MARY ANGEL C.

SARNO
BSCEN - 5
CE 165- Earthquake Engineering

The 1964 Niigata Earthquake

I. Introduction

Japan is vulnerable to earthquakes and has historically experienced many kinds of seismic
damages. Liquefaction attracted the first engineering concern after the 1964 Niigata
earthquake. Since then, the points of concern have varied from its causative mechanism and
assessment of liquefaction risk through preventive measure to consequence of liquefaction and
its prediction in the context of performance-based design principle. Moreover, many
technologies have developed to mitigate the liquefaction risk. In addition to reinforcing
structures as has been conventionally done, the development of lifelines since 1980s resulted
in real-time earthquake engineering. Thus, there are many ideas and evolution of geotechnical
earthquake engineering in Japan which is frequently attacked by earthquakes and is actually a
natural laboratory of earthquake engineering.

II. The Earthquake

It was at 13:01 local time (04:01 UTC) of January 16, 1964, when a magnitude 7.5 or 7.6
earthquake struck Niigata. The epicentre was on the continental shelf off the northwest coast
of Honshu, Japan in Niigata Prefecture, about 50 kilometres north of the city of Niigata. The
earthquake caused liquefaction over large parts of the city.

II.1 Magnitude, Location and Type

The earthquake had a magnitude of 7.6 on the moment magnitude scale, but the relatively
deep focal depth of 34 km meant that the perceived intensities on the coast of Honshu were
generally VIII (Severe) or less on the Mercalli intensity scale, on consolidated ground. The
calculated focal mechanism indicates reverse faulting on a west-dipping fault trending N 20°
E.
The northwestern side of Honshu lies on the southeastern margin of the Sea of Japan, an
area of oceanic crust created by back-arc spreading from the late Oligocene to middle
Miocene. The extensional tectonics associated with the spreading formed a series of N-S
trending extensional faults and associated basins. Currently the area is being deformed by
contractional tectonics, causing inversion of these earlier basins, forming anticlinal structures.
The earthquake is thought to have occurred due to reverse movement on one of these
reactivated faults.

II.2 Damages

There were 3,534 houses destroyed and a further 11,000 were damaged. This level of
damage is explained by the influence of poor sub-soil conditions. Most of the lower part of
the city of Niigata is built on recent deltaic deposits from the Shinano and Agano rivers, mainly
consisting of unconsolidated sand. Shaking during the earthquake caused liquefaction with
instantaneous compaction and formation of many sand volcanoes. Maps of areas of subsidence
and sand volcanoes were found to match closely with old maps of the position of former river
channels. Subsidence of up to 140 cm was measured over wide areas associated with the
liquefaction. In one area of apartment buildings built on reclaimed land by the Shinona River,
most of the blocks became inclined, one of them being completely overturned. This was
despite relatively low levels of ground acceleration recorded by strong motion accelerographs
placed in one of these buildings.
Niigata City, which had just recovered from the Great Niigata Fire of 1955, sustained
considerable damage from fire and liquefaction that resulted from the earthquake. Aside from
the buildings destroyed by liquefaction on the left bank of the Shinano River there was also
extensive damage on the right bank. The runway of the Niigata Airport was near the
hypocenter and was flooded due to liquefaction and the tsunami and a fire broke out inside
the airport. Most devastatingly, the pipes of a gasoline tank owned by Showa Shell Sekiyu,
located between the airport and the harbor, were also damaged by the shaking. Gasoline from
the tank was brought to the sea surface by the tsunami and underground water released by the
liquefaction and ignited 5 hours after the earthquake. The fire spread to nearby tanks and
induced explosions that fed the fire, allowing it to continue for 12 days. The fire spread to
nearby residential areas leaving 1407 people displaced. This fire is said to be the worst
industrial complex fire in the country's history. At the time the cause of the fire was said to be
caused by the liquefaction, but later research into large earthquakes revealed that long period
ground motion also played a role.
At the time of the fire, the new specially-designed fire truck for fighting chemical fires had
not yet been deployed to Niigata City. A request was sent to the Fire and Disaster Management
Agency and troops were dispatched from the Tokyo division. There was a danger of the fire
spreading to an attached oxygen tank, but the troops from Tokyo managed to stop it from
spreading to the tank, after a 20 hours battle.
The first wave of the tsunami hit Niigata City approximately 15 minutes after the
earthquake. It caused flooding damage on Sado Island, Awa Island, and as far away as the Oki
Islands in Shimane Prefecture. The wave reached heights of 3 m at Ryōtsu Harbor, 4 m at
Shiotani and near Iwafune Harbor, and between 1 and 2 m at Naoetsu. It was also reported
that due to the run-up that occurs on sandy beaches the wave reached 6 m in some places. The
first wave was the highest in many places, but the third was reportedly higher in others. The
ensuing waves came at intervals of 20 and 50 minutes. Flooding caused by the tsunami
persisted in some areas for up to a month.

II.3 Social Impact/Perception

II.4 Rebuild Efforts (as applicable)

New laws concerning earthquake insurance were enacted in June 1966 in response to
this earthquake.

III. Impact to Structural Engineering

In Japan, many remediation methods against liquefaction have been developed since the
1964 Niigata Earthquake, which caused severe damage to structures due to liquefaction. The
methods are classified into two categories: ground treatments to prevent liquefaction, and
measure that strengthen structures to prevent or minimize damage if the ground liquefies. The
remediation methods have been applied to many kinds of structures, such as oil tanks, quay
walls, bridges and buildings. The effectiveness of ground treatments to prevent liquefaction
has been proved during past earthquakes.

III.1 Structures with Severe Damages

Following the 1964 Niigata earthquake many bridges, including the Showa Bridge, over
the Shinano River collapsed. The newly-constructed Showa Bridge demonstrated one of the
worst instances of damage, and there are still uncertainties and controversies regarding the
causes of collapse.
The Showa bridge had a total length was 307m with main girder spans of 28m. Each span
was composed of 12 composite girders, making the bridge about 24m wide, and was supported
on nine 600mm diameter steel piles (in a single line) of wall thickness of 9 to 16mm.
Figure 1: Aerial photograph of the Showa Bridge after the 1964 Niigata
Earthquake, from Towhata (1999).
 Liquefaction occurred during the 1964 Niigata Earthquake in the lowland formed by
Shinano and Agano rivers. Many buildings, houses, tanks, bridges, roads, railways, river dikes
and buried pipes were damaged due to liquefaction. Apartment houses in Kawagishi Town
were also damaged. According to an inhabitant who was on the roof of a house, these houses
settled and tilted gradually after the main shock. 340 reinforced concrete buidings were
damaged by liquefaction during the 1964 earthquake. About half of the damaged buildings
settled and tilted without cracks forming in their walls. Oil tanks also settled and tilted.
According to several witnesses, the Showa Bridge which collapsed, the bridge girders started
to fall about one minute after the main shock.

III.2 Structural Code Revisions (as applicable)

IV. Conclusion

Liquefaction attracted the first engineering concern after the 1964 Niigata earthquake.
Since then, the points of concern have varied from its causative mechanism and assessment of
liquefaction risk through preventive measure to consequence of liquefaction and its prediction
in the context of performance-based design principle. Moreover, many technologies have
developed to mitigate the liquefaction risk. In addition to reinforcing structures as has been
conventionally done, the development of lifelines since 1980s resulted in real-time earthquake
engineering. Thus, there are many ideas and evolution of geotechnical earthquake engineering
in Japan which is frequently attacked by earthquakes and is actually a natural laboratory of
earthquake engineering.