Michael H. V Gerald D

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Michael H. v Gerald D.

FACTS

In 1976 Carole D. and Gerald D. were married and established a home in California. In 1978, Carole
became involved in an adulterous affair with Michael H. She conceived a child, Victoria, in 1980, with
Gerald listed as father on the birth certificate. Gerald has always held the child out to be his daughter,
but soon after delivery Carole informed Michael she believed he might be the father. In 1981 Gerald
moved to New York and Carole, Michael, and Victoria had blood tests revealing a 98.07% probability
that Michael was the father. Carole visited with Michael for several months, were he held Victoria out as
his daughter. Carole left Michael and took up residence in California with another man. In the summer
of 1982 Carole and Victoria visited Gerald in New York, and the three vacationed in Europe. In the fall
she returned to California. In November of 1982 Michael filed a filiation action in California to establish
his paternity and right to visitation. In 1983 the court appointed an attorney and a guardian ad litem to
represent Victoria’s interests. Victoria filed a cross-complaint asserting that if she had more than one
psychological or de facto father, she was entitled to maintain her filial relationship, with all of the
attendant rights, duties, and obligations, with both. Carole filed for summary judgment while she was
again living with Gerald in New York. In August of 1983 she returned to California and again became
involved with Michael, instructing her attorneys to remove the summary judgment motion. For the next
eight months Michael held Victoria out as his daughter. In April 1984, Carole and Michael signed a
stipulation that Michael was Victoria’s father. The next month Carole left Michael, instructing her
attorneys to not file the stipulation. Carole reconciled with Gerald and they lived together with two
more children being born.

In May 1984 Michael and Victoria, through guardian ad litem, sought visitation rights for Michael
pendente lite. A court appointed psychologist recommended that Carole retain sole custody, but
Michael be allowed continued contact with Victoria pursuant to a restricted visitation schedule. The
court concurred. In October of 1984 Gerald moved for summary judgment on the ground that under
California law there were no triable issues of fact as to Victoria’s paternity. The law provides that “the
issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to
be a child of the marriage.” The presumption may only be rebutted by blood tests, and a motion for
such tests must be made within two years of the birth by the husband, or by the wife if the NATURAL
father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity.

In 1985 the Superior Court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that Carole and Gerald
were cohabiting at the time of conception and birth and that Gerald was neither sterile nor impotent.

Issue

Whether or not the presumption established by the law infringe upon the due process rights of a man
who wishes to establish his paternity of a child born to the wife of another man or infringe upon the
constitutional right of the child to maintain a relationship with her natural father
Held

Michael contends as a matter of substantive due process that because he has established a parental
relationship with Victoria, protection of Gerald and Carole’s marital union is an insufficient state interest
to support termination of the relationship. However, Michael’s interest must be a fundamental liberty to
be constitutionally protected.

Historically, the marital family has been protected rather than the potential father outside of the
marriage. The presumption of legitimacy was fundamental at common law, and could be rebutted only
by a husband who was incapable of procreation or had no access to his wife during the relative period.
The policy rationales were the aversion to declaring children illegitimate and the peace and tranquility of
the States and families. No modern or historical precedent similarly recognizes the power of the
NATURAL father to assert parental rights.

Michael must establish not that society has traditionally allowed a natural father in his circumstances to
establish paternity, but that it has traditionally accorded such a father parental rights. To provide
protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a marital father.

Victoria’s due process challenge is weaker than Michael’s. Her claim that a State must recognize multiple
fatherhood has no support in history or tradition. The Court declines to accept Victoria’s argument that
she had no opportunity to rebut the presumption of her legitimacy, because Victoria is not illegitimate.

ROMUALDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

Spouses Romualdez allegedly made false representations in their sworn applications for Voter’s
Registration. They indicated that they are residents of Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were
residents of Quezon City. Garay charged them with violations of Omnibus Election Code and Voter’s
Registraion Act. The Comelec recommended the filing of information against the Spouses Romualdez for
violation of Voter’s Registration Act.

Spouses Romualdez argued that they were not accorded due process of law when the elections
offenses for which they are charged by Garay are different from the resolution of the Comelec. The
Spouses argue that Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act is vague on the ground that it
contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes
no reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election
offense.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration is vague.


Ruling:

NO. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However, the Court has imposed
certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. The
Court has declared that facial invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not
appropriate.

Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice. The Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude. As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of
election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a
violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The language of
Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of
the challenged provision involves no guesswork. The Court does not see herein an uncertainty that
makes the same vague. The petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or
meaning of which they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, where therein petitioner sought for statutory definition of particular words in the
challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the argument.

RUBEN SERRANO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION

FACTS

Ruben Serrano was the head of the security checkers section of Isetann Department Store. He was
charged with the task of supervising security checkers in their jobs (apprehending shoplifters and
preventing pilferage of merchandise). On October 11, 1991, the management sent him a letter
immediately terminating his services as security section head, effective on the same day. The reason
given by the management was “retrenchment”; they had opted to hire an independent security agency
as a cost-cutting measure. Serrano filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, under payment of
wages and nonpayment of salary and OT pay with the Labor Arbiter. The labor arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of Serrano.

It stated that Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its security division, that the petitioner
was not accorded due process, etc. and even stated that the day after Serrano’s dismissal, Isetann
employed a safety and security supervisor with similar duties to that of the former. The NLRC on the
other hand reversed the LA but ordered Isetann to pay separation pay equivalent to one month per year
of service, unpaid salary. It held that the phase-out of the security section was a valid exercise of
management prerogative on the part of Isetann, for which the NLRC cannot substitute its judgment in
the absence of bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of the latter; and that the security and safety
supervisor’s position was long in place prior to Serrano’s separation from the company, or the phase-out
of the Security Section.

ISSUE

Whether or not the dismissal was in compliance with the due process clause

RULING

No. The Court also responded to the arguments of Justices Puno and Panganiban by stating that the
violation in the procedural requirement of termination is not a denial of the fundamental right to due
process. This is because of the following reasons:

1) The due process clause is a limitation on governmental powers, inapplicable to the exercise of
private power, such as in this case. The provision “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and
property without due process of law” pertains only to the State, as only it has the authority to do the
same.

2) The purpose of the notice and hearing under the Due process clause is to provide an
opportunity for the employee to be heard before the power of the organized society is brought upon
the individual. Under Art. 283, however, the purpose is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss
of his job and for DOLE to determine whether economic causes exist to justify termination. It is not to
give opportunity to be heard–there is no charge against the employee under Art. 283

3) The employer cannot be expected to be an impartial judge of his own cause.

4) Not all notice requirements are requisites of due process. Some are simply a part of a procedure
to be followed before a right granted to party can be exercised; others are an application of the
Justinian precept. Such is the case here. The failure of the employer to observe a procedure for the
termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual.

5) Art. 279 of the Labor Code provides that only dismissal without just or authorized cause renders
such dismissal illegal. To consider termination without observing procedural requirements as also illegal
dismissal is to add another ground for the dismissal, thereby amending Art. 279.; Further, there is a
disparity in legal treatment, as employees who resign without giving due notice are only liable for
damages; it does not make their resignation void. In this case, the separation pay was a distinct award
from the payment of back wages as a way of penalty.
AGABON v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

Facts:

Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. [Riviera Home] is engaged in the business of selling
and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as
gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were
dismissed for abandonment of work. Virgilio and Jenny then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring
the dismissals illegal and ordered Riviera Home to pay the monetary claims.

Issue:

Whether the dismissal was proper and in compliance with due process.

Ruling:

YES. In cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin requirements of notice
and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by holding that
the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions, however, must
be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil. It must be stressed that in the present case, that Virgilio and
Jenny committed a grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which, if the requirements of due process were
complied with, would undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal.

An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282 should not be protected by the
Social Justice Clause of the Constitution. Social justice, as the term suggests, should be used only to
correct an injustice.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should
not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor Relations
Commission. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of
dismiss now, pay later, which the Court sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in
the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special
consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.

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