in its construction o f
political society.
The conceptual framework set forth in Pato£ka’s work —one grounded in the
“shaking o f accepted meaning” —leads to a meaningfulness that is demanding but
appropriate to man’s social being. This human meaningfulness constitutes a form o f
self-understanding that is coincident not only with the origin o f philosophy but also
with the origin o f politics. What Patodka has sought to describe breaks new ground
analytically and conceptually while appealing to symbolism long established. The
Czech philosopher does not pretend to uncover a new human experience; rather, the
experience is a familiar one and the subject o f human speculation throughout the ages.
The radical questioning o f naive meaning, which may be precipitated by a perceived
loss of meaning, opens the individual up to the possibility o f a “conversion” in the
Platonic sense. It is the experience of the cave-dweller in Plato’s “Allegory o f the Cave”
who “turns” from a reality o f shadows to one o f truth experienced.32
Yet PatoCka’s work, we should recall, is undertaken in the context o f a
philosophy o f history. The experience in question is precisely that which has been
described as separating the “prehistoric” mentality from the “historic.” Only in the light
o f a rejection o f simply given meaning can human activity take on the character of
action that is historically continuous with both past and future humankind. The
character o f this activity, as I have stressed, is conducive not only to individual
self-reflection, it is also conducive to the activity o f politics. Thus it is not coincidental
that the thematic differentiation o f philosophy in Socrates took place in concert with an
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uncovering o f a science o f politics as a theme in human life. Pato£ka’s work explicitly
stresses this connection just as it implicitly leads, contrary to Chvatik’s conclusion,
toward the illumination o f principles directly relevant to political thought.
It is not only individual life which, if it passes through the experience of

loss o f meaning and if it derives from it the possibility and need for a
wholly different self-relation to all that is, comes to a point o f global
“conversion.” Perhaps the inmost nature o f that rupture —which we
sought to define as that which separates the prehistoric epoch from
history proper -- lies in that shaking o f the naive certainty o f meaning
which governs the life o f humankind up to that specific transformation
which represents a nearly simultaneous —and in a more profound sense
really unitary —origin o f politics and philosophy.33
The “unitary origin” o f politics and philosophy reflects the connectedness o f the two
fields. Politics is a mode o f activity in which inheres the possibility to turn philosophy
“into the practice o f life itself.”34
This is not to say, however, that politics as a realm o f activity is to be ceded to
philosophers. It is the insight inherent in philosophy as Pato£ka describes it -- the
understanding o f freedom and problematicity —that he wishes to show is also crucial to
our practice o f the very human and problematic activities proper to the center o f the
polis. Patocka wishes to elevate the practice o f politics to a level above that o f reliance
on slogan, dogma, and distortion, but he does not suggest a philosophical elevation of
politics as a means to a solution o f its problems. To the contrary, rather than elevate
politics to a higher, philosophical plane, he seeks to bring philosophy back down to a
human level. PatoCka is acutely aware that the inconstant nature o f human beings leads
to unpredictability -- an unpredictability that has not been eliminated by the advances of
science and behavioral studies nor would be eliminated if philosophers were to rule.
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Rather, philosophy must accept the problematic nature o f reality as something with
which it much deal instead o f try to overcome. In just the same way politics must deal
with the problems that arise when humans attempt to live and act on a basis of freedom.
“Just as in acting politically humans expose themselves to the problematic nature of
action whose consequences are unpredictable and whose initiative soon passes into
other hands, so in philosophy humans expose themselves to the problematic being and
meaning o f what there is.”35
As a human endeavor, politics must resist the siren song o f an objective
metaphysics o f meaning even as it strives for transcendence. Genuinely political activity
transcends the particularities of present desires or physical needs. In doing so, it opens
itself up to its greatest possibility, the possibility o f becoming historical activity. Such
activity is not arbitrary, it is invested with a meaningfulness that is both human and
transcendental; it is the meaningfulness o f a significant activity that unifies and expands
human possibilities. As Pato£ka describes it:
In the community, the polis, in life dedicated to the polis, in political life,
humans make room for an autonomous, purely human meaningfulness,
one o f a mutual respect in activity significant for all its participants and
which is not restricted to the preservation o f physical life but which,
rather, is a source o f a life that transcends itself in the memory o f deed
guaranteed precisely by the polis. It is in many ways a more risky,
dangerous life than the vegetative humility on which prehistoric
humanhood depends.36
Politics is an activity “significant for all its participants” precisely because it is an
activity that transcends itself. With this analysis Pato£ka provides a basis for the
analysis and differentiation o f political activity, a means o f distinguishing political
activity, activity proper to the polis, from the activities o f merely physical life.
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The model o f politics, o f the polis, that PatoCka describes is grounded in an
attitude o f “mutual respect” guaranteed by the willingness o f all participants to risk by
giving up the security o f naive meaning. Politics in this sense, like philosophy, is a
matter o f struggle. To conceive o f it otherwise is to begin to hope for a solution that
does not require risk, that is given rather than fought for. It is in this sense that Jan
Patocka, following on the work o f Heidegger, evokes the name o f Heraclitus and his
symbol o f polemos, or conflict, in bringing the Heretical Essays to a close. The spirit o f
the polis, and thus the spirit o f politics, he argues, is conflict. Although Patodka evokes
Heraclitus most distinctly in the final pages o f the sixth and last “Heretical” essay, “War
in the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War,” this brief discussion does
not adequately describe his understanding of the concept.37 Polemos is discussed
analytically and in the context o f the polis earlier in the Heretical Essays, in the second
essay on “The Beginning o f History.”
The institutional model o f the polis, Patodka contends, is a place o f human unity
and possibility that emerges from the insight defining both philosophy and politics. That
insight is one evoking struggle and problematicity and, in this chapter as throughout the
Essays, Patocka argues decisively that this struggle is a unifying factor. It binds
individuals rather than separates them. Polemos is the spirit o f the polis, by which is
meant not the spirit o f the Greek polis as an historical event, but the spirit o f free
politics itself. Conflict, for Patodka, binds the activity o f political life to philosophy as
the struggle against the fall into an acceptance o f given meaning. Struggle is a
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presupposition o f life as problematic, and it manifests itself in the political community
as conflict.
The spirit o f the polis is a spirit o f unity in conflict, in battle. One cannot
be a citizen —polites —except in a community o f some against others,
and the conflict itself gives rise to the tension, the tenor o f the life o f the
polis, the shape o f the space o f freedom that citizens both offer and deny
each other ~ offering themselves in seeking support and overcoming
resistance.38
The conflict o f which Patodka speaks is not a destructive force. To perceive it this way
is to misunderstand fundamentally the political intent o f the Heretical Essays.
Polemos, as it is conceived in these essays, is constructive rather than destructive
o f community, and it is an appropriate symbol for Patodka’s political thought, one that
stands with no contradiction beside the Socratic theme o f care for the soul. Conflict is,
for example, the source o f law for it represents the one power that all individuals truly
seeking a just and unified community have in common. In the polis “Polemos is what is
common. Polemos binds together the contending parties, not only because it stands over
them but because in it they are at one. In it there arises the one, unitary power and will
from which alone all laws and constitutions derive, however different they may be.”39
Contrary to popular belief, common beliefs and ideologies passed from one individual
to another do not unite but divide. The unity o f a free state is not founded upon ideology
but upon the struggle against its dominance. It is this commitment to struggle and
acceptance o f conflict that is the one force to which all parties may equally lay claim.
Conflict and struggle make possible free thought and provide a stronger foundation for
political unity than systems grounded in mere “coalitions o f interests.”
Thus polemos is at the same time that which constitutes the polis and the
primordial insight that makes philosophy possible. Polemos is not the
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destructive passion o f a wild brigand but is, rather, the creator o f unity.
The unity it founds is more profound than any ephemeral sympathy or
coalition o f interests; adversaries meet in the shaking o f a given meaning,
and so create a new way o f being human —perhaps the only mode that
offers hope amid the storm of the world: the unity o f the shaken but
undaunted.40
With this analysis Patodka effectively ties his appeal o f “Wars of the Twentieth
Century” —which was directed at his “shaken but undaunted” students —to his overall
attempt at a philosophy that is inherently political. Thus the dramatic, quasi-Nietzschean
appeal to a “solidarity o f the shaken” and the references to war and the insight that
originates in periods o f “darkness,” are shown to have a foundation in a more sober,
broadly political analysis o f conflict and the free polis.41
It is important, in concluding this chapter, to take note o f the fact that Pato£ka’s
use of polemos once again draws from a source in the work o f Heidegger. This is, in
fact, particularly important given that Heidegger made use o f the concept in a text often
cited as evidence o f a proclivity toward political absolutism —evidence that Heidegger
was, in a word, creating a philosophy that led toward the fascism he briefly embraced in
the 1930s. Heidegger’s analysis o f polemos is found in An Introduction to Metaphysics,
the series of lectures he delivered in 1935 at the University o f Freiburg.
In contrast to PatoCka’s use of the term, however, there is a difficult ambiguity
in Heidegger’s writings that results in problems. First o f all, in An Introduction to
Metaphysics Heidegger does not provide a sufficient analysis o f polemos, and as a result
leaves a degree o f uncertainty that many are willing to resolve by referring to
Heidegger’s use o f the term K am pf in his “Rectoral Address” infamous for its evocation
of National Socialism.42 This, o f course, evokes a second and related problem.
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Heidegger’s discussion o f polemos comes in the context o f his nationalistic writings o f
the thirties, making it difficult to disassociate from his ill-fated political involvement.
Pato£ka’s use o f the symbol also had a political context. But in stark contrast to
Heidegger, it was a context o f an unambiguous struggle for truth and freedom, a
struggle against totalitarianism that was explicit in its rejection o f violence.
Though Pato£ka does not refer to Heidegger in his discussion o f polemos, the
reference is implicit. Heidegger had written in An Introduction to Metaphysics that
“Conflict does not split, much less destroy, unity. It constitutes unity....”43 It seems that
Patocka is taking a Heideggerean insight -- though without citing him —and developing
it in the direction o f political thought. Interestingly, the argument that has been made
that if a political theory can be said to exist in Heidegger at all it is to be found centered
in the brief, largely undeveloped contention that Heraclitian conflict is the source of
unity in the polis. In a 1981 article on Heidegger and community, Gregory Schufreider
argues that it is Heidegger’s use o f the notion of polemos that enables him to express the
formation o f unity in the polis without abrogating difference or individualism. He
writes:
This struggle, which allows opposition while at the same time keeping
the opponents unified, draws together as it sets apart, joins opponents
together in their difference, while letting that difference prevail within
unity. Polemos is, accordingly, thought [of] as a basic trait o f being itself
in that it unifies into unity what tends apart, and not in such a way that
difference is annulled, which is why it remains that “hidden harmony”
Heraclitus himself commends as superior (Fragment 54): the covert unity
o f opponents joining-together in their difference.44
As a trait o f Heidegger’s conception o f being, then, polemos becomes part o f a political
theory, since community is “properly unfolded in a communication o f struggle, a
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unification preserving difference, since we are then considering a community comprised
o f individuals.”45
Though Schufreider states that this notion may point toward a “‘political’
philosophy” in Heidegger, he admits that there is “not much to go on” and that this
certainly should not be construed as an attempt to suggest that Heidegger shows a
“propensity toward democracy.”46 What I would like to suggest is that Jan PatoCka takes
a lead from Heidegger’s analysis o f polemos but does not follow the German
philosopher toward a disdain for democracy. To the contrary, Patodka directly applies
conflict to questions o f democracy by conceiving o f the polis as primarily a political
unit, rather than the all-encompassing community described by Heidegger.
As a model for politics, the assumption o f a freedom and equality among
citizens at the center o f the polis is the fundamental core o f what Patodka envisions as a
democratic state, infused with the insight o f freedom and philosophy and accepting
polemos as an animating and uniting force. This assumption, however, is justified
through the phenomenological analysis o f PatoCka’s philosophy -- it is not justified by
appeal to a transcendent ideal acting as a source for our political values. Beyond the
freedom and human dignity inherent in the human as an ontologically aware being,
however, there is little in the way o f values that can be posited as natural to humanity in
an ahistorical sense. This is to argue, in other words, that the values that inform our
political self-organization are, like the political societies in which they exist, products o f
historical action. It makes little sense to speak of human rights based on a principle of
freedom if the society with which you are concerned is what Pato£ka would term
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“prehistorical,” that is, if the society does not originate from a thematic understanding
o f freedom as a human possibility.
Politics, particularly the politics o f Western states steeped in the democratic
tradition, must recognize these limitations if they are to function effectively and
humanly. It must understand, in sum, that its animating principle is problematicity. For
democratic politics to seek to eliminate problematicity and conflict is for it to abandon
freedom.
Conclusion
Pato£ka’s discussion o f the form o f the Greek polis is not conducted in order to
advocate the details o f its institutional structures; his political thought does not attempt
to analyze competing forms o f government or develop an ideal type o f institution. The
question is rather one o f principles. In the movement from a discussion o f Pato£kan
philosophy to one o f politics, one notion stands out as fundamental to the ground upon
which a sustainable political life may be built. The notion, inherent in the use of
polemos as a symbol o f a unified democratic community, is roughly as follows: to the
degree to which a state makes its goal the seeking o f an objectified or systematic
solution to the problems o f social being -- symbolized by Pato£ka in dreams of a “happy
end” -- it relinquishes its hold on freedom, it ceases to care for its soul.
The goal in terms o f democratic politics has been expressed succinctly by Ivan
Chvatfk, Pato£ka’s student, who captures the spirit o f Pato£ka’s political thought when
he concludes that: “The main trait o f a functioning democracy is balance —something
which should be supported so there will be no more ‘better tomorrows’ in democratic
societies.”47 The promise o f a “better tomorrow” was something with which
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Czechoslovakia was quite familiar during the years o f communist rule. It was the false
promise o f a future utopianism that served to justify present repression. This is not a
promise foreign to Western ears, however.
Pato£ka understood with Husserl, better than Husserl, in fact, that the Greek
notion o f rationality was the guiding principle o f Western life.48 Yet he recognized, as
Chvatik writes, that rationality is always “the rationality o f finite beings who look at
problems from particular viewpoints.” While this does not imply relativism, as we have
seen, it should be clear that it does not permit absolutism, whether in the name o f a
totalitarian or a democratic state. Because rationality is the rationality o f finite beings,
Chvatik continues, “it is impossible to ultimately reconcile their views, to resolve
conflicts once and for all. Those who try to do so in the hope o f attaining truth, justice
and prosperity, no matter how deep their beliefs, capitulate to totalitarian traps
inasmuchas (sic) they have yielded to the will to possess and live happily thereafter.”49
The dream o f producing a “better tomorrow” is the dream o f overcoming
problematicity. It is the dream o f answering the Socratic question and therefore
equivalent to a project o f metaphysical speculation.
In his final completed work, the lengthy essay entitled “On Masaryk’s
Philosophy of Religion,” Patoika summarizes the nature o f the task before man in terms
that bring his analysis o f meaning together with his views on the polis. He writes:
Man stands in front o f an enormous task: not to reclaim meaning for

itself, not to pick up the demand for the meaningfiilness o f the universe
for reasons o f his own advantage, but on the contrary to understand
himself as a being existing out of meaning and for meaning, living
therefore, in order for a meaningful world to originate, opening himself
such that meaning, whose basis “is” outside o f beings, settles and
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increases itself in it (the world). To understand himself as the recipient o f
an unshakable gift, to which nothing relative is comparable, as a being
which cannot and may not call for an even happier end after a happy
beginning, that “happyend” (sic) which philosophy construes from Plato
to Kant.50
Our task is not to search for meaning that will solve our problems for us, but rather to
initiate meaning in the world. The result will not be an end to problematicity, however.
There can be no such end to human striving. Our condition is inescapable. But insofar
as we work to initiate meaning within the limits o f our humanity, we extend those limits
incrementally. We become more fully human, we maximize the potential o f our nature,
if you will, as we open ourselves to possibility via a self-reflective attitude and
historical activity. The means toward this end, Patodka came to realize in his later
works, was to understand the nature o f the political unit most conducive to the pursuit
o f human possibility, and to illuminate its principles with the aim, not of a system
designed to solve the problem o f history, but of an institution geared toward truth and
the initiation o f meaning in human life.
A C ritical Perspective
It is Jan PatoCka’s achievement in philosophy to have offered a vision o f human
reality that represents, not only an internally consistent philosophy, but also a viable
alternative to the political theory o f the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His work is
first and foremost a direct response to the primary critique of postmodern thought, that
is, the critique o f the dominance o f “metanarratives,” including all forms o f historical
determinism. As a student of Heidegger and a victim of Marxism no less should have
been expected o f him. But Pato£ka was also a dedicated student o f Platonic thought. He
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rejected, therefore, the alternative o f a radical relativism o f meaning. PatoCka was an
anti-foundational philosopher who recognized that philosophy was all about searching
for foundations. What the philosopher must understand, however, is that his search is
not for a foundation in the sense o f an objective, given form o f knowledge or meaning.
The philosopher, on the Socratic model, rejects the hope for such knowledge at the
outset. Thus what he is seeking is a degree o f consistency and a sense of
meaningfulness, a ground upon which it is possible to construct a polity.
In order to locate this perspective critically, it will be instructive to consider the
way in which this work is likely to be received by various interests in the field o f
political theory. Patodka’s work is certainly relevant to all political theorists interested
in the relation between the care o f the individual soul and the illumination of the being
o f society; it is o f particular relevance, however, to groups within contemporary theory
who have a direct stake in the questions which PatoCka seeks to answer. Among these
groups are natural right theorists represented by Leo Strauss and his students,
continental theorists in the tradition o f either Husserlian phenomenology or
Heideggerean ontology, postmodern liberals represented by Richard Rorty, and
continental postmodernists represented by Jacques Derrida among others. This list, of
course, is by no means exhaustive; significant critique could come from within the
traditions of Marxist thought and liberalism, and both common ground and critique
could be elicited from the tradition o f philosophy o f history, and here I would
particularly mention the work o f Eric Voegelin.51 But in terms o f locating this work
critically, it will be most useful to place it in it’s most immediate context, that is, the
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context o f theory that directly reflects upon questions o f the ultimate foundations of
human social being.
For proponents o f natural right in politics or for students o f Leo Strauss, it is
likely that this body o f work will be judged to have significant shortcomings. Primary
will be the contention that PatoCka’s work, with its Heideggerean influences, verges on
historicism, that there is an insufficient commitment to the notion o f an ahistorical, or
“natural,” sense o f right. For PatoCka, human beings and the historical worlds they
inhabit are wholly original, they are not naturally heirs to a meaning that is passed,
unchanged, from age to age. A concept of right that does not take account o f history, he
would argue, is tantamount to a form o f accepted meaning. And Pato£ka is emphatic
and consistent in arguing that genuine human possibility —and a genuine politics —can
only emerge to the degree we are willing to shake ourselves free o f the grip o f such
objective or simply given meaning.
Pato£ka is clearly with Strauss, on the other hand, in his rejection o f relativism
as a solution to the problem o f right.52 Yet whereas Strauss frames the problem in terms
that are black and white, PatoCka is explicitly interested in exploring the grayness o f the
situation —its problematicity. Strauss writes that “to reject natural right is tantamount to
saying that all right is positive right, and this means that what is right is determined
exclusively by the legislators and the courts of the various countries.”53 Patodka rejects
this way of phrasing the problem; it is not the case that we must choose between
ahistorical truth or a relativism o f right.54 His work explores a human reality that is too
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contingent and variable to admit to such a dichotomy. Human reality is far more o f a
problem than Western philosophy since Plato has generally been willing to admit.
Besides a challenge from theorists dedicated to solidifying the foundations o f
Western thought, Pato£ka’s work is also subject to a challenge from those who wish to
abandon foundations altogether. Pato£ka will be unsatisfying to the committed
anti-foundationalist for his consistent critique o f nihilist relativism and his conclusion
that philosophy correctly —and necessarily —searches for foundations. Indeed, while
postmodernist thinkers such as Richard Rorty and Jean-Francois Lyotard have argued
that philosophy in a grand sense is no longer viable, that it can no longer function as a
means to ground social activity,55 Pato£ka philosophizes in a classic, political style. He
makes a model o f Socrates and uses the metaphor of “care for the soul” to encapsulate
his concerns.
Postmodern thinkers, then, will criticize this work for its reliance on classical
thinking. One could argue that Pato£ka is, despite his “negative” Platonism, still
something o f a Platonist. Jacques Derrida in fact goes further than this, finding in
Patocka a Christian foundationalism that makes him indistinguishable from a
traditionally metaphysical thinker. As I indicate in my discussion o f Derrida in the
appendix to this work, however, this reading is unfounded. A more defensible reading,
and one which contrasts sharply with Derrida’s, is that of Richard Rorty. Rorty,
interestingly, reads Pato£ka as a true anti-foundationalist. Yet even as he puts Patodka in
the postmodern tradition, Rorty is troubled by the centrality of Socrates and Plato in the
story. Pato£ka, he writes, “gave his heroes, Socrates and Plato, too much credit.”56 He is
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too much o f a classical philosopher, too interested in speaking o f the soul, truth, and
absolute meaning to be welcomed by postmodernism without reservation.
It is in the middle o f the divide between postmodern relativism and approaches
that stress ahistorical foundations that Patodka can be most directly situated, then. As a
means to navigate this divide, the Czech philosopher makes use of, first the
phenomenology o f Edmund Husserl, and second, the ontology o f Martin Heidegger. Yet
as I argued in Chapter Two, students of these two schools will also be prompted to find
fault with Patodka’s work. He cannot be called a devotee o f Husserl or o f Heidegger
because he is not a true follower o f either one. Patodka does not simply apply the
methods and assumptions o f either thinker.
For a phenomenologist, Patodka’s work is insufficiently precise in terms of its
conceptualizations. Above all it lacks the Husserlian commitment to mathematical rigor;
when the Czech philosopher describes his work as “phenomenological philosophy,”57 he
means to say that his hope is not to replace philosophy with phenomenology —Patodka
does not share the Husserlian goal o f a philosophy that responds to the Cartesian hope
for “apodicticity” -- but rather to pursue philosophy on grounds informed primarily by
phenomenological insight. The approach to Heidegger is similar, and thus the
contemporary Heideggerean thinker will also not find satisfaction. Patodka wishes to
use Heideggerean insight, to explore the questions o f being and history without seeking
to definitively answer either one, but within the limits prescribed by attention to the
“concrete human” in his “corporeal world.” Thus Patodka does not follow Heidegger
into the depths o f his exploration o f ontological understanding, and he does not hold the
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Heideggerean line in avoiding Platonic symbolism or serious attention to the teaching of
Socrates. Patodka is also willing to put o ff the genuine scholar o f Heidegger by mixing,
for example, the early Heidegger o f Being and Time with the later work on technology
and the “fourfold” (das Geviert).
Patodka’s work can be characterized in this way: he believed that he was
carrying on the philosophic enterprise in the wake o f these two thinkers. That is, he was
taking their insight and developing it in ways that they did not envision, and perhaps
may not have objected to. Patodka remains a true philosopher in his application of
Husserl and Heidegger to the Socratic concern for the soul. Ontology, for Patodka, is a
philosophy o f the soul. It is a philosophy that perceives that “authentic, transcendent
being” in humans is something different from transient opinion. Following Socrates,
Patodka situates his ontology, that is, his care for the soul, in the polis. And in this way
he concludes in the Heretical Essays that “philosophy must be at the same time care for
the soul (epimeleia tes psuches), ontology and theology —and all that in the care for the
polis, for the optimal state.”58
With this discussion it is possible to place the work o f Jan Patodka on the critical
map. I have attempted to demonstrate in this study that Patodka’s work presents us with
a viable, and in many ways preferable, alternative to the approaches I have been
discussing. No one o f the criticisms I have been laying out is fatal to this philosophy;
Patodka adequately defends himself against all o f them in the course o f his work. In
addition, he offers a benefit to which none of the other perspectives can attain.
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The political theory o f Jan Patodka is particularly deserving o f attention for the
seriousness with which it attempts to illuminate the murky ground between the more
polarized alternatives on the scene. He has, I have demonstrated, offered an internally
consistent attempt to solve a primary dilemma of contemporary political thought. He
has sought to bridge the divide between those seeking to shore up foundations and those
seeking to tear them down. His work sought a conception o f meaning that on the one
hand was neither relative nor nihilistic, and on the other did not amount to a new form
of simple, given meaning or o f “true” knowledge that could be passed from one to
another instead o f continually achieved in the active pursuit o f human possibility. The
effect o f this work was to demonstrate that the postmodern critique o f foundationalism
and metaphysics does not imply the impossibility o f a coherent and consistent political
ethics and democratic theory.
Although Patodka’s work is not without its drawbacks, its accomplishments for
contemporary political theory are evident. He allows the political theorist to speak o f
politics and ethics while remaining faithful to the contemporary insight into human
historicity, finitude, and contingency. He is, in other words, able to speak o f concepts
such as justice without either anchoring those concepts to a single metaphysical
narrative, or to the contrary allowing them to drift among an endless variety of
particular meanings, thus stripping them of any coherency or power to bind together a
society in an orderly fashion.
Yet whereas Patodka’s work is an attempt in a positive direction, it is not an
entirely successful attempt. There are a number o f shortcomings that, beyond the points
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o f contention mentioned above, will stand in the way o f a positive reception o f this
work on a large-scale. First, and in direct contrast to the philosopher’s contention that he
seeks universal elements o f human experience, there is a sense that this work is only
narrowly applicable. Attendant to this criticism is a larger and more significant point for
Patocka’s reception as a political theorist. This concerns the degree to which, if taken as
a model for political action in history, the Patodkan framework may take on the very
utopian quality o f which he is so critical in his analysis o f Marx or Enlightenment
thinkers such as Comte. Both points require some explanation.
Beginning with the first point, it is significant that, in the second o f his Heretical
Essays, Patodka argues that his work “should not be understood as an idealization o f the
Greek polis''' —this in spite o f the fact that he attributes nothing less than “the very
beginning o f history in the proper sense o f the word” to the rise o f this institution.59 The
truth is, however, that Patodka does idealize the polis. He does not, as he explains,
idealize its historical development —as if it arose suddenly and out o f selfless devotion
to the common good -- but he does place an inappropriate importance on the event of
the polis. It is only here, he contends, in this age and in this institution, that humans first
dare to shake given meaning and accept upon themselves the responsibility and
understanding that meaning is a product of their living in both concreteness and
transcendence; it is not a gift bestowed upon them from without. And this is done in
such a way as to attain “a universal significance.”60
Patodka is, in this way, very much a political theorist, for his analysis locates the
ontological categories that define humanity -- freedom and the possibility o f historical
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action —in the emergence o f a political institution. Yet there is a strong sense in which
this analysis has a reductive quality. When the polis is held up as epitomizing human
possibilities, it has the effect o f denying these possibilities to individuals or societies not
lucky enough to exist in the historical wake o f Greek civilization.
The aspect of Patodka’s philosophy o f history that most reflects this reductive
quality —it is the aspect most surely to draw criticism from contemporary academia
both within the West and without —is its Eurocentric framework. Based on Husserl’s
work in his Crisis o f European Sciences, Patodka’s outline o f history makes it an
entirely European affair. Non-European civilizations, because they did not benefit from
the Hellenic experience o f the polis, are relegated to the status o f “prehistorical”
societies. The spirit o f history, Patodka argues, is the spirit o f Europe and its
descendants.
With this idealization o f the Greek polis, not merely as an institutional and
spiritual model but as an historical event tied to a spirit that is particularly European,
Patodka eliminates the possibility o f finding experiences in nonwestem cultures that, to
varying degrees, can be considered equivalent. In doing so he reduces unnecessarily the
scope of his investigations and closes himself off to possibility. Patodka’s work on the
polis as a model for freedom and history is o f such significance for political theory that
it would be unfortunate to see it discounted for its neglect o f comparative analysis.
Patodka is right when he argues that there is something unique about the Western model
o f politics and philosophy, but he does himself a disservice when he frames his
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investigation in a way that precludes a truly comparative exploration o f the universality
of his ontological explanation o f history.
It is when the question o f a positive application o f this work to concrete political
reality arises that the second and more serious point becomes impossible to ignore. One
may argue that, despite the attention paid to problematicity in human life and the
requirement that the polis never relinquish its grounding in free and equal conflict, it
remains conceivable that, given a sufficient solidarity o f “spiritual people” able to
understand being and history, the construction o f a perfectly balanced polis may seem to
be within the realm o f possibility. To the extent that Patodka’s work leaves us with this
hope it leaves us with a view o f political reality that could justly be called utopian. This
question is in fact brought to the fore when Patodka notes that his model o f politics and
philosophy can have a truly historical effect on Western civilization only at the point
when we “turn from accidental rule to the rule o f those who understand what history is
about.” If politics is to succeed it will be because the good, the “shaken” who come
together in solidarity, can organize a political order around themselves. If this is in fact
a conclusion to which the Heretical Essays lend themselves then the problem of
utopianism is quite real.
Political reality, as James Madison pointed out in The Federalist Papers, points
to an inescapable fallibility in human being. “If men were angels,” he writes, “no
government would be necessary.”61 This is a fact o f the human condition which, on one
hand, is implicit in Patodka's work; human being and his involvement with history are
forever problematic, never ideal. Yet in another light, Patodka seems to neglect this
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reality at the most crucial moment —the moment o f political organization. It is
inevitable, as Madison points out, that humans will fail to live up to their potential and
the polis will not long be ruled by a cadre o f Aristotelian spoudaioi or otherwise
“spiritual” people. This is a pragmatic reality that Patodka’s analysis of being fails to
take up as it is applied to the realm of politics.
It is in light o f this that the warning o f Ivan Chvatik which I quoted above, to the
effect that Patodka’s work may not serve as a guideline for political action, is well
taken. He is correct in pointing out that Patodka’s ontological portrait of human being is
not suitable as a straightforward guidepost for political activity. Patodka himself was
clear in demarcating the limits of his thought at the end o f his sixth and final Heretical
Essay. He argued there, in the same breath as he spoke o f the special role of those “who
understand” and who are capable of “conversion” or “m e ta n o ia that his notion o f a
“solidarity o f the shaken,” which is a driving force behind his conception of a politics of
truth, “will not offer positive programs but will speak, like Socrates’ daimonion, in
warnings and prohibitions.”62 Patodka sees his philosophy as leading to a “spiritual
authority” that would not propose solutions to everyday problems but would rather
become the spiritual power that could drive the political world toward the restraint it
lacks. In doing so, in analyzing the nature o f human being in society and leading the
reader toward a reappraisal of the foundation upon which his own understanding of
politics is based, Patodka hopes that his work may help to render impossible the
pernicious forms o f ideological politics with which we are all too familiar from the
century just past.
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As I have argued, however, Chvatik is wrong in insisting that a connection
between this work and a science o f political order is impossible to establish. Such a
connection does exist, but it is not without limitations that must be clearly recognized.
Patocka’s analysis o f the interrelationship between philosophy and politics leads, on the
one hand, to principles that could be truly transformative for political theory as they
persuasively illuminate the character of the ground upon which the very concept o f
politics was built and continues to stand. It is insufficient, on the other hand, as a more
traditional work o f political theory; it cannot replace, but only supplement and act as a
corrective to theory that aims at the construction o f a framework for concrete activity or
constitution building. Patodka’s work is directed toward an exploration o f human
possibility and the effect an understanding o f our possibility could have on the realm o f
politics. In focusing on possibility it neglects probability, however, the probability that
humans will neglect their being, rather than care for it. If one were to seek, contrary to
the philosopher’s own advice, to derive a “positive” political program from his work, a
door would be opened to the danger that an individual o f great conviction might see fit
to jump the gun, to become so convinced o f his own “understanding” that he can see the
possibility o f a just society only in the case that he and his followers undertake to rule
unequivocally over those who do not understand.
Patodka’s achievement for politics suggests that we focus, not on theory of a
clearly foundational character, but on the development o f a universal ground for politics
that rests on a non-foundational ontology, on an understanding o f human being based in
its possibilities. It may be, in the final analysis, that Czech President Vaclav Havel is
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correct in his contention that a politics o f freedom and democracy will have its most
universal appeal when it justifies itself, not on foundations such as those implicit to
either liberal or socialist politics, but on the basis o f an ontological and
phenomenological understanding o f humanity that rejects abstraction and the pull of
ideology. As political theory, the work o f Jan Patodka goes a long way in providing this
kind o f understanding.
End Notes
'On (anti)foundationalism as a theme in contemporary thought and its relation to

political theory, see the essay “What difference does anti-foundationalism make to
political theory?,” by Michael Brint, William G. Weaver and Meredith Garmon, New
Literary History 26, no. 2 (Spring 1995) 225-238. The authors note that foundationalism
as a theme has penetrated numerous academic disciplines and is central to the thought o f
such figures as Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida, Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish, and W. V.
Quine.
2Patodka, Heretical Essays, 38.
3The phrase ‘happy end,’ interestingly, appears in contemporary Czech

philosophy as a concept. Rather than attempt a translation, the English phrase --
sometimes even written as one word, ‘happyend’ —is used in Patodka and elsewhere to
depict a utopian longing, an eschatological hope. A political lesson o f Patodka’s
thought, as Ivan Chvatik has expressed it, must be the realization that democracy should
abandon the hope for such a ‘happy end,’ recognizing instead that history is ruled by
struggle and problematicity. Ivan Chvatik, “Solidarity o f the Shaken,” 166.
4Richard Rorty, “The Seer of Prague,” 38.
5Patodka, Europe and the Post-European Age, 39.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., 38.
"Ibid., 39.
9Patodka, “Supercivilization,” 302.
332
I0Pato£ka, Heretical Essays, 118.
“ Patofika, “Osnova dSjin” (The Pattern o f History), in Europe and the

Post-European Age, 100.
I2Pato£ka, Heretical Essays, 59.
l3Ibid., 61.
uIbid„ 56.
l5O f values, for example, PatoCka writes the following: “values mean nothing
other than that being is meaningful, and they indicate what ‘gives’ it meaning: truth
means that beauty is intelligible and accessible to understanding and explanation;
beauty means that the emergence o f being in the human world manifests the mystery of
being as something perennially enchanting; goodness that the world may include an
unselfconscious or self-forgotten favor and grace. So it is with the entire infinite variety
o f values that constantly address us,...” Ibid., 55.
l6Ibid., 56-57. Note: the term “what is” designates “beings,” including “things.”
17Ibid., 57.
18Ibid.
l9Ibid.
20Heiddeger’s analysis o f anxiety is helpful here, as is Plato’s Parable o f the

Cave. They are comparable on at least one level: both entail the possibility or necessity
of return from a confrontation with a loss o f immediate meaning. A new type o f
meaning, PatoCka argues, emerges from this confrontation. He characterizes that
meaning as “wonder,” as the discovery that there is being beyond mere beings, albeit
being that appears as no thing —as nothing. See Ibid., p. 60.
21Ibid.
-Ibid., 60-61.
23See Appendix, pp. 386-87.
24On the flaws in Derrida’s interpretation see ibid.; on PatoCka’s discussion of

“absolute” meaning, see Heretical Essays, 75.
25Ivan Chvatik, “Kacifstvi Jana PatoCky v uvahach o krizi Evropy,” A Report for
333
the Center for Theoretical Study, CTS-96-02, (January 1996), 11.
“ Ibid.
“ Ibid., 59.
“ Ibid., 75.
“ Ibid.
3'Ibid., 77.
32See Plato, The Republic, Book VII, 514A-519D.
34Ibid., 143.
35Ibid., 63.
36Ibid.
37Here, we should recall, Patodka is speaking directly to his discouraged

students, and the Nietzschean tone he adopts does not well reflect the tenor of his
understanding either of polemos, or of the goal o f philosophy in general. See my
argument on the provocative tone o f Essay Six above, pp. 240-54.
“ Ibid., 41-42.
“ Ibid., 42.
“ Ibid., 43.
4'Indeed, Patodka’s discussion, in the sixth essay, o f the “great phenomenon of

fighting fo r peace” as something akin to an “eschatological” longing can be read as a
relevant commentary on Nietzsche’s controversial suggestion that we should “love
peace as a means to new wars —and the short peace more than the long” in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. Rather than evoking violence, both Patodka and Nietzsche seem to be
evoking struggle as a means to prevent the atrophy o f the spirit that is most directly to
blame when totalitarian or fascist movements are able to take hold.
“ Richard Wolin, for example, after condemning Heidegger’s use o f the term
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K am pf in his “Rectoral Address,” concludes that Heidegger’s later explanations of
K am pf as polemos amount to “transparent, post fetum apologetics.” Richard Wolin, The
Politics o f Being: the Political Thought o f Martin Heidegger, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1990) 90.
43Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim,

(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1959) 62.
44Gregory Schuffeider, “Heidegger on Community,” Man and World 14 (1981):

35.
45Ibid„ 36.
46Ibid., 36, 50.
47Ivan Chvatik, “Solidarity o f the Shaken,” 166.
48Patodka understood that Husserl’s conception o f reason, as with his ideal for
philosophy, was overly determined by his desire to develop a philosophy capable o f a
Cartesian certainty. Patodka therefore pursued a renewal o f a more authentically Greek
understanding o f reason, centered in his commitment to the differentiation o f the
Platonic symbolism o f “care for the soul.”
49Chvatik, “Solidarity o f the Shaken,” 166.
50Patodka, “Kolem Masarykovy filosofie nabozenstvi” (On Masaryk’s

Philosophy o f Religion), in Trl studie o Masarykovi (Three Studies on Masaryk), ed.
Ivan Chvatik and Pavel Kouba (Prague: Mlada Fronta, 1991),117.
5II consider Eric Voegelin and Jan Patodka to be in many ways on the same page
in terms o f the goals o f their theorizing. This is not to say, however, that Voegelin
would not find much to criticize in Patodka, and perhaps vice versa. In fact, a detailed
analysis o f the differences in the methodological and historical approaches used by
these two Central European thinkers in their attempts to illuminate the relationship
between being or consciousness and history would be o f great value to political theory.
It would require a major theoretical inquiry, however, beyond both the scope o f this
study and the purpose o f this critical appraisal.
S2“Humans cannot life in the certitude o f meaninglessness” presupposed by

genuine relativism, Patodka writes. See Heretical Essays, 75.
53Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, (Chicago: University o f Chicago

Press, 1953), 2.
335
S4Strauss does exhibit, however, some particular affinities with the Patodkan
approach, nowhere more so than when he characterizes the Socratic vision in terms very
reminiscent of Patodkan phenomenology. Strauss writes that: “All knowledge, however
limited or ‘scientific,’ presupposes a horizon, a comprehensive view within which
knowledge is possible. All understanding presupposes a fundamental awareness o f the
whole: prior to any perception of particular things, the human soul must have had a
vision of the ideas, a vision o f the articulated whole.” (Ibid., 125) The images of the
“horizon” and the “awareness o f the whole” prior to the perception o f individual things
seem to betray a continental, Husserlian influence that is at the heart o f Patodka’s work.
Yet the development o f a theory of natural right based on a perception o f a horizon o f
human knowledge, Patodka would claim, is tantamount to offering an answer to the
Socratic question, which is the question o f the whole.
5SThis argument is made by Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson in their essay
“Social Criticism without Philosophy: An encounter between feminism and
postmodernism,” in Postmodernism: A Reader (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993), 415-432.
56Richard Rorty, “The Seer of Prague,” 40. See also my discussion o f this essay
in the Appendix, below, pp. 373-76.
57See footnote 22 in Chapter Three, above.
58Patodka, Heretical Essays, 104.
59Ibid., 40-41.
“ Ibid., 41.
61Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed.
Clinton Rossiter (New York: Penguin Books, 1961), 322.
“ Patodka, Heretical Essays, 135. See also Chapter Five, above, pp. 249-50.
336
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the Concept o f a ‘World History’). Ceska mysl 31: 86-96.
1938. “MySlenka vzddlanosti a jeji dneSni aktualnost” (The Idea o f Liberal Education
and its Contemporary Relevance). Kriticky mesicnik 1, no. 6: 241-53.
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Amplitude). Kriticky mesicnik 2, no. 3: 101-06.
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University of Chicago Press.
1989g. “The Dangers o f Technicization in Science according to E. Husserl and the

Essence of Technology as Danger according to M. Heidegger: Vama Lecture,
1973.” In Jan Patocka: Philosophy and Selected Writings, ed. Erazim Kohak.
Chicago: University o f Chicago Press.
1989h. “Two Charta 77 Texts” (1977). In Jan Patocka: Philosophy and Selected
Writings, ed. Erazim Kohak. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press.
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Prague: Academia.
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Religion). In Tri studie o Masarykovi (Three Studies on Masaryk), ed. Ivan
Chvatik and Pavel Kouba. Prague: Mlada Fronta.
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Problem). Prague: Ceskoslovensky spisovatel.
1995a. “Documenta Philosophiae: Disduse k Heideggerovi.” Filosoficky Casopis 43,

no. 2: 206-218.
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Heideggerovi smrti” (Martin Heidegger, a Thinker o f Humanity: An Improvised
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Reflection upon the News o f Heidegger’s Death). Filosoficky Casopis 43, no. 1:
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Chicago and LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Press.
1996b. “Ideology and Life in the Idea.” In Two Articles by Jan Patocka. Translated by
Eric Manton. Report o f the Center fo r Theoretical Study CTS-96-09. Prague:
Center for Theoretical Study.
1996c. An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology. Translated by Erazim Kohak.

Chicago and LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Press.
1996d. “Platonism and Politics.” In Two Articles by Jan Patocka. Translated by Eric
Manton. Report o f the Center fo r Theoretical Study CTS-96-09. Prague: Center
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1996e. Sebrane Spisy Jana Patocky: Svazek 1 (The Collected Works o f Jan Patocka).
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prednasek o postaveni cloveka ve svete a v dejinach. Prvni dll: Stati z let
1929-1952, Nevydane texty zpadesatych let. (Care for the Soul I: A Collection
o f Articles and Lectures on the Position o f Man in the World and in History.
First Part: Manuscripts from the Years 1929-1952, Unpublished Texts from the
Fifties). Prague: OIKUMENE.
1997. Bibliografie 1928-1996: Jan Patocka. Prague: OIKOYMENH.
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1998b. “Heidegger.” Translated by Edward F. Findlay. Report o f the Center fo r

Theoretical Study CTS-98-06. Prague: Center for Theoretical Study.
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Center fo r Theoretical Study CTS-98-07. Prague: Center for Theoretical Study.
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o postaveni cloveka ve svete a v dejinach. Druhy dil: Stati z let 1970-1977,
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Collection o f Articles and Lectures on the Position o f Man in the World and in
History. First Part: Manuscripts from the Years 1970-1977, Unpublished Texts
and Lectures from the Seventies). Prague: OIKUMENE.
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APPENDIX
A R EV IEW O F THE LITERATURE
The philosopher Jan Pato£ka remains a relatively unknown figure in academic
circles in the English-speaking world —nowhere more so than in the United States. His
name and work is most often mentioned in relation to Vaclav Havel, the Czech
president who has often invoked the late philosopher in his writings. Although
Patocka’s work is crucial to an understanding o f Havel’s self-described “antipolitical”
approach to politics,1it has not been examined in great detail or with sufficient
coherence by students o f political thought in the West. The studies that do exist are
varied, yet they share a common trait: they tend to dismiss the validity o f PatoCka’s
attempt at resuscitating the insights o f the ancient Greek world via the approach o f
twentieth century phenomenology and ontology. Rather than analyzing and judging this
attempt on its own merits, the preferred approach in the literature is to tie Patodkan
philosophy to one or another stream o f already-established philosophical thought, this
even though, to sustain such an interpretation, it is necessary to argue that he is
inconsistent, that he switches back and forth between different modes o f thought. These
interpretive efforts do not do justice to Patodka’s work; they fail to deal with the
philosopher’s intention, which is to synthetically analyze various modes o f philosophy
that share, not a single method, but rather a common insight into human reality. The
result is a philosophy that implicitly resists categorization; its goal is not methodological
consistency but truth, the truth o f human social and political being that is a factor o f our
ability and willingness to accept and to understand our reality.
346
The primary problem behind the paucity o f thoughtful, considered literature on
PatoCka relates first o f all to the lack o f availability o f his work, particularly in English
translation. Having spend most of his working life as an “unsuitable” philosopher under
fascist or communist governments, Jan Pato£ka was unable to pursue his career at the
university in Prague, let alone publish his philosophical work free o f censorship. Many
o f the writings available today exist only through the efforts o f his students, who
painstakingly (and illegally) collected, transcribed and catalogued his texts and lectures.
It is a consequence o f communist censorship that there exists relatively little o f his work
in published form, even in the original Czech. While great strides have been made since
the 1989 “Velvet Revolution” toward publishing his corpus in his native language as
well as in French and German, it is only very recently that we have seen small steps
towards a presentation o f his work to the English-speaking public.2 Without doubt, the
lack o f a compendium o f Patodka’s works in English is the major factor behind the
relative absence o f a critical literature on the Czech philosopher. One aim o f this work is
to begin to make up for this shortcoming.
Yet another reason for the marginal status o f PatoCka’s thought, however, may
have to do with the nature o f one of the first o f Patodka’s texts to appear in English.
“Wars o f the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War,” the last o f the
Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History, was first published in English translation
as a separate article, without the other five essays and accompanying writings that form
its context, by the journal Telos, in 1976. The language o f this essay, often reminiscent
o f the later Heidegger, is full o f symbolism designed to shock the reader and to
encourage a continuation o f the struggle o f those dissidents already buffeted by the
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shock o f life under Czechoslovak totalitarianism in the 1970s. It’s evocation o f the
concept of polemos as the Heraclitian “father o f all” and its citation o f the work of Ernst
Jlinger, for example, have led readers to the erroneous conclusion that Patodka,
despondent over the crushed hopes o f the Prague Spring, had turned away from his
earlier, Socratic convictions and towards a reactionary, Nietzschean call to irrationalism
and war.3 The reception o f this article in the West, which was conditioned by it’s being
published independently o f the texts which form its context, seems to have also
contributed to the lack o f serious consideration o f Patodka’s work by political
philosophy.
The paucity o f published material is not the only problem that faces an
interpreter o f Patodka’s work, however. Patodka is a complex philosopher whose texts
present something o f a minefield for analysts unfamiliar with the phenomenological and
historical context in which he writes, or simply unwilling to consider his arguments on
their own terms. The result, even among those with access to a sizable selection of his
texts, is inconsistent and inaccurate interpretation. As I will demonstrate, the existing
literature either fails to appreciate or implicitly rejects Patodka’s primary goal -- that of
outlining an approach to philosophy that rejects the metaphysical trap o f assuming a
concrete, “given” foundation for human life and knowledge, yet without succumbing to
an anti-foundational nihilism or rejection o f all grounds for ethics in politics. The Czech
philosopher’s critics by and large pass over this goal and interpret him instead in terms
of the standard categories o f Western thought.
Patodka’s work does not conform to the categorizations o f contemporary
philosophy, however, it in fact directly challenges them. Patodka’s thought engenders
348
disagreement as to its status as classical or postmodern, conservative or radical, Platonic
or Heideggerean. Most contemporary analysts, having decided upon their own
preferences in terms o f these dichotomies and others, interpret Patodka accordingly.
This very act, however, betrays the essence o f Patodka’s philosophical project: while
the Czech thinker consciously remains open to the validity o f certain insights offered by
a variety o f philosophical schools or periods, yet he is uncompromisingly determined
not to fall prey to the temptation o f adopting the rigid outlines and limiting assumptions
which define a school or an “-ism.”
In attempting to place him within a particular tradition, Patodka’s interpreters are
providing him with a philosophical foundation, depicting him as, for example, a
“Masarykan humanist” or, alternately, an anti-foundationalist in the postmodern
tradition. The theme o f a foundation is indeed at the center o f Patodka’s work. It is
crucial to his political philosophy, for it concerns the basic understanding upon which
the construction o f community can take place. Tracing this theme through the literature,
however, it is evident that there is little or no agreement as to the philosophical ground
of Patocka’s thought, if in fact one exists. Rather, one finds directly contradictory
arguments and interpretations that need to be sorted out and themselves clarified.
To the extent that Patodka is known in the academic world o f the West, it is
primarily for two things: first, he is recognized to have been a phenomenologist o f the
first rank, a student o f Husserl’s and Heidegger’s and an interpreter o f the divide
between them.4 Second, he is remembered as a dissident who paid a Socratic price for
his involvement with politics, as the premier Czech philosopher o f this century who
inspired dissident thought in communist Czechoslovakia and himself became a
349
spokesman, late in life, for the dissident human rights movement Charter 77.5 The two
most ambitious examples o f analysis and interpretation o f Patodka’s work in English
focus primarily on these points and, in doing so, fail to deal directly with the broader
and more significant issue o f Patodka’s critical perspective on the question o f a
foundation for life in community, in the polls. Erazim Kohak and Aviezer Tucker have
both written a significant amount of material on Jan Patodka ~ the philosophical
biography o f the former still remains the primary source for readers o f English seeking
an introduction to Patodka’s thought. Other significant, but shorter, works o f
interpretation, such as Jacques Derrida’s The Gift o f Death, which appeared in English
in 1995, and a short article by Richard Rorty, do focus more specifically on the question
o f foundations, with Derrida arguing that Patodka presupposes a fundamentally religious
foundation, but Rorty concluding to the contrary that the Czech philosopher’s stance is
fundamentally anti-foundational.6 Before proceeding to these “postmodern”
perspectives, a closer look at the work o f Kohak and Tucker is required.
Erazim KohAk
Without the dedication and commitment o f Erazim Kohak, it is fair to say,
Patodka would continue to be practically unknown in the English-speaking world. As a
Czech emigre and professor at Boston University, Kohak translated and published the
vast majority o f the works which we now have in English. A phenomenologist o f some
renown himself, Kohak has also written extensively about Patodka as one o f the most
significant o f the successors o f Edmund Husserl.7 Kohak’s “Jan Patodka: A
Philosophical Biography,” with which he introduces his published collection o f
350
Patocka's selected writings, remains the major example o f interpretive work on the
Czech philosopher in English. It is a broad and thorough overview and interpretation o f
Patodka as a philosopher, and required reading for anyone hoping to become familiar
with his philosophy and bibliography. As an interpretive essay, however, it is not
without its shortcomings.
Primarily, Kohak views Patodka as a Czech thinker in the tradition o f “Czech
moral humanism,” a tradition in which Edmund “Husserl, a friend and fellow-student o f
[philosopher and first Czechoslovak president T.G.] Masaryk’s, was also rooted.”8
Beyond Masaryk and Husserl, this tradition extends back through the figure o f
Comenius (Jan Amos Komensky), 1592-1670, the Czech philosopher and contemporary
o f Descartes’ known to the Western world primarily for his pedagogical teachings.
While Patodka did write extensively about both Comenius and Masaryk —he spent
more than a decade doing archival work in the Masaryk Institute and Comenius Archive
while barred from University teaching by the communists —and certainly appreciated
the moral orientation of their philosophies, it does not follow that he fits into a
“tradition” bounded by these two great figures. Kohak brings to his interpretation o f
Patocka a strong feeling for Christian humanism, a strong sense that the “moral
maturity” o f T.G. Masaryk and the harmony with the world o f Comenius, grounded in
love and blending a Protestant faith in God with an Enlightenment belief in humanity, is
the appropriate response to the “crisis” o f modem man described by Husserl in his later
writings. While it was in fact this sense of a crisis that helped propel the young Patodka
351
into his academic vocation, it is a mischaracterization o f his philosophical response to
the situation to view it as a step in the path o f Czech moral humanism.
Kohak’s presentation o f Patodka also presents a problem in terms of a more
substantive bias. Kohak is a phenomenologist, making him eminently qualified to
analyze Patodka’s work. Yet, in his (nearly-exclusive) focus on the phenomenological
elements o f this work and his stress on its potential application toward a renewal o f
moral humanism in the world, Kohak neglects and misconstrues the centrality o f a
concept of politics in Patodka’s work. Not only is the political aspect o f Patodka’s
thought downplayed, it is explicitly denied a place o f significance. “Jan Patodka, after
all,” writes Kohak, “had never been.. .a political philosopher.”9 In his defense, however,
it seems clear that Kohak here conceives of political philosophy along the lines o f
philosophy that has been subordinated to mundane, political considerations. Understood
in this way, politics and the organization of the polis would certainly not be in the same
category with the philosophical quest of the individual towards greater understanding --
but this is not the way in which Jan Patodka understands politics. For Patodka, the
political and the philosophical are inextricably intertwined —the polis is the home o f
philosophy and its raison d ’etre is politics. Politics is “the realm o f the discovery o f
freedom and the ground of truth.”10 It is the activity via which philosophy and freedom
are made actual. In reflecting this understanding, Patodka’s overall project most
certainly falls within the realm o f political philosophy. These two elements are primary
shortcomings in Kohak’s philosophical biography, which is otherwise a complete and
coherent presentation deserving o f consideration.
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Erazim Kohak prefaces his philosophical biography by describing what he sees
as “the basic tension underlying modernity”: the tension between two contradictory
traditions and conceptions o f reality." In the Enlightenment tradition, to which Edmund
Husserl belongs, reality is understood as familiar and accessible to understanding; the
contending tradition, which he “superficially” designates as romanticism and associates
with Martin Heidegger, finds reality to be essentially other, alien and exceeding all
understanding.12 Only in the context of medieval Christianity, o f a God who allows for
an intelligible world yet is himself radically beyond understanding, could both forms o f
understanding coexist, suggests Kohak. In the modem world, after the death o f God,
they can only contradict. Jan Patodka, as student and interpreter o f both Husserl and
Heidegger, has a foot in each tradition, Kohak argues, and he seeks to bridge the chasm
beneath his feet.
Kohak presents this dichotomy in order to delineate two “basic insights,” two
modes of perceiving reality that are “irreducible yet irreconcilable.”13 Patodka, he
argues, moves between these two poles, seeking to synthesize them; his interpretation o f
Husserl and Heidegger forms the context o f this synthesis. For Kohak, Patodka is most
properly understood as situated somewhere in-between these poles, primarily oriented
towards the Husserlian understanding but also influenced (to different degrees in
different historical circumstances) by the Heideggerean ontological critique. The use of
Heideggerean, rather than Husserlian language represents a “shift” in Patodka’s work
that for Kohak is essentially a movement away from the Husserlian Enlightenment pole,
which Kohak prefers, and towards the Heideggerean.
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Kohak is convinced that his dichotomy is appropriate and that its two poles are
not reconcilable; and so he suggests that religion, conceived so as to allow room for an
understandable world but a radically transcendent God, may provide the answer (a
theme to which I will return shortly). Although the basis o f this description o f a tension
underlying modem thought —a tension between a conception o f reality as
fundamentally comprehensible and one that sees in it only a nihilistic absence of
meaning —is relevant, and his argument that Patodka is o f fundamental importance as
the “interpreter o f the dialogue between Husserl and Heidegger” is quite correct, it is not
the case that Patodka himself would describe Husserl and Heidegger as representative of
the two poles. The former pole, dominant in Western philosophy for two millennia, is
exemplified not only by Enlightenment humanism but also, and more emphatically, by
metaphysical constructions that posit a transcendental source o f meaning that is
objectively comprehensible, as in certain formulations o f the concept o f a divine Being.
The latter pole is most commonly represented in Patodka’s writings by the nihilistic
prescriptions put forth by Nietzsche. Husserl and Heidegger, though they may err on
either side o f this dichotomy, represent for Patodka affirmative responses to the
presence o f this tension; they do not stand for the two poles themselves. The most
insightful response to this problem that Patodka identifies, however, is not modem at
all. It is rather the response symbolized by Socrates. Thus Patodka’s work, particularly
in regard to politics and the polis, focuses on this ancient view o f reality and the way in
which it has been progressively distorted, as much if not more than it focuses on the
distinctions between Husserl and Heidegger. Patodka would remind us that philosophy
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is inherently historical, and it was in ancient Greece —most specifically in the figure o f
Plato’s Socrates ~ that the groundwork for an authentic perception o f reality was laid.
Thus for Patocka there exists primarily a dichotomy between thought which
surrenders its freedom to the surety o f metaphysics, and so betrays the insight of
Socrates at its core, and modem nihilistic reactions to the dominance o f metaphysics
which entirely reject it, thus similarly misconstruing reality by refusing to consider the
validity of the experiential essence o f metaphysics that Patodka would like to
resuscitate. Husserl and Heidegger represent alternatives to that dichotomy (each valid
to some degree though neither entirely successful), they do not represent the dichotomy
itself. So while Patodka does indeed interpret the dialogue between these two thinkers,
in this Kohak is correct, I believe it to be less than faithful to the spirit o f Patodka’s
thought to focus primarily on this modem division. It is not Patodka’s goal to simply
find a way to bridge Husserl and Heidegger; his goal is a greater one ~ to renew in both
philosophy and politics an insight uncovered in antiquity by approaching it with the aid
o f contemporary phenomenological method, in its Husserlian and its Heideggerean
varieties.
Kohak correctly locates the motive force behind Patodka’s early philosophy in
the work o f Edmund Husserl, particularly his work on the Crisis o f European Sciences
and Transcendental Phenomenology.1* The perception o f a crisis in Western
rationalism, also an important theme in the philosophy o f T.G. Masaryk, is central to
Husserl’s philosophy -- especially so in his later period when the young Jan Patodka is
one o f his closest and most dedicated students.15 The crisis itself, Kohak explains, is
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essentially the failure o f “science, the most refined form o f Western reason,” to lead to
moral growth in Western humanity.16 The task o f Western philosophy o f the last
century, he continues, is to understand why this has occurred. In a variation on the
fundamental dichotomy o f modem thought that he presented in the preface to his
philosophical biography, Kohak groups the historical responses to this problem into two
categories: the superficial and the structural. The superficial responses refer to those
schools of thought that still expect moral growth to come. Here one finds both Classical
Marxism, ever faithful to the goals of the revolution, and, surprisingly, Classical
liberalism, which “attributes the failure to a failure o f nerve and will.”17 On the other
side of the coin, those who respond structurally find the fault lying in Western
rationalism itself. Here are the Romantics, running the gamut from the positive in
Tolstoy to the negative in Nietzsche —the central stream being a critique o f rationalism
and technological reasoning.18
As Kohak reads him, Edmund Husserl’s diagnosis provides the possibility o f an
alternative, one that remains on the side o f rationality, but attempts to renew in it a sense
of humanity and a facility for moral judgment. It is at this point that Patocka takes up
the task begun by Husserl in his Crisis. Erazim Kohak’s description o f this progression,
and his interpretation o f Jan Patodka, point towards his own preference for a humanistic
solution to the dilemma he has outlined. This implicit preference in Kohak’s
interpretation is exemplified in three points that distinguish his approach: first is his
conclusion that Patodka is the philosophical heir of Husserl and Masaryk (as well as o f
Comenius) and thus innately connected to their Enlightenment humanism, second is the
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substance o f his criticism o f Patodka as inconsistent, as moving back and forth between
embracing the world and reacting against it, and third is his explicit suggestion that the
best source for a philosophical solution to the problem, with which Patodka’s work
would be compatible, may be Christianity (this despite Patodka’s analysis o f religion
which cites its shortcomings in relation to philosophy.) It is on these points that the
interpretive work o f Erazim Kohak is at its weakest, often contradicting clear textual
evidence.
In analyzing Patodka, in judging his alternating focus on Husserl and Heidegger,
his use o f language that seems at one point hopeful and humanistic, at another dark and
foreboding, Kohak concludes that the Czech philosopher is, in the end and throughout,
most consistently a thinker in the mold o f Husserl and T.G. Masaryk. As he puts it:
. Though in the course o f his philosophical career Patodka was to deal

intensively with Plato, with Aristotle and his heirs, with Comenius,
Herder, Kant, Hegel, and especially Heidegger, as well as with numerous
other thinkers, he remained throughout a critical heir o f Husserl —and o f
Masaryk, two men who, for all their differences, were, as Husserl
recognized at the end o f his life, rooted in the same philosophical
tradition.19
This is the tradition o f “Czech moral humanism” to which the Moravian-born Husserl
belonged, according to Kohak, along with Masaryk. It appears most clearly in Masaryk,
with his stress on moral maturity through education and religious faith. In Husserl,
Kohak sees a corresponding attempt to rescue rationality, to reintroduce to it a respect
for value-judgments and a potential for human growth.
Kohak does make clear, it should be noted, that it would be a mistake to reduce
Patodka entirely to this or its opposite pole; he is neither simply a Husserlian nor a
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Heideggerean thinker, but one who is genuinely heir to both.20 Kohak is quite correct,
here, yet in his analysis, Patodka is described not as staking out a genuinely independent
position, distinct from the conclusions o f the two German thinkers, but as being a
thinker o f two “strands,” one more Husserlian and one with a more Heideggerean
persona. The latter strand surfaces, according to Kohak, during historical periods o f
discouragement and hopelessness, such as in the darkest days o f Czechoslovak
communist “normalization” in the 1970s. Yet “if we consider Patodka’s work as a
whole,” Kohak concludes, “it is definitely the ‘Husserlian’ strand that is more consistent
and dominant.”21 It is also his implicit conclusion that the Husserlian strand is
preferable.
Kohak considers Patodka, therefore, to be o f two minds, a charge which a full
consideration o f Patodka’s philosophy will show to be unwarranted. Kohak’s conclusion
is reflected in the major criticism that he levels against the Czech philosopher’s corpus
as a whole: that there occurs an unfortunate “shift” in both Patodka’s idiom and, more
importantly, in his perception of reality, his perception “o f the context of human
striving.”22 The notion that there is a shift, a “pronounced discontinuity in Patodka’s
thought,” is meant to explain the perceived difference between Patodka’s stress on
caring for the soul, living in truth and other ethical concepts, and his striking words in,
for example, the last o f his Heretical Essays in which he subordinates the symbol of
“the day” to that o f “night” and speaks o f Heraclitus’s polemos, often translated as
“war,” as the father o f all.23 In these later writings, according to Kohak, Patodka’s
perception o f reality has been altered or conditioned by the vicissitudes o f the
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totalitarian situation in which he exists. Whereas he once perceived our human context,
the world, to be supportive o f human moral conduct, in the periods o f strife he altered
his perception o f the world, coming to see it as “hostile to human efforts,” and “alien.”24
This points to the conclusion that there effectively exist two Patodkas, one a Husserlian
or Masarykan humanist (whose thought is but a step away from a Christian solution),
and a second, who has seen his hopes for moral advancement crushed and has turned to
a more pessimistic and Heideggerean reading o f being in stark contrast to his earlier
work. Such a reading, however, is flawed. Above all, it does not accord with Patodka’s
overall body o f work, which is on the one hand inherently wary o f the metaphysical
content o f “Enlightenment humanism” and on the other firmly insistent that elements o f
Heideggerean insight and symbolism are not incompatible with a goal of moral
comportment.
To be fair, Kohak is clear in stating that he finds a broad consistency in
Patocka’s writings, locating it in the philosopher’s understanding o f the “goals” o f
human striving, thought not in his perception o f the context o f that striving. He, for
example, defends Patodka against the misinterpretation o f those who find in the later
writings a one hundred and eighty degree turn away from moral humanism and would
accuse Patodka o f becoming “a splenetic ultrarightist, glorying in orgiastic visions o f
war,” a tragically erroneous interpretation which Kohak attributes only to “a number of
Western readers, including Czech readers living in the West.”25 And yet Kohak’s
reading shares something in common with these readers’ —the perception that
Patodka’s later, political writings are less a part of his true philosophy than a
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consolatory reaction written for his students, a striking out against the injustice o f the
historical situation in which he found himself. Kohak’s attempt to defend the later
writings on this point is muted somewhat by this similarity.
Kohak’s wish to see in Patodka a humanist o f Masarykan dimensions, that is, a
humanist with a basic sense o f the transcendental origin o f human values, comes into
conflict most directly with Patodka’s Heretical Essays. With these late texts it becomes
impossible to interpret Patocka as a thinker intent on grounding human society on a
shared faith, a universal understanding, or a common set o f morals determined for us by
a presence greater than our own. Their content treats freedom as a struggle, as an
acceptance o f the possibility that enlightenment may come from out o f the darkness and
not from the day. As Kohak notes, Patodka often speaks o f freedom as a struggle against
the world; from this he assumes that, for Patodka, the world, the “other,” is necessarily
“radically alien.”26 Here we have the core of Kohak’s problem with Patodka’s
philosophy -- it’s conception o f human life as struggle, rather than as harmony. Simply
put, Kohak’s phenomenology o f the subject’s encounter with other humans and with the
world -- combined, his preferences suggest, with a degree o f religious faith —leads him
to the conclusion that love and harmony have an ontological primacy over struggle.27
Patodka’s invocation o f phenomenology as justification for the primacy o f struggle in
human life is unwarranted; though not illegitimate, it cannot be claimed to be “an
eidetically necessary result” o f a phenomenology based on experience o f the other,”
Kohak argues.28
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How then, does Patodka come to such conclusions? According to Erazim Kohak,
the answer is historical. As I have noted, Kohak finds in most o f Patodka’s work a
“vindication o f Husserl’s —and Masaryk’s —Enlightenment humanism.”29 Yet this
“vindication” is not bom out in Patodka’s work because the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 effectively crushed all existing hope. With the loss o f hope and
the onset o f depression, Kohak argues that Patodka assumed the role o f consoler for his
discouraged students: the Heretical Essays, with its invocation o fpolemos, “follows the
ageless strategy o f all consolatory writings, giving up all worldly hope and calling up
internal sources o f strength.”30 Though Kohak does not explicitly doubt the sincerity o f
these writings, he implies that they represent a calculated response to a situation, rather
than the truly reflective work of Patodka’s other writings. Thus historical circumstances
bring out in Patodka a more Heideggerean idiom, one that, though Kohak must admit is
irreducibly present in the texts, is not genuinely reflective o f the lifelong project o f the
Czech philosopher.
This critique is interpretive, it draws less from clear evidence in the texts
themselves than from Kohak’s own preference for the idiom o f those works of
Patodka’s that are more compatible on the surface with a Christian humanism. Although
Patodka does express admiration for certain aspects and goals o f the Christian
worldview, he cannot embrace its dogmatic tenants and, when he turns from an implicit
to an explicit exhortation o f struggle, Kohak is clearly disappointed. He in fact seems to
be urging Patodka, or at least the reader, to “discover Being, in love rather than in
strife.” “[W]hy not the religious option?” he asks elsewhere, as a means to resolve the
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dilemma o f a world simultaneously accessible to understanding and yet undeniably
possessed of something that exceeds it.31
Grudgingly, Kohak recognizes that Patocka was not a believer, and that his
reasons for this stance were fundamentally philosophical. Without rejecting Christianity
out o f hand, Patodka resisted what he saw as a temptation to abandon philosophy for
faith in the solidity o f a divine Being. Instead, he sought to answer the dilemma by
means of rigorous reflection, by philosophical means. He sought access to a
foundational understanding of humanity, meaning an understanding that was coherent
enough to serve as a ground for a morality resistant to nihilistic relativism. This
understanding, however, was to be no solid foundation in itself, it could not be a final
crutch upon which man could lean and which man could simply accept unquestioningly
-- no such foundation exists in human life, Patodka firmly insisted.
Erazim Kohak’s approach to Patodka is philosophical, but it is not political. It is
worth asking, and is itself quite revealing, whether it would be possible to found a truly
democratic, nonhierarchical politics upon mutual love without struggle. His
understanding o f the “context of human striving,” as Kohak calls it, denotes a crucial
element o f competition in the free relations o f the polis. The freedom that defines the
polis is precisely freedom from simple or naive understandings o f the human condition
-- understandings that have been at the heart o f Western politics since the inception of
metaphysics. Patodka’s critique o f Masaryk stems from the fact that Masaryk’s
philosophy (and politics) is founded upon such a metaphysics. For Masaryk,
“Democracy is not only a state form, but that theistic metaphysics which responds to the
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moral nature o f human reality.”32 As such it is hampered by the lack o f “independent
philosophical thinking,” meaning thinking able to free itself from dependence on
assumptions that, whether positivistic or religious, rest on metaphysical foundations.
Kohak’s interpretive work is, in the end, subject to the same critique as that leveled
against Masaryk. It seeks to rest on a metaphysical foundation to secure its deepest
convictions and goals. Patodka’s approach to philosophy is broader Kohak depicts it to
be. His search examined life in community and history as much as it did the
phenomenological aspects o f the relationship between subject and object or subject and
“other.” It embraced all o f these aspects, and an effective analysis o f his work must do
likewise.
Aviezer Tucker
As noted above, Aviezer Tucker’s approach to Patodka’s work suffers from a
similar shortcoming as Kohak’s -- it seeks to find in Patodka’s thought something that is
not present, in this case, a conception o f truth encompassing a concrete set o f ethics and
human rights upon which to base politics. Though his focus is primarily on Patodka as
dissident and Charter 77 activist, Tucker attempts to read Patodka’s and Havel’s texts
for their insight into a discussion on “the relationship between philosophy and politics
generally, and concretely on the relationship between phenomenology and its moral and
political consequences.”33 Tucker’s work on this topic consists o f a number of articles
on both Patodka and Havel, as well as on the Czech intellectual scene in general. Much
o f this is contained in a book published in Czech translation and entitled:
Phenomenology and Politics: From J. Patocka to V Havel. The focus o f this book is
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Charter 77, the human rights document published by the then-dissidents Havel, Patodka
and Jin Hayek. It is the question o f human rights, or o f ethics generally, as a necessary
consequence o f political philosophy that most captures Tucker’s attention. This question
colors Tucker’s interpretation o f Patodka, leading him to praise the Czech thinker as a
humanist for those parts o f his oeuvre that lend support to ethics, and damn him as a
reactionary for those parts (such as the later Heretical Essays) that seem to abandon
ethics for a form o f Heideggereanism.
Interestingly (but inaccurately), Tucker is even more convinced than Kohak o f
the inconsistency o f Patodka’s work; even more than Kohak he sets up Patodka’s
Heideggerean work as a straw man against which to contrast the normatively superior
humanistic or Platonic work. He also comes to the conclusion that historical
circumstances account for the variation in the material, claiming that the
disappointments o f the Communist era produced drastic changes in the substance and
content of his writings, thus explaining the texts that seem less than Platonic. This
interpretation essentially denies the validity o f Patodka’s attempt to draw upon both
ancient and modem, both Plato and Heidegger in an effort at understanding the human
condition by making use o f the insights of both while avoiding the shortcomings o f
either. Tucker, consistently with other interpreters, would focus upon one strand in
Patodka’s thought while criticizing that which might conflict with it -- this in lieu o f the
more challenging course o f examining the professed project on its own terms.
In the introduction to his book, Tucker accurately notes that the interpreters of
Vaclav Havel tend to read the Czech president in line with their own philosophical
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predispositions. In other words, he accuses them o f lacking objectivity, o f making Havel
into something he is not, something predetermined by their own partialities and
intellectual biases. Tucker is quite correct in this analysis; unfortunately, he succumbs to
the same temptation in his reading o f Jan Patodka. Tucker reads Pato£ka as a dissident
and human rights activist, seeking in his work a firm foundation for the rights and
morals associated with Charter 77, Patocka’s single explicit venture into the realm of
dissident political action. Tucker looks for an “anchor” in the Czech philosopher’s
position, a solid grounding for ethics and rights upon which one could found political
society without ambiguity. Yet Patodka’s philosophy, at its core and consistently
throughout, rejects the vision o f an anchored existence, preferring to understand man as
a free being who lives authentically when he accepts a “life without an anchor.”34
Tucker is o f course not oblivious to the evidence in Patodka’s work that points away
from his preferred interpretation. It is true that Patodka’s writings indeed vary greatly in
tone and content; the relative influence of Heidegger, e.g., is clearly present more in
some texts than in others. Yet it is a mistake to conclude, as Tucker does, that Pato£ka is
somewhat schizophrenic, having two distinct personas: one Platonic, humanist and
supportive o f human rights, and the other Heideggerean and reactionary, with a more
relativistic perspective on ethics.
Tucker’s book is most impressive when it focuses on the concrete philosophical
links between PatoCka’s texts and those of Husserl and Heidegger.35 Tucker notes
specific sections in Heidegger’s Being and Time as well as in Husserl’s work, where
particular Pato£kan concepts have their origin.36 This analysis helps clarify, for example,
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the degree to which Patodka’s use o f the metaphors o f “earth” and “sky” draw upon the
similar use o f such metaphors in Husserl and Heidegger, and the degree to which
Patocka makes them his own by also using them poetically, rather than strictly
phenomenologically. In fact, as Tucker notes, it is not entirely clear “where Patodka uses
‘the earth’ as a poetic metaphor, and where it is a given phenomenon.”37
In Tucker’s analysis, it is Plato and Heidegger that form the two essential poles
o f Patocka’s philosophy. This is, o f course, in contrast to Kohak, who reads Patocka in
modem terms, as a thinker primarily trying to bridge the gap between Husserl and
Heidegger. For Tucker, the modem pole o f Patodka’s thought is clearly dominated by
Heidegger over Husserl. In light o f this, Tucker’s work is valuable as it points out, e.g.,
the relationship between “care for the soul” and “care” (Sorge), and “ living in truth” and
“Being-in-truth” in Patoika and Heidegger, respectively. He argues, almost without
exception, that Pato£ka uses the terms differently than did Heidegger. “Patodka’s ‘care
for the soul,”’ for example, “stresses the importance o f recognizing finitude, but
otherwise bears little resemblance to Heidegger’s ‘care.’ It is much closer to Socrates’
than to Heidegger....”38
Although Tucker’s work is helpful in discussing these links, his evident
antipathy for Heidegger detracts somewhat from any sense of objectivity. A
considerable amount o f time is spent repeating the arguments o f Wolin, et al., to the
effect that Heidegger’s philosophy has an inherent connection to National Socialism.39
At one point, though perhaps not without irony, Tucker refers to Heidegger as the “evil
genius o f phenomenology.”40 Yet in the end, Tucker is unable to conclude one way or
the other whether Patodka’s work suffers from similar faults. Pato£ka uses
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Heideggerean terms in a Socratic sense, making him more o f a Platonic humanist most
of the time, but there are periods when Pato£ka is faithful to Heidegger, making him a
clear reactionary. This type o f analysis, I would argue, does not accurately portray
Patocka and is representative o f several significant faults in Tucker’s work as a whole.
Primary among these weaknesses is Tucker’s focus on Pato£ka as human rights
activist, with its implication that human rights are the essence o f Pato£ka’s philosophy,
the key to his “life in truth,” and so to his political philosophy. Tucker’s argument
proceeds from the claim that Pato£ka’s work is “metaphysical.” This is in fact the
fulcrum o f the analysis: the argument that the human rights movement Charter 77
sprung from metaphysical foundations in the philosophy o f it’s spokesman, Jan Patodka.
Tucker argues that Pato£ka “pushed Heideggerianism toward humanism and gave
morality a primary ontological status. He also adopted, following Kant, absolute and
universal ethics.”41 These “absolute and universal ethics” would serve, then, as a “basis
for political philosophy and political action.”42 All of this results in what Tucker calls,
surprisingly, Patodka’s “metaphysical system.”43
The conclusion that human morality is championed by Pato£ka in the form of
such a system is indeed surprising because, without doubt, it contradicts a basic tenant
of his actual writings. PatoSka is convinced, to the contrary, that the assumption o f
metaphysical foundations in life results in an existence that is less than fully human
because it is not truly philosophical, it does not experience life as an inquiry, but rather
accepts it as simply given and rests complacently on those assumptions. But Tucker, in
basing his inquiry on the event o f Charter 77 and the notion o f human rights, and from
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there moving to Patoika’s philosophical texts instead o f the other way around, makes
clear his intent on finding such a “system” o f rights in those texts. Tucker believes, with
Richard Wolin, that there simply must be a concrete foundation in absolute moral
principles or human rights for a politics o f authenticity to succeed.44 This is perhaps a
defensible position, and even logical if one looks only at the Charter 77 texts, but it is
not consistent with the whole o f Patodka’s philosophy, which attempts to use the
ontological insight o f Heidegger while retaining a focus on the inherent connection
between politics and ethics, yet without reverting to the traditional solution o f a
metaphysics o f morals.
One benefit o f Tucker’s focus on Charter 77, os opposed to Kohak’s broader
focus on phenomenology, is that it points a spotlight on one o f the more interesting, and
potentially problematic, elements o f Pato£ka’s work: namely his apparent adoption of
Kantian ethics. In one Charter 77 text entitled, “The Obligation to Resist Injustice,”
Patocka writes that
The idea o f human rights is nothing other than the conviction that even
states, even society as a whole, are subject to the sovereignty o f moral
sentiment: that they recognize something unconditional that is higher
than they are, something that is binding even on the, sacred, inviolable,
and that in their power to establish and maintain a rule o f law they seek
to express this recognition.45
This is what Tucker refers to as “Patodka’s Kantian formulation o f ethical absolutism,”46
and in this he appears to be correct. Tucker concludes, as I have noted, that Pato£ka has
adopted a positive conception o f absolute ethics which serve as a foundation for human
rights. Yet he makes this argument even while approvingly citing a French
commentator, Valerie Lowit, whose understanding o f PatoCka’s morality is different.
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Lowit sees morality in Pato£ka’s philosophy, not as a positive construct, but as a
negative reaction to untruth. In Tucker’s words, Lowit argues that:
.. .PatoCka’s ontologically primary “ought” is a morality that precedes

ethics in its modem or Kantian sense. This presupposed and presumed
morality is revealed in the “no!” of Socrates’ daimon and Antigone, this
negation reveals the primary positive ontological morality that was
accepted unreflectively in the world o f myth, just as nothingness reveals
being and Plato’s metaphysics reveals its negation —Heideggerean
ontology.47
In this interpretation, which is more faithful to Patodka than Tucker’s, morality is an
ontological phenomenon that is explicitly prior to Kantian ethics. It speaks through the
negative, the “no” o f the daimon, rather than through the positive of assumed universal
rights. But, as Tucker notes in response to this position:
Nevertheless, when required to articulate this primordial morality, in the

Charter 77 documents which he authored, Patodka used the Kantian
formula. Either, by the end o f his life, Pato£ka changed his earlier
position and primordial morality became close to Kantian ethics, or (and
this is more probable) when forced to articulate clearly what cannot be
articulated clearly, Patoika chose the readily available Kantian
formulation.48
The question o f the relationship between Pato£ka and Kantian ethics is still unresolved
and will need to be revisited further along in this work. Tucker, however, has made the
suggestion that that the Kantian formulation o f Charter 77 may not be representative o f
Patocka’s philosophical position on morality, which “cannot be articulated clearly.”
Instead, it may be an exoteric formulation, considered expedient and perhaps necessary
for the type o f action represented by Charter 77. Here Tucker seems to find this
explanation plausible, that Pato£ka’s dissident reversion to an unambiguous Kantian
morality is not representative o f his philosophical position, and I think that this
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conclusion is persuasive. In spite o f this insight, however, Tucker continues to insist on
the presence o f an absolute metaphysical morality of human rights in the Czech
philosopher’s work, a morality that Tucker “articulates clearly” in locating it’s core in
the notion o f human rights. The correct answer, I would argue, is far more tentative and
uncertain, befitting the human condition.
Tucker’s work is also flawed in its interpretation of the two “poles” that appear
to demarcate PatoCka’s work. Tucker effectively divides the work into a dominant
humanism with Platonic roots, and a “quite disturbing” perspective that is reactionary in
its Heideggereanism. The two faces o f PatoCka are exemplified in two main texts: Plato
and Europe and the Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History. Tucker claims that
the first text exemplifies Patodka’s humanism and his commitment to human rights,
while the second text is pessimistic and Heideggerean.49 The decisive element in this
dichotomy is the understanding o f the concept of truth.
In Plato and Europe, PatoCka agrees with Plato that pure, absolute, and
eternal truth is obtainable, and that the way to obtain it is through
dialectics. In Heretical essays, PatoCka agrees with Heidegger that truth
is relative and evasive, and that nothing can be done to achieve it.50
In fact, neither claim is accurate. Patodka is not a relativist even in his most
Heideggerean moments, nor is he an absolutist in his most classical or Platonic. The
perception o f two poles in Patodka’s work is not, however, inaccurate -- it is Tucker’s
description o f the philosopher’s relationship to those two poles that is inaccurate. As
Erazim Kohak recognized, an understanding of the world founded upon metaphysics
and a nihilistic relativism do indeed form two poles in Patoika’s thought, or rather they
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form two “limits” —both explicitly excluded as deformations o f reality on either side.51
Patodka’s most basic insight is the recognition that the reality o f human existence
conforms to neither o f these extremes, but lies somewhere in-between them. Tucker,
however, concludes that both o f these poles are present in Patofika’s work, surfacing at
different times in different essays. In Plato and Europe, “he was a humanist,” writes
Tucker, while in Heretical Essays, “he is reactionary” and a Heideggerean relativist.52
As I demonstrate in the body o f this study, Patocka remained consistent
throughout his life in his fundamental rejection of both relativism and it’s opposite, the
assumption o f an absolute knowledge accessible to man through metaphysics. He was
neither an anthropocentric humanist nor a reactionary, considering both to be forms of
escape from the problematicity and historicity o f human existence. Humanism, along
with much o f Enlightenment thought, Pato£ka considered to be essentially a form of
metaphysics. In an essay entitled “The Harmonism of Modem Humanism,” only
recently published in the original Czech, Pato£ka is resoundingly critical o f secular
humanism. This modem form o f thought, he argues, aims perpetually towards human
harmony; it is, as he calls it, a harmonism that conceives o f ethics as, e.g., a system of
moral postulates. Ethics is postulated as a system o f metaphysical truth that can enable
man to achieve harmony. For Patodka, however, ethics, or “moral striving,” must be
understood as “the striving o f concrete, historical people.” Ethics are to be uncovered in
the “actual history o f the engaged person.”53 The modem humanist, in seeking harmony
and uninterrupted growth, is a “man o f harmonism,” and “a closed, ready being, simple
and entirely transparent.”54 When Tucker writes that “[i]n his Platonic moments,
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Patocka is an optimistic humanist, believing that truth is achievable through
philosophical argumentation,”55 he decidedly misrepresents Pato£ka’s philosophical aim
o f explicating the absence o f an ultimate harmony, an achievable truth in human life.
For Patodka, truth is nothing if it is not problematic, particularly so for the philosopher.
Tucker’s interpretation o f the Heretical Essays as reactionary by virtue o f their
Heideggereanism is similarly flawed. Two components o f this interpretation exemplify
Tucker’s tendency to overextend his analysis. Neither Patodka’s discussions o f
medieval European history nor his conclusions as to the dangers in adopting a scientistic
view o f human being are accurately portrayed by Tucker. Patodka does not argue that
Medieval Europe was a spiritual ideal, nor that the development of science “suddenly
destroyed” this “wonderful spiritual culture.”56 The element o f exaggeration inherent in
Tucker’s descriptive analysis lends support to his thesis that Patodka’s work moves back
and forth between two extremities, two poles, but it does not serve to accurately portray
the philosophy o f the Heretical Essays.
Tucker’s interpretation proceeds from a desire to explicate the connection
between the Charter 77 affirmation o f human rights and the philosophy o f its primary
author, Jan Pato£ka. Its conclusion is that, despite occasional forays into the realm of
reactionary opinion attributable to the vicissitudes o f the historical situation, Pato€ka
was a philosopher o f human rights. That is, his philosophy o f ethics in the form o f
universal, enumerated rights is primary, and precedes any philosophy o f politics in
importance. As Tucker describes it,
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Pato£ka held that human authenticity is “life in truth,” the uniquely
human potential to witness the grand presence o f truth. Life in truth can
be achieved through the practice o f the Socratic method. The public
conduct of Platonic dialogues requires the protection o f human rights
(freedom o f speech, print etc.). Therefore, to live authentically, human
beings must live in a state that guarantees the conditions (human rights)
for search for, and life in, truth. These human rights are universal and
absolute and every just state must be founded on them. In Patodka’s
philosophy politics is subservient to ethics, and ethics guarantees
authenticity. The political level was the least fundamental for Patocka, it
is there only to guarantee the more important levels o f ethics and
authenticity as life in truth.57
Here Tucker argues for the primacy o f an enumerated ethics over politics in Pato£ka’s
philosophy; I would contend precisely to the contrary, that the philosophy o f politics in
Patocka’s work stresses the fact that freedom, the ground upon which a truly human life
unfolds, requires that our historical action, our political action, not be governed by a
form of metaphysics such as a universal, enumerated system o f morality. The absolute
morality o f which Pato£ka speaks in the Charter documents is not, as Tucker would
have it, expressed in a given set o f rights or freedoms upon which all societies must be
based in order to achieve authenticity. The ethical politics sought by Tucker, as well as
by Patocka, cannot be guaranteed through a system; it is a more tentative and hard-won
achievement that results from the commitment to freedom for others as well as for
oneself and from the openness to the transcendent and nonobjective nature o f the world
as a whole that is determinative o f our comportment as humans.
Rather than a foundation for politics in human rights (or humanism), PatoCka’s
political theory points to an institutional formulation reflective of a philosophy that is
grounded, neither in the particular things o f the world nor in a transcendent being or
Idea, but in an openness to the world as a whole. Such a formulation would consist o f a
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democratic community o f equals united in the idea o f the polls and in the perception
that unity presupposes and is guaranteed by a measure o f free conflict. A philosophical
clarification o f its foundations -- foundations that are, in a sense, non-foundational in
their grounding in freedom from theoretical constructs and material objects —will offer
the possibility o f resetting democratic practice on what PatoCka believes to be its proper
footing. In this way, as the Heretical Essays on the Philosophy o f History testify, the
sense of crisis that has plagued modem man for more than a century can be addressed
without a reactionary reversion to the politics o f the pre-modem period. Tucker is right
in asserting that the properly ordered polis must guarantee the right of its citizens to
freedom o f speech, but he is mistaken in claiming that Pato£ka’s philosophy can be
distilled into a system o f ethics based upon human rights of this type.
Postm odernism , Foundationalism , and Religion
Although both Kohak and Tucker avoid the issue o f foundations directly, each in
effect argues for a form o f humanistic foundation, for an anchor via which human life
can gain a degree o f certainty as a weapon against the pull o f nihilism and relativism. It
is with thinkers working in the postmodern tradition, however, that the question of
foundations is dealt with specifically. I refer here to interpretive essays on Patocka by
Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida, both o f which recognize that the question o f the
foundation is at the heart o f Patodka’s philosophy. Interestingly, and perhaps tellingly,
these two renowned postmodern thinkers come to opposite conclusions. While Rorty
points out that the Czech thinker, as an non-metaphysician, must reject foundations,
Derrida argues to the contrary that his thought has a fundamentally religious foundation,
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a grounding in the notion o f an “absolute being.” Clearly this question requires further
exploration.
Rorty and Derrida, like Kohak and Tucker, resist Pato£ka’s attempt to forge a
coherent path in-between the traditional foundationalism o f Western thought and the
anti-foundationalism o f contemporary, postmodern work. The former concludes that, in
effect, Pato£ka is postmodern, while the latter makes o f him a traditionalist, albeit one
with a difference. Both Rorty’s view of the Czech philosopher as an anti-foundationalist
and Derrida’s charge o f traditionalism for a perceived reliance on religious themes are
misguided. While Rorty’s account is often accurate, he goes too far in setting Patodka in
the anti-foundationalist camp. Derrida, on the other hand, comes to a conclusion that is
explicitly contradicted in many o f PatoCka’s other texts, texts one can presume were
unavailable to Derrida. For all o f the iconoclastic qualities o f their writings, Rorty and
Derrida approach Patocka through standard philosophical categories, even if
postmodern ones. Yet Pato5ka’s approach, which developed in relative isolation from
the academic trends o f the postwar West, begins from a position that is a step beyond
the simple dichotomy between the traditional and the postmodern perspectives. Central
to this study o f PatoCka is an assessment of the feasibility and success o f this attempt.
To begin this assessment, we must consider the arguments o f Rorty and Derrida in
greater detail.
The theme o f the foundation is presented most clearly in a short essay written for
The New Republic by Richard Rorty, the American philosopher often considered one o f
the most important o f postmodern thinkers. Rorty’s short article, a book review o f the
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collection o f essays in English edited by Kohak, the Heretical Essays, and Plato and
Europe (both in French translation), is merely a brief overview o f Patodka as the model
for Vaclav Havel and the other Czechoslovak dissidents o f the ‘60s and ‘70s, yet it
manages to elucidate the core issues in Patodka’s thought in a way unmatched by
Kohak’s or Tucker’s longer analyses.
While Rorty agrees with Erazim Kohak that Pato£ka is most immediately
significant as an interpreter of the dialogue between Husserl and Heidegger, he
disagrees with him in concluding that, in this dialogue, “PatoCka is mostly on
Heidegger’s side.”58 Yet a fundamental difference between the two remains for Rorty:
while Heidegger, after his experience with National Socialism, abandoned his interest in
politics and in resuscitating Western institutions, Pato£ka remained a political thinker
who thought those institutions could be freed from their reliance on metaphysics and
infused with freedom.
Heidegger found the difference between democracy and tyranny

philosophically uninteresting, insignificant compared to the titanic drama
o f the self-destruction o f metaphysics. Patodka threw himself, as soon as
he was asked, into what turned out to be a mortal struggle for democratic
freedom.59
Although he overstates the degree to which PatoCka is on “Heidegger’s side,” Rorty is
correct in pointing to this fundamental difference between the goals o f the Czech
philosopher and his German instructor.
In Rorty’s reading, it is Pato£ka’s Heideggerean critique o f metaphysics that
stands out, making the Czech more o f a Heideggerean than a Husserlian thinker.
Though Patodka was something o f a crusader for democracy as a dissident, Rorty argues
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that he could not be thought o f as a philosopher o f human rights, meaning the “sort of
philosopher who wants to give democratic institutions and hopes a ‘firm philosophical
foundation,”’ for the simple reason that if one rejects metaphysics, one must reject all
such foundations.60 For Rorty, Patodka conforms to this line o f reasoning. His critique
o f metaphysics makes him an anti-foundationalist. In this, Rorty notes, he stands quite
apart from “Straussians like Allan Bloom” and others who “insist on metaphysical
foundations for political choice,” on a “moral reality” reflected in the institutions of
democracy.61 Still, Rorty does not ignore Patodka’s moral language or his evocation o f a
moral foundation in the texts o f Charter 77. Rather, he conceives o f Patodkan moral
sentiment as responding to an elemental and non-metaphysically grounded sense of
human obligation; in this Rorty dismisses much o f Patodka’s ontological philosophy,
implying that it is an over-complication o f a simple human reaction -- the call o f
conscience.
The solution to the trap o f choosing between “absolutism” and “relativism”
(metaphysics and anti-foundationalism) lies in understanding the term “absolute” in a
different sense. For Rorty, Patodka is responding to a sense o f absolute obligation, our
conscience, that is in no way “objective.” It lacks any kind o f solid foundation, making
it something o f a “leap in the dark.” “For Patodka,” Rorty writes, “the unconditionality
o f the call o f conscience has nothing to do with the notion o f a moral demand being
legitimated or underwritten by something factual, something ‘out there.’”62 Rorty thus
reads Patodka to be a thorough postmodern in his rejection o f all metaphysical support
for moral action. Conscience is directed simply by a shared humanity, a shared sense of
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dignity and resulting obligation. Any more solid grounding or understanding than this
does not exist for Rorty. In a critique o f Patocka, Rorty finds the seeds o f the conditions
for social conscience to be varied and widespread. As such, Patodka’s focus on being
and consciousness, on positive versus negative forms o f Platonism, is superfluous and
inordinate. Too much emphasis is placed on Socrates and Plato, on the position of
philosophy in Patodka’s thought as an absolutely central force in history.
Rorty’s position is in distinct contrast to the conclusions o f both Kohak and
Tucker. Kohak explicitly reads Patodka to allow “no facile escape into an
‘anti-foundationalism.’ Choose we m ust...,” he writes. While the choice alluded to by
Kohak, judging by the content o f his analysis o f Patodka, does in fact rest on a
quasi-religious metaphysical foundation, the point is nevertheless well taken. Patodka’s
moral and philosophical conviction seems incomparably more solid than Rorty’s
non-foundational call of conscience. Rorty, in reducing this philosophy to a simple call
of conscience, leaves one with no conceptual apparatus at all to analyze, to compare
against one’s experience o f reality.
The reality o f the matter is that Patodka is never so simplistic in his rejection o f
foundations. It is not the concept of the ground, the foundation in and o f itself, with
which he takes issue, but the concept of the unproblematic, solid ground that we
artificially posit in our desire for a simple answer to our most difficult questions.
Patocka conceives o f philosophy itself as the development o f the theme o f the
problematic; within the boundaries o f an understanding o f problematicity, he argues, it
is appropriate to philosophy to seek something permanent, but only as long as it is
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understood that the ground sought is never simple and concrete, but always
problematic.63 Rorty’s anti-foundationalism thus goes beyond the limits o f what Patodka
seeks, to the point that it verges on the relativism which Patodka explicitly denies. This
analysis provides an invaluable counter-position to those o f Kohak and Tucker, but it
does not adequately respond to Patodka himself.
Though his article is brief, Rorty clearly disagrees with the conclusion that Plato
and Europe and the Heretical Essays are in some way contradictory. Unlike both Kohak
and Tucker, Rorty sees no inconsistencies between these two texts, no significant
distinction between the content or conclusions o f one and the other. In this he is
absolutely correct and so perhaps the most clear-sighted of Patodka’s American
interpreters. But rather than analyze and contest the fine points o f Patodka’s philosophy
on its own merits, Rorty is content to be dismissive o f it as an over-complication o f an
apparently self-evident human faculty. Yet the faculty o f conscience to which he refers
and which, he must presume, is sufficient to serve as a stabilizing and ordering force in
human society and politics, remains an undifferentiated concept in his account, not
rigorously explained or defended. As such it is insufficient as a conceptual undergirding
for a theory of politics. Patodka’s work yet needs to be examined on its own terms and
in its political context.
Derrida’s Gift o f Death
Contemporary postmodernism again weighs in on Jan Patodka in the figure o f
Jacques Derrida, whose The Gift o f Death speaks primarily to the Czech philosopher
and the postmodern question o f the ground or foundation o f his political philosophy.
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Yet, as I have noted, Derrida comes to precisely the opposite conclusion as Rorty —
namely, that Patocka’s work is in fact predicated on a foundation that is explicitly
metaphysical, the foundation o f religious faith in a supreme being. Though an
interesting piece of deconstructive analysis, Derrida’s perspective on Pato£ka is
unfortunately more distorting than enlightening.
Derrida’s The Gift o f Death is a reflection on the notion o f responsibility and its
ethical and political contexts. This analysis, or deconstructive critique, o f the concept o f
responsibility in Europe is conducted via an examination of two texts that focus on the
subject: Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and its story o f the sacrifice o f Isaac by
Abraham, and the fifth of Jan Patodka’s Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f History,
entitled “Is Technological Civilization Decadent, and Why?” The question of
responsibility is for Derrida a political question as well as a philosophical one. “It
concerns,” Derrida claims, “the very essence or future o f European politics.”64 His
analysis deconstructs the notion o f responsibility in the West based on its genealogy and
its connection to Christianity.
In a review o f The Gift o f Death, Andrew J. McKenna noted that, for Derrida,
Western philosophy is marked by a “crypto-theology.” It strives to anchor meaning in
principles that are unassailable. Derrida’s analyses, writes McKenna, “regularly uncover
presuppositions about foundations and primacies, points of origin and authoritative
presences that correspond to nothing other than a Supreme Being, however veiled or
unapproachable.”65 In doing this, Derrida claims to be exposing the “logocentrism” o f
Western thought. In The Gift o f Death, Derrida proceeds along just these lines,
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indicting, in the course of his argument, not Gnly Patodka’s work but that o f most recent
philosophy that has attempted to remain open to experiences typically o f interest to
religion.
In Patodka, Derrida claims to uncover a presupposition that amounts to the
presence o f an Absolute Being as the foundation for human responsibility. This
presence, he goes on to argue, forms the basis for a political project that seems, as
Derrida describes it, disturbing at best and tyrannical at worst. Derrida’s analysis with
respect to Patodka and Christianity, however, his placement of Patodka into a
“crypto-theological” framework with concrete political goals, is misguided in several
respects. Like other Western readers, Derrida declines to judge the work o f Patodka on
its own terms, that is, to seriously examine the attempt to find a philosophical path
between the traditional metaphysics o f which postmodernism is critical, and the
relativistic inability or unwillingness o f postmodernism to make moral and ethical
prescriptions or judgments. Instead, Derrida places it from the start into a derridean
framework, concluding that Patodka’s work, particularly his political thought and his
conceptualization o f responsibility, are determined by a relationship to Christianity.
The relationship to Christianity that Derrida uncovers is based on a close reading
o f several passages from one chapter o f the Heretical Essays; the conclusions drawn
from those passages, however, expressly contradict the tenor of Patodka’s philosophy
and present a distorted view of his nuanced relationship to Christianity. Lastly, it must
be noted that Derrida’s political conclusions in regard to Patodka’s philosophy, which
vaguely insinuate a desire to transform European politics along theological lines, are
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unsupported and, in fact, insupportable even if one were to focus exclusively on the
Heretical Essays and ignore the rest o f Patodka’s written work. In the end, the reader o f
Derrida sees that these conclusions fit into a larger, preconceived indictment o f all
contemporary philosophy willing to remain open to traditionally religious or theological
symbolization. This type of philosophy, Derrida argues, “consists o f proposing a non
dogmatic doublet o f dogma” that thinks religiously without a formal religion.66
Derrida’s analysis in The Gift o f Death focuses on the concept o f responsibility,
which he rightly notes is central to Patodka’s philosophy. In the Heretical Essays and
throughout his written work, Patodka links responsibility to the human being’s
conscious acceptance o f his or her life in freedom, absent any metaphysical anchor to
act as ballast and deliver us from the full weight o f the burden o f responsibility. This
achievement, this “accomplishment” o f life that is our coming to terms with it rather
than seeking to escape or avoid it, is at the heart o f Patodka’s notion o f responsibility.
The distinction here is between an authentic and an inauthentic life, with the former
denoting responsibility and the latter the attempt to escape it.67 In Chapter 5 o f the
Essays, however, Patodka adds to this distinction a second dichotomy that is also
related, if more peripherally, to human responsibility —that o f the opposition between
the everyday and the exceptional, the profane and the sacred or orgiastic. This
dichotomy represents another possibility for humans to avoid responsibility, by
becoming in some way “enraptured” or caught up in the unordinary, the passionate or
sacred. This type o f human activity is, as Patodka explains, a fundamentally different
phenomena, but one no less dismissive o f human responsibility:
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Face to face with this phenomenon [of the orgiastic] we tend to forget the
entire dimension o f the struggle for ourselves, forget responsibility and
escape, letting ourselves be drawn into a new, open dimension as if only
now true life stood before us, as if this “new life” had no need to care for
the dimension o f responsibility.68
Religion, far from being the demonic or sacred itself, Patodka argues, in fact emerges
“where the sacred qua demonic is being explicitly overcome. Sacral experiences pass
over [into] religious as soon as there is an attempt to introduce responsibility into the
sacred or to regulate the sacred thereby.”69 Thus Derrida is correct when he notes that, in
Patodka, “Religion is responsibility or it is nothing at all.”70
It is this second distinction discussed by Patodka upon which Derrida seizes and
upon which he builds his “genealogy” o f responsibility. For Derrida, this distinction of
the sacred versus the profane becomes primary, and the foundation for what he feels is
the kernel o f Patodkan responsibility, i.e., that the most profound form of responsibility,
and so the preferred form, is that which comes through religion. Drawing upon
Patodka’s discussion o f the gift o f faith from God to man that distinguishes Christianity,
Derrida goes on to conclude, purportedly on the basis o f the text, that the most profound
form o f responsibility is thus given as a gift from the absolute other, from God. Derrida
thus implies a subordination o f philosophy to religion, o f philosophy to a supreme being
who is the source o f human responsibility. This subordination, however, is counter to
rather than consistent with the philosophy o f Jan Patodka as he presented it throughout
his life.
The primary source o f Derrida’s conclusions is a passage in the Fifth essay in
which Patodka appears to argue that Christianity, the mysterium tremendum, represents
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the most profound source o f responsibility, only requiring to be thought through.
Derrida quotes the passage in full in both his first and second chapters. Patodka writes:
By virtue o f this foundation in the abysmal deepening o f the soul,

Christianity remains thus far the greatest, unsurpassed but also
un-thought-through human outreach that enabled humans to struggle
against decadence.71
Here Derrida reads the text to argue that that human responsibility reaches its peak with
Christianity. Yet Derrida’s reading o f this passage is decidedly one-sided. Patodka does
indeed praise the Christian deepening o f the soul, but he does so in the context o f a
discussion that is fundamentally historical. At the point in question, Patodka is
comparing the relative influence in Western history o f Platonic metaphysics and
Christianity in terms o f their effect on human responsibility. Christianity, historically
speaking, had the greatest effect, as yet unsurpassed. This does not mean, however, that
Patocka necessarily considers it a model to emulate. Dogmatic Christianity is weighed
down by its metaphysical foundations; what success it has via its theoretical treatment
of the soul is counteracted by its metaphysical foundations. While Christianity
represents the greatest historical success for Western man in his struggle against
decadence, it is not the outreach to which Patodka appeals, particularly in regard to
politics, for the precise reason that it continues to rest on metaphysical foundations. The
“thinking through” that has not yet occurred in Christian theology has to do with those
very foundations.
Patodka is a critic o f both Platonic metaphysics and dogmatic Christianity in
terms o f their effect on human responsibility; neither lead the human to accept
responsibility for his own life because both rest to some degree upon a supreme Idea
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and a Supreme Being, respectively. Historically, Patodka argues, Christianity has
provided the most profound perspective on human responsibility, but it nevertheless
must remain secondary to the philosophical experience. The philosophical experience to
which he refers, importantly, is not the experience o f Platonic metaphysics. Patodka
makes a fundamental distinction between the Platonism o f the Idea as absolute object
and the figure o f Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues. The philosophy to which Patodka
appeals is based on a mode of understanding drawing most directly upon the insight of
Socrates, an understanding that was not significant historically because it rapidly
degenerated into Platonic metaphysics. It is this “premetaphysical soil”72 o f philosophy
which Patodka is attempting to resuscitate with the help of contemporary
phenomenology and ontology, and it is this soil that is the genuine source o f human
responsibility, despite the historical success o f Christianity. The outline o f this argument
appears most clearly in Patodka’s writings on “Negative Platonism,” which is discussed
in greater detail in Chapter Three o f this study. Derrida fails to appreciate or chooses to
ignore this important distinction, and so comes to the conclusion that, for Patodka,
Christianity represented an advancement over Platonic thought in terms o f the
understanding o f responsibility, an advancement that Patodka aims to see through to its
conclusion by “thinking through” Christianity and finally “emancipating” it from both
Athens and Rome.73
The most surprising aspect o f Derrida’s interpretation o f Patodka is the political
project that he presumes (inexplicably, for the texts in no way support such a project) to
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be an implicit aim o f the text. Upon citing the passage quoted above, Derrida comes to
the following conclusions:
One should understand that in saying that Christianity has not been
thought right through Patodka intends that such a task be undertaken; not
only by means o f a more thorough thematization but also by means o f a
political and historical setting-in-train, by means o f political and
historical action; and he advocates that according to the logic o f a
messianic "schatology that is nevertheless indissociable from
phenomenology.... What has not yet come about is the fulfillment, within
history and in political history, and first and foremost in European
politics, of the new responsibility announced by the mysterium
tremendum. Only on this condition will Europe have a future, and will
there be a future in general, for Patodka speaks less o f a past event or fact
than he does o f a promise.74
Surely this is an astounding charge to level at a professor o f philosophy whose only
direct political involvement concerned speaking out in favor of basic human rights and
the principle o f truth in politics. It is further astounding because it is supported not by
textual evidence but by the faulty conclusion that Patodka is speaking o f a concrete
promise rather than o f history. In fact, the text clearly indicates that Patodka was
speaking historically,75 and Derrida can present no evidence (for none exists) suggesting
that Patodka truly advocated concrete “political and historical action,” let alone action
“according to the logic o f a messianic eschatology.” The historical action towards which
Patocka does aim consists in the transformation o f individual souls along Socratic
guidelines, not in the transformation o f societies along messianic-religious guidelines.
As this study has demonstrated, Patodkan philosophy explicitly rejects
“messianic eschatology,” though it does not abandon consideration o f the experience o f
transcendence —including the symbolization o f the “divine” in human life. Patodka also
does not perceive of Christianity as Derrida suggests, that is, as a progressive but still
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insufficient improvement upon the understanding o f existence contained in Platonic
metaphysics. Instead, his texts show that he considers both Christian and Platonic
metaphysics to be attempts to understand and symbolize the human condition that,
despite whatever validity their prescriptions may have, nevertheless rest upon
foundations that provide an escape from the predicament o f human responsibility
through the positing o f a transcendent objective. Patodka’s philosophical project does
not seek to “emancipate” Europe from Athens; to the contrary, it seeks to delve more
profoundly into Greek philosophy, primarily into the figure o f Socrates and his
injunction to live in truth and to care for the soul.
In the second chapter o f The Gift o f Death, Derrida backs away somewhat from
his specific political rhetoric, but proceeds to extend the scope o f his argument to
encompass a broad swath o f contemporary philosophy that, if not explicitly religious, is
at least so in spirit. In the course o f his discussion, Derrida recognizes the numerous
connections between Patodka’s work and the work o f Heidegger, yet he is also quick to
distinguish the two. The distinguishing characteristic for Derrida is what he sees as
Patodka’s “essential Christianity.”76 Whereas Heidegger analyzes Christian themes on
an ontological level, Patodka takes those same themes and re-Christianizes them.77 By
this Derrida means that these themes, including the concept o f responsibility, are
understood by Patodka as resting upon the foundation o f a supreme being. Whereas
Heidegger believes that “the origin of responsibility does not in any way reduce,
originarily, to a supreme being,” Patodka “deliberately takes an opposite tack.” He “is
no doubt convinced,” argues Derrida, “that there is no true binding responsibility or
387
obligation that doesn’t come from someone, from a person such as an absolute being
who transfixes me.”78
Derrida’s conclusion is mistaken. The evidence from Patodka’s writings,
specifically his centrally important “Negative Platonism,” makes readily apparent his
perspective. Patodkan philosophy, particularly his concept o f responsibility, explicitly
eschews a foundation in a concrete, transcendent being. Although Christianity
represented a profound development by virtue of its plumbing o f the depths o f the
human soul and its recognition o f the problematicity o f human life, it nevertheless
provided for itself an escape into non-problematicity, away from responsibility, in the
figure o f the supreme being. Patodka at one point describes Christianity as the
“contemporaneous seeing of problematicity and attempt to escape it.”79 As Patodka sees
it, a supreme being, conceived o f objectively, represents an escape route from the full
reality o f human problematicity and responsibility. It is not the perception o f a
transcendental reality that constitutes the origin of metaphysics, and so the beginning of
the decline o f philosophy; this occurs, rather, when the “living force of
transcendence...is transformed, with a fatal inevitability, into a transcendent,
supramundane reality, a transcendent deity.”80 The divine element o f human life, which
Patodka recognizes as a component of reality, cannot be conceived o f in objective terms.
Derrida’s conclusions in this regard are simply not tenable in light o f the evidence in
Patodka’s overall work.81
Derrida retreats somewhat in his second chapter from his charge o f the essential
Christianity o f these texts and, in doing so, greatly expands the scope of his critique to
388
include even Heidegger himself. He turns from the dichotomy o f Christian versus
non-Christian to a more subtle distinction: that o f philosophy that thinks religiously
without being religious. Derrida writes that “[t]he fact that Christian themes are
identifiable does not mean that this text is, down to the last word and in its final
signature, an essentially Christian one, even if Patodka could himself be said to be. It
matters little in the end.”82 What matters is the “logic” o f these themes, revolving
around the notion o f a gift; it is a logic, claims Derrida, that does not require the “event”
o f a revelation, only the ability to conceive of such an event, to “think the possibility” of
it. This point is crucial, for it permits a religious discourse “to be developed without
reference to religion as institutional dogma.”83 It is a case o f having one’s cake and
eating it too, o f philosophically thinking religious themes without having to admit that
one is religious, that one accepts dogma. This is a significant charge, based on what
Derrida admits is a “subtle and unstable” difference; nevertheless, Derrida is ready to
conclude that the discourses o f Levinas, Marion and “perhaps” of Ricoeur also can be
said to be in a similar situation to that o f Patodka. Derrida takes the analysis further,
however, arguing that
in the final analysis this list has no clear limit and it can be said, once
again taking into account the differences, that a certain Kant and a certain
Hegel, Kierkegaard o f course, and I might even dare to say for
provocative effect, Heidegger also, belong to this tradition that consists
o f proposing a nondogmatic doublet of dogma, a philosophical and
metaphysical doublet, in any case a thinking that “repeats” the possibility
o f religion without religion.84
This is perhaps the most interesting point in The Gift o f Death, but, as Derrida notes, it
requires a good deal o f further analysis, analysis that Derrida does not provide.
389
This analysis, as with the work in the concluding chapters which mostly
concerns Kierkegaard and the ethics o f the sacrifice demanded o f him by God,
essentially rest upon the conclusions arrived at through an interpretation o f Jan Pato£ka
-- an interpretation which is, as we have seen, inherently flawed. Derrida’s critique o f
the concept o f responsibility shows that concept to be founded upon a direct relationship
to an absolute Other, to a supreme being. Though he argues that this is something
different from a relationship to a transcendent objectification -- the Platonic Idea, for
example —it is clear that in Patodka’s analysis any notion o f a supreme being is
excluded as such an objectification, as a metaphysical means o f escape from authentic
human responsibility.
Patocka’s philosophy attempts to arrive at a different conception o f
responsibility than the one outlined by Derrida. In a certain sense, there is something to
Derrida’s point that Patoika’s thinking concerns the possibility o f religion without its
dogmatic elements. It concerns the recognition o f transcendence in human reality, an
inexplicable sense o f the whole that might very well be symbolized through the term
divine. It’s very aim, however, is to resist thinking o f that phenomenon as a
metaphysical entity, as a being upon whom we base our justification for ethics.
O th er Com m entaries
It is unfortunate that there does not as yet exist, in the English-language
literature, a published interpretive work o f significant length that does justice to Pato£ka
by dealing with him on his own terms, that does not try to shape the contents o f his
work into a form more acceptable to the author. This is not to say, however, that there
390
are no interpreters o f Patoika with an open perspective towards the actual aims o f this
Czech philosopher. Most o f those interpreters, however, do not work in English. A good
deal of analytical work exists, for example, in both Czech and French, but has appeared
in English only in the form of miscellaneous articles, introductions or summaries. It is
important, though, to note the themes stressed in some o f this literature, for it is here
that questions relevant to Patocka’s political perspective are approached, and in ways
often more faithful to the original intent than that which we have seen thus far.
One o f the most balanced voices from contemporary philosophy is that o f Paul
Ricoeur, long an admirer of Patodka and his work in phenomenology and political
thought. Though Ricoeur is not the author o f a major work on Patodka, his introduction
to the French edition o f the Heretical Essays (translated for the English edition)
demonstrates his appreciation for the Czech philosopher’s goals and illustrates the fact
that European philosophy more generally has for some time looked seriously at this
work and found it to be eminently worthy o f consideration. Ricoeur’s essay exemplifies
the twin concerns o f many Continental analysts, the first being phenomenology, for
which Patodka was well known, and the second being the political implications of his
focus, in the later essays, on the role of history and politics within an overall
philosophical approach to human existence.
In terms o f his methodology, Ricoeur notes the influence o f Husserl and
Heidegger, as well as the degree to which Patodka’s work is “heretical” with respect to
theirs. Instead o f pointing with other analysts to how he is “Husserlian” or
“Heideggerean,” Ricoeur sees an interpretive effort that moves in a direction
391
independent o f both o f these philosophers. It is an effort, further, that he recognizes as
inherently political. Patodka’s Heretical Essays begin with an exposition o f Husserl’s
concept o f the “natural world,” but then quickly proceed to critique Husserl for his
lingering Cartesian idealism and his inability to reach the meaningful historicity o f
humans and their concrete action in the world.85 Here Patodka is with Heidegger,
finding the ontological concept o f “openness” to being and to the world as a whole to be
prior to the mental phenomenon o f our consciousness. But Heidegger’s preoccupation
with the unconcealment o f being proves also to be insufficient to the task of
understanding humanity in its daily movement and pursuit o f freedom, in its activity
within a community. Human existence encompasses more than the movement towards a
philosophical understanding of being, such as Heidegger undertakes. Our openness,
Ricoeur notes, “exposes man and his freedom,” it makes the history o f philosophical
mankind concurrent with a fundamental problematicity, a problematicity that is
particularly relevant in the movement o f man within the world and the community.86
Patodka’s Heretical Essays aim to analyze the condition of European mankind in
relation to all o f its distinctively human activity, not simply its intellectual or its
ontological strivings. Thus Ricoeur writes that these essays “trace the
quasi-simultaneous origin in western Europe o f politics, philosophy, and history,”87
three topics that are inextricably intertwined in Patodka’s explication o f philosophy. The
humanity o f philosophical man -- or “historical” man, meaning Western man since the
breakthrough o f self-reflective philosophy in ancient Athens -- is in large part a measure
o f his understanding o f and relation to the problematic nature of his own existence, his
392
acceptance o f life in its fmitude and its fundamental uncertainty. Ricoeur stresses both
the philosophical and the political in Patodka’s work: for the individual there is a
process akin to metanoia, or conversion, in which he or she comes to accept the loss o f
metaphysical meaning, but without falling into a nihilistic meaninglessness. Rather,
there is an “access to the quality o f meaning implied in the search itself,” a meaning the
accompanies the Socratic care for the soul which is a “meaning within the condition o f
problematicity.”88 The properly political element comes, Ricoeur notes, with the
reflection on the possibility o f transferring “from the individual to the whole o f
European society the meditation on the relation between meaning, nonmeaning, and
searching.”89 Relative to this transfer, Patodka explicitly discusses the notion o f the
“solidarity o f the shaken,” the phenomenon o f Czechoslovak dissident life in which
those individuals with a genuine understanding o f their situation came together, amid
persecution and uncertainty, to stand against the untruth around them.
Ricoeur is by no means alone in emphasizing the political in Patodkan
phenomenology. Czech criticism in particular is acutely conscious o f the political
implications o f this work, and for obvious reasons: Patodka plays a role in the Czech
public consciousness as both a national philosopher and a political dissident, and his
compatriot in the latter endeavor, Vaclav Havel, still resides in Prague Castle as
President. Yet this does not mean that there is agreement as to how to interpret his
philosophy. Czech criticism also reflects abiding debate between those who seek in
philosophy a more traditional foundation for ethics and those who reject such bases in
favor o f a foundationless postmodernism. In essays by the Czech philosophers Miloslav
393
Bednaf and Ivan Chvatik, both students o f Patodka, there is a similar recognition o f the
relevance o f this philosophy to the democratic future o f the Czech Republic and the
future o f democratic governments in general. Both emphasize the goal, in Patodka’s
work, o f a genuine restoration o f the free space in society for politics, the agora as
Chvatik refers to it. Yet their conceptualizations o f this space reveal a fundamental
difference as well, a difference that discloses the presence o f both poles of
interpretation, the traditional and the postmodern, among even Patodka’s students.
For Bednaf, the emphasis is placed on the connection between ethics and
politics, a connection he sees at the heart o f the Platonic standpoint. This
“ethical-political” interpretation o f Plato’s surfaced, according to Bednaf, in the figure
of the first Czechoslovak philosopher-president, T.G. Masaryk, who transformed it into
a “practical ideal o f religious democracy.”90 In a manner reminiscent o f Erazim Kohak,
Bednar stresses a fundamental continuity between Masaryk and Jan Patodka. For
Bednaf, however, it is the Platonic influence that is the common bond, making
Patocka’s philosophy o f history “the philosophical pendant and extension o f Masaryk’s
religious-ethical concept o f politics.”91 Chvatik, by contrast, would reject all notion o f a
“religious-ethical” foundation in the philosophy o f Patodka. To the contrary, he stresses
the “real danger o f totalitarianism” in attempting to realize a concrete vision o f society
based on moral values.92 Chvatik’s interpretation belongs to the Heideggerean or
postmodern pole o f contemporary thought. It is rather Patodka’s interpretation of
Heraclitian conflict, not a commonly shared ethical foundation, that can be a source o f
unity and a bulwark against totalitarian politics.
394
Despite their conflicting interpretations as to the values (or lack o f them)
inherent in Patodka’s philosophy, both Chvatik and Bednaf agree that this philosophy
has as an implicit aim the restructuring o f the fundaments o f democratic politics in the
West. Bednaf writes, for example, that “this fundamental challenge for Europe and all
democracies cannot be solved without appropriate spiritual and moral grounds.”93 He
finds the contribution o f Czech philosophy, meaning primarily the Masarykan and
Patockan interpretations o f Plato, to be a cogent attempt at providing those grounds.
Chvatik also speaks o f a legitimization o f democratic politics, but from a different
perspective, drawn nevertheless from Patodka. For him the democratic agora must be
open to competing and conflicting views, it’s creation should embody “the struggle to
preserve the possibility to struggle (i.e., to live).”94 This institutionalization of conflict
will provide a unifying force and is the appropriate ground for democratic societies,
Chvatik argues. The hope for a society founded on moral values, the “hope o f attaining
truth, justice and prosperity,” is likely to dissolve into totalitarianism. “The main trait of
a functioning democracy is balance ~ something which should be supported so there
will be no more ‘better tomorrows’ in democratic societies.”95
O f the two, Chvatik’s description is closer to the vision o f democratic society
implicit in Patodka’s philosophy. Bednar’s evocation o f a moral ground for society
comes too close to the traditional metaphysics from which Patodka was trying to
distance himself. Yet Chvatik himself is forced to admit that Patodka is not as
Heideggerean as Heidegger himself —he does not entirely abandon, for example, the
notion of a meaningful center in human existence that can act as a moral compass.
395
Chvatik would follow Heidegger in destroying metaphysics and thus leave aside talk o f
morality in politics, instead relying on our understanding o f our own finite being, i.e.
death, to serve as the source o f meaning in our lives, and so he criticizes Patodka for
continuing to use the language o f morality and for recognizing a unifying center in
human being.96 Patodka continues to speak o f the world as one o f good and evil, but he
assumes for himself and his philosophy the task o f understanding and describing the
content o f that world in phenomenological terms ~ as something fundamentally
non-metaphysical. He seeks to recognize good and evil but in a phenomenological
manner, without falling back upon a metaphysical construct for support. For Chvatik,
this is a flaw in his work, a contradiction. But Patodka’s argumentation is convincing,
for the experience o f morality in life is a phenomenon that may impossible to discount
as valid. Whether Patodka succeeds in the philosophical task that he sets for himself is
the question to which this study has been directed.
Regrettably, the literature on the political philosophy o f Jan Patodka is erratic
and largely underdeveloped. It is lacking primarily in two ways: first, an exposition o f
this work as political thought is required that does not substitute the biases o f the author
for those o f the Czech philosopher, and second, an explication o f this philosophy in
relation to the question o f the foundation o f human social and political being, and o f
humanity in general. I have attempted, with this study, to fill this gap.
End Notes
‘On Havel’s “antipolitical” politics, see his essay “Politics and Conscience,” in
Open Letters: Selected Prose 1965-1990, ed. Paul Wilson (London: Faber and Faber,
1991), 249-271.
396
2In the complete bibliography o f Patodka’s work, published in 1997, the listings
for works in English translation take up approximately a page and a half; the listings in
French run more than six pages, those in German almost seven. See Bibliografie
1928-1996: Jan Patodka (Prague: OIKOYMENH, 1997).
3Erazim Kohak takes notes o f this phenomenon in his “Philosophical

Biography,” writing that “[i]n spite o f Patodka’s explicit disclaimer o f the equation
between the authentic and the ecstatic, his idiom suggested just that.... His invocation o f
an ultrarightist German writer, Ernst Jiinger, whom even most Germans find
problematic even though Jiinger came out explicitly against Hitler, does not help.
Finally, quotes from Heraclitus, that ‘war is the father o f all things’.. .badly translated
and cited totally out o f context, can be taken as evidence that Patodka, embittered by the
Soviet occupation, has turned away from the heritage o f Masaryk, the quest for moral
maturity and the consensus o f human decency, and has become a splenetic ultrarightist,
glorying in orgiastic visions of war. That is how a number o f Western readers, including
Czech readers living in the West, have in fact interpreted the Heretical Essays.” Erazim
Kohak, “A Philosophical Biography,” in Jan Patocka, 129. My own interpretation of
the sixth o f the Heretical Essays appears in Chapter Five o f this study.
4See Erazim Kohak, preface to Jan Patocka, xii-xiii.
5It was Patodka’s involvement with Charter 77 that led to his arrest and
interrogation, at age 69, and to the resulting brain hemorrhage that cost him his life.
6Jacques Derrida, The Gift o f Death, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University o f
Chicago Press, 1995); Rorty, “The Seer o f Prague,” 37.
7In his article, “Jan Patodka’s Search for the Natural World,” Husserl Studies 2
(Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985): 129-155, Kohak notes
that, at the time o f his death, Patodka was “one o f Europe’s most respected, most loved,
and least known philosophers” (129). He adds that future scholars should come to
regard Patodka as “the most persistent o f Husserl’s successors” (130).
8Ibid., 134. Kohak notes that Husserl had been bom in Moravia and on
numerous occasions “writes o f Czechoslovakia as his homeland.”
,0Jan Patodka, Heretical Essays, 148.
"Kohak, preface to Jan Patocka, xii.
12Ibid.
397
13Ibid.
14See Kohak, “A Philosophical Biography,” 24; idem, “The Crisis of Rationality

and the ‘Natural’ World,” Review o f Metaphysics 40 (September 1986): 88. In his
“Philosophical Biography,” Kohak notes that “Patodka was one o f the small circle to
whom Husserl sent his typescript o f Crisis o f European Sciences and had been his host
in Prague when Husserl first presented that theme in a lecture.”
I5See Jan Patodka, “Masaryk’s and Husserl’s Conception o f the Spiritual Crisis
o f European Humanity,” in Jan Patocka: 145-156.
16Ibid., 87.
l7Ibid.
,8Ibid.
I9Patodka, “A Philosophical Biography,” 10.
20Patodka, preface to Jan Patocka, xii.
2'Patodka, “Jan Patodka’s Search for the Natural World,” 137. This conclusion is
by no means unanimous. Richard Rorty comes to precisely the opposite conclusion,
writing that: “In the dialogue between Husserl and Heidegger, then, Patodka is mostly
on Heidegger’s side.” Rorty, “The Seer o f Prague,” 37.
-Patodka, “A Philosophical Biography,” 113.
23Kohak speaks o f this “discontinuity” in Ibid., 109. See also Patodka, Heretical
Essays, 119-137.
25Ibid., 129.
26Ibid., 95.
27Ibid.
28Ibid., 95-96.
29Patodka, “The Crisis o f Rationality and the ‘Natural’ World,’ 102.
398
30Ibid., 103.
3‘Patodka, “A Philosophical Biography,” 134; “The Crisis o f Rationality and the

‘Natural’ World,” 105. In fact, Patodka does not consider love and strife mutually
exclusive. Life in wakefulness and mutual strife, he argues in “The ‘Natural’ World and
Phenomenology,” actually results in a form o f unconditional love for others. “That is
not love as sympathy,” however, “as fellow feeling for a destiny o f the same suffering,
but o f the same glory, of the same victory -- the victory over the self-destructive
self-centeredness.” Patodka, “The ‘Natural’ World and Phenomenology,” 268.
32Jan Patodka, “An Attempt at a Czech National Philosophy and its Failure,”
trans. Mark Suino, in T. G. Masaryk in Perspective: Comments and Criticism, ed. M.
Capek and K. Hruby (Ann Arbor: SVU Press, 1981), 8.
33Aviezer Tucker, Fenomenologie A Politika: Od J. Patocky k V Havlovi

(Phenomenology and Politics: From J. Patodka to V. Havel) (Prague: Votobia, 1997),
13.
34See Jan Patodka, “Duchovni clovek a intele/ctudr (The Spiritual Person and the
Intellectual), 201.
35Tucker also presents some significant analysis, deserving o f further attention,

of the philosophical connections between the work o f Patodka and Emmanuel Levinas.
36“Patodka’s discussion o f the human movement in space,” Tucker writes,

“springs from Husserl’s The Spatiality o f Nature and Heidegger’s discussion of “The
Aroundness o f the Environment and Dasein ’s Spatiality” in Being and Time (101-113).
Tucker, Fenomenologie a Politika, 36.
37Ibid., 39.
38Ibid„ 54.
39See Richard Wolin, The Politics o f Being: The Political Thought o f Martin
Heidegger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990)
40Aviezier Tucker, “Shipwrecked: Patodka’s Philosophy o f Czech History,”

History and Theory 35, no. 2 (May 1996): 201.
4‘Tucker, Fenomenologie a Politika, 26.
42Ibid., 27.
43Ibid., 47.
399
“ Ibid., 50. Tucker writes, following Wolin, that “[wjithout further clarification
of the authentic moral essence o f man, all o f Heidegger’s main categories that have
ontic repercussions, authenticity, the call o f conscience, resoluteness, fate and destiny,
are empty and void, open to immoral interpretations.”
45Jan Patodka, “Two Charter 77 Texts: The Obligation to Resist Injustice,” trans.
Erazim Kohak, in Jan Patocka, 341.
46Tucker, Fenomenologie a politika, 80. Patodka, in the 1977 text “The

Obligation to Resist Injustice,” directly refers to Kant’s formulation, writing that
“Charter 77 does, however, remind us explicitly that, already a hundred and eighty
years ago, precise conceptual analysis made it clear that all moral obligations are rooted
in what we might call a person’s obligation to himself -- which includes, among other
things, the obligation to resist any injustice done him.” Patodka, “Two Charter 77
Texts,” in Kohak, Jan Patocka, 342.
47Tucker, Fenomenologie a Politika, 71. The work to which Tucker refers is

Valerie Lowit, “L’histoire et le negatif,” Les Cahiers de Philosophic, 11-12 (1992):
221-234.
48Ibid.
49Here Tucker is following Kohak, who also points to these two texts as
exemplifying the more enlightened versus the more pessimistic sides o f Patodka.
Tucker, however, goes farther than Kohak, who defends Patodka, albeit haltingly, from
the charge that he was “reactionary.” “I disagree with Kohak’s claim that such an
interpretation would be ‘tragically erroneous,’” Tucker writes. “I think that Patodka, like
most great philosophers, changed his views in time. For a time, perhaps following the
Soviet invasion, Patodka was indeed toying with ideas that may be considered
reactionary.” Tucker, Fenomenologie a politika, 92.
50Ibid., 63.
51See Kohak, “A Philosophical Biography,” 88.
52Tucker, Fenomenologie a politika, 93.
53Jan Patodka, “Harmonismus modemich humanistu: Mravni problemy a

hlediska soudasne filosofie” (The Harmonism o f Modem Humanists: Moral Problems
and the Perspective o f Contemporary Philosophy), in Pece o dusi I, 354.
54Ibid., 362.
400
55Tucker, Fenomenologie a politika, 63.
56Ibid., 89.
S7Ibid., 138.
“ Rorty, “The Seer o f Prague,” 37. Rorty adds, by way o f summarizing the
difference between the two, that “Patodka was a philosopher o f groundless hope and
Heidegger a philosopher o f grounded hopelessness.”
S9Ibid.
“ Ibid.
6‘Ibid.
“ Ibid., 39.
63In his essay “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” Patodka argues that,
“[ejssentially, all o f philosophy is nothing other than the development o f this
problematicity, in the way that great thinkers have grasped and expressed it. The battle
to extract out o f this problematicity something that emerges from it; to find a solid
shore, but to again problematize that which emerges as that shore.” Patodka, “The
Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” 202. For my discussion o f the concept o f
problematicity, see Chapter Four o f this study.
“ Jacques Derrida, The Gift o f Death, 33.
65Andrew J. McKenna, “Derrida, Death, and Forgiveness,” First Things 71

(March 1997), 34.
“ Derrida, Gift o f Death, 49.
“ See Patodka, Heretical Essays, 97-99.
“ Ibid., 99.
“ Ibid., 101. Note: the Kohak translation here contains what I can only assume is
a typographical error. The Czech “ZkuSenosti sakralni prechazeji v naboienske” is
rendered as “Sacral experiences pass over religious,” whereas it should read “ ...pass
over into religious.”
70Derrida, Gift o f Death, 2.
401
71Patodka, Heretical Essays, 108. Note: I cite the English translation o f the
Essays rather than the French quoted by Derrida because o f a significant difference in
verb tense that may have misleadingly encouraged Derrida in his analysis. The Czech
uschnopnil is the 3rd person past tense o f the English verb “to enable,” correctly
translated in the passage cited above. In the French translation cited by Derrida,
however, Christianity is portrayed as the “most powerful m eans.. .by which man is able
to struggle against his own decline” (Gift o f Death, 28). The use o f the present tense is,
in my view, inaccurate and misleading, for it implies that Patodka’s statement looks to
the future o f Christianity, rather than simply to the historical past and present.
“ Patodka, “Negative Platonism,” 180.
73“What is implicit yet explosive in Patodka’s text can be extended in a radical

way, for it is heretical with respect to a certain Christianity and a certain
Heideggerianism but also with respect to all the important European discourses. Taken
to its extreme, the text seems to suggest on the one hand that Europe will not be what it
must be until it becomes fully Christian, until the mysterium tremendum is adequately
thematized. On the other hand it also suggests that the Europe to come will no longer be
Greek, Greco-Roman, or even Roman.” Derrida, Gift o f Death, 29.
74Ibid., 28-29.
7SSee footnote 73.
76Derrida, Gift o f Death, 22.
77Derrida writes that “Heideggerean thinking often consists, notably in Sein und
Zeit, in repeating on an ontological level Christian themes and texts that have been
‘de-Christianized’.... Patodka makes an inverse yet symmetrical gesture, which therefore
amounts to the same thing. He reontologizes the historic themes o f Christianity and
attributes to revelation or to the mysterium tremendum the ontological content that
Heidegger attempts to remove from it.” Ibid., 23.
78Ibid., 32.
“ Patodka, “The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual,” 210.
“ Patodka, “Negative Platonism,” 182.
8'Kohak, the author o f a philosophical biography of Patodka, is also clear in

noting that Patodka “was not and could not be a believer.” Kohak, “A Philosophical
Biography,” 16.
“ Derrida, Gift o f Death, 48.
402
83Ibid., 49.
MIbid.
85Paul Ricoeur, preface to Heretical Essays, by Jan Patocka, x.
“ Ibid., xi.
87Ibid., viii.
88Ibid., xiv. Ricoeur contrasts distinctly here with Derrida, adding that “[a]ccess
to this meaning requires nothing less than a metanoia, a conversion, but in the
philosophical sense rather than the religious.”
89Ibid.
^Miloslav Bednaf, “Ethics and Politics in Plato, TomaS Garrigue Masaryk and
Jan Patocka as a Topical Issue,” in Traditions and Present Problems o f Czech Political
Culture: Czech Philosophical Studies /, eds. Miloslav Bednaf and Michal Vejrazka, vol.
IVA.3, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Central and Eastern Europe
(Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994) 146.
91Ibid., 150.
92Ivan Chvatik, “Solidarity o f the Shaken,” 166.
93Bednaf, “Ethics and Politics,” 156.
94Chvatik, “Solidarity o f the Shaken,” 166.
95Ibid.
96See two essays by Chvatik: “The Guarantee o f Death (The Importance of

Being Mortal), Report o f the Center for Theoretical Study, CTS-96-10 (November
1995): 24-27, and “Kacifstvi Jana Patodky v uvahach o krizi Evropy” (The Hereticism
of Jan Patodka in Reflections upon the Crisis of Europe), Report o f the Center for
Theoretical Study, CTS-96-02 (January 1996).
403
VITA
Edward Francis Findlay, bom in Washington D.C. on November 5, 1965, spent his
childhood in Malaysia, Japan, and Australia as the youngest o f four children in a
diplomatic family. He attended high school in Fairfax County, Virginia, and went on to
attend the University o f Virginia in Charlottesville, where he earned a Bachelor o f Arts
degree in 1988. He began his graduate studies in 1993 as a Board o f Regents Fellow in
the Department o f Political Science at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge. He
earned a Master o f Arts degree in 1997 and is presently a candidate for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in political science, expecting graduation in May, 2000. In
1997-1998, he spent a year in Prague, in the Czech Republic, on a Fulbright scholarship
conducting research for his dissertation on the political thought o f the Czech
philosopher Jan PatoCka. Mr. Findlay specializes in contemporary political theory and
comparative politics.
404'
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT
Candidate: Edward Francis Findlay
Major Field: Political Science
Title of Dissertation: Caring for the Soul in a Postmodern Age:

The Political Thought of Jan PatoCka
Major Prefatasor
Graduate School
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
A.
Date of Kraei nation:
March 21, 2000____

Caring For The Soul in A Postmodern Age PDF

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Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons

Caring for the Soul in a Postmodern Age: the

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced

Bell & Howell Information and Learning

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty o f the

The Department o f Political Science

Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company

I would like to acknowledge and extend my gratitude to a number o f individuals

foremost, I am grateful to Professors G. Ellis Sandoz and Cecil Eubanks o f the

Department o f Political Science at Louisiana State University for their invaluable

This is for you both.

2 “CONCRETE HUMANS IN THEIR CORPOREAL WORLD” : AN

3 PHILOSOPHY AFTER THE DEATH OF METAPHYSICS:

4 A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND A THEORY OF POLITICS .151

5 POLITICS AND ETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY........... 215

6 CONCLUSION: FOUNDATIONS AND PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS

WORKS C ITED ..................................................................................................................337

APPENDIX: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE..................................................... 346

philosopher and Charter 77 spokesman, Jan Pato£ka. It leads to a consideration o f the

fundamental problem of contemporary and postmodern theory, the question o f a

metaphysical foundation for our philosophical and political self-understanding.

also contribute to the subordination o f politics to ideology. As philosophy became

only at the cost o f its spirit o f freedom.

I develop this problem by examining four aspects o f Patodka’s thought: his

and unity for human beings. Though explicitly anti-foundational, it serves a

non-relative sense o f meaningfulness and ethics. I examine this previously unexplored

body o f work as an attempt to demonstrate that the postmodern critique o f

consistent politics and ethics.

human rights, against the deceitful rule o f the communist government in

Czechoslovak republic. Without PatoCka’s involvement as a spokesman, it is doubtful

is developed in the work of Jan Patocka. In undertaking an exegesis o f the political

bring a still relatively unknown thinker o f substantial importance to the attention of

another as a thorough postmodernist. It is conceivable, depending on the texts upon

attention to postmodern theory or, alternately, as a committed postmodern who is

deserves recognition not merely as an alternative reading o f already established bodies

of work, but as a unique contribution to philosophy and to political theory.

As a Czech in the middle o f the twentieth century, Patodka was literally

surrounded by German influence, politically as well as educationally. It is not surprising

Although o f the age when political developments forced many o f his

contemporaries to emigrate to the United States, Pato£ka chose to remain in

addition, to contemporary thinkers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricoeur

Methodologically, what ties Pato£ka to these thinkers is his engagement with

phenomenology and ontology, with philosophy pursued through direct, experiential

Thematically, he shares with many o f his contemporaries an interest in the classical

point, however, will require a considerable effort to establish conclusively.

its subordination o f the question o f relevance to one o f method or objectivity —Husserl

life. What Pato£ka realized, however, was that Husserl’s transcendental

phenomenology, while it proceeded from unimpeachable insight about the importance

phenomena perceived through the anticipatory lenses o f theory or ideology), was in

anchored in Enlightenment thinking; Patocka wished, in contrast, to renew a classical

he brought to Patocka a thematic exploration o f human being, and second, he stressed

the importance o f history, o f understanding humanity as situated temporally,

principle o f European civilization. Patocka wanted to renew it as a principle, however,

contemporary thought. Reason had to be re-understood phenomenologically and

ontologically, and this meant understanding it —following Heidegger’s critique of

metaphysics -- in a non-metaphysical sense.4