1

[G.R. No. 144412. November 18, 2003] a) January, 1978 to March, 1982

ALLIED BANKING Tagbilaran City Branch

CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and POTENCIANO L. b) April, 1982 to May, 1984
GALANIDA, respondents.
Lapulapu City Branch
DECISION
c) June, 1984
CARPIO, J.:
Mandaue City Branch
The Case
d) July, 1984 to April, 1986
Before the Court is a petition for
review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of 27 April Tagbilaran City Branch
2000 and the Resolution of 8 August 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451. The e) May, 1986 to May, 1987
Court of Appeals upheld the Decision[3] of 18
September 1998 and the Resolution of 24 Dumaguete City Branch
December 1998 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V- f) June, 1987 to August, 1987
000180-98. The NLRC modified the Decision
dated 23 December 1997 of Labor Arbiter Carbon Branch, Cebu City
Dominador A. Almirante (Labor Arbiter) in
NLRC Case No. RAB VII-05-0545-94 holding g) September, 1987 to Sept. 1989
that Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank)
illegally dismissed Potenciano L. Galanida
Lapulapu City Branch, Cebu
(Galanida). The NLRC awarded Galanida
separation pay, backwages, moral and
h) October, 1989 to Sept. 1992
exemplary damages, and other amounts
totaling P1,264,933.33.
Carbon Branch, Cebu City
Antecedent Facts
i) October 1992 to Sept. 1994
For a background of this case, we quote in part
from the Decision of the Court of Appeals: Jakosalem Regional Branch,

Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was Cebu City (Rollo, p. 47)

hired by petitioner Allied Banking Corporation
on 11 January 1978 and rose from accountant- Effecting a rotation/movement of officers
book(k)eeper to assistant manager in 1991. His assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner
appointment was covered by a Notice of listed respondent as second in the order of
Personnel Action which provides as one of the priority of assistant managers to be assigned
conditions of employment the provision on outside of Cebu City having been stationed
petitioners right to transfer employees: in Cebu for seven years already. Private
respondent manifested his refusal to be
REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood transferred to Bacolod City in a letter dated 19
that the bank reserves the right to transfer or April 1994 citing as reason parental obligations,
assign you to other departments or branches of expenses, and the anguish that would result if he
the bank as the need arises and in the interest is away from his family. He then filed a complaint
of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted service before the Labor Arbiter for constructive
to the public. dismissal.

Private respondent was promoted several times Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private
and was transferred to several branches as respondent (Rollo, p. 86) that he was to report to
follows: the Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May
1994. Private respondent refused. In a letter
 2
dated 13 June 1994, petitioner warned and establish and fortify my complaint now pending
required of private respondent as follows: at NLRC, RAB 7.[5] In the same letter, he
charged Allied Bank with discrimination and
There is no discrimination in your transfer. In favoritism in ordering his transfer, thus:
fact, among the officers mentioned, only you
have refused the new assignment citing difficulty xxx What I cannot decipher now under the
of working away from your family as if the other headship of Mr. Olveda is managements
officers concerned do not suffer the same discriminatory act of transferring only the long
predicament. To exempt you from the officer staying accountants of Cebu in the guise of its
transfer would result in favoritism in your favor exercise of management prerogative when in
and discrimination as against the other officers truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to
concerned. accommodate some new officers who happen to
enjoy favorable connection with
In furtherance of maintaining a smooth and management. How can the bank ever justify the
uninterrupted service to the public, and in transfer of Melinda T. Co, a new officer who had
accordance with the Banks order of priority of experienced being assigned outside of Cebu for
rotating its accountants places of assignments, more than a year only to Tabunok Branch? If the
you are well aware that Roberto Isla, purpose is for check and balance, is
AM/Accountant, assigned in Cebu for more than management implying that Melinda Co can
ten (10) years, was, on February 14, 1994, better carry out such function over Mr. Larry
reassigned to Iligan City Branch and then to Sabelino, who is a seasoned and experienced
Cagayan de Oro City Branch on June 8, accountant or any of the Metro Cebu
1994. Hence, your objection on the ground of accountants for that matter? Isnt this act of
your length of service is without merit. management an obvious display of favoritism?
xxx[6]
xxx
On 5 October 1994, Galanida received an inter-
As discussed, your refusal to follow instruction office communication[7] (Memo) dated 8
concerning your transfer and reassignment to September 1994 from Allied Banks Vice-
Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is penalized President for Personnel, Mr. Leonso C. Pe. The
under Article XII of the Banks Employee Memo informed Galanida that Allied Bank had
Discipline Policy and Procedure [which] terminated his services effective 1 September
provides: 1994. The reasons given for the dismissal
were: (1) Galanidas continued refusal to be
XII Transfer and Reassignment transferred from the
Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his
Refusal to follow instruction concerning transfers refusal to report for work despite the denial of his
and reassignments. application for additional vacation leave. The
salient portion of the Memo reads:
First and subsequent offenses
Therefore, your refusal to follow instruction
The penalty may range from suspension to concerning your transfer and reassignment
dismissal as determined by management. The to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is without
employee shall be required to comply with the any justifiable reason and constituted violations
order of transfer and reassignment, if the penalty of Article XII of the Banks EDPP xxx
is not termination of employment.
In view of the foregoing, please be informed
In view of the foregoing, please explain in writing that the Bank has terminated your services
within three (3) days from receipt hereof why no effective September 1, 1994 and considered
disciplinary action should be meted against you whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled as
for your having refused to follow instructions forfeited in accordance with 04, V Administrative
concerning the foregoing transfer and Penalties, page 6 of the Banks EDPP which
reassignment. xxx[4] provides as follows:

On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that 04. Dismissal.

(w)hether the banks penalty for my refusal be
Suspension or Dismissal xxx it will all the more
 3
Dismissal is a permanent separation for cause being away from the family.[10] (Underscoring
xxx supplied by the Labor Arbiter)

Notice of termination shall be issued by the The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanidas
Investigation Committee subject to the transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial
confirmation of the President or his authorized because Galanida would have to incur additional
representative as officer/employee who is expenses for board, lodging and travel. On the
terminated for cause shall not be eligible to other hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied
receive any benefit arising from her/his Bank failed to show any business urgency that
employment with the Bank or to termination pay. would justify the transfer.

It is understood that the termination of your The Labor Arbiter also gave credence to
service shall be without prejudice to whatever Galanidas claim that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co
legal remedies which the Bank may have special treatment. The Labor Arbiter stated that
already undertaken and/or will undertake Allied Bank deliberately left out Ms. Cos name
against you. from the list of accountants transferred
to Cebu as contained in Allied Banks letter
Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis dated 13 June 1994. However, Mr. Regidor
supplied)[8] Olveda, Allied Banks Vice President for
Operations Accounting, testified that the bank
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter transferred Ms. Co to the Tabunok, Cebu branch
within the first half of 1994.
After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held
that Allied Bank had abused its management Still, the Labor Arbiter declined to award
prerogative in ordering the transfer of Galanida Galanida back wages because he was not
to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches. In ruling entirely free from blame. Since another bank
that Galanidas refusal to transfer did not amount had already employed Galanida, the Labor
to insubordination, the Labor Arbiter granted Galanida separation pay in lieu
Arbiter misquoted this Courts decision of reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the
in Dosch v. NLRC,[9] thus: Labor Arbiters Decision of 23 December
1997 provides:
As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign
an employee is recognized as an employers WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
exclusive right and the prerogative of is hereby rendered ordering respondent Allied
management (Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC, Banking Corporation to pay complainant the
154 SCRA 713 [1987]). aggregate total amount of Three Hundred
Twenty Four Thousand Pesos (P324,000.00)
The exercise of this right, is not however, representing the following awards:
absolute. It has certain limitations. Thus, in
Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296 a) Separation pay for P272,000.00;
(1983), the Supreme Court, ruled:
b) Quarter bonus for 1994 P16,000.00;
While it may be true that the right to transfer or
reassign an employee is an employers exclusive c) 13th month pay for 1994 P16,000.00;
right and the prerogative of management, such
right is not absolute. The right of an employer to d) Refund of contribution to Provident Fund
freely select or discharge his employee is limited - P20,000.00.
by the paramount police power xxx for the
relations between capital and labor are not SO ORDERED.[11]
merely contractual but impressed with public
interest. xxx And neither capital nor labor shall The Ruling of the NLRC
act oppressively against each other.
On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be Bank terminated Galanida without just
considered insubordination where employee cause. The NLRC agreed that the transfer order
cited reason for said refusal, such (sic) as that of was unreasonable and unjustified, considering
 4
the family considerations mentioned by c) P 5,333.23 representing proportional 1994
Galanida. The NLRC characterized the transfer 13th month pay
as a demotion since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran
branches were smaller than the Jakosalem d) P 20,000.00 representing refund of Provident
branch, a regional office, and because the bank Fund Contribution
wanted Galanida, an assistant manager, to
replace an assistant accountant in the e) P 50,000.00 representing moral damages
Tagbilaran branch. The NLRC found unlawful
discrimination since Allied Bank did not transfer f) P 20,000.00 representing exemplary
several junior accountants in Cebu. The NLRC damages
also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special
treatment by assigning her to Cebu even though ===========
she had worked for the bank for less than two
years. P1,264,933.33 TOTAL AWARD

The NLRC ruled that Galanidas termination was All other claims are dismissed for lack of
illegal for lack of due process. The NLRC stated basis. The other respondents are dropped for
that Allied Bank did not conduct any lack of sufficient basis that they acted in excess
hearing. The NLRC declared that Allied Bank of their corporate powers.
failed to send a termination notice, as required
by law for a valid termination. The Memo merely SO ORDERED.[12]
stated that Allied Bank would issue a notice of
termination, but the bank did not issue any Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration
notice. which the NLRC denied in its Resolution of 24
December 1998.[13]
The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed
Galanida in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for
labor practice as the dismissal undermined review questioning the Decision and Resolution
Galanidas right to security of tenure and equal of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals.
protection of the laws. On these grounds, the
NLRC promulgated its Decision of 18
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
September 1998, the relevant portion of which
states:
Citing Dosch v. NLRC,[14] the Court of Appeals
held that Galanidas refusal to comply with the
In this particular case, We view as impractical,
transfer orders did not warrant his
unrealistic and no longer advantageous to both
dismissal. The appellate court ruled that the
parties to order reinstatement of the
transfer from a regional office to the
complainant. xxx For lack of sufficient basis, We
smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was
deny the claim for 1994 quarter bonus. Likewise,
effectively a demotion. The appellate court
no attorneys fees is awarded as counsels for
agreed that Allied Bank did not afford Galanida
complainant-appellee are from the City
procedural due process because there was no
Prosecutors Office of Cebu.
hearing and no notice of termination. The Memo
merely stated that the bank would issue a notice
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the of termination but there was no such notice.
decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December
23, 1997 is hereby MODIFIED by increasing the
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
award of separation pay and granting in addition
NLRC in its Decision of 27 April 2000, thus:
thereto backwages, moral and exemplary
damages. The respondent-appellant, ALLIED
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is
BANKING CORPORATION, is thus ordered to
DISMISSED and the assailed Decision of public
pay to herein complainant-appellee,
respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED.
POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, the following
amounts:
SO ORDERED. [15]
a) P336,000.00, representing separation pay

b) P833,600.00, representing backwages

 5
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration xxx His [Galanidas] refusal to transfer falls well
which the appellate court denied in its within the ruling of the Supreme Court in Helmut
Resolution of 8 August 2000.[16] Dosch vs. NLRC, et. al., 123 SCRA 296 (1983)
quoted as follows:
On 26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the
appellate courts decision and resolution to the xxx
Supreme Court. Allied Bank prayed that the
Supreme Court: (1) issue a temporary Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be
restraining order or writ of preliminary considered insubordination where employee
injunction ex parte to restrain the cited reason for said refusal, such as that of
implementation or execution of the questioned being away from the family.[18]
Decision and Resolution; (2) declare Galanidas
termination as valid and legal; (3) set aside the The Ruling of the Court
Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution; (4)
make permanent the restraining order or The petition is partly meritorious.
preliminary injunction; (5) order Galanida to pay
the costs; and (6) order other equitable reliefs. Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of
the Supreme Court
The Issues
The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano
Allied Bank raises the following issues: and, worse, the assailed Decision of the Labor
Arbiter, both misquoted the Supreme Courts
1. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. The Court held
PRESENTED THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN in Dosch:
PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF ITS
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE. We cannot agree to Northwests submission that
petitioner was guilty of disobedience and
2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS insubordination which respondent Commission
VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULES sustained. The only piece of evidence on which
CONSTITUTE A GROUND TO WARRANT THE Northwest bases the charge of contumacious
PENALTY OF DISMISSAL. refusal is petitioners letter dated August 28,
1975 to R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner
3. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS acknowledged receipt of the formers
PRESENTED, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO memorandum dated August 18, 1975,
HOLD THAT ALLIED BANK AFFORDED appreciated his promotion to Director of
PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE REQUIRED International Sales but at the same time
DUE PROCESS. regretted that at this time for personal reasons
and reasons of my family, I am unable to accept
4. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS the transfer from the Philippines and thereafter
LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE expressed his preference to remain in his
RESPONDENT CANNOT RECOVER ANY position, saying: I would, therefore, prefer to
MONETARY AWARD.[17] remain in my position of Manager-Philippines
until such time that my services in that capacity
In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of are no longer required by Northwest
Galanida was a valid exercise of its Airlines. From this evidence, We cannot discern
management prerogative. Allied Bank contends even the slightest hint of defiance, much less
that Galanidas continued refusal to obey the imply insubordination on the part of petitioner.[19]
transfer orders constituted willful disobedience
or insubordination, which is a just cause for The phrase [r]efusal to obey a transfer order
termination under the Labor Code. cannot be considered insubordination where
employee cited reason for said refusal, such as
On the other hand, Galanida defended his right that of being away from the family does not
to refuse the transfer order. The memorandum appear anywhere in
for Galanida filed with this Court, prepared by the Dosch decision. Galanidas counsel lifted
Atty. Loreto M. Durano, again misquotedthe the erroneous phrase from one of the italicized
Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC, thus: lines in the syllabus of Dosch found in the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
 6
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial premised on the absence of evidence but are
reports of Supreme Court decisions or contradicted by the evidence on record.[22] After
resolutions is not the work of the Court, nor does a scrutiny of the records, we find that some of
it state this Courts decision. The syllabus is these exceptions obtain in the present case.
simply the work of the reporter who gives his
understanding of the decision. The reporter The rule is that the transfer of an employee
writes the syllabus for the convenience of ordinarily lies within the ambit of the employers
lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not prerogatives.[23] The employer exercises the
a part of the courts decision.[20] A counsel should prerogative to transfer an employee for valid
not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully reasons and according to the requirement of its
considered text in the decision of the Court. business, provided the transfer does not result in
demotion in rank or diminution of the employees
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and salary, benefits and other privileges.[24] In illegal
Atty. Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of
substituted a portion of the decision with a showing that the transfer is not unnecessary,
headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced
even underscored. In short, they deliberately employee.[25]
made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear
as the words of the Supreme Court. We The constant transfer of bank officers and
admonish them for what is at the least patent personnel with accounting responsibilities from
carelessness, if not an outright attempt to one branch to another is a standard practice of
mislead the parties and the courts taking Allied Bank, which has more than a hundred
cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 branches throughout the country.[26] Allied Bank
of the Code of Professional Responsibility does this primarily for internal control. It also
mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly enables bank employees to gain the necessary
misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision experience for eventual promotion. The Bangko
or authority. It is the duty of all officers of the Sentral ng Pilipinas, in its Manual of Regulations
court to cite the rulings and decisions of the for Banks and Other Financial
Supreme Court accurately.[21] Intermediaries,[27] requires the rotation of these
personnel. The Manual directs that the duties of
Whether Galanida was dismissed for just personnel handling cash, securities and
cause bookkeeping records should be rotated and that
such rotation should be irregular, unannounced
We accord great weight and even finality to the and long enough to permit disclosure of any
factual findings of the Court of Appeals, irregularities or manipulations.[28]
particularly when they affirm the findings of the
NLRC or the lower courts. However, there are Galanida was well aware of Allied Banks policy
recognized exceptions to this rule. These of periodically transferring personnel to different
exceptions are: (1) when the findings are branches. As the Court of Appeals found,
grounded on speculation, surmise and assignment to the different branches of Allied
conjecture; (2) when the inference made is Bank was a condition of Galanidas
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) employment. Galanida consented to this
when there is grave abuse of discretion in the condition when he signed the Notice of
appreciation of facts; (4) when the factual Personnel Action.[29]
findings of the trial and appellate courts are
conflicting; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in The evidence on record contradicts the charge
making its findings, has gone beyond the issues that Allied Bank discriminated against Galanida
of the case and such findings are contrary to the and was in bad faith when it ordered his
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) transfer. Allied Banks letter of 13 June
when the judgment of the appellate court is 1994[30]showed that at least 14 accounting
premised on a misapprehension of facts or when officers and personnel from various branches,
it has failed to consider certain relevant facts including Galanida, were transferred to other
which, if properly considered, will justify a branches. Allied Bank did not single out
different conclusion; (7) when the findings of fact Galanida. The same letter explained that
are conclusions without citation of specific Galanida was second in line for assignment
evidence on which they are based; and (8) when outside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are seven years already. The person first in line,
 7
Assistant Manager Roberto Isla, who had been privileges. The assignment/transfer is for the
in Cebu for more than ten years, had already officer to assume the functions relative to his job
transferred to a branch in Cagayan de Oro and NOT the position/rank of the officer to be
City. We note that none of the other transferees replaced.
joined Galanida in his complaint or corroborated
his allegations of widespread discrimination and There is also no basis for the finding that Allied
favoritism. Bank was guilty of unfair labor practice in
dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor practices
As regards Ms. Co, Galanidas letter of 16 June relate only to violations of the constitutional right
1994 itself showed that her assignment of workers and employees to self-
to Cebu was not in any way related to Galanidas organization[32] and are limited to the acts
transfer. Ms. Co was supposed to replace a enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code,
certain Larry Sabelino in the Tabunok none of which applies to the present case. There
branch. The employer has the prerogative, is no evidence that Galanida took part in forming
based on its assessment of the employees a union, or even that a union existed in Allied
qualifications and competence, to rotate them in Bank.
the various areas of its business operations to
ascertain where they will function with maximum This leaves the issue of whether Galanida could
benefit to the company.[31] validly refuse the transfer orders on the ground
of parental obligations, additional expenses, and
Neither was Galanidas transfer in the nature of the anguish he would suffer if assigned away
a demotion. Galanida did not present evidence from his family.
showing that the transfer would diminish his
salary, benefits or other privileges. Instead, The Court has ruled on this issue before. In the
Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994 assured case of Homeowners Savings and Loan
Galanida that he would not suffer any reduction Association, Inc. v. NLRC,[33] we held:
in rank or grade, and that the transfer would
involve the same rank, duties and The acceptability of the proposition that transfer
obligations. Mr. Olveda explained this further in made by an employer for an illicit or
the affidavit he submitted to the Labor Arbiter, underhanded purpose i.e., to defeat an
thus: employees right to self-organization, to rid
himself of an undesirable worker, or to penalize
19. There is no demotion in position/rank or an employee for union activities cannot be
diminution of complainants salary, benefits and upheld is self-evident and cannot be
other privileges as the transfer/assignment of gainsaid. The difficulty lies in the situation where
branch officers is premised on the role/functions no such illicit, improper or underhanded purpose
that they will assume in the management and can be ascribed to the employer, the objection to
operations of the branch, as shown below: the transfer being grounded solely upon the
personal inconvenience or hardship that will be
(a) The Branch Accountant, as controller of the caused to the employee by reason of the
branch is responsible for the proper discharge of transfer. What then?
the functions of the accounting section of the
branch, review of documentation/proper This was the very same situation we faced
accounting and control of transaction. As such, in Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v.
the accounting functions in the branch can be Laplana. In that case, the employee, Alicia
assumed by any of the following officers with the Laplana, was a cashier at the Baguio City
rank of: Senior Manager/Acctg.; Manager/ Branch of PT&T who was directed to transfer to
Acctg.; Senior Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Asst. the companys branch office at Laoag City. In
Manager/Acctg.; Accountant or Asst. refusing the transfer, the employee averred that
Accountant. she had established Baguio City as her
permanent residence and that such transfer will
xxx involve additional expenses on her part, plus the
fact that an assignment to a far place will be a
20. The transfer/assignment of branch officer big sacrifice for her as she will be kept away from
from one branch, to another branch/office is her family which might adversely affect her
lateral in nature and carries with it the same efficiency. In ruling for the employer, the Court
position/rank, salary, benefits and other upheld the transfer from one city to another
 8
within the country as valid as long as there is no To be effective, a dismissal must comply with
bad faith on the part of the employer. We held Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus
then: Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Omnibus
Rules), which provides:
Certainly the Court cannot accept the
proposition that when an employee opposes his For termination of employment based on just
employers decision to transfer him to another causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor
work place, there being no bad faith or Code:
underhanded motives on the part of either party,
it is the employees wishes that should be made (i) A written notice served on the employee
to prevail. specifying the ground or grounds of termination,
and giving said employee reasonable
Galanida, through counsel, invokes the Courts opportunity within which to explain his side.
ruling in Dosch v. NLRC.[34] Dosch, however, is
not applicable to the present case. Helmut (ii) A hearing or conference during which the
Dosch refused a transfer consequential to a employee concerned, with the assistance of
promotion. We upheld the refusal because no counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to
law compels an employee to accept a respond to the charge, present his evidence, or
promotion, and because the position Dosch was rebut the evidence presented against him.
supposed to be promoted to did not even exist
at that time.[35] This left as the only basis for the (iii) A written notice of termination served on the
charge of insubordination a letter from Dosch in employee indicating that upon due consideration
which the Court found not even the slightest hint of all the circumstances, grounds have been
of defiance, much less xxx insubordination.[36] established to justify his termination.

Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an The first written notice was embodied in Allied
overseas post, as in the Dosch case, cannot be Banks letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice
likened to a transfer from one city to another required Galanida to explain why no disciplinary
within the country,[37] which is the situation in the action should be taken against him for his refusal
present case. The distance to comply with the transfer orders.
from Cebu City to Bacolod City or
from Cebu City to Tagbilaran City does not On the requirement of a hearing, this Court has
exceed the distance held that the essence of due process is simply
from Baguio City to Laoag City or an opportunity to be heard.[42] An actual hearing
from Baguio City to Manila, which the Court is not necessary. The exchange of several
considered a reasonable distance in PT&T v. letters, in which Galanidas wife, a lawyer with the
Laplana.[38] City Prosecutors Office, assisted him, gave
Galanida an opportunity to respond to the
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order charges against him.
constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order
of an employer.[39] Employees may object to, The remaining issue is whether the Memo
negotiate and seek redress against employers dated 8 September 1994 sent to Galanida
for rules or orders that they regard as unjust or constitutes the written notice of termination
illegal. However, until and unless these rules or required by the Omnibus Rules. In finding that it
orders are declared illegal or improper by did not, the Court of Appeals and the NLRC cited
competent authority, the employees ignore or Allied Banks rule on dismissals, quoted in the
disobey them at their Memo, that, Notice of termination shall be issued
peril.[40] For Galanidas continued refusal to obey by the Investigation Committee subject to the
Allied Banks transfer orders, we hold that the confirmation of the President or his authorized
bank dismissed Galanida for just cause in representative.[43] The appellate court and
accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor NLRC held that Allied Bank did not send any
Code.[41] Galanida is thus not entitled to notice of termination to Galanida. The Memo,
reinstatement or to separation pay. with the heading Transfer and Reassignment,
was not the termination notice required by law.
Whether Galanidas dismissal violated the
We do not agree.
requirement of notice and hearing
 9
Even a cursory reading of the Memo will show complaint for constructive dismissal[49] to one for
that it unequivocally informed Galanida of Allied illegal dismissal[50] after he received the
Banks decision to dismiss him. The statement, Memo. Clearly, Galanida had understood the
please be informed that the Bank has Memo to mean that Allied Bank had terminated
terminated your services effective September his services.
1, 1994 and considered whatever benefit, if any,
that you are entitled [to] as forfeited xxx[44] is The Memo complied with Allied Banks internal
plainly worded and needs no interpretation.The rules which required the banks President or his
Memo also discussed the findings of the authorized representative to confirm the notice
Investigation Committee that served as grounds of termination. The banks Vice-President for
for Galanidas dismissal. The Memo referred to Personnel, as the head of the department that
Galanidas open defiance and refusal to transfer handles the movement of personnel within Allied
first to the Bacolod City branch and then to Bank, can certainly represent the bank president
the Tagbilaran City branch. The Memo also in cases involving the dismissal of employees.
mentioned his continued refusal to report for
work despite the denial of his application for Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo suffered
additional vacation leave.[45] The Memo also from certain errors. Although the Memo stated
refuted Galanidas charges of discrimination and that Allied Bank terminated Galanidas services
demotion, and concluded that he had violated as of 1 September 1994, the Memo bore the
Article XII of the banks Employee Discipline date 8 September 1994. More importantly,
Policy and Procedure. Galanida only received a copy of the Memo on 5
October 1994, or more than a month after the
The Memo, although captioned Transfer and supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective,
Reassignment, did not preclude it from being a a written notice of termination must
notice of termination. The Court has held that be served on the employee.[51] Allied Bank
the nature of an instrument is characterized not could not terminate Galanida on 1 September
by the title given to it but by its body and 1994 because he had not received as of that
contents.[46] Moreover, it appears that Galanida date the notice of Allied Banks decision to
himself regarded the Memo as a notice of dismiss him. Galanidas dismissal could only
termination. We quote from the Memorandum take effect on 5 October 1994, upon his receipt
for Private Respondent-Appellee, as follows: of the Memo. For this reason, Galanida is
entitled to backwages for the period from 1
The proceedings may be capsulized as follows: September 1994 to 4 October 1994.

1. On March 13, 1994[47] Private Respondent- Under the circumstances, we also find an award
Appellee filed before the Region VII Arbitration of P10,000 in nominal damages proper. Courts
Branch a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal. award nominal damages to recognize or
A copy of the Complaint is attached to the vindicate the right of a person that another has
Petition as Annex H; violated.[52] The law entitles Galanida to receive
timely notice of Allied Banks decision to dismiss
xxx him. Allied Bank should have exercised more
care in issuing the notice of termination.
5. On September 8, 1994, Petitioner-
Appellant issued him a Letter of WHEREFORE, the Decision of 27 April 2000 of
Termination. A copy of said letter is attached to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451
the Petition as Annex N; upholding the Decision of 18 September 1998 of
the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98
6. Private Respondent-Appellee filed an is AFFIRMED, with the
Amended/ Supplemental Complaint wherein he following MODIFICATIONS:
alleged illegal dismissal. A copy of the
Amended/Supplemental Complaint is attached 1) The awards of separation pay, moral
to the Petition as Annex O; xxx [48] (Emphasis damages and exemplary damages are hereby
supplied) deleted for lack of basis;

The Memorandum for Private Respondent- 2) Reducing the award of backwages to cover
Appellee refers to the Memo as a Letter of only the period from 1 September 1994 to 4
Termination. Further, Galanida amended his October 1994; and
 10
3) Awarding nominal damages to private
respondent for P10,000.

This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for

the computation, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Decision, of the backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits, due
to Potenciano L. Galanida for the time his
dismissal was ineffectual from 1 September
1994 until 4 October 1994.

Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty.

Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be
more careful in citing the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the future.

SO ORDERED.
 11
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986 5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land
relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was
vs. discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and Infiels have possessed and occupied the land
ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., from generation to generation until the same
ETC., respondents. came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and
Acer Infiel;
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and
NARVASA, J.: tacking the possession of the Infiels who were
granted from whom the applicant bought said
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession
certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate is already considered from time immemorial.
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered 7. That the land sought to be registered is a
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer private land pursuant to the provisions of
Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute
390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it ownership to members of the non-Christian
from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Tribes on land occupied by them or their
Dumagat tribe. ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public
The registration proceedings were for domain;
confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land 8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.
Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
sums up the findings of the trial court in said (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements,
proceedings in this wise: said improvements were seen by the Court
during its ocular investigation of the land sought
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., to be registered on September 18, 1982;
represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with 9. That the ownership and possession of the
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and land sought to be registered by the applicant was
registered with the Securities and Exchange duly recognized by the government when the
Commission on December 23, 1959; Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have
negotiated for the donation of the townsite from
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this
represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire negotiation came to reality when the Board of
real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Articles of Incorporation particularly on the Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by
provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of
(9), Exhibit 'M-l'); Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15,
1979, and which donation was accepted by the
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela
proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, November 22, 1979.
1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of
cultural minorities; these findings except as to the applicability of the
1935 Constitution to the matter at hand.
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration
Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took proceedings have been commenced only on
place on October 29, 1962; July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution
had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly
applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article
 12
XIV prohibits private corporations or lands since time immemorial, or for more than
associations from holding alienable lands of the the required 30-year period and were, by reason
public domain, except by lease not to exceed thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in
1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their
1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any
when Acme purchased the lands in question pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-
from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire
registration in favor of Acme Section 48, and register ownership of said lands under any
paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than
No. 141, as amended, reads: Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Given the foregoing, the question before this
Philippines, occupying lands of the public Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be
interest therein, but whose titles have not been confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973
of First Instance of the province where the land Constitution was already in effect, having in
is located for confirmation of their claims, and the mind the prohibition therein against private
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under corporations holding lands of the public domain
the Land Registration Act, to wit: except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

xxx xxx xxx The question turns upon a determination of the

character of the lands at the time of institution of
(b) Those who by themselves or through their the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, then still part of the public domain, it must be
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession answered in the negative. If, on the other hand,
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public they were then already private lands, the
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or constitutional prohibition against their acquisition
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately by private corporations or associations obviously
preceding the filing of the application for does not apply.
confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be In this regard, attention has been invited
conclusively presumed to have performed all the to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
conditions essential to a Government grant and Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric
provisions of this chapter. Company, a domestic corporation more than
60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay,
who by themselves or through their Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. been possessed by the vendors and, before
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia
and occupation of lands of the public domain Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said
granted in subsection (b) hereof. lots. The court, assuming that the lots were
public land, dismissed the application on the
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not
in view of the quoted findings of the trial court qualified to apply for registration under Section
which were cited and affirmed by the 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for
controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public
and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
lands in question on October 29, 1962, are Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
members of the national cultural minorities who
had, by themselves and through their ..., the said land is still public land. It would cease
progenitors, possessed and occupied those to be public land only upon the issuance of the
 13
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming were in danger, if he had read every word of it.
it under section 48(b). Because it is still public The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or
land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is better, in view of the other provisions, might be
disqualified to apply for its registration under taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be litigation. There are indications that registration
given due course or has to be dismissed. was expected from all but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
prohibition makes no distinction between (on the wherever made, was not to confer title, but
one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
to which no occupant has an imperfect title and decree, if not by earlier law. ...
(on the other hand) alienable lands of the public
domain as to which an occupant has on That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character
imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi:
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not
distinguish, we should not make any distinction .... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover,
or qualification. The prohibition applies to the presumption juris et de jure established in
alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
may be secured under section 48(b). The amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes requirements for a grant by the Government
that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of were complied with, for he has been in actual
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, and physical possession, personally and
644). through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously,
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with
dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning a right to a certificate of title to said land under
with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that
to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her
and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
and undisputed possession of alienable public operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
land for the period prescribed by law creates the grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion that a certificate of title should be issued in order
of the requisite period ipso jure and without the that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be an application therefore is sufficient, under the
public land and becomes private property. That provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a
said dissent expressed what is the better — and, legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land
indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from in question by a grant of the State, it had already
a consideration of some of the principal rulings ceased to be of the public domain and had
cited therein, become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, control of the Director of Lands. Consequently,
in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of in selling the land in question of Angela Razon,
June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands the Director of Lands disposed of a land over
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the which he had no longer any title or control, and
Philippine Islands. It was ruled that: the sale thus made was void and of no effect,
and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any
It is true that the language of articles 4 and right. 6
5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do not Succeeding cases, of which only some need be
overlook the argument that this means may mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac
an English conveyancer would have vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
recommended an application under the Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
chief the notion that ancient family possessions
 14
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
affirmative: 11 decree, if not by earlier law."

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was
Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held already private land to which the Infiels had a
to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with legally sufficient and transferable title on
the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from
more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme
by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the had a perfect right to make such acquisition,
land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then
the land from the mass of public in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under Constitution which came into effect later)
the Public Land Act as by free patent. .... prohibiting corporations from acquiring and
owning private lands.
xxx xxx xxx
Even on the proposition that the land remained
As interpreted in several cases, when the technically "public" land, despite immemorial
conditions as specified in the foregoing provision possession of the Infiels and their ancestors,
are complied with, the possessor is deemed to until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a appropriate proceedings under the Public Land
grant, a government grant, without the necessity Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes
of a certificate of title being issued. The land, right to acquire the land at the time it did, there
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to might be construed to prohibit corporations from
dispose of. The application for confirmation is purchasing or acquiring interests in public land
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect to which the vendor had already acquired that
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to The only limitation then extant was that
be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12 corporations could not acquire, hold or lease
public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the hectares. The purely accidental circumstance
logical inevitability of considering possession of that confirmation proceedings were brought
public land which is of the character and duration under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an forbids corporations from owning lands of the
express grant from the State than the dictum of public domain cannot defeat a right already
the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall vested before that law came into effect, or
be conclusively presumed to have performed all invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and
the conditions essential to a Government grant proper. This Court has already held, in
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " analogous circumstances, that the Constitution
No proof being admissible to overcome a cannot impair vested rights.
conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a We hold that the said constitutional
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to
whether the possession claimed is of the the sales application of Binan Development Co.,
required character and length of time; and Inc. because it had already acquired a vested
registration thereunder would not confer title, but right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
simply recognize a title already vested. The Constitution took effect.
proceedings would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only confirm That vested right has to be respected. It could
such a conversion already affected by operation not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
of law from the moment the required period of Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
possession became complete. As was so well allows private corporations to purchase public
put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand
registration was expected from all, but none and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the in constitutional law.
proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
 15
xxx xxx xxx jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the
undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal
The due process clause prohibits the was already private property at the time it was
annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby
impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by acquired a registrable title, there being at the
the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a time no prohibition against said corporation's
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the holding or owning private land. The objection
constitution of the State, except in a legitimate that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified
exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78). to apply for judicial confirmation of title under
section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical,
xxx xxx xxx rather than substantial and, again, finds its
answer in the dissent in Meralco:
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior
to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right 6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of
of the corporation to purchase the land in Meralco's application on the technicality that the
question had become fixed and established and Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
was no longer open to doubt or controversy. Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical
Its compliance with the requirements of the and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had actions. Assuming that there was a technical
the effect of segregating the said land from the error not having filed the application for
public domain. The corporation's right to obtain registration in the name of the Piguing spouses
a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot as the original owners and vendors, still it is
be deprived of that right without due process conceded that there is no prohibition against
(Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15 and neither is there any prohibition against the
application being refiled with retroactive effect in
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation the name of the original owners and vendors (as
proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own such natural persons) with the end result of their
name must be regarded as simply another application being granted, because of their
accidental circumstance, productive of a defect indisputable acquisition of ownership by
hardly more than procedural and in nowise operation of law and the conclusive presumption
affecting the substance and merits of the right of therein provided in their favor. It should not be
ownership sought to be confirmed in said necessary to go through all the rituals at the
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's great cost of refiling of all such applications in
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable their names and adding to the overcrowded
that in the light of the undisputed facts, the court dockets when the Court can after all these
Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco
Constitution, could have had title in themselves vs. City of Davao)
confirmed and registered, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny The ends of justice would best be served,
the same benefit to their lawful successor-in- therefore, by considering the applications for
interest by valid conveyance which violates no confirmation as amended to conform to the
constitutional mandate. evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the
view, and so holds, that the majority ruling title that they had acquired by conclusive
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act
deemed to be binding precedent. The correct and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already corporations (both admittedly Filipino
referred to, is that alienable public land held by corporations duly qualified to hold and own
a possessor, personally or through his private lands) and granting the applications for
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously confirmation of title to the private lands so
and exclusively for the prescribed statutory acquired and sold or exchanged.
period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the There is also nothing to prevent Acme from
mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter
 16
from themselves applying for confirmation of title I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar
and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in that my dissenting opinion in the June,
their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni
But this would be merely indulging in empty Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld,
charades, whereas the same result is more "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the
efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no correct view." My dissent was anchored on the
prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the
the rule on amendment to conform to the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases
evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco. cited therein to the latest 1980 case
of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine.......
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier that an open, continuous, adverse and public
ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real possession of a land of the public domain for the
sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms period provided in the Public Land Act provision
and re-established, as it were, doctrines the in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
soundness of which has passed the test of in Susi under the old law [this period was
searching examination and inquiry in many past reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority preceding the filing of the application for
opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of confirmation of title' by amendment of
Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the
Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical individual personally and through his
person, was disqualified from applying for predecessors confers an effective title on said
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. of the public domain and becomes private
Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its property." I hereby reproduce the same by
Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential reference for brevity's sake. But since we are
limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, reverting to the old above-cited established
and may, in that context, be considered as doctrine and precedents and discarding
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which
constitutional question. departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel
constrained to write this concurrence in
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
the appealed judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, Under the express text and mandate of the cited
without costs in this instance. Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
SO ORDERED. essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and provisions of this chapter. "
Feliciano, JJ., concur.
The Court thus held in Susi that under the
presumption juris et de jure established in the
Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for
the statutory period "already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but
Separate Opinions a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro- application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a
Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here. legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land
in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his
authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
 17
The root of the doctrine goes back to the against corporations holding public lands
pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute
case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption
been deprived of ancestral family lands by the that the land remained public land despite the
dismissal of his application for registration) Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from
which reversed the dismissal of the registration time immemorial, respondent corporation's
court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962
adopted the liberal view that under the decree and P 45million investments redounding
and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words presumably to the welfare and progress of the
'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view community, particularly the municipality of
of the other provisions, might be taken to mean Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There the land for the townsite created a vested right
are indications that registration was expected which could not be impaired by the prohibition
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not jure converted into private land and they had a
to confer title, but simply to establish it, as legally sufficient and transferable
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier title conferred by the conclusive presumption of
law." the Public Land Act (which needed only to
be established in confirmation of title
The Court's decision at bar now expressly proceedings for formalization and issuance of
overturns the Meralco and related cases the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the validly transferred to respondent corporation.
aforecited established doctrine dating back to
1909 and was consistently applied up to June In fact, the many amendments to the Act
29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was extending the period for the filing of such
promulgated). We reaffirm the established applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable
alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by public lands expressly reiterate that it has
operation of law without the necessity of a prior always been the "policy of the State to hasten
issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles
jure ceases to be of the public domain and to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize
becomes private property, which may be lawfully that such lands publicly and notoriously
sold to and acquired by qualified corporations occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of
such as respondent corporation. (As stressed acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been
in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation converted into private property and grant the
is a mere formality, the lack of which does not possessors the opportunity to establish and
affect the legal sufficiency of the title.") record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing
of such application which would have originally
Such ipso jure conversion into private property expired first on December 31, 1938 was
of public lands publicly held under a bona successively extended to December 31, 1941,
fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the then extended to December 31, 1957, then to
public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated December 31, 1968, further extended to
therein. By virtue of such conversion into private December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to
property, qualified corporations may lawfully December 31, 1987. 7
acquire them and there is no "alteration or
defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition The cited Act's provision that only natural
against corporations holding or acquiring title to persons may apply thereunder for confirmation
lands of the public domain, as claimed in the of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no not of substance. My submittal in Meralco,
public lands are involved. mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The
ends of justice would best be served, therefore,
It should be noted that respondent corporation by considering the applications for confirmation
purchased the land from the Infiels on October as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as
16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 filed in the names of the original persons who as
Constitution which contained no prohibition natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
 18
formal confirmation of the title that they had possession, the Act confers on them a legally
acquired by conclusive presumption and sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to
mandate of the Public Land Act and who follow the letter of the law that they file the
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations applications for confirmation of their title,
(both admittedly Filipino corporations duly although they have lawfully transferred their title
qualified to hold and own private lands) and to the land. But such procedural failure cannot
granting the applications for confirmation of title and should not defeat the substance of the law,
to the private lands so acquired and sold or as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the
exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice lands are already private lands because
Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's
the same line from the majority ruling therein and predecessors and the realistic solution would be
held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the to consider the application for confirmation as
Court would characterize such jurisdictional filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in
defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical accordance with the evidence, confirm their title
person rather than the natural persons- to the private lands so converted by operation of
transferors, under the particular circumstances law and lawfully transferred by them to the
of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, validity of the transfer and sale of the private land
although the facts could be distinguished, the to the corporation. It should not be necessary to
approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of go in a round-about way and have the
Davao, where the legal question raised, instead corporation reassign its rights to the private land
of being deferred and possibly taken up in to natural persons-(as I understand), was done
another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying
that the realistic solution would be to decide the on paper with the technicality of having natural
matter as if the application under Section 48(b) persons file the application for confirmation of
were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume title to the private land.
suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente
Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in
the procedural result, likewise, in effect
dissented from the therein majority ruling on the MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
question of substance, and stated his opinion
that "the lots which are sought to be registered Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part,
have ceased to be lands of the public domain at provides:
the time they were acquired by the petitioner
corporation. They are already private lands SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
because of acquisitive prescription by the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
needed is the confirmation of the title. interest therein, but whose titles have not been
Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
private corporation or association may hold of First Instance of the province where the land
alienable lands of the public domain is is located for confirmation of their claims and the
inapplicable. " 10 issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the
filing of such applications to natural citizens who (a) ...
may prove their undisputed and open
possession of public lands for the required (b) Those who by themselves or through their
statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors in interest have been in open,
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
persons such as corporations, can actually, domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
physically and in reality possess public lands for ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
the required statutory 30-year period. That preceding the filing of the application for
juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is confirmation of title except when prevented by
obvious. But when the natural persons have war or force majeure. These shall be
fulfilled the required statutory period of conclusively presumed to have performed are
 19
the conditions essential to a Government grant actions. Assuming that there was a technical
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under error in not having filed the application for
the provisions of this chapter. registration in the name of the Piguing spouses
as the original owners and vendors,
(c) ...
still it is conceded that there is no
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, prohibition against their sale of the land to the
in part, provides: applicant Meralco

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or and neither is there any prohibition against the
association may hold alienable lands of the application being refiled with retroactive effect in
public domain except by lease not to exceed one the name of the original owners and vendors (as
thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen such natural persons) with the end result of their
hold such lands by lease in excess of five application being granted, because of their
hundred hectares .... indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law therein provided in their favor.
and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts It should not be necessary to go through all the
for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
lands of the public domain (Manila Electric applications in their names and adding to the
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; overcrowded court dockets when the Court can
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; after all these years dispose of it here and now."
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; (Paragraphing supplied)
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva
Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism The effect is that the majority opinion
should be adhered to in this case. now nullifies the statutory provision that only
citizens (natural persons) can apply for
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the
simple terms as follows: Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional
provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an prohibits corporations from acquiring title to
application for a certificate of title over the land lands of the public domain. That interpretation or
involved in the case. construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention
they can sell the land to ACME. of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of
Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688,
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US
of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am
the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that
the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for It has also been said that:
the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to
ACME. In the construction of statutes, the courts start
with the assumption that the legislature intended
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the to enact an effective law, and the legislature is
following excerpt from a dissent in Manila not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general
SCRA 799, 823 [1982]). principle that the courts should, if reasonably
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the
To uphold respondent judge's denial of provision being construed, so as to give it
Meralco's application on the technicality that the efficient operation and effect as a whole. An
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the interpretation should, if possible, be avoided,
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for under which the statute or provision being
confirmation of their title would be impractical construed is defeated, or as otherwise
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,
 20
repealed, explained away, or rendered of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine.......
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or that an open, continuous, adverse and public
nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two possession of a land of the public domain for the
constructions, one of which will give effect to the period provided in the Public Land Act provision
act, while the other will defeat it, the former in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
construction is preferred. One part of a statute in Susi under the old law [this period was
may not be construed so as to render another reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, preceding the filing of the application for
notwithstanding the general rule against the confirmation of title' by amendment of
enlargement of extension of a statute by Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the
construction, the meaning of a statute may be period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private
extended beyond the precise words used in the individual personally and through his
law, and words or phrases may be altered or predecessors confers an effective title on said
supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land
law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the of the public domain and becomes private
provision of a statute is general everything which property." I hereby reproduce the same by
is necessary to make such provision effectual is reference for brevity's sake. But since we are
supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois reverting to the old above-cited established
Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; doctrine and precedents and discarding
cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423) the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which
departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel
The statutory provision and the constitutional constrained to write this concurrence in
prohibition express a public policy. The proper amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
course for the Court to take is to promote in the
fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to Under the express text and mandate of the cited
avoid a construction which would alter or defeat Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively
that policy. presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of entitled to a certificate of title under the
this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro- provisions of this chapter. "
Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related
cases. The Court thus held in Susi that under the
presumption juris et de jure established in the
Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for
the statutory period "already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the Government, for it is not
Separate Opinions necessary that certificate of title should be
issued an order that said grant may be
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring: sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro- legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land
Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here. in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his
authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar
that my dissenting opinion in the June, The root of the doctrine goes back to the
1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell
1
Cristo cases, which is herein upheld, Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909
"expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have
correct view." My dissent was anchored on the been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the dismissal of his application for registration)
1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases which reversed the dismissal of the registration
cited therein to the latest 1980 case court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and
 21
adopted the liberal view that under the decree lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962
and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words and P 45million investments redounding
'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view presumably to the welfare and progress of the
of the other provisions, might be taken to mean community, particularly the municipality of
when called upon to do so in any litigation. There Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of
are indications that registration was expected the land for the townsite created a vested right
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want which could not be impaired by the prohibition
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently
The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
to confer title, but simply to establish it, as jure converted into private land and they had a
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier legally sufficient and transferable
law." title conferred by the conclusive presumption of
the Public Land Act (which needed only to
The Court's decision at bar now expressly be established in confirmation of title
overturns the Meralco and related cases proceedings for formalization and issuance of
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
aforecited established doctrine dating back to validly transferred to respondent corporation.
1909 and was consistently applied up to June
29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was In fact, the many amendments to the Act
promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm the extending the period for the filing of such
established doctrine that such acquisitive applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect
prescription of alienable public lands takes place and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable
ipso jure or by operation of law without the public lands expressly reiterate that it has
necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of always been the "policy of the State to hasten
title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles
domain and becomes private property, which to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize
may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified that such lands publicly and notoriously
corporations such as respondent corporation. occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of
(As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of converted into private property and grant the
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the possessors the opportunity to establish and
title.") record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing
of such application which would have originally
Such ipso jure conversion into private property expired first on December 31, 1938 was
of public lands publicly held under a bona successively extended to December 31, 1941,
fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the then extended to December 31, 1957, then to
public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated December 31, 1968, further extended to
therein. By virtue of such conversion into private December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to
property, qualified corporations may lawfully December 31, 1987. 7
acquire them and there is no "alteration or
defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition The cited Act's provision that only natural
against corporations holding or acquiring title to persons may apply thereunder for confirmation
lands of the public domain, as claimed in the of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no not of substance. My submittal in Meralco,
public lands are involved. mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The
ends of justice would best be served, therefore,
It should be noted that respondent corporation by considering the applications for confirmation
purchased the land from the Infiels on October as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as
16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 filed in the names of the original persons who as
Constitution which contained no prohibition natural persons are duly qualified to apply for
against corporations holding public lands formal confirmation of the title that they had
(except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later acquired by conclusive presumption and
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute mandate of the Public Land Act and who
prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations
that the land remained public land despite the (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from qualified to hold and own private lands) and
time immemorial, respondent corporation's granting the applications for confirmation of title
 22
to the private lands so acquired and sold or as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the
exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice lands are already private lands because
Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's
the same line from the majority ruling therein and predecessors and the realistic solution would be
held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the to consider the application for confirmation as
Court would characterize such jurisdictional filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in
defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical accordance with the evidence, confirm their title
person rather than the natural persons- to the private lands so converted by operation of
transferors, under the particular circumstances law and lawfully transferred by them to the
of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, validity of the transfer and sale of the private land
although the facts could be distinguished, the to the corporation. It should not be necessary to
approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of go in a round-about way and have the
Davao, where the legal question raised, instead corporation reassign its rights to the private land
of being deferred and possibly taken up in to natural persons-(as I understand), was done
another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying
that the realistic solution would be to decide the on paper with the technicality of having natural
matter as if the application under Section 48(b) persons file the application for confirmation of
were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume title to the private land.
suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente
Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in
the procedural result, likewise, in effect
dissented from the therein majority ruling on the MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
question of substance, and stated his opinion
that "the lots which are sought to be registered Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part,
have ceased to be lands of the public domain at provides:
the time they were acquired by the petitioner
corporation. They are already private lands SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
because of acquisitive prescription by the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
needed is the confirmation of the title. interest therein, but whose titles have not been
Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
private corporation or association may hold of First Instance of the province where the land
alienable lands of the public domain is is located for confirmation of their claims and the
inapplicable. " 10 issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the
filing of such applications to natural citizens who (a) ...
may prove their undisputed and open
possession of public lands for the required (b) Those who by themselves or through their
statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors in interest have been in open,
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
persons such as corporations, can actually, domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
physically and in reality possess public lands for ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
the required statutory 30-year period. That preceding the filing of the application for
juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is confirmation of title except when prevented by
obvious. But when the natural persons have war or force majeure. These shall be
fulfilled the required statutory period of conclusively presumed to have performed are
possession, the Act confers on them a legally the conditions essential to a Government grant
sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
follow the letter of the law that they file the the provisions of this chapter.
applications for confirmation of their title,
although they have lawfully transferred their title (c) ...
to the land. But such procedural failure cannot
and should not defeat the substance of the law,
 23
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, still it is conceded that there is no
in part, provides: prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the and neither is there any prohibition against the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one application being refiled with retroactive effect in
thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen the name of the original owners and vendors (as
hold such lands by lease in excess of five such natural persons) with the end result of their
hundred hectares .... application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law operation of law and the conclusive presumption
and constitutional provision prevent a therein provided in their favor.
corporation from directly applying to the Courts
for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to It should not be necessary to go through all the
lands of the public domain (Manila Electric rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; applications in their names and adding to the
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; overcrowded court dockets when the Court can
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; after all these years dispose of it here and now."
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva (Emphasis supplied)
Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism
should be adhered to in this case. The effect is that the majority opinion
now nullifies the statutory provision that only
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in citizens (natural persons) can apply for
simple terms as follows: certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
application for a certificate of title over the land prohibits corporations from acquiring title to
involved in the case. lands of the public domain. That interpretation or
construction adopted by the majority cannot be
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, justified. "A construction adopted should not be
they can sell the land to ACME. such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention
of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688,
of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US
the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for
the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to It has also been said that:
ACME.
In the construction of statutes, the courts start
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the with the assumption that the legislature intended
following excerpt from a dissent in Manila to enact an effective law, and the legislature is
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in
SCRA 799, 823 [1982]). the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general
principle that the courts should, if reasonably
To uphold respondent judge's denial of possible to do so interpret the statute, or the
Meralco's application on the technicality that the provision being construed, so as to give it
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the efficient operation and effect as a whole. An
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for interpretation should, if possible, be avoided,
confirmation of their title would be impractical under which the statute or provision being
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court construed is defeated, or as otherwise
actions. Assuming that there was a technical expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,
error in not having filed the application for repealed, explained away, or rendered
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or
as the original owners and vendors, nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two
constructions, one of which will give effect to the
act, while the other will defeat it, the former
 24
construction is preferred. One part of a statute
may not be construed so as to render another
part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover,
notwithstanding the general rule against the
enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be
extended beyond the precise words used in the
law, and words or phrases may be altered or
supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a
law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the
provision of a statute is general everything which
is necessary to make such provision effectual is
supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois
Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47;
cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional

prohibition express a public policy. The proper
course for the Court to take is to promote in the
fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to
avoid a construction which would alter or defeat
that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of

this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-
Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related
cases.
 25
record, sought advice from another counselor.
On 30 November 1987, petitioner, with the
assistance of his new counsel, filed in the
Regional Trial Court a Petition for Probation
invoking Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended. The Petition was not, however,
G.R. No. 84850 June 29, 1989 accepted by the lower court, since the records of
the case had already been forwarded to the
RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner, Court of Appeals.
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals
LEON GAW, respondents. Manifestation and Petition for Probation" dated
16 November 1987, enclosing a copy of the
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Petition for Probation that he had submitted to
Offices for petitioner. the trial court. Petitioner asked the Court of
Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation or, in
FELICIANO, J.: the alternative, to remand the Petition back to
the trial court, together with the records of the
Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of criminal case, for consideration and approval
Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Together with under P.D. No. 968, as amended. At the same
Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., President of the same time, petitioner prayed that the running of the
corporation, petitioner Llamado was prosecuted period for the filing of his Appellant's Brief be
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in held in abeyance until after the Court of Appeals
Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional Trial shall have acted on his Petition for Probation.
Court of Manila, Branch 49. The two (2) had co-
signed a postdated check payable to private In a "Manifestation and Motion" dated 3 March
respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of 1988 and filed with the Court of Appeals,
P186,500.00, which check was dishonored for petitioner formally withdrew his appeal
lack of sufficient funds. conditioned, however, on the approval of his
Petition for Probation. 2
In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court
convicted the petitioner alone, since jurisdiction Complying with a Resolution of the Court of
over the person of Pascual, who had thoughtfully Appeals, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
fled the country, had not been obtained. a Comment stating that it had no objection to
Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a petitioner Llamado's application for probation.
period of one (1) year of prision correccional and Private respondent-complainant, upon the other
to pay a fine of P 200,000.00 with subsidiary hand, sought and obtained leave to file a
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioner Comment on petitioner Llamado's application for
was also required to reimburse respondent Gaw probation, to which Comment, petitioner filed a
the amount of P186,500.00 plus the cost of suit. Reply. Private respondent then filed his
"Comment" on the Office of the Solicitor
On 20 March 1987, after the decision of the trial General's Comment of 18 March 1988.
court was read to him, petitioner through counsel
orally manifested that he was taking an appeal. In a Resolution dated 17 June 1988, the Court of
Having been so notified, the trial court on the Appeals, through Mr. Justice Magsino, denied
same day ordered the forwarding of the records the Petition for Probation. A dissenting opinion
of the case to the Court of Appeals. On 9 July was filed by Mr. Justice Bellosillo while Mr.
1987, petitioner through his counsel received Justice Santiago submitted a concurring opinion.
from the Court of Appeals a notice to file his Petitioner moved for reconsideration which
Appellant's Brief within thirty (30) days. Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on
Petitioner managed to secure several 23 August 1988, with another, briefer, dissenting
extensions of time within which to file his brief, opinion from Mr. Justice Bellosillo.
the last extension expiring on 18 November
1987. 1 Petitioner now asks this Court to review and
reverse the opinion of the majority in the Court
Petitioner Llamado, even while his Appellant's of Appeals and, in effect, to accept and adopt the
Brief was being finalized by his then counsel of dissenting opinion as its own.
 26
The issue to be resolved here is whether or not defendant on probation for such period and upon
petitioner's application for probation which was such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
filed after a notice of appeal had been filed with
the trial court, after the records of the case had The prosecuting officer concerned shall be
been forwarded to the Court of Appeals and the notified by the court of the filing of the application
Court of Appeals had issued the notice to file for probation and he may submit his comment on
Appellant's Brief, after several extensions of time such application within ten days from receipt of
to file Appellant's Brief had been sought from the notification.
and granted by the Court of Appeals but before
actual filing of such brief, is barred under P.D. Probation may be granted whether the sentence
No. 968, as amended. imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
P.D. No. 968, known as the Probation Law of An application for probation shall be filed with the
1976, was promulgated on 24 July 1976. Section trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an
4 of this statute provided as follows: appeal has been taken from the sentence of
conviction. The filing of the application shall be
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or
provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. In
shall have convicted and sentenced a the latter case, however, if the application is filed
defendant and upon application at any time of on or after the date of the judgment of the
said defendant, suspend the execution of said appellate court, said application shall be acted
sentence and place the defendant on upon by the trial court on the basis of the
probation for such period and upon such terms judgment of the appellate court. (Emphasis
and conditions as it may deem best. supplied)

Probation may be granted whether the sentence Examination of Section 4, after its amendment
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. by P.D. No. 1257, reveals that it had established
An application for probation shall be filed with the a prolonged but definite period during which an
trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an application for probation may be granted by the
appeal has been taken from the sentence of trial court. That period was: 'After [the trial court]
conviction. The filing of the application shall be shall have convicted and sentenced a
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the defendant but before he begins to serve his
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. sentence." Clearly, the cut-off time-
commencement of service of sentence-takes
An order granting or denying probation shall not place not only after an appeal has
be appealable. (Emphasis supplied) been taken from the sentence of conviction, but
even after judgement has been rendered by
It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No. the appellate court and after judgment has
968, the trial court could grant an application for become final. Indeed, in this last situation,
probation "at any time" "after it shall have Section 4, as amended by P.D. No. 1257
convicted and sentenced a defendant" and provides that "the application [for probation] shall
certainly after "an appeal has been taken from be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of
the sentence of conviction." Thus, the filing of the judgment of the appellate court"; for the
the application for probation was "deemed [to appellate court might have increased or reduced
constitute] automatic withdrawal of the original penalty imposed by the trial court. It
a pending appeal." would seem beyond dispute then that had the
present case arisen while Section 4 of the
On 1 December 1977, Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 statute as amended by P.D. No. 1257 was still in
was amended by P.D. No. 1257 so as to read as effect, petitioner Llamado's application for
follows: probation would have had to be granted. Mr.
Llamado's application for probation was filed
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the well before the cut-off time established by
provisions of this Decree, the court may, Section 4 as then amended by P.D. No. 1257.
senteafter it shall have convicted and sentenced
a defendant but before he begins to serve his On 5 October 1985, however, Section 4 of the
sentence and upon his application, suspend the Probation Law of 1976 was once again
execution of said sentence and place the amended. This time by P.D. No. 1990. As so
 27
amended and in its present form, Section 4 judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial
reads as follows: Court of Manila.

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the The period for perfecting an appeal from a
provisions of this Decree, the trial court judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
may, after it shall have convicted and under Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
said defendant within the period for perfecting for the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129 and
an appeal, suspend the execution of the under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
sentence and place the defendant on probation amended, or more specifically Section 5 of Rule
for such period and upon such terms and 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, is fifteen (15)
conditions as it may deem best; Provided, days from the promulgation or notice of the
That no application for probation shall be judgment appealed from. It is also clear from
entertained or granted if the defendant has Section 3 (a) of Rule 122 that such appeal is
perfected an appeal from the judgment of taken or perfected by simply filing a notice of
conviction. appeal with the Regional Trial Court which
rendered the judgment appealed from and by
Probation may be granted whether the sentence serving a copy thereof upon the People of the
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only Philippines. As noted earlier, petitioner Llamado
An application for probation shall be filed with the had manifested orally and in open court his
trial court. The filing of the application shall be intention to appeal at the time of promulgation of
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. the judgment of conviction, a manifestation at
least equivalent to a written notice of appeal and
An order granting or denying probation shall not treated as such by the Regional Trial Court.
be appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner urges, however, that the phrase
In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by "period for perfecting an appeal" and the clause
PD No. 1257, in its present form, Section 4 "if the defendant has perfected an appeal from
establishes a much narrower period during the judgment of conviction" found in Section 4 in
which an application for probation may be filed its current form, should not be interpreted to refer
with the trial court: "after [the trial court] shall to Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court; and
have convicted and sentenced a defendant and that the "whereas" or preambulatory clauses of
— within the period for perfecting an appeal — P.D. No. 1990 did not specify a period of fifteen
." As if to provide emphasis, a new proviso was (15) days for perfecting an appeal. 3 It is also
appended to the first paragraph of Section 4 that urged that "the true legislative intent of the
expressly prohibits the grant of an application for amendment (P.D. No. 1990) should not apply to
probation "if the defendant has perfected an petitioner who filed his Petition for probation at
appeal from the judgment of conviction." It is the earliest opportunity then prevailing and
worthy of note too that Section 4 in its present withdrew his appeal." 4
form has dropped the phrase which said that the
filing of an application for probation means "the Petitioner invokes the dissenting opinion
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal". The rendered by Mr. Justice Bellosillo in the Court of
deletion is quite logical since an application for Appeals. Petitioner then asks us to have
probation can no longer be filed once an appeal recourse to "the cardinal rule in statutory
is perfected; there can, therefore, be construction" that "penal laws [should]
no pending appeal that would have to be be liberally construed in favor of the accused,"
withdrawn. and to avoid "a too literal and strict application of
the proviso in P.D. No. 1990" which would
In applying Section 4 in the form it exists today "defeat the manifest purpose or policy for which
(and at the time petitioner Llamado was the [probation law] was enacted-."
convicted by the trial court), to the instant case,
we must then inquire whether petitioner Llamado We find ourselves unable to accept the
had submitted his application for probation eloquently stated arguments of petitioner's
"within the period for perfecting an appeal." Put counsel and the dissenting opinion. We are
a little differently, the question is whether by the unable to persuade ourselves that Section 4 as
time petitioner Llamado's application was filed, it now stands, in authorizing the trial court to
he had already "perfected an appeal" from the grant probation "upon application by [the]
 28
defendant within the period for perfecting an authority to invoke "liberal interpretation' or "the
appeal" and in reiterating in the proviso that spirit of the law" where the words of the statute
themselves, and as illuminated by the history of
no application for probation shall be entertained that statute, leave no room for doubt or
or granted if the defendant has perfected an interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit
appeal from the judgment of conviction. of law" may legitimately be invoked to set at
naught words which have a clear and definite
did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day meaning imparted to them by our procedural
period established, as indicated above, by B.P. law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously
Blg. 129, the Interim Rules and Guidelines be given effect by judges and all others who are
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1985 Rules charged with the application and implementation
on Criminal Procedure, but rather to some vague of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in
and undefined time, i.e., "the earliest mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the
opportunity" to withdraw the defendant's appeal. intent that is to be given effect are to be derived
The whereas clauses invoked by petitioner did from the words actually used by the law-maker,
not, of course, refer to the fifteen-day period. and not from some external, mystical or
There was absolutely no reason why they should metajuridical source independent of and
have so referred to that period for the operative transcending the words of the legislature.
words of Section 4 already do refer, in our view,
to such fifteen-day period. Whereas clauses do The Court is not here to be understood as giving
not form part of a statute, strictly speaking; they a "strict interpretation rather than a "liberal" one
are not part of the operative language of the to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as
statute. 5 Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal"
helpful to the extent they articulate are adjectives which too frequently impede a
the general purpose or reason underlying a new disciplined and principled search for the
enactment, in the present case, an enactment meaning which the law-making authority
which drastically but clearly changed the projected when it promulgated the language
substantive content of Section 4 existing before which we must apply. That meaning is clearly
the promulgation of P.D. No. visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and
1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The
control the specific terms of the statute; in the Court is simply reading Section 4 as it is in fact
instant case, the whereas clauses of P.D. No. written. There is no need for the involved
1990 do not purport to control or modify the process of construction that petitioner invites us
terms of Section 4 as amended. Upon the other to engage in, a process made necessary only
hand, the term "period for perfecting an appeal" because petitioner rejects the conclusion or
used in Section 4 may be seen to furnish meaning which shines through the words of the
specification for the loose language "first statute. The first duty of a judge is to take and
opportunity" employed in the fourth whereas apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would like
clause. "Perfection of an appeal" is, of course, a it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v.
term of art but it is a term of art widely Court of First Instance of Manila warned,
understood by lawyers and judges and Section confusion and uncertainty in application will
4 of the Probation Law addresses itself surely follow, making, we might add, stability and
essentially to judges and lawyers. "Perfecting an continuity in the law much more difficult to
appeal" has no sensible meaning apart from the achieve:
meaning given to those words in our procedural
law and so the law-making agency could only . . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements
have intended to refer to the meaning of those which tinge words so as to give them the color of
words in the context of procedural law. a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which
Turning to petitioner's invocation of "liberal has caused so much confusion in the law, which
interpretation" of penal statutes, we note at the has made it so difficult for the public to
outset that the Probation Law is not a penal understand and know what the law is with
statute. We, however, understand petitioner's respect to a given matter, is in considerable
argument to be really that any statutory measure the unwarranted interference by
language that appears to favor the accused in a judicial tribunals with the English language as
criminal case should be given a "liberal found in statutes and contracts, cutting the
interpretation." Courts, however, have no words here and inserting them there, making
 29
them fit personal ideas of what the legislature admonished their brethren of the need for
ought to have done or what parties should have discipline in observing the limitations A judge
agreed upon, giving them meanings which they must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor
do not ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting, to contract it. Whatever temptations the
changing and coloring until lawyers themselves statesmanship of policy-making might wisely
are unable to advise their clients as to the suggest, construction must eschew interpolation
meaning of a given statute or contract until it has and evisceration He must not read in by way of
been submitted to some court for its creation. He must not read out except to avoid
interpretation and construction. 6 patent nonsense of internal contradictions. ... 7

The point in this warning may be expected to Petitioner finally argues that since under Section
become sharper as our people's grasp of 4 of Probation Law as amended has vested in
English is steadily attenuated. the trial court the authority to grant the
application for probation, the Court of Appeals
There is another and more fundamental reason had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and
why a judge must read a statute as the should have (as he had prayed in the alternative)
legislative authority wrote it, not as he would remanded instead the records to the lower court.
prefer it to have been written. The words to be Once more, we are not persuaded. The trial
given meaning whether they be found in the court lost jurisdiction over the case when
Constitution or in a statute, define and therefore petitioner perfected his appeal. The Court of
limit the authority and discretion of the judges Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to
who must apply those words. If judges may, remand the case except for execution of
under cover of seeking the "true spirit" and "real judgment. Moreover, having invoked the
intent" of the law, disregard the words in fact jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is
used by the law-giver, the judges will effectively not at liberty casually to attack that jurisdiction
escape the constitutional and statutory when exercised adversely to him. In any case,
limitations on their authority and discretion. the argument is mooted by the conclusion that
Once a judge goes beyond the clear and we have reached, that is, that petitioner's right to
ordinary import of the words of the legislative apply for probation was lost when he perfected
authority, he is essentially on uncharted seas. In his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
a polity like ours which enshrines the
fundamental notion of limiting power through the WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
separation and distribution of powers, judges Appeals in CAGR No. 04678 is hereby
have to be particularly careful lest they substitute AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
their conceptions or preferences of policy for that
actually projected by the legislative agency. SO ORDERED.
Where a judge believes passionately that he
knows what the legislative agency should have
said on the particular matter dealt with by a
statute, it is easy enough for him to reach the
conclusion that therefore that was what the law-
making authority was really saying or trying to
say, if somewhat ineptly As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter explained:

Even within their area of choice the courts are

not at large. They are confined by the nature and
scope of the judicial function in its particular
exercise in the field of interpretation. They are
under the constraints imposed by the judicial
function in our democratic society. As a matter
of verbal recognition certainly, no one will
gainsay that the function in construing a statute
is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the
legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power
which our democracy has lodged in its elected
legislature. The great judges have constantly
 30
LUCERO, all of the
Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 69,
Pasig City,
Complainants,

-versus-
PROSECUTOR A.M. No. MTJ-06-
ROMANA R. REYES, 1623 JUDGE JULIA A.
Complainant, [Formerly OCA IPI REYES, Presiding
No. 04-1635-MTJ] Judge Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch A.M. No. MTJ-06-
Present: 69, Pasig City, 1627
-versus- Respondent. [Formerly OCA IPI
PUNO, C.J., x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - No. 04-1661-MTJ]
QUISUMBING,* ---------x
YNARES-
JUDGE JULIA A. SANTIAGO, ANDREE K.
REYES, Metropolitan CARPIO,** LAGDAMEO,
Trial Court, Branch CORONA, Complainant,
69, Pasig City, CARPIO MORALES,
Respondent. CHICO-NAZARIO, -versus-
VELASCO, JR.,***
NACHURA, JUDGE JULIA A.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - LEONARDO-DE REYES, Metropolitan
--------x CASTRO, Trial Court, Branch A.M. No. P-09-2693
BRION, 69, Pasig City, [Formerly OCA IPI
PERALTA, Respondent. No. 04-2048-P]
BERSAMIN, x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DEL CASTILLO, and ---------x
ABAD, JJ.
TIMOTEO A. MIGRIO,
Promulgated: Branch Clerk of
September 18, 2009 Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch
TIMOTEO A. MIGRIO 69, Pasig City,
and DOMINGO S. A.M. No. MTJ-06- Complainant,
CRUZ, 1624 A.M. No. MTJ-06-
Complainants, [Formerly OCA IPI -versus- 1638
No. 04-1636-MTJ] [Formerly OCA IPI
-versus- JUDGE JULIA A. No. 05-1746-MTJ]
REYES,
JUDGE JULIA A. Respondent.
REYES, Presiding x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judge of the ---------x
Metropolitan Trial
Court in Pasig City, FLORENCIO
Branch 69, SEBASTIAN, JR.,
Respondent. Complainant,
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
---------x A.M. No. MTJ-06- -versus-
1625
ARMI M. [Formerly OCA IPI HON. JULIA A.
FLORDELIZA, No. 04-1630-MTJ] REYES, Presiding
JULIET C. VILLAR Judge, Metropolitan
and MA. Trial
CONCEPCION
 31
Court, Pasig City,
Branch 69, I. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-
Respondent. 1623 (PROSECUTOR ROMANA R. REYES v.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x JUDGE JULIA A. REYES)

By letter-complaint of October 26,

2004,[6] Assistant City Prosecutor Romana
DECISION Reyes (Prosecutor Reyes), the public
prosecutor assigned to Branch 69, charged
PER CURIAM: Judge Reyes with grave abuse of authority
and/or grave misconduct, the details of which
follow:
Professionalism, respect for the rights of others,
good manners and right conduct are expected of On October 1, 2004 at past 6:00 p.m.,
all judicial officers and employees, because the Prosecutor Reyes accidentally met Judge Reyes
image of the judiciary is necessarily mirrored in at the office of Police Inspector Jovita V. Icuin
their actions.[1] (Inspector Icuin), the Chief of the Criminal
Investigation Branch of the Pasig City Police
Five administrative cases against Judge Julia A. Station. Judge Reyes was there to inquire about
Reyes (Judge Reyes), Presiding Judge of the her Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo Migrio
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City, (Migrio)[7] who was earlier arrested for alleged
Branch 69 and one administrative case which violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 or the
Judge Reyes filed against her Branch Clerk of Anti-Gambling Law. When Judge Reyes was
Court Timoteo Migrio were consolidated and informed that Migrio was already released on
referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, orders of Judge Jose Morallos, Judge Reyes
consultant of the Office of the Court asked Prosecutor Reyes to conduct an inquest
Administrator (OCA), for investigation, report against Migrio for malversation on the basis of a
and recommendation, by this Courts photocopy of an affidavit of a certain Ariel
Resolutions of September 28, 2005[2] and Nuestro, purportedly executed and sworn to
December 12, 2007.[3] before Judge Reyes on September 15, 2004.[8]
Prosecutor Reyes informed Judge Reyes that
Earlier, the Court preventively suspended Judge the case of malversation may not necessarily fall
Reyes effective immediately and until further under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
orders, by Resolution of December 14, 2004 in Court[9] on Arrest without Warrant and thus
A.M. No. 04-12-335-MeTC, Re: Problem cannot be the subject of inquest. Prosecutor
Besetting MeTC, Branch 69, Pasig City. Reyes explained that inquest could not be
conducted as it was already past 6:00
Records show that Judge Reyes whereabouts p.m. whereas inquest proceedings could be
have remained unknown. She was issued an conducted only until 6:00 p.m. unless authorized
Authority to Travel to the United States for the by the City Prosecutor. She added that since the
period from November 16 to 30, 2004. She crime was allegedly committed in 2003, Migrio
appears to have left the country in December would have to undergo preliminary
2004 but there is no record showing that she investigation.[10] Prosecutor Reyes continued:
sought the Courts permission therefor or filed
any leave of absence for December 2004.[4] When she heard that if inquest is conducted he
will be released for preliminary investigation, she
From an August 17, 2005 Certification from the was fuming mad and directed me to conduct the
Bureau of Immigration, the only entry in its preliminary investigation right then and there.It
database relative to the travel of Judge Reyes was really a surprise that a judge, a former
was her departure to an unknown destination prosecutor at the Rizal Provincial Prosecution
through Korean Air Flight No. KE622 Office, would direct me to conduct preliminary
on December 28, 2004.[5] investigation at the station without giving the
respondent (Mr. Migrino), at least the mandatory
Due to her absence, the Court declared Judge 10-day period within which to prepare for an
Reyes as having waived her right to answer or intelligent answer/counter-affidavit.
comment on the allegations against her and to
adduce evidence.
 32
She insisted that Mr. Migrino be detained on the officer who will take custody of you pending
weekend and the police detained him. He was contempt proceedings.
the subject of inquest on October 4, 2004,
Monday and was ordered release for preliminary The above-quoted statement, lifted from the
investigation by the City Prosecutor. transcript of stenographic notes of October 11,
2004 which is hereto attached as Annex A to A-
xxxx 5, only shows that she has already a pre-
judgment of the contempt charge and no
On October 5 and 6, 2004 I was not able to explanation, even if submitted, will convince her
appear during the hearing of criminal cases in to stop from declaring me with contempt.
her sala but I made it a point to inform the Court
by calling, through cellphone, one of her staff on I was hospitalized at the Medical City on the
the mornings of October 5 and 6. I was having night of October 11, 2004 until October 14,
severe headache and chest discomfort. 2004 due to chest pain and the Court was
informed of this fact. However[,] on October 13,
On October 11, 2004, I appeared at her sala to 2004 when I was still confined, respondent
discharge my official function as public issued an Order in open court stating:
prosecutor assigned in her Court. Before the
hearing started, she asked for my Medical x x x without any valid explanation except for
Certificate and I explained that to be candid, I did the word that she is presently confined at the
not personally see a doctor but called [the hospital, which is hearsay at the moment, in
doctor] to inform him of my condition and I was which case the same is just noted by the court.
advised to rest and take my regular medication. So for her failure to attend todays proceedings,
Surprisingly, and to my despite notice, as well as for her failure to attend
embarrassment, without any case for the proceedings yesterday as well as on October
contempt filed and without being included in 5 and 6 without any valid explanation, and for her
the days calendar, she brought up the failure to give any explanation after the lapse of
incident of October 1, 2004. I explained to her 24 hours from the time she was ordered to show
that unless I had been authorized by the City cause why she should not be cited in contempt
Prosecutor or Chief-Inquest, I could not conduct in open court last October 11, 2004, let warrant
inquest and inquest proceedings are being held of arrest issue against the said Public
in my position as a Prosecutor under the Prosecutor. x x x Bail is set at P1,000.00 per
Department of Justice. She insisted that I was case in which there is a total of 119 cases
there as the Prosecutor assigned to this Court delayed as a result of her absence since
and who is assigned at the same sala and you October 5 and October 6 as well as
refused to conduct an inquest forgetting her yesterday, October 12 and today, October
constitutional law that there is separation of 13. That means a bail of P119,000.00 as well
powers among the three branches of as for two (2) counts of apparent
government legislative, executive and the contempt which consist of misbehavior of an
judiciary. officer of the Court in the performance of her
official duties as well as for improper
She issued in open court an order requiring me conduct tending directly or indirectly to
to explain in writing within twenty-four (24) hours impede, obstruct, and degrade the
why I should not be cited for contempt for my administration of justice to which bail is set
refusal to conduct the inquest on October 1, at P25,000.00 each, to set an example to the
2004. I was all the more surprised when she public especially, since she is actually the
gave the following sweeping statement in open Public Prosecutor presently assigned to this
court: Court who committed such apparent act of
indirect contempt.[11] (Emphasis in the original;
Dont worry Prosec, I will not order your underscoring supplied)
arrest today, because I know that the Pasig
City Police Officer at the Pasig Police Station,
because your house is located in front of the In another letter dated October 29,
Pasig City Station, there is no one who will 2004,[12] Prosecutor Reyes informed the OCA
arrest you. I will still coordinate with the that during the October 27, 2004 hearing for the
office of Gen. Aglipay to send me a police issuance of a temporary restraining order in
connection with her petition for certiorari,
 33
prohibition and mandamus docketed as SCA- order[s] the installation of her microphone and
2732 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig computer. In the meantime, litigants are not
City, four police officers served a warrant of allowed to enter the courtroom but have to wait
arrest[13] purportedly issued on October 11, 2004 outside until they are allowed entry by the staff.
by Judge Reyes pertaining to Criminal Case
Nos. 02164-02173, all entitled People v. I reviewed the court records to know if the parties
Prosecutor Romana R. Reyes. had been notified of the scheduled hearings.
After the recitation of the Centennial Prayer and
Verification from the Office of the Clerk of Court before the calendar of cases were called, Judge
of the MeTC of Pasig City revealed, however, Julia Reyes called my attention and said that
that there was no pending case against there was an Order of the Court for me to explain
Prosecutor Reyes and that the particular case my failure to appear on October 5, 6, 12, 13, 18,
numbers pertained to cases against 10 19, 20, 25, 26 and 27 and up to now, I have not
individuals for offenses ranging from violation submitted my explanation. I stood up and
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 6 to Reckless politely explained to her that the incidents she
Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property.[14] was referring to was the subject of the case I
filed against her for Certiorari, Prohibition &
Prosecutor Reyes travails did not stop there, Mandamus, before the Regional Trial Court
however. On October 27, 2004, at around 10:30 Pasig City and there was an Order issued, a
a.m., she received copies of two Orders of copy of the Order had been served on her, that
October 11 and 13, 2004 of Judge Reyes any and all warrant of arrest issued by her would
directing Prosecutor Reyes in the later Order, to not be enforced and/or implemented by the
police agencies. She did not hear my reason
x x x show cause within 24 hours from receipt of and said that this is a new order and is not
this Order why she should not be cited in covered by the Order of Hon. Celso Lavina and
contempt for her failure to submit her she ordered that I be detained for one (1) day at
explanation to date and for her failure to attend the Pasig City Police Headquarters. I moved for
the proceedings of this Court without any a five (5) minute recess to make a call to my
explanation. lawyer and to fix myself as I was having
palpitation then. She denied my motion and
Considering the gravity of her responsibility as a ordered the start of the scheduled hearing of
Public Prosecutor, let warrant issue for her cases. She ordered the police officers to lock the
arrest. Bail is set at P2,000.00 per case, or a door of the courtroom and not to let anyone go
total of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT out or come in. This was the first time, during my
THOUSAND PESOS ONLY assignment at her branch, that the door of the
(P238,000.00).[15] (Emphasis and capitalization court was locked and nobody is allowed to leave
in the original; underscoring supplied) the room or go inside. Though not convenient,
as I was thinking of my health then, and the
humiliation I felt in, again, being declared in
On December 13, 2004, Prosecutor Reyes contempt in open court and ordered detained, I
wrote another letter[16] to the OCA charging continued to discharge my duties as a trial
Judge Reyes with Violation of the Code of prosecutor of the branch until after the more than
Judicial Conduct, Knowingly Rendering an 40 cases had been called.
Unjust Judgment or Order, and Gross Ignorance
of the Law or Procedure, as follows: After the hearing of criminal cases and the case
of contempt was called against Max Soliven et
On December 7, 2004, I arrived at the court al., I was informed by PO1 Sandy Galino, her
room of MTC-Pasig City Branch 69 at about 8:30 security escort, that the police officers whom
a.m. to discharge my duties as the trial they have called for assistance were already
prosecutor of the Branch. The hearing has not outside the courtoom and will be bringing me to
started, the Presiding Judge was not there yet the police station. They would not allow me to
and the litigants have not been allowed to enter leave the place unless I go with them at the
the courtroom. Hearing of cases on the Court Headquarters. When I was about to be escorted
does not promptly start at 8:30 a.m. but always out of the court room, my lawyer, Atty. Hans
been the hours of 9:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. as the Santos and my sister, Asst. Pros. Paz Yson,
Presiding Judge, Julia A. Reyes, usually arrive came and was bringing with them a certified
past 8:30 a.m. and when she arrive[s], she still copy of the Order of Hon. Celso Lavina dated
 34
November 22, 2004 stating that any and all Celso Lavina declaring my detention illegal but
warrants issued by Judge Julia Reyes will not be the Headquarters would not release me until
enforced by any police agencies. My lawyer after they have conferred with their superior
showed the Order to PO1 Sandy Galino and a officers. After conferring with the higher officials,
certain PO1 Villarosa and they said that they are I was finally released, over the written objection
getting orders from Judge Julia Reyes. My of Judge Julia Reyes in the copy of the Writ of
lawyer then asked them if they have a written Preliminary Prohibitory Mandatory Injunction
Order from the Court, or a Warrant for my Arrest and Court Order dated December 9, 2004, from
or a Commitment Order but they replied in the the Pasig City Police Headquarters at
negative. My lawyer further asked them if they about 7:00 p.m.
are detaining me and they said no.
x x x x[17] (Underscoring supplied)
xxxx

On or about 12:00 noon of December 9, 2004, I

have just alighted from a car and she was II. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-
standing infront of the building when she saw 1624 (TIMOTEO A. MIGRIO AND DOMINGO S
me. She immediately followed me and shouted . CRUZ v. JUDGE JULIA A. REYES)
Arrest her! Arrest her! To the guards on duty at By Complaint of October 16, 2004,[18] Migrio and
the entrance of the building. In the presence of Domingo S. Cruz charged Judge Reyes with
so many persons in the lobby and in high pitch Gross Ignorance of the Law, Oppression, Abuse
she made calls, through her cell phone, to of Authority, and Illegal Arrest and Detention, the
several police officers telling them that she details of which follow:
caught an escaped convict, a fugitive from
justice and needs a battery of police officers to In July 2003, not long after her appointment as
make the arrest. I warned her to be careful with Presiding Judge, Judge Reyes began to exhibit
her language considering that I did not escape unexplained prejudice and hostility towards
but was released by Hon. Executive Judge Jose Migrio. In fact, without any reason at all, Judge
Morallos upon presentation of the Order Reyes told Atty. Reynaldo Bautista, the MeTC
dated November 22, 2004 of Hon. Judge Celso Clerk of Court, that Migrio would be detailed at
Lavina, RTC-Pasig Br.71. She continued, in the the Office of the Clerk of Court.[19]
presence of people in the Lobby who had
converged to see what was causing the On several occasions, the latest of which was on
commotion, that I am an escaped convict and August 24, 2004, she barred Migrio from
should be detained at the Pasig CityPolice entering the court premises and the staff room.
Headquarters. She further said that it was Judge During lunch break on October 1, 2004, Migrio,
Jose Morallos who facilitated my escape last Deputy Sheriff Joel K. Agliam and Dandy T.
Tuesday, December 7, 2004. Liwag were arrested without warrant upon
orders of Judge Reyes as they were allegedly
xxxx caught in flagrante delictoplaying tong-
its. Police Officer 1 Sandy Galino (PO1 Galino),
While questioning the propriety of the order of the security officer of Judge Reyes, arrested
Direct Contempt, considering that there is an them and brought them to the Pasig City Police
order of November 22, 2004 stating that any and Station where they were detained by virtue of the
all warrants she issued will not be enforced or affidavits[20] of PO1 Galino and Judge Reyes.[21]
implemented, and that she has to issue the
necessary Commitment Order for my detention, When an Order of Release[22] was issued by
she slapped with me another seven (7) days of Judge Morallos after the three posted bail,
detention for Direct Contempt. Judge Reyes tried to prevent their release and
insisted that she had a complaint against Migrio
xxxx for malversation of public funds, infidelity in the
custody of document and/or qualified theft and
At about 6:00 p.m., the Sheriff of Regional Trial violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Court-Pasig City, Branch 71 arrived and served Act[23] allegedly committed in November 2002,
a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory and presented the Affidavit[24] of Ariel Nuestro
Injunction with an attached Order and the Joint Affidavit[25] she executed with court
dated December 9, 2004 issued by Hon Judge
 35
employees Remedios Diaz (Remedios) and gambling during office hours within the Court
Alma Santiano. premises (2) infidelity in the custody of
documents, (3) qualified theft and/or
Complainant Atty. Domingo S. Cruz (Atty. Cruz), malversation for misappropriation of the amount
counsel of Migrio, et al., intervened and of PHP10,000.00 entrusted to him for deposit by
demanded from Inspector Icuin the immediate one Ariel Nuestro in a criminal case filed before
release of his clients since there was already an this Court, (4) for violation of R.A. 3019 or the
Order of Release. Atty. Cruz and Prosecutor Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, among
Reyes also explained to Judge Reyes that others. He is likewise ordered to show cause
Migrio could not be detained on the basis of an why he should not be cited in contempt for
alleged offense that occurred in 2002 yet, and openly defying to submit to undersigned with
that the alleged offense was not covered by the respect to her complaint before the police
rule on warrantless arrest.[26] Migrio and Atty. authorities for the said crimes and/or offenses
Cruz continued: which defiance appear to be improper conduct
tending directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
15. Judge [Reyes] insisted that complainant or degrade the administration of justice under
Migrio must not be released as the case is Rule 71, Sec. 3(d) of the Rules of Court.
covered by the rule on warrantless arrest, the
alleged offense of malversation having been Set the hearing of this case on October 8,
allegedly discovered only recently by 2004 at 2:30 P.M. and said respondent is
respondent Judge and staff, specifically at 4:30 directed to make his explanation on said date
P.M. of 01 October 2004. She then told Pros. and time in open court with warning that should
Reyes to conduct an immediate he fail to attend said hearing despite due notice
Inquest/preliminary investigation. a warrant for arrest shall be issued.
16. It must be noted and emphasized that
Nuestro subscribed and swore to his The Process Server of this Court with the
Sinumpaang Salaysay before respondent Judge assistance of a Sheriff of the Metropolitan Trial
way back on September 15, 2004, and it could Court of Pasig City, is directed to send a copy of
not be said that the alleged offense of this Order by personal service to respondent
malversation of public funds was discovered TIMOTEO A. MIGRINO. Any officer of the law is
only at 4:30 P.M. of October 01, 2004. What is likewise directed to assist said Process Server in
certain is that respondent Judge timed the the service of this Order to said respondent and
alleged discovery to suit her is specifically directed to take custody of said
purpose[27] (Emphasis and underscoring respondent should he refuse to receive this
supplied) Order and bring the same to this Court on
October 8, 2004 at 2:00 P.M.[28] (Capitalization
in the original; emphasis and underscoring
Unable to convince Judge Reyes, Atty. Cruz left supplied)
the office of Inspector Icuin, but returned shortly
with a warning that he would hold them
responsible for illegal arrest, arbitrary detention Significantly, while in the said Order of October
and abuse of authority unless Migrio was 4, 2004, Judge Reyes found Atty. Cruz,
immediately released. Inspector Icuin finally Prosecutor Reyes, Inspector Icuin and PO3
ordered the release of Migrio. Jimenez to have also committed contumacious
acts, she singled out Migrio and directed him to
Migrio stayed in jail from October 1, 2004, a explain why he should not be declared in
Friday, until he was released on October 4, contempt of court.
2004. Judge Reyes was determined to send
Migrio back to jail, however, by means of her On October 8, 2004, Judge Reyes issued
contempt powers. In her October 4, 2004 Order, another Order[29] giving her process server, the
she stated: MeTC sheriff and any officer of the law blanket
authority to take custody of [Migrio] should he
x x x Timoteo Migrino, Clerk of Court, Branch 69, refuse to receive this Order and bring him to this
Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City, is hereby Court on October 11, 13, 14 & 15, 2004 at 2:00
ordered to show cause within twelve (12) hours P.M. Complainants further narrated:
from receipt of this order why he should not be
cited in contempt for the following acts: (1) illegal
 36
41. To show that the respondent judge is using of her staff to her nighttime gimmick; (5)
her contempt powers as a bludgeon to clobber unethical conduct; (6) conduct unbecoming a
her perceived enemies, instead of using the lady judge; (7) unfriendliness to litigants; (8) anti-
same as a necessary tool for preserving the public service; (9) inability to control emotions
integrity of the court, the respondent issued during hearing; (10) uttering invectives in front of
another Order dated October 14, 2004 ordering staff and lawyers; (11) conducting staff meeting
complainant Migrio to show cause why he in an unsightly attire; and (12) gross
should not be cited for at least 2,330 acts of inefficiency/laziness.
indirect contempt.Repeat, two thousand
three hundred thirty. A copy of this Order is According to complainants, it was of public
attached hereto as Annex J. knowledge at the Pasig City Hall of Justice that
Judge Reyes was residing in her chambers
The tyranny and despotism of the respondent where a big aparador she had placed therein
judge is crystal clear in the following statements was eventually removed after three Supreme
in said Order of October 14, 2004 (Annex J): Court lawyers investigated the matter. She
continued to sleep in the chambers after going
Moreover, respondent committed at least 1,510 out for evening gimmicks with some members of
acts of indirect contempt with respect to the case her staff. She would usually be fetched by a
of People vs. Marcos Rivera (Crim. Case No. certain Col. Miranda at 12 midnight and would
36172) which remains pending in the docket of return at 4:00 a.m.[33]
this court to date, when he failed to act on or set
for arraignment to date, the said case filed herein On two separate occasions in May 2003, Judge
on April 29, 1998. Considering that a total of Reyes instructed complainant Juliet Villar
around 1,510 working days has lapsed from the (Juliet), branch legal researcher, to act as her
said date of filing of said case up to the time that co-maker in her loan applications. Within the
said respondent was barred from entering the same period, Judge Reyes, who allegedly
court premises and the staff room on August 24, needed money for an ID picture, borrowed P500
2004, herein respondent is hereby ordered to from Juliet who was forced to borrow the amount
show cause why he should not be cited for 1,510 from Miguelito Limpo (Limpo), branch process
acts of indirect contempt for all the working days server, which amount remained unpaid as of the
that he failed to act on said case which appears filing of their complaint.[34] Judge Reyes also
to remain pending in the docket of this court to borrowed P20,000 from the branch process
date. server who, however, did not execute any
affidavit out of fear,[35] as relayed by Maria
Even assuming for purposes of argument that Concepcion Lucero (Maria Concepcion), branch
the failure of the respondent to set for in-charge of civil cases.[36] When Juliet informed
arraignment the aforementioned case is Limpo of the plan of some staff members to
contumacious, it was one continuing act of petition for the removal of Judge Reyes, Limpo
omission, not 1,510 separate acts of remarked, Bago nyo ipatanggal yun, hintayin
commission.[30] (Emphasis in the original; nyo munang bayaran ako. Inutangan ako nyan
underscoring supplied) ng P20,000.00, isinanla ko pa yung alahas para
lang may maipautang sa kanya.[37]

III. A.M. NO. MTJ-06- In her other affidavit,[38] Juliet claimed that in
1625 (ARMI M. FLORDELIZA, JULIET C. VILL October 2003, Judge Reyes stepped out of the
AR AND MA. CONCEPCION LUCERO v. JUD chambers and told complainant Armi Flordeliza
GE JULIA A. REYES) (Armie),[39] Court Stenographer I, Armie, ang
hina mo naman sumingil sa ex-parte, buti pa si
Leah. Dapat pag tinanong ka kung magkano,
By verified[31] letter-complaint of March 11, sabihin mo at least P2,000.00 Since then all ex-
2004,[32] Judge Reyes was charged by parte cases were assigned to court
complainants Armi M. Flordelisa et al. who are stenographer Leah Palaspas (Leah). Judge
court employees at Branch 69, with the following Reyes further remarked, Sino pa ba ibang
acts: (1) residing in chambers; (2) borrowing pwedeng pagkakitaan dito? O ikaw
money from staff; (3) instructing the Oswald, sheriff. The sheriff only smiled.
stenographer to collect a minimum amount
for ex-parte cases; (4) frequently bringing some
 37
Complainants stated that Judge Reyes Reyes for solemnization of marriage, Judge
habitually invited her staff to go with her in night Reyes ordered the stopping of the inventory to
gimmicks from 10:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. the give way to it. On March 4, 2004, Judge Reyes
following day, without regard to working days. sent Leah a text message advising her to reset
This practice hampered the delivery of judicial the hearings as she was unavailable, but upon
services, as the employees who went out with being informed by Remedios that there was a
her the previous night either went on leave or marriage to be solemnized that day, Judge
arrived late the following day.[40] Reyes immediately arrived and even attended
the wedding reception. In the months of
On December 23, 2003, upon the persistent December 2003 and January 2004, Judge
request of Judge Reyes, Juliet joined her and Reyes was able to solemnize 16[46] and
company in a comedy bar in Quezon City and 14[47] marriages, respectively.
stayed there until 4:00 a.m. of December 24,
2003. Judge Reyes brought her employees to Complainants claimed that Judge Reyes was
their respective homes and then went to sleep in anti-public service. She instructed the staff to
her chambers.[41] lock the door entrance to the room occupied by
the staff and not to answer phone calls during
Maria Concepcion, in another affidavit, stated court hearings even if there were employees in
that on January 2, 2004, Judge Reyes the staff room to attend to calls and queries.[48]
repeatedly invited the staff for lunch at her
residence. While inside her house, Judge Reyes Judge Reyes lacked the ability to control her
insistently gave her a glass of red wine, from emotions during hearings. In one hearing, she
which she pretended to take a sip, after which failed to maintain her composure and stormed
Judge Reyes consumed the remainder. Judge out of the room while Assistant City Prosecutor
Reyes joined the rest of the staff at the sala Fernando Dumpit was still talking.[49] Judge
where they consumed gin pomelo.[42] Reyes hurled invectives in front of the staff and
lawyers. On October 2, 2003, while with a lawyer
Complainants depicted Judge Reyes as very friend from the Office of the Solicitor General,
unethical. One time, in the presence of a she remarked in front of her staff, Alam mo na
stranger, Judge Reyes uttered, Ano kaya kung ang dami intriga dito; nireport ba naman na
mag-hearing ako ng hubot hubad tapos naka- nakatira ako dito, ano kaya masama dun? Alam
robe lang, pwede kaya?[43] At one time, Armie ko staff ko rin nagsumbong eh, PUTANG INA
overheard Judge Reyes utter over the NILA, PUTANG INA TALAGA NILA![50]
phone Hayaan mo, Farah, pag natikman ko na
siya, ipapasa ko sa iyo, ha ha ha![44] Several times, Judge Reyes conducted staff
meetings wearing T-shirt, slippers and
Judge Reyes exhibited conduct unbecoming a faded maong folded a little below the knee, as if
judge for repeatedly inviting her staff and other she was in her house. Oftentimes, she would
court employees to join her to a drinking spree wear the same clothes she wore the previous
in the courtroom after office hours on three day, which showed that she resided in the
consecutive Fridays in February 2004. chambers.[51]
On March 2, 2004, Juliet arrived at the office at
around 7:00 a.m. and saw Judge Reyes about to Judge Reyes was lazy and inefficient, as she
leave the office. Juliet was later informed by the delegated decision-writing to Juliet. Since her
guards and janitors that they saw an inebriated appointment, she was able to promulgate only
Judge Reyes sleeping on the bench outside the three or four decisions of her own writing.
office and found empty bottles of alcoholic drinks
in the garbage can.[45] Complainants thus requested the conduct of
judicial audit to determine her work output.[52]
Judge Reyes was also unfriendly to litigants.
On January 23, 2004 during the inventory of By Supplemental Complaint[53] of January 28,
cases, as a litigant attempted to verify the status 2005, Armie added:
of his case, Judge Reyes suddenly
remarked, Nag-iimbentaryo kami, bawal mag- 1. I was jailed on the strength of a warrant of
verify. Pag hindi ka umalis, iko- arrest dated October 8, 2004 issued by Judge
contempt kita! However, when an employee Julia A. Reyes in connection with the ten (10)
from another branch referred a couple to Judge counts of Indirect Contempt of Court charges
 38
which she had initiated against me for gross see Certification signed by Atty. Reynaldo V.
misconduct in office and insubordination; Bautista, Clerk of Court IV of the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig
2. The warrant of arrest of October 8, 2004 City Annex B, and a copy of the Warrant of
stemmed from my failure to attend the hearing of Arrest dated October 8, 2004 Annex C;
an Indirect Contempt of Court charge she filed
against me, then about to be heard on October xxxx
8, 2004 at 2:30 oclock in the afternoon where I
am supposed to explain my side; 21. Be it noted that in November 8, 2004, herein
complainant filed a Motion for Reduction of
xxxx Bail (Annex D) from P250,000.00 to P50,000.00
in cash which was not acted upon; the reason
5. I was served with a copy of the show cause why the herein complainant suffered for a longer
Order dated October 4, 2004 signed by Judge period inside the detention cell;
Reyes where I was informed that I committed
acts constituting contempt of court as defined by 22. On the same date (November 8, 2004),
Rule 71, Section 3 (a) and (b) of the 1997 Rules a Subpoena (Annex D-1) was served upon the
of Civil Procedure. On the basis of said show herein complainant alleging that a hearing will be
cause order, I was also directed by Judge Reyes held in November 9, 10, 11 and 12. However,
to appear on October 8, 2040 at 2:30 pm in court Judge Reyes never conduct[ed] the hearings in
and to make further explanation with warning November 10, 11 and 12, 2004 which constitute
that should I fail to attend the hearing on said an oppression and violation of human rights and
date despite due notice, a warrant for my arrest grave misconduct;
shall be issued by the court. Plain copy of
the Order dated October 4, 2004 is herewith 23. In November 16, 2004, the 12th day the
attached and duly marked as Annex A; herein complainant was under the detention cell,
was the day that I was released by posting a
6. For fear of being arrested, I did not attend cash bond of P50,000.00 granted by Hon. Divina
the hearing of October 8, 2004, despite notice, Gracia Lopez-Pelio, Pairing Judge of Branch 69,
and hence, as earlier stated, a warrant of arrest Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City as
dated October 8, 2004 was issued by Judge evidenced by Official Receipt No. 21065408
Reyes against me; (Annex E); Order dated November 16, 2004
(Annex F); and Order of Release (Annex
7. I was apprehended and confined at the G)[.] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
Pasig City Police Station, at Pariancillo, supplied)[54]
Kapasigan, Pasig City to my great damage and
prejudice and that of my family;

xxxx IV. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-

1627 (ANDREE K. LAGDAMEO v. JUDGE JU
11. What is worse is that Judge Reyes fixed the LIA A. REYES)
bail for my temporary liberty at two hundred
thousand (P250,000.00) pesos which to my
mind is quite excessive and violative of my Complainant Andree Lagdameo (Andree) is the
constitutional right to bail; private complainant in Criminal Case No. 42030
for physical injuries pending before Branch 69.
xxxx The case was originally set for promulgation of
judgment on May 19, 2004 but was cancelled
14. Surprisingly, the warrant of arrest dated and repeatedly reset to July 13,
October 8, 2004 issued by Judge 2004, September 14, 2004 and November 23,
Reyes supposedly carries a docket number 2004. Andree thus filed an Urgent Motion to Set
starting from Case Number 02154 up to and Promulgation of Judgment,[55] furnishing the
including 02163 which correspond to ten (10) OCA a copy thereof, which step, Andree
counts of Indirect Contempt of Court. However, believed, must have courted [the judges] ire.
the said case numbers does not pertain to a
person of Armie M. Flordeliza, nor with a case of Judge Reyes moved the promulgation date
Contempt of Court.Please from November 23, 2004 to October 20, 2004,
 39
only to reset the same to October 16, 2004. After Santiano, both employees of MTC Branch 69,
eight postponements,[56] the judgment was together with PO1 Galino and PO2 Lavadia,
finally promulgated on December 7, 2004 during sitting in the now empty courtroom. I could hear
which Criminal Case No. 42030 was first in the the raised voice of Judge Reyes emanating from
calendar of cases. Andree narrated: her chambers. I asked Leah Palaspas for a copy
of the decision, and to examine and photocopy
xxxx some documents in the file folder of Criminal
However, before the start of court proceedings Case No. 42030. She told me to wait as the
that day, there was a courtroom drama which folder was in the chamber of Judge Reyes. I
unfolded before the surprised eyes of all persons pointed to her that the decision in this case had
then inside the courtroom. The Honorable Judge just been promulgated this morning and
Julia A. Reyes ordered the arrest and detention logically, the folder would be in the pile in front of
of Prosecutor Romana Reyes. Judge Reyes her. She insisted that it was in the judges
ordered her personal close-in-security, whom I chambers, and for me to wait.
later came to know to be PO1 Sandy Galino, and
PO2 Rolando Lavadia, to implement her order. I 10. I then stood and waited for about another
was seated on the first bench and I had a clear half hour in the corridor fronting the courtroom of
view and could clearly hear the proceedings. I Branch 69 after which, I again approached Leah
heard Judge Reyes forbid Prosecutor Reyes Palaspas regarding my request. She called a co-
from calling her lawyer under pain of another day employee, whom I later came to know to be Ms.
of detention. I heard Judge Reyes further order Josefina Catacutan to accompany me to the
PO1 Galino and PO2 Lavadia to close the doors photocopying machine. While waiting in line, I
of the courtroom and to prevent Prosecutor noticed that the decision promulgated that
Reyes from leaving the same. morning was not in the file. I pointed this out to
Ms. Catacutan who proposed that we return to
6. Judge Reyes then proceeded to order Ms. Palaspas and ask for a copy.
Leah Palaspas to promulgate judgment in my
case, Criminal Case No. 42030. I was so 11. Accompanied by Ms. Catacutan, I returned
shocked by the intemperate and derogatory to the Branch 69 courtroom where we found Ms.
words Judge Reyes used to describe my person Palaspas standing in the corridor. I pointed out
in the aforesaid judgment, so much so that I left to her that a copy of the decision was not in the
the courtroom immediately after the reading file. She protested that it was almost noontime
because I was so afraid that my face would and that I should just come back in the
mirror my emotions and I might be cited for afternoon. I pointed out to her that it was still ten
contempt, especially after witnessing Judge minutes to twelve and it was just a matter of
Reyes actions toward Prosecutor Romana handing a copy of the decision to Ms. Catacutan,
Reyes. I am a mere layman and I must indeed and besides, I had been waiting since early
look puny to the high and mighty Judge Julia A. morning.
Reyes.
12. Ms. Leah Palaspas turned her back on me
I was the complainant, not the accused, in the and stepped into the courtroom where Judge
case and I cannot understand why the judge Reyes was sitting with Alma Santino, PO1
exhibited such kind of hostility against me in the Galino and PO2 Lavadia and declared Eto ho
judgment just promulgated. Judge, las doce na ho e.

7. I then waited for the termination of the 13. I followed Ms. Palaspas inside the
court proceedings, to request for a copy of the courtroom but had hardly stepped inside when I
decision since I wanted to consult a lawyer stopped in my tracks as Judge Reyes
regarding Judge Reyes affront on my person. I shouted Dont try me, come back at 1:00 PM,
was barred from re-entering the court room by GET OUT! I was so shocked at the arrogance of
PO1 Sandy Galino, the armed personal security Judge Reyes and the way she shouted at me
of Judge Reyes, pursuant to her orders. that I turned on my heels and left.

xxxx 14. On my way out probably out of sheer

frustration at the way the judge treats people
9. I then went back to the courtroom of Branch who happened to have business in her court I
69, and found Leah Palaspas and Alma commented to Ms. Palaspas who was standing
 40
beside me:O baka ma contempt pa ako and PO1 Sandy Galino y Abuyog, 33 years old,
continued walking away. married of this station brought in one Andree
Lagdameo y Kirkwood, legal age, widow, res
15. Either Ms. Palaspas told the respondent of 237 Marne St. San Juan Metro Mla. for
judge about my comment, or the judge herself direct contempt of court issued by Hon.
overheard me, when I reached the area in front Judge Julia Reyes of MTC
of the door of the staff room PO1 Sandy Galino B69 Pasig City. Order will follow.
suddenly grabbed my arm and prevented me
from moving. When I turned my head, I saw (Attached as Annex B)
Judge Julia Reyes in the lobby fronting her
courtroom wagging her finger in the air and xxxx
shouting, HULIHIN NIYO YAN, IKULONG
NINYO YAN! thus letting loose her armed gorilla 20. At 5:00 PM of December 7, 2004, Atty.
on a hapless victim like me. Atencia again demanded my release from
detention since it was now the close of office
16. I instinctively struggled to free myself from hours and Judge Julia Reyes had not issued any
the grip of PO1 Sandy Galino, all the while commitment order. Col. Galvan again refused
asking Judge Julia Reyes, Bakit, hindi naman and insisted that he was following the orders of
kita sinagot ah who all the while was viewing the Judge Julia Reyes.
scene with a smirk of satisfaction on her face.
xxxx
17. I was able to momentarily free my hand and
was able to call a lawyer friend on my mobile 22. I was finally released from detention after 24
phone who then advised me to demand for any hours. My release is entered on Page 0397 of
sort of written order to justify my arrest and the Pasig Police Blotter under Entry No. 1799,
detention. I was also advised to demand that the Date: December 08, 2004, Time: 12:30PM
arresting officers identify themselves and the which reads as follows:
unit to which they belong. PO1 Galino replied A
wala, basta utos ni Judge ito doon ka na Released
magpaliwanag at magtanong! In relation to Entry 1781 dated Dec. 7,
2004 one Andree Lagdameo was released
18. A uniformed police officer carrying an from the custody of this station physically
armalite rifle, whose name I was not able to get, and financially unmolested as attested by
then arrived. PO1 Sandy Galino addressed the her signature below.
latter: Pare, pag pumalag, barilin mo. I never Note: Detained w/o written commitment
imagined that I a simply citizen without any clout; order and released w/o written released
a weak, educated, woman who merely sought order.
the assistance of our courts to redress a (signature)
perceived grievance would be treated like a Andree Lagdameo
common criminal in this fair Republic of ours! (Attached as Annex C)

I then continued to demand a written order x x x x[57] (Emphasis, capitalization and italics in
regarding my arrest but Galino repeated, Hindi the original; underscoring supplied)
na raw kailangan, sabe ni Judge and proceeded
to forcibly bring me out of the Justice Hall. When
we reached the lobby I tried to go up to the office Andree supplemented[58] her December 22,
of Executive Judge Morallos but PO1 Galino 2004 Complaint[59] to allege that she finally
pulled me down the stairs. received a copy of the Decision[60] in Criminal
Case No. 42030 on December 16, 2004, several
xxxx days after she was illegally detained, and only
after she wrote a letter to Judge Reyes,
The fact of my arrest was then entered into the furnishing then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Blotter of the Pasig Station on Page 0393, Entry Jr. and the OCA a copy thereof.[61]
No. 1781, Date: Dec. 7, 2004 Time 12:30 PM
which reads as follows: When she read the Decision, she was shocked
on noting that Judge Reyes used very insulting
Brought-in language in referring to her as the therein private
 41
complainant. Judge Reyes wrote that [j]udging detention at Camp Caringal in Quezon City, the
from the demeanor and character of the accused couple was presented to the branch clerk of
who appears to be a quiet man with a pleasant court, and learned that the warrants of arrest
disposition and that of the private complainant were issued due to their failure to appear in court
who looks loud, rash and even vulgar in on October 28, 2003 as directed in an August
language in her dealings with the court 15, 2003 Order[67] which was not received by
personnel herein, this Court finds the version of them or their counsel, Atty. Jaime Vibar.
the accused to be more credible.[62] Judge
Reyes made a misrepresentation for she merely A perusal of the August 15, 2003 Order reveals
relied on the records in writing the decision as that the same suffers from grave infirmity. It
she never had the chance to hear the reads:
testimonies of the parties since Judge Alex
Quiroz was the presiding judge when the case The unsigned Order dated May 9, 2000 is
was tried. reiterated as follows:

Accused through counsel, having been [sic] filed

V. A.M. NO. P-09-2693 (TIMOTEO A. MIGRIO a Manifestation and Request for Remarking and
v. JUDGE JULIA A. REYES) Formal Offer of Exhibits. The Prosecution is
given five (5) days from receipt thereof within
which to make its comment thereto.
In an undated letter[63] received by the OCA
on October 4, 2004, Judge Reyes Set the same for hearing on October 28, 2003,
recommended that Migrio be separated from the at 8:130 [sic] A.M.
service on charges of illegal gambling during
office hours, qualified theft and/or infidelity in the Send copies of this Order to the parties.
custody of documents, and violation of the Anti- (Emphasis supplied)
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Upon the recommendation of the OCA, it The prior Order being unsigned, there was no
appearing that this case emanated from the factual or legal reason for Judge Reyes to
same incident of illegal gambling obtaining in reiterate the same and set the case for further
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624, the Court, by Resolution hearing, notably since the case had long been
of September 28, 2005,[64] ordered the submitted for decision.
consolidation of the two cases. Hence, the
factual background of this case is reflected in the Judge Reyes did not lift the warrant of arrest,
earlier discussed A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624. even after Atty. Vibar filed, pursuant to the
October 28, 2003 Order, a Motion for
Reconsideration, Compliance and Entry of
VI. A.M. NO. MTJ-06-1638 (FLORENCIO Appearance.[68]
SEBASTIAN, JR. v. HON. JULIA A. REYES)
At the promulgation of judgment on September
7, 2004, the branch clerk of court read only the
By verified Complaint-Affidavit of April 22, decretal portion of the decision convicting the
2005,[65] complainant Florencio Sebastian, Jr. couple. Atty. Vibar requested a copy of the
(Sebastian) charged Judge Reyes with Grave decision but Judge Reyes replied that the
Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, decision had not yet been printed but she could
Incompetence and Inefficiency arising from the give him a diskette which Atty. Vibar
procedings in Criminal Case No. 19110, People refused. After declaring that she would later re-
v. Florencio Sebastian, Jr., Alicia Ty Sebastian promulgate the judgment and that the couple
and Justo Uy, for falsification of public document should stay in court, Judge Reyes started calling
pending before Branch 69. out the other cases. Not wanting to be part of the
irregularity and due to other pressing
On February 18, 2004 at around 5:00 p.m., commitments, Atty. Vibar left. At around 11:40
police officers arrived at Sebastians residence a.m. inside the chambers, Judge Reyes read the
and served on him and his wife Alicia (the judgment from a computer screen without giving
couple) warrants of arrest[66] issued by Judge the couple a written copy[69] or computer print-
Reyes on October 28, 2003. After an overnight out.
 42
resulted in the appointment of one grossly
The couple raised on appeal that the trial court ignorant of the law and more importantly devoid
failed to comply with the mandate of Rule of the temperament required of a judicial arbiter.
120[70] of the Rules of Court and Section 14[71] of In the two cases mentioned above (A.M. No.
Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that the MTJ-06-1623 and A.M. No. 06-1627), the acts of
decision must be written and signed by the judge respondent Judge reveal a flaw in her
with a clear statement of the facts and the law on psychological makeup that disqualifies her
which the decision is based.[72] from holding the position of Judge. She appears
to be unaware of the jurisprudence that has
THE EVALUATION OF JUSTICE ROMULO S. given meaning to the power of contempt.
QUIMBO
xxxx
The Order dated 13 October 2004 (Exhibit G,
By Consolidated Report of June 27, Rollo, p. 27, A.M. MTJ-06-1623), betrays not
2004,[73] Retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo only her gross ignorance as regards the Rule on
evaluated the first five administrative cases, viz: Contempt of Court, but it also shows her
capricious arrogance and despotic nature, the
Migrino presented a certificate that there is no antithesis of an ideal arbiter. It betrays a flaw in
case against him pending with her psychological makeup that disqualifies her
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City. He from presiding a court and dispensing justice.
admits, however, that a case for illegal gambling
was filed against him. That the same may have Respondent inofficiously demanded that
been dismissed does not totally exempt him complainant conduct an inquest at the police
from administrative liability considering that station for the purpose of preventing the release
gambling within the courts premises is of Timoteo Migrino who had earlier been
proscribed by Administrative Circular No. 1- arrested while allegedly engaged in illegal
99[74] issued by the Supreme Court. His act of gambling and had posted the required bail.
playing tong-its with two others within the court Notwithstanding the explanation of complainant
premises makes him punishable under said Reyes that she was not authorized to conduct
circular. said inquest outside her office and the crime of
malversation allegedly committed two years
xxxx earlier could not be the proper subject of an
inquest, respondent could not be denied. She
The acts which appear to have been committed demanded and the police acquiesced to hold
by respondent Judge against Asst. City Migrino in jail over the weekend.
Prosecutor R[o]m[a]na A. Reyes and Andree K.
Lagdameo were clearly unjustified and The prosecution of Prosecutor Reyes was not
unwarranted. The respondent Judges orders to based on any law or rule but was purely the
declare them in contempt and issuing warrants whim and caprice of the respondent. After
for their arrest betray an abysmal lack of respondent Judge has held Prosecutor Reyes in
knowledge of the rules governing contempt and ordered her arrest (Exhibit [F],
contempt. Her fixing an atrociously excessive A[.]M[.] No. MTJ-06-1623, p. 24.) she required
bail is a clear manifestation that respondent an unconscionable amount of Php236,000.00 as
Judge wanted to exhibit her authority and fixing bail knowing that it was practically impossible to
such a ridiculous amount of bail was designed to meet.
prevent the complainants from obtaining Complainant R[o]m[a]na R. Reyes charges
temporary release. Her obvious ignorance of the respondent Judge with falsification of public
rule governing contempt and the jurisprudence documents. It appears that respondent Judge
that mandates that it be exercised as a issued a warrant for the arrest of
protective not a vindictive power makes us complainant. Since no case had been filed
wonder how, despite the rigorous screening of against complainant, respondent Judge
candidates by the Judicial and Bar Council conveniently issued the warrant under Criminal
(JBC), a lemon such as the respondent Judge Cases Nos. 02164 to 02173 (10 counts) which
managed to be nominated for appointment to pertained to cases filed against various persons
such exalted position. How she was able to during the year 1985. The Order of 13 October
elude the psychiatric and psychological tests 2004 (Exhibit [G], Rollo, A.M. MTJ-06-1623)
under which she went is remarkable for it conveniently omitted to show any case numbers.
 43
presiding Judge. She did this probably because
The travails suffered by complainant Lagdameo she felt guilty and could not find any justification
likewise prove that respondent Judge was not for her actions so she fled.
guided by law or rule but rather by whim and
caprice. The record does not show any reason In A.M. No. MTJ-06-1624, the harassment and
why respondent Judge could order the arrest of ill treatment of complainant Migrino was clearly
complainant. Assuming that she had uttered the established. The fact that respondent Judge
words I am going because I may be declared in followed Migrino to the police station and
contempt, this could not be the basis for demanded that he be kept in custody despite the
declaring her in direct contempt because the Order of Release issued by Judge Morallos
court was no longer in session and she ma[d]e upon Migrinos filing his bail both clearly shows
the remark outside the courtroom. It was not her to be whimsical and capricious. The
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court continued detention of Migrino after he was
as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before ordered released under bond is likewise
the same. Neither could it be considered arbitrary and in violation of Article 124 of the
disrespect towards the court. It is probably for Revised Penal Code and respondent Judge is a
this reason that respondent Judge did not issue principal by inducement.
any commitment order but orally commanded
the police to arrest Lagdameo. As can be seen In OCA-IPI No. 04-2048-P, the record reveals
from excerpts from the police blotter (Rollo, A.M. that the respondent Migrino was indicted for
No. MTJ-06-1627, p. 9) Lagdameo was brought illegal gambling having been allegedly
in on December 7, 2004 at 12:30 P.M. and was caught en flagrante by complainant Judge Julia
released on December 8, 2004, at 11[:]50 AM A. Reyes. The record also reveals that a
(ibid. p. 10). The same blotter states: Note: certificate was issued by the Clerk of
Detained w/o written commitment order & Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City tha
released w/o written released. [sic] (Emphasis t there is no pending case against Migrino. Even
and italics in the Report) if we assume that the illegal gambling case
which was filed against Migrino and for which he
Respondents verbal order directed to members had to file his bond was dismissed, it still remains
of the PNP to arrest and jail Lagdameo who that Migrino was seen gambling within the court
languished in said jail for a day is clearly a premises, an act which is proscribed by
violation of Article 124 of the Revised Penal Administrative Circular No. 1-99[75] earlier
Code and respondent Judge is a principal by mentioned.[76] (Emphasis partly in the original
inducement. and partly supplied; italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
The complaint filed by three personnel of Br. 69 Justice
charges respondent Judge with conduct Quimbo thereupon RECOMMENDED that
unbecoming a judge which could be considered Judge Reyes be dismissed from the service with
pecadillos and are covered by circulars and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits except
other issuances of the Court and are punished accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice
by either fines or suspensions or admonitions. to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including
Considering respondent Judges acts government-owned or controlled corporations
complained of by complainants R[o]mana R. and that Migrio be fined in an amount equivalent
Reyes and Andree K. Lagdameo, together with to his one month salary.
the acts committed by respondent Judge and
subject of other administrative cases assigned to Meanwhile, in A.M. No. MTJ-06-1638, Justice
the undersigned, there can only be one Quimbo, by Report of September 25,
conclusion that respondent Judge is suffering 2006,[77] reiterated his recommendation after
from some undiagnosed mental aberration that coming up with the following evaluation:
makes her totally unfit to hold the position she
now occupies. Not only was her gross The complaint mentions acts of respondent
ignorance established but her resort to Judge which are similar, if not identical to those
falsification was also proved. complained of in the following cases, to wit: A.M.
No. MTJ-06-1623 (Prosecutor Romana R.
The records show that respondent Judge was Reyes vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes); A.M. No. MTJ-
suspended and has abandoned her office of 06-1624 (Timeteo A. Migrino, et al. vs. Judge
 44
Julia A. Reyes); A.M. No. MTJ-06-1625 (Armi their office.[80] Unfortunately, respondent Judge
Flordeliza, et al. vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes); A.M. failed to resist the temptations of power which
No. MTJ-06-1627 (Andree Lagdameo vs. Judge eventually led her to transgress the very law she
Julia A. Reyes) which the undersigned had swore to protect and uphold.
earlier investigated and reported on. Our
conclusion remains firm that respondent To constitute gross ignorance of the law or
Judge is unfit to hold the position of procedure, the subject decision, order or
Presiding Judge of a Metropolitan Trial actuation of the judge in the performance of
Court. official duties should be contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence. Most importantly, the judge
In the present case, she is charged with must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty
ignorance because she had issued a bench or corruption.[81]
warrant against the complainant and his wife for
their failure to appear on a date that respondent Judge Reyes bad faith is clearly apparent from
Judge fixed for the continuation of the trial. While the above-related facts and circumstances in the
she may be correct in assuming that she had the consolidated cases. This Court cannot shrug off
authority to issue such warrant, said act was her failure to exercise that degree of care and
clearly unjustified. Firstly, it does not appear in temperance required of a judge in the correct
the record of the case that complainant or his and prompt administration of justice, more so in
wife received notice of said hearing. Neither these cases where her exercise of the power of
does it appear that their counsel received a copy contempt resulted in the detention and
of the Order of 15 August 2003 which contained deprivation of liberty of Migrio, Andree,
the said setting. Secondly, there was no longer Sebastian and Alicia, and endangered the
any trial to speak of because the case had freedom of the other complainants. Tiongco v.
already been submitted for decision and the Salao[82] is instructive:
complainant (accused therein) had no longer
any need for appearing.[78] (Emphasis and Thus, the carelessness and lack of
underscoring supplied) circumspection on respondent Judges part,
to say the least, in peremptorily ordering the
THIS COURTS RULING arrest and detention of complainant, warrant
the imposition of a penalty on respondent
The Court finds that Judge Julia Reyes should Judge as a corrective measure, so that she
indeed be dismissed from the service. and others may be properly warned about
carelessness in the application of the proper law
As early as 1949, this Court emphasized that the and undue severity in ordering the detention of
administration of justice is a lofty function. complainant immediately and depriving him of
the opportunity to seek recourse from higher
The administration of justice is a lofty function courts against the summary penalty of
and is no less sacred than a religious mission imprisonment imposed by respondent Judge.
itself. Those who are called upon to render
service in it must follow that norm of conduct It is also well-settled that the power to declare a
compatible only with public faith and trust in their person in contempt is inherent in all courts so as
impartiality, sense of responsibility, exercising to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to
the same devotion to duty and unction done by uphold the administration of justice. Judges,
a priest in the performance of the most sacred however, are enjoined to exercise such
ceremonies of a religious liturgy.[79] power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end view of utilizing
the same for correction and preservation of
By judges appointment to the office, the people the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation
have laid on them their confidence that they are or vindication. The salutary rule is that the
mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits power to punish for contempt for purposes that
of their varied contentions. For this reason, are impersonal, because that power is intended
members of the judiciary are expected to be as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but
fearless in their pursuit to render justice, to be for the functions that they exercise. Only
unafraid to displease any person, interest or occasionally should the court invoke the inherent
power, and to be equipped with a moral fiber power in order to retain that respect without
strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in
 45
which the administration of justice must falter or the above-mentioned places impairs the respect
fail.[83] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) due her, which in turn necessarily affects the
Being a dispenser of justice, Judge Reyes, a image of the judiciary. A judge is a visible
lady judge at that, should have demonstrated representation of the judiciary and, more often
finesse in her choice of words. In this case, the than not, the public cannot separate the judge
words used by her was hardly the kind of from the judiciary. Moreover, her act of bringing
circumspect language expected of a magistrate. some of her staff to her weekday gimmicks, that
The use of vulgar and curt language does not causes them to be absent or late for work
befit the person of a judge who is viewed by the disrupts the speedy administration of
public as a person of wisdom and service. She thus also failed to heed the
scruples.[84] Remarks such as Ano kaya kung mandate of the New Code of Judicial
mag-hearing ako ng hubot hubad tapos naka- Conduct, viz:
robe lang, pwede kaya?; Hayaan mo, Farah,
pag natikman ko na siya, ipapasa ko sa iyo, ha SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and
ha ha!; and Alam mo na ang dami intriga dito; the appearance of impropriety in all of their
nireport ba naman na nakatira ako dito, ano activities.
kaya masama dun? Alam ko staff ko rin
nagsumbong eh, PUTANG INA NILA, PUTANG SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny,
INA TALAGA NILA! have no place in the judges must accept personal restrictions that
judiciary. might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
Those who don the judicial robe must observe citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
judicial decorum which requires magistrates to particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a
be at all times temperate in their language, way that is consistent with the dignity of the
refraining from inflammatory or excessive judicial office.[89]
rhetoric or from resorting to the language of
vilification.[85]
As for Judge Reyes act of borrowing money from
Judge Reyes failed to heed this injunction, her staff, the same constitutes conduct
however. Her inability to control her emotions unbecoming a judge. While there is nothing
her act of walking out of the courtroom during wrong per se with borrowing money, it must be
hearings, and her shouting invectives at her staff borne in mind that she exerted moral
and lawyers indicate her unfitness to sit on the ascendancy over her staff, who may not have
bench. They betray her failure to exercise had the means but may have been forced to find
judicial temperament at all times, and maintain a way in order not to displease her.
composure and equanimity.[86]
Judge Reyes questioned actions reflect her lack Judge Reyes comments like Armie, ang hina mo
of patience, an essential part of dispensing naman sumingil sa ex-parte, buti pa si Leah.
justice; and of courtesy, a mark of culture and Dapat pag tinanong ka kung magkano, sabihin
good breeding. Her demonstrated belligerence mo at least P2,000.00 and Sino pa ba ibang
and lack of self-restraint and civility have no pwedeng pagkakitaan dito? O ikaw
place in the government service.[87] Oswald, sheriff smack of commercialism. This is
not expected of a judge, knowing that the aim of
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the the judiciary is to deliver speedy and
Philippine Judiciary (New Code of Judicial inexpensive justice.[90]
Conduct), which took effect on June 1,
2004, mandates: Respecting Judge Reyes failure to put into
writing her judgment, she having merely
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and required the accused to read it from the
decorum in all proceedings before the court and computer screen in camera without the
be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to presence of counsel, she violated the
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with Constitution. She could have simply printed and
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. signed the decision. Offering to a partys counsel
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal a diskette containing the decision when such
representatives, court staff and others subject to counsel demands a written copy thereof is
their influence, direction or control.[88] unheard of in the judiciary. A verbal judgment is,
Respecting Judge Reyes frequent nocturnal in contemplation of law, in esse, ineffective.[91] If
gimmicks, suffice it to state that her presence in Judge Reyes was not yet prepared to
 46
promulgate the decision as it was not yet printed,
she could have called the case later and have it
printed first. A party should not be left in the dark
on what issues to raise before the appellate
court.

It is a requirement of due process that the

parties to a litigation be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court. The court cannot simply say that judgment
is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just
leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal
to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe
that the decision should be reversed. A decision
that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based leaves the
parties in the dark as to how it was reached and
is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who
is unable to in point the possible errors of the
court for review by a higher tribunal.[92]

If judges were allowed to roam unrestricted

beyond the boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their
office, then the law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws excludes the exercise of
broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority.[93]

IN FINE, this Court finds Judge Reyes unfit to

discharge her functions as judge.

WHEREFORE, Judge Julia A. Reyes, Presiding

Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
69, Pasig City, is DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice
to re-employment in any branch of the
government including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo A. Migrio is, for

violation of Administrative Circular No. 1-99, by
gambling in the court premises, FINED in the
amount equivalent to his one-month salary. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same act or
the commission of a similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.
 47
3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners
suggest that there should be no distinction
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. between laws of general applicability and those
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF which are not; that publication means complete
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, publication; and that the publication must be
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs. In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as General, he claimed first that the motion was a
Executive Assistant to the President, HON. request for an advisory opinion and should
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that
Executive Assistant to the President, the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
AL., respondents. publication required therein was not always
imperative; that publication, when necessary,
RESOLUTION did not have to be made in the Official Gazette;
and that in any case the subject decision was
CRUZ, J.: concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next
demanding the disclosure of a number of the February Revolution and the Court required
presidential decrees which they claimed had not the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in
been published as required by law. The view of the supervening events, under Rule 3,
government argued that while publication was Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding,
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was he submitted that issuances intended only for
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees the internal administration of a government
themselves declared that they were to become agency or for particular persons did not have to
effective immediately upon their approval. In the be 'Published; that publication when necessary
decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and
affirmed the necessity for the publication of that, however, the decision under
some of these decrees, declaring in the reconsideration was not binding because it was
dispositive portion as follows: not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all Code providing as follows:
unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
they shall have no binding force and effect. following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
The petitioners are now before us again, this provided. This Code shall take effect one year
time to move for reconsideration/clarification of after such publication.
that decision. 1Specifically, they ask the
following questions: After a careful study of this provision and of the
arguments of the parties, both on the original
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or petition and on the instant motion, we have come
"general applicability"? to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
general applicability and laws which are not? publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective
 48
immediately upon approval, or on any other public interest which any member of the body
date, without its previous publication. politic may question in the political forums or, if
he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
the legislature may in its discretion provide that would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
or extended. An example, as pointed out by the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
present Chief Justice in his separate affect the public interest even if it might be
concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil directly applicable only to one individual, or
Code which did not become effective after fifteen some of the people only, and t to the public as a
days from its publication in the Official Gazette whole.
but "one year after such publication." The
general rule did not apply because it was We hold therefore that all statutes, including
"otherwise provided. " those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity,
It is not correct to say that under the disputed which shall begin fifteen days after publication
clause publication may be dispensed with unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
altogether. The reason. is that such omission legislature.
would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are Covered by this rule are presidential decrees
supposed to govern the legislature could validly and executive orders promulgated by the
provide that a law e effective immediately upon President in the exercise of legislative powers
its approval notwithstanding the lack of whenever the same are validly delegated by the
publication (or after an unreasonably short legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
period after publication), it is not unlikely that the Constitution. administrative rules and
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a regulations must a also be published if their
result and they would be so not because of a purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
failure to comply with but simply because they pursuant also to a valid delegation.
did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is
not true only of penal laws as is commonly Interpretative regulations and those merely
supposed. One can think of many non-penal internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
measures, like a law on prescription, which must personnel of the administrative agency and not
also be communicated to the persons they may the public, need not be published. Neither is
affect before they can begin to operate. publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors
We note at this point the conclusive presumption concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
that every person knows the law, which of by their subordinates in the performance of their
course presupposes that the law has been duties.
published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights published notwithstanding that it applies to only
recognizes "the right of the people to information a portion of the national territory and directly
on matters of public concern," and this certainly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
applies to, among others, and indeed especially, presidential decrees must be published,
the legislative enactments of the government. including even, say, those naming a public place
after a favored individual or exempting him from
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not certain prohibitions or requirements. The
only to those of general application, for strictly circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be
speaking all laws relate to the people in general published if they are meant not merely to
albeit there are some that do not apply to them interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship Bank Act which that body is supposed to
to a particular individual, like a relative of enforce.
President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such However, no publication is required of the
a law does not affect the public although it instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the Welfare on the case studies to be made in
people. The subject of such law is a matter of petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by
 49
the head of a government agency on the At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule
assignments or workload of his personnel or the upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify
wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, it if we find it impractical. That is not our function.
municipal ordinances are not covered by this That function belongs to the legislature. Our task
rule but by the Local Government Code. is merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political
We agree that publication must be in full or it is departments of the government in accordance
no publication at all since its purpose is to inform with the prescribed procedure. Consequently,
the public of the contents of the laws. As we have no choice but to pronounce that under
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws
mention of the number of the presidential must be made in the Official Gazett and not
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed after fifteen days from such publication or after a
date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of different period provided by the legislature.
the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even We also hold that the publication must be made
substantial compliance. This was the manner, forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2.
Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree There is that possibility, of course, although not
undeniably of general applicability and interest, suggested by the parties that a law could be
was "published" by the Marcos rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
7
administration. The evident purpose was to executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
withhold rather than disclose information on this publication as required. This is a matter,
vital law. however, that we do not need to examine at this
time.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that
only four justices were categorically for Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General
publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six that the instant motion is a request for an
others felt that publication could be made advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least,
elsewhere as long as the people were and deserves no further comment.
sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his
vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the The days of the secret laws and the unpublished
need for due publication without indicating decrees are over. This is once again an open
where it should be made. 11 It is therefore society, with all the acts of the government
necessary for the present membership of this subject to public scrutiny and available always to
Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this public cognizance. This has to be so if our
matter and to lay down a binding decision country is to remain democratic, with
supported by the necessary vote. sovereignty residing in the people and all
government authority emanating from them.
There is much to be said of the view that the
publication need not be made in the Official Although they have delegated the power of
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and legislation, they retain the authority to review the
limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it
general circulation could better perform the according to their lights, through their freedom of
function of communicating, the laws to the expression and their right of suffrage. This they
people as such periodicals are more easily cannot do if the acts of the legislature are
available, have a wider readership, and come concealed.
out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this
kind of publication is not the one required or Laws must come out in the open in the clear light
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
to such a law, and we have no information that it recognized as binding unless their existence and
exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been contents are confirmed by a valid publication
published. intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
 50
scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut process and to information on matters of public
unless the naked blade is drawn. concern.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws FELICIANO, J., concurring:

as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so
published in full in the Official Gazette, to eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
become effective only after fifteen days from At the same time, I wish to add a few statements
their publication, or on another date specified by to reflect my understanding of what the Court is
the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the saying.
Civil Code.
A statute which by its terms provides for its
SO ORDERED. coming into effect immediately upon approval
thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, effect immediately upon publication thereof in
Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the
Paras, JJ., concur. Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should
not be regarded as purporting literally to come
into effect immediately upon its approval or
enactment and without need of publication. For
Separate Opinions so to interpret such statute would be to collide
with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due
FERNAN, J., concurring: process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to and
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned unknowable by those subjected to the statute,
by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice has been throughout history a common tool of
Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few tyrannical governments. Such application and
observations. Even as a Member of the defunct enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of
Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand the fundamental principle of legality in the
against the insidious manner by which the relations between a government and its people.
previous dispensation had promulgated and
made effective thousands of decrees, executive At the same time, it is clear that the requirement
orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette,
law-making power which traditionally belongs to as distinguished from any other medium such as
the legislature been used and abused to satisfy a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied
the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in command. The statutory norm is set out in Article
those days, it was not surprising to witness the 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and
sad spectacle of two presidential decrees reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
bearing the same number, although covering No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised
two different subject matters. In point is the case Administrative Code. A specification of the
of two presidential decrees bearing number Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of
1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting publication may therefore be changed. Article 2
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the of the Civil Code could, without creating a
then President's nephew and the other imposing constitutional problem, be amended by a
a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March newspaper of general circulation in the country.
19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to Until such an amendatory statute is in fact
basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be
George Still obeyed and publication effected in the Official
Gazette and not in any other medium.
The categorical statement by this Court on the
need for publication before any law may be
made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part
of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures Separate Opinions
to the people their constitutional right to due
 51
FERNAN, J., concurring: process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to and
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned unknowable by those subjected to the statute,
by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice has been throughout history a common tool of
Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few tyrannical governments. Such application and
observations. Even as a Member of the defunct enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of
Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand the fundamental principle of legality in the
against the insidious manner by which the relations between a government and its people.
previous dispensation had promulgated and
made effective thousands of decrees, executive At the same time, it is clear that the requirement
orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette,
law-making power which traditionally belongs to as distinguished from any other medium such as
the legislature been used and abused to satisfy a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied
the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in command. The statutory norm is set out in Article
those days, it was not surprising to witness the 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and
sad spectacle of two presidential decrees reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
bearing the same number, although covering No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised
two different subject matters. In point is the case Administrative Code. A specification of the
of two presidential decrees bearing number Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of
1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting publication may therefore be changed. Article 2
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the of the Civil Code could, without creating a
then President's nephew and the other imposing constitutional problem, be amended by a
a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with subsequent statute providing, for instance, for
airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March newspaper of general circulation in the country.
19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to Until such an amendatory statute is in fact
basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be
George Still obeyed and publication effected in the Official
Gazette and not in any other medium.
The categorical statement by this Court on the
need for publication before any law may be
made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part
of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures
to the people their constitutional right to due
process and to information on matters of public
concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so

eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
At the same time, I wish to add a few statements
to reflect my understanding of what the Court is
saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its

coming into effect immediately upon approval
thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into
effect immediately upon publication thereof in
the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the
Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should
not be regarded as purporting literally to come
into effect immediately upon its approval or
enactment and without need of publication. For
so to interpret such statute would be to collide
with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due
 52
Not satisfied, the plaintiff-appellant interposed
the present appeal, and urges that the failure of
service of a copy of the decision upon the late
Severo Domingo was a denial of due process,
which invalidates the decision, and asks that, on
equitable grounds, the present case be heard as
a proceeding coram nobis.

G.R. No. L-17938 April 30, 1963 Assuming the truth of the allegation that Severo
Domingo, appellant's predecessor-in-interest,
ESPERIDION TOLENTINO, plaintiff-appellant, was never furnished a copy of the decision in
vs. G.R. No. L-32776, it appears in the printed report
ADELA ONGSIAKO, ET AL., defendants- of the case (55 Phil. 361) that he was
appellees. represented by Atty. Ramon Diokno. Being
represented by counsel, service of the decision
Esperidion Tolentino for and in his own behalf as is made upon the latter by the clerk of the
plaintiff-appellant. Supreme Court (Sec. 250, Act 190), and not
Edmundo M. Reyes and Senen Ceniza for upon the client (Palad vs. Cui, 28 Phil. 44); and
defendants-appellees. the unrebutted presumption is that the said
official of this Court had regularly performed his
REYES, J.B.L., J.: duty (No. 14, Sec. 334, Act 190; Sec. 69 [m],
Rule 123, Rules of Court). Appellant's alleged
Appeal from the order of dismissal of the Court predecessor-in-interest was not, therefore,
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its Civil Case denied due process of law.
No. 3197.
Appellant's position that the decision was
The plaintiff-appellant, Esperidion Tolentino, erroneous and unjust is entirely untenable,
prays in the complaint that he filed with the lower because the issue sought to be reopened is res
court on 20 May 1959, for the enforcement of the judicata, aside from its having stood
dissenting opinion rendered in the case entitled unchallenged for 30 years. The ridiculous prayer
"Severo Domingo, et al. vs. Santos Ongsiako, et to enforce a dissenting opinion requires no
al., G.R. No. 32776." discussion, it being sufficient to state that there
is nothing to enforce in a dissenting opinion,
since it affirms or overrules no claim, right, or
The decision in said case (in favor of appellees'
obligation, and neither disposes of, nor awards,
predecessors, and adverse to those of
anything; it merely expresses the views of the
appellant) was promulgated by this Court on 4
dissenter.
December 1930, and, together with the
dissenting opinion, appears in Volume 55 of the
Philippine Reports, starting on page 361. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
Unfortunately, the records of said case were foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
lost, or destroyed, during the war. approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence
to prove their case not covered by this stipulation
The plaintiff-appellant claims to be the
of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
successor-interest of the late Severo Domingo,
who died without having received a copy of the
decision, and alleges that plaintiff-appellant Lastly, the appellant's claim that "the lower court
learned of the decision, only about a week erred in not allowing plaintiff-appellant's cause
before he filed the aforementioned complaint; as a proceeding coram nobis", is devoid of merit.
that the decision of the majority of the Court was The ancient common law writ of error coram
erroneous and unjust; that the dissenting opinion nobis, now substantially obsolete even in
is the correct view of the case, and should be common law jurisdictions (49 CJS 561), does
enforced. The court below, on motion of one of not lie after affirmance of a judgment on writ of
the several defendants, dismissed the case, for error on appeal (49 CJS 562); nor can it be
lack of cause of action. grounded on facts already in issue and
adjudicated on the trial (49 CJS 567). Moreover,
the jurisdiction of a writ of error coram nobis lies
exclusively in the court which rendered the
 53
judgment sought to be corrected (49 CJS 568),
so that it should have been sought by appellants,
if at all, in the Supreme Court, and not in the
Court of First Instance.

In the Philippines, no court appears to have ever

recognized such writ, the rule in this jurisdiction
being that public policy and sound practice
demand that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final and
irrevocable at some definite date fixed by
law.1 Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium.

The order of dismissal appealed from is

affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
 54
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." It provides as
follows:

Sec. (1). The first paragraph of item (1),

paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:

(1) Personal Exemptions allowable to individuals

–– (1) Basic personal exemption as follows:
G.R. No. 104037 May 29, 1992
For single individual or married individual
REYNALDO V. UMALI, petitioner, judicially decreed as legally separated with no
vs. qualified dependents P9,000
HON. JESUS P. ESTANISLAO, Secretary of
Finance, and HON. JOSE U. ONG, For head of a family P12,000
Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, respondents. For married individual P18,000

G.R. No. 104069 May 29, 1992 Provided, That husband and wife electing to
compute their income tax separately shall be
RENE B. GOROSPE, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, entitled to a personal exemption of P9,000 each.
MANUEL M. SUNGA, PAUL D. UNGOS,
BIENVENIDO T. JAMORALIN, JR., JOSE D. Sec. 2. The first paragraph of item (2) (A),
FLORES, JR., EVELYN G. VILLEGAS, paragraph (1) of Section 29 of the same Code,
DOMINGO T. LIGOT, HENRY E. LARON, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
PASTOR M. DALMACION, JR., and, JULIUS as follows:
NORMAN C. CERRADA, petitioners,
(2) Additional exemption.
vs
(a) Taxpayers with dependents. –– A married
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL individual or a head of family shall be allowed an
REVENUE, respondent. additional exemption of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000) for each dependent: Provided, That the
Rene B. Gorospe, Leighton R. Siazon, Manuel total number of dependents for which additional
M. Sunga, Bienvinido T. Jamoralin, Jr and Paul exemptions may be claimed shall not exceed
D. Ungos for petitioners. four dependents: Provided, further, That an
additional exemption of One Thousand Pesos
(1,000) shall be allowed for each child who
otherwise qualified as dependent prior to
PADILLA, J.: January 1, 1980: Provided, finally, That the
additional exemption for dependents shall be
These consolidated cases are petitions claimed by only one of the spouses in case of
for mandamus and prohibition, premised upon married individuals electing to compute their
the following undisputed facts: income tax liabilities separately.

Congress enacted Rep. Act 7167, entitled "AN Sec. 3. This act shall take effect upon its
ACT ADJUSTING THE BASIC PERSONAL approval.
AND ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS
ALLOWABLE TO INDIVIDUALS FOR INCOME Approved. 1
TAX PURPOSES TO THE POVERTY
THRESHOLD LEVEL, AMENDING FOR THE The said act was signed and approved by the
PURPOSE SECTION 29, PARAGRAPH (L), President on 19 December 1991 and published
ITEMS (1) AND (2) (A) OF THE NATIONAL on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, general circulation.
 55
On 26 December 1991, respondents In the Court's resolution of 10 March 1992, these
promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92, the two (2) cases were consolidated. Respondents
pertinent portions of which read as follows: were required to comment on the petitions,
which they did within the prescribed period.
Sec. 1. SCOPE –– Pursuant to Sections 245 and
72 of the National Internal Revenue Code in The principal issues to be resolved in these
relation to Republic Act No. 7167, these cases are: (1) whether or not Rep. Act 7167 took
Regulations are hereby promulgated prescribing effect upon its approval by the President on 19
the collection at source of income tax on December 1991, or on 30 January
compensation income paid on or after January 1992, i.e., after fifteen (15) days following its
1, 1992 under the Revised Withholding Tax publication on 14 January 1992 in the "Malaya"
Tables (ANNEX "A") which take into account the a newspaper of general circulation; and (2)
increase of personal and additional exemptions. assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30
January 1992, whether or not the said law
xxx xxx xxx nonetheless covers or applies to compensation
income earned or received during calendar year
Sec. 3. Section 8 of Revenue Regulations No. 6- 1991.
82 is amended by Revenue Regulations No. 1-
86 is hereby further amended to read as follows: In resolving the first issue, it will be recalled that
the Court in its resolution in Caltex (Phils.),
Section 8. –– Right to claim the following Inc. vs. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
exemptions. . . . G.R. No. 97282, 26 June 1991 –– which is on all
fours with this case as to the first issue –– held:
Each employee shall be allowed to claim the
following amount of exemption with respect to The central issue presented in the instant
compensation paid on or after January 1, 1992. petition is the effectivity of R.A. 6965 entitled "An
Act Revising The Form of Taxation on Petroleum
xxx xxx xxx Products from Ad Valorem to Specific,
Amending For the Purpose Section 145 of the
Sec. 5. EFFECTIVITY. –– These regulations National Internal Revenue Code, As amended
shall take effect on compensation income from by Republic Act Numbered Sixty Seven Hundred
January 1, 1992. Sixty Seven."

On 27 February 1992, the petitioner in G.R. No. Sec. 3 of R.A. 6965 contains the effectivity
104037, a taxpayer and a resident of Gitnang clause which provides. "This Act shall take effect
Bayan Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, filed a upon its approval"
petition for mandamus for himself and in behalf
all individual Filipino taxpayers, to COMPEL the R.A. 6965 was approved on September 19,
respondents to implement Rep. Act 7167 with 1990. It was published in the Philippine Journal,
respect to taxable income of individual taxpayers a newspaper of general circulation in the
earned or received on or after 1 January 1991 or Philippines, on September 20, 1990. Pursuant to
as of taxable year ending 31 December 1991. the Act, an implementing regulation was issued
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
On 28 February 1992, the petitioners in G.R. No. Revenue Memorandum Circular 85-90, stating
104069 likewise filed a petition that R.A. 6965 took effect on October 5, 1990.
for mandamus and prohibition on their behalf as Petitioner took exception thereof and argued
well as for those other individual taxpayers who that the law took effect on September 20, 1990
might be similarly situated, to compel the instead.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to implement
the mandate of Rep. Act 7167 adjusting the Pertinent is Article 2 of the Civil Code (as
personal and additional exemptions allowable to amended by Executive Order No. 200) which
individuals for income tax purposes in regard to provides:
income earned or received in 1991, and to enjoin
the respondents from implementing Revenue Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
Regulations No. 1-92. following the completion of their publication
either in the official Gazette or in a newspaper of
 56
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is providing for such adjustment. But the President
otherwise provided. . . . did not.

In the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera (L-63915, However, House Bill 28970, which was
December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 452) we subsequently enacted by Congress as Rep. Act
construed Article 2 of the Civil Code and laid 7167, was introduced in the House of
down the rule: Representatives in 1989 although its passage
was delayed and it did not become effective law
. . .: the) clause "unless it is otherwise provided" until 30 January 1992. A perusal, however, of the
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the sponsorship remarks of Congressman
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in Hernando B. Perez, Chairman of the House
any event be omitted. This clause does not Committee on Ways and Means, on House Bill
mean that the legislator may make the law 28970, provides an indication of the intent of
effective immediately upon approval, or on any Congress in enacting Rep. Act 7167. The
other date without its previous publication. pertinent legislative journal contains the
following:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but
the legislature may in its discretion provide that At the outset, Mr. Perez explained that the Bill
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened Provides for increased personal additional
or extended. . . . exemptions to individuals in view of the higher
standard of living.
Inasmuch as R.A. 6965 has no specific date for
its effectivity and neither can it become effective The Bill, he stated, limits the amount of income
upon its approval notwithstanding its express of individuals subject to income tax to enable
statement, following Article 2 of the Civil Code them to spend for basic necessities and have
and the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, supra, more disposable income.
R.A. 6965 took effect fifteen days after
September 20, 1990, or specifically, on October xxx xxx xxx
5, 1990.
Mr. Perez added that inflation has raised the
Accordingly, the Court rules that Rep. Act 7167 basic necessities and that it had been three
took effect on 30 January 1992, which is after years since the last exemption adjustment in
fifteen (15) days following its publication on 14 1986.
January 1992 in the "Malaya."
xxx xxx xxx
Coming now to the second issue, the Court is of
the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should Subsequently, Mr. Perez stressed the necessity
cover or extend to compensation income earned of passing the measure to mitigate the effects of
or received during calendar year 1991. the current inflation and of the implementation of
the salary standardization law. Stating that it is
Sec. 29, par. (L), Item No. 4 of the National imperative for the government to take measures
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides: to ease the burden of the individual income tax
filers, Mr. Perez then cited specific examples of
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of how the measure can help assuage the burden
Finance, the President shall automatically adjust to the taxpayers.
not more often than once every three years, the
personal and additional exemptions taking into He then reiterated that the increase in the prices
account, among others, the movement in of commodities has eroded the purchasing
consumer price indices, levels of minimum power of the peso despite the recent salary
wages, and bare subsistence levels. increases and emphasized that the Bill will serve
to compensate the adverse effects of inflation on
As the personal and additional exemptions of the taxpayers. . . . (Journal of the House of
individual taxpayers were last adjusted in 1986, Representatives, May 23, 1990, pp. 32-33).
the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, could have adjusted the It will also be observed that Rep. Act 7167
personal and additional exemptions in 1989 by speaks of the adjustments that it provides for, as
increasing the same even without any legislation adjustments "to the poverty threshold level."
 57
Certainly, "the poverty threshold level" is the The personal exemptions as increased by Rep.
poverty threshold level at the time Rep. Act 7167 Act 7167 cannot be regarded as
was enacted by Congress, not poverty threshold available only in respect of compensation
levels in futuro, at which time there may be need income received during 1992, as the
of further adjustments in personal exemptions. implementing Revenue Regulations No. 1-92
Moreover, the Court can not lose sight of the fact purport to provide. Revenue Regulations No. 1-
that these personal and additional exemptions 92 would in effect postpone the availability of the
are fixed amounts to which an individual increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April
taxpayer is entitled, as a means to cushion the 1993, and thus literally defer the effectivity of
devastating effects of high prices and a Rep. Act 7167 to 1 January 1993. Thus, the
depreciated purchasing power of the currency. implementing regulations collide frontally with
In the end, it is the lower-income and the middle- Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the
income groups of taxpayers (not the high- statute "shall take effect upon its approval." The
income taxpayers) who stand to benefit most objective of the Secretary of Finance and the
from the increase of personal and additional Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
exemptions provided for by Rep. Act 7167. To postponing through Revenue Regulations No. 1-
that extent, the act is a social legislation intended 92 the legal effectivity of Rep. Act 7167 is, of
to alleviate in part the present economic plight of course, entirely understandable –– to defer to
the lower income taxpayers. It is intended to 1993 the reduction of governmental tax
remedy the inadequacy of the heretofore revenues which irresistibly follows from the
existing personal and additional exemptions for application of Rep. Act 7167. But the law-making
individual taxpayers. authority has spoken and the Court can not
refuse to apply the law-maker's words. Whether
And then, Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased or not the government can afford the drop in tax
personal exemptions that it provides for shall be revenues resulting from such increased
available thenceforth, that is, after Rep. Act 7167 exemptions was for Congress (not this Court) to
shall have become effective. In other words, decide.
these exemptions are available upon the filing of
personal income tax returns which is, under the WHEREFORE, Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Revenue
National Internal Revenue Code, done not later Regulations No. 1-92 which provide that the
than the 15th day of April after the end of a regulations shall take effect on compensation
calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, income earned or received from 1 January 1992
which became effective, as aforestated, on 30 are hereby SET ASIDE. They should take effect
January 1992, the increased exemptions are on compensation income earned or received
literally available on or before 15 April from 1 January 1991.
1992 (though not before 30 January 1992). But
these increased exemptions can be available on Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April
15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation 1992, the individual taxpayers entitled to the
income earned or received during the calendar increased exemptions on compensation income
year 1991. earned during calendar year 1991 who may
have filed their income tax returns on or before
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. 15 April 1992 (later extended to 24 April 1992)
Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available in without the benefit of such increased
respect of compensation income received during exemptions, are entitled to the corresponding
the 1990 calendar year; the tax due in respect of tax refunds and/or credits, and respondents are
said income had already accrued, and been ordered to effect such refunds and/or credits. No
presumably paid, by 15 April 1991 and by 15 costs.
July 1991, at which time Rep. Act 7167 had not
been enacted. To make Rep. Act 7167 refer SO ORDERED.
back to income received during 1990 would
require language explicitly retroactive in purport Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin,
and effect, language that would have to Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide,
authorize the payment of refunds of taxes paid Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
on 15 April 1991 and 15 July 1991: such
language is simply not found in Rep. Act 7167. Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:

 58
I wish to concur with the majority opinion penned It is very clear and needs no interpretation or
in this case by Justice Teodoro Padilla, because construction.
I believe that the tax exemptions referred to in
the law should be effective already with respect CRUZ. J., concurring:
to the income earned for the year 1991. After all,
even if We say that the law became effective As the ponente of Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA
only in 1992, still this can refer only to the income 446, I should like to make these brief
obtained in 1991 since after all, what should be observations on my brother Paras's separate
filed in 1992 is the income tax return of the opinion. He says that "the ratio decidendi in that
income earned in 1991. case was the ruling that without publication,
there can be no effectivity." Yet, while accepting
However, I wish to dissent from the part of the this, he contends that, pursuant to its terms, R.A.
decision which affirms the obiter 7167 became effective upon approval (i.e., even
dictum enunciated in the case of Tanada without publication). He adds that "since this law
vs.Tuvera (146 SCRA 446, 452) to the effect was approved by the President in December,
that a law becomes effective not on the date 1991, its subsequent publication in the January
expressly provided for in said law, but on the 1992 issue of the Civil Code is actually
date after fifteen (15) days from the publication immaterial." I confess I am profoundly bemused.
in the Official Gazette or any national newspaper
of general circulation. I say obiter
dictum because the doctrine mentioned is not
the actual issue in the case of Tanada Separate Opinions
vs. Tuvera(supra). In that case, several
presidential decrees of President Marcos were PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
issued, but they were never published in the
Official Gazette or in any national newspaper of I wish to concur with the majority opinion penned
general circulation. The real issue therefore in in this case by Justice Teodoro Padilla, because
said case was whether or not said presidential I believe that the tax exemptions referred to in
decrees ever became effective. The Court ruled the law should be effective already with respect
with respect to this issue (and not any other to the income earned for the year 1991. After all,
issue –– since there was no other issue even if We say that the law became effective
whatsoever), that said presidential decrees only in 1992, still this can refer only to the income
never became effective. In other words, the ratio obtained in 1991 since after all, what should be
decidendi in that case was the ruling that without filed in 1992 is the income tax return of the
publication, there can be no effectivity. Thus, the income earned in 1991.
statement as to which should be applied ––
"after fifteen (15) days from publication" or However, I wish to dissent from the part of the
"unless otherwise provided by law" (Art. 2, Civil decision which affirms the obiter
Code) was mere obiter. The subsequent ruling dictum enunciated in the case of Tanada
in the resolution dated June 26, 1991 in Caltex, vs.Tuvera (146 SCRA 446, 452) to the effect
Inc. vs. Com. of Internal Revenue cannot that a law becomes effective not on the date
likewise apply because it was based on the expressly provided for in said law, but on the
aforesaid obiter in Tanada v. Tuvera (supra). In date after fifteen (15) days from the publication
the instant tax exemptions case, the law in the Official Gazette or any national newspaper
says effective upon approval, therefore, since of general circulation. I say obiter
this law was approved by the President in dictum because the doctrine mentioned is not
December, 1991, its subsequent publication in the actual issue in the case of Tanada
the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code is vs. Tuvera(supra). In that case, several
actually immaterial. presidential decrees of President Marcos were
issued, but they were never published in the
Art. 2 of the Civil Code which states: Official Gazette or in any national newspaper of
general circulation. The real issue therefore in
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following said case was whether or not said presidential
the completion of their publication in the Official decrees ever became effective. The Court ruled
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This with respect to this issue (and not any other
Code shall take effect one year after such issue –– since there was no other issue
publication. whatsoever), that said presidential decrees
 59
never became effective. In other words, the ratio
decidendi in that case was the ruling that without
publication, there can be no effectivity. Thus, the
statement as to which should be applied ––
"after fifteen (15) days from publication" or
"unless otherwise provided by law" (Art. 2, Civil
Code) was mere obiter. The subsequent ruling
in the resolution dated June 26, 1991 in Caltex,
Inc. vs. Com. of Internal Revenue cannot
likewise apply because it was based on the
aforesaid obiter in Tanada v. Tuvera (supra). In
the instant tax exemptions case, the law
says effective upon approval, therefore, since
this law was approved by the President in
December, 1991, its subsequent publication in
the January 1992 issue of the Civil Code is
actually immaterial.

Art. 2 of the Civil Code which states:

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following

the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This
Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

It is very clear and needs no interpretation or

construction.

CRUZ. J., concurring:

As the ponente of Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA

446, I should like to make these brief
observations on my brother Paras's separate
opinion. He says that "the ratio decidendi in that
case was the ruling that without publication,
there can be no effectivity." Yet, while accepting
this, he contends that, pursuant to its terms, R.A.
7167 became effective upon approval (i.e., even
without publication). He adds that "since this law
was approved by the President in December,
1991, its subsequent publication in the January
1992 issue of the Civil Code is actually
immaterial." I confess I am profoundly bemused.
 60
area covered by TCT No. 97084 prior to the
institution of the case. Their complaint-in-
intervention was allowed.

On July 17, 1989, Corazon Rodriguez (as

administratrix of the estate of de Leon) and
petitioner entered into a compromise
agreement. Petitioner paid
Rodriguez P3,500,000 in exchange for the
release of the lis pendens annotation on the
individual titles of the properties involved in Civil
Case No. 455-R, and the dismissal of the case
G.R. No. 171469 August 11, 2008 without costs. The court approved the
compromise agreement, thereby terminating the
V.C. PONCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, case between petitioner and Rodriguez.
vs.
RODOLFO REYES, JOSE MONASTERIAL, Respondents, however, refused to compromise
JR., BENJAMIN PENARANDA, JOSE and the complaint-in-intervention was tried on
SAMBO, TEOFILO VIRAY, ANTONIO the merits. In a decision3 dated December 6,
ALFONSO, CEFERINO ARICHEA, DAVID 1989, the Pasay City RTC ruled in favor of
BAQUIRIN, JUANITO BEO, ADMIRADO respondents. The dispositive portion of the
COMERTA, ALBERTO CORVERA, ROMEO decision read:
MAPILE, CRESANCIO MARQUEZ, JR.,
ALEJANDRO ASANGA, ROSAURO UMALI, WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
CONRADO VILLAFRANCA (N. LACAMBRA) is hereby denied and accordingly, judgment is
and HONESTO VITUG, respondents.** hereby rendered in favor of the intervenors
herein and against defendant V.C. Ponce & Co.,
DECISION Inc. The Court hereby orders and declares:

CORONA, J.: 1. The individual Contracts to Sell entered into

between the intervenors and the defendant are
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule hereby declared valid, subsisting and binding on
45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner V.C. Ponce both parties, particularly the defendant V.C.
Company, Inc. assails the October 27, 2005 Ponce & Co., Inc. and the latter is hereby
decision1 and February 3, 2006 resolution2 of enjoined to abide by the terms and conditions
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the thereof subject to the modifications as
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) [hereinafter] provided and under the same price
No. 97084 and the issuance of individual titles in originally stated therein;
favor of respondents by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109. 2. The individual intervenors are hereby ordered
to pay defendant V.C. Ponce & Co., Inc. the
This case traces its history to a complaint filed balance of the purchase price within a period of
by Eusebia de Leon vda. de Rodriquez against twelve (12) months from finality of this decision
petitioner in the then Court of First Instance of to be paid in twelve (12) equal monthly
Pasay City on January 3, 1963 docketed as Civil amortizations;
Case No. 455-R. It sought the annulment of the
sale of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 3. The defendant V.C Ponce & Co., Inc. is
97084 she had previously sold to petitioner. The hereby given one (1) year from finality of this
subject property was already subdivided into decision within which to complete the
smaller lots for which individual TCTs were construction of the enumerated items in
issued in petitioner's name. paragraph 5 of the Contracts to Sell;

On October 22, 1971, respondents filed a 4. Defendant V.C. Ponce & Co., Inc. is ordered
complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 455- to deliver clean titles to the individual intervenors
R. Respondents executed contracts to sell with upon full payment of the purchase price;
petitioner over individual lots comprising the
5. xxx
 61
SO ORDERED. petitioner of its titles and to issue new ones to
them. The court ordered its clerk of court and ex-
The Pasay City RTC's December 6, 1989 officio sheriff to execute deeds of conveyance in
decision was appealed by petitioner and it favor of respondents. The Registrar of Deeds of
eventually reached the Supreme Court. In a Parañaque, however, refused to register
resolution dated October 21, 1991, respondents' respondents' deeds of conveyance because
claims were affirmed when we ruled in their petitioner adamantly refused to surrender its
favor.4 Entry of judgment was made on owner's duplicate TCTs. So, on January 11,
December 9, 1991. 2002, the Pasay City RTC ordered the Registrar
of Deeds of Parañaque to cancel petitioner's
It was at this point that respondents commenced duplicate TCTs. Petitioner sought a
the tedious process of trying to execute the reconsideration but the same was denied in an
Pasay City RTC's December 6, 1989 decision. order dated September 13, 2002.

On October 2, 1992, the Pasay City RTC issued Respondents filed a manifestation and motion
a writ of execution. Respondents consigned to seeking a court order annulling the titles of
the court their payments to petitioner under their petitioner over the properties involved in the
respective contracts to sell, pursuant to the case. In response, the Pasay City RTC issued
December 6, 1989 decision. But in view of the assailed order dated January 23, 2003
petitioner's obstinate refusal to comply with the nullifying and canceling this time TCT No. 97084
October 2, 1992 writ of execution, the RTC again (the mother title) and mandating the issuance of
directed petitioner to deliver clean titles to individual titles to respondents. Petitioner's
respondents after payment and motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
5
consignation. Petitioner was likewise ordered to
strictly obey the terms and conditions of the Petitioner questioned the January 23, 2003
December 6, 1989 decision with a stern warning order (and that denying the motion for
that repeated non-compliance would be dealt reconsideration) in the CA via a petition for
with severely. The RTC also ordered its clerk of certiorari. In denying relief to petitioner, the CA
court to receive respondents' cash payments. held that the cancellation of TCT No. 97084 (the
mother title) was necessary to the execution of
On August 5, 1993, the clerk of court was the trial court's decision, considering the refusal
ordered to receive from respondents' counsel of the Registrar of Deeds to register the deeds
their cash payments to petitioner and deposit of sale and issue clean individual titles to
them in the Philippine National Bank. Petitioner respondents.
was (again) ordered to comply with the
December 6, 1989 decision within ten days from Hence, this petition.
receipt of the order.
Petitioner claims that the January 23, 2003 order
Petitioner (once more) sought a deferment of the for the nullification and cancellation of TCT No.
enforcement of the March 8, 1993 and August 5, 97084 completely changed the tenor of the
1993 orders but the same was denied. In an December 6, 1989 decision.
order dated August 3, 1994, the Pasay City RTC
cited petitioner in contempt for its refusal to We deny the petition.
abide by the March 8, 1993 order. The Registrar
of Deeds of Parañaque was likewise directed to In general, the essential parts of a decision or
cancel petitioner's TCTs over the properties order consist of the following: (1) a statement of
which were already paid in full and to issue new the case; (2) a statement of the facts; (3) the
titles in favor of respondents. issues or assignment of errors; (4) the court
ruling; and (5) the dispositive portion.6 In a civil
Because of petitioner's continued inaction, an case such as this, the dispositive portion should
alias writ of execution dated August 7, 1995 was state whether the complaint or petition is granted
issued by the Pasay City RTC to enforce the or denied, the specific relief granted and the
December 6, 1989 decision. costs.7

Respondents then filed an ex-parte motion for The order of execution must substantially
entry of judgment, praying that the Registrar of conform to the dispositive portion of the decision
Deeds of Parañaque be directed to divest sought to be executed.8 In the event of variance,
 62
the dispositive portion of the final and executory Petitioner is wrong.
decision prevails.
It is a cardinal rule that the dispositive portion of
The dispositive portion of the December 6, 1989 an order or judgment prevails over the
decision read in part: discussion or the body of the said decision or
order. In this case, the dispositive portion of the
WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion to Dismiss January 23, 2003 order merely reiterated the
is hereby denied and accordingly, judgment is directive for the issuance of individual titles to
hereby rendered in favor of the intervenors respondents by the Registrar of Deeds.
herein and against defendant V.C. Ponce &
Co.[,] Inc. The Court hereby orders and Nevertheless, even if we analyze and compare
declares: the body of the January 23, 2003 order and that
of the December 6, 1989 decision, no
1. xxx substantial variance exists between them. On its
face, the January 23, 2003 order is in harmony
2. The individual intervenors are hereby ordered with the dispositive portion of the December 6,
to pay defendant V.C. Ponce & Co.[,] Ince. the 1989 decision. The Registrar of Deeds of
balance of the purchase price within a period of Parañaque City is being directed to issue
twelve (12) equal monthly amortizations; individual titles to respondents to complete the
satisfaction of judgment/decision of th[e] [c]ourt
3. xxx partially executed. Reference to the "partially
executed decision" simply stresses that the
4. Defendant V.C. Ponce & Co.[,] Inc. is ordered execution must conform to the December 6,
to deliver clean titles to the individual intervenors 1989 decision.
upon full payment of the purchase price; xxx
Petitioner admits that TCT No. 97084 is the
while the order dated January 23, 2003 stated in mother title of the individual titles of
part: respondents.9However, it claims for the first
time that TCT No. 97084 was the subject of
C]onsidering the affirmance of the decision of this Court dated December another case and that it was already cancelled
6, 1989 by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, for full by virtue of another court order or
satisfaction of the decision, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 97084, judgment.10 Furthermore, TCT No. 97084
Register of Deeds, Rizal, the original of which is presently on file with the allegedly subsists only with respect to areas
Register of Deeds of Parañaque City, is hereby NULLIFIED and which are not involved in this case.
CANCELLED and considered of no value and effect conformably with
Section 107 of PD 1529 xxx Petitioner's claims are not only immaterial and
undeserving of favorable consideration; they
In view of the foregoing, the Register of Deeds were also never established with evidence of
of Parañaque City is hereby directed to issue such alleged court order or judgment. Thus,
individual titles to the Intervenors to complete there is no way by which these allegations can
the satisfaction of judgment/decision of this be verified. Given petitioner's propensity to
Court already partially executed. manipulate legal procedures to defeat the just
claims against it, such lapse is fatal to its cause.
The Intervenors are directed to coordinate with
the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City to The Pasay City RTC was well within its powers
further hasten the issuance of their individual when it issued the January 23, 2003 order. It is
titles. the ministerial duty of the court to order the
execution of its final judgment. It has the inherent
SO ORDERED. power to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of its ministerial offices, and of all other
The variance claimed by petitioner allegedly lies persons in any manner connected with a case
in the directive to the Register of Deeds of before it, in every manner appertaining thereto.11
Parañaque City to nullify and cancel TCT No.
97084. Petitioner insists that there was no such Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court12 and
order in the dispositive portion of the December Section 107 of PD 152913 provide the procedure
6, 1989 decision. to be followed in case of a refusal by the owner
to surrender the duplicate copy of his TCT.
 63
A considerable length of time has passed. It is
time to end this litigation and write finis to this
case. Enough is enough.

We remind petitioner's counsel, Atty. Candice

Marie T. Bandong, that she is an officer of the
court who must see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must never be unduly
impeded, not even by her client. Her oath to
uphold the cause of justice is superior to her duty
to her client; its primacy is indisputable.14 In this
light, we are sternly warning her (or any other
counsel who might take over this case) of
disciplinary action for any further delay in the
execution of the decision of the Pasay City RTC.

That TCT No. 97084 has been subdivided into

smaller lots and that derivative titles have been
issued therefor are of no moment. The fact
remains that, for more than 15 years, petitioner
has been consistently refusing to surrender its
owner's duplicate originals of the derivative
TCTs, contrary to lawful orders and in evident
bad faith. We are therefore ordering the
cancellation and nullification of TCT No. 97084
and its derivative titles. Let new certificates of
title be issued (a) in the name of the individual
respondents for the lots covered by their
respective fully-paid contracts to sell and (b) in
the name of petitioner for those portions not
covered by the claims of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

The October 27, 2005 decision and February 3,
2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 77783 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

The Registrar of Deeds of Parañaque City is

ordered to cancel TCT No. 97084 and the
derivative titles of the lots covered by
respondents' respective contracts to sell (with
petitioner) and issue clean individual titles to
them.

Treble costs against petitioner.

 64
Alleging that the questioned Decision did not
contain a statement of facts and a dispositive
portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory
Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before
the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent,
similarly filed a separate Motion for
Reconsideration. In response, the trial court
issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:
G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004
"x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because
Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a
VELARDE, petitioner, Constitutional provision and to declare whether
vs. acts are violative thereof. The Decision did not
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent. make a dispositive portion because a dispositive
portion is required only in coercive reliefs, where
DECISION a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit
that the prevailing party wronged should get.
PANGANIBAN, J.: The step that these movants have to take, is
direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of
A decision that does not conform to the form and Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the
substance required by the Constitution and the Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court."7
law is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be
valid, decisions should comply with the form, the The Antecedent Proceedings
procedure and the substantive requirements laid
out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for
relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid
Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party,
and requirements. sought the interpretation of several constitutional
provisions,8 specifically on the separation of
The Case church and state; and a declaratory judgment on
the constitutionality of the acts of religious
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective
of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, office, or urging or requiring the members of their
2003 Decision2 and July 29, 2003 Order3 of the flock to vote for a specified candidate.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch
49).4 The subsequent proceedings were recounted in
the challenged Decision in these words:
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a
Petition for Declaratory Relief5 filed before the "x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within
RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion
Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister
Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together with His Eraño Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their
Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime
Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli
Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co- Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended
respondents. The Petition prayed for the period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of
resolution of the question "whether or not the act the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the
of a religious leader like any of herein Petition on the common grounds that it does not
respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a state a cause of action and that there is no
candidate for elective office or in urging or justiciable controversy. They were ordered to
requiring the members of his flock to vote for a submit a pleading by way of advisement, which
specified candidate, is violative of the letter or was closely followed by another Order denying
spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x."6 all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde,
Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister
Eraño Manalo moved to reconsider the denial.
His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for
 65
extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli "2. Whether or not there exists justiceable
Soriano complied with the first Order by controversy in herein respondent’s Petition for
submitting his Memorandum. x x x. declaratory relief;

"x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, "3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal
and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;
Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and
Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, which raised "4. Whether or not the constitutional question
no new arguments other than those already sought to be resolved by herein respondent is
considered in the motions to dismiss x x x."9 ripe for judicial determination;

After narrating the above incidents, the trial court "5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy
said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, other than the declaratory relief; and,
because "in praying for a determination as to
whether the actions imputed to the respondents "6. Whether or not the court a quo has
are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief
Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only of herein respondent."15
a question of law."10 It then proceeded to a
lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the During the Oral Argument, the issues were
Petition – the separation of church and state – narrowed down and classified as follows:
even tracing, to some extent, the historical
background of the principle. Through its "A. Procedural Issues
discourse, the court a quo opined at some point
that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in "Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a
an election to any public office is a clear violation justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of
of the separation clause."11 action? Did respondent have any legal standing
to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the
trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in "B. Substantive Issues
its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano
filed separate Motions for Reconsideration "1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form
which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the and substance required by the Constitution, the
lower court. law and the Rules of Court?
Hence, this Petition for Review.12 "2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner,
Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing
This Court, in a Resolution13 dated September 2, candidates for public office? Corollarily, may
2003, required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor they be banned from campaigning against said
General (OSG) to submit their respective candidates?"
comments. In the same Resolution, the Court
gave the other parties -- impleaded as The Court’s Ruling
respondents in the original case below --the
opportunity to comment, if they so desired. The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is
meritorious.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted
an Oral Argument.14 Procedural Issues:
The Issues Requisites of Petitions for Declaratory Relief
In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which
following issues for this Court’s resolution: deals with petitions for declaratory relief,
provides in part:
"1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June
2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper "Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person
and valid; interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, whose rights are affected by
 66
a statute, executive order or regulation, Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation RTC) "yields nothing in this respect." His
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003,
determine any question of construction or the election season had not even started yet;
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights and that, in any event, he has not been actively
or duties thereunder." involved in partisan politics.

Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the
relief should be filed by a person interested trial court should contain "a plain, concise and
under a deed, a will, a contract or other written direct statement of the ultimate facts on which
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a the party pleading relies for his claim x x
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an x."20 Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate
ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to facts.
interpret or to determine the validity of the written
instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated
the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.16 The without factual moorings that, as religious
essential requisites of the action are as follows: leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents
(1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a
controversy is between persons whose interests candidate or candidates for elective offices; and
are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has that such actual or threatened endorsement "will
a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the enable [them] to elect men to public office who
issue is ripe for judicial determination.17 [would] in turn be forever beholden to their
leaders, enabling them to control the
Justiciable Controversy government"[;]21 and "pos[ing] a clear and
present danger of serious erosion of the
Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS people’s faith in the electoral process[;] and
Petition failed to allege, much less establish reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders
before the trial court, that there existed a determine the ultimate result of
justiciable controversy or an adverse legal elections,"22 which would then be violative of the
interest between them; and that SJS had a legal separation clause.
right that was being violated or threatened to be
violated by petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde Such premise is highly speculative and merely
alleges that SJS premised its action on mere theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not
speculations, contingent events, and suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy.
hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened into The Petition does not even allege any indication
an actual controversy. Thus, its Petition for or manifest intent on the part of any of the
Declaratory Relief must fail. respondents below to champion an electoral
candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does
judicial determination, not one that is conjectural not give rise to an actionable right.
or merely anticipatory.18 The SJS Petition for
Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It Obviously, there is no factual allegation that
miserably failed to allege an existing controversy SJS’ rights are being subjected to any
or dispute between the petitioner and the named threatened, imminent and inevitable violation
respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not that should be prevented by the declaratory
sufficiently state what specific legal right of the relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the
petitioner was violated by the respondents courts to settle actual controversies involving
therein; and what particular act or acts of the rights that are legally demandable and
latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the enforceable23 cannot be exercised when there is
Constitution. no actual or threatened violation of a legal right.

As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was
his Comment,19 what exactly has he done that "that the question raised in paragraph 9 hereof
merited the attention of SJS? He confesses that be resolved."24 In other words, it merely sought
he does not know the answer, because the SJS an opinion of the trial court on whether the
 67
speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing thereunder.31 Nevertheless, a breach or
elective candidates for political offices violated violation should be impending, imminent or at
the constitutional principle on the separation of least threatened.
church and state. SJS did not ask for a
declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the
pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation RTC discloses no explicit allegation that the
of its declared rights. Courts, however, are former had any legal right in its favor that it
proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.25 sought to protect. We can only infer the interest,
supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation
Cause of Action that it "has thousands of members who are
citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who
Respondent SJS asserts that in order to are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of
maintain a petition for declaratory relief, a cause the constitutionality of the partisan participation
of action need not be alleged or proven. of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in
Supposedly, for such petition to prosper, there the process to insure adherence to the
need not be any violation of a right, breach of Constitution by everyone x x x."32
duty or actual wrong committed by one party
against the other. Such general averment does not, however,
suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not
Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the only is the presumed interest not personal in
subject matter of an action for declaratory relief character; it is likewise too vague, highly
should be a deed, a will, a contract (or other speculative and uncertain.33 The Rules require
written instrument), a statute, an executive that the interest must be material to the issue
order, a regulation or an ordinance. But the and affected by the questioned act or
subject matter of the SJS Petition is "the instrument, as distinguished from simple
constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to curiosity or incidental interest in the question
endorse the candidacy of a candidate for raised.34
elective office or to urge or require the members
of the flock to vote for a specified To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris
candidate."26According to petitioner, this subject Secundum and submits that the "[p]laintiff in a
matter is "beyond the realm of an action for declaratory judgment action does not seek to
declaratory relief."27 Petitioner avers that in the enforce a claim against [the] defendant, but
absence of a valid subject matter, the Petition seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights of the
fails to state a cause of action and, hence, parties for the purpose of guiding [their] future
should have been dismissed outright by the conduct, and the essential distinction between a
court a quo. ‘declaratory judgment action’ and the usual
‘action’ is that no actual wrong need have been
A cause of action is an act or an omission of one committed or loss have occurred in order to
party in violation of the legal right or rights of sustain the declaratory judgment action,
another, causing injury to the latter.28 Its although there must be no uncertainty that the
essential elements are the following: (1) a right loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be
in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the invaded."35
part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its
or omission that is violative of the right of the own reference – that there must be no
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the
of the former to the latter.29 asserted rights will be invaded. Precisely, as
discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that
The failure of a complaint to state a cause of herein petitioner (and his co-respondents
action is a ground for its outright below) might actively participate in partisan
dismissal.30 However, in special civil actions for politics, use "the awesome voting strength of its
declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of faithful flock [to] enable it to elect men to public
action under ordinary civil actions does not office x x x, enabling [it] to control the
strictly apply. The reason for this exception is government."36
that an action for declaratory relief presupposes
that there has been no actual breach of the During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner
instruments involved or of rights arising Velarde and his co-respondents below all
 68
strongly asserted that they had not in any way money raised by taxation.42 A taxpayer’s action
engaged or intended to participate in partisan may be properly brought only when there is an
politics. They all firmly assured this Court that exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
they had not done anything to trigger the issue power.43 In the present case, there is no
raised and to entitle SJS to the relief sought. allegation, whether express or implied, that
taxpayers’ money is being illegally disbursed.
Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for
Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact Second, there was no showing in the Petition for
upon which SJS could base a right of relief from Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or
the named respondents. In any event, even its members as registered voters would be
granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right adversely affected by the alleged acts of the
it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no respondents below, if the question at issue was
certainty that such right would be invaded by the not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS
said respondents. Not even the alleged had suffered or would be deprived of votes due
proximity of the elections to the time the Petition to the acts imputed to the said respondents.
was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have Neither did it allege that any of its members
provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be denied the right of suffrage or the
would be jeopardized or violated by any of those privilege to be voted for a public office they are
respondents. seeking.

Legal Standing Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its

"thousands of members who are citizens-
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined taxpayers-registered voters" is too general44 and
as a personal and substantial interest in the beyond the contemplation of the standards set
case, such that the party has sustained or will by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too
act.37 Interest means a material interest in issue vague, highly speculative and uncertain to
that is affected by the questioned act or satisfy the requirement of standing.45
instrument, as distinguished from a mere
incidental interest in the question involved.38 Transcendental Importance

Petitioner alleges that "[i]n seeking declaratory In any event, SJS urges the Court to take
relief as to the constitutionality of an act of a cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal
religious leader to endorse, or require the standing, considering that "the issues raised are
members of the religious flock to vote for a of paramount public interest."
specific candidate, herein Respondent SJS has
no legal interest in the controversy";39 it has In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the
failed to establish how the resolution of the locus standi requirement when a petition raises
proffered question would benefit or injure it. an issue of transcendental significance or
paramount importance to the
Parties bringing suits challenging the people.46 Recently, after holding that the IBP
constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must had no locus standi to bring the suit, the Court
show "not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but in IBP v. Zamora47 nevertheless entertained the
also that [they have] sustained or [are] in Petition therein. It noted that "the IBP has
immediate or imminent danger of sustaining advanced constitutional issues which deserve
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, the attention of this Court in view of their
and not merely that [they] suffer thereby in some seriousness, novelty and weight as
indefinite way."40 They must demonstrate that precedents." 48

they have been, or are about to be, denied some

right or privilege to which they are lawfully Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed
entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to the constitutional issue raised in the SJS Petition
some burdens or penalties by reason of the to be of paramount interest to the Filipino people.
statute or act complained of.41 The issue did not simply concern a delineation
of the separation between church and state, but
First, parties suing as taxpayers must ran smack into the governance of our country.
specifically prove that they have sufficient The issue was both transcendental in
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
 69
importance and novel in nature, since it had (10) days from service of the pleading
never been decided before. responded to.60

The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to When an answer fails to tender an issue or
determine with certainty whether it could resolve admits the material allegations of the adverse
the constitutional issue despite the barren party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that
allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the party, direct judgment on such pleading (except
abbreviated proceedings in the court below. in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment
Much to its chagrin, however, counsels for the of marriage or for legal
parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS -- separation).61 Meanwhile, a party seeking to
made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or
that would supply the deficiencies hereinabove crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratory relief --
discussed. Hence, even if the Court would may, at any time after the answer thereto has
exempt this case from the stringent locus been served, move for a summary judgment in
standi requirement, such heroic effort would be its favor.62 Similarly, a party against whom a
futile because the transcendental issue cannot claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -
be resolved anyway. - or a declaratory relief sought -- may, at any
time, move for a summary judgment in its
Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court favor.63 After the motion is heard, the judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is a
To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious showing that, except as to the amount of
judicial time and effort, and for the guidance of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
the bench and the bar, the Court reiterates material fact; and that the moving party is
the elementary procedure49 that must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.64
followed by trial courts in the conduct of civil
cases.50 Within the time for -- but before -- filing the
answer to the complaint or petition, the
Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or defendant may file a motion to dismiss based on
upon motion of the defendant -- dismiss a any of the grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16
complaint51 (or petition, in a special civil action) of the Rules of Court. During the hearing of the
that does not allege the plaintiff’s (or petitioner’s) motion, the parties shall submit their arguments
cause or causes of action.52 A complaint or on the questions of law, and their evidence on
petition should contain "a plain, concise and the questions of fact.65 After the hearing, the
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the
the party pleading relies for his claim or motion, or order the amendment of the
defense."53 It should likewise clearly specify the pleadings. It shall not defer the resolution of the
relief sought.54 motion for the reason that the ground relied upon
is not indubitable. In every case, the resolution
Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of therefor.66
court shall forthwith issue the corresponding
summons to the defendants or the respondents, If the motion is denied, the movant may file an
with a directive that the defendant answer within the balance of the period originally
answer55 within 15 days, unless a different prescribed to file an answer, but not less than
period is fixed by the court.56 The summons shall five (5) days in any event, computed from the
also contain a notice that if such answer is not receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading
filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a is ordered to be amended, the defendant shall
judgment by default and may be granted the file an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted
relief applied for.57 The court, however, may -- from the service of the amended pleading,
upon such terms as may be just -- allow an unless the court provides a longer period.67
answer to be filed after the time fixed by the
Rules.58 After the last pleading has been served and filed,
the case shall be set for pretrial,68 which is a
If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross- mandatory proceeding.69 A plaintiff’s/
claim, it must be answered within ten (10) days petitioner’s (or its duly authorized
from service.59 A reply may be filed within ten representative’s) non-appearance at the pretrial,
if without valid cause, shall result in the dismissal
 70
of the action with prejudice, unless the court contained no statement of ultimate facts upon
orders otherwise. A similar failure on the part of which the petitioner relied for its claim.
the defendant shall be a cause for allowing the Furthermore, it did not specify the relief it sought
plaintiff/petitioner to present evidence ex parte, from the court, but merely asked it to answer a
and the court to render judgment on the basis hypothetical question.
thereof.70
Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers
The parties are required to file their pretrial to a specific coercive measure prayed for as a
briefs; failure to do so shall have the same effect result of a violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a
as failure to appear at the pretrial.71 Upon the petitioner.80 As already discussed earlier, the
termination thereof, the court shall issue an Petition before the trial court had no allegations
order reciting in detail the matters taken up at the of fact81 or of any specific violation of the
conference; the action taken on them, the petitioner’s rights, which the respondents had a
amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the duty to respect. Such deficiency amounted to a
agreements or admissions, if any, made by the failure to state a cause of action; hence, no
parties regarding any of the matters coercive relief could be sought and adjudicated.
considered.72 The parties may further avail The Petition evidently lacked substantive
themselves of any of the modes of discovery,73 if requirements and, we repeat, should have been
they so wish. dismissed at the outset.

Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial,74 in Second, with respect to the trial court
which the parties shall adduce their respective proceedings. Within the period set to file their
evidence in support of their claims and/or respective answers to the SJS Petition, Velarde,
defenses. By their written consent or upon the Villanueva and Manalo filed Motions to Dismiss;
application of either party, or on its own motion, Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and Soriano, within a
the court may also order any or all of the issues priorly granted extended period, an Answer in
to be referred to a commissioner, who is to be which he likewise prayed for the dismissal of the
appointed by it or to be agreed upon by the Petition.82 SJS filed a Rejoinder to the Motion of
parties.75 The trial or hearing before the Velarde, who subsequently filed a Sur-
commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it Rejoinder. Supposedly, there were "several
would if held before the court.76 scheduled settings, in which the "[c]ourt was
apprised of the respective positions of the
Upon the completion of such proceedings, the parties."83 The nature of such settings -- whether
commissioner shall file with the court a written pretrial or trial hearings -- was not disclosed in
report on the matters referred by the the records. Before ruling on the Motions to
parties.77 The report shall be set for hearing, Dismiss, the trial court issued an Order84 dated
after which the court shall issue an order May 8, 2003, directing the parties to submit their
adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or in memoranda. Issued shortly thereafter was
part; or recommitting it with instructions; or another Order85 dated May 14, 2003, denying all
requiring the parties to present further evidence the Motions to Dismiss.
before the commissioner or the court.78
In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily
Finally, a judgment or final order determining the ruled:
merits of the case shall be rendered. The
decision shall be in writing, personally and "The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly Dismiss, and after all the memoranda are
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is submitted, then, the case shall be deemed as
based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and submitted for resolution."86
filed with the clerk of court.79
Apparently, contrary to the requirement of
Based on these elementary guidelines, let us Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the
examine the proceedings before the trial court in Motions were not heard. Worse, the Order
the instant case. purportedly resolving the Motions to Dismiss did
not state any reason at all for their denial, in
First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the contravention of Section 3 of the said Rule 16.
SJS. Even a cursory perusal of the Petition There was not even any statement of the
immediately reveals its gross inadequacy. It grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less,
 71
of the legal findings and conclusions of the trial The Constitution commands that "[n]o decision
court. shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved and the law on which it is based. No petition for
for reconsideration. Pending the resolution of review or motion for reconsideration of a
these Motions for Reconsideration, Villanueva decision of the court shall be refused due course
filed a Motion to suspend the filing of the parties’ or denied without stating the basis therefor."88
memoranda. But instead of separately resolving
the pending Motions fairly and squarely, the trial Consistent with this constitutional mandate,
court again transgressed the Rules of Court Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil
when it immediately proceeded to issue its Procedure similarly provides:
Decision, even before tackling the issues raised
in those Motions. "Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders.
– A judgment or final order determining the
Furthermore, the RTC issued its "Decision" merits of the case shall be in writing personally
without allowing the parties to file their answers. and directly prepared by the judge, stating
For this reason, there was no joinder of the clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
issues. If only it had allowed the filing of those which it is based, signed by him and filed with
answers, the trial court would have known, as the clerk of court."
the Oral Argument revealed, that the petitioner
and his co-respondents below had not In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the
committed or threatened to commit the act Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads as
attributed to them (endorsing candidates) -- the follows:
act that was supposedly the factual basis of the
suit. "Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The
judgment must be written in the official
Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to language, personally and directly prepared by
give a notice of the Petition to the OSG, which the judge and signed by him and shall contain
was entitled to be heard upon questions clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts
involving the constitutionality or validity of proved or admitted by the accused and the law
statutes and other measures.87 upon which the judgment is based.

Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, "x x x xxx x x x."

the questioned Decision of the trial court was
utterly wanting in the requirements prescribed by Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also
the Constitution and the Rules of Court. issued on January 28, 1988, Administrative
Circular No. 1, prompting all judges "to make
All in all, during the loosely abbreviated complete findings of facts in their decisions, and
proceedings of the case, the trial court indeed scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in
acted with inexplicable haste, with total the light of the evidence presented. They should
ignorance of the law -- or, worse, in cavalier avoid the tendency to generalize and form
disregard of the rules of procedure -- and with conclusions without detailing the facts from
grave abuse of discretion. which such conclusions are deduced."

Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and In many cases,89 this Court has time and time
of SJS, proceedings for declaratory relief must again reminded "magistrates to heed the
still follow the process described above -- the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the
petition must state a cause of action; the Constitution." The Court, through Chief Justice
proceedings must undergo the procedure Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of
outlined in the Rules of Court; and the decision Appeals,90discussed at length the implications of
must adhere to constitutional and legal this provision and strongly exhorted thus:
requirements.
"Faithful adherence to the requirements of
First Substantive Issue: Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due
Fundamental Requirements of a Decision process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by
the due process clause of the Constitution. The
 72
parties to a litigation should be informed of how substantially address the issues raised by the
it was decided, with an explanation of the factual parties.
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
the court. The court cannot simply say that In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y assailed Decision contains no statement of facts
and just leave it at that without any justification -- much less an assessment or analysis thereof
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is -- or of the court’s findings as to the probable
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal facts. The assailed Decision begins with a
to the higher court, if permitted, should he statement of the nature of the action and the
believe that the decision should be reversed. A question or issue presented. Then follows a brief
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state explanation of the constitutional provisions
the facts and the law on which it is based leaves involved, and what the Petition sought to
the parties in the dark as to how it was reached achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural
and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, incidents before the trial court are tracked. The
who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the
the court for review by a higher tribunal. More nature and the extent of the separation of church
than that, the requirement is an assurance to the and state. Without expressly stating the final
parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did conclusion she has reached or specifying the
so through the processes of legal reasoning. It relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her
is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of "Decision" with the clause "SO ORDERED."
the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse
dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the What were the antecedents that necessitated
purse by the Constitution but nonetheless the filing of the Petition? What exactly were the
vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing distinct facts that gave rise to the question
judgment on the life, liberty or property of his sought to be resolved by SJS? More important,
fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on what were the factual findings and analysis on
the power of reason for sustained public which the trial court based its legal findings and
confidence in the justness of his decision." conclusions? None were stated or implied.
Indeed, the RTC’s Decision cannot be upheld for
In People v. Bugarin,91 the Court also explained: its failure to express clearly and distinctly the
facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court
"The requirement that the decisions of courts clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.
must be in writing and that they must set forth
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on The significance of factual findings lies in the
which they are based serves many functions. It value of the decision as a precedent. How can it
is intended, among other things, to inform the be so if one cannot apply the ruling to similar
parties of the reason or reasons for the decision circumstances, simply because such
so that if any of them appeals, he can point out circumstances are unknown? Otherwise stated,
to the appellate court the finding of facts or the how will the ruling be applied in the future, if
rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. there is no point of factual comparison?
More than that, the requirement is an assurance
to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the Moreover, the court a quo did not include a
judge did so through the processes of legal resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-called
reasoning. x x x." Decision. The importance of such portion was
explained in the early case Manalang v. Tuason
Indeed, elementary due process demands that de Rickards,94 from which we quote:
the parties to a litigation be given information on
how the case was decided, as well as an "The resolution of the Court on a given issue as
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that embodied in the dispositive part of the decision
led to the conclusions of the court.92 or order is the investitive or controlling factor that
determines and settles the rights of the parties
In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,93 this Court had and the questions presented therein,
instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure notwithstanding the existence of statements or
that their decisions would present a declaration in the body of said order that may be
comprehensive analysis or account of the confusing."
factual and legal findings that would
 73
The assailed Decision in the present case In general, the essential parts of a good decision
leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of consist of the following: (1) statement of the
the Petition. To recall, the original Petition was case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or
for declaratory relief. So, what relief did the trial assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which
court grant or deny? What rights of the parties each issue is, as a rule, separately considered
did it conclusively declare? Its final statement and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion.
says, "SO ORDERED." But what exactly did the The ponente may also opt to include an
court order? It had the temerity to label its introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue,
issuance a "Decision," when nothing was in fact especially in cases in which controversial or
decided. novel issues are involved.98

Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive An introduction may consist of a concise but
portion can be found in the body of the assailed comprehensive statement of the principal factual
Decision. It claims that the issue is disposed of or legal issue/s of the case. In some cases --
and the Petition finally resolved by the statement particularly those concerning public interest; or
of the trial court found on page 10 of its 14-page involving complicated commercial, scientific,
Decision, which reads: "Endorsement of specific technical or otherwise rare subject matters -- a
candidates in an election to any public office is a longer introduction or prologue may serve to
clear violation of the separation clause."95 acquaint readers with the specific nature of the
controversy and the issues involved. An
We cannot agree. epilogue may be a summation of the important
principles applied to the resolution of the issues
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,96 the of paramount public interest or significance. It
obligation of the party imposed by the Court was may also lay down an enduring philosophy of law
allegedly contained in the text of the original or guiding principle.
Decision. The Court, however, held:
Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench
"x x x The quoted finding of the lower court and the bar, discuss the essential parts of a good
cannot supply deficiencies in the dispositive decision.
portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the
rule is settled that where there is a conflict 1. Statement of the Case
between the dispositive part and the opinion, the
former must prevail over the latter on the theory The Statement of the Case consists of a legal
that the dispositive portion is the final order while definition of the nature of the action. At the first
the opinion is merely a statement ordering instance, this part states whether the action is a
nothing." (Italics in the original) civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting of
title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it
Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed is a criminal case, this part describes the specific
to be the statement quoted by SJS and charge -- quoted usually from the accusatory
embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of portion of the information -- and the plea of the
the assailed 14-page Decision. If at all, that accused. Also mentioned here are whether the
statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical case is being decided on appeal or on a petition
legal question and just a part of the opinion of for certiorari, the court of origin, the case number
the trial court. It does not conclusively declare in the trial court, and the dispositive portion of
the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the the assailed decision.
Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less,
the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of
required of a dispositive portion. the criminal information serves as a guide in
determining the nature and the gravity of the
Failure to comply with the constitutional offense for which the accused may be found
injunction is a grave abuse of discretion culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. convicted of a crime different from or graver than
Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard that charged.
of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity
and must be struck down as void.97 Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information
is especially important when there is a question
Parts of a Decision on the sufficiency of the charge, or on whether
 74
qualifying and modifying circumstances have arriving at its findings and conclusions should be
been adequately alleged therein. explained.

To ensure that due process is accorded, it is On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of
important to give a short description of the the lower court fully, intelligently and correctly
proceedings regarding the plea of the accused. resolved all factual and legal issues involved
Absence of an arraignment, or a serious may partly explain why the reviewing court finds
irregularity therein, may render the judgment no reason to reverse the findings and
void, and further consideration by the appellate conclusions of the former. Conversely, the lower
court would be futile. In some instances, court’s patent misappreciation of the facts or
especially in appealed cases, it would also be misapplication of the law would aid in a better
useful to mention the fact of the appellants’ understanding of why its ruling is reversed or
detention, in order to dispose of the preliminary modified.
query -- whether or not they have abandoned
their appeal by absconding or jumping bail. In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of
facts no longer need to be presented. Issues for
Mentioning the court of origin and the case resolution usually involve questions of law,
number originally assigned helps in facilitating grave abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction;
the consolidation of the records of the case in hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed
both the trial and the appellate courts, after entry by the parties. With few exceptions, factual
of final judgment. issues are not entertained in non-criminal cases.
Consequently, the narration of facts by the lower
Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion court, if exhaustive and clear, may be
of the assailed decision informs the reader of reproduced; otherwise, the material factual
how the appealed case was decided by the court antecedents should be restated in the words of
a quo. the reviewing magistrate.

2. Statement of Facts In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or

body whose decision is under review should be
There are different ways of relating the facts of laid out, in order that the parties may clearly
the case. First, under the objective or reportorial understand why the lower court ruled in a certain
method, the judge summarizes -- without way, and why the reviewing court either finds no
comment -- the testimony of each witness and reason to reverse it or concludes otherwise.
the contents of each exhibit. Second, under the
synthesis method, the factual theory of the 3. Issues or Assignment of Errors
plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the
defendant or defense is summarized according Both factual and legal issues should be stated.
to the judge’s best light. Third, in the subjective On appeal, the assignment of errors, as
method, the version of the facts accepted by the mentioned in the appellant’s brief, may be
judge is simply narrated without explaining what reproduced in toto and tackled seriatim, so as to
the parties’ versions are. Finally, through a avoid motions for reconsideration of the final
combination of objective and subjective means, decision on the ground that the court failed to
the testimony of each witness is reported and the consider all assigned errors that could affect the
judge then formulates his or her own version of outcome of the case. But when the appellant
the facts. presents repetitive issues or when the assigned
errors do not strike at the main issue, these may
In criminal cases, it is better to present both the be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.
version of the prosecution and that of the
defense, in the interest of fairness and due Though not specifically questioned by the
process. A detailed evaluation of the contentions parties, additional issues may also be included,
of the parties must follow. The resolution of most if deemed important for substantial justice to be
criminal cases, unlike civil and other cases, rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases are
depends to a large extent on the factual issues given de novo review, in contrast to noncriminal
and the appreciation of the evidence. The cases in which the reviewing court is generally
plausibility or the implausibility of each version limited to issues specifically raised in the appeal.
can sometimes be initially drawn from a reading The few exceptions are errors of jurisdiction;
of the facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in questions not raised but necessary in arriving at
 75
a just decision on the case; or unassigned errors Depending on the writer’s character, genre and
that are closely related to those properly style, the language should be fresh and free-
assigned, or upon which depends the flowing, not necessarily stereotyped or in a fixed
determination of the question properly raised. form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and
pretentious. At all times, however, the decision
4. The Court’s Ruling must be clear, concise, complete and correct.

This part contains a full discussion of the specific Second Substantive Issue:
errors or issues raised in the complaint, petition
or appeal, as the case may be; as well as of Religious Leaders’ Endorsement
other issues the court deems essential to a just
disposition of the case. Where there are several of Candidates for Public Office
issues, each one of them should be separately
addressed, as much as practicable. The The basic question posed in the SJS Petition --
respective contentions of the parties should also WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF
be mentioned here. When procedural questions CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS
are raised in addition to substantive ones, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves
better to resolve the former preliminarily. serious consideration. As stated earlier, the
Court deems this constitutional issue to be of
5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it
concerns the governance of our country and its
In a criminal case, the disposition should include people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural
a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime transgressions by both SJS and the trial court,
committed, the penalty imposed, the this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not
participation of the accused, the modifying to leave any doubt that there might be room to
circumstances if any, and the civil liability and entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the
costs. In case an acquittal is decreed, the court merits.
must order the immediate release of the
accused, if detained, (unless they are being held Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to
for another cause) and order the director of the convince the Court that there are enough factual
Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the accused and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue.
is detained) to report, within a maximum of ten On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
(10) days from notice, the exact date when the General has sided with petitioner insofar as
accused were set free. there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition
and the assailed Decision.
In a civil case as well as in a special civil action,
the disposition should state whether the We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state
complaint or petition is granted or denied, the directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for
specific relief granted, and the costs. The its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for
following test of completeness may be SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual
applied. First, the parties should know their allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief.
rights and obligations. Second, they should Neither were there factual findings in the
know how to execute the decision under assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked
alternative contingencies. Third, there should be the trial court to answer a hypothetical question.
no need for further proceedings to dispose of the In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion,
issues. Fourth, the case should be terminated the rendition of which was beyond the court’s
by according the proper relief. The "proper relief" constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.99
usually depends upon what the parties seek in
their pleadings. It may declare their rights and Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in
duties, command the performance of positive clear violation of the Constitution, because it
prestations, or order them to abstain from made no findings of facts and final disposition.
specific acts. The disposition must also Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent.
adjudicate costs. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to
review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.
The foregoing parts need not always be
discussed in sequence. But they should all be Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court
present and plainly identifiable in the decision. to take up, on the merits, the paramount
 76
question involving a constitutional principle. It is
a time-honored rule that "the constitutionality of
a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and
to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily
involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the
parties concerned."100

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of

Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The
assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29,
2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL AND
VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for
Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to
state a cause of action.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the

Office of the Court Administrator to evaluate and
recommend whether the trial judge may, after
observing due process, be held administratively
liable for rendering a decision violative of the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant
circulars of this Court. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 77
SO ORDERED. 2

The antecedent facts are undisputed.

On September 16, 1993, petitioner Wilson Ong

Ching Kian Chuan, doing business under the
firm name of C.K.C. Trading, filed a Complaint
for Infringement of Copyright with prayer for writ
of injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 94 of Quezon City (hereinafter Quezon
City Court) against Lorenzo Tan, doing business
under the firm name Mcmaster International
Sales, and docketed as Q-93-17628. On the
same day, said court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the defendant, his
distributors and retailers from selling vermicelli
G.R. No. 131502 June 8, 2000 (sotanghon) "using the plaintiffs copyrighted
cellophane wrapper with the two-dragons
WILSON ONG CHING KIAN CHUNG and THE designed label, and setting the hearing of the
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL injunctive relief for September 21,
LIBRARY, petitioners, 1993".1âwphi1.nêt
vs.
CHINA NATIONAL CEREALS OIL AND On October 13, 1993, the Quezon City Court
FOODSTUFFS IMPORT AND EXPORT issued a Resolution which granted a writ of
CORP., CEROILFOOD SHANDONG CEREAL preliminary injunction in favor of the petitioner,
AND OILS and BENJAMIN IRAO, denied therein defendant's application for a writ
JR., respondents. of preliminary injunction and, issues having been
joined, set the case for pre-trial on November 12,
BUENA, J.: 1993. On December 15, 1993, the Quezon City
Court denied defendant's motion for dissolution
of the writ off preliminary injunction.
This is an appeal by way of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure of the Decision 1 in Civil Case On January 5, 1994, the China National Cereals
No. 94-68836 dated November 20, 1997 of the Oils & Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Manila, which (CEROILFOOD SHANDONG), and Benjamin
rendered a judgment on the pleadings against Irao, Jr., as representative and attorney-in-fact
herein petitioners, the dispositive portion of of CEROILFOOD SHANDONG, herein
which reads: respondents, filed a complaint 3 for
Annulment/Cancellation of Copyrighted
Certificate No. Q-93-491 and damages with
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
prayer for restraining order/writ of preliminary
favor of plaintiffs, and against defendant:
injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, (hereinafter Manila Court) against
1. Decreeing the cancellation or annulment of
Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chuan, doing business
the Copyrighted Registration No. 0-93-491 of
under the firm name and style C.K.C. Trading
defendant WILSON ONG;
and the Director of the National Library,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-68836.
2. Directing defendant Director of the National
Library to effect the cancellation or annulment of
On January 7, 1994, judge Rodolfo G. Palattao
the Copyrighted Registration No. 0-93-491 of
of the Manila Court issued a temporary
defendant WILSON ONG; and
restraining order 4 enjoining petitioner from using
his copyrighted labels and selling his vermicelli
Damages cannot be awarded to Plaintiffs as no products which is similar to that of respondents'.
evidence was presented to substantiate their On January 14, 1994, petitioner filed a motion to
claims. dissolve temporary restraining order 5 praying
that the complaint be dismissed on the following
With costs against defendant WILSON ONG. grounds: 1) litis pendentia, 2.) the issue involved
 78
is one of copyright under PD No. 49 and does motion to dismiss until further reception of
not involve trademarks under Republic Act 166, evidence, stating therein that the dispositive
3.) courts of co-equal and coordinate jurisdiction portion of the Court of Appeals Decision did not
cannot interfere with the orders of other courts order the dismissal of the case. In the meantime,
having the same power and jurisdiction, 4.) respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners
plaintiff CEROILFOOD SHANDONG, being a in default for failing to file an Answer despite the
foreign corporation and with no license to do March 8 Order, which motion was opposed by
business in the Philippines, has no legal petitioners, there being at that time a pending
capacity to sue, and 5.) courts should not issue motion to dismiss which the court a quo refused
injunctions which would in effect dispose of the to resolve on the merits.
main case without trial.
In an Order 12 dated July 19, 1996, the Manila
On January 27, 1994, the Manila Court issued court denied the motion to declare petitioners in
an Order 6 granting a writ of preliminary default, admitted motu proprio the motion to
injunction in favor of respondents and denying dismiss filed by petitioner as its answer, and
petitioner's motion to dismiss. directed the parties to submit their respective
pre-trial briefs.
On January 31, 1994, petitioner filed before the
Court of Appeals a petition On September 17, 1996, petitioner filed a
for certiorari docketed as CA - G.R. SP No. "Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
33178, seeking for the annulment of the January Execution" 1 praying that a motion for execution
27, 1994 Order of the Manila Court. dismissing the Manila case be issued, and citing
Atty. Benjamin Irao, Jr., counsel of
On July 22, 1994, after the parties have CEROILFOOD SHANDONG and his co-
expounded their respective positions by way of counsel, Atty. Antonio Albano, guilty of forum
their comment, reply and rejoinder, the Court of shopping, pursuant to the Decision of the Court
Appeals rendered its Decision, 7 the dispositive of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 33178.
portion of which reads:
On January 23, 1997, respondents filed before
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby the Manila court a Supplement To Motion For
GRANTED, and as prayed for by petitioner, the Judgment On The Pleadings, claiming that
Order dated January 27, 1994 issued in Civil petitioner failed to tender an issue. 14
Case 94-68836 by Branch 33, Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila, On November 20, 1997, Judge Rodolfo G.
is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, although Palattao of the Manila Court rendered a
the prayer for dismissal of the complaint in Judgment on the Pleadings in favor of
Manila may be pursued before said court during respondents, and ruled that litis pendentia,
the proceedings. multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping were not
present in the case.
In the same Decision, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the case was dismissible on grounds of litis Hence, the present appeal on pure questions of
pendentia, multiplicity of suits, and forum law.
shopping.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
On September 5, 1994, the Court of Appeals
denied respondents' motion for I
reconsideration. 8 The Court of Appeals'
Decision became final on October 3, 1994. Entry Whether or not the legal pronouncements of the
of Judgment 9 was made on November 15, Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33178 that
1994. the Manila case is dismissible on grounds of litis
pendentia, multiplicity of suits and forum
On November 21, 1994, petitioner filed a shopping constitute the "Law of the Case."
motion 10 praying for the dismissal of the Manila
case on the strength of the findings of the Court II
of Appeals, particularly on "forum shopping." In
an Order 11 dated March 8, 1995, the Manila
Court held in abeyance the resolution of the
 79
Whether or not the Regional Trial Judge of appears as principal defendant in the first, and
Branch 33, Manila erred in not applying the law as sole distributor of Cereal Food Shandong, in
of the case. the second. Indicatively, he is defending and
complaining substantively the same rights and
III interests in both cases, and in effect there is
identity of parties representing the same
Whether or not the court a quo can review the interests. While it is against TAN with whom the
legal conclusions of an appellate court in the QC RTC issued an injunction, that writ should
same case, on issues squarely submitted to and also apply to CEROILFOOD SHANDONG, as
passed upon by the appellate court under Tan is its exclusive and sole distributor in the
identical set of facts and circumstances Philippines, as private respondent corporation
obtaining in the court a quo. does business in the Philippines through TAN
who imports his vermicelli wholly from said
IV foreign corporation. And most importantly, TAN
asserts rights to the trademark PAGODA, also
Whether or not the court a quo erred in motu allegedly owned by CEROILFOOD between
proprio considering a motion to dismiss as the TAN and CEROILFOOD SHANDONG that he is
answer to the complaint and, thereafter, render its corporate distributor. Also in 93-17628,
a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that petitioner's prayer for injunction is based on his
the motion to dismiss did not tender an issue. 15 registered copyright certificate, while TAN
averred in his answer thereon that petitioner's
In support thereof, petitioners quote the ruling of copyright should be annulled and cancelled, and
the Court of Appeals on the issue of whether also prayed for injunction. In 94-68836, private
there was litis pendentia and multiplicity of suits respondent CEROILFOOD SHANDONG, as
in the present case, as follows: plaintiff, also prayed for "ANNULMENT AND
CANCELLATION OF COPYRIGHT
The Manila court should have considered also CERTIFICATE No. 0-93-491 WITH DAMAGES
that Civil Case Q-93-17628 involves practically AND PRAYER FOR RESTRAINING
the same parties, same subject-matter and ORDER/WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
same relief as in Civil Case 0-94-68836. INJUNCTION." As can well be seen from those
Petitioner filed the first case on September 16, pertinent allegations/averments/prayers in both
1993, for INFRINGEMENT OF HIS cases, they are identical with each other. They
REGISTERED COPYRIGHT, which covers the involved one and the same CERTIFICATE OF
cellophane wrapper that he uses in packaging COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION. Though the first
the vermicelli which he imports from the CHINA case is for INFRINGEMENT of copyright
NATIONAL CEREALS OILS & FOODSTUFFS registration, while the second is for
IMPORT AND EXPORT CORPORATION ANNULMENT AND CANCELLATION of the
BASED IN BEIJING, CHINA, the main or the same copyright, since the first involves a breach,
principal of private respondent CEROILFOOD infraction, transgression, and the second for
SHANDONG, the latter being the "branch" of invalidation, discontinuance, termination and
CEROILFOOD in Quingdao, China, and of suppression of the same copyright certificate,
which in Civil Case Q-93-17628, LORENZO what the first seeks to preserve is the exclusive
TAN avers in his answer he is the "exclusive and use of the copyright, and the second seeks to
sole distributor." In Civil Case 94-68836 terminate the very use of the same copyright by
subsequently filed in Manila, on January 5, the registrant/owner. Though the quest of
1994, LORENZO TAN admitted that he is the petitioner and private respondents in the two
"sole distributor" of plaintiff China National cases are aimed towards different ends — the
Cereals Oil and Foodstuffs Import and Export first to uphold the validity and effectiveness of
Corporation of the latter's PAGODA BRAND the same copyright, the second is merely a
vermicelli products. Atty. Benjamin Irao, Jr., the consequence of the first, — the real matter in
attorney of private respondents, also the controversy can be fully determined and
attorney-in-fact of Ceroilfood Shandong, resolved before the Quezon City court, and
admitted that his principal "does not do business would render the Manila case a surplus age and
in the Philippines," and named LORENZO TAN also constitutes multiplicity of suits and
as his principal's "exclusive distributor" of said dismissible on that ground, although such
product in the Philippines. Thus, Lorenzo Tan in dismissal should be considered as without
both Civil Cases Q-93-17628 and 94-68836 prejudice to the continuance of the proceedings
 80
before the Quezon City court. (pp. 8-10, CA conclusions laid down by the Court of Appeals in
Decision, Annex "B" of the Petition) its verdict and to dispose of the case in a manner
diametrically opposed thereto, citing the case
On the issue of forum shopping, the Court of of PNB vs. Noah's Ark Sugar Refinery, 226
Appeals ruled further, thus: SCRA 36, 48.

Finally, the Manila court should also have Petitioners further allege that the acts of the trial
considered forum shopping as a third drawback judge suffer from procedural infirmity: and that it
to private respondent's cause. It is a term makes no sense for the trial judge to refuse to
originally used to denominate a litigant's resolve the motion to dismiss on the merits;
privilege of choosing the venue of his action to motu proprio consider the motion to dismiss
where the law allows him to do so, or of an as the answer to the complaint; and to later rule
"election of remedies" of one of two or more co- that the motion to dismiss did not tender an issue
existing rights. In either of which situations, the and, therefore, a judgment on the pleadings is in
litigant actually shops for a forum of his action. order. Petitioners also aver that a motion to
However, instead of making a choice of the dismiss is not a responsive pleading (citing
forum of their actions, litigants through the Prudence Realty Development Corporation vs.
encouragement of their lawyers, file their actions CA, 231 SCRA 379); that at the time the trial
on all available courts, or invoke irrelevant judge considered the motion to dismiss to be the
remedies simultaneously, or even file actions answer to the complaint, he knew very well, or at
one after the other, a practice which had not only least should have known that the motion to
resulted conflicting adjudications among dismiss did not tender an issue for indeed, it is
different courts, confusion inimical to an orderly not within the province of the motion to admit or
administration of justice and created extreme deny the allegations of the complaint, and there
inconvenience to some of the parties to the being no legitimate answer and no real joinder of
action. And thus it has been held in Villanueva issues, the rendition of the subject Judgment on
vs. Andres, 172 SCRA 876, that forum shopping the Pleadings becomes suspect. According to
applies whenever as a result of an adverse petitioners, in deviating from the usual
opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable procedure, the court a quo gave undue benefit
opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari), in and advantage to the respondents at the
another forum. . . . expense of herein petitioners; and that the
explanation given by the trial judge that the
Observedly, Attys. IRAO and ALBANO, who are dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals
TAN's lawyers in Quezon City, are also private decision did not expressly order him to dismiss
respondents' lawyers in Manila. ATTY. IRAO the case is flimsy and untenable.
who entered his appearance as counsel for
private respondents in the Manila case, is also On the other hand, respondents assert that the
the "authorized representative and attorney-in- doctrine of law of the case is not applicable to
fact" of private respondent corporation in the the present case because the Court of Appeals
Manila case. While Atty. Irao "withdrew" as never ordered the dismissal of the case and that
counsel of TAN in the Quezon City, that did not the Order of the Manila Court dated January 27,
remove the case filed in Manila outside the 1994 was annulled and set aside only insofar as
sphere of the rule on "forum shopping." (pp. 10- the preliminary injunction is concerned.
11, CA Decision, Annex "B" of the Petition). Respondents cite the case of Magdalena Estate,
Inc. vs. Caluag, 11 SCRA 333 which ruled that
Petitioners contend that the foregoing the deficiencies in the dispositive part of the
conclusions of fact and law of the Court of decision cannot be supplied by any finding or
Appeals are correct and should not be disturbed, opinion found in the body of the decision.
especially since the decision of the Court of Respondents also allege that while petitioner
Appeals had already become final and entered Wilson Ong had belatedly faulted the Court
in the Books of Judgment; that the parties to the below in considering his motion to dismiss as his
case and the Regional Trial Judge in Branch 33, answer, he never questioned the correctness of
Manila are bound by the said conclusions of fact the findings of the court a quo in the assailed
and law and the same should not be reopened decision.
on remand of the case; and that it is not within
the Trial Judge's discretion to take exception to,
much less overturn, any factual or legal
 81
After a review of the records of the case and an the statement of the Court of Appeals regarding
examination of the pleadings filed by the parties, the prayer for the dismissal of the case
the Court finds the petition to be meritorious. seemingly gave the Manila court the discretion
to dismiss not to dismiss Civil Case No. 94-
Being interrelated, the first, second and third 68836, the Manila court should have referred to
issues shall be discussed jointly.1awphil the body of the decision for purposes of
construing the issue of whether or not the
Indeed, the court a quo erred in not resolving the complaint should be dismissed, because the
petitioner's motion to dismiss in accordance with dispositive part of a decision must find support
the decision of the Court of Appeals which found from the decision's ratio decidendi. Findings of
that "The Manila court should have considered the court are to be considered in the
also that Civil Case Q-93-17628 involves interpretation of the dispositive portion of the
practically the same parties, same subject- judgment. 18 Moreover, extensive and explicit
matter and same relief as in Civil Case 94- discussion and settlement of the issues are
68836"; that "the real matter in controversy can found in the body of the Court of Appeals
be fully determined and resolved before the decision so that it is grave error for the court a
Quezon City court and would render the Manila quo to rule again, as it did, on the issues of litis
case a surplusage and also constitutes pendentia and forum shopping in its decision,
multiplicity of suits and dismissible on that and to overturn that of the Court of Appeals,
ground, although such dismissal should be thus:
considered as without prejudice to the
continuance of the proceedings before the The argument of Defendant Ong in his motion
Quezon City court"; and that "the Manila court for execution that the case at bench should now
should also have considered forum shopping as be dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping
a third drawback to private respondents' cause." and litis pendentia as allegedly ruled by the
Court of Appeals, does not impress this Court.
While the Court of Appeals stated in the For while the appellate court urged this Court to
dispositive portion of its decision that "the prayer consider litis pendentia and forum shopping in
for dismissal of the complaint in Manila may be the trial resolution of the case at bench, nowhere
pursued before said court during the in its (CA) decision could it be deduced that this
proceedings," it is clear from the body of the Court is mandated to dismiss the case on these
Court of Appeals Decision that the case before precise grounds. The dispositive portion of the
the Manila court should be dismissed on decision does not contain such a mandate. 19
grounds of litis pendentia, and forum shopping.
In Viva Productions, Inc. vs. Court of
While the general rule is that the portion of a Appeals, 20 this Court set aside the decision of
decision that becomes the subject of execution the Makati court and declared null and void all
is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part orders of the RTC of Makati after ruling that:
thereof, there are exceptions to this rule.
Thus we find grave abuse of discretion on the
The exceptions where the dispositive part of the part of the Makati court, being a mere co-equal
judgment does not always prevail over the body of the Parañaque court, in not giving due
of the opinion are: deference to the latter before which the issue of
the alleged violation of the sub-judice rule had
(a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the already been raised and submitted. In such
body of the opinion may be referred to for instance, the Makati court, if it was wary of
purposes of construing the judgment because dismissing the action outrightly under
the dispositive part of a decision must find administrative Circular No. 04-94, should have,
support from the decision's ratio decidendi; 16 at least ordered the consolidation of its case with
that of the Parañaque court, which had first
(b) where extensive and explicit discussion and acquired 31 of the Revised Rules of Court.
settlement of the issue is found in the body of the (emphasis ours.)
decision. 17
The Quezon City court and the Manila court
Considering the circumstances of the instant have concurrent jurisdiction over the case.
case, the Court finds that the exception to the However, when the Quezon City court acquired
general rule applies to the instant case. Since jurisdiction over the case, it excluded all other
 82
courts of concurrent jurisdiction from acquiring Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the
jurisdiction over the same. The Manila court is, Office of the Ombudsman, an investigation was
therefore, devoid of jurisdiction over the requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the
complaint filed resulting in the herein assailed extension of the Temporary Resident Visas
decision which must perforce be declared null (TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB
and void. To hold otherwise would be to risk investigation revealed seven (7) other cases of
instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction TRV extensions tainted with similar
might have conflicting orders. 21 irregularities.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 in Civil filed before the Administrative Adjudication
Case No. 94-68836 is ANNULLED and SET Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a
ASIDE. Said case is ordered dismissed without formal complaint against herein petitioner. Also
prejudice to the continuance of the proceedings charged administratively were Atty. Arthel
before the Quezon City court where Civil Case Caronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang, Board
No. Q-93-17628 is pending. SO ORDERED. Member and Executive Assistant, respectively,
in petitioner’s division. With respect to petitioner,
G.R. No. 161629 July 29, 2005 the complaint was treated as both a criminal and
an administrative charge and docketed as OMB-
ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, Petitioners, 0-98-0214 (criminal aspect), for nine (9) counts
vs. of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANIANO A. Practices Act and for falsification of public
DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, documents, and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038
HON. ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, in his (administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of
capacity as Assistant Ombudsman, and Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of
Ombudsman’s Fact Finding and Intelligence Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.
Bureau, represented by Director AGAPITO
ROSALES,Respondents. The complaint against petitioner, Caronongan
and Ang alleged the following illegal acts: (a)
DECISION irregularly granting TRVs beyond the prescribed
period; and (b) using "recycled" or photocopied
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: applications for a TRV extension without the
applicants affixing their signatures anew to
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to validate the correctness and truthfulness of the
reverse and set aside the decision1 dated information previously stated therein.
August 28, 2003 and the resolution2 dated Specifically, petitioner and Caronongan
January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA- allegedly signed the Memorandum of
G.R. SP No. 58264 which affirmed with Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC)
modification public respondents’ (1) Joint of the BID, forwarding the applications for TRV
Resolution dated January 22, 1999, which extension of several aliens whose papers were
ordered, among other things, petitioner’s questionable.
suspension for one (1) year for conduct
prejudicial to the service; and (2) Order dated In a Joint Resolution5 dated January 22, 1999,
February 8, 2000, as reiterated in a Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes
Memorandum dated March 17, 2000, which resolved the administrative cases filed against
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration petitioner, Caronongan and Ang, as follows:
but reduced his suspension to nine (9) months
without pay. The Court of Appeals modified the WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, it is
above issuances by further reducing petitioner’s respectfully recommended that:
suspension from nine (9) months to six (6)
months and one (1) day without pay.4 1. Respondent ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA
be SUSPENDED from the service for one (1)
Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the year for Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the
Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Service;
Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-
complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with the Fact
 83
2. The instant case against ATTY. ARTHEL B. IN PROMULGATING ITS ASSAILED
CARONONGAN be DISMISSED, the same DECISION, RESPONDENT COURT OF
having been rendered moot and academic; and APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE
FOLLOWING RELEVANT FACTS AND
3. The instant case against respondent MA. MATTERS WHICH, IF PROPERLY
ELENA P. ANG be DISMISSED for lack of CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A
sufficient evidence. DIFFERENT CONCLUSION IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER:
SO RESOLVED.6
...
Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Aportadera, Jr. reviewed the Joint Resolution II.
which was approved by respondent
Ombudsman Desierto on December 29, 1999.7 THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE FINDING OF
In the meantime, on July 9, 1999, respondent THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT MERELY
Ombudsman approved a Resolution8 dated ADVISORY ON THE BUREAU OF
June 22, 1999 of Graft Investigation Officer IMMIGRATION (BI) IS CONTRARY TO THE
Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejica, dismissing PERTINENT PROVISION OF THE 1987
the criminal charges against petitioner for CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE
insufficiency of evidence.9 DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration10 in III.

the administrative case alleging that the BOC
which reviews all applications for TRVs RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO
extension, approved the TRVs in question, FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
hence, petitioner argued that it effectively OMBUDSMAN’S RESOLUTION FINDING
declared the applications for extension regular PETITIONER ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE
and in order and waived any infirmity thereon. CONSTITUTES AN INDIRECT
ENCROACHMENT INTO THE POWER OF THE
In an Order11 dated February 8, 2000, Graft BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION OVER
IMMIGRATION MATTERS. 13
Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the
motion for reconsideration which was approved
by respondent Ombudsman on March 24, 2000 The petition lacks merit.
but reduced the period of suspension from one
(1) year to nine (9) months without pay. Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which
approved the questioned applications for the
On April 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for extension of the TRVs. He denies that he misled
review with the Court of Appeals, which included or deceived the BOC into approving these
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary applications and argues that the BOC effectively
prohibitory mandatory injunction and/or ratified his actions and sanctioned his conduct
temporary restraining order to enjoin public when it approved the subject applications.
respondents from implementing the order of Petitioner adds that he acted in good faith and
suspension. The Court of Appeals issued the the government did not suffer any damage as a
TRO on April 19, 2000. result of his alleged administrative lapse.

In its Decision dated August 28, 2003, the Court We are not persuaded. In his attempt to escape
of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s suspension but liability, petitioner undermines his position in the
reduced the period from nine (9) months to six BID and his role in the processing of the subject
(6) months and one (1) day without pay.12 applications. But by his own admission,14 it
appears that the BSI not only transmits the
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, applications for TRV extension and its
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on supporting documents, but more importantly, it
the following grounds: interviews the applicants and evaluates their
papers before making a recommendation to the
I. BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and
when it finds them in order, it executes a
 84
Memorandum of Transmittal to the BOC Immigration Commissioner. He argues that to
certifying to the regularity and propriety of the uphold the appellate court’s ruling expands the
applications. authority granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman and runs counter to
In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,15 we stated that all prevailing jurisprudence on the matter,
heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable particularly Tapiador v. Office of the
extent on their subordinates. Practicality and Ombudsman.16 Petitioner submits that the
efficiency in the conduct of government business Ombudsman’s findings that the TRV
dictate that the gritty details be sifted and applications were illegal constitutes an indirect
reviewed by the time it reaches the final interference by the Ombudsman into the powers
approving authority. In the case at bar, it is not of the BOC over immigration matters.
unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the
evaluation and recommendation of the BSI as it We do not agree. The creation of the Office of
cannot be expected to review every detail of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987
each application transmitted for its approval. Constitution.17 The Ombudsman and his
Petitioner being the Chairman of the First deputies, as protectors of the people, are
Division of the BSI has direct supervision over its mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in
proceedings. Thus, he cannot feign ignorance or any form or manner against officers or
good faith when the irregularities in the TRV employees of the Government, or of any
extension applications are so patently clear on subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
its face. He is principally accountable for including government-owned or controlled
certifying the regularity and propriety of the corporations.18 Foremost among its powers is
applications which he knew were defective. the authority to investigate and prosecute cases
involving public officers and employees, thus:
Petitioner could not validly claim that he was
singled out for prosecution. It is of record that Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
administrative cases were also filed against have the following powers, functions, and duties:
Caronongan and Ang, but extraneous
circumstances rendered the case against (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
Caronongan moot while the case against Ang person, any act or omission of any public official,
was dismissed because it was proven that she employee, office or agency, when such act or
merely implemented the approved decision of omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper,
the BOC. or inefficient.

Equally untenable is the contention that the Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The
BOC’s approval of the defective applications for Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law
TRV extension cured any infirmities therein and on November 17, 1989 and provided for the
effectively absolved petitioner’s administrative structural and functional organization of the
lapse. The instant administrative case pertains Office of the Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated
to the acts of petitioner as Chairman of the First the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act
Division of the BSI in processing nine (9) promptly on complaints but also to enforce the
defective applications, independent of and administrative, civil and criminal liability of
without regard to the action taken by the BOC. It government officers and employees in every
does not impugn the validity of the TRV case where the evidence warrants to promote
extensions as to encroach upon the authority of efficient service by the Government to the
the BID on immigration matters. The main thrust people.19
of the case is to determine whether petitioner
committed any misconduct, nonfeasance, The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
misfeasance or malfeasance in the performance administrative investigations as in the present
of his duties. case is settled.20 Section 19 of RA 6770
provides:
Anent the second and third grounds, petitioner
essentially puts in issue the import of the SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. – The
Ombudsman’s findings. Petitioner questions the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating,
Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that the but not limited to acts or omissions which:
findings of the Ombudsman "may not be said to
be merely recommendatory" upon the (1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
 85
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or therewith". The proper interpretation of the
discriminatory; Court’s statement in Tapiador should be that the
Ombudsman has the authority to determine the
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of administrative liability of a public official or
an agency’s functions, though in accordance employee at fault, and direct and compel the
with law; head of the office or agency concerned to
implement the penalty imposed. In other words,
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the
ascertainment of facts; Ombudsman’s functions and not its jurisdiction.

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers We agree with the ratiocination of public
but for an improper purpose; or respondents. Several reasons militate against a
literal interpretation of the subject constitutional
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of provision. Firstly, a cursory reading
justification. of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the
case was the failure of the complainant therein
The point of contention is the binding power of to present substantial evidence to prove the
any decision or order that emanates from the charges of the administrative case. The
Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted statement that made reference to the power of
its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter
XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided: dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient
explanation, is susceptible to varying
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall interpretations, as what precisely is before us in
have the following powers, functions, and duties: this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from
... judicial examination.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take The provisions of RA 6770 support public
appropriate action against a public official or respondents’ theory. Section 15 is substantially
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, the same as Section 13, Article XI of the
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or Constitution which provides for the powers,
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. functions and duties of the Ombudsman. We
(Emphasis supplied) draw attention to subparagraph 3, to wit:

Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The
given its literal meaning; that is, that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
Ombudsman’s action is only advisory in nature following powers, functions and duties:
rather than one having any binding effect,
citing Tapiador v. Office of the ...
Ombudsman,21thus:
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take
... Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner appropriate action against a public officer or
were administratively liable, the Ombudsman employee at fault or who neglects to perform an
has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner act or discharge a duty required by law, and
from the government service, more particularly recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary
Constitution, the Ombudsman can only authority as provided in Section 21 of this
"recommend" the removal of the public official or Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer
employee found to be at fault, to the public without just cause to comply with an order of the
official concerned.22 Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee
For their part, the Solicitor General and the who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act
Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word or discharge a duty required by law shall be a
"recommend" must be taken in conjunction with ground for disciplinary action against said
the phrase "and ensure compliance officer; (Emphasis supplied)
 86
We note that the proviso above qualifies the Ombudsman a chance, with prestige and
"order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, persuasive powers, and also a chance to really
censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee – function as a champion of the citizen.
akin to the questioned issuances in the case at
bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any However, we do not want to foreclose the
officer to comply with such an order of the possibility that in the future, The Assembly, as it
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or may see fit, may have to give additional powers
employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a to the Ombudsman; we want to give the concept
strong indication that the Ombudsman’s of a pure Ombudsman a chance under the
"recommendation" is not merely advisory in Constitution.
nature but is actually mandatory within the
bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as MR. RODRIGO:
usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority
of the head of office or any officer concerned. It Madam President, what I am worried about is if
has long been settled that the power of the we create a constitutional body which has
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only
illegal act or omission of any public official is not persuasive powers, we might be raising the
an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent hopes of our people too much and then
authority in respect of the offense charged.23 By disappoint them.
stating therefore that the Ombudsman
"recommends" the action to be taken against an MR. MONSOD:
erring officer or employee, the provisions in the
Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the I agree with the Commissioner.
implementation of the order be coursed through
the proper officer, which in this case would be MR. RODRIGO:
the head of the BID.
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the
lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the legislature, why not leave this to the
Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure legislature?28
that it can effectively carry out its mandate as
protector of the people against inept and corrupt MR. MONSOD:
government officers and employees. The Office
was granted the power to punish for contempt in
Yes, because we want to avoid what happened
accordance with the Rules of Court.24 It was
in 1973. I read the committee report which
given disciplinary authority over all elective and
recommended the approval of the 27 resolutions
appointive officials of the government and its
for the creation of the office of the Ombudsman,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies
but notwithstanding the explicit purpose
(with the exception only of impeachable officers,
enunciated in that report, the implementing law
members of Congress and the Judiciary).25 Also,
– the last one, P.D. No. 1630—did not follow the
it can preventively suspend any officer under its
main thrust; instead it created the Tanodbayan,
authority pending an investigation when the
...
case so warrants.26
...
The foregoing interpretation is consistent with
the wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of
Office of the Ombudsman. The records of the
Commissioner Blas Ople):
deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission27 reveal the following:
May we just state that perhaps the honorable
Commissioner has looked at it in too much of an
MR. MONSOD:
absolutist position, The Ombudsman is seen as
a civil advocate or a champion of the citizens
Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if
against the bureaucracy, not against the
we give the spirit and intendment of the
President. On one hand, we are told he has no
Committee. What we wanted to avoid is the
teeth and he lacks other things. On the other
situation where it deteriorates into a prosecution
hand, there is the interpretation that he is a
arm. We wanted to give the idea of the
 87
competitor to the President, as if he is being of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264
brought up to the same level as the President. are AFFIRMED.

With respect to the argument that he is a SO ORDERED.

toothless animal, we would like to say that we
are promoting the concept in its form at the
present, but we are also saying that he can
exercise such powers and functions as may be
provided by law in accordance with the direction
of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We did
not think that at this time we should prescribe
this, but we leave it up to Congress at some
future time if it feels that it may need to designate
what powers the Ombudsman need in order that
he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.

So, his is a reversible disability, unlike that of a

eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability.
(Emphasis supplied)29

It is thus clear that the framers of our

Constitution intended to create a stronger and
more effective Ombudsman, independent and
beyond the reach of political influences and
vested with powers that are not merely
persuasive in character. The Constitutional
Commission left to Congress to empower the
Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which
it did when RA 6770 was enacted. In the case
of Uy v. Sandiganbayan,30 it was held:

Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs

from the classical Ombudsman model whose
function is merely to receive and process the
people’s complaints against corrupt and abusive
government personnel. The Philippine
Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is
armed with the power to prosecute erring public
officers and employees, giving him an active role
in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and
corrupt practices and such other offenses that
may be committed by such officers and
employees. The legislature has vested him with
broad powers to enable him to implement his
own actions. ...31

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Court

of Appeals did not commit any error in finding the
petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
interest of the service and reducing petitioner’s
period of suspension to six (6) months and one
(1) day without pay, taking into account the
education and length of service of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

The Decision dated August 28, 2003 and the
Resolution dated January 15, 2004 of the Court
 88
by the appellate court on the accused was
clearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA
6538,3 which is not considered reclusion
perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124.4

The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution

relied on People v. Omotoy5 where the Regional
Trial Court found the accused guilty of arson and
sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to reclusion perpetua. The case
reached this Court on automatic appeal. In
Footnote 16 of the decision, it was observed -

G.R. No. 149375 November 26, 2002 The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for
the reason no doubt that the penalty of reclusion
MARVIN MERCADO, petitioner, perpetua is involved, albeit joined to prision
vs. mayor in its maximum period in accordance with
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Actually, the
appeal should have gone to the Court of Appeals
DECISION since strictly speaking, this Court entertains
appeals in criminal cases only where "the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher"
BELLOSILLO, J.:
(Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII, Constitution), i.e., the
penalty is at least reclusion perpetua (or life
MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel
imprisonment, in special offenses). The lapse
Flores, Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques and
will be overlooked so as not to delay the
Enrile Bertumen, was charged with and
disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the
convicted of violation of R.A. 6538 or The Anti-
penalty of reclusion perpetua having in fact been
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, for which
imposed on the accused, and causes no
he and his co-accused were sentenced to a
prejudice whatsoever to any party.
prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph
months of reclusion temporal as maximum.1
of Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure is applicable to the instant
The case before us concerns only the petition for
case considering that the penalty imposed was
review of accused Marvin Mercado where he
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
assails his conviction, and arguing that the Court
thirty (30) years.
of Appeals having increased the penalty
imposed by the court a quo to a prison term
Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that
of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
thirty (30) years, should have certified the case
from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty
to this Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years
(40) years. While the thirty (30)-year period falls
was already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the
within that range, reclusion perpetua
last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124,2 of the 2000
nevertheless is a single indivisible penalty which
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
cannot be divided into different periods. The
thirty (30)-year period for reclusion perpetua is
We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead
only for purposes of successive service of
with the Court of Appeals.
sentence under Art. 70 of The Revised Penal
Code.6
In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of
Appeals correctly held that the provision of Sec.
More importantly, the crime committed by
13, Rule 124, relied upon by petitioner, was
petitioner is one penalized under RA 6538 or
applicable only when the penalty imposed was
The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 which is a
reclusion perpetua or higher as a single
special law and not under The Revised Penal
indivisible penalty, i.e., the penalty was at least
Code. Unless otherwise specified, if the special
reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed
penal law imposes such penalty, it is error to
 89
designate it with terms provided for in The appeal from the Court of Appeals to the
Revised Penal Code since those terms apply Supreme Court. As enunciated in Omotoy, the
only to the penalties imposed by the Penal Code, Supreme Court entertains appeals in criminal
and not to the penalty in special penal cases only where the penalty imposed is
laws.7 This is because generally, special laws reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis for this
provide their own specific penalties for the doctrine is the Constitution itself which
offenses they punish, which penalties are not empowers this Court to review, revise, reverse,
taken from nor refer to those in The Revised modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or the
Penal Code.8 Rules of Court may provide, final judgments of
lower courts in all criminal cases in which the
The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
months under RA 6538 is essentially within the higher.13
range of the medium period of reclusion
temporal. However, such technical term under Where the Court of Appeals finds that the
The Revised Penal Code is not similarly used or imposable penalty in a criminal case brought to
applied to the penalty for carnapping. Also, the it on appeal is at least reclusion perpetua, death
penalty for carnapping attended by the qualifying or life imprisonment, then it should impose such
circumstance of violence against or intimidation penalty, refrain from entering judgment thereon,
of any person or force upon things, i.e., certify the case and elevate the entire records to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to this Court for review.14 This will obviate the
thirty (30) years, does not correspond to that in unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting
The Revised Penal Code.9 But it is different shuttling of criminal cases between this Court
when the owner, driver or occupant of the and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof, very inception and can, without bothering the
since this is penalized with reclusion perpetua to Court of Appeals which has fully completed the
death.10 exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the
case.15
Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose
the penalty of "x x x imprisonment of TWELVE On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals
(12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to imposes a penalty less than reclusion perpetua,
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) a review of the case may be had only by petition
MONTHS of reclusion temporal as for review on certiorari under Rule 4516 where
11
maximum." For these reasons the use of the only errors or questions of law may be raised.
term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of
its decision is not proper. Besides, we see no Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the
basis for the trial court to set the minimum issue of whether there was indeed a violation of
penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day The Anti-Carnapping Act. This issue is factual,
since RA 6538 sets the minimum penalty for as we shall find hereunder.
carnapping at fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months. In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo
Bhagwani parked the subject Isuzu Trooper in
We see no error by the appellate court in relying front of his house at No. 7015-B Biac-na-Bato
on a Footnote in Omotoy12 to affirm the St., Makati City, Metro Manila. The vehicle was
conviction of the accused. The substance of the owned by Augustus Zamora but was used by
Footnote may not be the ratio decidendi of the Bhagwani as a service vehicle in their joint
case, but it still constitutes an important part of venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper
the decision since it enunciates a fundamental was nowhere to be found prompting Bhagwani
procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That to report its disappearance to the Makati Police
this rule is stated in a Footnote to a decision is Station and the Anti-Carnapping (ANCAR)
of no consequence as it is merely a matter of Division which immediately issued an Alarm
style. Sheet.17

It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours On 31 May 1996 Bhagwani’s neighbor, fireman
with the instant case since the former involves Avelino Alvarez, disclosed that he learned from
an appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the his daughter, a common-law wife of accused
Supreme Court while the case at bar is an Michael Cummins, that the accused Rommel
 90
Flores, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and case. This Court will not assess all over again
Michael Cummins himself stole the Isuzu the evidence adduced by the parties particularly
Trooper. Alvarez’s daughter however refused to where as in this case the findings of both the trial
issue any statement regarding the incident.18 court and the Court of Appeals completely
coincide.25
In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 "Miling"
Flores brought to his house Michael Cummins, However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals
Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen, Rommel on its imposition of the penalty. Republic Act No.
Flores, and complaining witness Bhagwani. In 6538 imposes the penalty of imprisonment
that meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen for seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
and Flores admitted that they took the vehicle thirty (30) years when the carnapping is
and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and committed by means of violence against or
Baguio.19 They claimed however that it was with intimidation of any person, or force upon things.
the knowledge and consent of Bhagwani. They The evidence in this case shows that the
alleged that on the night they took the vehicle, accused broke a quarter window of the Isuzu
they invited Bhagwani to join them in their outing Trooper to gain access to it, thus demonstrating
to Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined, they that force was used upon the vehicle;
asked him instead if they could borrow the Isuzu nonetheless, we believe that this does not merit
Trooper. Bhagwani allegedly agreed and even the imposition of the full penalty. With the
turned over the keys to them.20 application of The Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the penalty to be imposed may be reduced to an
Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17)
that confrontasi in the house of SPO3 "Miling" years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22)
Flores but his co-accused narrated his years.
participation in the crime.21
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the
The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction Court of Appeals denying the Motion and
but increased the penalty imposed on the four Manifestation of petitioner Marvin Mercado
(4) accused from a prison term of twelve (12) dated 19 January 2001 is AFFIRMED with the
years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion reduced to an indeterminate prison term of
temporal as maximum to seventeen (17) years seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to
and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.22 twenty-two (22) years. No costs.

Petitioner insists that the accused were more SO ORDERED.

motivated by fun rather than theft in taking the
Isuzu Trooper, and that they merely took the
vehicle for a joyride with no intention of stealing
it. If they were really thieves, according to
petitioner, they would have sold the vehicle
outright instead of simply abandoning it in
Baguio.23

Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this

is a petition for review on certiorari where only
questions of law, and not questions of fact, may
be raised. The issue before us being factual, a
reevaluation of the facts and the evidence may
not be entertained in this appeal. Besides,
findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the
Supreme Court.24 This rule may be disregarded
only when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, or are not
supported by the evidence on record. But there
is no ground to apply this exception to the instant
 91
September 20, 1993 supposedly issued by BFs
Vice-President. However, both documents were
subsequently found to be falsified.

Thus, the two (2) complaints for falsification of

public document were filed before the Manila
City Prosecutors Office. The charges against
respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz III
were dismissed by the City Prosecutors Office
which, however, found probable cause against
the other respondents. Nonetheless, on a
petition for review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ), the latter affirmed the dismissal
against Diaz but ordered the inclusion of
[G.R. No. 142947. March 19, 2002] respondent Villadores as an accused in the two
(2) criminal cases. Accordingly, the original
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, informations were amended to include
JR., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF respondent Villadores among those charged.
APPEALS and ROQUE
VILLADORES, respondents. Following the arraignment of respondent
Villadores, the private prosecutor, Rico and
DECISION Associates, filed anew a Motion to Admit
Amended Informations alleging damages
sustained by private complainant, herein
DE LEON, JR., J.:
petitioner Villanueva, Jr., as a result of the
crimes committed by the accused. The incident
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of
was referred to the City Prosecutors Office by
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated
the trial court. In compliance, the fiscals office
April 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50235
submitted a Motion to Admit Amended
reversing the two (2) Orders dated August 27,
Informations with the following amendment: to
1998[2] and December 4, 1998[3] of the Regional
the prejudice of Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr., and
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal
of public interest and in violation of public faith
Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 which denied
and destruction of truth as therein proclaimed.
respondent Roque Villadoress motion for
disqualification of Rico and Associates as
The Motion was granted by the trial court and the
private prosecutor for petitioner Francisco N.
amended informations were admitted in an
Villanueva, Jr., and the motion for
Order dated October 10, 1997. Respondent
reconsideration thereof, respectively.
Villadores subsequently filed a Manifestation
and/or Motion for Reconsideration but the same
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in
was denied in an Order dated October 24, 1997.
the amended informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 94-138744 and 94-138745 entitled, People
Thus, respondent Villadores interposed on
of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo,
November 26, 1997 a petition for certiorari with
Roque Villadores, Alberto Adriano and Rolando
the Court of Appeals. Said petition, which was
Advincula, for Falsification of Public Document
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46103, sought to
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
annul the Order of the trial court dated October
Branch 41.
10, 1997 which admitted the second amended
informations, as well as the Order dated October
It appears that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a
24, 1997 denying his motion for reconsideration
complaint for illegal dismissal against several
thereof.[6]
parties, among them, IBC 13. When the labor
arbiter[4] ruled in favor of petitioner Villanueva,
In a Decision dated June 22, 1998, the appellate
Jr., IBC 13 appealed to the National Labor
court, acting thru its Eleventh Division, found
Relations Commission (NLRC).[5] As an appeal
that the trial court committed no grave abuse of
bond, IBC 13 filed Surety Bond No. G (16) 00136
discretion in admitting the amended informations
issued by BF General Insurance Company, Inc.
and dismissed the petition of respondent
(BF) with the Confirmation Letter dated
Villadores.[7] The decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
 92
46103 became final and executory on July 18, Reconsideration[13] was sought by respondent
1998.[8] Villadores but the same was denied by the trial
court in its Order dated December 4, 1998.[14]
Subsequently, before Branch 41 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, respondent Villadores Thus, on January 7, 1999, respondent Villadores
moved for the disqualification of Rico and filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Associates as private prosecutor for petitioner Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No.
Villanueva, Jr.,[9]in line with the following 50235, seeking the annulment of the trial courts
pronouncement of the appellate court in CA- Order dated August 27, 1998 denying the Motion
G.R. SP No. 46103, to wit:[10] for Disqualification as well as its subsequent
Order dated December 4, 1998 denying
Incidentally, We are one with the petitioner when reconsideration.[15]
it argued that Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is not
the offended party in these cases. It must be On April 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered
underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured the its now challenged decision which reversed and
falsified surety bond for the purpose of the set aside the two (2) Orders of the trial court
appeal it had taken from an adverse judgment of dated August 27, 1998 and December 4, 1998.
the labor case filed by Francisco N. Villanueva, The appellate court directed that the name of
Jr. himself and wherein the latter prevailed. We petitioner Villanueva, Jr., appearing as the
see no reason how Villanueva could have offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-
sustained damages as a result of the falsification 138744-45 be stricken out from the records.[16]
of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation
letter when it could have even redounded to his Hence, this petition anchored on the following
own benefit if the appeal would be dismissed as grounds:[17]
a result of the forgery. If there be anyone who
was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
a fake surety bond. ERRED IN ENJOINING RICO & ASSOCIATES
FROM APPEARING AS PRIVATE
Rico and Associates opposed said motion on the PROSECUTOR AND/OR AS COUNSEL FOR
ground that the above-quoted pronouncement of FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., IN
the appellate court is a mere obiter dictum.[11] CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 94-138744-45.

In an Order[12] dated August 27, 1998 the trial THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
court denied the motion for disqualification ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT
ratiocinating, thus: THE MATTER OF WHETHER OR NOT
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR. IS AN
A reading of the aforecited decision of the Court OFFENDED PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS.
of Appeals clearly shows that the aforecited 94-138744-45 HAD BEEN RESOLVED WITH
reason for the motion is a mere obiter dictum. As FINALITY IN THE AFFIRMATIVE IN CA-G.R.
held by the Supreme Court, an obiter SP NO. 46103 WHERE THE HON. COURT OF
dictum lacks force of adjudication. It is merely an APPEALS UPHELD THE AMENDMENT OF
expression of an opinion with no binding force THE INFORMATIONS IN SAID CASES TO
for purposes of res judicata (City of Manila vs. STATE THAT THE CRIMES WERE
Entote, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA, 508-509). COMMITTED TO THE PREJUDICE OF
What is controlling is the dispositive portion of FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., AND
the subject decision of the Court of Appeals PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF RES
which denied due course and ordered dismissed JUDICATA, THE SAME COULD NO LONGER
the petition of the movant questioning the Order BE RELITIGATED IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 50235.
of this Court granting the Motion to Admit
Informations and admitting the Amended THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
Informations that include the name of Francisco ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
N. Villanueva, Jr. as the private offended party, PRONOUNCEMENT IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 46103
which in effect upheld and/or affirmed the THAT FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR. IS
questioned Order of this Court admitting the NOT AN OFFENDED PARTY, AS A MERE
amended informations. OBITER DICTUM.
 93
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY decided in the regular course of the
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT consideration of the case, and led up to the final
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., WAS IN conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on
FACT AN AGGRIEVED PARTY. which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a
point expressly decided does not lose its value
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY as a precedent because the disposition of the
ERRED IN ORDERING THE NAME OF case is, or might have been, made on some
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUVEVA, JR., other ground, or even though, by reason of other
APPEARING AS THE OFFENDED PARTY BE points in the case, the result reached might have
STRICKEN FROM THE RECORDS, DESPITE been the same if the court had held, on the
THE FACT THAT IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 46103, IT particular point, otherwise than it did. A decision
UPHELD THE AMENDMENT OF THE which the case could have turned on is not
INFORMATIONS SO AS TO STATE THAT THE regarded as obiter dictummerely because,
CRIMES CHARGED WERE COMMITTED TO owing to the disposal of the contention, it was
THE PREJUDICE OF FRANCISCO N. necessary to consider another question, nor can
VILLANUEVA, JR. an additional reason in a decision, brought
forward after the case has been disposed of on
All the foregoing issues boil down to the issue of one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also,
whether or not the pronouncement of the where a case presents two (2) or more points,
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 to the any one of which is sufficient to determine the
effect that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. is not an ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all
offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94- such points, the case as an authoritative
138744-45 is obiter dictum. precedent as to every point decided, and none
of such points can be regarded as having the
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion status of a dictum, and one point should not be
expressed by a court upon some question of law denied authority merely because another point
which is not necessary to the decision of the was more dwelt on and more fully argued and
case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion considered, nor does a decision on one
expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a proposition make statements of the court
cause, by the way, that is, incidentally or regarding other propositions dicta.[20]
collaterally, and not directly upon the question
before him, or upon a point not necessarily The decision of the appellate court in CA-
involved in the determination of the cause, or G.R. SP No. 46103 allegedly show a conflict
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or between the pronouncements in the body of the
argument. Such are not binding as precedent.[18] decision and the dispositive portion thereof.
However, when that decision is carefully and
Based on the foregoing, the pronouncement of thoroughly read, such conflict is revealed to be
the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 is more illusory than real. In denying the petition
not an obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103, the
clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his appellate court had this to say:
petition assailing the admission of the Amended
Informations. Among the issues upon which the At the centerfold of this controversy is Section 14
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 of Rule 110, 1st paragraph, which is quoted
was anchored, was whether Francisco N. hereunder:
Villanueva, Jr. is the offended
[19]
party. Argument on whether petitioner SEC. 14. Amendment. - The information or
Villanueva, Jr. was the offended party was, thus, complaint may be amended, in substance or
clearly raised by respondent Villadores. The form, without leave of court, at any time before
body of the decision contains discussion on that the accused pleads, and thereafter and during
point and it clearly mentioned certain principles the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at
of law. the discretion of the court, when the same can
be done without prejudice to the rights of the
It has been held that an adjudication on any point accused.
within the issues presented by the case cannot
be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule Needless to state, amendment of a criminal
applies to all pertinent questions, although only charge sheet depends much on the time when
incidentally involved, which are presented and the change is requested. If before arraignment it
 94
is a matter of right, no leave of court is necessary matter of form under the standards laid down in
and the prosecution is free to do so even in the cases above-cited.
matters of substance and in form. On the other
hand, the more complicated situation involves What seems to be more crucial here is the fact
an amendment sought after the accused had that the crime charged in the two informations is
already been arraigned. This time amendment falsification of public document committed by a
can only be made by a prior leave and at the private individual defined and penalized under
discretion of the court, only as to matters of form Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
when the same can be done without prejudice to Code. Accordingly, the evil sought to be
the rights of the accused [Draculan vs. Donato; punished and sanctioned by the offense of
140 SCRA 425 (1985); Teehankee vs. falsification of public document is the violation of
Madayag, 207 SCRA 134 (1992)]. the public faith and the destruction of the trust as
therein solemnly proclaimed [People vs.
Relative to the second instance, the primary Pacana, 47 Phil 48, citing Decisions of the
consideration is whether the intended Supreme Court of Spain of December 23, 1886;
amendment is only as to matter of form and People vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324, Po Giok To, 96
same could be done without prejudice to the Phil. 913; see Revised Penal Code, Luis B.
rights of the accused. Substantial amendment Reyes, 13th Division, p. 211 and Aquino, 1976
as a consequence is proscribed. In essence, ed., Vol. 2, p. 984]. Apropos, the crime of
substantial matters in the complaint or falsification of public document does not require
information is the recital of facts constituting the for its essential elements damage or intent to
offense charged and determinative of the cause damage. In the final analysis. the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are inclusion of the name of Francisco N. Villanueva.
merely of form [Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 Jr. would then be merely a superfluity in the
(1975); Teehankee vs. Madayag, supra]. information, a meaningless surplusage therein.
In fact. it is even highly doubted if civil damages
In other words, even if the amendment is only as may be awarded in such transgression of the
to matter of form, one other criteria must law.
accompany it for its admission, which is, that it
should not be prejudicial to the accused. Viewed from the above ratiocinations, We find
Conformably, the test as to when the rights of an no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a lower court in admitting the second amended
complaint or information is, when a defense informations albeit such amendment is totally
under the complaint or information, as it irrelevant and unnecessary to the crime
originally stood, would no longer be available charged. The mere fact that the court decides
after the amendment is made, and when any the question wrongly is utterly immaterial to the
evidence the accused might have, would no question of jurisdiction [Estrada vs. Sto
longer be available after the amendment is Domingo, 28 SCRA 891 (1969)]. And writs of
made, and when any evidence the accused certiorari are issued only for the correction of
might have, would be inapplicable to the errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
complaint or information as amended [People amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. It
vs. Montenegro, 159 SCRA 236 (1988); cannot be legally used for any other purpose
Teehankee vs. Madayag, supra]. [Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 527
(1986)].
Given the above aphorisms, the inclusion of the
name of Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. as the Incidentally, We are in one with the petitioner
prejudiced complainant in the cases appears to when it argued that Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr.
be not substantial. It did not change, alter or is not the offended party in these cases. It must
modify the crime charged nor any possible be underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured
defense. Likewise, any evidence the accused the falsified surety bond for the purpose of the
might have under his defense in the original appeal it had taken from an adverse judgment of
informations is still very much available to him the labor case filed by Francisco N. Villanueva,
and applicable to the amended informations. In Jr. himself and wherein the latter prevailed. We
sum, accused petitioner is not in any way see no reason how Villanueva could have
prejudiced in his rights with such amendment sustained damages as a result of the falsification
which, in Our considered opinion, is only a of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation
letter when it could have even redounded to his
 95
own benefit if the appeal would be dismissed as
a result of the forgery. If there be anyone who
was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased
a fake surety bond.[21]

Clearly then, while the appellate court in CA-

G.R. SP No. 46103 admitted that the addition of
petitioner Villanueva, Jr. as an offended party is
not necessary, it held that the admission of the
amended informations due to the amendment to
include petitioner Villanueva, Jr. did not by itself
amount to grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise
stated, there is an error of judgment but such did
not amount to an error of jurisdiction.

The special civil action for certiorari, which was

availed of respondent Villadores, is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. When a
court exercised its jurisdiction an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error
is committed. If it did, every error committed by
a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. Thus, an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correctible through the original
special civil action of certiorari.[22] In effect, the
appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 merely
held that respondent Villadores chose the wrong
remedy.

It is significant to mention that the intervention of

petitioner Villanueva, Jr. in the criminal cases as
an offended party is apparently predicated[23] on
the reduction by the NLRC, in IBCs appeal of the
illegal dismissal case, of the monetary award to
which he is entitled, despite finding the appeal
as not perfected due to the posting of the
spurious appeal bond.[24] However, such alleged
error should have been brought by petitioner
Villanueva, Jr. to the appropriate forum,[25] and
not raised in criminal cases before the trial court
as a ground for his inclusion as a prejudiced
party.

In view of all the foregoing, the instant petition,

being devoid of merit, must fail.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby

DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
50235 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 96
1996, i.e., he was both proponent and
implementer of the projects funded from his
CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers
pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing
Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen
(18) checks amounting to ₱4,868,277.08. Thus,
petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners
Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and
Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert
his CDF into cash.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and,

thereafter, the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a
Resolution2 dated May 29, 2000 recommending
the filing against herein petitioners of fourteen
(14) counts each of Malversation of Public
Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019. Said Resolution was approved by the
G.R. No. 147097 June 5, 2009
Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight (28)
Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO A.
26087 to 26114 were filed against herein
MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID and
petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
ANGELITO A. PELAYO, Petitioner,
vs.
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as
filed their respective Motions for
OMBUDSMAN, and SANDIGANBAYAN,
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions
THIRD DIVISION, Respondents.
were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the
DECISION
prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against
petitioners.
PERALTA, J.:
Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the
This resolves the petition for certiorari under Ombudsman its Resolution3 dated September
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the 18, 2000. It recommended the dismissal of the
Ombudsman's disapproval of the Office of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency
Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution1 dated of evidence.
September 18, 2000, recommending dismissal
of the criminal cases filed against herein
The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office
petitioners, be reversed and set aside.
of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP
Resolution. In a Memorandum 4 dated October
The antecedent facts are as follows. 24, 2000, the OLA recommended that the OSP
Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and directed to proceed with the trial of the cases
Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the against petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the
Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum,
docketed as OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated
petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as September 18, 2000 and ordering the
defined and penalized under Article 220 of the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases.
Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, The cases were then returned to the
paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal
3019, as amended. proceedings.
The complaint alleged that there were Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
irregularities in the use by then Congressman
Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide Petitioners allege that:
Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year
 97
I. Constitution had been fully dissected as far back
as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.6
THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with
JURISDICTION. the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall
II. "exercise such other functions or duties as may
be provided by law." Elucidating on this matter,
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS the Court stated:
BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial
CONJECTURES.5 powers from the Ombudsman was indeed
present, the Commission [referring to the
Amplifying their arguments, petitioners Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not
asseverate that the Ombudsman had no hesitate to recommend that the Legislature
authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution could, through statute, prescribe such other
dismissing the cases against petitioners powers, functions, and duties to the
because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Ombudsman. x x x As finally approved by the
Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only Commission after several amendments, this is
with the power to watch, investigate and now embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13,
recommend the filing of proper cases against Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of
erring officials, but it was not granted the power the Constitution, which provides:
to prosecute. They point out that under the
Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan), which was have the following powers, functions, and duties:
intended by the framers to be a separate and
distinct entity from the Office of the xxxx
Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as
provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise
separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman such other functions or duties as may be
should have no power and authority over the provided by law.
OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No.
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which Expounding on this power of Congress to
made the OSP an organic component of the prescribe other powers, functions, and duties to
Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck the Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners
down for being unconstitutional. Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by
Commissioner Rodrigo:
Next, petitioners insist that they should be
absolved from any liability because the checks xxxx
were issued to petitioner Lazatin allegedly as
reimbursement for the advances he made from MR. RODRIGO:
his personal funds for expenses incurred to
ensure the immediate implementation of Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the
projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo enumerated functions of the Ombudsman is: "to
victims. exercise such powers or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by law." So, the
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious. legislature may vest him with powers taken away
from the Tanodbayan, may it not?
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been settled MR. COLAYCO:
that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the
Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers Yes.
and placing the OSP under said office have no
constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said MR. MONSOD:
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the
 98
Yes. Anyway, since we state that the powers of the
Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the
xxxx legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?

MR. RODRIGO: xxxx

Madam President. Section 5 reads: "The MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of

Tanodbayan shall continue to function and Commissioner Blas Ople):
exercise its powers as provided by law."
xxxx
MR. COLAYCO:
With respect to the argument that he is a
That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. toothless animal, we would like to say that we
1630. are promoting the concept in its form at the
present, but we are also saying that he can
MR. RODRIGO: exercise such powers and functions as may be
provided by law in accordance with the direction
So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away of the thinking of Commissioner Rodrigo. We do
by law, I suppose. not think that at this time we should prescribe
this, but we leave it up to Congress at some
MR. COLAYCO: future time if it feels that it may need to designate
what powers the Ombudsman need in order that
That is correct. he be more effective.1awphi1 This is not
foreclosed.
MR. RODRIGO:
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a
And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability.7
the functions that can be performed by the
Ombudsman are "such functions or duties as The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No.
may be provided by law." The sponsors admitted 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the
that the legislature later on might remove some Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld
powers from the Tanodbayan and transfer these by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:
to the Ombudsman.
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion
MR. COLAYCO: of the Office of the Special Prosecutor as among
the offices under the Office of the Ombudsman
Madam President, that is correct. in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 ("An Act Providing
for the Functional and Structural Organization of
xxxx the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other
Purposes") is unconstitutional and void.
MR. RODRIGO:
The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if
we create a constitutional body which has xxxx
neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only
persuasive powers, we might be raising the x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides
hopes of our people too much and then that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be
disappoint them. henceforth known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and
MR. MONSOD: exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law, except those conferred on the
Office of the Ombudsman created under this
I agree with the Commissioner.
Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently
refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D.
MR. RODRIGO:
No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation.
It follows then that Congress may remove any of
the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers
 99
under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
except those powers conferred by the Philippines which provides, thus:
Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
one considers that by express mandate of form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise It was further explained in Fermin v. People13 as
such other powers or perform functions or duties follows:
as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then
that Congress has the power to place the Office The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence
of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may country to follow the rule established in a
remove some of the powers granted to the decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That
Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
to the Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
Special Prosecutor such other powers and land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on
functions and duties as Congress may deem fit the principle that once a question of law has
and wise. This Congress did through the been examined and decided, it should be
passage of R.A. No. 6770.8 deemed settled and closed to further
argument.141avvphi1
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been
reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero.9 More In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association
recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel
Valera,10 the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on Corporation,15 the Court expounded on the
its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating
the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of that:
the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control, and upon authority of The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy
the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. grounded on the necessity for securing certainty
6770, the power to preventively suspend is and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy
Ombudsman.11 The Court's ruling in Acop that Time and again, the court has held that it is a
the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute very desirable and necessary judicial
based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the practice that when a court has laid down a
Constitution was also made the foundation for principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
the decision in Perez v. facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it
Sandiganbayan,12 where it was held that the to all future cases in which the facts are
power to prosecute carries with it the power to substantially the same. Stare decisis et non
authorize the filing of informations, which power quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
therefore, beyond cavil that under the means that for the sake of certainty, a
Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from conclusion reached in one case should be
legislating the grant of additional powers to the applied to those that follow if the facts are
Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the substantially the same, even though the
Office of the Ombudsman. parties may be different. It proceeds from the
first principle of justice that, absent any
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on powerful countervailing considerations, like
the constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where
6770 should be revisited and the principle the same questions relating to the same event
of stare decisis set aside. Again, this contention have been put forward by the parties similarly
deserves scant consideration. situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
movere (to adhere to precedents and not to same issue.16
unsettle things which are established) is
 100
The doctrine has assumed such value in our without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
judicial system that the Court has ruled that abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack
"[a]bandonment thereof must be based only or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
the becoming virtue of predictability which is certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
expected from this Court would be errors of the trial court in its appreciation of
immeasurably affected and the public's the evidence of the parties, or its
confidence in the stability of the solemn conclusions anchored on the said findings
pronouncements diminished."17 Verily, only and its conclusions of law. It is not for this
upon showing that circumstances attendant in a Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-
particular case override the great benefits evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or
derived by our judicial system from the doctrine substitute the findings of fact of the court a
of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in quo.19
setting aside the same.
Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence
In this case, petitioners have not shown any indeed supports a finding of probable cause
strong, compelling reason to convince the Court would necessitate an examination and re-
that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be evaluation of the evidence upon which the
applied to this case. They have not successfully Ombudsman based its disapproval of the OSP
demonstrated how or why it would be grave Resolution. Hence, the Petition
abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who for Certiorari should not be given due course.
has been validly conferred by law with the power
of control and supervision over the OSP, to Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court
disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
the latter. on Behest Loans v. Desierto,20 imparting the
value of the Ombudsman's independence,
The second issue advanced by petitioners is that stating thus:
the Ombudsman's disapproval of the OSP
Resolution recommending dismissal of the Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987
cases is based on misapprehension of facts, Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act
speculations, surmises and conjectures. The of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to
question is really whether the Ombudsman investigate and prosecute any act or omission of
correctly ruled that there was enough evidence a public officer or employee when such act or
to support a finding of probable cause. That omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
issue, however, pertains to a mere error of or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling
judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a of the Court not to interfere with the
remedy meant to correct only errors of Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has and prosecutory powers as long as his
been emphasized in First Corporation v. Former rulings are supported by substantial
Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,18 to wit: evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the
people and preserver of the integrity of public
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review service, he has wide latitude in exercising his
of facts and evidence is not the province of the powers and is free from intervention from the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra three branches of government. This is to
ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In ensure that his Office is insulated from any
certiorari proceedings, judicial review does outside pressure and improper influence.21
not go as far as to examine and assess the
evidence of the parties and to weigh the Indeed, for the Court to overturn the
probative value thereof. It does not include Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, it is
an inquiry as to the correctness of the imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that
evaluation of evidence. Any error committed said public official acted with grave abuse of
in the evaluation of evidence is merely an discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good
error of judgment that cannot be remedied by Government v. Desierto,22 the Court elaborated
certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the on what constitutes such abuse, to wit:
court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
the act complained of was issued by the court and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount
 101
to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's
exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law. x x x23

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate

that the Ombudsman acted in a manner
described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was
acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and
properly exercised its power of control and
supervision over the OSP when it disapproved
the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.

It should also be noted that the petition does not

question any order or action of the
Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should
not have been included as a respondent in this
petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition

is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
 102
CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN,
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB,
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS,
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,
CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention.
x-----------------------------x

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 177499

PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President
EN BANC JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS,
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 176951 CITY OF CALBAYOG
PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented represented by MAYOR
by LCP National President MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF and JERRY P. TREAS in his
ILOILO represented by personal capacity as taxpayer,
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, Petitioners,
CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR - versus -
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P. TREAS in his COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
personal capacity as taxpayer, MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN,
Petitioners, PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
- versus - PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC,
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI,
MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL;
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN,
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL,
PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; Respondents.
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;
and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF
SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
 103
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB,
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS,
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF CITY OF CADIZ, and Promulgated:
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF TAGUM,
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF Petitioners-In-Intervention. August 24, 2010
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF x----------------------------------
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, ----------------x
CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention. RESOLUTION
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 178056 CARPIO, J.:

PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for
by LCP National President Present: reconsideration and (2) motion to annul the
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF Decision of 21 December 2009 filed by
ILOILO represented by CORONA, C.J., petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CARPIO, al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for
CITY OF CALBAYOG CARPIO MORALES, reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-
represented by MAYOR VELASCO, JR., intervention Batangas City, Santiago City,
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, NACHURA, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and
and JERRY P. TREAS in his LEONARDO-DE Oroquieta City.
CASTRO, On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En
personal capacity as taxpayer, BRION, Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the
Petitioners, PERALTA, subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section
BERSAMIN, 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the
DEL CASTILLO, equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the
- versus - ABAD, Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority
VILLARAMA, JR., vote, denied the respondents first motion for
PEREZ, reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme
MENDOZA, and Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; SERENO, JJ. respondents second motion for reconsideration.
MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN became final and executory and was recorded,
DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY in due course, in the Book of Entries of
OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF Judgments on 21 May 2009.
CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF
EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS However, after the finality of the 18 November
ORIENTAL, 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and
Respondents. compelling reason, the Court En
Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18
November 2008 Decision by upholding the
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the
SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, Decision of 21 December 2009.
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN,
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF
 104
A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the municipalities from the increased income
Constitution requirement in Section 450 of the Local
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Government Code, as amended by RA
Constitution provides: 9009. Such exemption clearly violates
No province, city, municipality, or Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and
barangay shall be created, is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid,
divided, merged, abolished or its such exemption must be written in the Local
boundary substantially Government Code and not in any other law,
altered, except in accordance including the Cityhood Laws.
with the criteria established in
the local government code and RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local
subject to approval by a majority Government Code. Section 1 of RA 9009
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in pertinently provides: Section 450 of Republic
the political units directly Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
affected. (Emphasis supplied) Government Code of 1991, is hereby
amended to read as follows: x x x. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of
government units must follow the criteria the Local Government Code, embodies the
established in the Local Government new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local
Code and not in any other law. There is only one Government Code. Considering the
Local Government Code.[1] The Constitution Legislatures primary intent to curtail the mad
requires Congress to stipulate in the Local rush of municipalities wanting to be converted
Government Code all the criteria necessary for into cities, RA 9009 increased the income
the creation of a city, including the conversion of requirement for the creation of cities. To repeat,
a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local
such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Government Code, as it expressly amended
Laws. Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and
that the creation of cities and other political units clear. Nothing is unintelligible or ambiguous; not
must follow the same uniform, non- a single word or phrase admits of two or more
discriminatory criteria found solely in the meanings. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code. Any derogation or Local Government Code of 1991 by increasing
deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local the income requirement for the creation of cities.
Government Code violates Section 10, Article X There are no exemptions from this income
of the Constitution. requirement.Since the law is clear, plain and
unambiguous that any municipality desiring to
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local convert into a city must meet the increased
Government Code to increase the income income requirement, there is no reason to go
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where
the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 the law does not make an exemption, the Court
June 2001. Hence, from that moment should not create one.[2]
the Local Government Code required that
any municipality desiring to become a city
must satisfy the P100 million income B. Operative Fact Doctrine
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of
does not contain any exemption from this the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration
income requirement. of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any operative fact doctrine is an admission that the
exemption to respondent municipalities, even law is unconstitutional.
though their cityhood bills were pending in
Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The However, the minoritys novel theory, invoking
Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment
of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the
 105
16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of The doctrine of operative fact,
officials and employees operate to as an exception to the general
contitutionalize the unconstitutional rule, only applies as a matter of
Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies equity and fair play. It nullifies
the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely the effects of an
dangerous precedent. unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence
Under the minoritys novel theory, an of a statute prior to a
unconstitutional law, if already implemented determination of
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by unconstitutionality is an
the Court, can no longer be revoked and its operative fact and may have
implementation must be continued despite being consequences which cannot
unconstitutional. This view will open the always be ignored. The past
floodgates to the wanton enactment of cannot always be erased by a
unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their new judicial declaration.
immediate implementation before the Court can The doctrine is applicable when a
declare them unconstitutional. This view is an declaration of unconstitutionality
open invitation to serially violate the will impose an undue burden on
Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the those who have relied on the
violation be stopped by the Court. invalid law. Thus, it was applied to
a criminal case when a declaration
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As of unconstitutionality would put the
such, it must be applied as an exception to the accused in double jeopardy or
general rule that an unconstitutional law would put in limbo the acts done by
produces no effects. It can never be invoked to a municipality in reliance upon a
validate as constitutional an unconstitutional law creating it. (Emphasis
act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil supplied)
Corporation,[3] the Court stated:
The operative fact doctrine never validates or
The general rule is that an constitutionalizes an unconstitutional
unconstitutional law is void. It law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the
produces no rights, imposes no unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional,
duties and affords no but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior
protection. It has no legal effect. to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left
It is, in legal contemplation, undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In
inoperative as if it has not been short, the operative fact doctrine affects or
passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional
required to pay the levy. All levies law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
paid should be refunded in
accordance with the general civil Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the
code principle against unjust present case, the Cityhood Laws remain
enrichment. The general rule is unconstitutional because they violate Section
supported by Article 7 of the Civil 10, Article X of the Constitution.However, the
Code, which provides: effects of the implementation of the Cityhood
ART. 7. Laws are Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity,
repealed only by such as the payment of salaries and supplies by
subsequent ones, and the new cities or their issuance of licenses or
their violation or non- execution of contracts, may be recognized as
observance shall not be valid and effective. This does not mean that the
excused by disuse or Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain
custom or practice to the void. Only the effects of the implementation of
contrary. these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed
When the courts declare a as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent
law to be inconsistent with people who may have relied on the presumed
the Constitution, the validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts
former shall be void and declaration of their unconstitutionality.
the latter shall govern.
 106
C. Equal Protection Clause Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court
provides:
As the Court held in the 18 November 2008
Decision, there is no substantial distinction SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is
between municipalities with pending cityhood equally divided. Where the
bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that court en banc is equally divided in
did not have pending bills. The mere pendency opinion, or the necessary majority
of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a cannot be had, the case shall
material difference to distinguish one again be deliberated on, and if
municipality from another for the purpose of the after such deliberation no decision
income requirement. The pendency of a is reached, the original action
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not commenced in the court shall be
affect or determine the level of income of a dismissed; in appealed cases, the
municipality. Municipalities with pending judgment or order appealed from
cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even shall stand affirmed; and on all
have lower annual income than municipalities incidental matters, the petition
that did not have pending cityhood bills. In or motion shall be
short, the classification criterion − mere denied. (Emphasis supplied)
pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress − is not rationally related to The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in
the purpose of the law which is to prevent A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads:
fiscally non-viable municipalities from A MOTION FOR THE
converting into cities. CONSIDERATION OF A
DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF
Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A
in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED
specific condition existing at the time of passage UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY
of RA 9009. That specific condition will never OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN
happen again. This violates the requirement BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS
that a valid classification must not be limited THE CASE MAY BE, WHO
to existing conditions only. In fact, the ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE
minority concedes that the conditions (pendency DELIBERATION OF THE
of the cityhood bills) adverted to can no longer MOTION.
be repeated.
IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A
Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood TIE, THE MOTION FOR
Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique RECONSIDERATION IS
advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis
of their cityhood bills before the end of the supplied)
11th Congress as against all other municipalities
that want to convert into cities after the effectivity
of RA 9009. The clear and simple language of the
clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no
In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 further explanation. If the voting of the Court en
municipalities violates the requirement that the banc results in a tie, the motion for
classification must apply to all similarly situated. reconsideration is deemed denied. The Courts
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 prior majority action on the main decision
respondent municipalities cannot convert into stands affirmed.[4] This clarificatory Resolution
cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities applies to all cases heard by the Court en
can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision banc, which includes not only cases involving
found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were the constitutionality of a law, but also, as
written in Section 450 of the Local Government expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of
Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation the Constitution, all other cases which under
of the equal protection clause. the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc.

D. Tie-Vote on a Motion for Reconsideration

 107
The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the November 2008 Decision stands affirmed. And
second motion for reconsideration necessarily assuming a non-majority lacks any precedential
resulted in the denial of the second motion for value, the 18 November 2008 Decision, which
reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly was unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the
divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 respondents second motion for reconsideration,
November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot nevertheless remains binding on the parties.[9]
result in any court order or directive.[5] The
judgment stands in full force.[6]Undeniably, the
6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior Conclusion
majority en banc Decision of 18 November
2008, as well as the prior majority en
banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second expressly provides that no x x x city shall be
motion for reconsideration is not the same as a created x x x except in accordance with the
tie-vote on the main decision where there is no criteria established in the local government
prior decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly signifies code. This provision can only be interpreted in
that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of
November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local
Resolution, and thus the second motion for Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood
reconsideration must be denied. Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than
the Local Government Code, provided an
Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for exemption from the increased income
reconsideration did not mean that the present requirement for the creation of cities under
cases were left undecided because there remain Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
the Decision of 18 November 2008 and the amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood
Resolution of 31 March 2009 where a majority of Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section
the Court en banc concurred in declaring the 10, Article X of the Constitution.
unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood
Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10,
Decision and the 31 March 2009 Resolution, Article X of the Constitution does not cripple
which were both reached with the Congress power to make laws. In fact, Congress
concurrence of a majority of the Court en is not prohibited from amending the Local
banc, are not reconsidered but stand Government Code itself, as what Congress did
affirmed.[7] These prior majority actions of by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of
the Court en banc can only be overruled by a amending laws comprises an integral part of the
new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a Legislatures law-making power. The
tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in
action. the fact that Congress provided an exemption
contrary to the express language of the
The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion Constitution that [n]o x x x city x x x shall be
for reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18 created except in accordance with the criteria
November 2008 Decision final. In fact, in its established in the local government code. In
Resolution of 28 April 2009, denying the second other words, Congress exceeded and abused its
motion for reconsideration, the Court en law-making power, rendering the challenged
banc reiterated that no further pleadings shall be Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the
entertained and stated that entry of judgment be Constitution.
made in due course.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for
The dissenting opinion stated that a deadlocked reconsideration of the 21 December 2009
vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority Decision and REINSTATE the 18 November
does not constitute a rule with precedential 2008 Decision
value.[8] declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood
Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390,
Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority a non- 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405,
majority which cannot overrule a prior affirmative 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
action, that is the 18 November 2008 Decision
striking down the Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18
 108
We NOTE petitioners motion to annul the D. Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), and Cynthia L.
Decision of 21 December 2009. Comandao (Comandao), the dispositive portion
of which reads:
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
private respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate
the petitioners with full backwages less the
amounts they received as separation pays. In
case reinstatement would no longer be feasible
because the positions previously held no longer
exist, the private respondent shall pay them
backwages plus, in lieu of reinstatement,
separation pays equal to one (1) month pay, or
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. In addition, the
private respondent is hereby ordered to pay the
petitioners moral damages in the amount of
₱20,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.3

The Facts

Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing

Corporation (PCMC) is a corporation registered
in the Philippines engaged in the business of
G.R. No. 191475 December 11, 2013 manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and
rugs.4 Respondents were its regular and
permanent employees, but were affected by
PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING
petitioner’s retrenchment and voluntary
CORPORATION, PACIFIC CARPET
retirement programs.
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, MR.
PATRICIO LIM and MR. DAVID
LIM, Petitioners, On March 15, 2004,
vs. Tagyamon,5 Luna,6 Badayos,7 Dela Cruz,8 and
IGNACIO B. TAGYAMON,PABLITO L. LUNA, Comandao9 received a uniformly worded
FE B. BADA YOS, GRACE B. MARCOS, Memorandum of dismissal, to wit:
ROGELIO C. NEMIS, ROBERTO B. ILAO,
ANICIA D. DELA CRUZ and CYNTHIA L. This is to inform you that in view of a slump in
COMANDAO, Respondents. the market demand for our products due to the
un-competitiveness of our price, the company is
DECISION constrained to reduce the number of its
workforce. The long-term effects of September
11 and the war in the Middle East have greatly
PERALTA, J.:
affected the viability of our business and we are
left with no recourse but to reorganize and
The Case
downsize our organizational structure.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
We wish to inform you that we are implementing
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court
a retrenchment program in accordance with
of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated July 7, 2009
Article 283 of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
and Resolution2 dated February 26, 2010 in CA-
as amended, and its implementing rules and
G.R. SP No. 105236. The assailed decision
regulations.
granted the petition for certiorari filed by
respondents Ignacio B. Tagyamon (Tagyamon),
In this connection, we regret to advise you that
Pablito I. Luna (Luna), Fe B. Badayos
you are one of those affected by the said
(Badayos), Grace B. Marcos (Marcos), Rogelio
exercise, and your employment shall be
C. Nemis (Nemis), Roberto B. Ilao (Ilao), Anicia
 109
terminated effective at the close of working waiver and quitclaim, PCMC invoked the
hours on April 15, 2004. principle of estoppel on the part of respondents
to question their separation from the service.
Accordingly, you shall be paid your separation Finally, as to Marcos, Ilao and Nemis, PCMC
pay as mandated by law. You will no longer be emphasized that they were not dismissed from
required to report for work during the 30-day employment, but in fact they voluntarily retired
notice period in order to give you more time to from employment to take advantage of the
look for alternative employment. However, you company’s program.16
will be paid the salary corresponding to the said
period. We shall process your clearance and On August 23, 2007, Labor Arbiter (LA) Donato
other documents and you may claim the G. Quinto, Jr. rendered a Decision dismissing
payables due you on March 31, 2004. the complaint for lack of merit.17 The LA found
no flaw in respondents’ termination as they
Thank you for your services and good luck to voluntarily opted to retire and were subsequently
your future endeavors.10 re-employed on a contractual basis then
regularized, terminated from employment and
As to Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis, they claimed that were paid separation benefits.18 In view of
they were dismissed effective March 31, 2004, respondents’ belated filing of the complaint, the
together with fifteen (15) other employees on the LA concluded that such action is a mere
ground of lack of market/slump in afterthought designed primarily for respondents
demand.11 PCMC, however, claimed that they to collect more money, taking advantage of the
availed of the company’s voluntary retirement 2006 Supreme Court decision.19
program and, in fact, voluntarily executed their
respective Deeds of Release, Waiver, and On appeal, the National Labor Relations
Quitclaim.12 Commission (NLRC) sustained the LA
decision.20 In addition to the LA ratiocination, the
Claiming that they were aggrieved by PCMC’s NLRC emphasized the application of the
decision to terminate their employment, principle of laches for respondents’ inaction for
respondents filed separate complaints for illegal an unreasonable period.
dismissal against PCMC, Pacific Carpet
Manufacturing Corporation, Mr. Patricio Lim and Still undaunted, respondents elevated the matter
Mr. David Lim. These cases were later to the CA in a petition for certiorari. In reversing
consolidated. Respondents primarily relied on the earlier decisions of the LA and the NLRC, the
the Supreme Court’s decision in Philippine CA refused to apply the principle of laches,
Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v. because the case was instituted prior to the
Hon. Sto. Tomas (Philcea case),13 as to the expiration of the prescriptive period set by law
validity of the company’s retrenchment program. which is four years. It stressed that said principle
They further explained that PCMC did not, in cannot be invoked earlier than the expiration of
fact, suffer losses shown by its acts prior to and the prescriptive period.21 Citing the Court’s
subsequent to their termination.14 They also decision in the Philcea case, the CA applied the
insisted that their acceptance of separation pay doctrine of stare decisis, in view of the similar
and signing of quitclaim is not a bar to the pursuit factual circumstances of the cases. As to Ilao,
of illegal dismissal case.15 Nemis and Marcos, while acknowledging their
voluntary resignation, the CA found the same
PCMC, for its part, defended its decision to not a bar to the illegal dismissal case because
terminate the services of respondents being a they did so on the mistaken belief that PCMC
necessary management prerogative. It pointed was losing money.22 With the foregoing findings,
out that as an employer, it had no obligation to the CA ordered that respondents be reinstated
keep in its employ more workers than are with full backwages less the amounts they
necessary for the operation of his business. received as separation pay. In case of
Thus, there was an authorized cause for impossibility of reinstatement, the CA ordered
dismissal. Petitioners also stressed that PCMC to pay respondents backwages and in
respondents belatedly filed their complaint as lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equal to
they allowed almost three years to pass making one month pay or ½ month pay for every year of
the principle of laches applicable. Considering service whichever is higher, plus moral
that respondents accepted their separation pay damages.23
and voluntarily executed deeds of release,
 110
The Issues voluntarily availed of the company’s Voluntary
Separation Program.28They further contend that
Aggrieved, petitioners come before the Court in respondents are guilty not only of laches but also
this petition for review on certiorari based on this of estoppel in view of their inaction for an
ground, to wit: unreasonable length of time to assail the alleged
illegal dismissal and in voluntarily executing a
IN RENDERING ITS DISPUTED DECISION release, quitclaim and waiver.29
AND RESOLUTION, THE COURT A QUO HAS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT The Court’s Ruling
IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND/OR
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE. Laches

a) Res Judicata should not be followed if to Laches has been defined as the failure or
follow it is to perpetuate error (Philippine Trust neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
Co., and Smith Bell & Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil. length of time to do that which by exercising due
30, 36 (1933). The (Supreme) Court is not diligence, could or should have been done
precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the
blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
immutability of final judgments would involve the or declined to assert it.30 It has been
sacrifice of justice for technicality (Heirs of repeatedly31 held by the Court that:
Maura So vs. Obliosca, G.R. No. 147082,
January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 406) x x x Laches is a doctrine in equity while
prescription is based on law. Our courts are
b) Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus,
against public policy. Waivers that represent a laches cannot be invoked to resist the
voluntary and reasonable settlement of the enforcement of an existing legal right. x x x
laborer’s claims are legitimate and should be Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound
respected by the Court as the law between the by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion
parties (Gamogamo vs. PNOC Shipping and to disregard them. In Zabat Jr. v. Court of
Transport Corp., G.R. No. 141707, May 2, Appeals x x x, this Court was more emphatic in
2002; Alcasero vs. NLRC, 288 SCRA 129) upholding the rules of procedure. We said
Where the persons making the waiver has done therein:
so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof,
and the consideration for the quitclaim is As for equity which has been aptly described as
credible and reasonable, the transaction must a "justice outside legality," this is applied only in
be recognized as valid and binding undertaking the absence of, and never against, statutory law
(Periquet vs. NLRC, 186 SCRA 724 or, as in this case, judicial rules of
[1990]; Magsalin vs. Coca Cola Bottlers Phils., procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit
Inc. vs. National Organization of Working Men legis. The pertinent positive rules being present
(N.O.W.M.], G.R. No. 148492, May 2, 2003).24 here, they should preempt and prevail over all
abstract arguments based only on equity.
Petitioners contend that the Philcea
case decided by this Court and relied upon by Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-
the CA in the assailed decision was based on year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot
erroneous factual findings, inapplicable financial be barred by laches. Courts should never apply
statement, as well as erroneous analysis of such the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration
financial statements.25 They, thus, implore the of time limited for the commencement of actions
Court to revisit the cited case in order to at law."32
dispense with substantial justice.26 They explain
that the Court made conclusions based on An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal
erroneous information. Petitioners also insist dismissal is one based on an injury to the
that the doctrines of res judicata and law of the complainants’ rights which should be brought
case are not applicable, considering that this within four years from the time of their dismissal
case does not involve the same parties as pursuant to Article 114633 of the Civil Code.
the Philcea case.27 They likewise point out that Respondents’ complaint filed almost 3 years
not all respondents were involuntarily separated after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well
on the ground of redundancy as some of them within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot,
 111
therefore, be invoked yet.34 To be sure, laches discussed the requisites of both retrenchment
may be applied only upon the most convincing and redundancy as authorized causes of
evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of termination and that petitioners failed to
laborers are protected under the social justice substantiate them. In ascertaining the bases of
provisions of the Constitution and under the Civil the termination of employees, it took into
Code.35 consideration petitioners’ claim of business
losses; the purchase of machinery and
Stare Decisis equipment after the termination, the declaration
of cash dividends to stockholders, the hiring of
The main issue sought to be determined in this 100 new employees after the retrenchment, and
case is the validity of respondents’ dismissal the authorization of full blast overtime work for
from employment. Petitioners contend that they six hours daily. These, said the Court, are
either voluntarily retired from the service or inconsistent with petitioners’ claim that there
terminated from employment based on an was a slump in the demand for its products
authorized cause. The LA and the NLRC are one which compelled them to implement the
in saying that the dismissal was legal. The CA, termination programs. In arriving at its
however, no longer discussed the validity of the conclusions, the Court took note of petitioners’
ground of termination. Rather, it applied the net sales, gross and net profits, as well as net
Court’s decision in the Philcea case where the income. The Court, thus, reached the conclusion
same ground was thoroughly discussed. In other that the retrenchment effected by PCMC is
words, the appellate court applied the doctrine invalid due to a substantive defect. We quote
of stare decisis and reached the same hereunder the Court’s pronouncement in
conclusion as the earlier case. the Philcea case, to wit:

Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when a court Respondents failed to adduce clear and
has laid down a principle of law as applicable to convincing evidence to prove the confluence of
a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that the essential requisites for a valid retrenchment
principle and apply it to all future cases in which of its employees. We believe that respondents
the facts are substantially the same, even acted in bad faith in terminating the employment
though the parties may be different.36 Where the of the members of petitioner Union.
facts are essentially different, however, stare
decisis does not apply, for a perfectly sound Contrary to the claim of respondents that the
principle as applied to one set of facts might be Corporation was experiencing business losses,
entirely inappropriate when a factual variant is respondent Corporation, in fact, amassed
introduced.37 substantial earnings from 1999 to 2003. It found
no need to appropriate its retained earnings
The question, therefore, is whether the factual except on March 23, 2001, when it appropriated
circumstances of this present case are ₱60,000,000.00 to increase production capacity.
substantially the same as the Philcea case. xxx

We answer in the affirmative. xxxx

This case and the Philcea case involve the The evidence on record belies the
same period which is March to April 2004; the ₱22,820,151.00 net income loss in 2004 as
issuance of Memorandum to employees projected by the SOLE. On March 29, 2004, the
informing them of the implementation of the cost Board of Directors approved the appropriation of
reduction program; the implementation of the ₱20,000,000.00 to purchase machinery to
voluntary retirement program and retrenchment improve its facilities, and declared cash
program, except that this case involves different dividends to stockholders at ₱30.00 per share. x
employees; the execution of deeds of release, xx
waiver, and quitclaim, and the acceptance of
separation pay by the affected employees. xxxx

The illegality of the basis of the implementation It bears stressing that the appropriation of
of both voluntary retirement and retrenchment ₱20,000,000.00 by the respondent Corporation
programs of petitioners had been thoroughly on September 16, 2004 was made barely five
ruled upon by the Court in the Philcea case. It months after the 77 Union members were
 112
dismissed on the ground that respondent issued said Memorandum. Such claim of a
Corporation was suffering from "chronic depressed market as of March 9, 2004 was only
depression." Cash dividends were likewise a pretext to retaliate against petitioner Union and
declared on March 29, 2004, barely two weeks thereby frustrate its demands for more monetary
after it implemented its "retrenchment program." benefits and, at the same time, justify the
dismissal of the 77 Union members.
If respondent Corporation were to be believed
that it had to retrench employees due to the xxxx
debilitating slump in demand for its products
resulting in severe losses, how could it justify the In contrast, in this case, the retrenchment
purchase of ₱20,000,000.00 worth of machinery effected by respondent Corporation is invalid
and equipment? There is likewise no justification due to a substantive defect, non-compliance
for the hiring of more than 100 new employees, with the substantial requirements to effect a valid
more than the number of those who were retrenchment; it necessarily follows that the
retrenched, as well as the order authorizing full termination of the employment of petitioner
blast overtime work for six hours daily. All these Union's members on such ground is, likewise,
are inconsistent with the intransigent claim that illegal. As such, they (petitioner Union's
respondent Corporation was impelled to members) are entitled to reinstatement with full
retrench its employees precisely because of low backwages.38
demand for its products and other external
causes. We find no reason to depart from the above
conclusions which are based on the Court’s
xxxx examination of the evidence presented by the
parties therein. As the respondents here were
That respondents acted in bad faith in similarly situated as the union members in
retrenching the 77 members of petitioner is the Philcea case, and considering that the
buttressed by the fact that Diaz issued his questioned dismissal from the service was
Memorandum announcing the cost-reduction based on the same grounds under the same
program on March 9, 2004, after receipt of the circumstances, there is no need to relitigate the
February 10, 2004 letter of the Union president issues presented herein. In short, we adopt the
which included the proposal for additional Court’s earlier findings that there was no valid
benefits and wage increases to be incorporated ground to terminate the employees.
in the CBA for the ensuing year. Petitioner and
its members had no inkling, before February 10, A closer look at petitioners’ arguments would
2004, that respondent Corporation would show that they want the Court to re-examine our
terminate their employment. Moreover, decision in the Philcea case allegedly on the
respondent Corporation failed to exhaust all ground that the conclusions therein were based
other means to avoid further losses without on erroneous interpretation of the evidence
retrenching its employees, such as utilizing the presented.
latter's respective forced vacation leaves.
Respondents also failed to use fair and Indeed, in Abaria v. National Labor Relations
reasonable criteria in implementing the Commission,39 although the Court was
retrenchment program, and instead chose to confronted with the same issue of the legality of
retrench 77 of the members of petitioner out of a strike that has already been determined in a
the dismissed 88 employees. Worse, previous case, the Court refused to apply the
respondent Corporation hired new employees doctrine of stare decisis insofar as the award of
and even rehired the others who had been backwages was concerned because of the clear
"retrenched." erroneous application of the law. We held
therein that the Court abandons or overrules
As shown by the SGV & Co. Audit Report, as of precedents whenever it realizes that it erred in
year end December 31, 2003, respondent the prior decision.40 The Court’s pronouncement
Corporation increased its net sales by more than in that case is instructive:
₱8,000,000.00. Respondents failed to prove that
there was a drastic or severe decrease in the The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon
product sales or that it suffered severe business a showing that circumstances attendant in a
losses within an interval of three (3) months from particular case override the great benefits
January 2004 to March 9, 2004 when Diaz derived by our judicial system from the doctrine
 113
of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it the employer paid is incredible and
aside. For the Court, as the highest court of the unreasonable; or (3) the terms of the waiver are
land, may be guided but is not controlled by contrary to law, public order, public policy,
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third
new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly person with a right recognized by law.46The
a particular decision that it determines, after re- instant case falls under the first situation.
examination, to call for a rectification.41
As the ground for termination of employment
The Abaria case, however, is not applicable in was illegal, the quitclaims are deemed illegal as
this case.1âwphi1 There is no reason to the employees’ consent had been vitiated by
abandon the Court’s ruling in the Philcea case. mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor
upon quitclaims and releases by employees
Do we apply the aforesaid decision to all the pressured into signing by unscrupulous
respondents herein? Again, we answer in the employers minded to evade legal
47
responsibilities. The circumstances show that
affirmative.
petitioner’s misrepresentation led its employees,
Just like the union members in the Philcea case, specifically respondents herein, to believe that
respondents Tagyamon, Luna, Badayos, Dela the company was suffering losses which
Cruz, and Comandao received similarly worded necessitated the implementation of the voluntary
memorandum of dismissal effective April 15, retirement and retrenchment programs, and
2004 based on the same ground of slump in the eventually the execution of the deeds of release,
market demand for the company’s products. As waiver and quitclaim.48
such, they are similarly situated in all aspects as
the union members. With respect to respondents It can safely be concluded that economic
Marcos, Nemis and Ilao, although they applied necessity constrained respondents to accept
for voluntary retirement, the same was not petitioners’ monetary offer and sign the deeds of
accepted by petitioner. Instead, it issued notice release, waiver and quitclaim. That respondents
of termination dated March 6, 2004 to these are supervisors and not rank-and-file employees
same employees.42 And while it is true that does not make them less susceptible to financial
petitioner paid them separation pay, the offers, faced as they were with the prospect of
payment was in the nature of separation and not unemployment. The Court has allowed
retirement pay. In other words, payment was supervisory employees to seek payment of
made because of the implementation of the benefits and a manager to sue for illegal
retrenchment program and not because of dismissal even though, for a consideration, they
retirement.43 As their application for availing of executed deeds of quitclaims releasing their
the company’s voluntary retirement program employers from liability.49
was based on the wrong premise, the intent to
retire was not clearly established, or rather that x x x There is no nexus between intelligence, or
the retirement is involuntary. Thus, they shall be even the position which the employee held in the
considered discharged from company when it concerns the pressure which
employment.44 Consequently, they shall be the employer may exert upon the free will of the
treated as if they are in the same footing as the employee who is asked to sign a release and
other respondents herein and the union quitclaim. A lowly employee or a sales manager,
members in the Philcea case. as in the present case, who is confronted with
the same dilemma of whether [to sign] a release
Waivers, Releases and Quitclaims and quitclaim and accept what the company
offers them, or [to refuse] to sign and walk out
"As a rule, deeds of release and quitclaim cannot without receiving anything, may do succumb to
bar employees from demanding benefits to the same pressure, being very well aware that it
which they are legally entitled or from contesting is going to take quite a while before he can
the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of recover whatever he is entitled to, because it is
those benefits would not amount to only after a protracted legal battle starting from
estoppel."45 To excuse respondents from the labor arbiter level, all the way to this Court,
complying with the terms of their waivers, they can he receive anything at all. The Court
must locate their case within any of three narrow understands that such a risk of not receiving
grounds: (1) the employer used fraud or deceit anything whatsoever, coupled with the
in obtaining the waivers; (2) the consideration probability of not immediately getting any gainful
 114
employment or means of livelihood in the registered in the name of Francisco A. Veloso,
meantime, constitutes enough pressure upon single,[3] on October 4, 1957.[4] The said title was
anyone who is asked to sign a release and subsequently canceled and a new one, Transfer
quitclaim in exchange of some amount of money Certificate of Title No. 180685, was issued in the
which may be way below what he may be name of Aglaloma B. Escario, married to
entitled to based on company practice and policy Gregorio L. Escario, on May 24, 1988.[5]
or by law.50
On August 24, 1988, petitioner Veloso filed an
The amounts already received by respondents action for annulment of documents,
as consideration for signing the releases and reconveyance of property with damages and
quitclaims should be deducted from their preliminary injunction and/or restraining
respective monetary awards.51 order. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. 88-45926, was raffled to the Regional Trial
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court, Branch 45, Manila. Petitioner alleged
petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of therein that he was the absolute owner of the
Appeals Decision dated July 7, 2009 and subject property and he never authorized
Resolution dated February 26, 2010 in CA-G.R. anybody, not even his wife, to sell it. He alleged
SP No. 105236 are AFFIRMED. that he was in possession of the title but when
his wife, Irma, left for abroad, he found out that
SO ORDERED. his copy was missing. He then verified with the
Registry of Deeds of Manila and there he
discovered that his title was already canceled in
favor of defendant Aglaloma Escario. The
transfer of property was supported by a General
Power of Attorney[6] dated November 29, 1985
and Deed of Absolute Sale, dated November 2,
1987, executed by Irma Veloso, wife of the
[G.R. No. 102737. August 21, 1996] petitioner and appearing as his attorney-in-fact,
and defendant Aglaloma Escario.[7] Petitioner
FRANCISCO A. VELOSO, petitioner, vs. Veloso, however, denied having executed the
COURT OF APPEALS, AGLALOMA B. power of attorney and alleged that his signature
ESCARIO, assisted by her husband was falsified. He also denied having seen or
GREGORIO L. ESCARIO, the REGISTER OF even known Rosemarie Reyes and Imelda
DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF Santos, the supposed witnesses in the
MANILA, respondents. execution of the power of attorney. He
vehemently denied having met or transacted
with the defendant. Thus, he contended that the
DECISION
sale of the property, and the subsequent transfer
thereof, were null and void. Petitioner Veloso,
TORRES, JR., J.:
therefore, prayed that a temporary restraining
order be issued to prevent the transfer of the
This petition for review assails the decision of the subject property; that the General Power of
Court of Appeals, dated July 29, 1991, the Attorney, the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
dispositive portion of which reads: Transfer Certificate of Title No. 180685 be
annulled; and the subject property be
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reconveyed to him.
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against
appellant.[1] Defendant Aglaloma Escario in her answer
alleged that she was a buyer in good faith and
The following are the antecedent facts: denied any knowledge of the alleged
irregularity. She allegedly relied on the general
Petitioner Francisco Veloso was the owner of a power of attorney of Irma Veloso which was
parcel of land situated in the district of Tondo, sufficient in form and substance and was duly
Manila, with an area of one hundred seventy notarized. She contended that plaintiff (herein
seven (177) square meters and covered by petitioner), had no cause of action against
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 49138 issued by her. In seeking for the declaration of nullity of the
the Registry of Deeds of Manila.[2] The title was documents, the real party in interest was Irma
 115
Veloso, the wife of the plaintiff. She should have WHEREFORE, the Court finds for the
been impleaded in the case. In fact, Plaintiffs defendants and against plaintiff-
cause of action should have been against his
wife, Irma. Consequently, defendant Escario a. declaring that there was a valid sale of the
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the subject property in favor of the defendant;
payment to her of damages.[8]
b. denying all other claims of the parties for want
Pre-trial was conducted. The sole issue to be of legal and factual basis.
resolved by the trial court was whether or not
there was a valid sale of the subject property.[9] Without pronouncement as to costs.

During the trial, plaintiff (herein petitioner) SO ORDERED.

Francisco Veloso testified that he acquired the
subject property from the Philippine Building Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner Veloso
Corporation, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale filed his appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
dated October 1, 1957.[10] He married Irma respondent court affirmed in toto the findings of
Lazatin on January 20, 1962.[11] Hence, the the trial court.
property did not belong to their conjugal
partnership. Plaintiff further asserted that he did Hence, this petition for review before us.
not sign the power of attorney and as proof that
his signature was falsified, he presented Allied This petition for review was initially dismissed for
Bank Checks Nos. 16634640, 16634641 and failure to submit an affidavit of service of a copy
16634643, which allegedly bore his genuine of the petition on the counsel for private
signature. respondent.[13] A motion for reconsideration of
the resolution was filed but it was denied in a
Witness for the plaintiff Atty. Julian G. Tubig resolution dated March 30, 1992.[14] A second
denied any participation in the execution of the motion for reconsideration was filed and in a
general power of attorney. He attested that he resolution dated Aug. 3, 1992, the motion was
did not sign thereon, and the same was never granted and the petition for review was
entered in his Notarial Register on November reinstated.[15]
29, 1985.
A supplemental petition was filed on October 9,
In the decision of the trial court dated March 9, 1992 with the following assignment of errors:
1990,[12] defendant Aglaloma Escaro was
adjudged the lawful owner of the property as she I
was deemed an innocent purchaser for
value. The assailed general power of attorney The Court of Appeals committed a grave error in
was held to be valid and sufficient for the not finding that the forgery of the power of
purpose. The trial court ruled that there was no attorney (Exh. C) had been adequately proven,
need for a special power of attorney when the despite the preponderant evidence, and in doing
special power was already mentioned in the so, it has so far departed from the applicable
general one. It also declared that plaintiff failed provisions of law and the decisions of this
to substantiate his allegation of fraud. The court Honorable Court, as to warrant the grant of this
also stressed that plaintiff was not entirely petition for review on certiorari.
blameless for although he admitted to be the
only person who had access to the title and other II
important documents, his wife was still able to
possess the copy. Citing Section 55 of Act 496,
There are principles of justice and equity that
the court held that Irmas possession and
warrant a review of the decision.
production of the certificate of title was deemed
a conclusive authority from the plaintiff to the
III
Register of Deeds to enter a new
certificate.Then applying the principle of
equitable estoppel, plaintiff was held to bear the The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
loss for it was he who made the wrong decision of the trial court which misapplied the
possible. Thus: principle of equitable estoppel since the
petitioner did not fail in his duty of observing due
 116
diligence in the safekeeping of the title to the that the same was not duly notarized for as
property. testified by Atty. Tubig himself, he did not sign
thereon nor was it ever recorded in his notarial
We find petitioners contentions not meritorious. register. To bolster his argument, petitioner had
presented checks, marriage certificate and his
An examination of the records showed that the residence certificate to prove his alleged
assailed power of attorney was valid and regular genuine signature which when compared to the
on its face. It was notarized and as such, it signature in the power of attorney, showed some
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it difference.
with respect to its due execution. While it is true
that it was denominated as a general power of We found, however, that the basis presented by
attorney, a perusal thereof revealed that it stated the petitioner was inadequate to sustain his
an authority to sell, to wit: allegation of forgery. Mere variance of the
signatures cannot be considered as conclusive
2. To buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or proof that the same were forged. Forgery cannot
otherwise hypothecate lands, tenements and be presumed.[17] Petitioner, however, failed to
hereditaments or other forms of real property, prove his allegation and simply relied on the
more specifically TCT No. 49138, upon such apparent difference of the signatures. His denial
terms and conditions and under such covenants had not established that the signature on the
as my said attorney shall deem fit and proper.[16] power of attorney was not his.

Thus, there was no need to execute a separate We agree with the conclusion of the lower court
and special power of attorney since the general that private respondent was an innocent
power of attorney had expressly authorized the purchaser for value. Respondent Aglaloma
agent or attorney in fact the power to sell the relied on the power of attorney presented by
subject property. The special power of attorney petitioners wife, Irma. Being the wife of the
can be included in the general power when it is owner and having with her the title of the
specified therein the act or transaction for which property, there was no reason for the private
the special power is required. respondent not to believe in her
authority. Moreover, the power of attorney was
The general power of attorney was accepted by notarized and as such, carried with it the
the Register of Deeds when the title to the presumption of its due execution. Thus, having
subject property was canceled and transferred in had no inkling on any irregularity and having no
the name of private respondent. In LRC participation thereof, private respondent was a
Consulta No. 123, Register of Deeds of Albay, buyer in good faith. It has been consistently held
Nov. 10, 1956, it stated that: that a purchaser in good faith is one who buys
property of another, without notice that some
Whether the instrument be denominated as other person has a right to, or interest in such
general power of attorney or special power of property and pays a full and fair price for the
attorney, what matters is the extent of the power same, at the time of such purchase, or before he
or powers contemplated upon the agent or has notice of the claim or interest of some other
attorney in fact. If the power is couched in person in the property.[18]
general terms, then such power cannot go
beyond acts of administration. However, where Documents acknowledged before a notary
the power to sell is specific, it not being merely public have the evidentiary weight with respect
implied, much less couched in general terms, to their due execution. The questioned power of
there can not be any doubt that the attorney in attorney and deed of sale, were notarized and
fact may execute a valid sale. An instrument therefore, presumed to be valid and duly
may be captioned as special power of attorney executed. Atty. Tubig denied having notarized
but if the powers granted are couched in general the said documents and alleged that his
terms without mentioning any specific power to signature had also been falsified. He presented
sell or mortgage or to do other specific acts of samples of his signature to prove his
strict dominion, then in that case only acts of contention. Forgery should be proved by clear
administration may be deemed conferred. and convincing evidence and whoever alleges it
has the burden of proving the same. Just like the
Petitioner contends that his signature on the petitioner, witness Atty. Tubig merely pointed out
power of attorney was falsified. He also alleges that his signature was different from that in the
 117
power of attorney and deed of sale. There had Certificate of Title, as well as other documents
never been an accurate examination of the necessary for the transfer of title were in the
signature, even that of the petitioner. To possession of plaintiffs wife, Irma L. Veloso,
determine forgery, it was held in Cesar vs. consequently leaving no doubt or any suspicion
Sandiganbayan[19] (quoting Osborn, The on the part of the defendant as to her
Problem of Proof) that: authority. Under Section 55 of Act 496, as
amended, Irmas possession and production of
The process of identification, therefore, must the Certificate of Title to defendant operated as
include the determination of the extent, kind, and conclusive authority from the plaintiff to the
significance of this resemblance as well as of the Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate.[21]
variation. It then becomes necessary to
determine whether the variation is due to the Considering the foregoing premises, We found
operation of a different personality, or is only the no error in the appreciation of facts and
expected and inevitable variation found in the application of law by the lower court that will
genuine writing of the same writer. It is also warrant the reversal or modification of the
necessary to decide whether the resemblance is appealed decision.
the result of a more or less skillful imitation, or is
the habitual and characteristic resemblance ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is
which naturally appears in a genuine hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
writing. When these two questions are correctly
answered the whole problem of identification is SO ORDERED.
solved.

Even granting for the sake of argument, that the

petitioners signature was falsified and
consequently, the power of attorney and the
deed of sale were null and void, such fact would
not revoke the title subsequently issued in favor
of private respondent Aglaloma. In the case of
Tenio-Obsequio vs. Court of Appeals,[20] it was
held, viz.:

The right of an innocent purchaser for value

must be respected and protected, even if the
seller obtained his title through fraud. The
remedy of the person prejudiced is to bring an
action for damages against those who caused or
employed the fraud, and if the latter are
insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the
Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages
against the Assurance Fund.

Finally, the trial court did not err in applying

equitable estoppel in this case. The principle of
equitable estoppel states that where one or two
innocent persons must suffer a loss, he who by
his conduct made the loss possible must bear
it. From the evidence adduced, it should be the
petitioner who should bear the loss. As the
court a quo found:

Besides, the records of this case disclosed that

the plaintiff is not entirely free from blame. He
admitted that he is the sole person who has
access to TCT No. 49138 and other documents
appertaining thereto (TSN, May 23, 1989, pp. 7-
12). However, the fact remains that the
 118
WHEREFORE, the judgment dated March 29,
2000 of Branch 56 of the RTC of Angeles City is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a
new judgment entered in favor of the petitioners,
ordering the respondents and all persons
claiming rights under them to vacate from the
subject lots and to remove their houses and/or
any other structures or constructions thereon.[3]

The overturned Decision of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch
[4]
56, affirmed in toto the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Angeles City, Branch II.[5]

The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA

in this wise:

In a Complaint for Illegal Detainer with Damages

filed on October 15, 1998, the [respondents]
alleged that they are the owners of four (4)
parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 164, 165,
166, and 167 of the Cadastral Survey of Angeles
City, and covered, respectively, by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 83247, 83246, 83248
and 83249, all issued by the Register of Deeds
of Angeles City. These four (4) parcels of land
have been consolidated and subdivided into
[G.R. No. 148126. November 10, 2003]
several blocks and lots, and are now collectively
designated as Bagong Silang Phase III-C. By
GEORGE T. VILLENA, CARLOS N. VILLENA, mere permission and tolerance of the
AURORA M. BONDOC and RONNIE C. [respondents], the [petitioners] have occupied
FERNANDEZ, and their Respective and erected their homes on four (4) of the said
Spouses, petitioners, vs. Spouses ANTONIO lots, as follows:
C. CHAVEZ and NOEMI MARCOS-CHAVEZ
and CARLITA C. CHAVEZ, respondents. George T. Villena and wife = Block 5, Lot 14
DECISION Carlos N. Villena and wife = Block 5, Lot 13
PANGANIBAN, J.: Aurora M. Bondoc and husband = Block 2, Lot 4
Stare decisis simply means that a judgment Ronnie C. Hernandez and wife = Block 3, Lot 5
reached in one case should be applied to
successive ones in which the facts are
All the [petitioners] are members of
substantially identical, even though the parties
the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners
may be different. Like cases ought to be decided
Association, Inc., with office address
alike.
at Cutud, Angeles City. The [respondents]
allowed the [petitioners] and other members of
The Case the said homeowners association to continue
occupying the subject lots and ultimately to
Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under acquire ownership of the lots occupied, in
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May consideration of a certain amount to be paid to
9, 2001 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) the [respondents] as equity.
in CA-GR SP No. 58329. The decretal portion of
the Decision reads as follows: The [respondents] further alleged that the other
members of the said homeowners association
 119
paid to the [respondents] their respective equity continued only upon the release of a Purchase
for their right to continue occupying and Commitment Line (PCL).
ultimately acquiring ownership of the occupied
lots. However, notwithstanding repeated In addition, the [petitioners] alleged that they are
demands made upon the [petitioners], they have qualified beneficiaries under Republic Act No.
refused and failed without any justifiable ground 7279, otherwise known as the Urban
to pay their respective equity. In view of such Development and Housing Act of 1992; hence,
failure to pay, the [petitioners] have forfeited they cannot be summarily evicted and their
their right to continue occupying the lots in dwelling houses demolished unless and until
question. Formal demand letters were then sent they have been relocated. According to the
by registered mail to the [petitioners], wherein [petitioners], they are also builders in good faith
they were given a period of thirty (30) days from and should be indemnified for the improvements
receipt within which to vacate and remove their they constructed on the properties in question.
houses from the subject lots. The period given to
the [petitioners] lapsed on April 11, 1998, but up The [petitioners] prayed in their answer that the
to the present time, the [petitioners] refused and complaint be dismissed; that they be declared
failed without any justifiable reason or ground to lawful tenants and qualified beneficiaries under
vacate and remove their houses from the said R.A. 7279; that the [respondents] be ordered to
lots. sell the lots in question to them, and to pay
attorneys fees and the costs of suit.
The [respondents] then prayed in their
Complaint that the [petitioners] be ordered to After the pre-trial conference, both parties
vacate and remove their houses from the lots submitted their position papers. On September
currently occupied; that each of the [petitioners] 15, 1999, MTC Branch II of Angeles City
be ordered to pay the [respondents] P1,000.00 rendered a decision dismissing both the
a month as reasonable rental for the use and [respondents] complaint and the [petitioners]
occupation of the lots starting from April 11, 1998 counter-claim, on the ground that the filing of
until they have finally vacated and removed their an ejectment case based on the alleged
houses from said lots; and that the [petitioners] violation of the parties agreement which has not
jointly and severally pay the [respondents] yet been rescinded is premature, and that it is
P25,000.00 as actual and compensatory beyond the competence of the said court to act
damages, P2,000.00 as appearance fee per on the case, as rescission or specific
hearing, exemplary damages, and the costs of performance is beyond the jurisdiction of the
the suit. said court.

In their answer with compulsory counter-claim The [respondents] appealed such adverse
filed on November 3, 1998, the [petitioners] judgment to the RTC of Angeles City, which
countered that the [respondents] have no cause appeal was raffled to Branch 56 of the said court.
of action to institute the present action, On March 29, 2000, RTC Branch 56 of Angeles
considering that the properties in question are City rendered a decision affirming in toto the
under the community mortgage program MTC judgment.[6]
implemented by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation. Moreover, the [petitioners] Ruling of the Court of Appeals
claimed that they are lawful tenants of the
premises, and that they have been paying their The CA held that the right of petitioners to
equity to their originator, the Urban Land and continue occupying the subject properties
Development Foundation[,] Inc. However, they hinged on their continued payment of the agreed
were not issued the corresponding receipts amount as equity.[7] Even after formal letters of
evidencing payment and a copy of their contract. demand to vacate the premises had been sent
The [petitioners] further averred that they were to them, however, they still did not make any
willing to continue paying their equity until the effort to pay their equity to protect their right to
same shall have been fully paid, but their continue occupying those lots. Thus, the
originator, without justifiable reason, refused to appellate court ruled that their failure to pay
accept the tender of payment made by them. made their occupancy unlawful, in consequence
The [petitioners] subsequently agreed with their of which they became subject to
originator that the payment of equity should be an ejectment suit.
 120
The CA rejected the contention of petitioners The Courts Ruling
that they were protected by RA 7279. According
to the appellate court, there was no express The Petition is meritorious.
declaration by the local government unit that the
parcels of land owned by respondents were to Main Issue:
be used for socialized housing. Neither was
there proof of the allegation that they had Propriety of Unlawful Detainer
applied therefor under the Community Mortgage
Program of the National Home Mortgage The CA ruled that petitioners possession or
Finance Corporation under Section 31 of RA occupancy of the subject premises was by mere
7279. Besides, even granting that petitioners tolerance of respondents. Hence, once
were protected under RA 7279, they were still petitioners failed to pay the agreed amount as
liable to pay amortization or face eviction. equity, their right to continue occupying the lots
was lost.
Likewise debunked was the allegation of
petitioners that respondents were not the real We disagree. Contradictory were the statements
parties in interest. Being the owners of the lots of the appellate court that, on the one hand,
occupied by the former, the latter had a material there was no contract between the parties; and
interest in the suit and stood to be benefited or yet, on the other, that petitioners failed to pay
injured by any judgment affecting those parcels the agreed equity. The fact that the CA found
of land. that there was failure to pay the equity was an
indication of an agreement. To be sure,
Hence, this Petition.[8] petitioners possession of the subject premises
was not by mere tolerance of respondents.
The Issues
In the Complaint[10] of respondents, filed before
Petitioners raise the following issues for our Branch II of
consideration: the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, they
themselves alleged the presence of an
I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals agreement between the parties as follows:
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing and 10. That in consideration of a certain amount to
setting aside the Decisions of the Municipal Trial be paid to the [respondents] by each of the
Court, Branch II and of the Regional Trial Court, [petitioners] as equity for their right to continue
Branch 56 both of Angeles City[;] occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of
the lots that they occupy, the said homeowners
II. Whether or not the Honorable Municipal Trial association has made arrangements with the
Court has jurisdiction over the case; [respondents] to allow the [petitioners] and other
members of the said homeowners association to
III. Whether or not the non-inclusion of continue occupying and ultimately acquire
the Bagong Silang Homeowners Association ownership of the lots that they occupy[.][11]
Inc., is fatal to respondents[] cause of action[;]
Further, in the Special Power of
IV. Whether or not ejectment is proper in the Attorney[12] annexed to their Complaint, they
case at bar; constituted and appointed Teodorico B.
Sanchez and/or Arturo M. Yadan as their
V. Whether or not the absence of contractual attorneys-in-fact to do, among others, the
relation[s] between the respondents and the following:
petitioners bar[s] the filing of any action by the
respondents against the petitioner.[9] 1. To collect and receive any amount or amounts
as equity for the sale thereof to them from the
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether occupants or any other interested buyer or
unlawful detainer is the proper action to resolve buyers of any portion or portions of the following-
this case. If it is, then the MTC indeed had described parcels of land:
jurisdiction over the case, and the CA was
correct in overturning the RTCs ruling that the xxx xxx xxx
MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
 121
of which we are the absolute and exclusive occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of
owners, and which comprise the parcels of land the lots that they occupy, but notwithstanding
being acquired by the members or beneficiaries repeated demands made on them, up to the
of the BAGONG SILANG PHASE III-C present time, the [petitioners] have refused and
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, failed without any justifiable ground or reason to
at Brgy. Cutud, Angeles City[.] [13] pay their respective equity to the [respondents],
and, in view of such refusal and failure, the
Based on the admissions of respondents [petitioners] have forfeited their right to continue
themselves, they entered into an agreement with occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of
petitioners. Necessarily, the latters occupancy of the lots that they occupy[.][15]
the lots in question was not based merely on
the formers tolerance or permission. Thus, Petitioners, on the other hand, denied any
petitioners were not necessarily bound by an breach on their part and argued that the principal
implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing issue was one of interpretation, enforcement
which, a summary action for ejectment would and/or rescission of the contract. Under these
have become proper. circumstances, proof of violation of the
provisions of the contract is a condition
The MTCs findings of fact on this point are precedent to resolution or rescission.[16] The
instructive: contract can be declared rescinded only when its
nature has been clarified and the eventual
About the only thing that the parties have met on violation thereof, if any, has been
a common ground is that: [Respondents] have established. Upon such rescission, in turn,
entered into an arrangement/agreement hinges a pronouncement that the possession of
with Bagong Silang Homeowners Association, the realty has become unlawful. Thus, the basic
Inc. that called for the payment of certain issue is not possession but interpretation,
amounts as equity for [petitioners] right to enforcement and/or rescission of the contract --
continue occupying the lots with the end in view a matter that is beyond the jurisdiction of the
of eventually becoming the owners thereof, that Municipal Trial Court to hear and determine.
pursuant to such agreement [petitioners] have
paid certain amounts as acquisition fees or as An allegation of a violation of a contract or
equity but later discontinued making payments agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by
in view of the non-issuance of the so-called the presentation of competent evidence, upon
purchase commitment line/loan, and as a which an MTC judge might make a finding to that
consequence, [respondents] are now accusing effect. But certainly, that court cannot declare
[petitioners] for violating the agreement and on and hold that the contract is rescinded, as such
the basis of such breach of the agreement by power is vested in the RTC.[17]
[petitioners], demands for the latter to vacate the
lots were made by [respondents].[14] The rescission of the contract is the basis of, and
therefore a condition precedent for, the illegality
When respondents alleged that of a partys possession of a piece of
the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners realty.[18] Without judicial intervention and
Association made arrangements with them to determination, even a stipulation entitling one
allow petitioners and other members of the party to take possession of the land and building
association to continue to occupy and ultimately in case the other party violates the contract
to acquire ownership of the lots in question, cannot confer upon the former the right to take
respondents explicitly admitted that a contract possession thereof, if that move is objected to.[19]
had indeed been entered into. The eventual
transfer of ownership of real property evidenced To be sure, the jurisdiction of a court is
that obligation. What is clear is that in their determined by the allegations in the
Complaint, respondents alleged that petitioners complaint.[20] Thus, in ascertaining whether or
had violated the stipulations of their agreement not an action is one for unlawful detainer falling
as follows: within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior
courts, the averments of the complaint and the
11. That the other members of character of the relief sought should be
the Ba[g]ong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners examined.
Association, Inc., paid to the [respondents] their
respective equity for their right to continue
 122
Also, as correctly pleaded by petitioners, a Having ruled that the MTC had indeed no
similar case had been decided by the CA in CA- jurisdiction to take cognizance of this case in the
GR SP No. 58679, in which it ruled that the first place, we see no more need to address the
proper action should have been a complaint for other issues raised by petitioners.
rescission or specific performance, not for
illegal detainer. In that case, the same plaintiffs WHEREFORE, the Petition is
filed the same charges against a different but hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of
similarly situated set of defendants. the Court of Appeals
is OVERTURNED. Consequently, the Decisions
The appellate court ruled therein that there was of the MTC and the RTC of Angeles City
an existing agreement or contract that are REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
determined the nature of the parties costs.
relationship.[21] Thus, it held that the proper
action should have been for rescission of SO ORDERED.
contract or specific performance, not
unlawful detainer.[22] When the CA Decision was
elevated, this Court denied the appeal for failure
to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the appellate court. Thereafter, the
Decision became final and executory on April
23, 2002.[23]

Said the appellate court in the previous case:

Inasmuch as the relationship existing between

the parties is not a lessor-lessee relationship but
one that emanated from the agreement between
appellants and the Urban Land and
Development Foundation, Inc., the so-called
originator of the Bagong Silang Homeowners
Association, Inc., the relief being sought then by
appellants appears to be improper. If ever there
was no payment of equity as provided for under
the said agreement, the same cannot be
considered as non-payment of rentals. Thus, it
cannot be a sufficient basis for filing
an ejectment case against appellees, the proper
remedy being an action for rescission of contract
or specific performance.[24]

We stress that when a court has laid down a

principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it
to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same.[25] Stare decisis et
non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case should be applied to those
that follow if the facts are substantially the same,
even though the parties may be different.[26] It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that,
absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike.[27]