Bombo Radyo Phils. v. Secretary of Labor, Et Al

Bombo Radyo Phils. v. Secretary of Labor, et al.
G.R. No. 179652 : March 6, 2012
PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.), Petitioner, v. THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and
JANDELEON JUEZAN, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE). The DOLE Regional Director found that private respondent was an employee of
petitioner, and was entitled to his money claims. When the matter was brought before the CA, it was
held that the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction over the matter. In the Decision of this Court, the CA
Decision was reversed and set aside, and the complaint against petitioner was dismissed. The Court
found that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent. It
was held that while the DOLE may make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, this function could not be co-extensive with the visitorial and enforcement power provided
in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. The National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) was held to be the primary agency in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.
From this Decision, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of Decision (with
Leave of Court). The PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE
be not considered as co-extensive with the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. In its Comment, the DOLE sought clarification as well, as to the extent of its visitorial and
enforcement power under the Labor Code, as amended.
ISSUE: May the DOLE make a determination of whether or not an employer-employee relationship
exists, and if so, to what extent?
HELD: The Decision of this Court is affirmed with modification.
LABOR LAW
No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a
preliminary finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE
would first seek the NLRCs determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, or
that should the existence of the employer-employee relationship be disputed, the DOLE would refer the
matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to determine whether or not an employer-
employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in
accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be
respected. The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted by RA 7730 would be
rendered nugatory if the alleged employer could, by the simple expedient of disputing the employer-
employee relationship, force the referral of the matter to the NLRC. The Court issued the declaration
that at least a prima facie showing of the absence of an employer-employee relationship be made to
oust the DOLE of jurisdiction. But it is precisely the DOLE that will be faced with that evidence, and it is
the DOLE that will weigh it, to see if the same does successfully refute the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee
relationship, it takes cognizance of the matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no
jurisdiction only if the employer-employee relationship has already been terminated, or it appears, upon
review, that no employer-employee relationship existed in the first place.
To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards
provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an
existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If
the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the
NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the
jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that
the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for
reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee
relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be
questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
FRANCISCO GUICO vs. HON. LEONARDO QUISIMBING et. al.G.R. No. 131750. November 16, 1998
Facts:
The case started when the Office of the Regional Director, Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), Region I, San Fernando, La Union, received a letter-complaint dated April 25, 1995, requesting
for an investigation of petitioner's establishment, Copylandia Services & Trading, for violation of labor
standards laws. Pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or his duly authorized representative under Article 128 of the Labor Code,as amended,
inspections were conducted at Copylandia's outlets on April 27 and May 2,1995. The inspections yielded
the following violations involving twenty-one (21)employees who are copier operators: (1)
underpayment of wages; (2) underpayment of 13th month pay; and (3) no service incentive leave with
pay.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the labor standards case.
Ruling:
The petition was dismissed. The Court sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent Secretary. As the
respondent correctly pointed out, this Court's ruling in Servando case that the visitorial power of the
Secretary of Labor to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws cannot be exercised where
the individual claim exceeds P5,000.00, can no longer be applied in view of the enactment of R.A. No.
7730amending Article 128(b) of the Labor Code. Moreover, the records of the House of Representatives
show that Congressmen AlbertoS. Veloso and Eriberto V. Loreto sponsored the law. In his sponsorship
speech,Congressman Veloso categorically declared that "this bill seeks to do away with the jurisdictional
limitations imposed through said ruling (referring to Servando) and to finally settle any lingering doubts
on the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment." Thus, petitioner's
reliance on Servando is untenable.
APEX MINING CO., INC. versus NLRC
FACTS:
 Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc to
perform laundry services at its staff house.
 On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her
laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. As a result of the accident she was not
able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication.
 De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to
persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work.
 Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.
 Private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment,
which the latter rendered its Decision by ordering the Apex Mining Co. to pay Candida the total
amount of P55,161.42 for salary differential, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay differential
and separation pay.
 Petitioner appealed the case before the NLRC, which was subsequently dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the private respondent should be treated as househelper or domestic servant or a
regular employee.
HELD:
 Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the term "househelper" as
used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any person, whether
male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are
usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively
to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family.
 The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelper or laundrywomen working in staffhouses
of a company, like private respondent who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other
persons availing of said facilities.
 The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the
business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses
for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper
or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public respondent
NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs

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Bombo Radyo Phils. v. Secretary of Labor, et al.

G.R. No. 179652 : March 6, 2012

VELASCO, JR., J.:

HELD: The Decision of this Court is affirmed with modification.

APEX MINING CO., INC. versus NLRC

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