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    Game Theory

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    Santosh Parvatikar
    The security dilemma explains how the probable actions of two methods in a scenario like a buildup of troops at a border or suspected coup could lead to an unintended catastrophe. For example, if one actor moves troops defensively, the other may see it as threatening and feel compelled to respond aggressively to maintain deterrence, risking escalation. The document analyzes how lack of trust between the two nations in the scenario would push them to act preemptively out of perceived weakness, exacerbating the security dilemma and increasing chances of an unintended conflict despite neither side truly desiring war.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Game Theory

    Uploaded by

    Santosh Parvatikar
    18 views4 pages
    The security dilemma explains how the probable actions of two methods in a scenario like a buildup of troops at a border or suspected coup could lead to an unintended catastrophe. For example, if one actor moves troops defensively, the other may see it as threatening and feel compelled to respond aggressively to maintain deterrence, risking escalation. The document analyzes how lack of trust between the two nations in the scenario would push them to act preemptively out of perceived weakness, exacerbating the security dilemma and increasing chances of an unintended conflict despite neither side truly desiring war.

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    game theory

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    The security dilemma explains how the probable actions of two methods in a scenario like a buildup of troops at a border or suspected coup could lead to an unintended catastrophe. For example, if one actor moves troops defensively, the other may see it as threatening and feel compelled to respond aggressively to maintain deterrence, risking escalation. The document analyzes how lack of trust between the two nations in the scenario would push them to act preemptively out of perceived weakness, exacerbating the security dilemma and increasing chances of an unintended conflict despite neither side truly desiring war.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    18 views4 pages

    Game Theory

    Uploaded by

    Santosh Parvatikar
    The security dilemma explains how the probable actions of two methods in a scenario like a buildup of troops at a border or suspected coup could lead to an unintended catastrophe. For example, if one actor moves troops defensively, the other may see it as threatening and feel compelled to respond aggressively to maintain deterrence, risking escalation. The document analyzes how lack of trust between the two nations in the scenario would push them to act preemptively out of perceived weakness, exacerbating the security dilemma and increasing chances of an unintended conflict despite neither side truly desiring war.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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