GAANAN V IAC
GAANAN V IAC
GAANAN V IAC
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room discussing the terms
for the withdrawal of the complaint of direct assault filed before the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo
Laconico. After they had decided on the conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico.
Laconico telephoned Edgardo Gaanan (lawyer) to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of
the direct assault case because Atty Leon Gonzaga (regular lawyer of Laconico) went on a business trip.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A
breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer
for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case
for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High
School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel Montebon
at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case
against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor.
Later on, complainant called up Laconico and asked whether he agrees and the latter agreed to the
conditions. Complainant gave him instructions and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the
office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico prior to that informed his friend Colonel Zulueta
of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, and insisted that complainant himself
should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested
by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00
for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the
complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
Lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of Violating Section 1 of R.A. 4200 and were sentenced
to one year imprisonment with costs. The petition appealed to the IAC.
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication
between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act
No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the
complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone
conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act
No. 4200.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was private
in nature;
(b) Whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act
No. 4200;
(c) Whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and
(d) Whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the
petitioner.
HELD:
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The
issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third
party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the
conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension
was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
A. Yes, The conversation was private. There is no question that the telephone conversation between
complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were
made between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is
also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the
caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of
the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order
to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of
the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can
force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be
the word of the caller against the listener's.
The court stated in this case that there are what we call “crossed lines” or one that results due to technical
problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone
cables are made to carry in certain areas. The court supported this proposition with a hypothetical incident
wherein a citizen who happens to pick up his phone and eventually overhears a crime might hesitate to
inform the authorities in fear of being prosecuted under the wiretapping act. The law, according to the court,
was not crafted to create such a situation.
B. NO. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping"
the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose.
It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be
taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66
SCRA 113,120). The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a
physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit
does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within
a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end
of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case
of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v.
United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated
August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of
violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.